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
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



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

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
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
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# GREECE

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OF PEISISTRATUS AT ATHENS

BY  
GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.

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# HISTORY OF GREECE.

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## PART II.

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### CHAPTER LXIX.

#### CYRUS THE YOUNGER AND THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.

IN my last volume, I brought down the History of Grecian affairs to the close of the Peloponnesian war, including a description of the permanent loss of imperial power, the severe temporary oppression, the enfranchisement and renewed democracy, which marked the lot of defeated Athens. The defeat of that once powerful city, accomplished by the Spartan confederacy, — with large pecuniary aid from the young Persian prince Cyrus, satrap of most of the Ionian seaboard, — left Sparta mistress, for the time, of the Grecian world. Lysander, her victorious admiral, employed his vast temporary power for the purpose of setting up, in most of the cities, Dekarchies or ruling Councils of Ten, composed of his own partisans; with a Lacedæmonian Harmost and garrison to enforce their oligarchical rule. Before I proceed, however, to recount, as well as it can be made out, the unexpected calamities thus brought upon the Grecian world, with their eventual consequences, — it will be convenient to introduce here the narrative of the Ten Thousand Greeks, with their march into the heart of the Persian empire and their still more celebrated Retreat. This incident, lying apart from the main stream of Grecian affairs, would form an item, strictly speaking, in Persian history rather than in Grecian. But its effects on the Greek mind, and upon the future course of Grecian affairs, were numerous and important;



while as an illustration of Hellenic character and competence, measured against that of the contemporary Asiatics, it stands pre-eminent and full of instruction.

This march from Sardis up to the neighborhood of Babylon, conducted by Cyrus the younger and undertaken for the purpose of placing him on the Persian throne in the room of his elder brother Artaxerxes Mnemon, — was commenced about March or April in the year 401 B. C. It was about six months afterwards, in the month of September or October of the same year, that the battle of Kunaxa was fought, in which, though the Greeks were victorious, Cyrus himself lost his life. They were then obliged to commence their retreat, which occupied about one year, and ultimately brought them across the Bosphorus of Thrace to Byzantium, in October or November, 400 B. C.

The death of king Darius Nothus, father both of Artaxerxes and Cyrus, occurred about the beginning of 404 B. C., a short time after the entire ruin of the force of Athens at Ægospotami. His reign of nineteen years, with that of his father Artaxerxes Longimanus which lasted nearly forty years, fill up almost all the interval from the death of Xerxes in 465 B. C. The close of the reigns both of Xerxes and of his son Artaxerxes had indeed been marked by those phenomena of conspiracy, assassination, fratricide, and family tragedy, so common in the transmission of an Oriental sceptre. Xerxes was assassinated by the chief officer of the palace, named Artabanus, — who had received from him at a banquet the order to execute his eldest son Darius, but had not fulfilled it. Artabanus, laying the blame of the assassination upon Darius, prevailed upon Artaxerxes to avenge it by slaying the latter; he then attempted the life of Artaxerxes himself, but failed, and was himself killed, after carrying on the government a few months. Artaxerxes Longimanus, after reigning about forty years, left the sceptre to his son Xerxes the second, who was slain after a few months by his brother Sogdianus; who again was put to death after seven months, by a third brother Darius Nothus mentioned above.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Diodor. xi. 69; xii. 64-71; Ktesias, Persica, c. 29-45; Aristotel. Polit. v. 14, 8. This last passage of Aristotle is not very clear. Compare Justin, x. 1.

For the chronology of these Persian kings, see a valuable Appendix i Mr. Fynes Clinton's *Fasti Hellenici*, App. 18, vol. ii, p. 313-316.

The wars between the Persian empire, and Athens as the head of the confederacy of Delos (477-449 B. C.), have been already related in one of my earlier volumes. But the internal history of the Persian empire during these reigns is scarcely at all known to us; except a formidable revolt of the satrap Megabyzus, obscurely noticed in the Fragments of Ktesias.<sup>1</sup> About 414 B. C. the Egyptians revolted. Their native prince Amyrtæus maintained his independence, — though probably in a part only, and not the whole, of that country,<sup>2</sup> — and was succeeded by a native Egyptian dynasty for the space of sixty years. A revolt of the Medes, which took place in 408 B. C., was put down by Darius, and subsequently a like revolt of the Kadusians.<sup>3</sup> The peace concluded in 449 B. C., between Athens and the Persian empire, continued without open violation, until the ruinous catastrophe which befel the former near Syracuse, in 413 B. C. Yet there had been various communications and envoys from Sparta to the Persian court, endeavoring to procure aid from the Great King during the early years of the war; communications so confused and contradictory, that Artaxerxes (in a letter addressed to the Spartans, in 425 B. C., and carried by his envoy Artaphernes who was captured by the Athenians), complained of being unable to understand what they meant, — no two Spartans telling the same story.<sup>4</sup> It appears that Pisuthnes, satrap of Sardis, revolted from the Persian king, shortly after this period, and that Tissaphernes was sent by the Great King to suppress this revolt; in which having succeeded, by bribing the Grecian commander of the satrap's mercenary troops, he was rewarded by the possession of the satrapy.<sup>5</sup> We find Tissa-

<sup>1</sup> Ktesias, Persica, c. 38-40.

<sup>2</sup> See the Appendix of Mr. Fynes Clinton, mentioned in the preceding note, p. 317.

There were some Egyptian troops in the army of Artaxerxes at the battle of Kunaxa; on the other hand, there were other Egyptians in a state of pronounced revolt. Compare two passages of Xenophon's *Anabasis*, i. 8, 9; ii. 5, 13; Diodor. xiii. 46; and the Dissertation of F. Ley, *Fata et Conditio Ægypti sub imperio Persarum*, p. 20-56 (Cologne, 1830).

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. i. 2, 19; ii. 1, 13.

<sup>4</sup> Thucyd. iv. 50. πολλῶν γὰρ ἐλθόντων πρεσβέων οὐδένα ταῦτα λέγειν.

This incompetence, or duplicity, on the part of the Spartan envoys, helps to explain the facility with which Alkibiades duped them at Athens (Thucyd. v. 45). See above, in this History, Vol. VII. ch. iv. p. 47.

<sup>5</sup> Ktesias, Persica, c. 52.



phernes satrap in the year 413 B. C., commencing operations jointly with the Spartans, for detaching the Asiatic allies from Athens, after her reverses in Sicily; and employing the Spartans successfully against Amorges, the revolted son of Pissuthnes, who occupied the strong maritime town of Iasus.<sup>1</sup>

The increased vigor of Persian operations against Athens, after Cyrus, the younger son of Darius Nothus, came down to the Ionic coast in 407 B. C., has been recounted in my preceding volume; together with the complete prostration of Athenian power, accomplished during the ensuing three years. Residing at Sardis and placed in active coöperation with Greeks, this ambitious and energetic young prince soon became penetrated with their superior military and political efficiency, as compared with the native Asiatics. For the abilities and character of Lysander, the Peloponnesian admiral, he contracted so much admiration, that, when summoned to court during the last illness of his father Darius in 405 B. C., he even confided to that officer the whole of his tribute and treasure, to be administered in furtherance of the war;<sup>2</sup> which during his absence was brought to a victorious close.

Cyrus, born after the accession of his father to the throne, was not more than eighteen years of age when first sent down to Sardis (in 407 B. C.) as satrap of Lydia, Phrygia, and Kappadokia, and as commander of that Persian military division which mustered at the plain of Kastölus; a command not including the Ionic Greeks on the seaboard, who were under the satrapy of Tissaphernes.<sup>3</sup> We cannot place much confidence in the account which Xenophon gives of his education; that he had been brought up with his brother and many noble Persian youths in the royal palace, — under the strictest discipline and restraint, enforcing modest habits, with the reciprocal duties of obedience and command, upon all of them, and upon him with peculiar success.<sup>4</sup> It is contradicted by all the realities which we read about the Persian court, and is a patch of Grecian rather than of Oriental sentiment, better suited to the romance of the *Cyropædia* than to the history of the *Anabasis*. But in the Persian accomplishments of horsemanship

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. viii, 28. See Vol. VII, ch. lxi, p. 389 of this History.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 14. Compare Xen. *Oeconom.* iv, 20.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. *Anab.* i, 1, 2; i, 9, 7; Xen. Hellen. i, 4, 3.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. *Anab.* i, 9, 3-5. Compare *Cyropædia*, i, 2, 4-6; viii, 1, 16, etc.

mastery of the bow and of the javelin, bravery in the field, daring as well as endurance in hunting wild beasts, and power of drinking much wine without being intoxicated, — Cyrus stood preëminent; and especially so when compared with his elder brother Artaxerxes, who was at least unwarlike, if not lazy and timid.<sup>1</sup> And although the peculiar virtue of the Hellenic citizen, — competence for alternate command and obedience, — formed no part of the character of Cyrus, yet it appears that Hellenic affairs and ideas became early impressed upon his mind; insomuch that on first coming down to Sardis as satrap, he brought down with him strong interest for the Peloponnesian cause, and strenuous antipathy to that ancient enemy by whom the Persian arms had been so signally humbled and repressed. How zealously he coöperated with Lysander and the Peloponnesians in putting down Athens, has been shown in my last preceding volume.<sup>2</sup>

An energetic and ambitious youth like Cyrus, having once learnt from personal experience to appreciate the Greeks, was not slow in divining the value of such auxiliaries as instruments of power to himself. To coöperate effectively in the war, it was necessary that he should act to a certain extent upon Grecian ideas, and conciliate the good will of the Ionic Greeks; so that he came to combine the imperious and unsparing despotism of a Persian prince, with something of the regularity and system belonging to a Grecian administrator. Though younger than Artaxerxes, he seems to have calculated from the first upon succeeding to the Persian crown at the death of his father. So undetermined was the law of succession in the Persian royal family, and so constant the dispute and fratricide on each vacancy of the throne, that such ambitious schemes would appear feasible to a young man of much less ardor than Cyrus. Moreover he was the favorite son of queen Parysatis,<sup>3</sup> who greatly preferred him to his elder brother Artaxerxes. He was born after the accession of Darius to the throne, while Artaxerxes had been born prior to that event; and, as this latter consideration had been employed seventy years earlier by

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 2-6; Xen. *Anab.* *ut sup.*

<sup>2</sup> See Vol. VIII. ch. lxiv, p. 135.

<sup>3</sup> Darius had had thirteen children by Parysatis; but all except Artaxerxes and Cyrus died young. Ktesias asserts that he heard this statement from Parysatis herself (Ktesias, *Persica*, c. 49).



queen Atossa<sup>1</sup> in determining her husband Darius son of Hystaspes to declare (even during his lifetime) her son Xerxes as his intended successor, to the exclusion of an elder son by a different wife, and born before his accession, — so Cyrus, perhaps, anticipated the like effective preference to himself from the solicitations of Parysatis. Probably his hopes were farther inflamed by the fact that he bore the name of the great founder of the monarchy; whose memory every Persian revered. How completely he reckoned on becoming king, is shown by a cruel act performed about the early part of 405 B. C. It was required as a part of Persian etiquette that every man who came into the presence of the king should immerse his hands in certain pockets or large sleeves, which rendered them for the moment inapplicable to active use; but such deference was shown to no one except the king. Two first cousins of Cyrus, — sons of Hieramenès, (seemingly one of the satraps or high Persian dignitaries in Asia Minor), by a sister of Darius, — appeared in his presence without thus concealing their hands;<sup>2</sup> upon which Cyrus ordered them both to be put to death. The father and mother preferred bitter complaints of this atrocity to Darius; who was induced to send for Cyrus to visit him in Media, on the ground, not at all fictitious, that his own health was rapidly declining.

If Cyrus expected to succeed to the crown, it was important that he should be on the spot when his father died. He accordingly went up from Sardis to Media, along with his body guard of three hundred Greeks, under the Arcadian Xenias; who were so highly remunerated for this distant march, that the rate of pay was long celebrated.<sup>3</sup> He also took with him Tissaphernes as an ostensible friend; though there seems to have been a real enmity between them. Not long after his arrival, Darius died; but without complying with the request of Parysatis that he should declare in

<sup>1</sup> Herodot. vii, 4.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 8, 9; Thucyd. viii, 58.

Compare Xen. Cyropæd. viii, 3, 10; and Lucian, Navigium seu Vota, c. 30, vol. iii, p. 267, ed. Hemsterhuys with Du Soul's note.

It is remarkable that, in this passage of the Hellenica, either Xenophon, or the copyist, makes the mistake of calling Xerxes (instead of Artaxerxes) father of Darius. Some of the editors, without any authority from MSS., wish to alter the text from *Ξέρξου* to *Ἀρταξέρξου*.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 4, 12.

favor of Cyrus as his successor. Accordingly Artaxerxes, being proclaimed king, went to Pasargadæ, the religious capital of the Persians, to perform the customary solemnities. Thus disappointed, Cyrus was farther accused by Tissaphernes of conspiring the death of his brother; who caused him to be seized, and was even on the point of putting him to death, when the all-powerful intercession of Parysatis saved his life.<sup>1</sup> He was sent down to his former satrapy at Sardis, whither he returned with insupportable feelings of anger and wounded pride, and with a determined resolution to leave nothing untried for the purpose of dethroning his brother. This statement, given to us by Xenophon, represents doubtless the story of Cyrus and his friends, current among the Cyreian army. But if we look at the probabilities of the case, we shall be led to suspect that the charge of Tissaphernes may well have been true, and the conspiracy of the disappointed Cyrus against his brother, a reality instead of a fiction.<sup>2</sup>

The moment when Cyrus returned to Sardis was highly favorable to his plans and preparations. The long war had just been concluded by the capture of Athens and the extinction of her power. Many Greeks, after having acquired military tastes and habits, were now thrown out of employment; many others were driven into exile, by the establishment of the Lysandrian Dekarchies throughout all the cities at once. Hence competent recruits, for a well-paid service like that of Cyrus, were now unusually abundant. Having already a certain number of Greek mercenaries, distributed throughout the various garrisons in his satrapy, he directed the officers in command to strengthen their garrisons by as many additional Peloponnesian soldiers as they could obtain. His pretext was, — first, defence against Tissaphernes, with whom, since the denunciation by the latter, he was at open war, — next, protection of the Ionic cities on the seaboard, who had been hitherto comprised under the government of Tissaphernes, but had now revolted of their own accord, since the enmity of Cyrus against him had been declared. Miletus alone had been prevented from executing this resolution, for Tissaphernes, reinforcing his garrison in that place, had adopted violent measures of repression, killing or banishing several of the leading men.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 1, 4.

<sup>2</sup> So it is presented by Justin, v, 11.



Cyrus, receiving these exiled Milesians with every demonstration of sympathy, immediately got together both an army and a fleet, under the Egyptian Tamos,<sup>1</sup> to besiege Miletus by land and sea. He at the same time transmitted to court the regular tribute due from these maritime cities, and attempted, through the interest of his mother Parysatis, to procure that they should be transferred from Tissaphernes to himself. Hence the Great King was deluded into a belief that the new levies of Cyrus were only intended for private war between him and Tissaphernes; an event not uncommon between two neighboring satraps. Nor was it displeasing to the court that a suspected prince should be thus occupied at a distance.<sup>2</sup>

Besides the army thus collected around Miletus, Cyrus found means to keep other troops within his call, though at a distance and unsuspected. A Lacedæmonian officer named Klearchus, of considerable military ability and experience, presented himself as an exile at Sardis. He appears to have been banished, (as far as we can judge amidst contradictory statements,) for gross abuse of authority, and extreme tyranny, as Lacedæmonian Harmost at Byzantium, and even for having tried to maintain himself in that place after the Ephors had formally dismissed him. The known efficiency, and restless warlike appetite of Klearchus,<sup>3</sup> procured for him the confidence of Cyrus, who gave him the large sum of ten thousand Darics, (about £7600), which he employed in levying an army of mercenary Greeks for the defence of the Grecian cities in the Chersonese against the Thracian tribes in their neighborhood; thus maintaining the troops until

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 1, 6; i, 4, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 1, 7, 8, ὥστε οὐδὲν ἤχθετο (the king) αὐτῶν πολεμούντων.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 1, 9; ii, 6, 3. The statements here contained do not agree with Diodor. xiv, 12; while both of them differ from Isokrates (Orat. viii, De Pace, s. 121; Or. xii, Panath. s. 111), and Plutarch, Artaxerxes. c. 6.

I follow partially the narrative of Diodorus, so far as to suppose that the tyranny which he mentions was committed by Klearchus as Harmost of Byzantium. We know that there was a Lacedæmonian Harmost in that town, named as soon as the town was taken, by Lysander, after the battle of Ægospotami (Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 2). This was towards the end of 405 B. C. We know farther, from the Anabasis, that Kleander was Harmost there in 400 B. C. Klearchus may have been Harmost there in 404 B. C.

they were required by Cyrus. Again, Aristippus and Menon, — Thessalians of the great family of the Alcudæ at Larissa, who had maintained their tie of personal hospitality with the Persian royal family ever since the time of Xerxes, and were now in connection with Cyrus,<sup>1</sup> — received from him funds to maintain a force of two thousand mercenaries for their political purposes in Thessaly, subject to his call whenever he should require them. Other Greeks, too, who had probably contracted similar ties of hospitality with Cyrus by service during the late war, — Proxenus, a Bœotian; Agias and Sophænetus, Arcadians; Sokrates, an Achæan, etc., — were also empowered by him to collect mercenary soldiers. His pretended objects were, partly the siege of Miletus; partly an ostensible expedition against the Pisidians, — warlike and predatory mountaineers who did much mischief from their fastnesses in the south-east of Asia Minor.

Besides these unavowed Grecian levies, Cyrus sent envoys to the Lacedæmonians to invoke their aid, in requital for the strenuous manner in which he had seconded their operations against Athens, — and received a favorable answer. He farther got together a considerable native force, taking great pains to conciliate friends as well as to inspire confidence. "He was straightforward and just, like a candidate for command," — to use the expression of Herodotus respecting the Median Dēiokēs;<sup>2</sup> maintaining order and security throughout his satrapy, and punishing evil doers in great numbers, with the utmost extremity of rigor; of which the public roads exhibited abundant living testimony, in the persons of mutilated men, deprived of their hands, feet, or eyesight.<sup>3</sup> But he was also exact in rewarding faithful service,

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 1, 10; Herodot. vii, 6; ix, 1; Plato, Menon, c. 1, p. 70; c. 11, p. 78 C.

<sup>2</sup> Herodot. i. 96. 'Ο δὲ (Dēiokēs) οἷα μνέμενος ἀρχὴν, εὐδύς τε καὶ δίκαιος ἦν.

Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 1, 1; Diodor. xiv, 19.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Anab. 1, 9, 8. Πολλὰ καὶ ἦν ἀνὰ τὰς στείβομένας ὁδοὺς, καὶ ποδῶν καὶ χειρῶν καὶ ὀφθαλμῶν στειρομένους ἀνθρώπους.

For other samples of mutilation inflicted by Persians, not merely on malefactors, but on prisoners by wholesale, see Quintus Curtius, v. 5, 6. Alexander the Great was approaching near to Persepolis, "quum miserabile agmen, inter pauca fortunæ exempla memorandum, regi occurrit. Captivi erant Græci ad quatuor millia ferè, quos Persæ vario suppliciorum modo



both civil and military. He not only made various expeditions against the hostile Mysians and Pisidians, but was forward in exposing his own person, and munificent, rewarding the zeal of all soldiers who distinguished themselves. He attached men to his person both by a winning demeanor and by seasonable gifts. As it was the uniform custom, (and is still the custom in the East), for every one who approached Cyrus to come with a present in his hand,<sup>1</sup> so he usually gave away again these presents as marks of distinction to others. Hence he not only acquired the attachment of all in his own service, but also of those Persians whom Artaxerxes sent down on various pretences for the purpose of observing his motions. Of these emissaries from Susa, some were even sent to obstruct and enfeeble him. It was under such orders that a Persian named Orontes, governor of Sardis, acted, in levying open war against Cyrus; who twice subdued him, and twice pardoned him, on solemn assurance of fidelity for the future.<sup>2</sup> In all agreements, even with avowed enemies, Cyrus kept faith exactly; so that his word was trusted by every one.

Of such virtues, (rare in an Oriental ruler, either ancient or

*affecerunt. Alios pedibus, quosdam manibus auribusque, amputatis, inus-  
tisque barbararum literarum notis, in longum sui ludibrium reservaverant,*"  
etc. Compare Diodorus, xvii, 69; and the prodigious tales of cruelty re-  
counted in Herodot. ix, 112; Ktesias, Persic. c. 54-59; Plutarch, Artaxerx.  
c. 14, 16, 17.

It is not unworthy of remark, that while there was nothing in which the Persian rulers displayed greater invention than in exaggerating bodily suffering upon a malefactor or an enemy, — at Athens, whenever any man was put to death by public sentence, the execution took place within the prison by administering a cup of hemlock, without even public exposure. It was the minimum of pain, as well as the minimum of indignity; as any one may see who reads the account of the death of Sokrates, given by Plato at the end of the Phædon.

It is certain, that, on the whole, the public sentiment in England is more humane now than it was in that day at Athens. Yet an Athenian public could not have borne the sight of a citizen publicly hanged or beheaded in the market-place. Much less could they have borne the sight of the prolonged tortures inflicted on Damians at Paris in 1757 (a fair parallel to the Persian *σκάφεις* described in Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 16), in the presence of an immense crowd of spectators when every window commanding a view of the Place de Grève was let at a high price, and filled by the best company in Paris.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 9, 13.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 6, 6.

modern,) — and of such secret preparations, — Cyrus sought to reap the fruits at the beginning of 401 B. C. Xenias, his general at home, brought together all the garrisons, leaving a bare sufficiency for defence of the towns. Klearchus, Menon, and the other Greek generals were recalled, and the siege of Miletus was relinquished; so that there was concentrated at Sardis a body of seven thousand seven hundred Grecian hoplites, with five hundred light armed.<sup>1</sup> Others afterwards joined on the march, and there was, besides, a native army of about one hundred thousand men. With such means Cyrus set forth, (March or April, 401 B. C.), from Sardis. His real purpose was kept secret; his ostensible purpose, as proclaimed and understood by every one except himself and Klearchus, was to conquer and root out the Pisidian mountaineers. A joint Lacedæmonian and Persian fleet, under the Lacedæmonian admiral Samius, at the same time coasted round the south of Asia Minor, in order to lend coöperation from the sea-side.<sup>2</sup> This Lacedæmonian coöperation passed for a private levy effected by Cyrus himself; for the ephors would not formally avow hostility against the Great King.<sup>3</sup>

The body of Greeks, immortalized under the name of the Ten Thousand, who were thus preparing to plunge into so many unexpected perils, — though embarking on a foreign mercenary service, were by no means outcasts, or even men of extreme poverty. They were for the most part persons of established position, and not a few even opulent. Half of them were Acadians or Achæans.

Such was the reputation of Cyrus for honorable and munificent dealing, that many young men of good family had run away from their fathers and mothers; others of mature age had been tempted to leave their wives and children; and there were even some who had embarked their own money in advance of outfit for other poorer men, as well as for themselves.<sup>4</sup> All calculated on a year's

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 2, 2-3    <sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 1.    <sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiv, 21.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Anab. vi, 4, 8. *Τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν οἱ πλείστοι ἦσαν οὐ σπάνει βίον ἐκπεπλευκότες ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν μισθοφορὰν, ἀλλὰ τὴν Κύρου ἀρετὴν ἀκούοντες, οἱ μὲν καὶ ἀνδρας ἄγοντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ προσανελωκότες χρήματα, καὶ τούτων ἕτεροι ἀποδεδρακότες πατέρας καὶ μητέρας, οἱ δὲ καὶ τέκνα καταλιπόντες, ὥς χρήματα αὐτοῖς κτησάμενοι ἤζοντες πάλιν, ἀκούοντες καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς παρὰ Κύρῳ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ πράττειν. Τοιοῦτοι οὖν ὄντες, ἐπόθουν εἰ τὴν Ἑγγάδα σώζεσθαι. Compare v. 10, 10.*



campaign in Pisidia; which might perhaps be hard, but would certainly be lucrative, and would enable them to return with a well-furnished purse. So the Greek commanders at Sardis all confidently assured them; extolling, with the emphasis and eloquence suitable to recruiting officers, both the liberality of Cyrus<sup>1</sup> and the abundant promise of all men of enterprise.

Among others, the Boeotian Proxenus wrote to his friend Xenophon, at Athens, pressing him strongly to come to Sardis, and offering to present him to Cyrus, whom he, (Proxenus,) considered as a better friend to him than his own country;<sup>2</sup> a striking evidence of the manner in which such foreign mercenary service overlaid Grecian patriotism, which we shall recognize more and more as we advance forward. This able and accomplished Athenian, — entitled to respectful gratitude, not indeed from Athens his country, but from the Cyreian army and the intellectual world generally, — was one of the class of Knights or Horsemen, and is said to have served in that capacity at the battle of Delium.<sup>3</sup> Of his previous life we know little or nothing, except that he was an attached friend and diligent hearer of Sokrates; the memorials of whose conversation we chiefly derive from his pen, as we also derive the narrative of the Cyreian march. In my last preceding chapter on Sokrates, I have made ample use of the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon; and I am now about to draw from his *Anabasis* (a model of perspicuous and interesting narrative) the account of the adventures of the Cyreian army, which we are fortunate in knowing from so authentic a source.

<sup>1</sup> Compare similar praises of Ptolemy Philadelphus, in order to attract Greek mercenaries from Sicily to Egypt (*Theokrit.* xiv, 50-59).

<sup>2</sup> *Xen. Anab.* iii, 1, 4. Ὑποχνεῖτο δὲ αὐτῷ (Proxenus to Xenophon) εἰ ἔλθοι, φίλον Κύρου ποιήσειν· ὃν αὐτὸς ἐφ' κρείττω αὐτῷ νομίζειν τῆς πατρίδος.

<sup>3</sup> *Strabo*, ix, p. 403. The story that Sokrates carried off Xenophon, wounded and thrown from his horse, on his shoulders, and thus saved his life, — seems too doubtful to enter into the narrative.

Among the proofs that Xenophon was among the Horsemen or Ἴππεις of Athens, we may remark, not only his own strong interest, and great skill in horsemanship, in the cavalry service and the duties of its commander, and in all that relates to horses, as manifested in his published works, — but also the fact, that his son Gryllus served afterwards among the Athenian horsemen at the combat of cavalry which preceded the great battle of Mantinea (*Diogen. Laërt.* ii, §4).

On receiving the invitation from Proxenus, Xenophon felt much inclined to comply. To a member of that class of Knights, which three years before had been the mainstay of the atrocities of the Thirty, (how far he was personally concerned, we cannot say,) it is probable that residence in Athens was in those times not peculiarly agreeable to him. He asked the opinion of Sokrates; who, apprehensive lest service under Cyrus, the bitter enemy of Athens, might expose him to unpopularity with his countrymen, recommended an application to the Delphian oracle. Thither Xenophon went; but in truth he had already made up his mind beforehand. So that instead of asking, "whether he ought to go or refuse, — he simply put the question, "To which of the gods must I sacrifice, in order to obtain safety and success in a journey which I am now meditating?" The reply of the oracle, — indicating Zeus Basileus as the god to whom sacrifice was proper, — was brought back by Xenophon; upon which Sokrates, though displeased that the question had not been fairly put as to the whole project, nevertheless advised, since an answer had now been given, that it should be literally obeyed. Accordingly Xenophon, having offered the sacrifices prescribed, took his departure first to Ephesus and thence to Sardis, where he found the army about to set forth. Proxenus presented him to Cyrus, who entreated him earnestly to take service, promising to dismiss him as soon as the campaign against the Pisidians should be finished.<sup>1</sup> He was thus induced to stay, yet only as a volunteer or friend of Proxenus, without accepting any special post in the army, either as officer or soldier. There is no reason to believe that his service under Cyrus had actually the effect apprehended by Sokrates, of rendering him unpopular at Athens. For though he was afterwards banished, this sentence was not passed against him until after the battle of Koroneia in 394 B. C., where he was in arms as a conspicuous officer under Agesilaus, against his own countrymen and their Theban allies, — nor need we look farther back for the grounds of the sentence.

Though Artaxerxes, entertaining general suspicions of his brother's ambitious views, had sent down various persons to watch him, yet Cyrus had contrived to gain or neutralize these spies, and

<sup>1</sup> *Xen. Anab.* iii, 1, 4-9; v, 9, 22-24.



had masked his preparations so skilfully, that no intimation was conveyed to Susa until the march was about to commence. It was only then that Tissaphernes, seeing the siege of Miletus relinquished, and the vast force mustering at Sardis, divined that something more was meant than the mere conquest of Pisidian freebooters, and went up in person to warn the king; who began his preparations forthwith.<sup>1</sup> That which Tissaphernes had divined was yet a secret to every man in the army, to Proxenus as well as the rest, — when Cyrus, having confided the provisional management of his satrapy to some Persian kinsmen, and to his admiral the Egyptian Tamos, commenced his march in a south-easterly direction from Sardis, through Lydia and Phrygia.<sup>2</sup> Three days' march, a distance stated at twenty-two parasangs,<sup>3</sup> brought him to

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 2, 4; ii, 3, 19.

Diodorus (xiv, 11) citing from Ephorus affirms that the first revelation to Artaxerxes was made by Pharnabazus, who had learnt it from the acuteness of the Athenian exile Alkibiades. That the latter should have had any concern in it, appears improbable. But Diodorus on more than one occasion, confounds Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 19.

<sup>3</sup> The parasang was a Persian measurement of length, but according to Strabo, not of uniform value in all parts of Asia; in some parts, held equivalent to thirty stadia, in others to forty, in others to sixty (Strabo, xi, p. 518; Forbiger, Handbuch der Alten Geograph. vol. i, p. 555). This variability of meaning is no way extraordinary, when we recollect the difference between English, Irish, and German miles, etc.

Herodotus tells us distinctly what he meant by a parasang, and what the Persian government of his day recognized as such in their measurement of the great road from Sardis to Susa, as well as in their measurements of territory for purposes of tribute (Herod. v, 53; vi, 43). It was thirty Greek stadia = nearly three and a half English miles, or nearly three geographical miles. The distance between every two successive stations, on the road from Sardis to Susa, (which was "all inhabited and all secure," *διὰ οικουμένης τε ἅπασα καὶ ἀσφαλὲς*), would seem to have been measured and marked in parasangs and fractions of a parasang. It seems probable, from the account which Herodotus gives of the march of Xerxes (vii, 26), that this road passed from Kappadokia and across the river Halys, through Kelænæ and Kolossæ to Sardis; and therefore that the road which Cyrus took for his march, from Sardis at least as far as Kelænæ, must have been so measured and marked.

Xenophon also in his summing up of the route, (ii, 2, 6; vii, 8, 26) implies the parasang as equivalent to thirty stadia, while he gives for the most part, each day's journey measured in parasangs. Now even as the

the Mæander; one additional march of eight parasangs, after crossing that river, forwarded him to Kolossæ, a flourishing city

At the outset of the march, we have no reason to believe that there was any official measurer of road-progress accompanying the army, like Bæton, *ὁ Βηματοστάτης Ἀλεξάνδρου*, in Alexander's invasion; see Athenæus, x, p. 442, and Geier, *Alexandri Magni Histor. Scriptt.* p. 357. Yet Xenophon, throughout the whole march, even as far as Trebizond, states the day's march of the army in parasangs; not merely in Asia Minor, where there were roads, but through the Arabian desert between Thapsakus and Pylæ, — through the snows of Armenia, — and through the territory of the barbarous Chalybes. He tells us that in the desert of Arabia they marched ninety parasangs in thirteen days, or very nearly seven parasangs per day, — and that too under the extreme heat of summer. He tells us, farther, that in the deep snows of Armenia, and in the extremity of winter, they marched fifteen parasangs in three days; and through the territory (also covered with snow) of the pugnacious Chalybes, fifty parasangs in seven days, or more than seven parasangs per day. Such marches, at thirty stadia for the parasang, are impossible. And how did Xenophon measure the distance marched over?

The most intelligent modern investigators and travellers, — Major Rennell, Mr. Ainsworth, Mr. Hamilton, Colonel Chesney, Professor Koch, etc., offer no satisfactory solution of the difficulty. Major Rennell reckons the parasangs as equal to 2.25 geogr. miles; Mr. Ainsworth at three geogr. miles; Mr. Hamilton (travels in Asia Minor, c. 42, p. 200), at something less than two and a half geogr. miles; Colonel Chesney (Euphrat. and Tigris, ch. 8, p. 207) at 2.608 geogr. miles between Sardis and Thapsakus — at 1.98 geogr. miles, between Thapsakus and Kunaxa, — at something less than this, without specifying how much, during the retreat. It is evident that there is no certain basis to proceed upon, even for the earlier portion of the route; much more, for the retreat. The distance between Ikonium and Dana (or Tyana), is one of the quantities on which Mr. Hamilton rests his calculation; but we are by no means certain that Cyrus took the direct route of march; he rather seems to have turned out of his way, partly to plunder Lykaonia, partly to conduct the Kilikian princess homeward. The other item, insisted upon by Mr. Hamilton, is the distance between Kelænæ and Kolossæ, two places the site of which seems well ascertained, and which are by the best modern maps, fifty-two geographical miles apart. Xenophon calls the distance twenty parasangs. Assuming the road by which he marched to have been the same with that now travelled, it would make the parasang of Xenophon = 2.6 geographical miles. I have before remarked that the road between Kolossæ and Kelænæ was probably measured and numbered according to parasangs; so that Xenophon, in giving the number of parasangs between these two places, would be speaking upon official authority.

Even a century and a half afterwards, the geographer Eratosthenes found



in Phrygia, where Menon overtook him with a reinforcement of one thousand hoplites, and five hundred peltasts, — Dolopes, Ænians, and Olynthians. He then marched three days onward to Kelænæ, another Phrygian city, "great and flourishing," with a citadel very strong both by nature and art. Here he halted no less than thirty days, in order to await the arrival of Klearchus, with his division of one thousand hoplites, eight hundred Thracian peltasts, and two hundred Kretan bowmen; at the same time Sophænetus arrived with one thousand farther hoplites, and Sosias with three hundred. This total of Greeks was reviewed by

it not possible to obtain accurate measurements, in much of the country traversed by Cyrus (Strabo, ii, p. 73.)

Colonel Chesney remarks, — "From Sardis to Cunaxa, or the mounds of Mohammed, cannot be much under or over twelve hundred and sixty-five geographical miles; making 2.364 geographical miles for each of the five hundred and thirty-five parasangs given by Xenophon between those two places."

As a measure of distance, the parasang of Xenophon is evidently untrustworthy. Is it admissible to consider, in the description of this march, that the parasangs and stadia of Xenophon are measurements rather of time than of space? From Sardis to Kelænæ, he had a measured road and numbered parasangs of distance; it is probable that the same mensuration and numeration continued for four days farther, as far as Keramôn-Agora, (since I imagine that the road from Kelænæ to the Halys and Kappadokia must have gone through these two places,) — and possibly it may have continued even as far as Ikonium or Dana. Hence, by these early marches, Xenophon had the opportunity of forming to himself roughly an idea of the time (measured by the course of the sun) which it took for the army to march one, two, or three parasangs and when he came to the ulterior portions of the road, he called *that length of time* by the name of one, two, or three parasangs. Five parasangs seem to have meant with him a full day's march; three or four, a short day; six, seven, or eight, a long, or very long day.

We must recollect that the Greeks in the time of Xenophon had no portable means of measuring hours, and did not habitually divide the day into hours, or into any other recognized fraction. The Alexandrine astronomers, near two centuries afterwards, were the first to use *ὥρη* in the sense of hour (Ideler, *Handbuch der Chronologie*, vol. i, p. 239.)

This may perhaps help to explain Xenophon's meaning, when he talks about marching five or seven parasangs amidst the deep snows of Armenia. I do not however suppose that he had this meaning uniformly or steadily present to his mind. Sometimes, it would seem, he must have used the word in its usual meaning of distance.

Cyrus in one united body at Kelænæ; eleven thousand hoplites and two thousand peltasts.<sup>1</sup>

As far as Kelænæ, his march had been directed straight towards Pisidia, near the borders of which territory that city is situated. So far, therefore, the fiction with which he started was kept up. But on leaving Kelænæ, he turned his march away from Pisidia, in a direction nearly northward; first in two days, ten parasangs, to the town of Peltæ; next in two days farther, twelve parasangs, to Keramôn-Agora, the last city in the district adjoining Mysia. At Peltæ, in a halt of three days, the Arcadian general Xenias celebrated the great festival of his country, the Lykæa, with its usual games and matches, in the presence of Cyrus. From Keramôn-Agora, Cyrus marched in three days the unusual distance of thirty parasangs,<sup>2</sup> to a city called Käystru-Pedion, (the plain

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 2, 8, 9. About Kelænæ, Arrian, Exp. Al. i, 29, 2; Quint Curt. iii, 1, 6.

<sup>2</sup> These three marches, each of ten parasangs, from Keramôn-Agora to Käystru-Pedion, — are the longest recorded in the Anabasis. It is rather surprising to find them so; for there seems no motive for Cyrus to have hurried forward. When he reached Käystru-Pedion, he halted five days. Koch (*Zug der Zehn Tausend*, Leipzig, 1850, p. 19) remarks that the three days' march, which seem to have dropped out of Xenophon's calculation, comparing the items with the total, might conveniently be let in here; so that these thirty parasangs should have occupied six days' march instead of three; five parasangs per day. The whole march which Cyrus had hitherto made from Sardis, including the road from Keramôn-Agora to Käystru-Pedion, lay in the great road from Sardis to the river Halys, Kappadokia, and Susa. That road (as we see by the March of Xerxes, Herodot. vii, 26; v, 52) passed through both Kelænæ and Kolossæ; though this is a prodigious departure from the straight line. At Käystru-Pedion, Cyrus seems to have left this great road; taking a different route, in a direction nearly south-east towards Ikonium. About the point, somewhere near Synnada, where these different roads crossed, see Mr. Ainsworth, *Trav. in the Track*, p. 28.

I do not share the doubts which have been raised about Xenophon's accuracy, in his description of the route from Sardis to Ikonium; though the names of several of the places which he mentions are not known to us, and their sites cannot be exactly identified. There is a great departure from the straight line of bearing. But we at the present day assign more weight to that circumstance than is suited to the days of Xenophon. Straight roads, stretching systematically over a large region of country, are not of that age; the communications were probably all originally made, between



of Käystrus), where he halted for five days. Here his repose was disturbed by the murmurs of the Greek soldiers, who had received no pay for three months, (Xenophon had before told us that they were mostly men who had some means of their own), and who now flocked around his tent to press for their arrears. So impoverished was Cyrus by previous disbursements, — perhaps also by remissions of tribute for the purpose of popularizing himself, — that he was utterly without money, and was obliged to put them off again with promises. And his march might well have ended here, had he not been rescued from embarrassment by the arrival of Epyaxa, wife of the Kilikian prince Syennesis, who brought to him a large sum of money, and enabled him to give to the Greek soldiers four months' pay at once. As to the Asiatic soldiers, it is probable that they received little beyond their maintenance.

Two ensuing days of march, still through Phrygia, brought the army to Thymbrium; two more to Tyriæum. Each day's march is called five parasangs<sup>1</sup>. It was here that Cyrus, halting three days, passed the army in review, to gratify the Kilikian princess Epyaxa, who was still accompanying the march. His Asiatic troops were first made to march in order before him, cavalry and infantry in their separate divisions; after which he himself in a chariot, and Epyaxa in a Harmamaxa, (a sort of carriage or litter covered with an awning which opened or shut at pleasure), passed all along the front of the Greek line, drawn up separately. The hoplites were marshalled four deep, all in their best trim; brazen helmets, purple tunics, greaves or leggings, and the shields rubbed bright, just taken out of the wrappers in which they were

one neighboring town and another, without much reference to saving of distance, and with no reference to any promotion of traffic between distant places.

It was just about this time that King Archelaus began to "cut straight roads" in Macedonia, — which Thucydides seems to note as a remarkable thing (ii, 100).

<sup>1</sup> Neither Thymbrium, nor Tyriæum, can be identified. But it seems that both must have been situated on the line of road now followed by the caravans from Smyrna to Konieh (Ikonium,) which line of road follows a direction between the mountains called Emir Dagb on the north-east, and those called Sultan Dagb on the south-west (Koch, *Der Zug der Zehn Tausend*, p. 21, 22).

carried during a mere march.<sup>1</sup> Klearchus commanded on the left, and Menon on the right; the other generals being distributed in the centre. Having completed his review along the whole line, and taken a station with the Kilikian princess at a certain distance in front of it, Cyrus sent his interpreter to the generals, and desired that he might see them charge. Accordingly, the orders were given, the spears were protended, the trumpets sounded, and the whole Greek force moved forward in battle array with the usual shouts. As they advanced, the pace became accelerated, and they made straight against the victualling portion of the Asiatic encampment. Such was the terror occasioned by the sight, that all the Asiatics fled forthwith, abandoning their property, — Epyaxa herself among the first, quitting her palanquin. Though she had among her personal guards some Greeks from Aspendus, she had never before seen a Grecian army, and was amazed as well as terrified; much to the satisfaction of Cyrus, who saw in the scene an augury of his coming success.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Εἶχον δὲ πάντες κράνη χαλκᾶ, καὶ χιτῶνας φοινικοῦς, καὶ κνημίδας, καὶ ῥάδες ἀσπίδας ἐκκεκαθαρμένους.

When the hoplite was on march, without expectation of an enemy, the shield seems to have been carried behind him, with his blanket attached to it (see Aristoph. *Acharn.* 1085, 1089-1149); it was slung by the strap round his neck and shoulder. Sometimes indeed he had an opportunity of relieving himself from the burden, by putting the shield in a baggage-wagon (Xen. *Anab.* i, 7, 20). The officers generally, and doubtless some soldiers, could command attendants to carry their shields for them (iv, 2, 20; Aristoph. l. c.).

On occasion of this review, the shields were unpacked, rubbed, and brightened, as before a battle (Xen. *Hell.* vii, 5, 20); then fastened round the neck or shoulders, and held out upon the left arm, which was passed through the rings or straps attached to its concave or interior side.

Respecting the cases or wrappers of the shields, see a curious stratagem of the Syracusan Agathokles (Diodor. xx, 11). The Roman soldiers also carried their shields in leathern wrappers, when on march (Plutarch, *Lucull.* c. 27).

It is to be remarked that Xenophon, in enumerating the arms of the Cyreians, does not mention *breastplates*; which (though sometimes worn, see Plutarch, *Dion.* c. 30) were not usually worn by hoplites, who carried heavy shields. It is quite possible that some of the Cyreian infantry may have had breastplates as well as shields, since every soldier provided his own arms; but Xenophon states only what was common to all.

Grecian cavalry commonly wore a heavy breastplate, but had no shield.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. *Anab.* i, 2, 16-19.

Three days of farther march, (called twenty parasangs in all) brought the army to Ikonium, (now Konieh), the extreme city of Phrygia; where Cyrus halted three days. He then marched for five days (thirty parasangs) through Lykaonia; which country, as being out of his own satrapy, and even hostile, he allowed the Greeks to plunder. Lykaonia being immediately on the borders of Pisidia, its inhabitants were probably reckoned as Pisidians, since they were of the like predatory character:<sup>1</sup> so that Cyrus would be partially realizing the pretended purpose of his expedition. He thus, too, approached near to Mount Taurus, which separated him from Kilikia; and he here sent the Kilikian princess, together with Menon and his division, over the mountain, by a pass shorter and more direct, but seemingly little frequented, and too difficult for the whole army; in order that they might thus get straight into Kilikia,<sup>2</sup> in the rear of Syennesis, who was occupying the regular pass more to the northward. Intending to enter with his main body through this latter pass, Cyrus first proceeded through Kappadokia (four days' march, twenty-five parasangs) to Dana or Tyana, a flourishing city of Kappadokia; where he halted three days, and where he put to death two Persian officers, on a charge of conspiring against him.<sup>3</sup>

This regular pass over Taurus, the celebrated Tauri-Pylæ or Kilikian Gates, was occupied by Syennesis. Though a road fit for vehicles, it was yet three thousand six hundred feet above the level of the sea, narrow, steep, bordered by high ground on each side, and crossed by a wall with gates, so that it could not be forced if ever so moderately defended.<sup>4</sup> But the Kilikian prince,

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iii, 2, 25.

<sup>2</sup> This shorter and more direct pass crosses the Taurus by Kizil-Ches-meh, Alan Buzuk, and Mizetli; it led directly to the Kilikian seaport-town Soli, afterwards called Pompeiopolis. It is laid down in the Peutinger Tables as the road from Iconium to Pompeiopolis (Ainsworth, p. 40 seq.; Chesney, Euph. and Tigr. ii, p. 209).

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 2, 20.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 2, 21; Diodor. xiv, 20. See Mr. Kinneir, Travels in Asia Minor, p. 116; Col. Chesney, Euphrates and Tigris, vol. i, p. 293-354; and Mr. Ainsworth, Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 40 seq., also his other work, Travels in Asia Minor, vol. ii. ch. 30, p. 70-77; and Koch, Der Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 26-172, for a description of this memorable pass.

alarmed at the news that Menon had already crossed the mountains by the less frequented pass to his rear, and that the fleet of Cyrus was sailing along the coast, evacuated his own impregnable position, and fell back to Tarsus; from whence he again retired, accompanied by most of the inhabitants, to an inaccessible fastness on the mountains. Accordingly Cyrus, ascending without opposition the great pass thus abandoned, reached Tarsus after a march of four days, there rejoining Menon and Epyaxa. Two lochi or companies of the division of Menon, having dispersed on their march for pillage, had been cut off by the natives; for which the main body of Greeks now took their revenge, plundering both the city and the palace of Syennesis. That prince, though invited by Cyrus to come back to Tarsus, at first refused, but was at length prevailed upon by the persuasions of his wife, to return under a safe conduct. He was induced to contract an alliance, to exchange presents with Cyrus, and to give him a large sum of money towards his expedition, together with a contingent of troops; in return for which it was stipulated that Kilikia should be no farther plundered, and that the slaves taken away might be recovered wherever they were found.<sup>1</sup>

It seems evident, though Xenophon does not directly tell us so, that the resistance of Syennesis, (this was a standing name or title of the hereditary princes of Kilikia under the Persian crown), was a mere feint; that the visit of Epyaxa with a supply of money to Cyrus, and the admission of Menon and his division over Mount Taurus, were manœuvres in collusion with him; and that, thinking Cyrus would be successful, he was disposed to support his cause, yet careful at the same time to give himself the air of having been overpowered, in case Artaxerxes should prove victorious.<sup>2</sup>

Alexander the Great, as well as Cyrus, was fortunate enough to find this impregnable pass abandoned; as it appears, through sheer stupidity or recklessness of the satrap who ought to have defended it, and who had not even the same excuse for abandoning it as Syennesis had on the approach of Cyrus (Arrian. E. A. ii. 4; Curtius, iii, 9, 10, 11).

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 2, 23-27.

<sup>2</sup> Diodorus (xiv, 20) represents Syennesis as playing a double game, though reluctantly. He takes no notice of the proceeding of Epyaxa.

So Livy says, about the conduct of the Macedonian courtiers in regard to the enmity between Perseus and Demetrius, the two sons of Philip II. of



At first, however, it appeared as if the march of Cyrus was destined to finish at Tarsus, where he was obliged to remain twenty days. The army had already passed by Pisidia, the ostensible purpose of the expedition, for which the Grecian troops had been engaged; not one of them, either officer or soldier, suspecting anything to the contrary, except Klearchus, who was in the secret. But all now saw that they had been imposed upon, and found out that they were to be conducted against the Persian king. Besides the resentment at such delusion, they shrunk from the risk altogether; not from any fear of Persian armies, but from the terrors of a march of three months inward from the coast, and the impossibility of return, which had so powerfully affected the Spartan King Kleomenes,<sup>1</sup> a century before; most of them being (as I have before remarked) men of decent position and family in their respective cities. Accordingly they proclaimed their determination to advance no farther, as they had not been engaged to fight against the Great King.<sup>2</sup>

Among the Grecian officers, each (Klearchus, Proxenus, Menon, Xenias, etc.) commanded his own separate division, without any generalissimo except Cyrus himself. Each of them probably sympathized more or less in the resentment as well as in the repugnance of the soldiers. But Klearchus, an exile and a mercenary by profession, was doubtless prepared for this mutiny, and had assured Cyrus that it might be overcome. That such a man as Klearchus could be tolerated as a commander of free and non-professional soldiers, is a proof of the great susceptibility of the Greek hoplites for military discipline. For though he had great military merits, being brave, resolute, and full of resource in the hour of danger, provident for the subsistence of his soldiers, and unshrinking against fatigue and hardship, — yet his look and manner were harsh, his punishments were perpetual as well as cruel, and he neither tried nor cared to conciliate his soldier; who accordingly stayed with him, and were remarkable for exactness of discipline, so long as political orders required them, —

Macedon: "Crescente in dies Philippi odio in Romanos, cui Perseus indulgeret, Demetrius summâ ope adversaretur, prospicientes animo exitum incauti a fraude fraternâ juvenis — adjuvandum, quod futurum erat, rati, foveamque spem potentioris, Persæ se adiungunt," etc. (Livy xl, 5).

<sup>1</sup> See Herodot. v. 49.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 3, 4.

but preferred service under other commanders, when they could obtain it.<sup>1</sup> Finding his orders to march forward disobeyed, Klearchus proceeded at once in his usual manner to enforce and punish. But he found resistance universal; he himself with the cattle who carried his baggage, was pelted when he began to move forward, and narrowly escaped with his life. Thus disappointed in his attempt at coercion, he was compelled to convene the soldiers in a regular assembly, and to essay persuasion.

On first appearing before the assembled soldiers, this harsh and imperious officer stood for a long time silent, and even weeping; a remarkable point in Grecian manners, — and exceedingly impressive to the soldiers, who looked on him with surprise and in silence. At length he addressed them: "Be not astonished, soldiers, to see me deeply mortified. Cyrus has been my friend and benefactor. It was he who sheltered me as an exile, and gave me ten thousand Darics, which I expended not on my own profit or pleasure, but upon you, and in defence of Grecian interests in the Chersonese against Thracian depredators. When Cyrus invited me, I came to him along with you, in order to make him the best return in my power for his past kindness. But now, since you will no longer march along with me, I am under the necessity either of renouncing you or of breaking faith with him. Whether I am doing right or not, I cannot say; but I shall stand by you, and share your fate. No one shall say of me that, having conducted Greek troops into a foreign land, I betrayed the Greeks and chose the foreigner. You are to me country, friends, allies; while you are with me, I can help a friend, and repel an enemy. Understand me well; I shall go wherever you go, and partake your fortune."<sup>2</sup>

This speech, and the distinct declaration of Klearchus that he would not march forward against the King, was heard by the soldiers with much delight: in which those of the other Greek divisions sympathized, especially as none of the other Greek commanders had yet announced a similar resolution. So strong was this feeling among the soldiers of Xenias and Pasion, that two

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. ii, 6, 5-15.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 3, 2-7. Here, as on other occasions, I translate the sense rather than the words.

thousand of them left their commanders, coming over forthwith with arms and baggage, to the encampment of Klearchus.

Meanwhile Cyrus himself, dismayed at the resistance encountered, sent to desire an interview with Klearchus. But the latter, knowing well the game that he was playing, refused to obey the summons. He, however, at the same time despatched a secret message to encourage Cyrus with the assurance that everything would come right at last, — and to desire farther that fresh invitations might be sent, in order that he (Klearchus) might answer by fresh refusals. He then again convened in assembly both his own soldiers and those who had recently deserted Xenias to join him. "Soldiers," (said he), we must recollect that we have now broken with Cyrus. We are no longer his soldiers, nor he our paymaster; moreover, I know that he thinks we have wronged him, — so that I am both afraid and ashamed to go near him. He is a good friend, — but a formidable enemy; and has a powerful force of his own, which all of you see near at hand. This is no time for us to slumber. We must take careful counsel whether to stay or go; and if we go, how to get away in safety, as well as to obtain provisions. I shall be glad to hear what any man has to suggest."

Instead of the peremptory tone habitual with Klearchus, the troops found themselves now, for the first time, not merely released from his command, but deprived of his advice. Some soldiers addressed the assembly, proposing various measures suitable to the emergency; but their propositions were opposed by other speakers, who, privately instigated by Klearchus himself, set forth the difficulties either of staying or departing. One among these secret partisans of the commander even affected to take the opposite side, and to be impatient for immediate departure. "If Klearchus does not choose to conduct us back (said this speaker) let us immediately elect other generals, buy provisions, get ready to depart, and then send to ask Cyrus for merchant-vessels, — or at any rate for guides in our return march by land. If he refuses both these requests, we must put ourselves in marching order, to fight our way back; sending forward a detachment without delay to occupy the passes." Klearchus here interposed to say, that as for himself, it was impossible for him to continue in command; but he would faithfully obey any other commander

who might be elected. He was followed by another speaker, who demonstrated the absurdity of going and asking Cyrus, either for a guide, or for ships, at the very moment when they were frustrating his projects. How could he be expected to assist them in getting away? Who could trust either his ships or his guides? On the other hand, to depart without his knowledge or concurrence was impossible. The proper course would be to send a deputation to him, consisting of others along with Klearchus, to ask what it was that he really wanted — which no one yet knew. His answer to the question should be reported to the meeting, in order that they might take their resolution accordingly.

To this proposition the soldiers acceded; for it was but too plain that retreat was no easy matter. The deputation went to put the question to Cyrus; who replied that his real purpose was to attack his enemy Abrokomas, who was on the river Euphrates, twelve days' march onward. If he found Abrokomas there, he would punish him as he deserved. If, on the other hand, Abrokomas had fled, they might again consult what step was fit to be taken.

The soldiers, on hearing this, suspected it to be a deception, but nevertheless acquiesced, not knowing what else to do. They required only an increase of pay. Not a word was said about the Great King, or the expedition against him. Cyrus granted increased pay of fifty per cent. upon the previous rate. Instead of one daric per month to each soldier, he agreed to give a daric and a half."<sup>1</sup>

This remarkable scene at Tarsus illustrates the character of the Greek citizen-soldier. What is chiefly to be noted, is, the appeal made to their reason and judgment, — the habit, established more or less throughout so large a portion of the Grecian world, and attaining its maximum at Athens, of hearing both sides and deciding afterwards. The soldiers are indignant, justly and naturally, at the fraud practised upon them. But instead of surrendering themselves to this impulse arising out of the past, they are brought to look at the actualities of the present, and take measure of what is best to be done for the future. To return back from the place where they stood, against the wish of

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i. 3. 16-21



Cyrus, was an enterprise so full of difficulty and danger, that the decision to which they came was recommended by the best considerations of reason. To go on was the least dangerous course of the two, besides its chances of unmeasured reward.

As the remaining Greek officers and soldiers followed the example of Klearchus and his division, the whole army marched forward from Tarsus, and reached Issus, the extreme city of Kilikia, in five days' march, — crossing the rivers Sarus<sup>1</sup> and Pyramus. At Issus, a flourishing and commercial port in the angle of the Gulf so called, Cyrus was joined by his fleet of fifty triremes, — thirty-five Lacedæmonian and twenty-five Persian triremes; bringing a reinforcement of seven hundred hoplites, under the command of the Lacedæmonian Cirisophus, said to have been despatched by the Spartan Ephors.<sup>2</sup> He also received a farther reinforcement of four hundred Grecian soldiers; making the total of Greeks in his army fourteen thousand, from which

<sup>1</sup> The breadth of the river Sarus (Seihun) is given by Xenophon at three hundred feet; which agrees nearly with the statements of modern travellers (Koch, *Der Zug der Zehn Tausend*, p. 34).

Compare, for the description of this country, Kinneir's *Journey through Asia Minor*, p. 135; Col. Chesney, *Euphrates and Tigris*, ii, p. 211; Mr. Ainsworth, *Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand*, p. 54.

Colonel Chesney affirms that neither the Sarus nor the Pyramus is fordable. There must have been bridges; which, in the then flourishing state of Kilikia, is by no means improbable. He and Mr. Ainsworth, however, differ as to the route which they suppose Cyrus to have taken between Tarsus and Issus.

Xenophon mentions nothing about the Amanian Gates, which afterwards appear noticed both in Arrian (ii, 6, ii, 7) and in Strabo (xiv, p. 676). The various data of ancient history and geography about this region are by no means easy to reconcile; see a valuable note of Mützel on Quintus Curtius, iii, 17, 7. An inspection of the best recent maps, either Colonel Chesney's or Kiepert's, clears up some of these better than any verbal description. We see by these maps that Mount Amanus bifurcates into two branches, one of them flanking the Gulf of Issus on its western, the other on its eastern side. There are thus two different passes, each called *Pylæ Amanides* or Amanian Gates; one having reference to the Western Amanus, the other to the Eastern. The former was crossed by Alexander, the latter by Darius, before the battle of Issus; and Arrian (ii, 6; ii, 7) is equally correct in saying of both of them that they passed the Amanian Gates: though both did not pass the same gates.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv. 21.

are to be deducted the one hundred soldiers of Menon's division, slain in Kilikia.

The arrival of this last body of four hundred men was a fact of some importance. They had hitherto been in the service of Abrokomas (the Persian general commanding a vast force, said to be three hundred thousand men, for the king, in Phœnicia and Syria), from whom they now deserted to Cyrus. Such desertion was at once the proof of their reluctance to fight against the great body of their countrymen marching upwards, and of the general discouragement reigning amidst the king's army. So great, indeed, was that discouragement, that Abrokomas now fled from the Syrian coast into the interior; abandoning three defensible positions in succession — 1. The Gates of Kilikia and Syria. 2. The pass of Beilan over Mount Amanus. 3. The passage of the Euphrates. — He appears to have been alarmed by the easy passage of Cyrus from Kappadokia into Kilikia, and still more, probably, by the evident collusion of Syennesis with the invader.<sup>1</sup>

Cyrus had expected to find the gates of Kilikia and Syria stoutly defended, and had provided for this emergency by bringing up his fleet to Issus, in order that he might be able to transport a division by sea to the rear of the defenders. The pass was at one day's march from Issus. It was a narrow road for the length of near half a mile, between the sea on one side and the steep cliffs terminating mount Amanus on the other. The two entrances, on the side of Kilikia as well as on that of Syria, were both closed by walls and gates; midway between the two the river Kersus broke out from the mountains and flowed into the sea. No army could force this pass against defenders; but the possession of the fleet doubtless enabled an assailant to turn it. Cyrus was overjoyed to find it undefended.<sup>2</sup> And here we cannot but notice the superior ability and forethought of Cyrus as compared with the other Persians opposed to him. He had looked at this as well as at the other difficulties of his march, beforehand, and had provided the means of meeting them; whereas, on the king's side, all the numerous means and opportunities of defence are succe-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 4, 3-5. 'Αβροκόμας δ' οὐ τοῦτο ἐποίησεν ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἤκουσε Κύρον ἐν Κιλικίᾳ ὄντα, ἀναστρέψας ἐκ Φοινίκης, παρὰ βασιλέα ἀπήλαυνεν, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv.

sively abandoned; the Persians have no confidence, except in vast numbers, — or when numbers fail, in treachery.

Five parasangs, or one day's march from this pass, Cyrus reached the Phœnician maritime town of Myriandrus; a place of great commerce, with its harbor full of merchantmen. While he rested here seven days, his two generals Xenias and Pasion deserted him; privately engaging a merchant vessel to carry them away with their property. They could not brook the wrong which Cyrus had done them in permitting Klearchus to retain under his command those soldiers who had deserted them at Tarsus, at the time when the latter played off his deceitful manœuvre. Perhaps the men who had thus deserted may have been unwilling to return to their original commanders, after having taken so offensive a step. And this may partly account for the policy of Cyrus in sanctioning what Xenias and Pasion could not but feel as a great wrong, in which a large portion of the army sympathized. The general belief among the soldiers was, that Cyrus would immediately despatch some triremes to overtake and bring back the fugitives. But instead of this, he summoned the remaining generals, and after communicating to them the fact that Xenias and Pasion were gone, added, — "I have plenty of triremes to overtake their merchantmen if I chose, and to bring them back. But I will do no such thing. No one shall say of me, that I make use of a man while he is with me, — and afterwards seize, rob, or ill-use him, when he wishes to depart. Nay, I have their wives and children under guard as hostages, at Tralles;<sup>1</sup> but even these shall be given up to them, in consideration of their good behavior down to the present day. Let them go if they choose, with the full knowledge that they behave worse towards me than I towards them." This behavior, alike judicious and conciliating, was universally admired, and produced the best possible effect upon the spirits of the army; imparting a confidence in Cyrus which did much to outweigh the

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 4, 6. To require the wives or children of generals in service, as hostages for fidelity, appears to have been not unfrequent with Persian kings. On the other hand, it was remarked as a piece of gross obsequiousness in the Argeian Nikostratus, who commanded the contingent of his countrymen serving under Artaxerxes Ochus in Egypt, that he volunteered to bring up his son to the king as an hostage, without being demanded (Theopompus, Frag. 135 [ed. Wickers] ap. Athenæ. vi, p. 252).

prevailing discouragement, in the unknown march upon which they were entering.<sup>1</sup>

At Myriandrus Cyrus finally quitted the sea, sending back his fleet,<sup>2</sup> and striking with his land-force eastward into the interior. For this purpose it was necessary first to cross mount Amanus, by the pass of Beilan; an eminently difficult road, which he was fortunate enough to find open, though Abrokomas might easily have defended it, if he had chosen.<sup>3</sup> Four days' march brought the army to the Chalus (perhaps the river of Aleppo), full of fish held sacred by the neighboring inhabitants; five more days, to the sources of the river Daradax, with the palace and park of the Syrian satrap Belesys; three days farther, to Thapsakus on the Euphrates. This was a great and flourishing town, a centre of commerce enriched by the important ford or transit of the river Euphrates close to it, in latitude about 35° 40' N.<sup>4</sup> The river,

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 4, 7-9.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 21.

<sup>3</sup> See the remarks of Mr. Ainsworth, *Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand*, p. 58-61; and other citations respecting the difficult road through the pass of Beilan, in Müttel's valuable notes on Quintus Curtius, iii, 20, 13, p. 101.

<sup>4</sup> Neither the Chalus, nor the Daradax, nor indeed the road followed by Cyrus in crossing Syria from the sea to the Euphrates, can be satisfactorily made out (Koch, *Zug der Zehn Tausend*, p. 36, 37).

Respecting the situation of Thapsakus, — placed erroneously by Rennell lower down the river at Deir, where it stands marked even in the map annexed to Col. Chesney's Report on the Euphrates, and by Reichard higher up the river, near Bir — see Ritter, *Erdkunde*, part x, B. iii; *West Asien*, p. 14-17, with the elaborate discussion, p. 972-978, in the same volume; also the work of Mr. Ainsworth above cited, p. 70. The situation of Thapsakus is correctly placed in Colonel Chesney's last work (*Euphr. and Tigr.* p. 213), and in the excellent map accompanying that work; though I dissent from his view of the march of Cyrus between the pass of Beilan and Thapsakus.

Thapsakus appears to have been the most frequented and best-known passage over the Euphrates, throughout the duration of the Seleukid kings, down to 100 B. C. It was selected as a noted point, to which observations and calculations might be conveniently referred, by Eratosthenes and other geographers (see Strabo, ii, p. 79-87). After the time when the Roman empire became extended to the Euphrates, the new Zeugma, higher up the river near Bir or Bihrejik (about the 37th parallel of latitude) became more used and better known, at least to the Roman writers.

The passage at Thapsakus was in the line of road from Palmyra to



when the Cyreians arrived, was four stadia, or somewhat less than half an English mile, in breadth.

Cyrus remained at Thapsakus five days. He was now compelled formally to make known to his soldiers the real object of the march, hitherto, in name at least, disguised. He accordingly sent for the Greek generals, and desired them to communicate publicly the fact, that he was on the advance to Babylon against his brother, — which to themselves, probably, had been for some time well known. Among the soldiers, however, the first announcement excited loud murmurs, accompanied by accusation against the generals, of having betrayed them, in privy with Cyrus. But this outburst was very different to the strenuous repugnance which they had before manifested at Tarsus. Evidently they suspected, and had almost made up their minds to, the real truth; so that their complaint was soon converted into a demand for a donation to each man, as soon as they should reach Babylon; as much as that which Cyrus had given to his Grecian detachment on going up thither before. Cyrus willingly promised them five minæ per head (about £19 5s.), equal to more than a year's pay, at the rate recently stipulated of a daric and a half per month. He engaged to give them, besides, the full rate of pay until they should have been sent back to the Ionian coast. Such ample offers satisfied the Greeks, and served to counterbalance at least, if not to efface, the terrors of that unknown region which they were about to tread.

But before the general body of Greek soldiers had pronounced their formal acquiescence, Menon with his separate division was already in the water, crossing. For Menon had instigated his men to decide separately for themselves, and to execute their decision, before the others had given any answer. "By acting thus (said he) you will confer special obligation on Cyrus, and earn corresponding reward. If the others follow you across, he will suppose

Karrhæ in Northern Mesopotamia; also from Seleukeia (on the Tigris below Bagdad) to the other cities founded in Northern Syria by Seleukus Nikator and his successors, Antioch on the Orontes, Seleukeia in Pieria, Laodikeia, Antioch ad Taurum, etc.

The ford at Thapsakus (says Mr. Ainsworth, p. 69, 70) "is celebrated to this day as the ford of the Anezeh or Beduins. On the right bank of the Euphrates there are the remains of a paved causeway leading to the very banks of the river, and continued on the opposite side."

that they do so because you have set the example. If, on the contrary, the others should refuse, we shall all be obliged to retreat: but he will never forget that you, separately taken, have done all that you could for him." Such breach of communion, and avidity for separate gain, at a time when it vitally concerned all the Greek soldiers to act in harmony with each other, was a step suitable to the selfish and treacherous character of Menon. He gained his point, however, completely; for Cyrus, on learning that the Greek troops had actually crossed, despatched Glus the interpreter to express to them his warmest thanks, and to assure them that he would never forget the obligation; while at the same time, he sent underhand large presents to Menon separately.<sup>1</sup> He passed with his whole army immediately afterwards; no man being wet above the breast.

What had become of Abrokomas and his army, and why did he not defend this passage, where Cyrus might so easily have been arrested? We are told that he had been there a little before, and that he had thought it sufficient to burn all the vessels at Thapsakus, in the belief that the invaders could not cross the river on foot. And Xenophon informs us that the Thapsakenes affirmed the Euphrates to have been never before fordable, — always passed by means of boats; insomuch that they treated the actual low state of the water as a providential interposition of the gods in favor of Cyrus; "the river made way for him to come and take the sceptre." When we find that Abrokomas came too late afterwards for the battle of Kunaxa, we shall be led to suspect that he too, like Syennesis in Kilikia, was playing a double game between the two royal brothers, and that he was content with destroying those vessels which formed the ordinary means of communication between the banks, without taking any means to inquire whether the passage was practicable without them. The assertion of the Thapsakenes, in so far as it was not a mere piece of flattery to Cyrus, could hardly have had any other foundation than the fact, that they had never seen the river crossed on foot (whether practicable or not), so long as there were regular ferry-boats.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 4, 12-18.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 4, 18. Compare (Plutarch, Alexand. 17) analogous expressions of flattery — from the historians of Alexander, affirming that the sea near Pamphylia providentially made way for him — from the inhabitants on the

After crossing the Euphrates, Cyrus proceeded, for nine days' march,<sup>1</sup> southward along its left bank, until he came to its affluent, the river Araxes or Chaboras, which divided Syria from Arabia. From the numerous and well-supplied villages there situated, he supplied himself with a large stock of provisions, to confront the desolate march through Arabia on which they were about to enter, following the banks of the Euphrates still further southward. It was now that he entered on what may be called the Desert,—an endless breadth or succession of undulations, "like the sea," without any cultivation or even any tree; nothing but wormwood and various aromatic shrubs.<sup>2</sup> Here too the astonished Greeks saw, for the first time, wild asses, antelopes, ostriches, bustards, some of which afforded sport, and occasionally food, to the horsemen who amused themselves by chasing them; though the wild ass was swifter than any horse, and the ostrich altogether unapproachable. Five days' march brought them to Korsôtê, a town which had been abandoned by its inhabitants,—probably, however, leaving

banks of the Euphrates, when the river was passed by the Roman legions and the Parthian prince Tiridates, in the reign of the Emperor Tiberius (Tacitus, *Annal.* vi. 37); and by Lucullus still earlier (Plutarch, *Lucul.* c. 24).

The time when Cyrus crossed the Euphrates, must probably have been about the end of July or beginning of August. Now the period of greatest height, in the waters of the Euphrates near this part of its course, is from the 21st to the 28th of May; the period when they are lowest, is about the middle of November (see Colonel Chesney's Report on the Euphrates, p. 5). Rennell erroneously states that they are lowest in August and September (*Expedition of Xenophon*, p. 277). The waters would thus be at a sort of mean height, when Cyrus passed.

Mr. Ainsworth states that there were only twenty inches of water in the ford at Thapsakus, from October 1841 to February 1842; the steamers Nimrod and Nitocris then struck upon it (p. 72), though the steamers Euphrates and Tigris had passed over it without difficulty in the month of May.

<sup>1</sup> Xenophon gives these nine days of march as covering fifty parasangs (*Anab.* i. 4, 19). But Koch remarks that the distance is not half so great as that from the sea to Thapsakus; which latter Xenophon gives at sixty-five parasangs. There is here some confusion; together with the usual difficulty in assigning any given distance as the equivalent of the parasang (Koch, *Zug der Zehn Tausend*, p. 38).

<sup>2</sup> See the remarkable testimony of Mr. Ainsworth, from personal observation, to the accuracy of Xenophon's description of the country, even at the present day.

the provision dealers behind, as had before happened at Tarsus, in Kilikia;<sup>1</sup> since the army here increased their supplies for the onward march. All that they could obtain was required, and was indeed insufficient, for the trying journey which awaited them. For thirteen successive days, and ninety computed parasangs, did they march along the left bank of the Euphrates, without provisions, and even without herbage except in some few places. Their flour was exhausted, so that the soldiers lived for some days altogether upon meat, while many baggage-animals perished of hunger. Moreover the ground was often heavy and difficult, full of hills and narrow valleys, requiring the personal efforts of every man to push the cars and waggons at particular junctures; efforts in which the Persian courtiers of Cyrus, under his express orders, took zealous part, toiling in the dirt with their ornamented attire.<sup>2</sup> After these thirteen days of hardship, they reached Pylæ; near the entrance of the cultivated territory of Babylonia, where they seem to have halted five or six days to rest and refresh.<sup>3</sup> There

<sup>1</sup> Xen. *Anab.* i. 2, 24.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. *Anab.* i. 5, 4-8.

<sup>3</sup> I infer that the army halted here five or six days, from the story afterwards told respecting the Ambrakiot Silanus, the prophet of the army; who, on sacrificing, had told Cyrus that his brother would not fight for ten days (i. 7, 16). This sacrifice must have been offered, I imagine, during the halt—not during the distressing march which preceded. The ten days named by Silanus, expired on the fourth day after they left Pylæ.

It is in reference to this portion of the course of the Euphrates, from the Chaboras southward down by Anah and Hit (the ancient Is, noticed by Herodotus, and still celebrated from its unexhausted supply of bitumen), between latitude 35½° and 34°—that Colonel Chesney, in his Report on the Navigation of the Euphrates (p. 2), has the following remarks:—

"The scenery above Hit, in itself very picturesque, is greatly heightened, as one is carried along the current, by the frequent recurrence, at very short intervals, of ancient irrigating aqueducts; these beautiful specimens of art and durability are attributed by the Arabs to the times of the ignorant, meaning (as is expressly understood) the Persians, when fire-worshippers, and in possession of the world. They literally cover both banks, and prove that the borders of the Euphrates were once thickly inhabited by a people far advanced indeed in the application of hydraulics to domestic purposes, of the first and greatest utility—the transport of water. The greater portion is now more or less in ruins, but some have been repaired, and kept up for use either to grind corn or to irrigate. The aqueducts are of stone, firmly cemented, narrowing to about two feet or twenty inches at top, placed at



was on the opposite side of the river, at or near this point, a flourishing city named Charmandê; to which many of the soldiers

right angles to the current, and carried various distances towards the interior, from two hundred to one thousand two hundred yards.

"But what most concerns the subject of this memoir is, the existence of a parapet wall or stone rampart in the river, just above the several aqueducts. In general, there is one of the former attached to each of the latter. And almost invariably, between two mills on the opposite banks, one of them crosses the stream from side to side, with the exception of a passage left in the centre for boats to pass up and down. The object of these subaqueous walls would appear to be exclusively, to raise the water sufficiently at low seasons, to give it impetus, as well as a more abundant supply to the wheels. And their effect at those times is, to create a fall in every part of the width, save the opening left for commerce, through which the water rushes with a moderately irregular surface. These dams were probably from four to eight feet high originally; but they are now frequently a bank of stones disturbing the evenness of the current, but always affording a sufficient passage for large boats at low seasons."

The marks which Colonel Chesney points out, of previous population and industry on the banks of the Euphrates at this part of its course, are extremely interesting and curious, when contrasted with the desolation depicted by Xenophon; who mentions that there were no other inhabitants than some who lived by cutting millstones from the stone quarries near, and sending them to Babylon in exchange for grain. It is plain that the population, of which Colonel Chesney saw the remaining tokens, either had already long ceased, or did not begin to exist, or to construct their dams and aqueducts, until a period later than Xenophon. They probably began during the period of the Seleukid kings, after the year 300 B. C. For this line of road along the Euphrates began then to acquire great importance as the means of communication between the great city of Seleukeia (on the Tigris, below Bagdad) and the other cities founded by Seleukus Nikator and his successors in the North of Syria and Asia Minor — Seleukeia in Pieria, Antioch, Laodikeia, Apameia, etc. This route coincides mainly with the present route from Bagdad to Aleppo, crossing the Euphrates at Thapsakus. It can hardly be doubted that the course of the Euphrates was better protected during the two centuries of the Seleukid kings (B. C. 300-100, speaking in round numbers), than it came to be afterwards, when that river became the boundary line between the Romans and the Parthians. Even at the time of the Emperor Julian's invasion, however, Ammianus Marcellinus describes the left bank of the Euphrates, north of Babylonia, as being in several parts well cultivated, and furnishing ample subsistence, (Ammian. Marc. xxiv, 1). At the time of Xenophon's Anabasis, there was nothing to give much importance to the banks of the Euphrates north of Babylonia.

crossed over (by means of skins stuffed with hay), and procured plentiful supplies, especially of date-wine and millet.<sup>1</sup>

It was during this halt opposite Charmandê that a dispute occurred among the Greeks themselves, menacing to the safety of all. I have already mentioned that Klearchus, Menon, Proxenus, and each of the Greek chiefs, enjoyed a separate command over his own division, subject only to the superior control of Cyrus himself. Some of the soldiers of Menon becoming involved in a quarrel with those of Klearchus, the latter examined into the case, pronounced one of Menon's soldiers to have misbehaved, and caused him to be flogged. The comrades of the man thus punished resented the proceeding to such a degree, that as Klearchus was riding away from the banks of the river to his own tent, attended by a few followers only through the encampment of Menon, — one of the soldiers who happened to be cutting wood, flung the hatchet at him, while others hooted and began to pelt him with stones. Klearchus, after escaping unhurt from this danger to his own division, immediately ordered his soldiers to take arms and put themselves in battle order. He himself advanced at the head of his Thracian peltasts, and his forty horsemen, in hostile attitude against Menon's division; who on their side ran to arms, with Menon himself at their head, and placed themselves in order of defence. A slight accident might have now brought on irreparable disorder and bloodshed, had not Proxenus, coming up at the moment with a company of his hoplites, planted himself in military array between the two disputing par-

Mr. Ainsworth describes the country on the left bank of the Euphrates, before reaching Pylæ, as being now in the same condition as it was when Xenophon and his comrades marched through it. — "full of hills and narrow valleys, and presenting many difficulties to the movement of an army. The illustrator was, by a curious accident, left by the Euphrates steamer on this very portion of the river, and on the same side as the Perso-Greek army, and he had to walk a day and a night across these inhospitable regions; so that he can speak feelingly of the difficulties which the Greeks had to encounter." (Travels in the Track, etc. p. 81.)

<sup>1</sup> I incline to think that Charmandê must have been nearly opposite Pylæ lower down than Hit. But Major Rennell (p. 107) and Mr. Ainsworth (p. 84) suppose Charmandê to be the same place as the modern Hit (the Is of Herodotus). There is no other known town with which we can identify it.

ties, and entreated Klearchus to desist from farther assault. The latter at first refused. Indignant that his recent insult and narrow escape from death should be treated so lightly, he desired Proxenus to retire. His wrath was not appeased, until Cyrus himself, apprised of the gravity of the danger, came galloping up with his personal attendants and his two javelins in hand. "Klearchus, Proxenus, and all you Greeks (said he), you know not what you are doing. Be assured that if you now come to blows, it will be the hour of my destruction, — and of your own also, shortly after me. For if *your* force be ruined, all these natives whom you see around, will become more hostile to us even than the men now serving with the King." On hearing this (says Xenophon) Klearchus came to his senses, and the troops dispersed without any encounter."<sup>1</sup>

After passing Pylæ, the territory called Babylonia began. The hills flanking the Euphrates, over which the army had hitherto been passing, soon ceased, and low alluvial plains commenced.<sup>2</sup> Traces were now discovered, the first throughout their long march, of a hostile force moving in their front, ravaging the country and burning the herbage. It was here that Cyrus detected the treason of a Persian nobleman named Orontes, whom he examined in his tent, in the presence of various Persians possessing his intimate confidence, as well as of Klearchus with a guard of three

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 5, 11-17

<sup>2</sup> The commentators agree in thinking that we are to understand by Pylæ a sort of gate or pass, marking the spot where the desert country north of Babylonia — with its undulations of land, and its steep banks along the river — was exchanged for the flat and fertile alluvium constituting Babylonia proper. Perhaps there was a town near the pass, and named after it.

Now it appears from Col. Chesney's survey that this alteration in the nature of the country takes place a few miles below Hit. He observes — (Euphrates and Tigris, vol. i, p. 54) — "Three miles below Hit, the remains of aqueducts disappear, and the windings become shorter and more frequent, as the river flows through a tract of country almost level." Thereabouts it is that I am inclined to place Pylæ.

Colonel Chesney places it lower down, twenty-five miles from Hit. Professor Koch (*Zug der Zehn Tausend*, p. 44), lower down still. Mr. Ainsworth places it as much as seventy geographical miles lower than Hit (*Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand*, p. 81); compare Ritter, *Erdkunde*, West Asien, x. p. 16; xi, pp. 755-763.



thousand hoplites. Orontes was examined, found guilty, and privately put to death.<sup>1</sup>

After three days' march, estimated by Xenophon at twelve *parasangs*, Cyrus was induced by the evidences before him, or by the reports of deserters, to believe that the opposing army was close at hand, and that a battle was impending. Accordingly, in the middle of the night, he mustered his whole army, Greeks as well as barbarians; but the enemy did not appear as had been expected. His numbers were counted at this spot, and it was found that there were, of Greeks ten thousand four hundred hoplites, and two thousand five hundred peltasts; of the barbarian or Asiatic force of Cyrus, one hundred thousand men with twenty *scythed* chariots. The numbers of the Greeks had been somewhat diminished during the march, from sickness, desertion, or other causes. The reports of deserters described the army of Artaxerxes at one million two hundred thousand men, besides the six thousand horse-guards commanded by Artagerses, and two hundred *scythed* chariots, under the command of Abrokomas, Tissaphernes, and two others. It was ascertained afterwards, however, that the force of Abrokomas had not yet joined, and later accounts represented the numerical estimation as too great by one-fourth.

In expectation of an action, Cyrus here convened the generals as well as the *Lochages* (or captains) of the Greeks; as well to consult about suitable arrangements, as to stimulate their zeal in his cause. Few points in this narrative are more striking than the language addressed by the Persian prince to the Greeks, on this as well as on other occasions.

"It is not from want of native forces, men of Hellas, that I have brought you hither, but because I account you better and braver than any number of natives. Prove yourselves now worthy of the freedom which you enjoy; that freedom for which I envy you, and which I would choose, be assured, in preference to all my possessions a thousand times multiplied. Learn now from me, who know it well, all that you will have to encounter, — vast numbers and plenty of noise; but if you despise these, I am

<sup>1</sup> The description given of this scene (known to the Greeks through the communications of Klearchus) by Xenophon, is extremely interesting (*Anab.* 1. 6). I omit it from regard to space.

ashamed to tell you what worthless stuff you will find in these native men. Behave well, — like brave men, and trust me for sending you back in such condition as to make your friends at home envy you; though I hope to prevail on many of you to prefer my service to your own homes."

"Some of us are remarking, Cyrus, (said a Samian exile named Gaulitês), that you are full of promises at this hour of danger, but will forget them, or perhaps will be unable to perform them, when danger is over. . . . . As to ability, (replied Cyrus), my father's empire reaches northward to the region of intolerable cold, southward to that of intolerable heat. All in the middle is now apportioned in satrapies among my brother's friends; all, if we are victorious, will come to be distributed among mine. I have no fear of not having enough to give away, but rather of not having friends enough to receive it from me. To each of you Greeks, moreover, I shall present a wreath of gold."

Declarations like these, repeated by Cyrus to many of the Greek soldiers, and circulated among the remainder, filled all of them with confidence and enthusiasm in his cause. Such was the sense of force and superiority inspired, that Klearchus asked him, — "Do you really think, Cyrus, that your brother will fight you? . . . . . Yes, by Zeus, (was the reply); assuredly, if he be the son of Darius and Parysatis, and my brother, I shall not win this prize without a battle." All the Greeks were earnest with him at the same time not to expose his own person, but to take post in the rear of their body.<sup>1</sup> We shall see presently how this advice was followed.

The declarations here reported, as well as the expressions employed before during the dispute between Klearchus and the soldiers of Menon near Charmandê — being, as they are, genuine and authentic, and not dramatic composition such as those of Æschylus in the *Persæ*, nor historic amplification like the speeches ascribed to Xerxes in Herodotus, — are among the most valuable evidences respecting the Hellenic character generally. It is not merely the superior courage and military discipline of the Greeks which Cyrus attests, compared with the cowardice of Asiatics, — but also their fidelity and sense of obligation which he contrasts with the time-serving treachery of the latter;<sup>2</sup> connect-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 7, 2-9.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. i 5, 16.



ing these superior qualities with the political freedom which they enjoy. To hear this young prince expressing such strong admiration and envy for Grecian freedom, and such ardent personal preference for it above all the splendor of his own position, — was doubtless the most flattering of all compliments which he could pay to the listening citizen-soldiers. That a young Persian prince should be capable of conceiving such a sentiment, is no slight proof of his mental elevation above the level both of his family and of his nation. The natural Persian opinion is expressed by the conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus in Herodotus. To Xerxes, the conception of free citizenship, — and of orderly, self-sufficing courage planted by a public discipline, patriotic as well as equalizing, — was not merely repugnant, but incomprehensible. He understood only a master issuing orders to obedient subjects, and stimulating soldiers to bravery by means of the whip. His descendant Cyrus, on the contrary, had learnt by personal observation to enter into the feeling of personal dignity prevalent in the Greeks around him, based as it was on the conviction that they governed themselves and that there was no man who had any rights of his own over them, — that the law was their only master, and that in rendering obedience to it they were working for no one else but for themselves.<sup>2</sup> Cyrus knew where to touch the sentiment of Hellenic honor, so fatally extinguished after the Greeks lost their political freedom by the hands

<sup>1</sup> See Herodot. vii. 102, 103, 202. Compare the observations of the Persian Achaemenés, c. 236.

<sup>2</sup> Herod. vii. 104. Demaratus says to Xerxes, respecting the Lacedæmonians — Ἐλευθέροι γὰρ ἄνθρωποι, οἳ πάντα ἑλάνθεροι εἰσι· ἐπεὶ οὐ γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐξ αὐτῶν νόμος, τὸν ἐποδευμένονσι πολλὸν μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ σοὶ σέ.

Again, the historian observes about the Athenians, and their extraordinary increase of prowess after having shaken off the despotism of Hippias (v. 78) — Δηλοὶ δ' οὐ κατ' ἐν μόνον ἀλλὰ πανταχοί, ἡ ἰσχυροτέρα ἔστι ἀρετὴ σπουδαῖον· εἰ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τυραννεύμενοι μὲν, σέδαμον τῶν σοφῶν περισσεύοντων ἦσαν τὰ πολέμια ἀμείνους, ἀπαλλαγθέντες δὲ τυραννῶν, μακρῶ πρώτοι ἐγένοντο. Δηλοὶ ὦν ταῦτα, ὅτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν ἐθελοκακείον, ὡς δεσποτῇ ἐργαζόμενοι· ἑλευθερωθέντων δὲ, αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἐωῦτα προθυμεῖτο ἐργάζεσθαι.

Compare Menander, Fragm. Incert. CL. ap. Meineke, Fragm. Comicæ Græc. vol. iv. p. 268 —

Ἐλευθέρος πᾶς ἐν δεινότητι νομῶ

Δυσὶν δὲ δούλος, καὶ νόμῳ καὶ δεσπότῃ.

of the Macedonians, and exchanged for that intellectual quickness combined with moral degeneracy, which Cicero and his contemporaries remark as the characteristic of these once high-toned communities.

Having concerted the order of battle with the generals, Cyrus marched forward in cautious array during the next day, anticipating the appearance of the king's forces. Nothing of the kind was seen, however, though abundant marks of their retiring footsteps were evident. The day's march, (called three parasangs) having been concluded without a battle, Cyrus called to him the Ambrakiotic prophet Silanus, and presented him with three thousand darics or ten Attic talents. Silanus had assured him, on the eleventh day preceding, that there would be no action in ten days from that time; upon which Cyrus had told him,—"If your prophecy comes true, I will give you three thousand darics. My brother will not fight at all, if he does not fight within ten days."<sup>1</sup>

In spite of the strong opinion which he had expressed in reply to Klearchus, Cyrus now really began to conceive that no battle would be hazarded by his enemies; especially as in the course of this last day's march, he came to a broad and deep trench (thirty feet broad and eighteen feet deep), approaching so near to the Euphrates as to leave an interval of only twenty feet for passage. This trench had been dug by order of Artaxerxes across the plain, for a length said to be of twelve parasangs (about forty-two English miles, if the parasang be reckoned at thirty stadia), so as to touch at its other extremity what was called the walls of Media.<sup>2</sup> It had been dug as a special measure

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 7, 14-17.

<sup>2</sup> From Pylæ to the undefended trench, there intervened three entire days of march, and one part of a day; for it occurred in the fourth day's march.

Xenophon calls the three entire days, twelve parasangs in all. This argues short marches, not full marches. And it does not seem that the space of ground traversed during any one of them can have been considerable. For they were all undertaken with visible evidences of an enemy immediately in front of them; which circumstance was the occasion of the treason of Orontes, who asked Cyrus for a body of cavalry, under pretence of attacking the light troops of the enemy in front, and then wrote a letter to inform Artaxerxes that he was about to desert with his division. The letter was delivered to Cyrus, who thus discovered the treason.

of defence against the approaching invaders. Yet we hear with surprise, and the invaders themselves found with equal surprise, that not a man was on the spot to defend it; so that the whole Cyreian army and baggage passed without resistance through the narrow breadth of twenty feet. This is the first notice of any defensive measures taken to repel the invasion, — except the precaution of Abrokomas in burning the boats at Thapsakus. Cyrus had been allowed to traverse all this immense space, and to pass through so many defensible positions, without having yet struck a blow. And now Artaxerxes, after having cut a prodigious extent of trench at the cost of so much labor, — provided a valuable means of resistance, especially against Grecian heavy-armed

Marching with a known enemy not far off in front, Cyrus must have kept his army in something like battle order, and therefore must have moved slowly. Moreover the discovery of the treason of Orontes must itself have been an alarming fact, well calculated to render both Cyrus and Klearchus doubly cautious for the time. And the very trial of Orontes appears to have been conducted under such solemnities as must have occasioned a halt of the army.

Taking these circumstances, we can hardly suppose the Greeks to have got over so much as thirty English miles of ground in the three entire days of march. The fourth day they must have got over very little ground indeed; not merely because Cyrus was in momentary expectation of the King's main army, and of a general battle (i, 7, 14), but because of the great delay necessary for passing the trench. His whole army (more than one hundred thousand men), with baggage, chariots, etc., had to pass through the narrow gut of twenty feet wide between the trench and the Euphrates. He can hardly have made more than five miles in this whole day's march, getting at night so far as to encamp two or three miles beyond the trench. We may therefore reckon the distance marched over between Pylæ and the trench as about thirty-two miles in all; and two or three miles farther to the encampment of the next night. Probably Cyrus would keep near the river, yet not following its bends with absolute precision; so that in estimating distance, we ought to take a mean between the straight line and the full windings of the river.

I conceive the trench to have cut the Wall of Media at a much wider angle than appears in Col. Chesney's map; so that the triangular space included between the trench, the Wall, and the river, was much more extensive. The reason, we may presume, why the trench was cut, was, to defend that portion of the well-cultivated and watered country of Babylonia which lay outside of the Wall of Media — which portion (as we shall see hereafter in the marches of the Greeks after the battle) was very considerable.



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soldiers, — and occupied it seemingly until the very last moment, — throws it up from some unaccountable panic, and suffers a whole army to pass unopposed through this very narrow gut. Having surmounted unexpectedly so formidable an obstacle, Cyrus as well as the Greeks imagined that Artaxerxes would never think of fighting in the open plain. All began to relax in that careful array which had been observed since the midnight review, inasmuch that he himself proceeded in his chariot instead of on horseback, while many of the Greek soldiers lodged their arms on the waggons or beasts of burden.<sup>1</sup>

On the next day but one after passing the undefended trench, they were surprised, at a spot called Kunaxa,<sup>2</sup> just when they were about to halt for the mid-day meal and repose, by the sudden in-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 7, 20. The account given by Xenophon of this long line of trench, first dug by order of Artaxerxes, and then left useless and undefended, differs from the narrative of Diodorus (xiv, 22), which seems to be borrowed from Ephorus. Diodorus says that the king caused a long trench to be dug, and lined with carriages and waggons as a defence for his baggage; and that he afterwards marched forth from this entrenchment, with his soldiers free and unincumbered, to give battle to Cyrus. This is a statement more plausible than that of Xenophon, in this point of view, that it makes out the king to have acted upon a rational scheme; whereas in Xenophon he appears at first to have adopted a plan of defence, and then to have renounced it, after immense labor and cost, without any reason, so far as we can see. Yet I have no doubt that the account of Xenophon is the true one. The narrow passage, and the undefended trench, were both facts of the most obvious and impressive character to an observing soldier.

<sup>2</sup> Xenophon does not mention the name Kunaxa, which comes to us from Plutarch (Artaxerx. c. 8), who states that it was five hundred stadia (about fifty-eight miles) from Babylon; while Xenophon was informed that the field of battle was distant from Babylon only three hundred and sixty stadia. Now, according to Colonel Chesney (Euphrates and Tigris, vol. i, p. 57), Hillah (Babylon) is distant ninety-one miles by the river, or sixty-one and a half miles direct, from Felujah. Following therefore the distance given by Plutarch (probably copied from Ktesias), we should place Kunaxa a little lower down the river than Felujah. This seems the most probable supposition.

Rennell and Mr. Baillie Fraser so place it (Mesopotamia and Assyria, p. 186, Edin. 1842), I think rightly; moreover the latter remarks, what most of the commentators overlook, that the Greeks did not pass through the Wall of Media until long after the battle. See a note a little below, near the beginning of my next chapter, in reference to that Wall.

timation that the king's army was approaching in order of battle on the open plain. Instantly Cyrus hastened to mount on horseback, to arm himself, and to put his forces in order, while the Greeks on their side halted and formed their line with all possible speed.<sup>1</sup> They were on the right wing of the army, adjoining the river Euphrates; Ariæus with the Asiatic forces being on the left, and Cyrus himself, surrounded by a body-guard of six hundred well-armed Persian horsemen, in the centre. Among the Greeks, Klearchus commanded the right division of hoplites, with Paphlagonian horsemen and the Grecian peltasts on the extreme right, close to the river; Proxenus with his division stood next; Menon commanded on the left. All the Persian horsemen around Cyrus had breastplates, helmets, short Grecian swords, and two javelins in their right hands; the horses also were defended by facings both over the breast and head. Cyrus himself, armed generally like the rest, stood distinguished by having an upright tiara instead of the helmet. Though the first news had come upon them by surprise, the Cyreians had ample time to put themselves in complete order; for the enemy did not appear until the afternoon was advanced. First, was seen dust, like a white cloud, — next, an undefined dark spot, gradually nearing, until the armor began to shine, and the component divisions of troops, arranged in dense masses, became discernible. Tissaphernes was on the left, opposite to the Greeks, at the head of the Persian horsemen, with white cuirasses; on his right, stood the Persian bowmen, with their

<sup>1</sup> The distance of the undefended trench from the battle-field of Kunaxa would be about twenty-two miles. First, three miles beyond the trench, to the first night-station; next, a full day's march, say twelve miles; thirdly, a half day's march, to the time of the mid-day halt, say seven miles.

The distance from Pylæ to the trench having before been stated at thirty-two miles, the whole distance from Pylæ to Kunaxa will be about fifty-four miles.

Now Colonel Chesney has stated the distance from Hit to Felujah Castle (two known points) at forty-eight miles of straight line, and seventy-seven miles, if following the line of the river. Deduct four miles for the distance from Hit to Pylæ, and we shall then have between Pylæ and Felujah, a rectilinear distance of forty-four miles. The marching route of the Greeks (as explained in the previous note, the Greeks following generally, but not exactly, the windings of the river) will give fifty miles from Pylæ to Felujah, and fifty-three or fifty-four from Pylæ to Kunaxa.



gerrha, or wicker shields, spiked so as to be fastened in the ground while arrows were shot from behind them; next, the Egyptian infantry with long wooden shields covering the whole body and legs. In front of all was a row of chariots with scythes attached to the wheels, destined to begin the charge against the Grecian phalanx.<sup>1</sup>

As the Greeks were completing their array, Cyrus rode to the front, and desired Klearchus to make his attack with the Greeks upon the centre of the enemy; since it was there that the king in person would be posted, and if that were once beaten, the victory was gained. But such was the superiority of Artaxerxes in numbers, that his centre extended beyond the left of Cyrus. Accordingly Klearchus, afraid of withdrawing his right from the river, lest he should be taken both in flank and rear, chose to keep his position on the right, — and merely replied to Cyrus, that he would manage everything for the best. I have before remarked<sup>2</sup> how often the fear of being attacked on the unshielded side and on the rear, led the Greek soldier into movements inconsistent with military expediency; and it will be seen presently that Klearchus, blindly obeying this habitual rule of precaution, was induced here to commit the capital mistake of keeping on the right flank, contrary to the more judicious direction of Cyrus.<sup>3</sup> The latter continued for a short time riding slowly in front of the lines, looking alternately at the two armies, when Xenophon, one of the small total of Grecian horsemen, and attached to the division of Proxenus, rode forth from the line to accost him, asking if he had any orders to give. Cyrus desired him to proclaim to every one that the sacrifices were favorable. Hearing a murmur going through the Grecian ranks, he inquired from Xenophon what it was; and received for answer, that the watchword was now being passed along for the second time. He asked, with some surprise, who gave the watchword? and what it was? Xenophon replied that it was "Zeus the Preserver, and Victory." — "I accept it," replied Cyrus; "let that be the word;" and immediately rode away to his own post in the centre, among the Asiatics.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 8, 8-11.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. v. 70. See Vol. VII, ch. lvi, p. 84 of this History.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch (Artaxerx. c. 8) makes this criticism upon Klearchus; and it seems quite just.

The vast host of Artaxerxes, advancing steadily and without noise, were now within less than half a mile of the Cyreians, when the Greek troops raised the pæan or usual war-cry, and began to move forward. As they advanced, the shout became more vehement, the pace accelerated, and at last the whole body got into a run.<sup>1</sup> This might have proved unfortunate, had their opponents been other than Grecian hoplites; but the Persians did not stand to await the charge. They turned and fled, when the assailants were yet hardly within bow-shot. Such was their panic, that even the drivers of the scythed chariots in front, deserting their teams, ran away along with the rest; while the horses, left to themselves, rushed apart in all directions, some turning round to follow the fugitives, others coming against the advancing Greeks, who made open order to let them pass. The left division of the king's army was thus routed without a blow, and seemingly without a man killed on either side; one Greek only being wounded by an arrow, and another by not getting out of the way of one of the chariots.<sup>2</sup> Tissaphernes alone, — who, with the body of horse immediately around him, was at the extreme Persian left, close to the river, — formed an exception to this universal flight. He charged and penetrated through the Grecian peltasts, who stood opposite to him between the hoplites and the river. These peltasts, commanded by Episthenes of Amphipolis, opened their ranks to let him pass, darting at the men as they rode by, yet without losing any one themselves. Tissaphernes thus got into the rear of the Greeks, who continued, on their side, to pursue the flying Persians before them.<sup>3</sup>

Matters proceeded differently in the other parts of the field. Artaxerxes, though in the centre of his own army, yet from his superior numbers outflanked Ariæus, who commanded the extreme left of the Cyreians.<sup>4</sup> Finding no one directly opposed to him, he began to wheel round his right wing, to encompass his enemies; not noticing the flight of his left division. Cyrus, on the other hand, when he saw the easy victory of the Greeks on their side, was overjoyed; and received from every one around him salutations, as if he were already king. Nevertheless, he had self-command

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 8, 17; Diodor. xiv, 23.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 10, 4-8.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 8, 17-20.

Xen. Anab. i, 8, 23; i, 9 31



enough not yet to rush forward as if the victory was already gained,<sup>1</sup> but remained unmoved, with his regiment of six hundred horse around him, watching the movements of Artaxerxes. As soon as he saw the latter wheeling round his right division to get upon the rear of the Cyreians, he hastened to check this movement by an impetuous charge upon the centre, where Artaxerxes was in person, surrounded by the body-guard of six thousand horse, under Artagerses. So vigorous was the attack of Cyrus, that with his six hundred horse, he broke and dispersed this body-guard, killing Artagerses with his own hand. His own six hundred horse rushed forward in pursuit of the fugitives, leaving Cyrus himself nearly alone, with only the select few, called his "Table-Companions," around him. It was under these circumstances that he first saw his brother Artaxerxes, whose person had been exposed to view by the flight of the body-guards. The sight filled him with such a paroxysm of rage and jealous ambition,<sup>2</sup> that he lost all thought of safety or prudence,—cried out, "I see the man,"—and rushed forward with his mere handful of companions to attack Artaxerxes, in spite of the numerous host behind him. Cyrus made directly at his brother, darting his javelin with so true an aim as to strike him in the breast, and wound him through the cuirass; though the wound (afterwards cured by the Greek surgeon Ktesias) could not have been very severe, since Artaxerxes did not quit the field, but, on the contrary, engaged in personal combat, he and those around him, against this handful of assailants. So unequal a combat did not last long. Cyrus, being severely wounded under the eye by the javelin of a Karian soldier, was cast from his horse and slain. The small number of faithful com-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 8, 21.

Κύρος δὲ, ὁρῶν τοὺς Ἑλλήνας νικῶντας τὸ καθ' αὐτοὺς καὶ διώκοντας, ἡδόμενος καὶ προσκυνοῦμενος ἤδη ὡς βασιλεὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφ' αὐτὸν, οὐδ' ὡς ἐξ ἡχθρῆ δειώκεται, etc.

The last words are remarkable, as indicating that no other stimulus except that of ambitious rivalry and fraternal antipathy, had force enough to overthrow the self-command of Cyrus.

<sup>2</sup> Compare the account of the transport of rage which seized the Theban Pelopidas, when he saw Alexander the despot of Phæræ in the opposite army; which led to the same fatal consequences (Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 32; Cornel. Nepos, Pelop. c. 5). See also the reflections of Xenophon on the conduct of Teleutas before Olynthus. — Hellenic. v. 3, 7.

panions around him all perished in his defence. Artasyras, who stood first among them in his confidence and attachment, seeing him mortally wounded and fallen, cast himself down upon him, clasped him in his arms, and in this position either slew himself, or was slain by order of the king.<sup>1</sup>

The head and the right hand of the deceased prince were immediately cut off by order of Artaxerxes, and doubtless exhibited conspicuously to view. This was a proclamation to every one that the entire contest was at an end; and so it was understood by Ariæus, who, together with all the Asiatic troops of Cyrus, deserted the field and fled back to the camp. Not even there did they defend themselves, when the king and his forces pursued them; but fled yet farther back to the resting-place of the previous night. The troops of Artaxerxes got into the camp and began to plunder it without resistance. Even the harem of Cyrus fell into their power. It included two Grecian women,—of free condition, good family, and education,—one from Phokæa, the other from Miletus, brought to him, by force, from their parents to Sardis. The elder of these two, the Phokæan, named Milto, distinguished alike

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 8, 22–29. The account of this battle and of the death of Cyrus by Ktesias (as far as we can make it out from the brief abstract in Photius — Ktesias, Fragm. c. 58, 59, ed. Bähr) does not differ materially from Xenophon. Ktesias mentions the Karian soldier (not noticed by Xenophon) who hurled the javelin; and adds that this soldier was afterwards tortured and put to death by Queen Parysatis, in savage revenge for the death of Cyrus. He also informs us that Bagapatês, the person who by order of Artaxerxes cut off the head and hand of Cyrus, was destroyed by her in the same way.

Diodorus (xiv, 23) dresses up a much fuller picture of the conflict between Cyrus and his brother, which differs on many points, partly direct and partly implied, from Xenophon.

Plutarch (Artaxerxes, c. 11, 12, 13) gives an account of the battle, and of the death of Cyrus, which he professes to have derived from Ktesias, but which differs still more materially from the narrative in Xenophon. Compare also the few words of Justin, v, 11.

Diodorus (xiv, 24) says that twelve thousand men were slain of the king's army at Kunaxa; the greater part of them by the Greeks under Klearchus, who did not lose a single man. He estimates the loss of Cyrus's Asiatic army at three thousand men. But as the Greeks did not lose a man, so they can hardly have killed many in the pursuit; for they had scarcely any cavalry, and no great number of peltasts, — while hoplites could not have overtaken the flying Persians.



for beauty and accomplished intelligence, was made prisoner and transferred to the harem of Artaxerxes; the other, a younger person, found means to save herself, though without her upper garments,<sup>1</sup> and sought shelter among some Greeks who were left in the camp on guard of the Grecian baggage. These Greeks repelled the Persian assailants with considerable slaughter; preserving their own baggage, as well as the persons of all who fled to them for shelter. But the Asiatic camp of the Cyreians was completely pillaged, not excepting those reserved waggons of provisions which Cyrus had provided in order that his Grecian auxiliaries might be certain, under all circumstances, of a supply.<sup>2</sup>

While Artaxerxes was thus stripping the Cyreian camp, he was joined by Tissaphernes and his division of horse, who had charged through between the Grecian division and the river. At this time, there was a distance of no less than thirty stadia or three and a half miles between him and Klearchus with the Grecian division; so far had the latter advanced forward in pursuit of the Persian fugitives. Apprised, after some time, that the king's troops had been victorious on the left and centre, and were masters of the camp, — but not yet knowing of the death of Cyrus, — Klearchus marched back his troops, and met the enemy's forces also returning. He was apprehensive of being surrounded by superior numbers, and therefore took post with his rear upon the river. In this position, Arta-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 10, 3. The accomplishments and fascinations of this Phokæan lady, and the great esteem in which she was held first by Cyrus and afterwards by Artaxerxes, have been exaggerated into a romantic story, in which we cannot tell what may be the proportion of truth (see Ælian, V. H. xii, 1; Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 26, 27; Justin, x, 2). Both Plutarch and Justin state that the subsequent enmity between Artaxerxes and his son Darius, which led to the conspiracy of the latter against his father, and to his destruction when the conspiracy was discovered, arose out of the passion of Darius for her. But as that transaction certainly happened at the close of the long life and reign of Artaxerxes, who reigned forty-six years — and as she must have been then sixty years old, if not more — we may fairly presume that the cause of the family tragedy must have been something different.

Compare the description of the fate of Berenikê of Chios, and Monimê of Miletus, wives of Mithridates king of Pontus, during the last misfortunes of that prince (Plutarch, Lucullus, c. 18).

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 10, 17. This provision must probably have been made during the recent halt at Pylæ.

xerxes again marshalled his troops in front, as if to attack him, but the Greeks, anticipating his movement, were first in making the attack themselves, and forced the Persians to take flight even more terror-stricken than before. Klearchus, thus relieved from all enemies, waited awhile in hopes of hearing news of Cyrus. He then returned to the camp, which was found stripped of all its stores; so that the Greeks were compelled to pass the night without supper, while most of them also had had no dinner, from the early hour at which the battle had commenced.<sup>1</sup> It was only on the next morning that they learnt, through Proklês (descendant of the Spartan king Demaratus, formerly companion of Xerxes in the invasion of Greece), that Cyrus had been slain; news which converted their satisfaction at their own triumph into sorrow and dismay.<sup>2</sup>

Thus terminated the battle of Kunaxa, and along with it the ambitious hopes as well as the life of this young prince. His character and proceedings suggest instructive remarks. Both in the conduct of this expedition, and in the two or three years of administration in Asia Minor which preceded it, he displayed qualities such as are not seen in Cyrus called the Great, nor in any other member of the Persian regal family, nor indeed in any other Persian general throughout the history of the monarchy. We observe a large and long-sighted combination, — a power of foreseeing difficulties, and providing means beforehand for overcoming them, — a dexterity in meeting variable exigencies, and dealing with different parties, Greeks or Asiatics, officers or soldiers, — a conviction of the necessity, not merely of purchasing men's service by lavish presents, but of acquiring their confidence by straightforward dealing and systematic good faith, — a power of repressing displeasure when policy commanded, as at the desertion of Xenias and Pasion, and the first conspiracies of Orontes; although usually the punishments which he inflicted were full of Oriental barbarity. How rare were the merits and accomplishments of Cyrus, as a Persian, will be best felt when we contrast this portrait, by Xenophon, with the description of the Persian satraps by Isokrates.<sup>3</sup> That many

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 10, 18, 19.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 3, 4.

<sup>3</sup> Isokrates, Orat. iv, (Panegyric.) s. 175–182; a striking passage, as describing the way in which political institutions work themselves into the individual character and habits.



persons deserted from Artaxerxes to Cyrus, — none, except Orotanes, from Cyrus to Artaxerxes, — has been remarked by Xenophon. Not merely throughout the march, but even as to the manner of fighting at Kunaxa, the judgment of Cyrus was sounder than that of Klearchus. The two matters of supreme importance to the Greeks, were, to take care of the person of Cyrus, and to strike straight at that of Artaxerxes with the central division around him. Now it was the fault of Klearchus, and not of Cyrus, that both these matters were omitted; and that the Greeks gained only a victory comparatively insignificant on the right. Yet in spite of such mistake, not his own, it appears that Cyrus would have been victorious, had he been able to repress that passionate burst of antipathy which drove him, like a madman, against his brother. The same insatiable ambition, and jealous fierceness when power was concerned, which had before led him to put to death two first cousins, because they omitted, in his presence, an act of deference never paid except to the king in person, — this same impulse, exasperated by the actual sight of his rival brother, and by that standing force of fraternal antipathy so frequent in regal families,<sup>1</sup> blinded him, for the moment, to all rational calculation.

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus (xiv, 23) notices the legendary pair of hostile brothers, Eteokles and Polyneikes, as a parallel. Compare Tacitus, *Annal.* iv, 60. "Atrox Drusi ingenium, super cupidinem potentiae, et solita fratribus odia, accendebatur invidia, quod mater Agrippina promptior Neroni erat," etc.; and Justin, xlii, 4.

Compare also the interesting narrative of M. Prosper Mérimée, in his life of Don Pedro of Castile; a prince commonly known by the name of Peter the Cruel. Don Pedro was dethroned, and slain in personal conflict, by the hand of his bastard brother, Henri of Transjume.

At the battle of Navarrete, in 1367, says M. Mérimée, "Don Pédre, pendant le combat, s'était jété au plus fort de la mêlée, s'acharna long temps à la poursuite des fuyards. On le voyait galoper dans la plaine, monté sur un cheval noir, sa bannière armoriée de Castille devant lui, cherchant son frère partout où l'on combattait encore, et criant, échauffé par le carnage — 'Où est ce bâtard, qui se nomme roi de Castille?'" (*Histoire de Don Pédre*, p. 504.)

Ultimately Don Pedro, blocked up and almost starved out in the castle of Montiel, was entrapped by simulated negotiations in the power of his enemies. He was slain in personal conflict by the dagger of his brother Henri, after a desperate struggle, in which he seemed likely to prevail, if Henri had not been partially aided by a bystander.

We may however remark that Hellas, as a whole, had no cause to regret the fall of Cyrus at Kunaxa. Had he dethroned his brother and become king, the Persian empire would have acquired under his hand such a degree of strength as might probably have enabled him to forestall the work afterwards performed by the Macedonian kings, and to make the Greeks in Europe as well as those in Asia his dependents. He would have employed Grecian military organization against Grecian independence, as Philip and Alexander did after him. His money would have enabled him to hire an overwhelming force of Grecian officers and soldiers, who would (to use the expression of Proxenus as recorded by Xenophon<sup>1</sup>) have thought him a better friend to them than their own country. It would have enabled him also to take advantage of dissension and venality in the interior of each Grecian city, and thus to weaken their means of defence while he strengthened his own means of attack. This was a policy which none of the Persian kings, from Darius son of Hystaspes down to Darius Codomanus, had ability or perseverance enough to follow out; none of them knew either the true value of Grecian instruments, or how to employ them with effect. The whole conduct of Cyrus, in reference to this memorable expedition, manifests a superior intelligence, competent to use the resources which victory would have put in his hands, — and an ambition likely to use them against the Greeks, in avenging the humiliations of Marathon, Salamis, and the peace of Kallias.

This tragical scene (on the night of the 23d of March, 1369) is graphically described by M. Mérimée (p. 564-566).

<sup>1</sup> Xen. *Anab.* iii, 1, 4. "Ἵπισχνεῖτο δὲ αὐτῷ (Ξενοφῶντα Προξένου) εἰ ἔλθοι, φίλον Κύρῳ ποιήσειν ἢ ν αὐτός ἐφη κρείττω εἶναι αὐτῷ νομίζετον ἢ τοῦ πατρίδος."



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## CHAPTER LXX.

## RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.

THE first triumphant feeling of the Greek troops at Kunaxa was exchanged, as soon as they learnt the death of Cyrus, for dismay and sorrow; accompanied by unavailing repentance for the venture into which he and Klearchus had seduced them. Probably Klearchus himself too repented, and with good reason, of having displayed, in his manner of fighting the battle, so little foresight, and so little regard either to the injunctions or to the safety of Cyrus. Nevertheless he still maintained the tone of a victor in the field, and after expressions of grief for the fate of the young prince, desired Proklès and Glus to return to Ariæus, with the reply, that the Greeks on their side were conquerors without any enemy remaining; that they were about to march onward against Artaxerxes; and that if Ariæus would join them, they would place him on the throne which had been intended for Cyrus. While this reply was conveyed to Ariæus by his particular friend Menon along with the messengers, the Greeks procured a meal as well as they could, having no bread, by killing some of the baggage animals; and by kindling fire, to cook their meat, from the arrows, the wooden Egyptian shields which had been thrown away on the field, and the baggage carts.<sup>1</sup>

Before any answer could be received from Ariæus, heralds appeared coming from Artaxerxes; among them being Phalinus, a Greek from Zakynthus, and the Greek surgeon Ktesias of Knidus, who was in the service of the Persian king.<sup>2</sup> Phalinus, an officer

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 5-7

<sup>2</sup> We know from Plutarch (Artaxer. c. 13) that Ktesias distinctly asserted himself to have been present at this interview, and I see no reason why we should not believe him. Plutarch indeed rejects his testimony as false, affirming that Xenophon would certainly have mentioned him, had he been there; but such an objection seems to me insufficient. Nor is it necessary to construe the words of Xenophon, ἦν δ' αὐτῶν Φαλίνος εἰς Ἑλλήν, ii, 1, 7) so strictly as to negative the presence of one or two other Greeks. Phalinus is thus specified because he was the spokesman of the party—a military man.

of some military experience and in the confidence of Tissaphernes, addressed himself to the Greek commanders; requiring them on the part of the king, since he was now victor and had slain Cyrus, to surrender their arms and appeal to his mercy. To this summons, painful in the extreme to a Grecian ear, Klearchus replied that it was not the practice for victorious men to lay down their arms. Being then called away to examine the sacrifice which was going on, he left the interview to the other officers, who met the summons of Phalinus by an emphatic negative. "If the king thinks himself strong enough to ask for our arms unconditionally, let him come and try to seize them." "The king (rejoined Phalinus) thinks that you are in his power, being in the midst of his territory, hemmed in by impassable rivers, and encompassed by his innumerable subjects."—"Our arms and our valor are all that remain to us (replied a young Athenian); we shall not be fools enough to hand over to you our only remaining treasure, but shall employ them still to have a fight for your treasure."<sup>1</sup> But though several spoke in this resolute tone, there were not wanting others disposed to encourage a negotiation; saying that they had been faithful to Cyrus as long as he lived, and would now be faithful to Artaxerxes, if he wanted their services in Egypt or anywhere else. In the midst of this parley Klearchus returned, and was requested by Phalinus to return a final answer on behalf of all. He at first asked the advice of Phalinus himself; appealing to the common feeling of Hellenic patriotism, and anticipating, with very little judgment, that the latter would encourage the Greeks in holding out. "If (replied Phalinus) I saw one chance out of ten thousand in your favor, in the event of a contest with the king, I should advise you to refuse the surrender of your arms. But as there is no chance of safety for you against the king's consent, I recommend you to look out for safety in the only quarter where it presents itself." Sensible of the mistake which he had made in asking the question, Klearchus rejoined,— "That is *your* opinion; now report our answer: We think we shall be better friends to the king, if we are to be his friends,—or more effective enemies, if we are to be his enemies,—with our arms, than without them."

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 12 μὴ οὖν οἶον τὰ μόνα ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα ἡμῖν παραδόναι· ἀλλὰ σὺν τοῦτοις καὶ περὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων ἀγαθῶν μαχομένους.



Phalinus, in retiring, said that the king proclaimed a truce so long as they remained in their present position,—but war, if they moved, either onward or backward. And to this Klearchus acceded, without declaring which he intended to do.<sup>1</sup>

Shortly after the departure of Phalinus, the envoys despatched to Ariæus returned; communicating his reply, that the Persian grandees would never tolerate any pretensions on his part to the crown, and that he intended to depart early the next morning on his return; if the Greeks wished to accompany him, they must join him during the night. In the evening, Klearchus, convening the generals and the lochages (or captains of lochi), acquainted them that the morning sacrifice had been of a nature to forbid their marching against the king,—a prohibition of which he now understood the reason, from having since learnt that the king was on the other side of the Tigris, and therefore out of their reach,—but that it was favorable for rejoining Ariæus. He gave directions accordingly for a night-march back along the Euphrates, to the station where they had passed the last night but one prior to the battle. The other Grecian generals, without any formal choice of Klearchus as chief, tacitly acquiesced in his orders, from a sense of his superior decision and experience, in an emergency when no one knew what to propose. The night-march was successfully accomplished, so that they joined Ariæus at the preceding station about midnight; not without the alarming symptom, however, that Miltokythês the Thracian deserted to the king, at the head of three hundred and forty of his countrymen, partly horse, partly foot.

The first proceeding of the Grecian generals was to exchange solemn oaths of reciprocal fidelity and fraternity with Ariæus. According to an ancient and impressive practice, a bull, a wolf, a boar, and a ram, were all slain, and their blood allowed to run into the hollow of a shield; in which the Greek generals dipped a sword, and Ariæus, with his chief companions, a spear.<sup>2</sup> The latter, besides the

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 14-22. Diodorus (xiv, 25) is somewhat copious in his account of the interview with Phalinus. But he certainly followed other authorities besides Xenophon, if even it be true that he had Xenophon before him. The allusion to the past heroism of Leonidas seems rather in the style of Ephorus.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 7-9. Koch remarks, however, with good reason, that it is difficult to see how they could get a wolf in Babylonia for the sacrifice (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 51).

promise of alliance, engaged also to guide the Greeks, in good faith, down to the Asiatic coast. Klearchus immediately began to ask what route he proposed to take; whether to return by that along which they had come up, or by any other. To this Ariæus replied, that the road along which they had marched was impracticable for retreat, from the utter want of provisions through seventeen days of desert; but that he intended to choose another road, which, though longer, would be sufficiently productive to furnish them with provisions. There was, however, a necessity (he added), that the first two or three days' marches should be of extreme length, in order that they might get out of the reach of the king's forces, who would hardly be able to overtake them afterwards with any considerable numbers.

They had now come ninety-three days' march<sup>1</sup> from Ephesus, or ninety from Sardis.<sup>2</sup> The distance from Sardis to Kunaxa is, according to colonel Chesney, about twelve hundred and sixty-five geographical miles, or fourteen hundred and sixty-four English miles. There had been at least ninety-six days of rest, enjoyed at various places, so that the total of time elapsed must have at least been one hundred and eighty-nine days, or a little more than half a year;<sup>3</sup> but it was probably greater, since some intervals of rest are not specified in number of days.

How to retrace their steps, was now the problem, apparently insoluble. As to the military force of Persia in the field, indeed, not merely the easy victory at Kunaxa, but still more the undisputed march throughout so long a space, left them no serious

<sup>1</sup> Such is the sum total stated by Xenophon himself (Anab. ii, 1, 6). It is greater, by nine days, than the sum total which we should obtain by adding together the separate days' march specified by Xenophon from Sardis. But the distance from Sardis to Ephesus, as we know from Herodotus, was three days' journey (Herod. v, 55); and therefore the discrepancy is really only to the amount of six, not of nine. See Krüger ad Anab. p. 556; Koch, Zug der Z. p. 141.

<sup>2</sup> Colonel Chesney (Euphrates and Tigris, c. ii, p. 208) calculates twelve hundred and sixty-five geographical miles from Sardis to Kunaxa or the Mounds of Mohammed.

<sup>3</sup> For example, we are not told how long they rested at Pylæ, or opposite to Charmandê. I have given some grounds (in the preceding chapter) for believing that it cannot have been less than five days. The army must have been in the utmost need of repose, as well as of provisions.



apprehensions.<sup>1</sup> In spite of this great extent, population, and riches, they had been allowed to pass through the most difficult and defensible country, and to ford the broad Euphrates, without a blow; nay, the king had shrunk from defending the long trench which he had specially caused to be dug for the protection of Babylonia. But the difficulties which stood between them and their homes were of a very different character. How were they to find their way back, or obtain provisions, in defiance of a numerous hostile cavalry, which, not without efficiency even in a pitched battle would be most formidable in opposing their retreat? The line of their upward march had all been planned, with supplies furnished, by Cyrus; — yet even under such advantages, supplies had been on the point of failing, in one part of the march. They were now, for the first time, called upon to think and provide for themselves; without knowledge of either roads or distances, — without trustworthy guides, — without any one to furnish or even to indicate supplies, — and with a territory all hostile, traversed by rivers which they had no means of crossing. Klearchus himself knew nothing of the country, nor of any other river except the Euphrates; nor does he indeed, in his heart, seem to have conceived retreat as practicable without the consent of the king.<sup>2</sup> The reader who casts his eye on a map of Asia, and imagines the situation of this Greek division on the left bank of the Euphrates, near the parallel of latitude 33° 30' — will hardly be surprised at any measure of despair, on the part either of general or soldiers. And we may add that Klearchus had not even the advantage of such a map, or probably of any map at all, to enable him to shape his course.

In this dilemma, the first and most natural impulse was to consult Ariæus who (as has been already stated) pronounced, with good reason, that return by the same road was impracticable; and promised to conduct them home by another road, — longer indeed, yet better supplied. At daybreak on the ensuing morning, they began their march in an easterly direction, anticipating that before night they should reach some villages of the Babylonian territory, as in fact they did;<sup>3</sup> yet not before they had been alarmed in the

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 5, 9.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 6, 7.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 13. 'Επεὶ γὰρ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο, ἐπορεύοντο ἐν δριφίᾳ ἔχοντες τὸν ἥλιον, λογιζόμενοι ἥξειν ἅμα ἡλίῳ δύνοντι εἰς κώμας τῆς Βαβυλωνίας χώρας καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐπεύσθησαν.

afternoon by the supposed approach of some of the enemy's horse, and by evidences that the enemy were not far off, which induced them to slacken their march for the purpose of more cautious array. Hence they did not reach the first villages before dark; and these too had been pillaged by the enemy while retreating before them, so that only the first-comers under Klearchus could obtain accommodation, while the succeeding troops, coming up in the dark, pitched as they could without any order. The whole camp was a scene of clamor, dispute, and even alarm, throughout the night. No provisions could be obtained. Early the next morning Klearchus

Schneider, in his note on this passage, as well as Ritter, (Erdkunde, part. x, 3, p. 17), Mr. Ainsworth (Travels in the Track, p. 103) and Colonel Chesney (Euphr. and Tigr. p. 219), understand the words here used by Xenophon in a sense from which I dissent. "When it was day, the army proceeded onward on their march, having the sun on their right hand," — these words they understand as meaning that the army marched *northward*; whereas, in my judgment, the words intimate that the army marched *eastward*. To have the sun on the right hand, does not so much refer either to the precise point where, or to the precise instant when, the sun rises, — but to his diurnal path through the heavens, and to the general direction of the day's march. This may be seen by comparing the remarkable passage in Herodotus, iv, 42, in reference to the alleged circumnavigation of Africa, from the Red Sea round the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Gibraltar, by the Phœnicians under the order of Nekos. These Phœnicians said, "that in sailing round Africa (from the Red Sea) they had the sun on their right hand" — ὡς τὴν Λιβύην περιπλῶντες τὸν ἥλιον ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ. Herodotus rejects this statement as incredible. Not knowing the phenomena of a southern latitude beyond the tropic of Capricorn, he could not imagine that men in sailing from East to West could possibly have the sun on their right hand; any man journeying from the Red Sea to the Straits of Gibraltar must, in his judgment, have the sun on the left hand, as he himself had always experienced in the north latitude of the Mediterranean or the African coast. See Vol. III. of this History, ch. xviii, p. 282.

In addition to this reason, we may remark, that Ariæus and the Greeks, starting from their camp on the banks of the Euphrates (the place where they had passed the last night but one before the battle of Kunaxa) and marching *northward*, could not expect to arrive, and could not really arrive, at villages of the Babylonian territory. But they might naturally expect to do so, if they marched *eastward*, towards the Tigris. Nor would they have hit upon the enemy in a northerly march, which would in fact have been something near to a return upon their own previous steps. They would moreover have been stopped by the undefended Trench, which could only be passed at the narrow opening close to the Euphrates.



thus ordered them under arms; and desiring to expose the groundless nature of the alarm, caused the herald to proclaim, that whoever would denounce the person who had let the ass into the camp on the preceding night, should be rewarded with a talent of silver.<sup>1</sup>

What was the project of route entertained by Ariæus, we cannot ascertain;<sup>2</sup> since it was not farther pursued. For the effect of the unexpected arrival of the Greeks as if to attack the enemy, — and even the clamor and shouting of the camp during the night — so intimidated the Persian commanders, that they sent heralds the next morning to treat about a truce. The contrast between this message, and the haughty summons of the preceding day to lay down their arms, was sensibly felt by the Grecian officers, and taught them that the proper way of dealing with the Persians was by a bold and aggressive demeanor. When Klearchus was apprised of the arrival of the heralds, he desired them at first to wait at the outposts until he was at leisure; then, having put his troops into the best possible order, with a phalanx compact on every side to the eye, and the unarmed persons out of sight, he desired the heralds to be admitted. He marched out to meet them with the most showy and best-armed soldiers immediately around him, and when they informed him that they had come from the king with instructions to propose a truce, and to report on what conditions the Greeks would agree to it, Klearchus replied abruptly, — "Well then, — go and tell the king, that our first business must be to fight; for we have nothing to eat, nor will any man presume to talk to Greeks about a truce, without first providing dinner for them." With this reply the heralds rode off, but returned very speedily; thus making it plain that the king, or the commanding officer, was near at hand. They brought word that the king thought their answer reasonable, and had sent guides to conduct them to a place where they would obtain provisions, if the truce should be concluded.

After an affected delay and hesitation, in order to impose upon the Persians, Klearchus concluded the truce, and desired that the

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 20. This seems to have been a standing military jest, to make the soldiers laugh at their past panic. See the references in Krüger and Schneider's notes.

<sup>2</sup> Diodorus (xvi, 24) tells us that Ariæus intended to guide them towards Paphlagonia; a very loose indication.

guides would conduct the army to those quarters where provisions could be had. He was most circumspect in maintaining exact order during the march, himself taking charge of the rear guard. The guides led them over many ditches and channels, full of water, and cut for the purpose of irrigation; some so broad and deep that they could not be crossed without bridges. The army had to put together bridges for the occasion, from palm trees either already fallen, or expressly cut down. This was a troublesome business, which Klearchus himself superintended with peculiar strictness. He carried his spear in the left hand, his stick in the right; employing the latter to chastise any soldier who seemed remiss, — and even plunging into the mud and lending his own hands in aid wherever it was necessary.<sup>1</sup> As it was not the usual season of irrigation for crops, he suspected that the canals had been filled on this occasion expressly to intimidate the Greeks, by impressing them with the difficulties of their prospective march; and he was anxious to demonstrate to the Persians that these difficulties were no more than Grecian energy could easily surmount.

At length they reached certain villages indicated by their guides for quarters and provision; and here for the first time they had a sample of that unparalleled abundance of the Babylonian territory, which Herodotus is afraid to describe with numerical precision. Large quantities of corn, — dates not only in great numbers, but of such beauty, freshness, size and flavor, as no Greek had ever seen or tasted, insomuch that fruit like what was imported into Greece, was disregarded and left for the slaves, — wine and vinegar, both also made from the date-palm: these are the luxuries which Xenophon is eloquent in describing, after his recent period of scanty fare and anxious apprehension; not without also noticing the headaches which such new and luscious food, in unlimited quantity, brought upon himself and others.<sup>2</sup>

After three days passed in these restorative quarters, they were visited by Tissaphernes, accompanied by four Persian grandees and a suite of slaves. The satrap began to open a negotiation with Klearchus and the other generals. Speaking through an interpreter, he stated to them that the vicinity of his satrapy

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 7, 13.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 14, 17.



to Greece impressed him with a strong interest in favor of the Cyreian Greeks, and made him anxious to rescue them out of their present desperate situation; that he had solicited the king's permission to save them, as a personal recompense to himself for having been the first to forewarn him of the schemes of Cyrus, and for having been the only Persian who had not fled before the Greeks at Kunaxa; that the King had promised to consider this point, and had sent him in the meantime to ask the Greeks what their purpose was in coming up to attack him; and that he trusted the Greeks would give him a conciliatory answer to carry back, in order that he might have less difficulty in realizing what he desired for their benefit. To this Klearchus, after first deliberating apart with the other officers, replied, that the army had come together, and had even commenced their march, without any purpose of hostility to the King; that Cyrus had brought them up the country under false pretences, but that they had been ashamed to desert him in the midst of danger, since he had always treated them generously; that since Cyrus was now dead, they had no purpose of hostility against the King, but were only anxious to return home; that they were prepared to repel hostility from all quarters, but would be not less prompt in requiting favor or assistance. With this answer Tissaphernes departed, and returned on the next day but one, informing them that he had obtained the King's permission to save the Grecian army, — though not without great opposition, since many Persian counselors contended that it was unworthy of the King's dignity, to suffer those who had assailed him to escape. "I am now ready (said he) to conclude a covenant and exchange oaths with you; engaging to conduct you safely back into Greece, with the country friendly, and with a regular market for you to purchase provisions. You must stipulate on your part always to pay for your provisions, and to do no damage to the country. If I do not furnish you with provisions to buy, you are then at liberty to take them where you can find them." Well were the Greeks content to enter into such a covenant, which was sworn, with hands given upon it, by Klearchus, the other generals, and the lochages, on their side, — and by Tissaphernes with the King's brother-in-law on the other. Tissaphernes then left them, saying that he would

go back to the King, make preparations, and return to reconduct the Greeks home; going himself to his own satrapy.<sup>1</sup>

The statements of Ktesias, though known to us only indirectly and not to be received without caution, afford ground for believing that Queen Parysatis decidedly wished success to her son Cyrus in his contest for the throne, — that the first report conveyed to her of the battle of Kunaxa, announcing the victory of Cyrus, filled her with joy, which was exchanged for bitter sorrow when she was informed of his death, — that she caused to be slain with horrible tortures all those, who though acting in the Persian army and for the defence of Artaxerxes, had any participation in the death of Cyrus — and that she showed favorable dispositions towards the Cyreian Greeks.<sup>2</sup> It seems probable, farther, that her influence may have been exerted to procure for them an unimpeded retreat, without anticipating the use afterwards made by Tissaphernes (as will soon appear) of the present convention. And in one point of view, the Persian king had an interest in facilitating their retreat. For the very circumstance which rendered retreat difficult, also rendered the Greeks dangerous to him in their actual position. They were in the heart of the Persian empire, within seventy miles of Babylon; in a country not only teeming with fertility, but also extremely defensible; especially against cavalry, from the multiplicity of canals, as Herodotus observed respecting Lower Egypt.<sup>3</sup> And Klearchus might say to his Grecian soldiers, — what Xenophon was afterwards preparing to say to them at Kalpê on the Euxine Sea, and what Nikias also affirmed to the unhappy Athenian army whom he conducted away from Syracuse<sup>4</sup> — that wherever they sat down, they were sufficiently numerous and well-organized to become at once a city. A body of such troops might effectually assist, and would perhaps encourage, the Babylonian population to throw off the Persian yoke, and to exonerate themselves from the prodigious tribute which they now paid to the satrap. For these reasons,

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 18-27.

<sup>2</sup> Ktesias Persica, Fragm. c. 59, ed. Bähr; compared with the remarkable Fragment. 18, preserved by the so-called Demetrius Phaléreus: see also Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 17.

<sup>3</sup> Herodot. i, 193; ii, 108; Strabo, xvii p. 788

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 16; Thucyd. vii.



the advisers of Artaxerxes thought it advantageous to convey the Greeks across the Tigris out of Babylonia, beyond all possibility of returning thither. This was at any rate the primary object of the convention. And it was the more necessary to conciliate the good-will of the Greeks, because there seems to have been but one bridge over the Tigris; which bridge could only be reached by inviting them to advance considerably farther into the interior of Babylonia.

Such was the state of fears and hopes on both sides, at the time when Tissaphernes left the Greeks, after concluding his convention. For twenty days did they await his return, without receiving from him any communication; the Cyreian Persians under Ariæus being encamped near them. Such prolonged and unexplained delay became, after a few days, the source of much uneasiness to the Greeks; the more so as Ariæus received during this interval several visits from his Persian kinsmen, and friendly messages from the king, promising amnesty for his recent services under Cyrus. Of these messages the effects were painfully felt in manifest coldness of demeanor on the part of his Persian troops towards the Greeks. Impatient and suspicious, the Greek soldiers impressed upon Klearchus their fears, that the king had concluded the recent convention only to arrest their movements, until he should have assembled a larger army and blocked up more effectually the roads against their return. To this Klearchus replied,—"I am aware of all that you say. Yet if we now strike our tents, it will be a breach of the convention and a declaration of war. No one will furnish us with provisions; we shall have no guides; Ariæus will desert us forthwith, so that we shall have his troops as enemies instead of friends. Whether there be any other river for us to cross, I know not; but we know that the Euphrates itself can never be crossed, if there be an enemy to resist us. Nor have we any cavalry,—while cavalry is the best and most numerous force of our enemies. If the king, having all these advantages, really wishes to destroy us, I do not know why he should falsely exchange all these oaths and solemnities, and thus make his own word worthless in the eyes both of Greeks and barbarians."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 3-8.

Such words from Klearchus are remarkable, as they testify his own complete despair of the situation,—certainly a very natural despair,—except by amicable dealing with the Persians; and also his ignorance of geography and the country to be traversed. This feeling helps to explain his imprudent confidence afterwards in Tissaphernes.

That satrap, however, after twenty days, at last came back, with his army prepared to return to Ionia,—with the king's daughter whom he had just received in marriage,—and with another grandee named Orontas. Tissaphernes took the conduct of the march, providing supplies for the Greek troops to purchase; while Ariæus and his division now separated themselves altogether from the Greeks, and became intermingled with the other Persians. Klearchus and the Greeks followed them, at the distance of about three miles in the rear, with a separate guide for themselves; not without jealousy and mistrust, sometimes shown in individual conflicts, while collecting wood or forage, between them and the Persians of Ariæus. After three days' march (that is, apparently, three days, calculated from the moment when they began their retreat with Ariæus) they came to the Wall of Media, and passed through it,<sup>1</sup> prosecuting their march onward through the country on its other or interior side. It was of bricks cemented with bitumen, one hundred feet high, and twenty feet broad; it was said to extend a length of twenty parasangs (or about seventy miles, if we reckon the parasang at thirty stadia), and to be not far distant

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 12. Διελθόντες δὲ τρεῖς σταθμοὺς, ἀφίκοντο πρὸς τὸ Μηδίας καλούμενον τεῖχος, καὶ παρ' ἡλθον αὐτοῦ εἰσω. It appears to me that these three days' march or σταθμοὶ can hardly be computed from the moment when they commenced their march under the conduct of Tissaphernes. On the other hand, if we begin from the moment when the Greeks started under conduct of Ariæus, we can plainly trace three distinct resting places (σταθμοὺς) before they reached the Wall of Media. First, at the villages where the confusion and alarm arose (ii, 13-21). Secondly, at the villages of abundant supply, where they concluded the truce with Tissaphernes, and waited twenty days for his return (ii, 3, 14; ii, 4, 9). Thirdly, one night's halt under the conduct of Tissaphernes, before they reached the Wall of Media. This makes three distinct stations or halting places, between the station (the first station after passing the undefended trench) from whence they started to begin their retreat under the conduct of Ariæus,—and the point where they traversed the Wall of Media.



from Babylon. Two days of farther march, computed as eight parasangs, brought them to the Tigris. During these two days they crossed two great ship canals, one of them over a permanent bridge, the other over a temporary bridge laid on seven boats. Canals of such magnitude must probably have been two among the four stated by Xenophon to be drawn from the river Tigris, each of them a parasang distant from the other. They were one hundred feet broad, and deep enough even for heavy vessels; they were distributed by means of numerous smaller channels and ditches for the irrigation of the soil; and they were said to fall into the Euphrates; or rather, perhaps, they terminated in one main larger canal cut directly from the Euphrates to the Tigris, each of them joining this larger canal at a different point of its course. Within less than two miles of the Tigris was a large and populous city named Sittakê, near which the Greeks pitched their camp, on the verge of a beautiful park or thick grove full of all kinds of trees; while the Persians all crossed the Tigris, at the neighboring bridge.

As Proxenus and Xenophon were here walking in front of the camp after supper, a man was brought up who had asked for the former at the advanced posts. This man said that he came with instructions from Ariæus. He advised the Greeks to be on their guard, as there were troops concealed in the adjoining grove, for the purpose of attacking them during the night, — and also to send and occupy the bridge over the Tigris, since Tissaphernes intended to break it down, in order that the Greeks might be caught without possibility of escape between the river and the canal. On discussing this information with Klearchus, who was much alarmed by it, a young Greek present remarked that the two matters stated by the informant contradicted each other; for that if Tissaphernes intended to attack the Greeks during the night, he would not break down the bridge, so as both to prevent his own troops on the other side from crossing to aid, and to deprive those on this side of all retreat if they were beaten, — while, if the Greeks were beaten, there was no escape open to them, whether the bridge continued or not. This remark induced Klearchus to ask the messenger, what was the extent of ground between the Tigris and the canal. The messenger replied, that it was a great extent of country, comprising many large cities and villages. Reflecting on this communication, the Greek officers came to the con-

clusion that the message was a stratagem on the part of Tissaphernes to frighten them and accelerate their passage across the Tigris; under the apprehension that they might conceive the plan of seizing or breaking the bridge and occupying a permanent position in the spot where they were; which was an island, fortified on one side by the Tigris, — on the other sides, by intersecting canals between the Euphrates and the Tigris.<sup>1</sup> Such an island was

<sup>1</sup> I reserve for this place the consideration of that which Xenophon states, in two or three passages, about the Wall of Media and about different canals in connection with the Tigris, — the result of which, as far as I can make it out, stands in my text.

I have already stated, in the preceding chapter, that in the march of the day next but one preceding the battle of Kunaxa, the army came to a deep and broad trench dug for defence across their line of way, with the exception of a narrow gut of twenty feet broad close by the Euphrates; through which gut the whole army passed. Xenophon says, "This trench had been carried upwards across the plain as far as the Wall of Media, where indeed, the canals are situated, flowing from the river Tigris; four canals, one hundred feet in breadth, and extremely deep, so that corn-bearing vessels sail along them. They strike into the Euphrates, they are distant each from the other by one parasang, and there are bridges over them — Παρετέτατο δ' ἡ τάφρος ἄνω διὰ τοῦ πεδίου ἐπὶ δώδεκα παράσαγγας, μέχρι τοῦ Μηδίας τείχους, ἐνθα δὲ (the books print a full stop between τείχους and ἐνθα, which appears to me incorrect, as the sense goes on without interruption) εἰσὶν αἱ διωρυχες, ὑπὸ τοῦ Τίγρητος ποταμοῦ ῥέουσαι· εἰσὶ δὲ τέτταρες, τὸ μὲν εἶρος πλεθριαῖαι, βαθεῖαι δὲ ἰσχυρῶς, καὶ πλοῖα πλεῖ ἐν αὐταῖς σιταγωγὰ· εἰσβάλλουσι δὲ εἰς τὸν Εὐφράτην, διαλείπονσι δ' ἐκάστη παρασάγγην, γέφυραι δ' ἔπεισιν. The present tense — εἰσὶν αἱ διωρυχες — seems to mark the local reference of ἐνθα to the Wall of Media, and not to the actual march of the army.

Major Rennell (Illustrations of the Expedition of Cyrus, pp. 79–87, etc.), Ritter, (Erdkunde, x, p. 16), Koch, (Zug der Zehn Tausend, pp. 46, 47), and Mr. Ainsworth (Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 88) consider Xenophon to state that the Cyreian army on this day's march (the day but one before the battle) passed through the Wall of Media and over the four distinct canals reaching from the Tigris to the Euphrates. They all, indeed, contest the accuracy of this latter statement; Rennell remarking that the level of the Tigris, in this part of its course, is lower than that of the Euphrates; and that it could not supply water for so many broad canals so near to each other. Col. Chesney also conceives the army to have passed through the Wall of Media before the battle of Kunaxa.

It seems to me, however, that they do not correctly interpret the words of Xenophon, who does not say that Cyrus ever passed either the Wall of Media, or these four canals before the battle of Kunaxa, but who says (as



a defensible position, having a most productive territory with numerous cultivators, so as to furnish shelter and means of hostility for all the king's enemies. Tissaphernes calculated that the message

Krüger, *De Authentia Anabaseos*, p. 12, prefixed to his edition of the *Anabasis*, rightly explains him), that these four canals flowing from the Tigris are at, or near, the Wall of Media, which the Greeks did not pass through until long after the battle, when Tissaphernes was conducting them towards the Tigris, two days' march before they reached Sittakê (*Anab.* ii, 4, 12).

It has been supposed, during the last few years, that the direction of the Wall of Media could be verified by actual ruins still subsisting on the spot. Dr. Ross and Captain Lynch (see *Journal of the Geographical Society*, vol. ix. pp. 447-473, with Captain Lynch's map annexed) discovered a line of embankment which they considered to be the remnant of it. It begins on the western bank of the Tigris, in latitude  $34^{\circ} 3'$ , and stretches towards the Euphrates in a direction from N. N. E. to S. S. W. "It is a solitary straight single mound, twenty-five long paces thick, with a bastion on its western face at every fifty-five paces; and on the same side it has a deep ditch, twenty-seven paces broad. The wall is here built of the small pebbles of the country, imbedded in cement of lime of great tenacity; it is from thirty-five to forty feet in height, and runs in a straight line as far as the eye can trace it. The Bedouins tell me that it goes in the same straight line to two mounds called Ramelah on the Euphrates, some hours above Felujah; that it is, in places far inland, built of brick, and in some parts worn down to a level with the desert." (*Dr. Ross*, l. c. p. 446).

Upon the faith of these observations, the supposed wall (now called Sidd Nimrud by the natives) has been laid down as the Wall of Media reaching from the Tigris to the Euphrates, in the best recent maps, especially that of Colonel Chesney; and accepted as such by recent inquirers.

Nevertheless, subsequent observations, recently made known by Colonel Rawlinson to the Geographical Society, have contradicted the views of Dr. Ross as stated above, and shown that the Wall of Media, in the line here assigned to it, has no evidence to rest upon. Captain Jones, commander of the steamer at Bagdad, undertook, at the request of Colonel Rawlinson a minute examination of the locality, and ascertained that what had been laid down as the Wall of Media was merely a line of mounds; no wall at all, but a mere embankment, extending seven or eight miles from the Tigris, and designed to arrest the winter torrents and drain off the rain water of the desert into a large reservoir, which served to irrigate an extensive valley between the rivers.

From this important communication it results, that there is as yet no evidence now remaining for determining what was the line or position of the Wall of Media; which had been supposed to be a datum positively established, serving as premises from whence to deduce other positions mentioned by Xenophon. As our knowledge now stands, there is not a single point mentioned by Xenophon in Babylonia which can be positively verified, except

now delivered would induce the Greeks to become alarmed with their actual position and to cross the Tigris with as little delay as possible. At least this was the interpretation which the Greek officers put upon his proceeding; an interpretation highly plausible, since, in order to reach the bridge over the Tigris, he had been obliged to conduct the Greek troops into a position sufficiently tempting for them to hold, — and since he knew that his own purposes were purely treacherous. But the Greeks, officers as well

Babylon itself, — and Pylæ, which is known pretty nearly, as the spot where Babylonia proper commences.

The description which Xenophon gives of the Wall of Media is very plain and specific. I see no reason to doubt that he actually saw it, passed through it, and correctly describes it in height as well as breadth. Its entire length he of course only gives from what he was told. His statement appears to me good evidence that there was a Wall of Media, which reached from the Tigris to the Euphrates, or perhaps to some canal cut from the Euphrates, though there exists no mark to show what was the precise locality and direction of the Wall. Ammianus Marcellinus (xxiv, 2), in the expedition of the emperor Julian, saw near Macepracta, on the left bank of the Euphrates, the ruins of a wall, "which in ancient times had stretched to a great distance for the defence of Assyria against foreign invasion." It is fair to presume that this was the Wall of Media; but the position of Macepracta cannot be assigned.

It is important, however, to remember, — what I have already stated in this note, — that Xenophon did not see, and did not cross either the Wall of Media, or the two canals here mentioned, until many days after the battle of Kunaxa.

We know from Herodotus that all the territory of Babylonia was intersected by canals, and that there was one canal greater than the rest and navigable, which flowed from the Euphrates to the Tigris, in a direction to the south of east. This coincides pretty well with the direction assigned in Colonel Chesney's map to the Nahr-Malcha or Regium Flumen, into which the four great canals, described by Xenophon as drawn from the Tigris to the Euphrates, might naturally discharge themselves, and still be said to fall into the Euphrates, of which the Nahr-Malcha was as it were a branch. How the level of the two rivers would adjust itself, when the space between them was covered with a network of canals great and small, and when a vast quantity of the water of both was exhausted in fertilizing the earth, is difficult to say.

The island wherein the Greeks stood, at their position near Sittakê, before crossing the Tigris, would be a parallelogram formed by the Tigris, the Nahr-Malcha, and the two parallel canals joining them. It might well be called a large island, containing many cities and villages, with a large population.



as soldiers, were animated only by the wish of reaching home. They trusted, though not without misgivings, in the promise of Tissaphernes to conduct them; and never for a moment thought of taking permanent post in this fertile island. They did not, however, neglect the precaution of sending a guard during the night to the bridge over the Tigris, which no enemy came to assail. On the next morning they passed over it in a body, in cautious and mistrustful array, and found themselves on the eastern bank of the Tigris, — not only without attack, but even without sight of a single Persian, except Glus, the interpreter, and a few others watching their motions.

After having crossed by a bridge laid upon thirty-seven pontoons, the Greeks continued their march to the northward upon the eastern side of the Tigris, for four days, to the river Physkus; said to be twenty parasangs.<sup>1</sup> The Physkus was one hundred feet wide, with a bridge, and the large city of Opis near it. Here, at the frontier of Assyria and Media, the road from the eastern regions to Babylon joined the road northerly on which the Greeks were marching. An illegitimate brother of Artaxerxes was seen at the head of a numerous force, which he was conducting from Susa and Ekbatana as a reinforcement to the royal army. This great host halted to see the Greeks pass by; and Klearchus ordered the march in column of two abreast, employing himself actively to maintain an excellent array, and halting more than once. The army thus occupied so long a time in passing by the Persian host, that their numbers appeared greater than the reality, even to themselves; while the effect upon the Persian spectators was very imposing.<sup>2</sup> Here Assyria ended and Media began. They marched, still in a northerly direction, for six days through a portion of Media almost unpeopled, until they came to some flourishing villages which formed a portion of the domain of queen Parysatis; probably these villages, forming so marked an exception to the desert character of the remaining march, were

There seems reason to believe that in ancient times the Tigris, above Bagdad, followed a course more to the westward, and less winding, than it does now. The situation of Opis cannot be verified. The ruins of a large city were seen by Captain Lynch near the confluence of the river Adhem with the Tigris, which he supposed to be Opis, in lat. 34°.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 26.

situated on the Lesser Zab, which flows into the Tigris, and which Xenophon must have crossed, though he makes no mention of it. According to the order of march stipulated between the Greeks and Tissaphernes, the latter only provided a supply of provisions for the former to purchase; but on the present halt, he allowed the Greeks to plunder the villages, which were rich and full of all sorts of subsistence, — yet without carrying off the slaves. The wish of the satrap to put an insult on Cyrus, as his personal enemy,<sup>1</sup> through Parysatis, thus proved a sentence of ruin to these unhappy villagers. Five more days' march, called twenty parasangs, brought them to the banks of the river Zabatus, or the Greater Zab, which flows into the Tigris near a town now called Senn. During the first of these five days, they saw on the opposite side of the Tigris a large town called Kænæ, from whence they received supplies of provisions, brought across by the inhabitants upon rafts supported by inflated skins.<sup>2</sup>

On the banks of the Great Zab they halted three days, — days of serious and tragical moment. Having been under feelings of mistrust, ever since the convention with Tissaphernes, they had followed throughout the whole march, with separate guides of their own, in the rear of his army, always maintaining their encampment apart. During their halt on the Zab, so many various mani-

<sup>1</sup> Ktesias, Fragm. 18, ed. Bähr.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 26-28.

Mannert, Rennell, Mr. Ainsworth, and most modern commentators, identify this town of *Kaival* or Kænæ with the modern town Senn; which latter place Mannert (*Geogr. der Röm.* v. p. 333) and Rennell (*Illustrations* p. 129) represent to be near the Lesser Zab instead of the greater Zab.

To me it appears that the locality assigned by Xenophon to *Kaival*, does not at all suit the modern town of Senn. Nor is there much real similarity of name between the two; although our erroneous way of pronouncing the Latin name *Caenæ*, creates a delusive appearance of similarity. Mr. Ainsworth shows that some modern writers have been misled in the same manner by identifying the modern town of Sert with *Tigranocerta*.

It is a perplexing circumstance in the geography of Xenophon's work, that he makes no mention of the Lesser Zab, which yet he must have crossed. Herodotus notices them both, and remarks on the fact that though distinct rivers, both bore the same name (v, 52). Perhaps in drawing up his narrative after the expedition, Xenophon may have so far forgotten, as to fancy that two synonymous rivers mentioned as distinct in his memoirs, were only one.



festations occurred to aggravate the mistrust, that hostilities seemed on the point of breaking out between the two camps. To obviate this danger Klearchus demanded an interview with Tissaphernes, represented to him the threatening attitude of affairs, and insisted on the necessity of coming to a clear understanding. He impressed upon the satrap that, over and above the solemn oaths which had been interchanged, the Greeks on their side could have no conceivable motive to quarrel with him; that they had everything to hope from his friendship, and everything to fear, even to the loss of all chance of safe return, from his hostility; that Tissaphernes, also, could gain nothing by destroying them, but would find them, if he chose, the best and most faithful instruments for his own aggrandizement and for conquering the Mysians and the Pisidians, — as Cyrus had experienced while he was alive. Klearchus concluded his protest by requesting to be informed, what malicious reporter had been filling the mind of Tissaphernes with causeless suspicions against the Greeks.<sup>1</sup>

"Klearchus (replied the satrap), I rejoice to hear such excellent sense from your lips. You remark truly, that if you were to meditate evil against me, it would recoil upon yourselves. I shall prove to you, in my turn, that you have no cause to mistrust either the king or me. If we had wished to destroy you, nothing would be easier. We have superabundant forces for the purpose; there are wide plains in which you would be starved, — besides mountains and rivers which you would be unable to pass, without our help. Having thus the means of destroying you in our hands, and having nevertheless bound ourselves by solemn oaths to save you, we shall not be fools and knaves enough to attempt it now, when we should draw upon ourselves the just indignation of the gods. It is my peculiar affection for my neighbors, the Greeks, — and my wish to attach to my own person, by ties of gratitude, the Greek soldiers of Cyrus, — which have made me eager to conduct you to Ionia in safety. For I know that when you are in my service, though the king is the only man who can wear his tiara erect upon his head, I shall be able to wear mine erect upon my heart, in full pride and confidence."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 2-15.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 17-23. This last comparison is curious, and in all probability the genuine words of the satrap — *τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ*

So powerful was the impression made upon Klearchus by these assurances, that he exclaimed, — "Surely those informers deserve the severest punishment, who try to put us at enmity, when we are such good friends to each other, and have so much reason to be so." "Yes (replied Tissaphernes), they deserve nothing less; and if you, with the other generals and lochages, will come into my tent to-morrow, I will tell you who the calumniators are." "To-be-sure I will (rejoined Klearchus), and bring the other generals with me. I shall tell you at the same time, who are the parties that seek to prejudice us against you." The conversation then ended, the satrap detaining Klearchus to dinner, and treating him in the most hospitable and confidential manner.

On the next morning, Klearchus communicated what had passed to the Greeks, insisting on the necessity that all the generals should go to Tissaphernes pursuant to his invitation; in order to reestablish that confidence which unworthy calumniators had shaken, and to punish such of the calumniators as might be Greeks. So emphatically did he pledge himself for the good faith and philhellenic dispositions of the satrap, that he overruled the opposition of many among the soldiers; who, still continuing to entertain their former suspicions, remonstrated especially against the extreme imprudence of putting all the generals at once into the power of Tissaphernes. The urgency of Klearchus prevailed. Himself with four other generals, — Proxenus, Menon, Agias, and Sokrates, — and twenty lochages or captains, — went to visit the satrap in his tent; about two hundred of the soldiers going along with them, to make purchases for their own account in the Persian camp-market.<sup>1</sup>

On reaching the quarters of Tissaphernes, — distant nearly three miles from the Grecian camp, according to habit, — the five generals were admitted into the interior, while the lochages remained at the entrance. A purple flag, hoisted from the top of the tent, betrayed too late the purpose for which they had been invited to come. The lochages and the Grecian soldiers who had accompanied them were surprised and cut down, while the generals in the interior were detained, put in chains, and carried up as prisoners to the Persian court. Here Klearchus, Proxenus, Agias, and

*τίαναν βασιλεὶ μόνῳ ἔξεστιν ὀρθὴν ἔχειν, τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ ὡς ἂν ὑμῶν παρόντων καὶ ἑτεροῦς εἰπεῖν ἔχει.*

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 30.



Sokrates were beheaded after a short imprisonment. Queen Parysatis, indeed, from affection to Cyrus, not only furnished many comforts to Klearchus in the prison, by the hands of her surgeon, Ktesias, but used all her influence with her son Artaxerxes to save his life; though her efforts were counteracted, on this occasion, by the superior influence of queen Stateira, his wife. The rivalry between these two royal women, doubtless arising out of many other circumstances besides the death of Klearchus, became soon afterwards so furious, that Parysatis caused Stateira to be poisoned.<sup>1</sup>

Menon was not put to death along with the other generals. He appears to have taken credit at the Persian court for the treason of entrapping his colleagues into the hands of Tissaphernes. But his life was only prolonged to perish a year afterwards in disgrace and torture, — probably by the requisition of Parysatis, who thus avenged the death of Klearchus. The queen-mother had always power enough to perpetrate cruelties, though not always to avert them.<sup>2</sup> She had already brought to a miserable end every one, even faithful defenders of Artaxerxes, concerned in the death of her son Cyrus.

Though Menon thought it convenient, when brought up to Babylon, to boast of having been the instrument through whom the generals were entrapped into the fatal tent, this boast is not to be treated as matter of fact. For not only does Xenophon explain the catastrophe differently, but in the delineation which he gives of Menon, dark and odious as it is in the extreme, he does not advance any such imputation; indirectly, indeed, he sets it

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. ii, 6, 1. Ktesias Frag. Persica, c. 60, ed. Bähr; Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 19, 20; Diodor. xiv, 27.

<sup>2</sup> Tacit. Histor. i, 45. "Othoni nondum auctoritas inerat ad prohibendum scelus; jubere jam poterat. Ita, simulatione iræ, vinciri jussum (Marium Celsum) et majores poenas daturum, affirmans, præsentis exitio subtraxit."

Ktesias (Persica, c. 60; compare Plutarch and Diodorus as referred to in the preceding note) attests the treason of Menon, which he probably derived from the story of Menon himself. Xenophon mentions the ignominious death of Menon, and he probably derived his information from Ktesias (see Anabasis, ii, 6, 29).

The supposition that it was Parysatis who procured the death of Menon, in itself highly probable, renders all the different statements consistent and harmonious.

aside.<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately for the reputation of Klearchus, no such reasonable excuse can be offered for his credulity, which brought himself as well as his colleagues to so melancholy an end, and his whole army to the brink of ruin. It appears that the general sentiment of the Grecian army, taking just measure of the character of Tissaphernes, was disposed to greater circumspection in dealing with him. Upon that system Klearchus himself had hitherto acted; and the necessity of it might have been especially present to his mind, since he had served with the Lacedæmonian fleet at Miletus in 411 B. C., and had, therefore, had fuller experience than other men in the army, of the satrap's real character.<sup>2</sup> On a sudden he now turns round, and on the faith of a few verbal declarations, puts all the military chiefs into the most defenceless posture and the most obvious peril, such as hardly the strongest grounds for confidence could have justified. Though the remark of Machiavel is justified by large experience, — that from the short-sightedness of men and their obedience to present impulse, the most notorious deceiver will always find new persons to trust him, — still such misjudgment on the part of an officer of age and experience is difficult to explain.<sup>3</sup> Polyænus intimates that beautiful women, exhibited by the satrap at his first banquet to Klearchus alone, served as a lure to attract him with all his colleagues to the second; while Xenophon imputes the error to continuance of a jealous rivalry with Menon. The latter,<sup>4</sup> it appears, having always been intimate with Ariæus, had been

<sup>1</sup> Xenophon seems to intimate that there were various stories current, which he does not credit, to the disparagement of Menon, — καὶ τὰ μὲν δὲ ἀφανῆ ἐξεστὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ψεύδεσθαι, etc. (Anab. ii, 6, 28).

Athenæus (xi, p. 505) erroneously states that Xenophon affirmed Menon to be the person who caused the destruction of Klearchus by Tissaphernes.

<sup>2</sup> Xenophon in the Cyropædia (viii, 8, 3) gives a strange explanation of the imprudent confidence reposed by Klearchus in the assurance of the Persian satrap. It arose (he says) from the high reputation for good faith which the Persians had acquired by the undeviating and scrupulous honor of the first Cyrus (or Cyrus the Great), but which they had since ceased to deserve, though the corruption of their character had not before publicly manifested itself.

This is a curious perversion of history to serve the purpose of his romance.

<sup>3</sup> Macciavelli, Principe, c. 18, p. 65.

<sup>4</sup> Polyæn. vii, 18



thus brought into previous communication with Tissaphernes, by whom he had been well received, and by whom he was also encouraged to lay plans for detaching the whole Grecian army from Klearchus, so as to bring it all under his (Menon's) command, into the service of the satrap. Such at least was the suspicion of Klearchus; who, jealous in the extreme of his own military authority, tried to defeat the scheme by bidding still higher himself for the favor of Tissaphernes. Imagining that Menon was the unknown calumniator who prejudiced the satrap against him, he hoped to prevail on the satrap to disclose his name and dismiss him.<sup>1</sup> Such jealousy seems to have robbed Klearchus of his customary prudence. We must also allow for another impression deeply fixed in his mind; that the salvation of the army was hopeless without the consent of Tissaphernes, and, therefore, since the latter had conducted them thus far in safety, when he might have destroyed them before, that his designs at the bottom could not be hostile.<sup>2</sup>

Notwithstanding these two great mistakes, — one on the present occasion, one previously, at the battle of Kunaxa, in keeping the Greeks on the right contrary to the order of Cyrus, — both committed by Klearchus, the loss of that officer was doubtless a great misfortune to the army; while, on the contrary, the removal of Menon was a signal benefit, — perhaps a condition of ultimate safety. A man so treacherous and unprincipled as Xenophon depicts Menon, would probably have ended by really committing towards the army that treason, for which he falsely took credit at the Persian court in reference to the seizure of the generals.

The impression entertained by Klearchus, respecting the hopeless position of the Greeks in the heart of the Persian territory after the death of Cyrus, was perfectly natural in a military man who could appreciate all the means of attack and obstruction which the enemy had it in their power to employ. Nothing is so unaccountable in this expedition as the manner in which such means were thrown away, — the spectacle of Persian impotence. First, the whole line of upward march, including the passage of the Euphrates, left undefended; next, the long trench dug across the

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 27, 28.

<sup>2</sup> Compare Anab. ii, 4, 6, 7; ii, 5, 9.

frontier of Babylonia, with only a passage of twenty feet wide left near the Euphrates, abandoned without a guard; lastly, the line of the Wall of Media and the canals which offered such favorable positions for keeping the Greeks out of the cultivated territory of Babylonia, neglected in like manner, and a convention concluded, whereby the Persians engaged to escort the invaders safe to the Ionian coast, beginning by conducting them through the heart of Babylonia, amidst canals affording inexpugnable defences if the Greeks had chosen to take up a position among them. The plan of Tissaphernes, as far as we can understand it, seems to have been, to draw the Greeks to some considerable distance from the heart of the Persian empire, and then to open his schemes of treasonable hostility, which the imprudence of Klearchus enabled him to do, on the banks of the Great Zab, with chances of success such as he could hardly have contemplated. We have here a fresh example of the wonderful impotence of the Persians. We should have expected that, after having committed so flagrant an act of perfidy, Tissaphernes would at least have tried to turn it to account; that he would have poured, with all his forces and all his vigor, on the Grecian camp, at the moment when it was unprepared, disorganized, and without commanders. Instead of which, when the generals (with those who accompanied them to the Persian camp) had been seized or slain, no attack whatever was made except by small detachments of Persian cavalry upon individual Greek stragglers in the plain. One of the companions of the generals, an Arcadian named Nikarchus, ran wounded into the Grecian camp where the soldiers were looking from afar at the horsemen scouring the plain without knowing what they were about, — exclaiming that the Persians were massacring all the Greeks, officers as well as soldiers. Immediately the Greek soldiers hastened to put themselves in defence, expecting a general attack to be made upon their camp; but no more Persians came near than a body of about three hundred horse, under Ariæus and Mithridates (the confidential companions of the deceased Cyrus), accompanied by the brother of Tissaphernes. These men, approaching the Greek lines as friends, called for the Greek officers to come forth, as they had a message to deliver from the king. Accordingly, Kleanor and Sophænetus, with an adequate guard, came to the front, accompanied by Xenophon, who was anxious to hear news about Proxenus. Ariæus



then acquainted them that Klearchus, having been detected in a breach of the convention to which he had sworn, had been put to death; that Proxenus and Menon, who had divulged his treason, were in high honor at the Persian quarters. He concluded by saying, — the king calls upon you to surrender your arms, which now (he says) belong to him, since they formerly belonged to his slave Cyrus."<sup>1</sup>

The step here taken seems to testify a belief on the part of these Persians, that the generals being now in their power, the Grecian soldiers had become defenceless, and might be required to surrender their arms, even to men who had just been guilty of the most deadly fraud and injury towards them. If Ariæus entertained such an expectation, he was at once undeceived by the language of Kleanor and Xenophon, who breathed nothing but indignant reproach; so that he soon retired and left the Greeks to their own reflections.

While their camp thus remained unmolested, every man within it was a prey to the most agonizing apprehensions. Ruin appeared impending and inevitable, though no one could tell in what precise form it would come. The Greeks were in the midst of a hostile country, ten thousand stadia from home, surrounded by enemies, blocked up by impassable mountains and rivers, without guides, without provisions, without cavalry to aid their retreat, without generals to give orders. A stupor of sorrow and conscious helplessness seized upon all. Few came to the evening muster; few lighted fires to cook their suppers; every man lay down to rest where he was; yet no man could sleep, for fear, anguish, and yearning after relatives whom he was never again to behold.<sup>2</sup>

Amidst the many causes of despondency which weighed down this forlorn army, there was none more serious than the fact, that not a single man among them had now either authority to command, or obligation to take the initiative. Nor was any ambitious candidate likely to volunteer his pretensions, at a moment when the post promised nothing but the maximum of difficulty as well as of hazard. A new, self-kindled, light — and self-originated stimulus — was required, to vivify the embers of suspended hope and action, in a mass paralyzed for the moment, but every way capable

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 37, 38.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 2, 3

of effort. And the inspiration now fell, happily for the army, upon one in whom a full measure of soldierly strength and courage was combined with the education of an Athenian, a democrat, and a philosopher.

It is in true Homeric vein, and in something like Homeric language, that Xenophon (to whom we owe the whole narrative of the expedition) describes his dream, or the intervention of Oneirus, sent by Zeus, from which this renovating impulse took its rise.<sup>1</sup> Lying mournful and restless, like his comrades, he caught a short repose; when he dreamt that he heard thunder, and saw the burning thunder-bolt fall upon his paternal house, which became forthwith encircled by flames. Awaking, full of terror, he instantly sprang up; upon which the dream began to fit on and blend itself with his waking thoughts, and with the cruel realities of his position. His pious and excited fancy generated a series of shadowy analogies. The dream was sent by Zeus<sup>2</sup> the King, since it was from him that thunder and lightning proceeded. In one respect, the sign was auspicious, — that a great light had appeared to him from Zeus, in the midst of peril and suffering. But on the other hand, it was alarming, that the house had appeared to be completely encircled by flames, preventing all egress, because this seemed to indicate that he would remain confined where he was in the Persian dominions, without being able to overcome the difficulties which hedged him in. Yet doubtful as the promise was, it was still the message of Zeus addressed to himself, serving as a stimulus to him to break through the common stupor and take the initiative movement.<sup>3</sup> "Why am I lying here? Night is advan-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4–11. Ἦν δὲ τις ἐν τῇ στρατιᾷ Ξενοφῶν Ἀθηναῖος, ὃς οὐτε στρατηγός, etc.

Homer, Iliad, v, 9 —

Ἦν δὲ τις ἐν Τρώεσσι Δάρης, ἄφνειος, ἀμύμων,

Ἰρὲς Ἥφαιστοιο, etc.

Compare the description of Zeus sending Oneirus to the sleeping Agamemnon, at the beginning of the second book of the Iliad.

<sup>2</sup> Respecting the value of a sign from Zeus Basileus, and the necessity of conciliating him, compare various passages in the Cyropædia, ii, 4, 19; iii, 3, 21; vii, 5, 57.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 12, 13. Περίφοβος δ' εὐθὺς ἀνηγέρθη, καὶ τὸ ὄναρ τῷ μὲν ἐκρίνεν ἀγαθόν, ὅτι ἐν πόνοις ὦν καὶ κινδύνοις φῶς μέγα ἐκ Διὸς ἴειν ἔδοξε, etc. . . . . Ὅποιόν μὲν δὴ ἐστὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ὄναρ λδεῖν, ἐξίστι σκοπεῖν



ing; at day-break the enemy will be on us, and we shall be put to death with tortures. Not a man is stirring to take measures of defence. Why do I wait for any man older than myself, or for man of a different city, to begin?"

With these reflections, interesting in themselves and given with Homeric vivacity, he instantly went to convene the lochagi or captains who had served under his late friend Proxenus; and impressed upon them emphatically the necessity of standing forward to put the army in a posture of defence. "I cannot sleep, gentlemen; neither, I presume, can you, under our present perils. The enemy will be upon us at day-break,—prepared to kill us all with tortures, as his worst enemies. For my part, I rejoice that his flagitious perjury has put an end to a truce by which we were the great losers; a truce under which we, mindful of our oaths, have passed through all the rich possessions of the king, without touching anything except what we could purchase with our own scanty means. Now, we have our hands free; all these rich spoils stand between us and him, as prizes for the better man. The gods, who preside over the match, will assuredly be on the side of us, who have kept our oaths in spite of strong temptations, against these perjurers. Moreover, our bodies are more enduring, and our spirits more gallant, than theirs. They are easier to wound, and easier to kill, than we are, under the same favor of the gods as we experienced at Kunaxa.

"Probably others also are feeling just as we feel. But let us not wait for any one else to come as monitors to us; let us take the lead, and communicate the stimulus of honor to others. Do you show yourselves now the best among the lochages,—more worthy of being generals than the generals themselves. Begin at once,

ἐκ τῶν συμβάντων μετὰ τὸ θῆναι. Γίνεται γὰρ τάδε. Εὐθὺς ἐπειδὴ ἀνηγγέθη, πρῶτον μὲν ἐννοία αὐτῷ ἐμπίπτει· Τι κατάκειται; ἡ δὲ νῦν προβαίνει ἅμα δὲ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ εἰκὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἤξειν, etc.

The reader of Homer will readily recall various passages in the Iliad and Odyssey, wherein the like mental talk is put into language and expanded,—such as Iliad, xi, 403—and several other passages cited or referred to in Colonel Mure's History of the Language and Literature of Greece, ch. xiv, vol. ii, p. 25 *seq.*

A vision of light shining brightly out of a friendly house, counts for a favorable sign (Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, p. 587 C.)

and I desire only to follow you. But if you order me into the front rank, I shall obey without pleading my youth as an excuse,—accounting myself of complete maturity, when the purpose is to save myself from ruin."<sup>1</sup>

All the captains who heard Xenophon cordially concurred in his suggestion, and desired him to take the lead in executing it. One captain alone,—Apollonides, speaking in the Boeotian dialect,—protested against it as insane; enlarging upon their desperate position, and insisting upon submission to the king, as the only chance of safety. "How (replied Xenophon)? Have you forgotten the courteous treatment which we received from the Persians in Babylonia, when we replied to their demand for the surrender of our arms by showing a bold front? Do not you see the miserable fate which has befallen Klearchus, when he trusted himself unarmed in their hands, in reliance on their oaths? And yet you scout our exhortations to resistance, again advising us to go and plead for indulgence! My friends, such a Greek as this man, disgraces not only his own city, but all Greece besides. Let us banish him from our counsels, cashier him, and make a slave of him to carry baggage."—"Nay (observed Agasias of Stymphalus), the man has nothing to do with Greece; I myself have seen his ears bored, like a true Lydian." Apollonides was degraded accordingly.<sup>2</sup>

Xenophon with the rest then distributed themselves in order to bring together the chief remaining officers in the army, who were presently convened, to the number of about one hundred. The

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 16, 25.

"Vel imperatore, vel milite, me utemini." (Sallust, Bellum Catilinar. c. 20).

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 26–30. It would appear from the words of Xenophon, that Apollonides had been one of those who had held faint-hearted language (ὑπομαλακίζόμενοι, ii, 1, 14) in the conversation with Phalinos shortly after the death of Cyrus. Hence Xenophon tells him, that this is the second time of his offering such advice—"Α σὺ πάντα εἰδὼς, τοὺς μὲν ἀμύνεσθαι κελεύοντας φλαρεῖν φῆς, πείθειν δὲ πάλιν κελεύεις λόγῳ τας;

This helps to explain the contempt and rigor with which Xenophon here treats him. Nothing indeed could be more deplorable, under the actual circumstances, than for a man "to show his acuteness by summing up the perils around." See the remarkable speech of Demosthenes at Pylus (Thucyd. iv, 10).



senior captain of the earlier body next desired Xenophon to repeat to this larger body the topics upon which he had just before been insisting. Xenophon obeyed, enlarging yet more emphatically on the situation, perilous, yet not without hope,—on the proper measures to be taken,—and especially on the necessity that they, the chief officers remaining, should put themselves forward prominently, first fix upon effective commanders, then afterwards submit the names to be confirmed by the army, accompanied with suitable exhortations and encouragement. His speech was applauded and welcomed, especially by the Lacedæmonian general Cheirisophus who had joined Cyrus with a body of seven hundred hoplites at Issus in Kilikia. Cheirisophus urged the captains to retire forthwith, and agree upon other commanders instead of the four who had been seized; after which the herald must be summoned, and the entire body of soldiers convened without delay. Accordingly Timasion of Dardanus was chosen instead of Klearchus; Xanthiklès in place of Sokrates; Kleanor in place of Agias; Philesius in place of Menon; and Xenophon instead of Proxenus.<sup>1</sup> The captains, who had served under each of the departed generals, separately chose a successor to the captain thus promoted. It is to be recollected that the five now chosen were not the only generals in the camp; thus for example, Cheirisophus had the command of his own separate division, and there may have been one or two others similarly placed. But it was now necessary for all the generals to form a Board and act in concert.

At daybreak the newly constituted Board of generals placed proper outposts in advance, and then convened the army in general assembly, in order that the new appointments might be submitted and confirmed. As soon as this had been done, probably on the proposition of Cheirisophus (who had been in command before), that general addressed a few words of exhortation and encouragement to the soldiers. He was followed by Kleanor, who delivered, with the like brevity, an earnest protest against the perfidy of Tissaphernes and Ariæus. Both of them left to Xenophon the task, alike important and arduous at this moment of despondency, of setting forth the case at length,—working up the feelings of the soldiers to that pitch of resolution which the emergency required,

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 36-46.

—and above all, extinguishing all those inclinations to acquiesce in new treacherous proposals from the enemy, which the perils of the situation would be likely to suggest.

Xenophon had equipped himself in his finest military costume at this his first official appearance before the army, when the scales seemed to tremble between life and death. Taking up the protest of Kleanor against the treachery of the Persians, he insisted that any attempt to enter into convention or trust with such liars, would be utter ruin,—but that if energetic resolution were taken to deal with them only at the point of the sword, and punish their misdeeds, there was good hope of the favor of the gods and of ultimate preservation. As he pronounced this last word, one of the soldiers near him happened to sneeze. Immediately the whole army around shouted with one accord the accustomed invocation to Zeus the Preserver; and Xenophon, taking up the accident, continued,—“Since, gentlemen, this omen from Zeus the Preserver has appeared at the instant when we were talking about preservation, let us here vow to offer the preserving sacrifice to that god, and at the same time to sacrifice to the remaining gods as well as we can, in the first friendly country which we may reach. Let every man who agrees with me, hold up his hand.” All held up their hands; all then joined in the vow, and shouted the pæan.

This accident, so dexterously turned to profit by the rhetorical skill of Xenophon, was eminently beneficial in raising the army out of the depression which weighed them down, and in disposing them to listen to his animating appeal. Repeating his assurances that the gods were on their side, and hostile to their perjured enemy, he recalled to their memory the great invasions of Greece by Darius and Xerxes,—how the vast hosts of Persia had been disgracefully repelled. The army had shown themselves on the field of Kunaxa worthy of such forefathers; and they would for the future be yet bolder, knowing by that battle of what stuff the Persians were made. As for Ariæus and his troops, alike traitors and cowards, their desertion was rather a gain than a loss. The enemy were superior in horsemen; but men on horseback were, after all, only men, half-occupied in the fear of losing their seats,—incapable of prevailing against infantry firm on the ground,—and only better able to run away. Now that the satrap refused to furnish them with provisions to buy, they on their side were



released from their covenant, and would take provisions without buying. Then as to the rivers; those were indeed difficult to be crossed in the middle of their course; but the army would march up to their sources, and could then pass them without wetting the knee. Or indeed, the Greeks might renounce the idea of retreat, and establish themselves permanently in the king's own country, defying all his force, like the Mysians and Pisidians. "If (said Xenophon) we plant ourselves here at our ease in a rich country, with these tall, stately, and beautiful Median and Persian women for our companions,<sup>1</sup> — we shall be only too ready, like the Lottophagi, to forget our way home. We ought first to go back to Greece, and tell our countrymen that if they remain poor, it is their own fault, when there are rich settlements in this country awaiting all who choose to come, and who have courage to seize them. Let us burn our baggage-waggons and tents, and carry with us nothing but what is of the strictest necessity. Above all things,

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iii, 2, 25.

Ἀλλὰ γὰρ δέδοικα μὴ ἂν ἀπαξ μάθωμεν ἄργοι ζῆν καὶ ἐν ἀφρόνοις βιοτεύειν, καὶ Μήδων δὲ καὶ Περσῶν καλαῖς καὶ μεγάλαις γυναιξὶ καὶ παρθένοις ὁμιλεῖν, μὴ, ὥσπερ οἱ λωτοφάγοι, ἐπιλαθόμεθα τῆς οἰκαδὲ ὁδοῦ.

Hippokrates (De Aëre, Locis, et Aquis, c. 12) compares the physical characteristics of Asiatics and Europeans, noticing the ample, full-grown, rounded, voluptuous, but inactive forms of the first, — as contrasted with the more compact, muscular, and vigorous type of the second, trained for movement, action, and endurance.

Dio Chrysostom has a curious passage, in reference to the Persian preference for eunuchs as slaves, remarking that they admired even in males an approach to the type of feminine beauty, — their eyes and tastes being under the influence only of aphrodisiac ideas; whereas the Greeks, accustomed to the constant training and naked exercises of the palæstra, boys competing with boys and youths with youths, had their associations of the male beauty attracted towards active power and graceful motion.

Οὐ γὰρ φανερόν, ὅτι οἱ Πέρσαι εὐνούχους ἐποίουν τοὺς καλοὺς, ὅπως αὐτοῖς ὡς κάλλιστοι ὦσι; Τοσοῦτον διαφέρειν φοντο πρὸς κάλλος τὸ θῆλυ σχεδὸν καὶ πάντες οἱ βάρβαροι, διὰ τὸ μόνον τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἐννοεῖν. Κάκεινοι γυναικὸς εἶδος περιτιθέασιν τοῖς ἄρρεσιν, ἄλλως δ' οὐκ ἐπίστανται ἔρῳ ἰσως δὲ καὶ ἡ τροφὴ αἰτία τοῖς Πέρσαις, τῷ μέχρι πολλοῦ τρέφεσθαι ὑπὸ τε γυναικῶν καὶ εὐνούχων τῶν πρεσβυτέρων παῖδας δὲ μετὰ παιδῶν, καὶ μεῖράκια μετὰ μεῖρακιων μὴ πάνιν συνεῖναι, μηδὲ γυμνοῦσθαι ἐν παλαίστραις καὶ γυμνασίαις, etc. (Orat. xxi, p. 270).

Compare Euripides, Bacchæ, 447 seq.; and the Epigram of S' ato in the Anthologia, xxxiv, vol. ii, p. 367 Brunck.

let us maintain order, discipline, and obedience to the commanders, upon which our entire hope of safety depends. Let every man promise to lend his hand to the commanders in punishing any disobedient individuals; and let us thus show the enemy that we have ten thousand persons like Klearchus, instead of that one whom they have so perfidiously seized. Now is the time for action. If any man, however obscure, has anything better to suggest, let him come forward and state it; for we have all but one object, — the common safety."

It appears that no one else desired to say a word, and that the speech of Xenophon gave unqualified satisfaction; for when Cheirisophus put the question, that the meeting should sanction his recommendations, and finally elect the new generals proposed, — every man held up his hand. Xenophon then moved that the army should break up immediately, and march to some well-stored villages, rather more than two miles distant; that the march should be in a hollow oblong, with the baggage in the centre; that Cheirisophus, as a Lacedæmonian, should lead the van; while Kleanor, and the other senior officers, would command on each flank, — and himself with Timasion, as the two youngest of the generals, would lead the rear-guard.

This proposition was at once adopted, and the assembly broke up, proceeding forthwith to destroy, or distribute among one another, every man's superfluous baggage, — and then to take their morning meal previous to the march.

The scene just described is interesting and illustrative in more than one point of view.<sup>1</sup> It exhibits that susceptibility to the influence of persuasive discourse which formed so marked a feature in the Grecian character, — a resurrection of the collective body out of the depth of despair, under the exhortation of one who had no established ascendancy, nor anything to recommend him, except his intelligence, his oratorical power, and his community of interest with themselves. Next, it manifests, still more strikingly, the superiority of Athenian training as compared with that of other parts of Greece. Cheirisophus had not only been before in

<sup>1</sup> A very meagre abstract is given by Diodorus, of that which passed after the seizure of the generals (xiv, 27). He does not mention the name of Xenophon on this occasion, nor indeed throughout all his account of the march.



office as one of the generals, but was also a native of Sparta, whose supremacy and name was at that moment all-powerful. Kleon had been before, not indeed a general, but a lochage, or one in the second rank of officers;—he was an elderly man,—and he was an Arcadian, while more than the numerical half of the army consisted of Arcadians and Achæans. Either of these two, therefore, and various others besides, enjoyed a sort of prerogative, or established starting-point, for taking the initiative in reference to the dispirited army. But Xenophon was comparatively a young man, with little military experience;—he was not an officer at all, either in the first or second grade, but simply a volunteer, companion of Proxenus;—he was, moreover, a native of Athens, a city at that time unpopular among the great body of Greeks, and especially of Peloponnesians, with whom her recent long war had been carried on. Not only, therefore, he had no advantages compared with others, but he was under positive disadvantages. He had nothing to start with except his personal qualities and previous training; in spite of which we find him not merely the prime mover, but also the ascendent person for whom the others make way. In him are exemplified those peculiarities of Athens, attested not less by the denunciation of her enemies than by the panegyric of her own citizens,<sup>1</sup>—spontaneous and forward impulse, as well in conception as in execution,—confidence under circumstances which made others despair,—persua-

<sup>1</sup> Compare the hostile speech of the Corinthian envoy at Sparta prior to the Peloponnesian war, with the eulogistic funeral oration of Perikles, in the second year of that war (Thucyd. i, 70, 71; ii, 39, 40).

Οἱ μὲν γε (εἰσὶ), νεωτεροποιοὶ (description of the Athenians by the Corinthian speaker) καὶ ἐπινοῆσαι ὁξεῖς καὶ ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργα ἃ ἂν γινώσκουσιν ὑμεῖς δὲ (Lacedæmonians), τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε σώζειν καὶ ἐπιγινῶναι μηδὲν καὶ ἔργῳ οὐδὲ τὰναγκαῖα ἐξικέσθαι. Αὐτίς δὲ, οἱ μὲν, καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταὶ καὶ παρὰ γνώμην κινδυνεύουσι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες τὸ δὲ ἕμμετρον, τῆς τεδυνάμειος ἐνδεῶς πράξαι, τῆς τε γνώμης μηδὲ τοῖς βεβαίοις πιστεῦσαι, τῶν τε δεινῶν μηδέποτε οἰεσθαι ἀπολυθῆσεσθαι. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἄοκνοι πῶς ὑμᾶς μελλήτας, καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους, etc.

Again, in the oration of Perikles—Καὶ αὐτοὶ ἤτοι κρίνομεν ἢ ἐνθουσιάζομεθα ὁρθῶς τὰ πράγματα, οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην ἡγούμενοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ προδιδαχθῆναι μάλλον λόγῳ, πρότερον ἢ ἐπὶ ἃ δεῖ ἔργῳ ἔλθεῖν. Διαφερόντως μὲν δὴ καὶ τότε ἔχομεν, ὥστε τολμᾶν τε οἱ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐπιχειρήσομεν ἐπιλογίζεσθαι· ὁ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀμαθῶν ἡθῶς, λογισμὸς δὲ ἄκων, φέρει.

sive discourse and publicity of discussion, made subservient to practical business, so as at once to appeal to the intelligence, and stimulate the active zeal, of the multitude. Such peculiarities stood out more remarkably from being contrasted with the opposite qualities in Spartans,—mistrust in conception, slackness in execution, secrecy in counsel, silent and passive obedience. Though Spartans and Athenians formed the two extremities of the scale, other Greeks stood nearer on this point to the former than to the latter.

If, even in that encouraging autumn which followed immediately upon the great Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, the inertia of Sparta could not be stirred into vigorous action without the vehemence of the Athenian Alkibiades,—much more was it necessary under the depressing circumstances which now overclouded the unofficered Grecian army, that an Athenian bosom should be found as the source of new life and impulse. Nor would any one, probably, except an Athenian, either have felt or obeyed the promptings to stand forward as a volunteer at that moment, when there was every motive to decline responsibility, and no special duty to impel him. But if by chance, a Spartan or an Arcadian had been found thus forward, he would have been destitute of such talents as would enable him to work on the minds of others<sup>1</sup>—of that flexibility, resource, familiarity with the temper and movements of an assembled crowd, power of enforcing the essential views and touching the opportune chords, which Athenian demo-

<sup>1</sup> Compare the observations of Perikles, in his last speech to the Athenians about the inefficiency of the best thoughts, if a man had not the power of setting them forth in an impressive manner (Thucyd. ii, 60). Καίτοι ἐμοὶ τοιοῦτῳ ἀνδρὶ ὁργίζεσθε, ὅς οὐδενὸς οἶομαι ἥσσων εἶναι γινῶναι τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι τὰ ὕτα, φιλόπολις τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείττων· ὁ τε γὰρ γινῶν καὶ μὴ σαφῶς διδάξας, ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐνεθυμήθῃ, etc.

The philosopher and the statesman at Athens here hold the same language. It was the opinion of Sokrates—μόνον ἄξιον εἶναι τιμῆς τοῦ εἰδότος τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι δυναμένους (Xenoph. Mem. i, 2, 52).

A striking passage in the funeral harangue of Lysias (Orat. ii, Epitaph. 19) sets forth the prevalent idea of the Athenian democracy—authoritative law, with persuasive and instructive speech, as superseding mutual violence (νόμος and λόγος, as the antithesis of βία). Compare a similar sentiment in Isokrates (Or. iv, (Panegyric.) s. 53–56).



cratical training imparted. Even Brasidas and Gylippus, individual Spartans of splendid merit, and equal or superior to Xenophon in military resource, would not have combined with it that political and rhetorical accomplishment which the position of the latter demanded. Obvious as the wisdom of his propositions appears, each of them is left to him not only to imitate, but to enforce; — Cheirisophus and Kleanor, after a few words of introduction, consign to him the duty of working up the minds of the army to the proper pitch. How well he performed this, may be seen by his speech to the army, which bears in its general tenor a remarkable resemblance to that of Perikles addressed to the Athenian public in the second year of the war, at the moment when the miseries of the epidemic, combined with those of invasion, had driven them almost to despair. It breathes a strain of exaggerated confidence, and an undervaluing of real dangers, highly suitable for the occasion, but which neither Perikles nor Xenophon would have employed at any other moment.<sup>1</sup> Throughout the whole of his speech, and especially in regard to the accidental sneeze near at hand which interrupted the beginning of it, Xenophon displayed that skill and practice in dealing with a numerous audience and a given situation, which characterized more or less every educated Athenian. Other Greeks, Lacedæmonians or Arcadians, could act, with bravery and in concert; but the Athenian Xenophon was among the few who could think, speak, and act, with equal efficiency.<sup>2</sup> It was this tripartite accomplishment

<sup>1</sup> See the speech of Perikles (Thuc. ii, 60-64). He justifies the boastful tone of it, by the unwonted depression against which he had to contend on the part of his hearers — Δελώσω δὲ καὶ τόδε ὃ μοι δοκεῖτε οὐτ' αὐτοὶ πώποτε ἐνθυμηθῆναι ὑπάρχον ὑμῖν μεγέθους περὶ ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐτ' ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς πρὶν λόγοις, οὐδ' ἂν νῦν ἐχρησάμην κομπωδεστέραν ἔχοντι τὴν προσποιήσιν, εἰ μὴ καταπεπληγμένους ὑμᾶς παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἑώρων.

This is also the proper explanation of Xenophon's tone.

<sup>2</sup> In a passage of the Cyropædia (v. 5, 46), Xenophon sets forth in a striking manner the combination of the λεκτικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς — Ὡσπερ καὶ ὅταν μάχεσθαι δέη, ὁ πλείστον χειρῶσάμενος ἀλκιμώτατος δοξάζεται εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ ὅταν πείσαι δέη, ὁ πλείστον ὁμογνώμονας ἡμῖν ποιήσας οὕτως δικάως ἂν λεκτικώτατος καὶ πρακτικώτατος κρίνοιτο ἂν εἶναι. Μὴ μὲντοι ὥς λόγον ἡμῖν ἐπιδειξόμενοι, οἷοι ἂν εἴποιντε πρὸς κάστον αὐτῶν, οὗτο μελετᾶτε — ἀλλ' ὥς τοὺς περὶ σεμνί-

which an aspiring youth was compelled to set before himself as an aim, in the democracy of Athens, and which the sophists as well as the democratical institutions, both of them so hardly depreciated, helped and encouraged him to acquire. It was this tripartite accomplishment, the exclusive possession of which, in spite of constant jealousy on the part of Boeotian officers and comrades of Proxenus,<sup>1</sup> elevated Xenophon into the most ascendent person of the Cyreian army, from the present moment until the time when it broke up, — as will be seen in the subsequent history.

I think it the more necessary to notice this fact, — that the accomplishments whereby Xenophon leaped on a sudden into such extraordinary ascendancy, and rendered such eminent service to his army, were accomplishments belonging in an especial manner to the Athenian democracy and education, — because Xenophon himself has throughout his writings treated Athens not merely without the attachment of a citizen, but with feelings more like the positive antipathy of an exile. His sympathies are all in favor of the perpetual drill, the mechanical obedience, the secret government proceedings, the narrow and prescribed range of ideas, the silent and deferential demeanor, the methodical, though tardy, action — of Sparta. Whatever may be the justice of his preference, certain it is, that the qualities whereby he was himself enabled to contribute so much both to the rescue of the Cyreian army, and to his own reputation, — were Athenian far more than Spartan.

While the Grecian army, after sanctioning the propositions of Xenophon, were taking their morning meal before they commenced their march, Mithridates, one of the Persians previously attached to Cyrus, appeared with a few horsemen on a mission of pretended friendship. But it was soon found out that his purposes were treacherous, and that he came merely to seduce individual

νοὺς ὑφ' ἐκάστου δῆλους ἐσομένους οἷς ἂν πρᾶττωσιν, εὖτε παρασκευάζεσθε.

In describing the duties of a Hipparch or commander of the cavalry, Xenophon also insists upon the importance of persuasive speech, as a means of keeping up the active obedience of the soldiers — Εἰς γε μὴν τὸ εὖπειθεῖς εἶναι τοὺς ἀρχομένους, μέγα μὲν καὶ τὸ λίγῃ διδάσκειν, ὅσα ἀγαθὰ ἐν τῇ τῷ πειθαρχεῖν, etc. (Xen. Mag. Eq. i, 24).

<sup>1</sup> See Xenoph. Anab. v, 6, 25.



soldiers to desertion, — with a few of whom he succeeded. Accordingly, the resolution was taken to admit no more heralds or envoys.

Disembarrassed of superfluous baggage, and refreshed, the army now crossed the Great Zab River, and pursued their march on the other side, having their baggage and attendants in the centre, and Cheirisophus leading the van, with a select body of three hundred hoplites.<sup>1</sup> As no mention is made of a bridge, we are to presume that they forded the river, — which furnishes a ford (according to Mr. Ainsworth), still commonly used, at a place between thirty and forty miles from its junction with the Tigris. When they had got a little way forward, Mithridates again appeared with a few hundred cavalry and bowmen. He approached them like a friend; but as soon as he was near enough, suddenly began to harass the rear with a shower of missiles. What surprises us most, is, that the Persians, with their very numerous force, made no attempt to hinder them from crossing so very considerable a river; for Xenophon estimates the Zab at four hundred feet broad, — and this seems below the statement of modern travellers, who inform us that it contains not much less water than the Tigris; and though usually deeper and narrower, cannot be much narrower at any fordable place.<sup>2</sup> It is to be recollected that the Persians, habitually marching in advance of the Greeks, must have reached the river first, and were, therefore, in possession of the crossing, whether bridge or ford. Though on the watch for every opportunity of perfidy, Tissaphernes did not dare to resist the Greeks even in the most advantageous position, and ventured only upon sending Mithridates to harass the rear; which he executed with considerable effect. The bowmen and darters of the Greeks, few in number, were at the same time inferior to those of the Persians; and

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iii, 3, 6; iii, 5, 43.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 1. Ainsworth, *Travels and Researches in Asia Minor*, etc. vol. ii, ch. 44, p. 327; also his *Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand*, p. 119-134.

Professor Koch, who speaks with personal knowledge both of Armenia and of the region east of the Tigris, observes truly that the Great Zab is the only point (east of the Tigris) which Xenophon assigns in such a manner as to be capable of distinct local identification. He also observes, here as elsewhere, that the number of parasangs specified by Xenophon is essentially delusive as a measure of distance (*Zug der Zehn Tausend*, p. 64).

when Xenophon employed his rear guard, hoplites and peltasts, to charge and repel them, he not only could never overtake any one, but suffered much in getting back to rejoin his own main body. Even when retiring, the Persian horseman could discharge his arrow or cast his javelin behind him with effect; a dexterity which the Parthians exhibited afterwards still more signally, and which the Persian horsemen of the present day parallel with their carbines. This was the first experience which the Greeks had of marching under the harassing attack of cavalry. Even the small detachment of Mithridates greatly delayed their progress; so that they accomplished little more than two miles, reaching the villages in the evening, with many wounded, and much discouragement.<sup>1</sup>

"Thank Heaven," (said Xenophon in the evening, when Cheirisophus reproached him for imprudence in quitting the main body to charge cavalry, whom yet he could not reach.) "Thank Heaven, that our enemies attacked us with a small detachment only, and not with their great numbers. They have given us a valuable lesson, without doing us any serious harm." Profiting by the lesson, the Greek leaders organized during the night and during the halt of the next day, a small body of fifty cavalry; with two hundred Rhodian slingers, whose slings, furnished with leaden bullets, both carried farther and struck harder than those of the Persians hurling large stones. On the ensuing morning, they started before daybreak, since there lay in their way a ravine difficult to pass. They found the ravine undefended (according to the usual stupidity of Persian proceedings), but when they had got nearly a mile beyond it, Mithridates reappeared in pursuit with a body of four thousand horsemen and darters. Confident from his achievement of the preceding day, he had promised, with a body of that force, to deliver the Greeks into the hands of the satrap. But the latter were now better prepared. As soon as he began to attack them, the trumpet sounded, — and forthwith the horsemen, slingers, and darters, issued forth to charge the Persians, sustained by the hoplites in the rear. So effective was the charge, that the Persians fled in dismay, notwithstanding their superiority in number; while the ravine so impeded their flight that many of them were slain, and eighteen prisoners made. The Greek soldiers of their own

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iii, 3, 9.



accord mutilated the dead bodies, in order to strike terror into the enemy.<sup>1</sup> At the end of the day's march they reached the Tigris, near the deserted city of Larissa, the vast, massive, and lofty brick walls of which (twenty-five feet in thickness, one hundred feet high, seven miles in circumference) attested its former grandeur. Near this place was a stone pyramid, one hundred feet in breadth, and two hundred feet high; the summit of which was crowded with fugitives out of the neighboring villages. Another day's march up the course of the Tigris brought the army to a second deserted city called Mespila, nearly opposite to the modern city of Mosul. Although these two cities, which seem to have formed the continuation or the substitute of the once colossal Nineveh or Ninus, were completely deserted, — yet the country around them was so well furnished with villages and population, that the Greeks not only obtained provisions, but also strings for the making of new bows, and lead for bullets to be used for the slingers.<sup>2</sup>

During the next day's march, in a course generally parallel with the Tigris, and ascending the stream, Tissaphernes, coming up along with some other grandees, and with a numerous army, enveloped the Greeks both in flanks and rear. In spite of his advantage of numbers, he did not venture upon any actual charge, but kept up a fire of arrows, darts, and stones. He was, however, so well answered by the newly-trained archers and slingers of the Greeks, that on the whole they had the advantage, in spite of the superior size of the Persian bows, many of which were taken and effectively employed on the Grecian side. Having passed the night in a well-stocked village, they halted there the next day in order to stock themselves with provisions, and then pursued their march for four successive days along a level country, until, on the fifth day, they reached hilly ground with the prospect of still higher hills beyond. All this march was made under unremitting annoyance from the enemy, insomuch that though the order of the Greeks was never broken, a considerable number of their

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 1-5.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 17, 18. It is here, on the site of the ancient Nineveh, that the recent investigations of Mr. Layard have brought to light so many curious and valuable Assyrian remains. The legend which Xenophon heard on the spot, respecting the way in which these cities were captured and ruined, is of a truly Oriental character.

men were wounded. Experience taught them, that it was inconvenient for the whole army to march in one inflexible, undivided, hollow square; and they accordingly constituted six *lochi* or regiments of one hundred men each, subdivided into companies of fifty, and *enômoties* or smaller companies of twenty-five, each with a special officer (conformably to the Spartan practice) to move separately on each flank, and either to fall back, or fall in, as might suit the fluctuations of the central mass, arising from impediments in the road or menaces of the enemy.<sup>1</sup> On reaching the hills, in sight of an elevated citadel or palace, with several villages around it, the Greeks anticipated some remission of the Persian attack. But after having passed over one hill, they were proceeding to ascend the second, when they found themselves assailed with unwonted vigor by the Persian cavalry from the summit of it, whose leaders were seen flogging on the men to the attack.<sup>2</sup> This charge was so efficacious, that the Greek light troops were driven in with loss, and forced to take shelter within the ranks of the hoplites. After a march both slow and full of suffering, they could only reach their night-quarters by sending a detachment to get possession of some ground above the Persians, who thus became afraid of a double attack.

The villages which they now reached (supposed by Mr. Ainsworth to have been in the fertile country under the modern town called Zakhu),<sup>3</sup> were unusually rich in provisions; magazines of flour, barley, and wine, having been collected there for the Persian satrap. They reposed here three days, chiefly in order to tend the numerous wounded, for whose necessities, eight of the most competent persons were singled out to act as surgeons. On the fourth day they resumed their march, descending into the plain. But experience had now satisfied them that it was imprudent to continue in march under the attack of cavalry, so that when Tissaphernes appeared and began to harass them, they halted at the first village, and when thus in station, easily repelled him. As the afternoon advanced, the Persian assailants began

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 19-23.

I incline to believe that there were six *lochi* upon each flank — that is, twelve *lochi* in all; though the words of Xenophon are not quite clear.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. iii, 4-25. Compare Herodot. vii, 21, 56, 103.

<sup>3</sup> Professor Koch (*Zug der Zehn Tausend*, p. 68) is of the same opinion.



to retire; for they were always in the habit of taking up their night-post at a distance of near seven miles from the Grecian position; being very apprehensive of nocturnal attack in their camp, when their horses were tied by the leg and without either saddle or bridle.<sup>1</sup> As soon as they had departed, the Greeks resumed their march, and made so much advance during the night, that the Persians did not overtake them either on the next day or the day after.

On the ensuing day, however, the Persians, having made a forced march by night, were seen not only in advance of the Greeks, but in occupation of a spur of high and precipitous ground overhanging immediately the road whereby the Greeks were to descend into the plain. When Cheirisophus approached, he at once saw that descent was impracticable in the face of an enemy thus posted. He therefore halted, sent for Xenophon from the rear, and desired him to bring forward the peltasts to the van. But Xenophon, though he obeyed the summons in person and galloped his horse to the front, did not think it prudent to move the peltasts from the rear, because he saw Tissaphernes, with another portion of the army, just coming up; so that the Grecian army was at once impeded in front, and threatened by the enemy closing upon them behind. The Persians on the high ground in front could not be directly assailed. But Xenophon observed, that on the right of the Grecian army, there was an accessible mountain-summit yet higher, from whence a descent might be made for a flank attack upon the Persian position. Pointing out this summit to Cheirisophus, as affording the only means of dislodging the troops in front, he urged that one of them should immediately hasten with a detachment to take possession of it, and offered to Cheirisophus the choice either of going, or staying with the army. "Choose yourself," said Cheirisophus. "Well, then, (said Xenophon), I will go; since I am the younger of the

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 35; see also Cyropædia, iii, 3, 37.

The Thracian prince Seuthes was so apprehensive of night attack, that he and his troops kept their horses bridled all night (Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 21.)

Mr. Kinneir (Travels in Asia Minor, etc., p. 481) states that the horses of Oriental cavalry, and even of the English cavalry in Hindostan, are still kept tied and shackled at night, in the same way as Xenophon describes to have been practised by the Persians.



LION-GATE AT MYCENÆ

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then, (said Xenophon), I will go; since I am the younger of the two." Accordingly, at the head of a select detachment from the van and centre of the army, he immediately commenced his flank march up the steep ascent to this highest summit. So soon as the enemy saw their purpose, they also detached troops on their side, hoping to get to the summit first; and the two detachments were seen mounting at the same time, each struggling with the utmost efforts to get before the other, — each being encouraged by shouts and clamor from the two armies respectively.

As Xenophon was riding by the side of his soldiers, cheering them on and reminding them that their chance of seeing their country and their families all depended upon success in the effort before them, a Sikyonian hoplite in the ranks, named Sotêridas, said to him, — "You and I are not on an equal footing, Xenophon. You are on horseback; I am painfully struggling up on foot, with my shield to carry." Stung with this taunt, Xenophon sprang from his horse, pushed Sotêridas out of his place in the ranks, took his shield as well as his place, and began to march forward afoot along with the rest. Though thus weighed down at once by the shield belonging to an hoplite, and by the heavy cuirass of a horseman (who carried no shield), he nevertheless put forth all his strength to advance, under such double incumbrance, and to continue his incitement to the rest. But the soldiers around him were so indignant at the proceeding of Sotêridas, that they reproached and even struck him, until they compelled him to resume his shield as well as his place in the ranks. Xenophon then remounted and ascended the hill on horseback as far as the ground permitted; but was obliged again to dismount presently, in consequence of the steepness of the uppermost portion. Such energetic efforts enabled him and his detachment to reach the summit first. As soon as the enemy saw this, they desisted from their ascent, and dispersed in all directions; leaving the forward march open to the main Grecian army, which Cheirisophus accordingly conducted safely down into the plain. Here he was rejoined by Xenophon on descending from the summit. All found themselves in comfortable quarters, amidst several well-stocked villages on the banks of the Tigris. They acquired moreover an additional booty of large droves of cattle, intercepted when on the point

of being transported across the river; where a considerable body of horse were seen assembled on the opposite bank.<sup>1</sup>

Though here disturbed only by some desultory attacks on the part of the Persians, who burnt several of the villages which lay in their forward line of march, the Greeks became seriously embarrassed whither to direct their steps; for on their left flank was the Tigris, so deep that their spears found no bottom,—and on their right, mountains of exceeding height. As the generals and the lochages were taking counsel, a Rhodian soldier came to them with a proposition for transporting the whole army across to the other bank of the river by means of inflated skins, which could be furnished in abundance by the animals in their possession. But this ingenious scheme, in itself feasible, was put out of the question by the view of the Persian cavalry on the opposite bank; and as the villages in their front had been burnt, the army had no choice except to return back one day's march to those in which they had before halted. Here the generals again deliberated, questioning all their prisoners as to the different bearings of the country. The road from the south was that in which they had already marched from Babylon and Media; that to the westward, going to Lydia and Ionia, was barred to them by the interposing Tigris; eastward (they were informed) was the way to Ekbatana and Susa; northward, lay the rugged and inhospitable mountains of the Karduchians,—fierce freemen who despised the Great King, and defied all his efforts to conquer them; having once destroyed a Persian invading army of one hundred and twenty thousand men. On the other side of Karduchia, however, lay the rich Persian satrapy of Armenia, wherein both the Euphrates and the Tigris could be crossed near their sources, and from whence could choose their farther course easily towards Greece. Like Mysia, Pisidia, and other mountainous regions, Karduchia was a free territory surrounded on all sides by the dominions of the Great King, who reigned only in the cities and on the plains.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 36–49, iii, 5, 3.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. iii, 5; iv, 1, 3. Probably the place where the Greeks quit-  
ted the Tigris to strike into the Karduchian mountains, was the neighbor-  
hood of Jezireh ibn Omar, the ancient Bezabde. It is here that farther  
march, up the eastern side of the Tigris, is rendered impracticable by the

Determining to fight their way across these difficult mountains into Armenia, but refraining from any public announcement, for fear that the passes should be occupied beforehand,—the generals sacrificed forthwith, in order that they might be ready for breaking up at a moment's notice. They then began their march a little after midnight, so that soon after daybreak they reached the first of the Karduchian mountain-passes, which they found undefended. Cheirisophus, with his front division and all the light troops, made haste to ascend the pass, and having got over the first mountain, descended on the other side to some villages in the valley or nooks beneath; while Xenophon with the heavy-armed and the baggage, followed at a slower pace,—not reaching the villages until dark, as the road was both steep and narrow. The Karduchians, taken completely by surprise, abandoned the villages as the Greeks approached, and took refuge on the mountains; leaving to the intruders plenty of provisions, comfortable houses, and especially, abundance of copper vessels. At first the Greeks were careful to do no damage, trying to invite the natives to amicable colloquy. But none of the latter would come near, and at length necessity drove the Greeks to take what was necessary for refreshment. It was just when Xenophon and the rear guard were coming in at night, that some few Karduchians first set upon them; by surprise and with considerable success,—so that if their numbers had been greater, serious mischief might have ensued.<sup>1</sup>

Many fires were discovered burning on the mountains,—an earnest of resistance during the next day; which satisfied the Greek generals that they must lighten the army, in order to ensure greater expedition as well as a fuller complement of available hands during the coming march. They therefore gave orders to burn all the baggage except what was indispensable, and to dismiss all the prisoners; planting themselves in a narrow strait, through which the army had to pass, in order to see that their directions were executed. The women, however, of whom there

mountains closing in. Here the modern road crosses the Tigris by a bridge from the eastern bank to the western (Koch, *Zug der Zehn Tausend* p. 72).

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 1, 12.



were many with the army, could not be abandoned; and it seems farther that a considerable stock of baggage was still retained;<sup>1</sup> nor could the army make more than slow advance, from the narrowness of the road and the harassing attack of the Karduchians, who were now assembled in considerable numbers. Their attack was renewed with double vigor on the ensuing day, when the Greeks were forced, from want of provisions, to hasten forward their march, though in the midst of a terrible snow-storm. Both Cheirisophus in the front and Xenophon in the rear, were hard pressed by the Karduchian slingers and bowmen; the latter, men of consummate skill, having bows three cubits in length, and arrows of more than two cubits, so strong that the Greeks when they took them could dart them as javelins. These archers, amidst the rugged ground and narrow paths, approached so near and drew the bow with such surprising force, resting one extremity of it on the ground, that several Greek warriors were mortally wounded even through both shield and corslet into the reins, and through the brazen helmet into their heads; among them especially, two distinguished men, a Lacedæmonian named Kleonymus, and an Arcadian named Basias.<sup>2</sup> The rear division, more roughly handled than the rest, was obliged continually to halt to repel the enemy, under all the difficulties of the ground, which made it scarcely possible to act against nimble mountaineers. On one occasion, however, a body of these latter were entrapped into an ambush, driven back with loss, and (what was still more fortunate) two of their number were made prisoners.

Thus impeded, Xenophon sent frequent messages entreating Cheirisophus to slacken the march of the van division; but instead of obeying, Cheirisophus only hastened the faster, urging Xenophon to follow him. The march of the army became little better than a rout, so that the rear division reached the halting-place in extreme confusion; upon which Xenophon proceeded to remonstrate with Cheirisophus for prematurely hurrying forward and neglecting his comrades behind. But the other, — pointing out to his attention the hill before them, and the steep path ascending it, forming their future line of march, which was beset with numerous Karduchians, — defended himself by saying that

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iv. 3, 19–30.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. iv. 1, 18; iv. 2, 28.

he had hastened forward in hopes of being able to reach this pass before the enemy, in which attempt however he had not succeeded.<sup>1</sup>

To advance farther on this road appeared hopeless; yet the guides declared that no other could be taken. Xenophon then bethought him of the two prisoners whom he had just captured, and proposed that these two should be questioned also. They were accordingly interrogated apart; and the first of them, — having persisted in denying, notwithstanding all menaces, that there was any road except that before them, — was put to death under the eyes of the second prisoner. This latter, on being then questioned, gave more comfortable intelligence; saying that he knew of a different road, more circuitous, but easier and practicable even for beasts of burden, whereby the pass before them and the occupying enemy might be turned; but that there was one particular high position commanding the road, which it was necessary to master beforehand by surprise, as the Karduchians were already on guard there. Two thousand Greeks, having the guide bound along with them, were accordingly despatched late in the afternoon, to surprise this post by a night-march; while Xenophon, in order to distract the attention of the Karduchians in front, made a feint of advancing as if about to force the direct pass. As soon as he was seen crossing the ravine which led to this mountain, the Karduchians on the top immediately began to roll down vast masses of rock, which bounded and dashed down the roadway, in such manner as to render it unapproachable. They continued to do this all night, and the Greeks heard the noise of the descending masses long after they had returned to their camp for supper and rest.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile the detachment of two thousand, marching by the circuitous road, and reaching in the night the elevated position, (though there was another above yet more commanding), held by the Karduchians, surprised and dispersed them, passing the night by their fires. At daybreak, and under favor of a mist, they stole silently towards the position occupied by the other Karduchians in front of the main Grecian army. On coming near they suddenly sounded their trumpets, shouted aloud, and commenced the attack, which proved completely successful. The defenders, taken un-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iv. 1, 21.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. iv. 2, 4.



prepared, fled with little resistance, and scarcely any loss, from their activity and knowledge of the country; while Cheirisophus and the main Grecian force, on hearing the trumpet which had been previously concerted as the signal, rushed forward and stormed the height in front; some along the regular path, others climbing up as they could and pulling each other up by means of their spears. The two bodies of Greeks thus joined each other on the summit, so that the road became open for farther advance.

Xenophon, however, with the rear guard, marched on the circuitous road taken by the two thousand, as the most practicable for the baggage animals, whom he placed in the centre of his division, — the whole array covering a great length of ground, since the road was very narrow. During this interval, the dispersed Karduchians had rallied, and reoccupied two or three high peaks, commanding the road, — from whence it was necessary to drive them. Xenophon's troops stormed successively these three positions, the Karduchians not daring to affront close combat, yet making destructive use of their missiles. A Grecian guard was left on the hindmost of the three peaks, until all the baggage train should have passed by. But the Karduchians, by a sudden and well-timed movement, contrived to surprise this guard, slew two out of the three leaders, with several soldiers, and forced the rest to jump down the crags as they could, in order to join their comrades in the road. Encouraged by such success, the assailants pressed nearer to the marching army, occupying a crag over against that lofty summit on which Xenophon was posted. As it was within speaking distance, he endeavored to open a negotiation with them in order to get back the dead bodies of the slain. To this demand the Karduchians at first acceded, on condition that their villages should not be burnt; but finding their numbers every moment increasing, they resumed the offensive. When Xenophon with the army had begun his descent from the last summit, they hurried onward in crowds to occupy it; beginning again to roll down masses of rock, and renew their fire of missiles, upon the Greeks. Xenophon himself was here in some danger, having been deserted by his shield-bearer; but he was rescued by an Arcadian hoplite named Eurylochus, who ran to give him the benefit of his own shield as a protection for both in the retreat.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 17-21.

After a march thus painful and perilous, the rear division at length found themselves in safety among their comrades, in villages with well-stocked houses and abundance of corn and wine. So eager, however, were Xenophon and Cheirisophus to obtain the bodies of the slain for burial, that they consented to purchase them by surrendering the guide, and to march onward without any guide; — a heavy sacrifice in this unknown country, attesting their great anxiety about the burial.<sup>1</sup>

For three more days did they struggle and fight their way through the narrow and rugged paths of the Karduchian mountains, beset throughout by these formidable bowmen and slingers; whom they had to dislodge at every difficult turn, and against whom their own Kretan bowmen were found inferior, indeed, but still highly useful. Their seven days' march through this country, with its free and warlike inhabitants, were days of the utmost fatigue, suffering and peril; far more intolerable than anything which they had experienced from Tissaphernes and the Persians. Right glad were they once more to see a plain, and to find themselves near the banks of the river Kentritês, which divided these mountains from the hillocks and plains of Armenia, — enjoying comfortable quarters in villages, with the satisfaction of talking over past miseries.<sup>2</sup>

Such were the apprehensions of Karduchian invasion, that the Armenian side of the Kentritês, for a breadth of fifteen miles, was unpeopled and destitute of villages.<sup>3</sup> But the approach of the Greeks having become known to Tiribazus, satrap of Armenia, the banks of the river were lined with his cavalry and infantry to oppose their passage; a precaution, which if Tissaphernes had

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 23.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 2. His expressions have a simple emphasis which marks how unfading was the recollection of what he had suffered in Karduchia.

Καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐνταυθα ἀνεπαύσαντο ἄσμενοι ἰδόντες πέδιον ἀπείχε δὲ τῶν ὁρέων ὁ ποταμὸς ἐξ ἧ ἑπτα στάδια τῶν Καρδουχῶν. Τότε μὲν οὖν ἠγλίασθησαν μάλα ἡδέως, καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔχοντες καὶ πολλὰ τῶν παρεληλυθότων πόνων μνημονεύοντες. Ἑπτα γὰρ ἡμέρας, ὡς ἂν ἐπορεύθησαν διὰ τῶν Καρδουχῶν, πάρας μαχόμενοι διετέλεσαν, καὶ ἐπαθον κακὰ ὅσα οὐδὲ τὰ σύμπαντα ὑπὸ βασιλείᾳ καὶ Τισσαφέρνῳ. Ὡς οὖν ἀτηλλαγμένοι τούτων ἡδέως ἐκοιμήθησαν.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 4, 1.



taken at the Great Zab at the moment when he perfidiously seized Klearchus and his colleagues, the Greeks would hardly have reached the northern bank of that river. In the face of such obstacles, the Greeks, nevertheless, attempted the passage of the Kentritês, seeing a regular road on the other side. But the river was two hundred feet in breadth (only half the breadth of the Zab), above their breasts in depth, extremely rapid, and with a bottom full of slippery stones; insomuch that they could not hold their shields in the proper position, from the force of the stream, while if they lifted the shields above their heads, they were exposed defenceless to the arrows of the satrap's troops. After various trials, the passage was found impracticable, and they were obliged to resume their encampment on the left bank. To their great alarm they saw the Karduchians assembling on the hills in their rear, so that their situation, during this day and night, appeared nearly desperate. In the night, Xenophon had a dream,—the first, which he has told us, since his dream on the terrific night after the seizure of the generals,—but on this occasion, of augury more unequivocally good. He dreamed that he was bound in chains, but that his chains on a sudden dropped off spontaneously; on the faith of which, he told Cheirisophus at daybreak that he had good hopes of preservation; and when the generals offered sacrifice, the victims were at once favorable. As the army were taking their morning meal, two young Greeks ran to Xenophon with the auspicious news that they had accidentally found another ford near half a mile up the river, where the water was not even up to their middle, and where the rocks came so close on the right bank that the enemy's horse could offer no opposition. Xenophon, starting from his meal in delight, immediately offered libations to those gods who had revealed both the dream to himself in the night, and the unexpected ford afterwards to these youths; two revelations which he ascribed to the same gods.<sup>1</sup>

Presently they marched in their usual order, Cheirisophus commanding the van and Xenophon the rear, along the river to the newly-discovered ford; the enemy marching parallel with them on the opposite bank. Having reached the ford, halted, and grounded arms, Cheirisophus placed a wreath on his head, took it off again,

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 6-13.

and then resumed his arms, ordering all the rest to follow his example.<sup>1</sup> Each lochus (company of one hundred men) was then arranged in column or single file, with Cheirisophus himself in the centre. Meanwhile the prophets were offering sacrifice to the river. So soon as the signs were pronounced to be favorable, all the soldiers shouted the pæan, and all the women joined in chorus with their feminine yell. Cheirisophus then at the head of the army, entered the river and began to ford it; while Xenophon, with a large portion of the rear division, made a feint of hastening back to the original ford, as if he were about to attempt the passage there. This distracted the attention of the enemy's horse; who became afraid of being attacked on both sides, galloped off to guard the passage at the other point, and opposed no serious resistance to Cheirisophus. As soon as the latter had reached the other side, and put his division into order, he marched up to attack the Armenian infantry, who were on the high banks a little way above; but this infantry, deserted by its cavalry, dispersed without awaiting his approach. The handful of Grecian cavalry, attached to the division of Cheirisophus, pursued and took some valuable spoils.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 17.

...ἐθεντο τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ αὐτὸς πρῶτος Χειρίσοφος, στεφανώμενος καὶ ἀπὸ δὲ, ἐλάμβανε τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι παρήγγελλε.

I apprehend that the words τὸν στέφανον are here to be understood after ἀποδοῦς—not the words τὰ ὅπλα, as Krüger in his note seems to imagine. It is surely incredible, that in the actual situation of the Grecian army, the soldiers should be ordered first to disarm, and then to resume their arms. I conceive the matter thus:—First, the order is given, to ground arms; so that the shield is let down and drops upon the ground, sustained by the left hand of the soldier upon its upper rim; while the spear, also resting on the ground, is sustained by the shield and by the same left hand. The right hand of the soldier being thus free, he is ordered first to wreath himself (the costume usual in offering sacrifice)—next, to take off his wreath—lastly, to resume his arms.

Probably the operations of wreathing and unwreathing, must here have been performed by the soldiers symbolically, or by gesture, raising the hand to the head, as if to crown it. For it seems impossible that they could have been provided generally with actual wreaths, on the banks of the Kentritês, and just after their painful march through the Karduchian mountains. Cheirisophus himself, however, had doubtless a real wreath, which he put on and took off: so probably had the prophets and certain select officiating persons.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 20-25.



As soon as Xenophon saw his colleague successfully established on the opposite bank, he brought back his detachment to the ford over which the baggage and attendants were still passing, and proceeded to take precautions against the Karduchians on his own side, who were assembling in the rear. He found some difficulty in keeping his rear division together, for many of them, in spite of orders, quitted their ranks, and went to look after their mistresses or their baggage in the crossing of the water.<sup>1</sup> The peltasts and bowmen, who had gone over with Cheirisophus, but whom that general now no longer needed, were directed to hold themselves prepared on both flanks of the army crossing, and to advance a little way into the water, in the attitude of men just about to recross. When Xenophon was left with only the diminished rear-guard, the rest having got over, — the Karduchians rushed upon him, and began to shoot and sling. But on a sudden, the Grecian hoplites charged with their accustomed pæan, upon which the Karduchians took to flight, — having no arms for close combat on the plain. The trumpet now being heard to sound, they ran away so much the faster; while this was the signal, according to orders before given by Xenophon, for the Greeks to suspend their charge, to turn back, and to cross the river as speedily as possible. By favor of this able manœuvre, the passage was accomplished by the whole army, with little or no loss, about mid-day.<sup>2</sup>

They now found themselves in Armenia; a country of even, undulating surface, but very high above the level of the sea, and extremely cold at the season when they entered it, — December. Though the strip of land bordering on Karduchia furnished no supplies, one long march brought them to a village, containing abundance of provisions, together with a residence of the satrap Tiribazus; after which, in two farther marches, they reached the river Teleboas, with many villages on its banks. Here Tiribazus himself, appearing with a division of cavalry, sent forward his interpreter to request a conference with the leaders; which being held, it was agreed that the Greeks should proceed unmolested through his territory, taking such supplies as they required, — but should neither burn nor damage the villages. They accordingly advanced onward for three days, computed at fifteen parasangs, or

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 30.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 31-34; iv, 4, 1.

three pretty full days' march; without any hostility from the satrap, though he was hovering within less than two miles of them. They then found themselves amidst several villages, wherein were regal or satrapical residences, with a plentiful stock of bread, meat, wine, and all sorts of vegetables. Here, during their nightly bivouac, they were overtaken by so heavy a fall of snow, that the generals, on the next day, distributed the troops into separate quarters among the villages. No enemy appeared near, while the snow seemed to forbid any rapid surprise. Yet at night, the scouts reported that many fires were discernible, together with traces of military movements around; insomuch that the generals thought it prudent to put themselves on their guard, and again collected the army into one bivouac. Here, in the night, they were overwhelmed by a second fall of snow, still heavier than the preceding; sufficient to cover over the sleeping men and their arms, and to benumb the cattle. The men, however, lay warm under the snow and were unwilling to rise, until Xenophon himself set the example of rising, and employing himself, without his arms, in cutting wood and kindling a fire.<sup>1</sup> Others followed his example, and great comfort was found in rubbing themselves with pork-fat, oil of almonds, or of sesame, or turpentine. Having sent out a clever scout named Demokrates, who captured a native prisoner, they learned that Tiribazus was laying plans to intercept them in a lofty mountain-pass lying farther on in their route; upon which they immediately set forth, and by two days of forced march, surprising in their way the camp of Tiribazus, got over the difficult pass in safety. Three days of additional march brought them to the Euphrates river,<sup>2</sup> — that is, to the eastern branch, now called Murad. They found a ford and crossed it, without having the water higher than the navel; and they were informed that its sources were not far off.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 4, 11.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 2.

The recent editors, Schneider and Krüger, on the authority of various MSS., read here *ἐπορεύθησαν* — *ἐπὶ τὸν Εὐφράτην ποταμὸν*. The old reading was, as it stands in Hutchinson's edition, *παρὰ τὸν Εὐφράτην ποταμὸν*.

This change may be right, but the geographical data are here too vague to admit of any certainty. See my Appendix annexed to this chapter.



Their four days of march, next on the other side of the Euphrates, were toilsome and distressing in the extreme; through a plain covered with deep snow (in some places six feet deep), and at times in the face of a north wind so intolerably chilling and piercing, that at length one of the prophets urged the necessity of offering sacrifices to Boreas; upon which (says Xenophon<sup>1</sup>) the severity of the wind abated conspicuously, to the evident consciousness of all. Many of the slaves and beasts of burden, and a few even of the soldiers, perished; some had their feet frost-bitten, others became blinded by the snow, others again were exhausted by hunger. Several of these unhappy men were unavoidably left behind; others lay down to perish, near a warm spring which had melted the snow around, from extremity of fatigue and sheer wretchedness, though the enemy were close upon the rear. It was in vain that Xenophon, who commanded the rear-guard, employed his earnest exhortations, prayers, and threats, to induce them to move forward. The sufferers, miserable and motionless, answered only by entreating him to kill them at once. So greatly was the army disorganized by wretchedness, that we hear of one case in which a soldier, ordered to carry a disabled comrade, disobeyed the order, and was about to bury him alive.<sup>2</sup> Xenophon made a sally, with loud shouts and clatter of spear with shield, in which even the exhausted men joined,—against the pursuing enemy. He was fortunate enough to frighten them away, and drive them to take shelter in a neighboring wood. He then left the sufferers lying down, with assurance that relief should be sent to them on the next day,—and went forward, seeing all along the line of march the exhausted soldiers lying on the snow, without even the protection of a watch. He and his rear-guard, as well as the rest, were obliged thus to pass the night without either food or fire, distributing scouts in the best way the case admitted. Meanwhile, Cheirisophus with the van division had got into a village, which they reached so unexpectedly, that they found the wo-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Ἐνθα δὲ τῶν μάντεων τις εἶπε σφαγιάσασθαι τῷ Ἀνέμῳ καὶ πᾶσι δὲ περιφανῶς ἔδοξε λῆξαι τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦ πνεύματος.*

The suffering of the army from the terrible snow and cold of Armenia are set forth in Diodorus, xiv, 28.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 8, 8-11.

men fetching water from a fountain outside the wall, and the headman of the village in his house within. This division here obtained rest and refreshment, and at daybreak some of their soldiers were sent to look after the rear. It was with delight that Xenophon saw them approach, and sent them back to bring up in their arms, into the neighboring village, those exhausted soldiers who had been left behind.<sup>1</sup>

Repose was now indispensable after the recent sufferings. There were several villages near at hand, and the generals, thinking it no longer dangerous to divide the army, quartered the different divisions among them according to lot. Polykrates, an Athenian, one of the captains in the division of Xenophon, requested his permission to go at once and take possession of the village assigned to him, before any of the inhabitants could escape. Accordingly, running at speed with a few of the swiftest soldiers, he came upon the village so suddenly as to seize the headman, with his newly-married daughter, and several young horses intended as a tribute for the king. This village, as well as the rest, was found to consist of houses excavated in the ground (as the Armenian villages are at the present day), spacious within, but with a narrow mouth like a well, entered by a descending ladder. A separate entrance was dug for conveniently admitting the cattle. All of them were found amply stocked with live cattle of every kind, wintered upon hay; as well as with wheat, barley, vegetables, and a sort of barley-wine or beer, in tubs, with the grains of barley on the surface. Reeds or straws, without any joint in them, were lying near, through which they sucked the liquid.<sup>2</sup> Xenophon did his utmost to conciliate the headman (who spoke Persian, and with whom he communicated through the Perso-Grecian interpreter of the army),

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 8-22.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 26. *Κάλαμοι γόνυα οὐκ ἔχοντες.*

This Armenian practice of sucking the beer through a reed, to which the observation of modern travellers supplies analogies (see Krüger's note), illustrates the Fragment of Archilochus (No. 28, ed. Schreidewin, *Poetae Græc. Minor*).

*ὥσπερ αὐλῶ βρύτον ἡ θεοῖς ἀνὴρ  
ἡ φρὸς ἐβρουζε etc.*

The similarity of Armenian customs to those of the Thracians and Phrygians, is not surprising.



promising him that not one of his relations should be maltreated, and that he should be fully remunerated if he would conduct the army safely out of the country, into that of the Chalybes which he described as being adjacent. By such treatment the headman was won over, promised his aid, and even revealed to the Greeks the subterranean cellars wherein the wine was deposited; while Xenophon, though he kept him constantly under watch, and placed his youthful son as a hostage under the care of Episthenes, yet continued to treat him with studied attention and kindness. For seven days did the fatigued soldiers remain in these comfortable quarters, refreshing themselves and regaining strength. They were waited upon by the native youths, with whom they communicated by means of signs. The uncommon happiness which all of them enjoyed after their recent sufferings, stands depicted in the lively details given by Xenophon; who left here his own exhausted horse, and took young horses in exchange, for himself and the other officers.<sup>1</sup>

After this week of repose, the army resumed its march through the snow. The headman, whose house they had replenished as well as they could, accompanied Cheirisophus in the van as guide, but was not put in chains or under guard; his son remained as an hostage with Episthenes, but his other relations were left unmolested at home. As they marched for three days without reaching a village, Cheirisophus began to suspect his fidelity, and even became so out of humor, though the man affirmed that there were no villages in the track, as to beat him, — yet without the precaution of putting him afterwards in fetters. The next night, accordingly, this headman made his escape; much to the displeasure of Xenophon, who severely reproached Cheirisophus, first for his harshness, and next for his neglect. This was the only point of difference between the two (says Xenophon), during the whole march; a fact very honorable to both, considering the numberless difficulties against which they had to contend. Episthenes retained the headman's youthful son, carried him home in safety, and became much attached to him.<sup>2</sup>

Condemned thus to march without a guide, they could do no better than march up the course of a river; and thus, from the

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 26-36.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 1-3.

villages which had proved so cheering and restorative, they proceeded seven days' march all through snow, up the river Phasis, a river not verifiable, but certainly not the same as is commonly known under that name by Grecian geographers; it was one hundred feet in breadth.<sup>1</sup> Two more days' march brought them from this river to the foot of a range of mountains; near a pass occupied by an armed body of Chalybes, Taochi, and Phasiani.

Observing the enemy in possession of this lofty ground, Cheirisophus halted until all the army came up; in order that the generals might take counsel. Here Kleanor began by advising that they should storm the pass with no greater delay than was necessary to refresh the soldiers. But Xenophon suggested that it was far better to avoid the loss of life which must thus be incurred, and to amuse the enemy by feigned attack, while a detachment should be sent by stealth, at night, to ascend the mountain at another point and turn the position. "However (continued he, turning to Cheirisophus), stealing a march upon the enemy is more your trade than mine. For I understand that you, the full citizens and peers at Sparta, practise stealing from your boyhood upward;<sup>2</sup> and that it is held no way base, but even honorable, to steal such things as the law does not distinctly forbid. And to the end that you may steal with the greatest effect, and take pains to do it in secret, the custom is, to flog you if you are found out. Here, then, you have an excellent opportunity for displaying your training. Take good care that we be not found out in stealing an occupation of the mountain now before us; for if we *are* found out, we shall be well beaten.

"Why, as for that (replied Cheirisophus), you Athenians, also, as I learn, are capital hands at stealing the public money, and that too in spite of prodigious peril to the thief; nay, your most powerful men steal most of all, — at least, if it be the most powerful men among you who are raised to official command. So that this

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 4.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 10-14.

*Kai ouk aischron einai, alla kalon kleptein*, etc. The reading *καλόν* is preferred by Schneider to *ἀναγκαῖον*, which has been the vulgar reading, and is still retained by Krüger. Both are sanctioned by authority of MSS., and either would be admissible. on the whole, I incline to side with Schneider.



is a time for *you* to exhibit *your* training as well as for me to exhibit mine."<sup>1</sup>

We have here an interchange of raillery between the two Grecian officers, which is not an uninteresting feature in the history of the expedition. The remark of Cheirisophus, especially illustrates that which I noted in a former chapter as true both of Sparta and Athens<sup>2</sup>, — the readiness to take bribes, so general in individuals clothed with official power; and the readiness, in official Athenians, to commit such peculation, in spite of serious risk of punishment. Now this chance of punishment proceeded altogether from those accusing orators commonly called demagogues, and from the popular judicature whom they addressed. The joint working of both greatly abated the evil, yet was incompetent to suppress it. But according to the pictures commonly drawn of Athens, we are instructed to believe that the crying public evil was, — too great a license of accusation, and too much judicial trial. Assuredly, such was not the conception of Cheirisophus; nor shall we find it borne out by any fair appreciation of the general evidence. When the peculation of official persons was thus notorious in spite of serious risks, what would it have become if the door had been barred to accusing demagogues, and if the numerous popular dikasts had been exchanged for a few select judges of the same stamp and class as the official men themselves?

Enforcing his proposition, Xenophon now informed his colleagues that he had just captured a few guides by laying an ambush for certain native plunderers who beset the rear; and that these guides acquainted him that the mountain was not inaccessible, but pastured by goats and oxen. He farther offered himself to take command of the marching detachment. But this being overruled by Cheirisophus, some of the best among the captains, Aristonymus, Aristetas, and Nichomachus, volunteered their services and were accepted. After refreshing the soldiers, the generals marched with the main army near to the foot of the pass,

Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 16

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Χειρισόφος, καὶ γὰρ ὑμᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀκούω δεινοὺς εἶναι κλέπτειν τὰ δημόσια, καὶ μάλα ὄντος δεινοῦ τοῦ κινδύνου τῷ κλεπτοντῇ, καὶ τοὺς κρατίστους μέντοι μάλιστα, εἴπερ ὑμῖν οἱ κρατίστοι ἄρχειν ἀξιούνασιν ὥστε ὧρα καὶ σοὶ ἐπιδείκνυσθαι τὴν παιδείαν.

<sup>2</sup> See Vol. VII, ch. lxi, γ. 401 seq.

and there took up their night-station, making demonstrations of a purpose to storm it the next morning. But as soon as it was dark, Aristonymus and his detachment started, and ascending the mountain at another point, obtained without resistance a high position on the flank of the enemy, who soon, however, saw them and despatched a force to keep guard on that side. At daybreak these two detachments came to a conflict on the heights, in which the Greeks were completely victorious, while Cheirisophus was marching up the pass to attack the main body. His light troops, encouraged by seeing this victory of their comrades, hastened on to the charge faster than their hoplites could follow. But the enemy was so dispirited by seeing themselves turned, that they fled with little or no resistance. Though only a few were slain, many threw away their light shields of wicker or wood-work, which became the prey of the conquerors.<sup>1</sup>

Thus masters of the pass, the Greeks descended to the level ground on the other side, where they found themselves in some villages well-stocked with provisions and comforts; the first in the country of the Taochi. Probably they halted here some days; for they had seen no villages, either for rest or for refreshment, during the last nine days' march, since leaving those Armenian villages in which they had passed a week so eminently restorative, and which apparently had furnished them with a stock of provisions for the onward journey. Such halt gave time to the Taochi to carry up their families and provisions into inaccessible strongholds, so that the Greeks found no supplies, during five days' march through the territory. Their provisions were completely exhausted, when they arrived before one of these strongholds, a rock on which were seen the families and the cattle of the Taochi; without houses or fortification, but nearly surrounded by a river, so as to leave only one narrow ascent, rendered unapproachable by vast rocks which the defenders hurled or rolled from the summit. By an ingenious combination of bravery and stratagem, in which some of the captains much distinguished themselves, the Greeks overcame this difficulty, and took the height. The scene which then ensued was awful. The Taochian women seized their children, flung them over the precipice, and then cast

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 20-27



themselves headlong also, followed by the men. Almost every soul thus perished, very few surviving to become prisoners. An Arcadian captain named Æneas, seeing one of them in a fine dress about to precipitate himself with the rest, seized him with a view to prevent it. But the man in return grasped him firmly, dragged him to the edge of the rock, and leaped down to the destruction of both. Though scarcely any prisoners were taken, however, the Greeks obtained abundance of oxen, asses, and sheep, which fully supplied their wants.<sup>1</sup>

They now entered into the territory of the Chalybes, which they were seven days in passing through. These were the bravest warriors whom they had seen in Asia. Their equipment was a spear of fifteen cubits long, with only one end pointed, — a helmet, greaves, stuffed corselet, with a kilt or dependent flaps, — a short sword which they employed to cut off the head of a slain enemy, displaying the head in sight of their surviving enemies with triumphant dance and song. They carried no shield; perhaps because the excessive length of the spear required the constant employment of both hands, — yet they did not shrink from meeting the Greeks occasionally in regular, stand-up fight. As they had carried off all their provisions into hill-forts, the Greeks could obtain no supplies, but lived all the time upon the cattle which they had acquired from the Taochi. After seven days of march and combat, — the Chalybes perpetually attacking their rear, — they reached the river Harpasus (four hundred feet broad), where they passed into the territory of the Skythini. It rather seems that the territory of the Chalybes was mountainous; that of the Skythini was level, and containing villages, wherein they remained three days, refreshing themselves, and stocking themselves with provisions.<sup>2</sup>

Four days of additional march brought them to a sight, the like of which they had not seen since Opis and Sittakê on the Tigris in Babylonia, — a large and flourishing city called Gymnias; an earnest of the neighborhood of the sea, of commerce, and of civilization. The chief of this city received them in a friendly manner, and furnished them with a guide who engaged to conduct them, after five days' march, to a hill from whence they would

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 7, 2-15.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 7, 18.

have a view of the sea. This was by no means their nearest way to the sea, for the chief of Gymnias wished to send them through the territory of some neighbors to whom he was hostile; which territory, as soon as they reached it, the guide desired them to burn and destroy. However, the promise was kept, and on the fifth day, marching still apparently through the territory of the Skythini, they reached the summit of a mountain called Thêchês, from whence the Euxine Sea was visible.<sup>1</sup>

An animated shout from the soldiers who formed the van-guard testified the impressive effect of this long-deferred spectacle, assuring as it seemed to do, their safety and their return home. To Xenophon and to the rear-guard, — engaged in repelling the attack of natives who had come forward to revenge the plunder of their territory, — the shout was unintelligible. They at first imagined that the natives had commenced attack in front as well as in the rear, and that the van-guard was engaged in battle. But every moment the shout became louder, as fresh men came to the summit and gave vent to their feelings; so that Xenophon grew anxious, and galloped up to the van with his handful of cavalry to see what had happened. As he approached, the voice of the overjoyed crowd was heard distinctly crying out, *Thalatta, Thalatta* (The sea, the sea), and congratulating each other in ecstasy. The main body, the rear-guard, the baggage-soldiers driving up their horses and cattle before them, became all excited by the sound, and hurried up breathless to the summit. The whole army, officers and soldiers, were thus assembled, manifesting their joyous emotions by tears, embraces, and outpourings of enthusiastic sympathy. With spontaneous impulse they heaped up stones to decorate the spot by a monument and commemorative trophy, putting on the stones such homely offerings as their means afforded, — sticks, hides, and a few of the wicker shields just taken from the natives. To the guide, who had performed his engagement of bringing them in five days within sight of the sea, their gratitude was unbounded. They presented him with a horse, a silver bowl, a Persian costume, and ten darics in money; besides seve-

Diodorus (xiv, 29) calls the mountain *Χήνιον* — Chenium. He seems to have had Xenophon before him in his brief description of this interesting scene.



ral of the soldiers' rings, which he especially asked for. Thus loaded with presents, he left them, having first shown them a village wherein they could find quarters,—as well as the road which they were to take through the territory of the Makrônes.<sup>1</sup>

When they reached the river which divided the land of the Makrônes from that of the Skythini, they perceived the former assembled in arms on the opposite side to resist their passage. The river not being fordable, they cut down some neighboring trees to provide the means of crossing. While these Makrônes were shouting and encouraging each other aloud, a peltast in the Grecian army came to Xenophon, saying that he knew their language, and that he believed this to be his country. He had been a slave at Athens, exported from home during his boyhood,—he had then made his escape (probably during the Peloponnesian war, to the garrison of Dekeleia), and afterwards taken military service. By this fortunate accident, the generals were enabled to open negotiations with the Makrônes, and to assure them that the army would do them no harm, desiring nothing more than a free passage and a market to buy provisions. The Makrônes, on receiving such assurance in their own language from a countryman, exchanged pledges of friendship with the Greeks, assisted them to pass the river, and furnished the best market in their power during the three days' march across their territory.<sup>2</sup>

The army now reached the borders of the Kolchians, who were found in hostile array, occupying the summit of a considerable mountain which formed their frontier. Here Xenophon, having marshalled the soldiers for attack, with each *lochus* (company of one hundred men) in single file, instead of marching up the hill in phalanx, or continuous front with only a scanty depth,—addressed to them the following pithy encouragement,—“Now, gentlemen, these enemies before us are the only impediment that keeps us away from reaching the point at which we have been so long aiming. We must even eat them raw, if in any way we can do so.”

Eighty of these formidable companies of hoplites, each in single file, now began to ascend the hill; the peltasts and bowmen being partly distributed among them, partly placed on the flanks. Cheirisophus and Xenophon, each commanding on one wing, spread

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 7, 23–27.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 4–7.

their peltasts in such a way as to outflank the Kolchians, who accordingly weakened their centre in order to strengthen their wings. Hence the Arcadian peltasts and hoplites in the Greek centre were enabled to attack and disperse the centre with little resistance; and all the Kolchians presently fled, leaving the Greeks in possession of their camp, as well as of several well-stocked villages in their rear. Amidst these villages the army remained to refresh themselves for several days. It was here that they tasted the grateful, but unwholesome honey, which this region still continues to produce,—unaware of its peculiar properties. Those soldiers who ate little of it were like men greatly intoxicated with wine; those who ate much, were seized with the most violent vomiting and diarrhoea, lying down like madmen in a state of delirium. From this terrible distemper some recovered on the ensuing day, others two or three days afterwards. It does not appear that any one actually died.<sup>1</sup>

Two more days' march brought them to the sea, at the Greek maritime city of Trapezus or Trebizond, founded by the inhabitants of Sinôpê on the coast of the Kolchian territory. Here the Trapezuntines received them with kindness and hospitality, sending them presents of bullocks, barley-meal, and wine. Taking up their quarters in some Kolchian villages near the town, they now enjoyed, for the first time since leaving Tarsus, a safe and undisturbed repose during thirty days, and were enabled to recover in some degree from the severe hardships which they had undergone. While the Trapezuntines brought produce for sale into the camp, the Greeks provided the means of purchasing it by predatory incursions against the Kolchians on the hills. Those Kolchians who dwelt under the hills and on the plain were in a state of semi-dependence upon Trapezus; so that the Trapezuntines mediated on their behalf and prevailed on the

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 15–22. Most modern travellers attest the existence, in these regions, of honey intoxicating and poisonous, such as Xenophon describes. They point out the *Azalea Pontica*, as the flower from which the bees imbibe this peculiar quality. Professor Koch, however, calls in question the existence of any honey thus naturally unwholesome near the Black Sea. He states (*Zug der Zehn Tausend*, p. 111) that after careful inquiries he could find no trace of any such. Not contradicting Xenophon, he thinks that the honey which the Greeks ate must have been stale or tainted.



Greeks to leave them unmolested, on condition of a contribution of bullocks.

These bullocks enabled the Greeks to discharge the vow which they had made, on the proposition of Xenophon, to Zeus the Preserver, during that moment of dismay and despair which succeeded immediately on the massacre of their generals by Tisaphernes. To Zeus the Preserver, to Heraklès the Conductor, and to various other gods, they offered an abundant sacrifice on their mountain camp overhanging the sea; and after the festival ensuing, the skins of the victims were given as prizes to competitors in running, wrestling, boxing, and the pankration. The superintendence of such festival games, so fully accordant with Grecian usage and highly interesting to the army, was committed to a Spartan named Drakontius; a man whose destiny recalls that of Patroklos and other Homeric heroes, — for he had been exiled as a boy, having unintentionally killed another boy with a short sword. Various departures from Grecian custom, however, were admitted. The matches took place on the steep and stony hill-side overhanging the sea, instead of on a smooth plain; and the numerous hard falls of the competitors afforded increased interest to the by-standers. The captive non-Hellenic boys were admitted to run for the prize, since otherwise a boy-race could not have been obtained. Lastly, the animation of the scene, as well as the ardor of the competitors, was much enhanced by the number of their mistresses present.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 23–27.

A curious and interesting anecdote in Plutarch's Life of Alexander, (c 41) attests how much these Hetærae accompanying the soldiers (women for the most part free), were esteemed in the Macedonian army, and by Alexander himself among the rest. A Macedonian of Ægæ named Eurylochus, had got himself improperly put on a list of veterans and invalids, who were on the point of being sent back from Asia to Europe. The imposition was detected, and on being questioned he informed Alexander that he had practised it in order to be able to follow a free Hetæra named Telesippa, who was about to accompany the departing division. "I sympathize with your attachment, Eurylochus (replied Alexander); let us see whether we cannot prevail upon Telesippa either by persuasion or by presents, since she is of free condition, to stay behind" (*Ἡμᾶς μὲν, ὦ Εὐρύλοχε, συνερῶντας ἔχεις ὅρα δὲ ὅπως πείθωμεν ἢ λόγοις ἢ δώροις τὴν Τηλεσίπταν, ἐπειδήπερ ἐξ ἐλευθέρων ἐστί*).

## APPENDIX TO CHAPTER LXX.

### ON THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND AFTER THEY QUITTED THE TIGRIS AND ENTERED THE KARDUCHIAN MOUNTAINS.

It would be injustice to this gallant and long-suffering body of men not to present the reader with a minute description of the full length of their stupendous march. Up to the moment when the Greeks enter Karduchia, the line of march may be indicated upon evidence which, though not identifying special halting-places or localities, makes us certain that we cannot be far wrong on the whole. But after that moment, the evidence gradually disappears, and we are left with nothing more than a knowledge of the terminus, the general course, and a few negative conditions.

Mr. Ainsworth has given, in his Book IV. (Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 155 seq.) an interesting topographical comment on the march through Karduchia, and on the difficulties which the Greeks would have to surmount. He has farther shown what may have been their probable line of march through Karduchia; but the most important point which he has established here, seems to be the identity of the river Kentritès with the Buhtan-Chai, an eastern affluent of the Tigris — distinguishing it from the river of Betlis on the west and the river Khabur on the south-east, with both of which it had been previously confounded (p. 167). The Buhtan-Chai falls into the Tigris at a village called Til, and "constitutes at the present day, a natural barrier between Kurdistan and Armenia" (p. 166). In this identification of the Kentritès with the Buhtan-Chai, Professor Koch agrees (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 78).

If the Greeks crossed the Kentritès near its confluence with the Tigris, they would march up its right bank in one day to a situation near the modern town of Sert (Mr. Ainsworth thinks), though Xenophon takes no notice of the river of Bitlis, which nevertheless they must have passed. Their next two days of march, assuming a direction nearly north, would carry them (as Xenophon states, iv. 4, 2) beyond the sources of the Tigris; that is, "beyond the headwaters of the eastern tributaries to the Tigris."

Three days of additional march brought them to the river Teleboas — "of no great size, but beautiful" (iv. 4, 4). There appear sufficient reasons to identify this river with the Kara-Su or Black River, which flows through the valley or plain of Mush into the Murad or Eastern



Euphrates (Ainsworth, p. 172; Ritter, *Erdkunde*, part x. s. 37. p. 682). Though Kinneir (*Journey through Asia Minor and Kurdistan*, 1818, p. 484), Rennell (*Illustrations of the Expedition of Cyrus*, p. 207) and Bell (*System of Geography*, iv. p. 140) identify it with the Ak-Sa or river of Mush — this, according to Ainsworth, is only a small tributary to the Kara-Su, which is the great river of the plain and district."

Professor Koch, whose personal researches in and around Armenia give to his opinion the highest authority, follows Mr. Ainsworth in identifying the Teleboas with the Kara-Su. He supposes, however, that the Greeks crossed the Kentritès, not near its confluence with the Tigris, but considerably higher up, near the town of Sert or Sort. From hence he supposes that they marched nearly north-east in the modern road from Sert to Bitlis, thus getting round the head or near the head of the river called Bitlis-Su, which is one of the eastern affluents to the Tigris (falling first into the Buhtan-Chai), and which Xenophon took for the Tigris itself. They then marched farther, in a line not far distant from the Lake of Van, over the saddle which separates that lake from the lofty mountain Ali-Dagh. This saddle is the water-shed which separates the affluents to the Tigris from those to the Eastern Euphrates, of which latter the Teleboas or Kara-Su is one (Koch, *Zuch der Zehn Tausend*, p. 82-84).

After the river Teleboas, there seems no one point in the march which can be identified with anything approaching to certainty. Nor have we any means even of determining the general line of route, apart from specific places, which they followed from the river Teleboas to Trebizond.

Their first object was to reach and cross the Eastern Euphrates. They would of course cross at the nearest point where they could find a ford. But how low down its course does the river continue to be fordable, in mid-winter, with snow on the ground? Here professor Koch differs from Mr. Ainsworth and colonel Chesney. He affirms that the river would be fordable a little above its confluence with the Tscharbatur, about latitude  $39^{\circ} 3'$ . According to Mr. Ainsworth, it would not be fordable below the confluence with the river of Khanus (Khinnis). Koch's authority, as the most recent and systematic investigator of these regions, seems preferable, especially as it puts the Greeks nearly in the road now travelled over from Mush to Erzerum, which is said to be the only pass over the mountains open throughout the winter, passing by Khinnis and Koili; see Ritter, *Erdkunde*, x. p. 387. Xenophon mentions a warm spring, which the army passed by during the third or fourth day after crossing the Euphrates (*Anab.* iv. 5, 15). Professor Koch believes himself to have identified this warm spring — the only one, as he states (p. 90-93), south of the range of mountains called the Bingöldagh — in the district called Wardo, near the village of Bashkan.

To lay down, with any certainty, the line which the Greeks followed from the Euphrates to Trebizond, appears altogether impossible. I cannot admit the hypothesis of Mr. Ainsworth, who conducts the army across the Araxes to its northern bank, carries them up northward to the latitude of Teflis in Georgia, then brings them back again across the Harpa Chai (a northern affluent of the Araxes, which he identifies with the Harpasus mentioned by Xenophon) and the Araxes itself, to Gymnias, which he places near the site of Erzerum. Professor Koch (p. 104-108), who dissents with good reason from Mr. Ainsworth, proposes (though with hesitation and uncertainty) a line of his own which appears to me open greatly to the same objection as that of Mr. Ainsworth. It carries the Greeks too much to the northward of Erzerum, more out of their line of march from the place where they crossed the Eastern Euphrates, than can be justified by any probability. The Greeks knew well that, in order to get home they must take a westerly direction (see *Anab.* iii. 5, 15).

Their great and constant purpose would be to make way to the westward, as soon as they had crossed the Euphrates; and the road from that river, passing near the site of Erzerum to Trebizond, would thus coincide, in the main, with their spontaneous tendency. They had no motive to go northward of Erzerum, nor ought we to suppose it without some proof. I trace out, therefore, a line of march much less circuitous; not meaning it to be understood as the real road which the army can be proved to have taken, but simply because it seems a possible line, and because it serves as a sort of approximation to complete the reader's idea of the entire ground travelled over by the Ten Thousand.

Koch hardly makes sufficient account of the overwhelming hardships with which the Greeks had to contend, when he states (p. 96) that if they had taken a line as straight, or nearly as straight as was practicable, they might have marched from the Euphrates to Trebizond in sixteen or twenty days, even allowing for the bad time of year. Considering that it was mid-winter, in that very high and cold country, with deep snow throughout; that they had absolutely no advantages or assistance of any kind; that their sick and disabled men, together with their arms, were to be carried by the stronger; that there were a great many women accompanying them; that they had beasts to drive along, carrying baggage and plunder, — the prophet Silanus, for example, having preserved his three thousand darics in coin from the field of Kunaxa until his return; that there was much resistance from the Chalybes and Taochi; that they had to take provisions where provisions were discoverable; that even a small stream must have impeded them, and probably driven them out of their course to find a ford, — considering the intolerable accumulation of these and other hardships, we need not wonder at any degree of slowness in their progress. It



rarely happens that modern travellers go over these regions in mid-winter; but we may see what travelling is at that season, by the dreadful description which Mr. Baillie Fraser gives of his journey from Tauris to Erzerum in the month of March (*Travels in Koordhistan*, Letter XV). Mr. Kinneir says (*Travels*, p. 353) — "The winters are so severe that all communication between Baiburt and the circumjacent villages is cut off for four months in the year, in consequence of the depth of the snow."

Now if we measure on Kiepert's map the rectilinear distance, — the air-line — from Trebizond to the place where Koch represents the Greeks to have crossed the Eastern Euphrates, — we shall find it one hundred and seventy English miles. The number of days' journey-marches which Xenophon mentions are fifty-four; even if we include the five days of march undertaken from Gymnias (*Anab.* iv. 7, 20), which, properly speaking, were directed against the enemies of the governor of Gymnias, more than for the promotion of their retreat. In each of those fifty-four days, therefore, they must have made 3.14 miles of rectilinear progress. This surely is not an unreasonably slow progress to suppose, under all the disadvantages of their situation; nor does it imply any very great actual departure from the straightest line practicable. Indeed Koch himself (in his *Introduction*, p. 4) suggests various embarrassments which must have occurred on the march, but which Xenophon has not distinctly stated.

The river which Xenophon calls the Harpasus seems to be probably the Tchouk-su, as colonel Chesney and Prof. Koch suppose. At least it is difficult to assign any other river with which the Harpasus can be identified.

I cannot but think it probable that the city which Xenophon calls *Gymnias* (*Diodorus*, xiv. 29, calls it *Gymnasia*) was the same as that which is now called Gumisch-Khana (Hamilton), Gumush-Kaneh (Ainsworth), Gemisch-Khanah (Kinneir). "Gumisch-Khanah (says Mr. Hamilton, *Travels in Asia Minor*, vol. i. ch. xi. p. 168; ch. xiv. p. 234) is celebrated as the site of the most ancient and considerable silver-mines in the Ottoman dominions." Both Mr. Kinneir and Mr. Hamilton passed through Gumisch-Khana on the road from Trebizond to Erzerum.

Now here is not only great similarity of name, and likelihood of situation, — but the existence of the silver mines furnishes a plausible explanation of that which would otherwise be very strange; the existence of this "great, flourishing, inhabited, city," inland, in the midst of such barbarians, — the Chalybes, the Skythini, the Makrônes, etc.

Mr. Kinneir reached Gumisch-Khana at the end of the third day after quitting Trebizond; the two last days having been very long and fatiguing. Mr. Hamilton, who also passed through Gumisch-Khana, reached it at the end of two long days. Both these travellers repre-

sent the road near Gumisch-Khana as extremely difficult. Mr. Ainsworth, who did not himself pass through Gumisch-Khana, tells us (what is of some importance in this discussion) that it lies in the *winter-road* from Erzerum to Trebizond (*Travels in Asia Minor*, vol. ii. p. 394). "The winter-road, which is the longest, passes by Gumisch-Khana, and takes the longer portion of valley; all the others cross over the mountain at various points, to the east of the road by the mines. But whether going by the mountains or the valley, the muleteers often go indifferently to the west as far as Ash Kaleh, and at other times turn off by the villages of Bey Mausour and Kodjah Bunar, where they take to the mountains."

Mr. Hamilton makes the distance from Trebizond to Gumish-Khana eighteen hours, or fifty-four calculated post miles; that is, about forty English miles (*Appendix to Travels in Asia Minor*, vol. ii. p. 389).

Now we are not to suppose that the Greeks marched in any direct road from Gymnias to Trebizond. On the contrary, the five days' march which they undertook immediately from Gymnias were conducted by a guide sent from that town, who led them over the territories of people hostile to Gymnias, in order that they might lay waste the lands (iv. 7, 20). What progress they made, during these marches, towards Trebizond, is altogether doubtful. The guide promised that on the fifth day he would bring them to a spot from whence they could view the sea, and he performed his promise by leading them to the top of the sacred mountain Thêché.

Thêché was a summit (*ἄκρον*, iv. 7, 25), as might be expected. But unfortunately it seems impossible to verify the particular summit on which the interesting scene described by Xenophon took place. Mr. Ainsworth presumes it to be the mountain called Kop-Dagh; from whence, however, according to Koch, the sea cannot be discerned. D'Anville and some other geographers identify it with the ridge called Tekieh-Dagh, to the east of Gumisch-Khana; nearer to the sea than that place. This mountain, I think, would suit pretty well for the narrative in respect to position; but Koch and other modern travellers affirm that it is neither high enough, nor near enough to the sea, to permit any such view as that which Xenophon relates. It stands on Kiepert's map at a distance of full thirty-five English miles from the sea, the view of which, moreover, seems intercepted by the still higher mountain-chain now called Kolath-Dagh, a portion of the ancient Paryadres, which runs along parallel to the coast. It is to be recollected that in the first half of February, the time of Xenophon's visit, the highest peaks would certainly be all covered with snow, and therefore very difficult to ascend.

There is a striking view obtained of the sea from the mountain called Karakaban. This mountain, more than four thousand feet high, lies rather above twenty miles from the sea, to the south of Trebizond,



and immediately north of the still higher chain of Kolath-Dagh. From the Kolath-Dagh chain, which runs east and west, there strike out three or four parallel ridges to the northward, formed of primitive slate, and cut down precipitously so as to leave deep and narrow valleys between. On leaving Trebizond, the traveller ascends the hill immediately above the town, and then descends into the valley on the other side. His road to Karakaban lies partly along the valley, partly along the crest of one of the four ridges just mentioned. But throughout all this road, the sea is never seen; being hidden by the hills immediately above Trebizond. He does not again see the sea until he reaches Karakaban, which is sufficiently high to enable him to see over those hills. The guides (as I am informed by Dr. Holland, who twice went over the spot) point out with great animation this view of the sea, as particularly deserving of notice. It is enjoyed for a short space while the road winds round the mountain, and then again lost.

Here is a view of the sea at once distant, sudden, impressive, and enjoyed from an eminence not too high to be accessible to the Cyreian army. In so far, it would be suitable to the description of Xenophon. Yet again it appears that a person coming to this point from the land-side (as Xenophon of course did), would find it in his descending route, not in his ascending; and this can hardly be reconciled with the description which we read in the Greek historian. Moreover, the subsequent marches which Xenophon mentions after quitting the mountain summit Théchê, can hardly be reconciled with the supposition that it was the same as what is now called Karakaban. It is, indeed, quite possible, (as Mr. Hamilton suggests), that Théchê may have been a peak apart from any road, and that the guide may have conducted the soldiers thither for the express purpose of showing the sea, guiding them back again into the road afterwards. This increases the difficulty of identifying the spot. However, the whole region is as yet very imperfectly known, and perhaps it is not impossible that there may be some particular locality even on Tekiah-Dagh, whence, through an accidental gap in the intervening mountains, the sea might become visible.

## CHAPTER LXXI.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS, FROM THE TIME THAT THEY REACHED TRAPEZUS, TO THEIR JUNCTION WITH THE LACEDÆMONIAN ARMY IN ASIA MINOR.

WE now commence a third act in the history of this memorable body of men. After having followed them from Sardis to Kunaxa as mercenaries to procure the throne for Cyrus, — then from Kunaxa to Trapezus as men anxious only for escape, and purchasing their safety by marvellous bravery, endurance, and organization, we shall now track their proceedings among the Greek colonies on the Euxine and at the Bosphorus of Thrace, succeeded by their struggles against the meanness of the Thracian prince Seuthes, as well as against the treachery and arbitrary harshness of the Lacedæmonian commanders Anaxibius and Aristarchus.

Trapezus, now Trebizond, where the army had recently found repose, was a colony from Sinôpê, as were also Kerasus and Kolyôra, farther westward; each of them receiving an *harmost* or governor from the mother-city, and paying to her an annual tribute. All these three cities were planted on the narrow strip of land dividing the Euxine from the elevated mountain range which so closely borders on its southern coast. At Sinôpê itself, the land stretches out into a defensible peninsula, with a secure harbor, and a large breadth of adjacent fertile soil. So tempting a site invited the Milesians, even before the year 600 B. C., to plant a colony there, and enabled Sinôpê to attain much prosperity and power. Farther westward, not more than a long day's journey for a rowing vessel from Byzantium, was situated the Megarian colony of Herakleia, in the territory of the Mariandyni.

The native tenants of this line of coast, upon whom the Greek settlers intruded themselves (reckoning from the westward), were the Bithynian Thracians, the Mariandyni, the Paphlagonians, the Tibarêni, Chalybes, Mosynœki, Drilæ, and Kolchians. Here, as elsewhere, these natives found the Greek seaports useful, in giving a new value to inland produce, and in furnishing the great men



with ornaments and luxuries to which they would otherwise have had no access. The citizens of Herakleia had reduced into dependence a considerable portion of the neighboring Mariandyni, and held them in a relation resembling that of the natives of Esthonia and Livonia to the German colonies in the Baltic. Some of the Kolchian villages were also subject, in the same manner, to the Trapezuntines;<sup>1</sup> and Sinôpê doubtless possessed a similar inland dominion of greater or less extent. But the principal wealth of this important city arose from her navy and maritime commerce; from the rich thunny fishery attached to her promontory; from the olives in her immediate neighborhood, which was a cultivation not indigenous, but only naturalized by the Greeks on the seaboard; from the varied produce of the interior, comprising abundant herds of cattle, mines of silver, iron, and copper in the neighboring mountains, wood for ship-building, as well as for house furniture, and native slaves.<sup>2</sup> The case was similar with the three colonies of Sinôpê, more to the eastward, — Kotyôra, Kerasus, and Trapezus; except that the mountains which border on the Euxine, gradually approaching nearer and nearer to the shore, left to each of them a more confined strip of cultivable land. For these cities the time had not yet arrived, to be conquered and absorbed by the inland monarchies around them, as Miletus and the cities on the eastern coast of Asia Minor had been. The Paphlagonians were at this time the only indigenous people in those regions who formed a considerable aggregated force, under a prince named Korylas; a prince tributary to Persia, yet half independent, — since he had disobeyed the summons of Artaxerxes to come up and help in repelling Cyrus<sup>3</sup> — and now on terms of established alliance with Sinôpê, though not without secret designs, which he wanted only force to execute, against that city.<sup>4</sup> The other native tribes to the eastward were mountaineers both ruder and more divided; warlike on their own heights, but little capable of any aggressive combinations.

Though we are told that Perikles had once despatched a detachment of Athenian colonists to Sinôpê,<sup>5</sup> and had expelled from thence the despot Timesilaus, — yet neither that city nor any of

<sup>1</sup> Strabo, xii, p. 542; Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 24.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 8.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Perikles, c. 20.

<sup>4</sup> Strabo, xii, p. 545, 546

<sup>5</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 5, 23

their neighbors appear to have taken a part in the Peloponnesian war, either for or against Athens; nor were they among the number of tributaries to Persia. They doubtless were acquainted with the upward march of Cyrus, which had disturbed all Asia; and probably were not ignorant of the perils and critical state of his Grecian army. But it was with a feeling of mingled surprise, admiration, and alarm, that they saw that army descend from the mountainous region, hitherto only recognized as the abode of Kolchians, Makrônes, and other analogous tribes, among whom was perched the mining city of Gymnias.

Even after all the losses and extreme sufferings of the retreat, the Greeks still numbered, when mustered at Kerasus,<sup>1</sup> eight thousand six hundred hoplites, with peltasts or targeteers, bowmen, slingers, etc., making a total of above ten thousand military persons. Such a force had never before been seen in the Euxine. Considering both the numbers and the now-acquired discipline and self-confidence of the Cyreians, even Sinôpê herself could have raised no force capable of meeting them in the field. Yet they did not belong to any city, nor receive orders from any established government. They were like those mercenary armies which marched about in Italy during the fourteenth century, under the generals called Condottieri, taking service sometimes with one city, sometimes with another. No one could predict what schemes they might conceive, or in what manner they might deal with the established communities on the shores of the Euxine. If we imagine that such an army had suddenly appeared in Sicily, a little time before the Athenian expedition against Syracuse, it would have been probably enlisted by Leontini and Katana in their war against Syracuse. If the inhabitants of Trapezus had wished to throw off the dominion of Sinôpê, — or if Korylas, the Paphlagonian, were meditating war against that city, — here were formidable auxiliaries to second their wishes. Moreover there were various tempting sites, open to the formation of a new colony, which, with so numerous a body of original Greek settlers, would

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 3, 3; v, 7, 9. The maximum of the Grecian force, when mustered at Issus after the junction of those three hundred men who deserted from Abrokomas, was thirteen thousand nine hundred men. At the review in Bablylonia, three days before the battle of Kunaxa, there were mustered, however, only twelve thousand nine hundred (Anab. i, 7, 10).



probably have overtopped Sinôpê herself. There was no restraining cause to reckon upon, except the general Hellenic sympathies and education of the Cyreian army; and what was of not less importance, the fact that they were not mercenary soldiers by permanent profession, such as became so formidably multiplied in Greece during the next generation,—but established citizens who had come out on a special service under Cyrus, with the full intention, after a year of lucrative enterprise, to return to their homes and families.<sup>1</sup> We shall find such gravitation towards home steadily operative throughout the future proceedings of the army. But at the moment when they first emerged from the mountains, no one could be sure that it would be so. There was ample ground for uneasiness among the Euxine Greeks, especially the Sinopians, whose supremacy had never before been endangered.

An undisturbed repose of thirty days enabled the Cyreians to recover from their fatigues, to talk over their past dangers, and to take pride in the anticipated effect which their unparalleled achievement could not fail to produce in Greece. Having discharged their vows and celebrated their festival to the gods, they held an assembly to discuss their future proceedings; when a Thuriar soldier, named Antileon, exclaimed,—“Comrades, I am already tired of packing up, marching, running, carrying arms, falling into line, keeping watch, and fighting. Now that we have the sea here before us, I desire to be relieved from all these toils, to sail the rest of the way, and to arrive in Greece outstretched and

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. vi, 2, 8.

Τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν οἱ πλείστοι ἦσαν οὐ σπάνει βίου ἐκπεπλευκότες ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν μισθοφορὰν, ἀλλὰ τὴν Κύρου ἀρετὴν ἀκούοντες, οἱ μὲν καὶ ἀνδράς ἔχοντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ προσανηλωκοτες χρήματα, καὶ τούτων ἕτεροι ἀποδεδρακότες πατέρας καὶ μητέρας, οἱ δὲ καὶ τέκνα καταλιπόντες, ὥς χρήματα αὐτοῖς κτησάμενοι ἤξοντες πάλιν, ἀκούοντες καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς παρὰ Κύρῳ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ πράττειν. Τοιοῦτοι οὖν ὄντες ἐπόθουν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα σῶζεσθαι.

This statement respecting the position of most of the soldiers is more authentic, as well as less disparaging, than that of Isokrates (Orat. iv, Panegy. s. 170).

In another oration, composed about fifty years after the Cyreian expedition, Isokrates notices the large premiums which it had been formerly necessary to give to those who brought together mercenary soldiers, over and above the pay to the soldiers themselves (Isokrates, Orat. v. ad Philipp. s. 112); as contrasted with the over-multiplication of unemployed mercenaries during his own later time (Ibid. s. 142 seq.)

asleep, like Odysseus.” This pithy address being received with vehement acclamations, and warmly responded to by all,—Cheirisophus offered, if the army chose to empower him, to sail forthwith to Byzantium, where he thought he could obtain from his friend the Lacedæmonian admiral, Anaxibius, sufficient vessels for transport. His proposition was gladly accepted; and he departed to execute the project.

Xenophon then urged upon the army various resolutions and measures, proper for the regulation of affairs during the absence of Cheirisophus. The army would be forced to maintain itself by marauding expeditions among the hostile tribes in the mountains. Such expeditions, accordingly, must be put under regulation; neither individual soldiers, nor small companies, must be allowed to go out at pleasure, without giving notice to the generals; moreover, the camp must be kept under constant guard and scouts, in the event of surprise from a retaliating enemy. It was prudent also to take the best measures in their power for procuring vessels; since, after all, Cheirisophus might possibly fail in bringing an adequate number. They ought to borrow a few ships of war from the Trapezuntines, and detain all the merchant ships which they saw; unshipping the rudders, placing the cargoes under guard, and maintaining the crew during all the time that the ships might be required for transport of the army. Many such merchant vessels were often sailing by;<sup>1</sup> so that they would thus acquire the means of transport, even though Cheirisophus should bring few or none from Byzantium. Lastly, Xenophon proposed to require the Grecian cities to repair and put in order the road along the coast, for a land-march; since, perhaps, with all their efforts, it would be found impossible to get together a sufficient stock of transports.

All the propositions of Xenophon were readily adopted by the army, except the last. But the mere mention of a renewed land-march excited such universal murmurs of repugnance, that he did not venture to put that question to the vote. He took upon himself, however, to send messages to the Grecian cities, on his own responsibility; urging them to repair the roads, in order that the

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 1, 3–13.

Ὅρῳ δ' ἐγὼ πλοῖα πολλάκις παραπλέοντα, etc. This is a forcible proof how extensive was the Grecian commerce with the town and region of Phasis, at the eastern extremity of the Euxine.



departure of the army might be facilitated. And he found the cities ready enough to carry his wishes into effect, as far as Kotyôra.<sup>1</sup>

The wisdom of these precautionary suggestions of Xenophon soon appeared; for Cheirisophus not only failed in his object, but was compelled to stay away for a considerable time. A pente-korter (or armed ship with fifty oars) was borrowed from the Trapezuntines, and committed to the charge of a Lacedæmonian Pericæus, named Dexippus, for the purpose of detaining the merchant vessels passing by. This man having violated his trust, and employed the ship to make his own escape out of the Euxine, a second was obtained and confided to an Athenian, Polykrates; who brought in successively several merchant vessels. These the Greeks did not plunder, but secured the cargoes under adequate guard, and only reserved the vessels for transports. It became, however, gradually more and more difficult to supply the camp with provisions. Though the army was distributed into suitable detachments for plundering the Kolchian villages on the hills, and seizing cattle and prisoners for sale, yet these expeditions did not always succeed; indeed on one occasion, two Grecian lochi or companies got entangled in such difficult ground, that they were destroyed, to a man. The Kolchians united on the hills in increased and menacing numbers, insomuch that a larger guard became necessary for the camp; while the Trapezuntines, — tired of the protracted stay of the army, as well as desirous of exempting from pillage the natives in their own immediate neighborhood, — conducted the detachments only to villages alike remote and difficult of access. It was in this manner that a large force under Xenophon himself, attacked the lofty and rugged stronghold of the Drilæ, — the most warlike nation of mountaineers in the neighborhood of the Euxine; well armed, and troublesome to Trapezus by their incursions. After a difficult march and attack which Xenophon describes in interesting detail, and wherein the Greeks encountered no small hazard of ruinous defeat, — they returned in the end completely successful, and with a plentiful booty.<sup>2</sup>

At length, after long awaiting in vain the reappearance of Cheirisophus, increasing scarcity and weariness determined them to

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. v. 1, 15.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. v. 2

leave Trapezus. A sufficient number of vessels had been collected to serve for the transport of the women, of the sick and wounded, and of the baggage. All these were accordingly placed on board, under the command of Philesius and Sophænetus, the two oldest generals; while the remaining army marched by land, along a road which had been just made good under the representations of Xenophon. In three days they reached Kerasus, another maritime colony of the Sinopeans, still in the territory called Kolchian; there they halted ten days, mustered and numbered the army, and divided the money acquired by the sale of their prisoners. Eight thousand six hundred hoplites, out of a total probably greater than eleven thousand, were found still remaining; besides targeteers and various light troops.<sup>1</sup>

During the halt at Kerasus, the declining discipline of the army became manifest as they approached home. Various acts of outrage occurred, originating now, as afterwards, in the intrigues of treacherous officers. A captain named Klearetus persuaded his company to attempt the plunder of a Kolchian village near Kerasus, which had furnished a friendly market to the Greeks, and which rested secure on the faith of peaceful relations. He intended to make off separately with the booty in one of the vessels; but his attack was repelled, and he himself slain. The injured villagers despatched three elders, as heralds, to remonstrate with the Grecian authorities; but these heralds being seen in Kerasus by some of the repulsed plunderers, were slain. A partial tumult then ensued, in which even the magistrates of Kerasus were in great danger, and only escaped the pursuing soldiers by running

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. v. 3, 3. Mr. Kinneir (*Travels in Asia Minor*, p. 327) and many other authors, have naturally presumed from the analogy of name that the modern town Kerasoun (about long. 38° 40') corresponds to the Kerasus of Xenophon, which Arrian in his *Periplus* conceives to be identical with what was afterwards called Pharnakia.

But it is remarked both by Dr. Cramer (*Asia Minor*, vol. i, p. 281) and by Mr. Hamilton (*Travels in Asia Minor*, ch. xv, p. 250), that Kerasoun is too far from Trebizond to admit of Xenophon having marched with the army from the one place to the other in three days; or even in less than ten days, in the judgment of Mr. Hamilton. Accordingly Mr. Hamilton places the site of the Kerasus of Xenophon much nearer to Trebizond (about long. 39° 20', as it stands in Kiepert's map of Asia Minor,) near a river now called the Kerasoun Dere Sü.



into the sea. This enormity, though it occurred under the eyes of the generals, immediately before their departure from Kerasus, remained without inquiry or punishment, from the numbers concerned in it.

Between Kerasus and Kotyôra, there was not then (nor is there now any regular road.<sup>1</sup> This march cost the Cyreian army not less than ten days, by an inland track departing from the sea-shore, and through the mountains inhabited by the indigenous tribes Mosynœki and Chalybes. The latter, celebrated for their iron works, were under dependence to the former. As the Mosynœki refused to grant a friendly passage across their territory, the army were compelled to fight their way through it as enemies, with the aid of one section of these people themselves; which alliance was procured for them by the Trapezuntine Timesitheos, who was proxenus of the Mosynœki, and understood their language. The Greeks took the mountain fastnesses of this people, and plundered the wooden turrets which formed their abodes. Of their peculiar fashions Xenophon gives an interesting description, which I have not space to copy.<sup>2</sup> The territory of the Tibarêni was more easy and accessible. This people met the Greeks with presents, and tendered a friendly passage. But the generals at first declined the presents, — preferring to treat them as enemies

<sup>1</sup> It was not without great difficulty that Mr. Kinneir obtained horses to travel from Kotyôra to Kerasoun by land. The aga of the place told him that it was madness to think of travelling by land, and ordered a felucca for him; but was at last prevailed on to furnish horses. There seems, indeed, to have been no regular or trodden road at all; the hills approach close to the sea, and Mr. Kinneir "travelled the whole of the way along the shore alternately over a sandy beach and a high wooded bank. The hills at intervals jutting out into the sea, form capes and numerous little bays along the coast; but the nature of the country was still the same, that is to say, studded with fine timber, flowers, and groves of cherry trees" (*Travels in Asia Minor*, p. 324).

Kerasus is the indigenous country of the cherry tree, and the origin of its name.

Professor Koch thinks, that the number of days' march given by Xenophon (ten days) between Kerasus and Kotyôra, is more than consists with the real distance even if Kerasus be placed where Mr. Hamilton supposes. If the number be correctly stated, he supposes that the Greeks must have halted somewhere (*Zug der Zehn Tausend*, p. 115, 116).

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 5, 3.

and plunder them; which in fact they would have done, had they not been deterred by inauspicious sacrifices.<sup>1</sup>

Near Kotyôra, which was situated on the coast of the Tibarêni, yet on the borders of Paphlagonia, they remained forty-five days, still awaiting the appearance of Cheirisophus with the transports to carry them away by sea. The Sinopian harmost or governor, did not permit them to be welcomed in so friendly a manner as at Trapezus. No market was provided for them, nor were their sick admitted within the walls. But the fortifications of the town were not so constructed as to resist a Greek force, the like of which had never before been seen in those regions. The Greek generals found a weak point, made their way in, and took possession of a few houses for the accommodation of their sick; keeping a guard at the gate to secure free egress, but doing no farther violence to the citizens. They obtained their victuals partly from the Kotyôrite villages, partly from the neighboring territory of Paphlagonia, until at length envoys arrived from Sinôpê to remonstrate against their proceedings.

These envoys presented themselves before the assembled soldiers in the camp, when Hekatonymus, the chief and the most eloquent among them, began by complimenting the army upon their gallant exploits and retreat. He then complained of the injury which Kotyôra and Sinôpê, as the mother city of Kotyôra, had suffered at their hands, in violation of common Hellenic kinship. If such proceedings were continued, he intimated that Sinôpê would be compelled in her own defence to seek alliance with the Paphlagonian prince Korylas, or any other barbaric auxiliary who would lend them aid against the Greeks.<sup>2</sup> Xenophon replied that if the Kotyôrites had sustained any damage, it was owing to their own ill-will and to the Sinôpian harmost in the place; that the generals were under the necessity of procuring subsistence for the soldiers, with house-room for the sick, and that they had taken nothing more; that the sick men were lying within the town, but at their own cost, while the other soldiers were all encamped without; that they had maintained cordial friendship with the Trapezuntines, and requited all their good offices; that they sought no enemies except through necessity, being anxious

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 7, 13-25.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 5, 7-12.



only again to reach Greece; and that as for the threat respecting Korylas, they knew well enough that that prince was eager to become master of the wealthy city of Sinôpê, and would speedily attempt some such enterprise if he could obtain the Cyreian army as his auxiliaries.<sup>1</sup>

This judicious reply shamed the colleagues of Hekatonymus so much, that they went the length of protesting against what he had said, and of affirming that they had come with propositions of sympathy and friendship to the army, as well as with promises to give them an hospitable reception at Sinôpê, if they should visit that town on their way home. Presents were at once sent to the army by the inhabitants of Kotyôra, and a good understanding established.

Such an interchange of good will with the powerful city of Sinôpê was an unspeakable advantage to the army, — indeed, an essential condition to their power of reaching home. If they continued their march by land, it was only through Sinopian guidance and mediation that they could obtain or force a passage through Paphlagonia; while for a voyage by sea, there was no chance of procuring a sufficient number of vessels except from Sinôpê, since no news had been received of Cheirisophus. On the other hand, that city had also a strong interest in facilitating their transit homeward, and thus removing formidable neighbors for whose ulterior purposes there could be no guarantee. After some preliminary conversation with the Sinopian envoys, the generals convoked the army in assembly, and entreated Hekatonymus and his companions to advise them as to the best mode of proceeding westward to the Bosphorus. Hekatonymus, after apologizing for the menacing insinuations of his former speech, and protesting that he had no other object in view except to point out the safest and easiest plan of route for the army, began to unfold the insuperable difficulties of a march through Paphlagonia. The very entrance into the country must be achieved through a narrow aperture in the mountains, which it was impossible to force if occupied by the enemy. Even assuming this difficulty to be surmounted, there were spacious plains to be passed over, wherein the Paphlagonian horse, the most numerous and bravest in Asia, would be found almost irresistible. There were also three or four great rivers, which the

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 5, 13-22.

army would be unable to pass, — the Thermôdôn and the Iris each three hundred feet in breadth, — the Halys, two stadia or nearly a quarter of a mile in breadth, — the Parthenius, also very considerable. Such an array of obstacles (he affirmed) rendered the project of marching through Paphlagonia impracticable; whereas the voyage by sea from Kotyôra to Sinôpê, and from Sinôpê to Herakleia, was easy; and the transit from the latter place, either by sea to Byzantium, or by land across Thrace, yet easier.<sup>1</sup>

Difficulties like these, apparently quite real, were more than sufficient to determine the vote of the army, already sick of marching and fighting, in favor of the sea-voyage; though there were not wanting suspicions of the sincerity of Hekatonymus. But Xenophon, in communicating to the latter the decision of the army, distinctly apprised him that they would on no account permit themselves to be divided; that they would either depart or remain all in a body, and that vessels must be provided sufficient for the transport of all. Hekatonymus desired them to send envoys of their own to Sinôpê to make the necessary arrangements. Three envoys were accordingly sent, — Ariston, an Athenian, Kalimachus, an Arcadian, and Samolas, an Achæan; the Athenian, probably, as possessing the talent of speaking in the Sinopian senate or assembly.<sup>2</sup>

During the absence of these envoys, the army still continued near Kotyôra with a market provided by the town, and with traders from Sinôpê and Herakleia in the camp. Such soldiers as had no money wherewith to purchase, subsisted by pillaging the neighboring frontier of Paphlagonia.<sup>3</sup> But they were receiving no pay; every man was living on his own resources; and instead of carrying back a handsome purse to Greece, as each soldier had hoped when he first took service under Cyrus, there seemed every prospect of their returning poorer than when they left home.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, the army was now moving onward without any definite purpose, with increasing dissatisfaction and decreasing discipline; insomuch that Xenophon foresaw the difficulties which would beset the responsible commanders when they should come within the stricter restraints and obligations of the Grecian world.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 4-11.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 19; vi, 1, 2.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 14.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Anab. vi, 4, 8, vi 2, 4.



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<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 19; vi, 1, 2.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 14.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Anab. vi, 4, 8, vi 2, 4.



It was these considerations which helped to suggest to him the idea of employing the army on some enterprise of conquest and colonization in the Euxine itself; an idea highly flattering to his personal ambition, especially as the army was of unrivalled efficiency against an enemy, and no such second force could ever be got together in those distant regions. His patriotism as a Greek was inflamed with the thoughts of procuring for Hellas a new autonomous city, occupied by a considerable Hellenic population, possessing a spacious territory, and exercising dominion over many indigenous neighbors. He seems to have thought first of attacking and conquering some established non-Hellenic city; an act which his ideas of international morality did not forbid, in a case where he had contracted no special convention with the inhabitants, — though he (as well as Cheirisophus) strenuously protested against doing wrong to any innocent Hellenic community.<sup>1</sup> He contemplated the employment of the entire force in capturing Phasis or some other native city; after which, when the establishment was once safely effected, those soldiers who preferred going home to remaining as settlers, might do so without imperiling those who stayed, and probably with their own purses filled by plunder and conquest in the neighborhood. To settle as one of the richest proprietors and chiefs, — perhaps even the recognized *CEkist*, like Agnon at Amphipolis, — of a new Hellenic city such as could hardly fail to become rich, powerful, and important, — was a tempting prospect for one who had now acquired the habits of command. Moreover, the sequel will prove, how correctly Xenophon appreciated the discomfort of leading the army back to Greece without pay and without certain employment.

It was the practice of Xenophon, and the advice of his master Sokrates,<sup>2</sup> in grave and doubtful cases, where the most careful re-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 15-30; vi, 2, 6; vii, 1, 25, 29.

Haken and other commentators do injustice to Xenophon when they ascribe to him the design of seizing the Greek city of Kotyōra.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Memorab. i, 1, 8, 9. Ἐφη δὲ (Sokrates) δεῖν, ἃ μὲν μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ, μανθάνειν ἃ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ, πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ, οἷς ἂν ὥσιν λέγειν σημαίνειν.

Compare passages in his *Cyropædia*, i, 6, 3; *De Officio Magistr. Equit.* ix, 9.

"The gods (says Euripides, in the Sokratic vein) have given us wisdom

flection was at fault, to recur to the inspired authority of an oracle or a prophet, and to offer sacrifice, in full confidence that the gods would vouchsafe to communicate a special revelation to any person whom they favored. Accordingly Xenophon, previous to any communication with the soldiers respecting his new project, was anxious to ascertain the will of the gods by a special sacrifice; for which he invoked the presence of the Ambrakiot Silanus, the chief prophet in the army. This prophet (as I have already mentioned), before the battle of Kunaxa, had assured Cyrus that Artaxerxes would not fight for ten days, — and the prophecy came to pass; which made such an impression on Cyrus that he rewarded him with the prodigious present of three thousand darics or ten Attic talents. While others were returning poor, Silanus, having contrived to preserve this sum throughout all the hardships of the retreat, was extremely rich, and anxious only to hasten home with his treasure in safety. He heard with strong repugnance the project of remaining in the Euxine, and determined to traverse it by intrigue. As far as concerned the sacrifices, indeed, which he offered apart with Xenophon, he was obliged to admit that the indications of the victims were favorable;<sup>1</sup> Xenophon

to understand and appropriate to ourselves the ordinary comforts of life; in obscure or untelligible cases, we are enabled to inform ourselves by looking at the blaze of the fire, or by consulting prophets who understand the livers of sacrificial victims and the flight of birds. When they have thus furnished so excellent a provision for life, who but spoilt children can be discontented, and ask for more? Yet still human prudence, full of self-conceit, will struggle to be more powerful, and will presume itself to be wiser, than the gods."

Ἄ δ' ἔστ' ἄσημα, κοῦ σαφῆ, γιγνώσκομεν

Εἰς πῦρ βλέποντες, καὶ κατὰ σπλάγχχνων πύχας

Μάντις προσημαίνουσιν οἰωνῶν τ' ἄπο.

Ἀρ' οὐ τρυφῶμεν, θεοῦ κατασκευὴν βίου

Δόντος τοιαύτην, οἷσιν οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τάδε;

Ἄλλ' ἢ φρόνησις τοῦ θεοῦ μείζον σθένειν

Ζητεῖ τὸ γαῦρον δ' ἐν χεροῖν κεκήμενοι

Δοκοῦμεν εἶναι δαιμόνων σοφώτεροι (Supplices, 211).

It will be observed that this constant outpouring of special revelations, through prophets, omens, etc., was (in the view of these Sokratic thinkers) an essential part of the divine government; indispensable to satisfy their ideas of the benevolence of the gods; since rational and scientific prediction was so habitually at fault and unable to fathom the phenomena of the future.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 29



himself being too familiar with the process to be imposed upon. But he at the same time tried to create alarm by declaring that a nice inspection disclosed evidence of treacherous snares laid for Xenophon; which latter indications he himself began to realize, by spreading reports among the army that the Athenian general was laying clandestine plans for keeping them away from Greece without their own concurrence.<sup>1</sup>

Thus prematurely and insidiously divulged, the scheme found some supporters, but a far larger number of opponents; especially among those officers who were jealous of the ascendancy of Xenophon. Timasion and Thorax employed it as a means of alarming the Herakleotic and Sinopian traders in the camp; telling them that unless they provided not merely transports, but also pay for the soldiers, Xenophon would find means to detain the army in the Euxine, and would employ the transports when they arrived, not for the homeward voyage, but for his own projects of acquisition. This news spread so much terror both at Sinôpê and Herakleia, that large offers of money were made from both cities to Timasion, on condition that he would ensure the departure of the army, as soon as the vessels should be assembled at Kotyôra. Accordingly these officers, convening an assembly of the soldiers, protested against the duplicity of Xenophon in thus preparing momentous schemes without any public debate or decision. And Timasion, seconded by Thorax, not only strenuously urged the army to return, but went so far as to promise to them, on the faith of the assurances from Herakleia and Sinôpê, future pay on a liberal scale, to commence from the first new moon after their departure; together with a hospitable reception in his native city of Dardanus on the Hellespont, from whence they could make incursions on the rich neighboring satrapy of Pharnabazus.<sup>2</sup>

It was not, however, until these attacks were repeated from more than one quarter, — until the Achæans Philêsius and Lykon had

<sup>1</sup> Though Xenophon accounted sacrifice to be an essential preliminary to any action of dubious result, and placed great faith in the indications which the victims offered, as signs of the future purposes of the gods, — he nevertheless had very little confidence in the professional prophets. He thought them quite capable of gross deceit (See Xen. Cyrop. i, 6, 2, 3; compare Sophokles, *Antigone*, 1035, 1060; and *Œdip. Tyrann.* 387).

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 19–26.

loudly accused Xenophon of underhand manœuvring to cheat the army into remaining against their will, — that the latter rose to repel the imputation; saying, that all that he had done was, to consult the gods whether it would be better to lay his project before the army or to keep it in his own bosom. The encouraging answer of the gods, as conveyed through the victims and testified even by Silanus himself, proved that the scheme was not ill-conceived; nevertheless, (he remarked) Silanus had begun to lay snares for him, realizing by his own proceedings a collateral indication which he had announced to be visible in the victims. "If (added Xenophon) you had continued as destitute and unprovided as you were just now, — I should still have looked out for a resource in the capture of some city which would have enabled such of you as chose, to return at once; while the rest stay behind to enrich themselves. But now there is no longer any necessity; since Herakleia and Sinôpê are sending transports, and Timasion promises pay to you from the next new moon. Nothing can be better; you will go back safely to Greece, and will receive pay for going thither. I desist at once from my scheme, and call upon all who were favorable to it to desist also. Only let us all keep together until we are on safe ground; and let the man who lags behind or runs off, be condemned as a wrong-doer."<sup>1</sup>

Xenophon immediately put this question to the vote, and every hand was held up in its favor. There was no man more disconcerted with the vote than the prophet Silanus, who loudly exclaimed against the injustice of detaining any one desirous to depart. But the soldiers put him down with vehement disapprobation, threatening that they would assuredly punish him if they caught him running off. His intrigue against Xenophon thus recoiled upon himself, for the moment. But shortly afterwards, when the army reached Herakleia, he took his opportunity for clandestine flight, and found his way back to Greece with the three thousand darics.<sup>2</sup>

If Silanus gained little by his manœuvre, Timasion and his partners gained still less. For so soon as it became known that the army had taken a formal resolution to go back to Greece, and that Xenophon himself had made the proposition, the Sinopians

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 30–33

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 34, vi, 4, 13.



and the Herakleots felt at their ease. They sent the transport vessels, but withheld the money which they had promised to Timasion and Thorax. Hence these officers were exposed to dishonor and peril; for, having positively engaged to find pay for the army, they were now unable to keep their word. So keen were their apprehensions, that they came to Xenophon and told him that they had altered their views, and that they now thought it best to employ the newly-arrived transports in conveying the army, not to Greece, but against the town and territory of Phasis at the eastern extremity of the Euxine.<sup>1</sup> Xenophon replied, that they might convene the soldiers and make the proposition, if they chose; but that he would have nothing to say to it. To make the very proposition themselves, for which they had so much inveighed against Xenophon, was impossible without some preparation; so that each of them began individually to sound his captains, and get the scheme suggested by them. During this interval, the soldiery obtained information of the manœuvre, much to their discontent and indignation; of which Neon (the lieutenant of the absent Cheirisophus) took advantage, to throw the whole blame upon Xenophon; alleging that it was he who had converted the other officers to his original project, and that he intended as soon as the soldiers were on shipboard, to convey them fraudulently to Phasis instead of to Greece. There was something so plausible in this glaring falsehood, which represented Xenophon as the author of the renewed project, once his own, — and something so improbable in the fact that the other officers should spontaneously have renounced their own strong opinions to take up his, — that we can hardly be surprised at the ready credence which Neon's calumny found among the army. Their exasperation against Xenophon became so intense, that they collected in fierce groups; and there was even a fear that they would break out into mutinous violence, as they had before done against the magistrates of Kerasus.

Well knowing the danger of such spontaneous and informal assemblages, and the importance of the habitual solemnities of convocation and arrangement, to ensure either discussion or legitimate

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 36.

I may here note that this *Phasis* in the Euxine means the town of that name, not the river.

defence,<sup>1</sup> — Xenophon immediately sent round the herald to summon the army into the regular agora, with customary method and ceremony. The summons was obeyed with unusual alacrity, and Xenophon then addressed them, — refraining, with equal generosity and prudence, from saying anything about the last proposition which Timasion and others had made to him. Had he mentioned it, the question would have become one of life and death between him and those other officers.

“Soldiers (said he), I understand that there are some men here calumniating me, as if I were intending to cheat you and carry you to Phasis. Hear me, then, in the name of the gods. If I am shown to be doing wrong, let me not go from hence unpunished; but if, on the contrary, my calumniators are proved to be the wrong-doers, deal with them as they deserve. You surely well know where the sun rises and where he sets; you know that if a man wishes to reach Greece, he must go westward, — if to the barbaric territories, he must go eastward. Can any one hope to deceive you on this point, and persuade you that the sun rises on *this* side, and sets on

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 7, 1-3.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ᾗσθάνετο ὁ Ξενοφῶν, ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ὡς τάχιστα συναγαγεῖν αὐτῶν ἀγορὰν, καὶ μὴ εἶσαι συλλεγεῖν αὐτομάτους καὶ ἐκέλευε τὸν κήρυκα συλλέξει ἀγορὰν.

The prudence of Xenophon in convoking the assembly at once is incontestable. He could not otherwise have hindered the soldiers from getting together, and exciting one another to action, without any formal summons.

The reader should contrast with this the scene at Athens (described in Thucydides, ii, 22; and in Vol. VI, Ch. xlviii, p. 133 of this History) during the first year of the Peloponnesian war, and the first invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians; when the invaders were at Acharnæ, within sight of the walls of Athens, burning and destroying the country. In spite of the most violent excitement among the Athenian people, and the strongest impatience to go out and fight, Perikles steadily refused to call an assembly, for fear that the people should take the resolution of going out. And what was much more remarkable — the people even in that state of excitement though all united within the walls, did not meet in any informal assembly, nor come to any resolution, or to any active proceeding; which the Cyreians would certainly have done, had they not been convened in a regular assembly.

The contrast with the Cyreian army here illustrates the extraordinary empire exercised by constitutional forms over the minds of the Athenian citizens.



that? Can any one cheat you into going on shipboard with a wind which blows you away from Greece? Suppose even that I put you aboard when there is no wind at all. How am I to force you to sail with me against your own consent, — I being only in one ship, you in a hundred and more? Imagine, however, that I could even succeed in deluding you to Phasis. When we land there, you will know at once that we are not in Greece; and what fate can I then expect, — a detected impostor in the midst of ten thousand men with arms in their hands? No, — these stories all proceed from foolish men, who are jealous of my influence with you; jealous, too, without reason, — for I neither hinder *them* from outstripping me in your favor, if they can render you greater service, — nor *you* from electing them commanders, if you think fit. Enough of this, now; I challenge any one to come forward and say how it is possible either to cheat, or to be cheated, in the manner laid to my charge."<sup>1</sup>

Having thus grappled directly with the calumnies of his enemies, and dissipated them in such manner as doubtless to create a reaction in his own favor, Xenophon made use of the opportunity to denounce the growing disorders in the army; which he depicted as such that, if no corrective were applied, disgrace and contempt must fall upon all. As he paused after this general remonstrance, the soldiers loudly called upon him to go into particulars; upon which he proceeded to recall, with lucid and impressive simplicity, the outrages which had been committed at and near Kerasus, — the unauthorized and unprovoked attack made by Klearetus and his company on a neighboring village which was in friendly commerce with the army, — the murder of the three elders of the village, who had come as heralds to complain to the generals about such wrong, — the mutinous attack made by disorderly soldiers even upon the magistrates of Kerasus, at the very moment when they were remonstrating with the generals on what had occurred; exposing these magistrates to the utmost peril, and putting the generals themselves to ignominy.<sup>2</sup> "If such are to be our proceedings, (continued Xenophon), look you well into what condition the army will fall. You, the aggregate body,<sup>3</sup> will no longer be

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 7, 7-11.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 7, 13-26.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Anab. v 7 26-27. Εἰ οὖν ταῦτα τοιαῦτά ἐσται: θεάσασθε οἷα ἔ

the sovereign authority to make war or peace with whom you please; each individual among you will conduct the army against any point which he may choose. And even if men should come to you as envoys, either for peace or for other purposes, they may be slain by any single enemy; so that you will be debarred from all public communications whatever. Next, those whom your universal suffrage shall have chosen commanders, will have no authority; while any self-elected general who chooses to give the word, Cast! Cast! (i. e. darts or stones), may put to death, without trial, either officer or soldier, as it suits him; that is, if he finds you ready to obey him, as it happened near Kerasus. Look, now, what these self-elected leaders have done for you. The magistrate of Kerasus, if he was really guilty of wrong towards you, has been enabled to escape with impunity; if he was innocent, he has been obliged to run away from you, as the only means of avoiding death without pretence or trial. Those who stoned the heralds to death, have brought matters to such a pass, that you alone, among all Greeks, cannot enter the town of Kerasus in safety, unless in commanding force; and that we cannot even send in a herald to take up our dead (Klearetus and those who were slain in the attack on the Kerasuntine village) for burial; though at first those who had slain them in self-defence were anxious to give up the bodies to us. For who will take the risk of going in as herald, from those who have set the example of putting heralds to death? We generals were obliged to entreat the Kerasuntines to bury the bodies for us."<sup>1</sup>

Continuing in this emphatic protest against the recent disorders and outrages, Xenophon at length succeeded in impressing his own sentiment, heartily and unanimously, upon the soldiers. They

κατάστασις ἡμῖν ἐσται τῆς στρατιᾶς. Ὑμεῖς μὲν οἱ πάντες οὐκ ἐσεσθε κύριοι, οὐτ' ἀνελεύσθαι πόλεμον ᾧ ἂν βούλησθε, οὔτε καταλύσαι ἰδίᾳ δὲ ὁ βουλομενός ἄξει στρατεύμα ἐφ' ὃ, τι ἂν ἐθέλῃ. Κἂν τινες πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἴωσι πρέσβεις, ἢ εἰρήνης δεόμενοι ἢ ἄλλου τινος, κατακαίνοντες τοὺτους οἱ βουλόμενοι, ποιήσουσιν ὑμᾶς τῶν λόγων μὴ ἀκοῦσαι τῶν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἰόντων. Ἐπεὶ δὲ, οὓς μὲν ἂν ἡμεῖς ἅπαντες ἐλησθε ἄρχοντας, ἐν οὐδεμιά χώρᾳ ἔσονται· ὅστις δ' ἂν ἐαυτὸν ἐληται στρατηγόν, καὶ ἐθέλῃ λέγειν, Βάλλε, Βάλλε, οὗτος ἐσται ἱκανὸς καὶ ἄρχοντα κατακαίνειν καὶ ἰδιώτην δὴ ἂν ὑμῶν ἐθέλῃ ἄκριτον — ἂν ὥσιν αἱ κεισόμεναι αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἐγενετο.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. v 7, 27-30.



passed a vote that the ringleaders of the mutiny at Kerasus should be punished; that if any one was guilty of similar outrages in future, he should be put upon his trial by the generals, before the lochages or captains as judges, and if condemned by them, put to death; and that trial should be had before the same persons, for any other wrong committed since the death of Cyrus. A suitable religious ceremony was also directed to be performed, at the instance of Xenophon and the prophets, to purify the army.<sup>1</sup>

This speech affords an interesting specimen of the political morality universal throughout the Grecian world, though deeper and more predominant among its better sections. In the miscellaneous aggregate, and temporary society, now mustered at Kotyôra, Xenophon insists on the universal suffrage of the whole body, as the legitimate sovereign authority for the guidance of every individual will; the decision of the majority, fairly and formally collected, as carrying a title to prevail over every dissentient minority; the generals chosen by the majority of votes, as the only persons entitled to obedience. This is the cardinal principle to which he appeals, as the anchorage of political obligation in the mind of each separate man or fraction; as the condition of all success, all safety, and all conjoint action; as the only condition either for punishing wrong or protecting right; as indispensable to keep up their sympathies with the Hellenic communities, and their dignity either as soldiers or as citizens. The complete success of his speech proves that he knew how to touch the right chord of Grecian feeling. No serious acts of individual insubordination occurred afterwards, though the army collectively went wrong on more than one occasion. And what is not less important to notice, — the influence of Xenophon himself, after his unreserved and courageous remonstrance, seems to have been sensibly augmented, — certainly no way diminished.

The circumstances which immediately followed were indeed well calculated to augment it. For it was resolved, on the proposition of Xenophon himself<sup>2</sup> that the generals themselves should be

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 7, 34, 35.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 7, 35.

Παρανοήντος δὲ Ξενοφώντος, καὶ τῶν μάντεων συμβουλευόντων, ἔδοξε καὶ καθάραι τὸ στράτευμα· καὶ ἐγένετο καθαρμός· ἔδοξε δὲ καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς δίκην ὑποσχέειν τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου.

tried before the newly-constituted tribunal of the lochages or captains, in case any one had complaint to make against them for past matters; agreeably to the Athenian habit of subjecting every magistrate to a trial of accountability on laying down his office. In the course of this investigation, Philesius and Xanthiklēs were fined twenty minæ, to make good an assignable deficiency of that amount, in the cargoes of those merchantmen which had been detained at Trapezus for the transport of the army; Sophænetus, who had the general superintendence of this property, but had been negligent in that duty, was fined ten minæ. Next, the name of Xenophon was put up, when various persons stood forward to accuse him of having beaten and ill-used them. As commander of the rear-guard, his duty was by far the severest and most difficult, especially during the intense cold and deep snow; since the sick and wounded, as well as the laggards and plunderers, all fell under his inspection. One man especially was loud in complaints against him, and Xenophon questioned him, as to the details of his case, before the assembled army. It turned out that he had given him blows, because the man, having been intrusted with the task of carrying a sick soldier, was about to evade the duty by burying the dying man alive.<sup>1</sup> This interesting debate (given in the *Anabasis* at length) ended by full approbation, on the part of the army, of Xenophon's conduct, accompanied with regret that he had not handled the man yet more severely.

The statements of Xenophon himself give us a vivid idea of the internal discipline of the army, even as managed by a discreet and well-tempered officer. "I acknowledge (said he to the soldiers) to have struck many men for disorderly conduct; men who were content to owe their preservation to your orderly march and constant fighting, while they themselves ran about to plunder and enrich themselves at your cost. Had we all acted as they did, we should have perished to a man. Sometimes, too, I struck

In the distribution of chapters as made by the editors, chapter the eighth is made to begin at the second *ἔδοξε*, which seems to me not convenient for comprehending the full sense. I think that the second *ἔδοξε*, as well as the first, is connected with the words *παρανοήντος Ξενοφώντος*, and ought to be included not only in the same chapter with them, but also in the same sentence, without an intervening full stop.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 8, 3-12.



men who were lagging behind with cold and fatigue, or were stopping the way so as to hinder others from getting forward; I struck them with my fist,<sup>1</sup> in order to save them from the spear of the enemy. You yourselves stood by, and saw me; you had arms in your hands, yet none of you interfered to prevent me. I did it for their good as well as for yours, not from any insolence of disposition; for it was a time when we were all alike suffering from cold, hunger, and fatigue; whereas I now live comparatively well, drink more wine, and pass easy days, — and yet I strike no one. You will find that the men who failed most in those times of hardship, are now the most outrageous offenders in the army. There is Boiskus,<sup>2</sup> the Thessalian pugilist, who pretended sickness during the march, in order to evade the burthen of carrying his shield, — and now, as I am informed, he has stripped several citizens of Kotyôra of their clothes. If (he concluded) the blows which I have occasionally given, in cases of necessity, are now brought in evidence, — I call upon those among you also, to whom I have rendered aid and protection, to stand up and testify in my favor.”<sup>3</sup>

Many individuals responded to this appeal, insomuch that Xenophon was not merely acquitted, but stood higher than before in the opinion of the army. We learn from his defence that for a commanding officer to strike a soldier with his fist, if wanting in duty, was not considered improper; at least under such circumstances as those of the retreat. But what deserves notice still more, is, the extraordinary influence which Xenophon's powers of speaking gave him over the minds of the army. He stood distinguished from the other generals, Lacedæmonian, Arcadian, Achæan, etc.,

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 8, 16. ἐπαισα πῶς, ὅπως μὴ λόγῳ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων παύοιτο.

<sup>2</sup> The idea that great pugilists were not good soldiers in battle, is as old among the Greeks as the Iliad. The unrivalled pugilist of the Homeric Grecian army, Epeius, confesses his own inferiority as a soldier (Iliad, xxiii 667).

Ἄσπον ἴτω, ὅστις δέπας οἴσεται ἀμφικύπελλον  
Ἥμιονον δ' οὐ φημί τιν' ἄξεμεν ἄλλον Ἀχαιῶν,  
Πυγμῇ νικήσαντ' ἐπεὶ εὐχομαι εἶναι ἄριστος.  
Ἦ οὐκ ἄλλος, ὅστις μάχης ἐπιδεδύσθαι; οὐδ' ἄρα πῶς ἔν  
Ἐν πάντεσσ' ἔργοισι δαίμονα φῶτα γενέσθαι.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 8, 13-25.

by having the power of working on the minds of the soldiers collectively; and we see that he had the good sense, as well as the spirit, not to shrink from telling them unpleasant truths. In spite of such frankness — or rather, partly by means of such frankness, — his ascendancy as commander not only remained unabated, as compared with that of the others, but went on increasing. For whatever may be said about the flattery of orators as a means of influence over the people, — it will be found that though particular points may be gained in this way, yet wherever the influence of an orator has been steady and long-continued (like that of Perikles<sup>1</sup> or Demosthenes) it is owing in part to the fact that he has an opinion of his own, and is not willing to accommodate himself constantly to the prepossessions of his hearers. Without the oratory of Xenophon, there would have existed no engine for kindling or sustaining the *sensus communis* of the ten thousand Cyreians assembled at Kotyôra, or for keeping up the moral authority of the aggregate over the individual members and fractions. The other officers could doubtless speak well enough to address short encouragements, or give simple explanations, to the soldiers; without this faculty, no man was fit for military command over Greeks. But the oratory of Xenophon was something of a higher order. Whoever will study the discourse pronounced by him at Kotyôra, will perceive a dexterity in dealing with assembled multitudes, — a discriminating use sometimes of the plainest and most direct appeal, sometimes of indirect insinuation or circuitous transitions to work round the minds of the hearers, — a command of those fundamental political convictions which lay deep in the Grecian mind, but were often so overlaid by the fresh impulses arising out of each successive situation, as to require some positive friction to draw them out from their latent state — lastly, a power of expansion and varied repetition — such as would be naturally imparted both by the education and the practice of an intelligent Athenian, but would rarely be found in any other Grecian city. The energy and judgment displayed by Xenophon in the retreat were doubtless not less essential to his influence than his power of speaking; but in these points we may be sure that other officers were more nearly his equals.

<sup>1</sup> See the striking remarks of Thucydides (ii, 65) upon Perikles.



The important public proceedings above described not only restored the influence of Xenophon, but also cleared off a great amount of bad feeling, and sensibly abated the bad habits, which had grown up in the army. A scene which speedily followed was not without effect in promoting cheerful and amicable sympathies. The Paphlagonian prince Korylas, weary of the desultory warfare carried on between the Greeks and the border inhabitants, sent envoys to the Greek camp with presents of horses and fine robes,<sup>1</sup> and with expressions of a wish to conclude peace. The Greek generals accepted the presents, and promised to submit the proposition to the army. But first they entertained the envoys at a banquet, providing at the same time games and dances, with other recreations amusing not only to them but also to the soldiers generally. The various dances, warlike and pantomimic, of Thracians, Mysians, Ænians, Magnètes, etc., are described by Xenophon in a lively and interesting manner. They were followed on the next day by an amicable convention concluded between the army and the Paphlagonians.<sup>2</sup>

Not long afterwards, — a number of transports, sufficient for the whole army, having been assembled from Herakleia and Sinôpê, — all the soldiers were conveyed by sea to the latter place, passing by the mouth of the rivers Thermodon, Iris, and Halys, which they would have found impracticable to cross in a land-march through Paphlagonia. Having reached Sinôpê after a day and a night of sailing with a fair wind, they were hospitably received, and lodged in the neighboring seaport of Armênê, where the Sinopians sent to them a large present of barley-meal and wine, and where they remained for five days.

It was here that they were joined by Cheirisophus, whose ab-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 2. Πέμπει παρὰ τοῦς Ἑλληνας πρέσβεις, ἔχοντας ἵππους καὶ στολὰς καλὰς, etc.

The horses sent were doubtless native Paphlagonian, the robes sent were probably the produce of the looms of Sinôpê and Kotyôra; just as the Thracian princes used to receive fine woven and metallic fabrics from Abdera and the other Grecian colonies on their coast — ὑφαντὰ καὶ λεία, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κατασκευή, etc. (Thucyd. ii, 96). From the like industry probably proceeded the splendid "regia textilia" and abundance of gold and silver vessels, captured by the Roman general Paulus Emilius along with Persena, the last king of Macedonia (Livy, xlv, 33-35).

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. vi, 1 10-14.

sence had been so unexpectedly prolonged. But he came with only a single trireme, bringing nothing except a message from Anaxibius, the Lacedæmonian admiral in the Bosphorus; who complimented the army, and promised that they should be taken into pay as soon as they were out of the Euxine. The soldiers, severely disappointed on seeing him arrive thus empty-handed, became the more strongly bent on striking some blow to fill their own purses before they reached Greece. Feeling that it was necessary to the success of any such project that it should be prepared not only skilfully, but secretly, they resolved to elect a single general in place of that board of six (or perhaps more) who were still in function. Such was now the ascendancy of Xenophon, that the general sentiment of the army at once turned towards him; and the lochages or captair, communicating to him what was in contemplation, intimated to him their own anxious hopes that he would not decline the offer. Tempted by so flattering a proposition, he hesitated at first what answer he should give. But at length the uncertainty of being able to satisfy the exigencies of the army, and the fear of thus compromising the reputation which he had already realized, outweighed the opposite inducements. As in other cases of doubt, so in this, — he offered sacrifice to Zeus Basileus; and the answer returned by the victims was such as to determine him to refusal. Accordingly, when the army assembled, with predetermination to choose a single chief, and proceeded to nominate him, — he respectfully and thankfully declined, on the ground that Cheirisophus was a Lacedæmonian, and that he himself was not; adding that he should cheerfully serve under any one whom they might name. His excuse, however, was repudiated by the army; and especially by the lochages. Several of these latter were Arcadians; and one of them, Agasias, cried out, with full sympathy of the soldiers, that if that principle were admitted, he, as an Arcadian, ought to resign his command. Finding that his former reason was not approved, Xenophon acquainted the army that he had sacrificed to know whether he ought to accept the command, and that the gods had peremptorily forbidden him to do so.<sup>1</sup>

Cheirisophus was then elected sole commander, and undertook

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 22-31.



the duty; saying that he would have willingly served under Xenophon, if the latter had accepted the office, but that it was a good thing for Xenophon himself to have declined, — since Desipus had already poisoned the mind of Anaxibius against him, although he (Cheirisophus) had emphatically contradicted the calumnies.<sup>1</sup>

On the next day, the army sailed forward, under the command of Cheirisophus, to Herakleia; near which town they were hospitably entertained, and gratified with a present of meal, wine, and bullocks, even greater than they had received at Sinôpê. It now appeared that Xenophon had acted wisely in declining the sole command; and also that Cheirisophus, though elected commander, yet having been very long absent, was not really of so much importance in the eyes of the soldiers as Xenophon. In the camp near Herakleia, the soldiers became impatient that their generals (for the habit of looking upon Xenophon as one of them still continued) took no measures to procure money for them. The Achæan Lykon proposed that they should extort a contribution of no less than three thousand staters of Kyzikus (about sixty thousand Attic drachmæ, or ten talents, equal to two thousand three hundred pounds) from the inhabitants of Herakleia; another man immediately outbid this proposition, and proposed that they should require ten thousand staters — a full month's pay for the army. It was moved that Cheirisophus and Xenophon should go to the Herakleots as envoys with this demand. But both of them indignantly refused to be concerned in so unjust an extortion from a Grecian city which had just received the army kindly, and sent handsome presents. Accordingly, Lykon with two Arcadian officers undertook the mission, and intimated the demand, not without threats in case of non-compliance, to the Herakleots. The latter replied that they would take it into consideration. But they waited only for the departure of the envoys, and then immediately closed their gates, manned their walls, and brought in their outlying property.

The project being thus baffled, Lykon and the rest turned their displeasure upon Cheirisophus and Xenophon, whom they accused of having occasioned its miscarriage. And they now began to

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 32.

exclaim that it was disgraceful to the Arcadians and Achæans, who formed more than one numerical half of the army and endured all the toil — to obey as well as to enrich generals from other Hellenic cities; especially a single Athenian who furnished no contingent to the army. Here again it is remarkable that the personal importance of Xenophon caused him to be still regarded as a general, though the sole command had been vested, by formal vote, in Cheirisophus. So vehement was the dissatisfaction, that all the Arcadian and Achæan soldiers in the army, more than four thousand and five hundred hoplites in number, renounced the authority of Cheirisophus, formed themselves into a distinct division, and chose ten commanders from out of their own numbers. The whole army thus became divided into three portions — first, the Arcadians and Achæans; secondly, one thousand and four hundred hoplites and seven hundred peltasts, who adhered to Cheirisophus; lastly, one thousand seven hundred hoplites, three hundred peltasts, and forty horsemen, (all the horsemen in the army), attaching themselves to Xenophon; who however was taking measures to sail away individually from Herakleia and quit the army altogether, which he would have done had he not been restrained by unfavorable sacrifices.<sup>1</sup>

The Arcadian division, departing first, in vessels from Herakleia, landed at the harbor of Kalpê; an untenanted promontory of the Bithynian or Asiatic Thrace, midway between Herakleia and Byzantium. From thence they marched at once into the interior of Bithynia, with the view of surprising the villages, and acquiring plunder. But through rashness and bad management, they first sustained several partial losses, and ultimately became surrounded upon an eminence, by a large muster of the indigenous Bithynians from all the territory around. They were only rescued from destruction by the unexpected appearance of Xenophon with his division; who had left Herakleia somewhat later, but heard by accident, during their march, of the danger of their comrades. The whole army thus became re-assembled at Kalpê, where the Arcadians and Achæans, disgusted at the ill-success of their separate expedition, again established the old union and the old generals. They chose Neon in place of Cheirisophus, who, — afflicted by

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. vi, 2, 11-16.



the humiliation put upon him, in having been first named sole commander and next deposed within a week, — had fallen sick of a fever and died. The elder Arcadian captains farther moved a resolution, that if any one henceforward should propose to separate the army into fractions, he should be put to death.<sup>1</sup>

The locality of Kalpê was well suited for the foundation of a colony, which Xenophon evidently would have been glad to bring about, though he took no direct measures tending towards it; while the soldiers were so bent on returning to Greece, and so jealous lest Xenophon should entrap them into remaining, that they almost shunned the encampment. It so happened that they were detained there for some days without being able to march forth even in quest of provisions, because the sacrifices were not favorable. Xenophon refused to lead them out, against the warning of the sacrifices — although the army suspected him of a deliberate manœuvre for the purpose of detention. Neon, however, less scrupulous, led out a body of two thousand men who chose to follow him, under severe distress for want of provisions. But being surprised by the native Bithynians, with the aid of some troops of the Persian satrap Pharnabazus, he was defeated with the loss of no less than five hundred men; a misfortune which Xenophon regards as the natural retribution for contempt of the sacrificial warning. The dangerous position of Neon with the remainder of the detachment was rapidly made known at the camp; upon which Xenophon, unharnessing a waggon-bullock as the only animal near at hand, immediately offered sacrifice. On this occasion, the victim was at once favorable; so that he led out without delay the greater part of the force, to the rescue of the exposed detachment, which was brought back in safety to the camp. So bold had the enemy become, that in the night the camp was attacked. The Greeks were obliged on the next day to retreat into stronger ground, surrounding themselves with a ditch and palisade. Fortunately a vessel arrived from Herakleia, bringing to the camp at Kalpê a supply of barley-meal, cattle, and wine; which restored the spirits of the army, enabling them to go forth on the ensuing morning, and assume the aggressive against the Bithynians and the troops of Pharnabazus. These troops were completely defeated and dis-

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Anab. vi. 3, 10-25; vi. 4, 11.

persed, so that the Greeks returned to their camp at Kalpê in the evening, both safe and masters of the country.<sup>1</sup>

At Kalpê they remained some time, awaiting the arrival of Kleander from Byzantium, who was said to be about to bring vessels for their transport. They were now abundantly provided with supplies, not merely from the undisturbed plunder of the neighboring villages, but also from the visits of traders who came with cargoes. Indeed the impression — that they were preparing, at the instance of Xenophon, to found a new city at Kalpê — became so strong, that several of the neighboring native villages sent envoys to ask on what terms alliance would be granted to them. At length Kleander came, but with two triremes only.<sup>2</sup>

Kleander was the Lacedæmonian harmost or governor of Byzantium. His appearance opens to us a new phase in the eventful history of this gallant army, as well as an insight into the state of the Grecian world under the Lacedæmonian empire. He came attended by Dexippus, who had served in the Cyreian army until their arrival at Trapezus, and who had there been entrusted with an armed vessel for the purpose of detaining transports to convey the troops home, but had abused the confidence reposed in him by running away with the ship to Byzantium.

It so happened that at the moment when Kleander arrived, the whole army was out on a marauding excursion. Orders had been already promulgated, that whatever was captured by every one when the whole army was out, should be brought in and dealt with as public property; though on days when the army was collectively at rest, any soldier might go out individually and take to himself whatever he could pillage. On the day when Kleander arrived, and found the whole army out, some soldiers were just coming back with a lot of sheep which they had seized. By right, the sheep ought to have been handed into the public store. But these soldiers, desirous to appropriate them wrongfully, addressed themselves to Dexippus, and promised him a portion if he would enable them to retain the rest. Accordingly the latter interfered, drove away those who claimed the sheep as public property, and denounced them as thieves to Kleander; who desired him to bring them before him. Dexippus arrested one of them, a soldier be-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. vi. 5

Xen. Anab. vi. 6. 1-5



longing to the lochus or company of one of the best friends of Xenophon, — the Arcadian Agasias. The latter took the man under his protection; while the soldiers around, incensed not less at the past than at the present conduct of Dexippus, broke out into violent manifestations, called him a traitor and pelted him with stones. Such was their wrath that not Dexippus alone, but the crew of the triremes also, and even Kleander himself, fled in alarm; in spite of the intervention of Xenophon and the other generals, who on the one hand explained to Kleander, that it was an established army-order which these soldiers were seeking to enforce — and on the other hand controlled the mutineers. But the Lacedæmonian harmost was so incensed as well by his own fright as by the calumnies of Dexippus, that he threatened to sail away at once, and proclaim the Cyreian army enemies to Sparta, so that every Hellenic city should be interdicted from giving them reception.<sup>1</sup> It was in vain that the generals, well knowing the formidable consequences of such an interdict, entreated him to relent. He would consent only on condition that the soldier who had begun to throw stones, as well as Agasias the interfering officer, should be delivered up to him. This latter demand was especially insisted upon by Dexippus, who, hating Xenophon, had already tried to prejudice Anaxibius against him, and believed that Agasias had acted by his order.<sup>2</sup>

The situation became now extremely critical; since the soldiers would not easily be brought to surrender their comrades, — who had a perfectly righteous cause, though they had supported it by undue violence, — to the vengeance of a traitor like Dexippus. When the army was convened in assembly, several of them went so far as to treat the menace of Kleander with contempt. But Xenophon took pains to set them right upon this point. "Soldiers (said he), it will be no slight misfortune if Kleander shall depart as he threatens to do, in his present temper towards us. We are here close upon the cities of Greece; now the Lacedæmonians are the imperial power in Greece, and not merely their authorized officers, but even each one of their individual citizens, can accomplish what he pleases in the various cities. If then Kleander begins by shutting us out from Byzantium, and next enjoins the Lacedæ-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. vi. 6, 5-9.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. vi. 1, 32 · vi. 4, 11- 5.

dæmonian harmosts in the other cities to do the same, proclaiming us lawless and disobedient to Sparta, — if, besides, the same representation should be conveyed to the Lacedæmonian admiral of the fleet, Anaxibius, — we shall be hard pressed either to remain or to sail away; for the Lacedæmonians are at present masters, both on land and at sea.<sup>1</sup> We must not, for the sake of any one or two men, suffer the whole army to be excluded from Greece. We must obey whatever the Lacedæmonians command, especially as our cities, to which we respectively belong, now obey them. As to what concerns myself, I understand that Dexippus has told Kleander that Agasias would never have taken such a step except by my orders. Now, if Agasias himself states this, I am ready to exonerate both him and all of you, and to give myself up to any extremity of punishment. I maintain too, that any other man whom Kleander arraigns, ought in like manner to give himself up for trial, in order that you collectively may be discharged from the imputation. It will be hard indeed, if just as we are reaching Greece, we should not only be debarred from the praise and honor which we anticipated, but should be degraded even below the level of others, and shut out from the Grecian cities."<sup>2</sup>

After this speech from the philo-Laonian Xenophon, — so significant a testimony of the unmeasured ascendancy and interference of the Lacedæmonians throughout Greece, — Agasias rose and proclaimed, that what he had done was neither under the orders, nor with the privity, of Xenophon; that he had acted on a personal impulse of wrath, at seeing his own honest and innocent soldier dragged away by the traitor Dexippus; but that he now willingly gave himself up as a victim, to avert from the army the displeasure of the Lacedæmonians. This generous self-sacrifice, which at the

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. vi, 12, 13.

Εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἐγγὺς αἱ Ἑλληνίδες πόλεις τῆς δ' Ἑλλάδος Λακεδαιμόνιο προεστήκασιν· ἱκανοὶ δὲ εἰσι καὶ εἰς ἕκαστος Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅτι βούλονται διαπράττεσθαι. Εἰ οὖν οὗτος πρῶτον μὲν ἡμᾶς Βυζαντίον ἀποκλείσει, ἔπειτα δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀρμοσταῖς παραγγελεῖ εἰς τὰς πόλεις μὴ δέχεσθαι, ὡς ἀπιστοῦντας Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ ἀνόμους ὄντας — ἐτι δὲ πρὸς Ἀναξίβιον τὸν ναύαρχον οὗτος ὁ λόγος περὶ ἡμῶν ἥξει — χαλεπὸν ἔσται καὶ μένειν καὶ ἀποπλεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ γῇ ἀρχοῦσι Λακεδαμόνιοι καὶ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ τὸν νῦν χρόνον.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. vi, 12-16.



moment promised nothing less than a fatal result to Agasias, was accepted by the army; and the generals conducted both him and the soldier whom he had rescued, as prisoners to Kleander. Presenting himself as the responsible party, Agasias at the same time explained to Kleander the infamous behavior of Dexippus to the army, and said that towards no one else would he have acted in the same manner; while the soldier whom he had rescued and who was given up at the same time, also affirmed that he had interfered merely to prevent Dexippus and some others from overruling, for their own individual benefit, a proclaimed order of the entire army. Kleander, having observed that if Dexippus had done what was affirmed, he would be the last to defend him, but that no one ought to have been stoned without trial, — desired that the persons surrendered might be left for his consideration, and at the same time retracted his expressions of displeasure as regarded all the others.<sup>1</sup>

The generals then retired, leaving Kleander in possession of the prisoners, and on the point of taking his dinner. But they retired with mournful feelings, and Xenophon presently convened the army to propose that a general deputation should be sent to Kleander to implore his lenity towards their two comrades. This being cordially adopted, Xenophon, at the head of a deputation comprising Drakontius, the Spartan, as well as the chief officers, addressed an earnest appeal to Kleander, representing that his honor had been satisfied with the unconditional surrender of the two persons required; that the army, deeply concerned for two meritorious comrades, entreated him now to show mercy and spare their lives; that they promised him in return the most implicit obedience, and entreated him to take the command of them, in order that he might have personal cognizance of their exact discipline, and compare their worth with that of Dexippus. Kleander was not merely soothed, but completely won over by this address, and said in reply that the conduct of the generals belied altogether the representations made to him, (doubtless by Dexippus) that they were seeking to alienate the army from the Lacedæmonians. He not only restored the two men in his power, but also accepted the command of the army, and promised to conduct them back into Greece.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 22-28.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 31-36.

The prospects of the army appeared thus greatly improved; the more so, as Kleander, on entering upon his new functions as commander, found the soldiers so cheerful and orderly, that he was highly gratified, and exchanged personal tokens of friendship and hospitality with Xenophon. But when sacrifices came to be offered, for beginning the march homeward, the signs were so unpropitious, for three successive days, that Kleander could not bring himself to brave such auguries at the outset of his career. Accordingly, he told the generals, that the gods plainly forbade him, and reserved it for them, to conduct the army into Greece; that he should therefore sail back to Byzantium, and would receive the army in the best way he could, when they reached the Bosphorus. After an interchange of presents with the soldiers, he then departed with his two triremes.<sup>1</sup>

The favorable sentiment now established in the bosom of Kleander will be found very serviceable hereafter to the Cyreians at Byzantium; but they had cause for deeply regretting the unpropitious sacrifices which had deterred him from assuming the actual command at Kalpê. In the request preferred to him by them that he would march as their commander to the Bosphorus, we may recognize a scheme, and a very well-contrived scheme, of Xenophon; who had before desired to leave the army at Herakleia, and who saw plainly that the difficulties of a commander, unless he were a Lacedæmonian of station and influence, would increase with every step of their approach to Greece. Had Kleander accepted the command, the soldiers would have been better treated, while Xenophon himself might either have remained as his adviser, or might have gone home. He probably would have chosen the latter course.

Under the command of their own officers, the Cyreians now marched from Kalpê across Bithynia to Chrysopolis,<sup>2</sup> (in the territory of Chalkêdon on the Asiatic edge of the Bosphorus, immediately opposite to Byzantium, as Scutari now is to Constantinople) where they remained seven days, turning into money the slaves

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 36, 37.

<sup>2</sup> Nearly the same cross march was made by the Athenian general Lamachus, in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war, after he had lost his triremes by a sudden rise of the water at the mouth of the river Kalos, in the territory of Herakleia (Thucyd. iv, 75).



and plunder which they had collected. Unhappily for them, the Lacedæmonian admiral Anaxibius was now at Byzantium, so that their friend Kleander was under his superior command. And Pharnabazus, the Persian satrap of the north-western regions of Asia Minor, becoming much alarmed lest they should invade his satrapy, despatched a private message to Anaxibius; whom he prevailed upon, by promise of large presents, to transport the army forthwith across to the European side of the Bosphorus.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, Anaxibius, sending for the generals and the lochages across to Byzantium, invited the army to cross, and gave them his assurance that as soon as the soldiers should be in Europe, he would provide pay for them. The other officers told him that they would return with this message and take the sense of the army; but Xenophon, on his own account, said that he should not return; that he should now retire from the army, and sail away from Byzantium. It was only on the pressing instance of Anaxibius that he was induced to go back to Chrysopolis and conduct the army across; on the understanding that he should depart immediately afterwards.

Here at Byzantium, he received his first communication from the Thracian prince Seuthes; who sent Medosadês to offer him a reward if he would bring the army across. Xenophon replied that the army would cross; that no reward from Seuthes was needful to bring about that movement; but that he himself was about to depart, leaving the command in other hands. In point of fact, the whole army crossed with little delay, landed in Europe, and found themselves within the walls of Byzantium.<sup>2</sup> Xenophon, who had come along with them, paid a visit shortly afterwards to his friend the harmost Kleander, and took leave of him as about to depart immediately. But Kleander told him that he must not think of departing until the army was out of the city, and that he would be held responsible if they stayed. In truth Kleander was very uneasy so long as the soldiers were within the walls, and was well aware that it might be no easy matter to induce them to go away.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 2. Πέμψας πρὸς Ἀναξίβιον τὸν ναύαρχον, ἔδειτο διαβιβάσαι τὸ στράτευμα ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας, καὶ ὑπισχνεῖτο πάντα ποιήσειν αὐτῷ ὅσα δέοι.

Compare vii, 2, 7, when Anaxibius demanded in vain the fulfilment of this promise.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 5-7.

For Anaxibius had practised a gross fraud in promising them pay, which he had neither the ability nor the inclination to provide. Without handing to them either pay or even means of purchasing supplies, he issued orders that they must go forth with arms and baggage, and muster outside of the gates, there to be numbered for an immediate march; any one who stayed behind being held as punishable. This proclamation was alike unexpected and offensive to the soldiers, who felt that they had been deluded, and were very backward in obeying. Hence Kleander, while urgent with Xenophon to defer his departure until he had conducted the army outside of the walls, added — "Go forth as if you were about to march along with them; when you are once outside, you may depart as soon as you please."<sup>1</sup> Xenophon replied that this matter must be settled with Anaxibius, to whom accordingly both of them went, and who repeated the same directions, in a manner yet more peremptory. Though it was plain to Xenophon that he was here making himself a sort of instrument to the fraud which Anaxibius had practised upon the army, yet he had no choice but to obey. Accordingly, he as well as the other generals put themselves at the head of the troops, who followed, however reluctantly, and arrived most of them outside of the gates. Eteonikus (a Lacedæmonian officer of consideration, noticed more than once in my last preceding volume) commanding at the gate, stood close to it in person; in order that when all the Cyreians had gone forth, he might immediately shut it and fasten it with the bar.<sup>2</sup>

Anaxibius knew well what he was doing. He fully anticipated that the communication of the final orders would occasion an outbreak among the Cyreians, and was anxious to defer it until they were outside. But when there remained only the rearmost companies still in the inside and on their march, all the rest having got out — he thought the danger was over, and summoned to him the generals and captains, all of whom were probably near the gates superintending the march through. It seems that Xenophon, having given notice that he intended to depart, did not answer to this summons as one of the generals, but remained outside among

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 7-10. Ἀλλ' ὁμῶς (ἔφη), ἐγὼ σοι συμβουλεύω ἐξελθεῖν ὡς πορευόμενον· ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐξω γένηται τὸ στράτευμα, τότε ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 12.



the soldiers. "Take what supplies you want (said Anaxibius) from the neighboring Thracian villages, which are well furnished with wheat, barley, and other necessities. After thus providing yourselves, march forward to the Chersonesus, and there Kyniskus will give you pay."<sup>1</sup>

This was the first distinct intimation given by Anaxibius that he did not intend to perform his promise of finding pay for the soldiers. Who Kyniskus was, we do not know, nor was he probably known to the Cyreians; but the march here enjoined was at least one hundred and fifty English miles, and might be much longer. The route was not indicated, and the generals had to inquire from Anaxibius whether they were to go by what was called the Holy Mountain (that is, by the shorter line, skirting the northern coast of the Propontis), or by a more inland and circuitous road through Thrace; — also whether they were to regard the Thracian prince, Seuthes, as a friend or an enemy.<sup>2</sup>

Instead of the pay which had been formally promised to them by Anaxibius if they would cross over from Asia to Byzantium, the Cyreians thus found themselves sent away empty-handed, to a long march, — through another barbarous country, with chance supplies to be ravished only by their own efforts, — and at the end of it a lot unknown and uncertain; while, had they remained in Asia, they would have had at any rate the rich satrapy of Pharnabazus within their reach. To perfidy of dealing was now added a brutal ejection from Byzantium, without even the commonest manifestations of hospitality; contrasting pointedly with the treatment which the army had recently experienced at Trapezus, Sinôpê, and Herakleia; where they had been welcomed not only by compliments on their past achievements, but also by an ample present of flour, meat, and wine. Such behavior could not fail to provoke the most violent indignation in the bosoms of the soldiery; and Anaxibius had therefore delayed giving the order until the last soldiers were marching out, thinking that the army would hear nothing of it until the generals came out of the gates to inform them; so that the gates would be closed, and the walls manned to resist any assault from without. But his calculations were not realized. Either one of the soldiers passing by heard him give the

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 13.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 14.

order, or one of the captains forming his audience stole away from the rest, and hastened forward to acquaint his comrades on the outside. The bulk of the army, already irritated by the inhospitable way in which they had been thrust out, needed nothing farther to inflame them into spontaneous mutiny and aggression. While the generals within (who either took the communication more patiently, or at least, looking farther forward, felt that any attempt to resent or resist the ill usage of the Spartan admiral would only make their position worse) were discussing with Anaxibius the details of the march just enjoined, the soldiers without, bursting into spontaneous movement, with a simultaneous and fiery impulse, made a rush back to get possession of the gate. But Eteonikus, seeing their movement, closed it without a moment's delay, and fastened the bar. The soldiers on reaching the gate and finding it barred, clamored loudly to get it opened, threatened to break it down, and even began to knock violently against it. Some ran down to the sea-coast, and made their way into the city round the line of stones at the base of the city wall, which protected it against the sea; while the rearmost soldiers who had not yet marched out, seeing what was passing, and fearful of being cut off from their comrades, assaulted the gate from the inside, severed the fastenings with axes, and threw it wide open to the army.<sup>1</sup> All the soldiers then rushed up, and were soon again in Byzantium.

Nothing could exceed the terror of the Lacedæmonians as well as of the native Byzantines, when they saw the excited Cyreians again within the walls. The town seemed already taken and on the point of being plundered. Neither Anaxibius nor Eteonikus took the smallest means of resistance, nor stayed to brave the approach of the soldiers, whose wrath they were fully conscious of having deserved. Both fled to the citadel — the former first running to the sea-shore, and jumping into a fishing-boat to go thither by sea. He even thought the citadel not tenable with its existing garrison, and sent over to Chalkêdon for a reinforcement. Still more terrified were the citizens of the town. Every man in the market-place instantly fled; some to their houses, others to the merchant vessels in the harbor, others to the triremes or ships of war, which they hauled down to the water, and thus put to sea.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 15-17.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 18, 19.



To the deception and harshness of the Spartan admiral, there was thus added a want of precaution in the manner of execution, which threatened to prove the utter ruin of Byzantium. For it was but too probable that the Cyreian soldiers, under the keen sense of recent injury, would satiate their revenge, and reimburse themselves for the want of hospitality towards them, without distinguishing the Lacedæmonian garrison from the Byzantine citizens; and that too from mere impulse, not merely without orders, but in spite of prohibitions, from their generals. Such was the aspect of the case, when they became again assembled in a mass within the gates; and such would probably have been the reality, had Xenophon executed his design of retiring earlier, so as to leave the other generals acting without him. Being on the outside along with the soldiers, Xenophon felt at once, as soon as he saw the gates forced open and the army again within the town, the terrific emergency which was impending; first, the sack of Byzantium, — next, horror and antipathy, throughout all Greece, towards the Cyreian officers and soldiers indiscriminately, — lastly, unsparing retribution inflicted upon all by the power of Sparta. Overwhelmed with these anxieties, he rushed into the town along with the multitude, using every effort to pacify them and bring them into order. They on their parts, delighted to see him along with them, and conscious of their own force, were eager to excite him to the same pitch as themselves, and to prevail on him to second and methodize their present triumph. "Now is your time, Xenophon, (they exclaimed), to make yourself a man. You have here a city, — you have triremes, — you have money, — you have plenty of soldiers. Now then, if you choose, you can enrich us; and we in return can make you powerful." — "You speak well (replied he); I shall do as you propose; but if you want to accomplish anything, you must fall into military array forthwith." He knew that this was the first condition of returning to anything like tranquillity; and by great good fortune, the space called the Thrakion, immediately adjoining the gate inside, was level, open, and clear of houses; presenting an excellent place of arms or locality for a review. The whole army, — partly from their long military practice, — partly under the impression that Xenophon was really about to second their wishes and direct some aggressive operation, — threw themselves almost of their own accord into regular array on the Thrakion,

the hoplites eight deep, the peltasts on each flank. It was in this position that Xenophon addressed them as follows: —

"Soldiers! I am not surprised that you are incensed, and that you think yourselves scandalously cheated and ill-used. But if we give way to our wrath, if we punish these Lacedæmonians now before us for their treachery, and plunder this innocent city, — reflect what will be the consequence. We shall stand proclaimed forthwith as enemies to the Lacedæmonians and their allies; and what sort of a war that will be, those who have witnessed and who still recollect recent matters of history, may easily fancy. We Athenians entered into the war against Sparta with a powerful army and fleet, an abundant revenue, and numerous tributary cities in Asia as well as Europe, — among them this very Byzantium in which we now stand. We have been vanquished in the way that all of you know. And what then will be the fate of us soldiers, when we shall have as united enemies, Sparta with all her old allies and Athens besides, — Tissaphernes and the barbaric forces on the coast, — and most of all, the Great King whom we marched up to dethrone and slay, if we were able? Is any man fool enough to think that we have a chance of making head against so many combined enemies? Let us not plunge madly into dishonor and ruin, nor incur the enmity of our own fathers and friends; who are in the cities which will take arms against us, — and will take arms justly, if we, who abstained from seizing any barbaric city, even when we were in force sufficient, shall nevertheless now plunder the first Grecian city into which we have been admitted. As far as I am concerned, may I be buried ten thousand fathoms deep in the earth, rather than see you do such things; and I exhort *you*, too, as Greeks, to obey the leaders of Greece. Endeavor, while thus obedient, to obtain your just rights; but if you should fail in this, rather submit to injustice than cut yourselves off from the Grecian world. Send to inform Anaxibius that we have entered the city, not with a view to commit any violence, but in the hope, if possible, of obtaining from him the advantages which he promised us. If we fail, we shall at least prove to him that we quit the city, not under his fraudulent manœuvres, but under our own sense of the duty of obedience."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 30-31.



This speech completely arrested the impetuous impulse of the army, brought them to a true sense of their situation, and induced them to adopt the proposition of Xenophon. They remained unmoved in their position on the Thrakion, while three of the captains were sent to communicate with Anaxibius. While they were thus waiting, a Theban named Kœratadas approached, who had once commanded in Byzantium under the Lacedæmonians, during the previous war. He had now become a sort of professional Condottiero or general, looking out for an army to command, wherever he could find one, and offering his services to any city which would engage him. He addressed the assembled Cyreians, and offered, if they would accept him for their general, to conduct them against the Delta of Thrace (the space included between the north-west corner of the Propontis and the south-west corner of the Euxine), which he asserted to be a rich territory presenting great opportunity to plunder; he farther promised to furnish them with ample subsistence during the march. Presently the envoys returned, bearing the reply of Anaxibius, who received the message favorably, promising that not only the army should have no cause to regret their obedience, but that he would both report their good conduct to the authorities at home, and do everything in his own power to promote their comfort.<sup>1</sup> He said nothing farther about taking them into pay; that delusion having now answered its purpose. The soldiers, on hearing his communication, adopted a resolution to accept Kœratadas as their future commander, and then marched out of the town. As soon as they were on the outside, Anaxibius, not content with closing the gates against them, made public proclamation that if any one of them were found in the town, he should be sold forthwith into slavery.

There are few cases throughout Grecian history in which an able discourse has been the means of averting so much evil, as was averted by this speech of Xenophon to the army in Byzantium. Nor did he ever, throughout the whole period of his command, render to them a more signal service. The miserable consequences, which would have ensued, had the army persisted in their aggressive impulse, — first, to the citizens of the town, ultimately to themselves, while Anaxibius, the only guilty person,

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. viii, 1, 32–35.

had the means of escaping by sea, even under the worst circumstances, — are stated by Xenophon rather under than above the reality. At the same time no orator ever undertook a more difficult case, or achieved a fuller triumph over unpromising conditions. If we consider the feelings and position of the army at the instant of their breaking into the town, we shall be astonished that any commander could have arrested their movements. Though fresh from all the glory of their retreat, they had been first treacherously entrapped over from Asia, next roughly ejected, by Anaxibius; and although it may be said truly that the citizens of Byzantium had no concern either in the one or the other, yet little heed is commonly taken, in military operations, to the distinction between garrison and citizens in an assailed town. Having arms in their hands, with consciousness of force arising out of their exploits in Asia, the Cyreians were at the same time inflamed by the opportunity both of avenging a gross recent injury, and enriching themselves in the process of execution; to which we may add, the excitement of that rush whereby they had obtained the reëntree, and the farther fact, that without the gates they had nothing to expect except poor, hard, uninviting service in Thrace. With soldiers already possessed by an overpowering impulse of this nature, what chance was there that a retiring general, on the point of quitting the army, could so work upon their minds as to induce them to renounce the prey before them? Xenophon had nothing to invoke except distant considerations, partly of Hellenic reputation, chiefly of prudence; considerations indeed of unquestionable reality and prodigious magnitude, yet belonging all to a distant future, and therefore of little comparative force, except when set forth in magnified characters by the orator. How powerfully he worked upon the minds of his hearers, so as to draw forth these far-removed dangers from the cloud of present sentiment by which they were overlaid, — how skilfully he employed in illustration the example of his own native city, — will be seen by all who study his speech. Never did his Athenian accomplishments, — his talent for giving words to important thoughts, — his promptitude in seizing a present situation and managing the sentiments of an impetuous multitude, — appear to greater advantage than when he was thus suddenly called forth to meet a terrible emergency. His pre-established reputation and the habit of obeying his orders, were



doubtless essential conditions of success. But none of his colleagues in command would have been able to accomplish the like memorable change on the minds of the soldiers, or to procure obedience for any simple authoritative restraint; nay, it is probable, that if Xenophon had not been at hand, the other generals would have followed the passionate movement, even though they had been reluctant, — from simple inability to repress it.<sup>1</sup> Again, — whatever might have been the accomplishments of Xenophon, it is certain that even *he* would not have been able to work upon the minds of these excited soldiers, had they not been Greeks and citizens as well as soldiers, — bred in Hellenic sympathies and accustomed to Hellenic order, with authority operating in part through voice and persuasion, and not through the Persian whip and instruments of torture. The memorable discourse on the Thracian at Byzantium illustrates the working of that persuasive agency which formed one of the permanent forces and conspicuous charms of Hellenism. It teaches us that if the orator could sometimes accuse innocent defendants and pervert well-disposed assemblies, — a part of the case which historians of Greece often present as if it were the whole, — he could also, and that in the most trying emergencies, combat the strongest force of present passion, and bring into vivid presence the half-observed lineaments of long-sighted reason and duty.

After conducting the army out of the city, Xenophon sent, through Kleander, a message to Anaxibius, requesting that he himself might be allowed to come in again singly, in order to take his departure by sea. His request was granted, though not without much difficulty; upon which he took leave of the army, under the strongest expressions of affection and gratitude on their part,<sup>2</sup> and went into Byzantium along with Kleander; while on the next day Kœratadas came to assume the command according to agreement, bringing with him a prophet, and beasts to be offered in

<sup>1</sup> So Tacitus says about the Roman general Spurius (governor of Placentia for Otho against Vitellius), and his mutinous army who marched out to fight the Vitellian generals against his strenuous remonstrance — "*Fit temeritatis alienæ comes Spurius, primo coactus, mox velle simulans, quo plus auctoritatis inesset consiliis, si seditione mitesceret*" (Tacitus, Hist. ii. 18).

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 33.

sacrifice. There followed in his train twenty men carrying sacks of barley-meal, twenty more with jars of wine, three bearing olives, and one man with a bundle of garlic and onions. All these provisions being laid down, Kœratadas proceeded to offer sacrifice, as a preliminary to the distribution of them among the soldiers. On the first day, the sacrifices being unfavorable, no distribution took place; on the second day, Kœratadas was standing with the wreath on his head at the altar, and with the victims beside him, about to renew his sacrifice, — when Timasion and the other officers interfered, desired him to abstain, and dismissed him from the command. Perhaps the first unfavorable sacrifices may have partly impelled them to this proceeding. But the main reason was, the scanty store, inadequate even to one day's subsistence for the army, brought by Kœratadas, — and the obvious insufficiency of his means.<sup>1</sup>

On the departure of Kœratadas, the army marched to take up its quarters in some Thracian villages not far from Byzantium, under its former officers; who however could not agree as to their future order of march. Kleânor and Phryniskus, who had received presents from Seuthes, urged the expediency of accepting the service of that Thracian prince; Neon insisted on going to the Chersonese under the Lacedæmonian officers in that peninsula (as Anaxibius had projected); in the idea that he, as a Lacedæmonian, would there obtain the command of the whole army; while Timasion, with the view of re-establishing himself in his native city of Dardanus, proposed returning to the Asiatic side of the strait.

Though this last plan met with decided favor among the army, it could not be executed without vessels. These Timasion had little or no means of procuring; so that considerable delay took place, during which the soldiers, receiving no pay, fell into much distress. Many of them were even compelled to sell their arms in order to get subsistence; while others got permission to settle in some of the neighboring towns, on condition of being disarmed. The whole army was thus gradually melting away, much to the satisfaction of Anaxibius, who was anxious to see the purposes of Pharnabazus accomplished. By degrees, it would probably have

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 34–40.



been dissolved altogether, had not a change of interest on the part of Anaxibius induced him to promote its reorganization. He sailed from Byzantium to the Asiatic coast, to acquaint Pharnabazus that the Cyreians could no longer cause uneasiness, and to require his own promised reward. It seems moreover that Xenophon himself departed from Byzantium by the same opportunity. When they reached Kyzikus, they met the Lacedæmonian Aristarchus; who was coming out as newly-appointed harmost of Byzantium, to supersede Kleander, and who acquainted Anaxibius that Polus was on the point of arriving to supersede him as admiral. Anxious to meet Pharnabazus and make sure of his bribe, Anaxibius impressed his parting injunction upon Aristarchus to sell for slaves all the Cyreians whom he might find at Byzantium on his arrival, and then pursued his voyage along the southern coast of the Propontis to Parium. But Pharnabazus, having already received intimation of the change of admirals, knew that the friendship of Anaxibius was no longer of any value, and took no farther heed of him; while he at the same time sent to Byzantium to make the like compact with Aristarchus against the Cyreian army.<sup>1</sup>

Anaxibius was stung to the quick at this combination of disappointment and insult on the part of the satrap. To avenge it, he resolved to employ those very soldiers whom he had first corrupted and fraudulently brought across to Europe, next cast out from Byzantium, and lastly, ordered to be sold into slavery, so far as any might yet be found in that town; bringing them back into Asia for the purpose of acting against Pharnabazus. Accordingly he addressed himself to Xenophon, and ordered him without a moment's delay to rejoin the army, for the purpose of keeping it together, of recalling the soldiers who had departed, and transporting the whole body across into Asia. He provided him with an armed vessel of thirty oars to cross over from Parium to Perinthus, sending over a peremptory order to the Perinthians to furnish him with horses in order that he might reach the army

Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 7. Φαρνάβαζος δὲ, ἐπεὶ ᾔθετο Ἀριστάρχον τε ἡκοί-  
τα εἰς Βυζάντιον ἁρμοστήν καὶ Ἀναξίβιον οὐκέτι ναυαρχοῦντα, Ἀναξίβιον  
μὲν ἡμέλησε, πρὸς Ἀριστάρχον δὲ διεπράττετο τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τοῦ Κυρείου  
στρατεύματος ἅπερ καὶ πρὸς Ἀναξίβιον.

with the greatest speed.<sup>1</sup> Perhaps it would not have been safe for Xenophon to disobey this order, under any circumstances. But the idea of acting with the army in Asia against Pharnabazus, under Lacedæmonian sanction, was probably very acceptable to him. He hastened across to the army, who welcomed his return with joy, and gladly embraced the proposal of crossing to Asia, which was a great improvement upon their forlorn and destitute condition. He accordingly conducted them to Perinthus, and encamped under the walls of the town; refusing, in his way through Selymbria, a second proposition from Seuthes to engage the services of the army.

While Xenophon was exerting himself to procure transports for the passage of the army at Perinthus, Aristarchus the new harmost arrived there with two triremes from Byzantium. It seems that not only Byzantium, but also both Perinthus and Selymbria, were comprised in his government as harmost. On first reaching Byzantium to supersede Kleander, he found there no less than four hundred of the Cyreians, chiefly sick and wounded; whom Kleander, in spite of the ill-will of Anaxibius, had not only refused to sell into slavery, but had billeted upon the citizens, and tended with solicitude; so much did his good feeling towards Xenophon and towards the army now come into play. We read with indignation that Aristarchus, immediately on reaching Byzantium to supersede him, was not even contented with sending these four hundred men out of the town; but seized them, — Greeks, citizens, and soldiers as they were, — and sold them all into slavery.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 8-25.

Ἐκ τούτου δὴ ὁ Ἀναξίβιος, καλέσας Ξενοφῶντα, κελεύει πᾶση τέχνῃ καὶ μηχανῇ πλεῖσαι ἐπὶ τὸ στράτευμα ὡς τάχιστα, καὶ συνέχειν τε τὸ στράτευμα καὶ συναθροίζειν τῶν διεσπαρμένων ὡς ἂν πλείστους δύνηται, καὶ παραγόντα εἰς τὴν Πέρινθον διαβιβάζειν εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν ὅτι τάχιστα· καὶ δίδωσιν αὐτῷ τριακόντορον, καὶ ἐπιστολὴν καὶ ἄνδρα συμπίμπει κελεύοντα τοὺς Περινθίους ὡς τάχιστα Ξενοφῶντα προπέμψαι τοῖς ἵπποις ἐκ τὸ στράτευμα.

The vehement interest which Anaxibius took in this new project is marked by the strength of Xenophon's language; extreme celerity is enjoined three several times.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 6. Καὶ ὁ Ἀναξίβιος τῷ μὲν Ἀριστάρχῳ ἐπιστέλλει ὑπόσους ἂν εὗροι ἐν Βυζαντίῳ τῶν Κύρου στρατιωτῶν ὑπολελειμμένους, ἀπολίσσθαι· ὁ δὲ Κλεάνδρος οὐδένα ἐπεπράκει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας ἐθερό-



Apprised of the movements of Xenophon with the army, he now came to Perinthus to prevent their transit into Asia; laying an embargo on the transports in the harbor, and presenting himself personally before the assembled army to prohibit the soldiers from crossing. When Xenophon informed him that Anaxibius had given them orders to cross, and had sent him expressly to conduct them, — Aristarchus replied, "Anaxibius is no longer in functions as admiral, and I am harmost in this town. If I catch any of you at sea, I will sink you." On the next day, he sent to invite the generals and the captains (lochages) to a conference within the walls. They were just about to enter the gates, when Xenophon, who was among them, received a private warning, that if he went in, Aristarchus would seize him, and either put him to death or send him prisoner to Pharnabazus. Accordingly Xenophon sent forward the others, and remained himself with the army, alleging the obligation of sacrificing. The behavior of Aristarchus, — who, when he saw the others without Xenophon, sent them away, and desired that they would all come again in the afternoon, — confirmed the justice of his suspicions, as to the imminent danger from which he had been preserved by this accidental warning.<sup>1</sup> It need hardly be added that Xenophon disregarded the second invitation no less than the first; moreover a third invitation, which Aristarchus afterwards sent, was disregarded by all.

We have here a Lacedæmonian harmost, not scrupling to lay a snare of treachery as flagrant as that which Tissaphernes had practised on the banks of the Zab to entrap Klearchus and his colleagues, — and that too against a Greek, and an officer of the highest station and merit, who had just saved Byzantium from pillage, and was now actually in execution of orders received

πενεν οικτείρων, καὶ ἀναγκάζων οικία δέχεσθαι. Ἀριστάρχος δ' ἐπεὶ ἤλθον τάχιστα, οὐκ ἐλάττους τετρακοσίων ἀπέδοτο.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 14-16.

Ἦδη δὲ ὄντων πρὸς τῷ τείχει, ἐξαγγέλλει τις τῷ Ξενοφῶντι ὅτι, εἰ εἰσεῖσι, συλληφθήσεται καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ τι τεῖσεται, ἥ καὶ Φαρναβάζω, παραδοθήσεται. Ὁ δὲ, ἀκούσας ταῦτα, τοὺς μὲν προπέμπεται, αὐτὸς δ' εἶπεν, ὅτι θύσαι τ. βούλοιο. . . . Οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ λοχαγοὶ ἤκοντες παρὰ τοῦ Ἀριστάρχου, ἀπήγγελλον ὅτι νῦν μὲν ἀπιέναι σφᾶς κελεύει, τῆς δειλῆς δὲ ἡκείν· ἐνθ' αὖ καὶ ὅλη μᾶλλον ἐδόκει [εἶναι] ἡ ἐπιβουλὴ. Compare vii, 3, 2.

from the Lacedæmonian admiral Anaxibius. Had the accidental warning been withheld, Xenophon would assuredly have fallen into this snare, nor could we reasonably have charged him with imprudence, — so fully was he entitled to count upon straightforward conduct under the circumstances. But the same cannot be said of Klearchus, who undoubtedly manifested lamentable credulity, nefarious as was the fraud to which he fell a victim.

At the second interview with the other officers, Aristarchus, while he forbade the army to cross the water, directed them to force their way by land through the Thracians who occupied the Holy mountain, and thus to arrive at the Chersonese; where (he said) they should receive pay. Neon the Lacedæmonian, with about eight hundred hoplites who adhered to his separate command, advocated this plan as the best. To be set against it, however, there was the proposition of Seuthes to take the army into pay; which Xenophon was inclined to prefer, uneasy at the thoughts of being cooped up in the narrow peninsula of the Chersonese, under the absolute command of the Lacedæmonian harmost, with great uncertainty both as to pay and as to provisions.<sup>1</sup> Moreover it was imperiously necessary for these disappointed troops to make some immediate movement; for they had been brought to the gates of Perinthus in hopes of passing immediately on shipboard; it was mid-winter, — they were encamped in the open field, under the severe cold of Thrace, — they had neither assured supplies, nor even money to purchase, if a market had been near.<sup>2</sup> Xenophon, who had brought them to the neighborhood of Perinthus, was now again responsible for extricating them from this untenable situation, and began to offer sacrifices, according to his wont, to ascertain whether the gods would encourage him to recommend a covenant with Seuthes. The sacrifices were so favorable, that he himself, together with a confidential officer from each of the generals, went by night and paid a visit to Seuthes, for the purpose of understanding distinctly his offers and purposes.

Mæsadês, the father of Seuthes, had been apparently a dependent prince under the great monarchy of the Odrysian Thracians

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 15; vii, 3, 3; vii, 6, 13.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 24. μεσος δὲ χειμῶν ἦν, etc. Probably the month of December.



so formidable in the early years of the Peloponnesian war. But intestine commotions had robbed him of his principality over three Thracian tribes; which it was now the ambition of Seuthes to recover, by the aid of the Cyreian army. He offered to each soldier one stater of Kyzikus (about twenty Attic drachmæ, or nearly the same as that which they originally received from Cyrus) as pay per month; twice as much to each lochage or captain, — four times as much to each of the generals. In case they should incur the enmity of the Lacedæmonians by joining him, he guaranteed to them all the right of settlement and fraternal protection in his territory. To each of the generals, over and above pay, he engaged to assign a fort on the sea-coast, with a lot of land around it, and oxen for cultivation. And to Xenophon in particular, he offered the possession of Bisanthê, his best point on the coast. "I will also (he added, addressing Xenophon) give you my daughter in marriage; and if you have any daughter, I will buy her from you in marriage according to the custom of Thrace."<sup>1</sup> Seuthes farther engaged never on any occasion to lead them more than seven days' journey from the sea, at farthest.

These offers were as liberal as the army could possibly expect; and Xenophon himself, mistrusting the Lacedæmonians, as well as mistrusted by them, seems to have looked forward to the acquisition of a Thracian coast-fortress and territory (such as Miltiades, Alkibiades, and other Athenian leaders had obtained before him) as a valuable refuge in case of need.<sup>2</sup> But even if the promise had been less favorable, the Cyreians had no alternative; for they had not even present supplies, — still less any means of subsistence throughout the winter; while departure by sea was rendered impossible by the Lacedæmonians. On the next day, Seuthes was introduced by Xenophon and the other generals to the army, who accepted his offers and concluded the bargain.

They remained for two months in his service, engaged in warfare against various Thracian tribes, whom they enabled him to conquer and despoil; so that at the end of that period, he was in possession of an extensive dominion, a large native force, and a considerable tribute. Though the sufferings of the army from cold were extreme, during these two months of full winter and amidst

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 17-28.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 34.

the snowy mountains of Thrace, they were nevertheless enabled by their expeditions along with Seuthes to procure plentiful subsistence; which they could hardly have done in any other manner. But the pay which he had offered was never liquidated; at least, in requital of their two months of service, they received pay only for twenty days and a little more. And Xenophon himself, far from obtaining fulfilment of those splendid promises which Seuthes had made to him personally, seems not even to have received his pay as one of the generals. For him, the result was singularly unhappy; since he forfeited the good-will of Seuthes by importunate demand and complaint for the purpose of obtaining the pay due to the soldiers; while they on their side, imputing to his connivance the non-fulfilment of the promise, became thus in part alienated from him. Much of this mischief was brought about by the treacherous intrigues and calumny of a corrupt Greek from Maroneia, named Herakleides; who acted as minister and treasurer to Seuthes.

Want of space compels me to omit the narrative given by Xenophon, both of the relations of the army with Seuthes, and of the warfare carried on against the hostile Thracian tribes, — interesting as it is from the juxtaposition of Greek and Thracian manners. It seems to have been composed by Xenophon under feelings of acute personal disappointment, and probably in refutation of calumnies against himself as if he had wronged the army. Hence we may trace in it a tone of exaggerated querulousness, and complaint that the soldiers were ungrateful to him. It is true that a portion of the army, under the belief that he had been richly rewarded by Seuthes while they had not obtained their stipulated pay, expressed virulent sentiments and falsehoods against him.<sup>1</sup> Until such suspicions were refuted, it is no wonder that the army were alienated; but they were perfectly willing to hear both sides, — and Xenophon triumphantly disproved the accusation. That in the end, their feelings towards him were those of esteem and favor, stands confessed in his own words,<sup>2</sup> proving that the ingratitude of which he complains was the feeling of some indeed, but not of all.

It is hard to say, however, what would have been the fate of this gallant army, when Seuthes, having obtained from their arms in

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 9, 10.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 55-57.



two months all that he desired, had become only anxious to send them off without pay, — had they not been extricated by a change of interest and policy on the part of all-powerful Sparta. The Lacedæmonians had just declared war against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, — sending Thimbron into Asia to commence military operations. They then became extremely anxious to transport the Cyreians across to Asia, which their harmost, Aristarchus had hitherto prohibited, — and to take them into permanent pay; for which purpose two Lacedæmonians, Charminus and Polynikus were commissioned by Thimbron to offer to the army the same pay as had been promised, though not paid, by Seuthes; and as had been originally paid by Cyrus. Seuthes and Herakleides, eager to hasten the departure of the soldiers, endeavored to take credit with the Lacedæmonians for assisting their views.<sup>1</sup> Joyfully did the army accept this offer, though complaining loudly of the fraud practised upon them by Seuthes; which Charminus, at the instance of Xenophon, vainly pressed the Thracian prince to redress.<sup>2</sup> He even sent Xenophon to demand the arrear of pay in the name of the Lacedæmonians, which afforded to the Athenian an opportunity of administering a severe lecture to Seuthes.<sup>3</sup> But the latter was found less accessible to the workings of eloquence than the Cyreian assembled soldiers; nor did Xenophon obtain anything beyond a miserable dividend upon the sum due; — together with civil expressions towards himself personally, — an invitation to remain in his service with one thousand hoplites instead of going to Asia with the army, — and renewed promises, not likely now to find much credit, of a fort and grant of lands.

When the army, now reduced by losses and dispersions to six thousand men,<sup>4</sup> was prepared to cross into Asia, Xenophon was desirous of going back to Athens, but was persuaded to remain with them until the junction with Thimbron. He was at this time so poor, having scarcely enough to pay for his journey home, that he was obliged to sell his horse at Lampsakus, the Asiatic town

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 1-7

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 15

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 21-47

The lecture is of unsuitable prolixity, when we consider the person to whom, and the circumstances under which, it purports to have been spoken.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Anab.

where the army landed. Here he found Eukleides, a Phliasian prophet with whom he had been wont to hold intercourse and offer sacrifice at Athens. This man, having asked Xenophon how much he had acquired in the expedition, could not believe him when he affirmed his poverty. But when they proceeded to offer sacrifice together, from some animals sent by the Lampsakenes as a present to Xenophon, Eukleides had no sooner inspected the entrails of the victims, than he told Xenophon that he fully credited the statement. "I see (he said) that even if money shall be ever on its way to come to you, you yourself will be a hindrance to it, even if there be no other (here Xenophon acquiesced); Zeus Meilichios (the Gracious)<sup>1</sup> is the real bar. Have you ever sacrificed to him, with entire burnt-offerings, as we used to do together at Athens?" "Never (replied Xenophon), throughout the whole march." "Do so now, then (said Eukleides), and it will be for your advantage." The next day, on reaching Ophrynium, Xenophon obeyed the injunction; sacrificing little pigs entire to Zeus Meilichios, as was the custom at Athens during the public festival called Diasia. And on the very same day he felt the beneficial effects of the proceeding; for Biton and another envoy came from the Lacedæmonians with an advance of pay to the army, and with dispositions so favorable to himself, that they bought back for him his horse, which he had just sold at Lampsakus for fifty darics. This was equivalent to giving him more than one year's pay in hand (the pay which he would have received as general being four darics per month, or four times that of the soldier), at a time when he was known to be on the point of departure, and therefore would not stay to earn it. The short-comings of Seuthes were now made

<sup>1</sup> It appears that the epithet *Meilichios* (the Gracious) is here applied to Zeus in the same euphemistic sense as the denomination *Eumenides* to the avenging goddesses. Zeus is conceived as having actually inflicted, or being in a disposition to inflict, evil; the sacrifice to him under this surname represents a sentiment of fear, and is one of atonement, expiation or purification, destined to avert his displeasure; but the surname itself is to be interpreted *proleptice*, to use the word of the critics — it designates, not the actual disposition of Zeus (or of other gods), but that disposition which the sacrifice is intended to bring about in him.

See Pausan. i, 37, 3; ii, 20, 3. K. F. Hermann, *Gottesdienstl. Alterthümer der Griechen*, s. 58; Van Stegeren, *De Græcorum Diebus Festis*, p. 5 (Utrecht, 1849).



up with immense interest, so that Xenophon became better off than any man in the army; though he himself slurs over the magnitude of the present, by representing it as a delicate compliment to restore to him a favorite horse.

Thus gratefully and instantaneously did Zeus the Gracious respond to the sacrifice which Xenophon, after a long omission, had been admonished by Eukleides to offer. And doubtless Xenophon was more than ever confirmed in the belief, which manifests itself throughout all his writings, that sacrifice not only indicates, by the interior aspect of the immolated victims, the tenor of coming events, — but also, according as it is rendered to the right god and at the right season, determines his will, and therefore the course of events, for dispensations favorable or unfavorable.

But the favors of Zeus the Gracious, though begun, were not yet ended. Xenophon conducted the army through the Troad, and across mount Ida, to Antandrus; from thence along the coast to Lydia, through the plain of Thêbê and the town of Adramyttium, leaving Atarneus on the right hand, to Pergamus in Mysia, a hill-town overhanging the river and plain of Kâikus. This district was occupied by the descendants of the Eretrian Gongylus, who, having been banished for embracing the cause of the Persians when Xerxes invaded Greece, had been rewarded (like the Spartan king Demaratus) with this sort of principality under the Persian empire. His descendant, another Gongylus, now occupied Pergamus, with his wife Hellas and his sons Gorgion and Gongylus. Xenophon was here received with great hospitality. Hellas acquainted him that a powerful Persian, named Asidates, was now dwelling, with his wife, family, and property, in a tower not far off, on the plain; and that a sudden night-march, with three hundred men, would suffice for the capture of this valuable booty, to which her own cousin should guide him. Accordingly, having sacrificed and ascertained that the victims were favorable, Xenophon communicated his plan after the evening meal to those captains who had been most attached to him throughout the expedition, wishing to make them partners in the profit. As soon as it became known, many volunteers, to the number of six hundred, pressed to be allowed to join. But the captains repelled them, declining to take more than three hundred, in order that the booty might afford an ampler dividend to each partner.

Beginning their march in the evening, Xenophon and his detachment of three hundred reached about midnight the tower of Asidates; it was large, lofty, thickly built, and contained a considerable garrison. It served for protection to his cattle and cultivating slaves around, like a baronial castle in the middle ages; but the assailants neglected this outlying plunder, in order to be more sure of taking the castle itself. Its walls however were found much stronger than was expected; and although a breach was made by force about day-break, yet so vigorous was the defence of the garrison, that no entrance could be effected. Signals and shouts of every kind were made by Asidates to procure aid from the Persian forces in the neighborhood; numbers of whom soon began to arrive, so that Xenophon and his company were obliged to retreat. And their retreat was at last only accomplished, after severe suffering and wounds to nearly half of them, through the aid of Gongylus with his forces from Pergamus, and of Prekles (the descendant of Demaratus) from Halisarna, a little farther off seaward.<sup>1</sup>

Though his first enterprise thus miscarried, Xenophon soon laid plans for a second, employing the whole army; and succeeded in bringing Asidates prisoner to Pergamus, with his wife, children, horses, and all his personal property. Thus (says he, anxious above all things for the credit of sacrificial prophecy) the "previous sacrifices (those which had promised favorably before the first unsuccessful attempt) now came true."<sup>2</sup> The persons of this family were doubtless redeemed by their Persian friends for a large ransom;<sup>3</sup> which, together with the booty brought in, made up a prodigious total to be divided.

In making the division, a general tribute of sympathy and admiration was paid to Xenophon, to which all the army, — generals, captains, and soldiers, — and the Lacedæmonians besides, — unanimously concurred. Like Agamemnon at Troy, he was allowed to select for himself the picked lots of horses, mules, oxen, and other items of booty; insomuch that he became possessor of a

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 10-19

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 22. Ἐνταῦθα οἱ περὶ Ξενοφῶντα συμπεριτυχάνουσιν αὐτῷ καὶ λαμβάνουσιν αὐτὸν (Ἀσιδάτην) καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ παῖδας καὶ τοὺς ἵππους καὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα καὶ οὕτω τὰ πρότερα λεγὰ ἀπεβή.

<sup>3</sup> Compare Plutarch, Kimon, c. 9; and Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 21



share valuable enough to enrich him at once, in addition to the fifty darics which he had before received. "Here then Xenophon (to use his own language<sup>1</sup>) had no reason to complain of the god" (Zeus Meilichios). We may add, — what he ought to have added, considering the accusations which he had before put forth, — that neither had he any reason to complain of the ingratitude of the army.

As soon as Thimbron arrived with his own forces, and the Cyreians became a part of his army, Xenophon took his leave of them. Having deposited in the temple at Ephesus that portion which had been confided to him as general, of the tithe set apart by the army at Kerasus for the Ephesian Artemis,<sup>2</sup> he seems to have executed his intention of returning to Athens.<sup>3</sup> He must have arrived there, after an absence of about two years and a half, within a few weeks, at farthest, after the death of his friend and preceptor Sokrates, whose trial and condemnation have been recorded in my last volume. That melancholy event certainly occurred during his absence from Athens;<sup>4</sup> but whether it had come to his knowledge before he reached the city, we do not know. How much grief and indignation it excited in his mind, we may see by his collection of memoranda respecting the life and conversations of Sokrates, known by the name of *Memorabilia*, and probably put together shortly after his arrival.

That he was again in Asia, three years afterwards, on military service under the Lacedæmonian king Agesilaus, is a fact attested by himself; but at what precise moment he quitted Athens for his second visit to Asia, we are left to conjecture. I incline to believe that he did not remain many months at home, but that he went out again in the next spring to rejoin the Cyreians in Asia, — became again their commander, — and served for two years under the Spartan general Derkyllidas before the arrival of Age-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 23.

<sup>2</sup> *Ἐνταῦθα τὸν θεὸν οὐκ ἠτιάσατο ὁ Ξενοφῶν· συνέπραττον γὰρ καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες καὶ οἱ λοχαγοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται, ὥστε ἐξαίρετα λαβεῖν καὶ ἵππους καὶ ζεύγη καὶ ἄλλα, ὥστε ἱκανὸν εἶναι καὶ ἄλλον ἥδη εἶναι.*

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 3, 6. It seems plain that this deposit must have been first made on the present occasion.

<sup>4</sup> Compare Anabasis, vii, 7, 57; vii, 8, 2.

<sup>5</sup> Xenoph. Memorab. iv, 8, 4 — as well as the opening sentence of the work.

silas. Such military service would doubtless be very much to his taste; while a residence at Athens, then subject and quiescent, would probably be distasteful to him; both from the habits of command which he had contracted during the previous two years, and from feelings arising out of the death of Sokrates. After a certain interval of repose, he would be disposed to enter again upon the war against his old enemy Tissaphernes; and his service went on when Agesilaus arrived to take the command.<sup>1</sup>

But during the two years after this latter event, Athens became a party to the war against Sparta, and entered into conjunction with the king of Persia as well as with the Thebans and others; while Xenophon, continuing his service as commander of the Cyreians, and accompanying Agesilaus from Asia back into Greece, became engaged against the Athenian troops and their Bœotian allies at the bloody battle of Korôneia. Under these circumstances, we cannot wonder that the Athenians passed sentence of banishment against him; not because he had originally taken part in aid of Cyrus against Artaxerxes, — nor because his political sentiments were unfriendly to democracy, as has been sometimes erroneously affirmed, — but because he was now openly in arms, and in conspicuous command, against his own country.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 2, 7 — a passage which Morus refers, I think with much probability, to Xenophon himself.

The very circumstantial details, which Xenophon gives (iii, 1, 11–28) about the proceedings of Derkyllidas against Meidias in the Troad, seem also to indicate that he was serving there in person.

<sup>2</sup> That the sentence of banishment on Xenophon was not passed by the Athenians until after the battle of Korôneia, appears plainly from Anabasis, v, 3, 7. This battle took place in August 394 B. C.

Pausanias also will be found in harmony with this statement, as to the time of the banishment. *Ἐδιδόχθη δὲ ὁ Ξενοφῶν ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων, ὡς ἐπὶ βασιλείᾳ τῶν Περσῶν, σφίσι εὖνον δυντα, στρατείας μετασχὼν Κῆρυ πολέμιωτάτῳ τοῦ δήμου* (iv, 6, 4). Now it was not until 396 or 395 B. C., that the Persian king began to manifest the least symptoms of good-will towards Athens; and not until the battle of Knidus (a little before the battle of Korôneia in the same year), that he testified his good-will by conspicuous and effective service. If, therefore, the motive of the Athenians to banish Xenophon arose out of the good feeling on the part of the king of Persia toward them, the banishment could not have taken place before 395 B. C., and is not likely to have taken place until after 394 B. C.; which is the intimation of Xenophon himself as above.



Having thus become an exile, Xenophon was allowed by the Lacedæmonians to settle at Skillûs, one of the villages of Triphylia, near Olympia in Peloponnesus, which they had recently emancipated from the Eleians. At one of the ensuing Olympic festivals, Megabyzus, the superintendent of the temple of Artemis at Ephesus, came over as a spectator; bringing with him the money which Xenophon had dedicated therein to the Ephesian Artemis. This money Xenophon invested in the purchase of lands at Skillus, to be consecrated in permanence to the goddess; having previously consulted her by sacrifice to ascertain her approval of the site contemplated, which site was recommended to him by its resemblance in certain points to that of the Ephesian temple. Thus, there was near each of them a river called by the same name Selinûs, having in it fish and a shelly bottom. Xenophon constructed a chapel, an altar, and a statue of the goddess made of cypress-wood: all exact copies, on a reduced scale, of the temple and golden statue at Ephesus. A column near them was inscribed with the following words, — "This spot is sacred to Artemis. Whoever possesses the property and gathers its fruits, must sacrifice to her the tithe every year, and keep the chapel

Lastly, Diogenes Laërtius (ii, 52) states, what I believe to be the main truth, that the sentence of banishment was passed against Xenophon by the Athenians on the ground of his attachment to the Lacedæmonians — ἐπὶ Λακωνισμῷ.

Krüger and others seem to think that Xenophon was banished because he took service under Cyrus, who had been the bitter enemy of Athens. It is true that Sokrates, when first consulted, was apprehensive beforehand that this might bring upon him the displeasure of Athens (Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 5). But it is to be remembered that at this time, the king of Persia was just as much the enemy of Athens as Cyrus was; and that Cyrus in fact had made war upon her with the forces and treasures of the king. Artaxerxes and Cyrus being thus, at that time, both enemies of Athens, it was of little consequence to the Athenians whether Cyrus succeeded or failed in his enterprise. But when Artaxerxes, six years afterwards, became their friend, their feelings towards his enemies were altered.

The passage of Pausanias as above cited, if understood as asserting the main cause of Xenophon's banishment, is in my judgment inaccurate. Xenophon was banished for *Laconism*, or attachment to Sparta against his country, the fact of his having served under Cyrus against Artaxerxes counted at best only as a secondary motive.

in repair out of the remainder. Should any one omit this duty the goddess herself will take the omission in hand."<sup>1</sup>

Immediately near the chapel was an orchard of every description of fruit-trees, while the estate around comprised an extensive range of meadow, woodland, and mountain, — with the still loftier mountain called Pholoë adjoining. There was thus abundant pasture for horses, oxen, sheep, etc., and excellent hunting-ground near for deer and other game; advantages not to be found near the Artemision at Ephesus. Residing hard by on his own property, allotted to him by the Lacedæmonians, Xenophon superintended this estate as steward for the goddess; looking perhaps to the sanctity of her name for protection from disturbance by the Eleians, who viewed with a jealous eye the Lacedæmonian<sup>2</sup> settlers at Skillus, and protested against the peace and convention promoted by Athens after the battle of Leuktra, because it recognized that place, along with the townships of Triphylia, as autonomous. Every year he made a splendid sacrifice, from the tithe of all the fruits of the property; to which solemnity not only all the Skilluntines, but also all the neighboring villages, were invited. Booths were erected for the visitors, to whom the goddess furnished (this is the language of Xenophon) an ample dinner of barley-meal, wheaten loaves, meat, game, and sweetmeats;<sup>3</sup> the game being provided by a general hunt, which the sons of Xenophon conducted, and in which all the neighbors took part if they chose. The produce of the estate, saving this tithe and subject to the obligation of keeping the holy building in repair, was enjoyed by Xenophon himself. He had a keen relish for both hunting and horsemanship, and was among the first authors, so far as we know, who ever made these pursuits, with the management of horses and dogs, the subject of rational study and description.

Such was the use to which Xenophon applied the tithe voted

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 3, 13. Καὶ στηλὴ ἐστίηκε παρὰ τὸν ναὸν, γράμματα ἔχουσα — ἱερὸς ὁ Χῶρος τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος· τὸν δὲ ἔχοντα καὶ καρποῦμενον τὴν μὲν δεκάτην καταθῆναι ἐκάστου ἔτους, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ περισσού τὸν ναὸν ἐπισκευάζειν· εἰ δὲ τις μὴ ποιῇ ταῦτα, τῇ θεῷ μελήσει.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 2.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 3, 9. Παρείχε δ' ἡ θεὸς τοῖς σκηνοῦσιν ἄλφιστα, ἄρτους, οἶνον, τραγήματα, etc.



by the army at Kerasus to the Ephesian Artemis; the other tithe, voted at the same time to Apollo, he dedicated at Delphi in the treasure-chamber of the Athenians, inscribing upon the offering his own name and that of Proxenus. His residence being only at a distance of twenty stadia from the great temple of Olympia, he was enabled to enjoy society with every variety of Greeks, — and to obtain copious information about Grecian politics, chiefly from philo-Laconian informants, and with the Lacedæmonian point of view predominant in his own mind; while he had also leisure for the composition of his various works. The interesting description which he himself gives of his residence at Skillus, implies a state of things not present and continuing,<sup>1</sup> but past and gone; other testimonies too, though confused and contradictory, seem to show that the Lacedæmonian settlement at Skillus lasted no longer than the power of Lacedæmon was adequate to maintain it. During the misfortunes which befel that city after the battle of Leuktra (371 B. C.), Xenophon, with his family and his fellow-settlers, was expelled by the Eleians, and is then said to have found shelter at Corinth. But as Athens soon came to be not only at peace, but in intimate alliance, with Sparta, — the sentence of banishment against Xenophon was revoked; so that the latter part of his life was again passed in the enjoyment of his birthright as an Athenian citizen and Knight.<sup>2</sup> Two of his sons, Gryllus and Diodorus, fought among the Athenian horsemen at the cavalry combat which preceded the battle of Mantinea, where the former was slain, after manifesting distinguished bravery; while his grandson Xenophon became in the next generation the subject of a pleading before the Athenian Dikastery, composed by the orator Deinarchus.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. v, 3, 9.

<sup>2</sup> Diogen. Laërt. ii, 53, 54, 59. Pausanias (v, 6, 4) attests the reconquest of Skillus by the Eleians, but adds (on the authority of the Eleian *ἐξηγηταί* or show guides) that they permitted Xenophon, after a judicial examination before the Olympic Senate, to go on living there in peace. The latter point I apprehend to be incorrect.

The latter works of Xenophon (*De Vectigalibus*, *De Officio Magistri Equitum*, etc.), seem plainly to imply that he had been restored to citizenship, and had come again to take cognizance of politics at Athens.

<sup>3</sup> Diogen. Laërt. ut sup. Dionys. Halic. *De Dinarcho*, p. 661, ed. Reiske. Dionysius mentions this oration under the title of *Ἀποστασίον ὑπολογία*.

On bringing this accomplished and eminent leader to the close of that arduous retreat which he had conducted with so much honor, I have thought it necessary to anticipate a little on the future, in order to take a glance at his subsequent destiny. To his exile (in this point of view not less useful than that of Thucydides) we probably owe many of those compositions from which so much of our knowledge of Grecian affairs is derived. But to the contemporary world, the retreat, which Xenophon so successfully conducted, afforded a far more impressive lesson than any of his literary compositions. It taught in the most striking manner the impotence of the Persian land-force, manifested not less in the generals than in the soldiers. It proved that the Persian leaders were unfit for any systematic operations, even under the greatest possible advantages, against a small number of disciplined warriors resolutely bent on resistance; that they were too stupid and reckless even to obstruct the passage of rivers, or destroy roads, or cut off supplies. It more than confirmed the contemptuous language applied to them by Cyrus himself, before the battle of Kunaxa; when he proclaimed that he envied the Greeks their freedom, and that he was ashamed of the worthlessness of his own countrymen.<sup>1</sup> Against such perfect weakness and disorgan-

*Αισχύλου πρὸς Ξενοφῶντα.* And Diogenes also alludes to it — *ὡς φησι Δεινάρχος ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ξενοφῶντα ὑποστασίῳ.*

Schneider in his *Epimetrum* (ad calcem *Anabases*, p. 573), respecting the exile of Xenophon, argues as if the person against whom the oration of Deinarchus was directed, was Xenophon himself, the Cyreian commander and author. But this, I think, is chronologically all but impossible; for Deinarchus was not born till 361 B. C., and composed his first oration in 336 B. C.

Yet Deinarchus, in his speech against Xenophon, undoubtedly mentioned several facts respecting the Cyreian Xenophon, which implies that the latter was a relative of the person against whom the oration was directed. I venture to set him down as grandson, on that evidence, combined with the identity of name and the suitableness in point of time. He might well be the son of Gryllus, who was slain fighting at the battle of Mantinea in 362 B. C.

Nothing is more likely than that an orator, composing an oration against Xenophon the grandson, should touch upon the acts and character of Xenophon the grandfather; see for analogy, the oration of Isokrates, *de Bigis*, among others.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 7, 4. Compare Plutarch, *Artaxerxes*, c. 20; and Isokrates, *Panegyris* Or. iv, s. 168, 169 *seq.*

ization, nothing prevented the success of the Greeks along with Cyrus, except his own paroxysm of fraternal antipathy.<sup>1</sup> And we shall perceive hereafter the military and political leaders of Greece, — Agesilaus, Jason of Pheræ,<sup>2</sup> and others down to Philip and Alexander,<sup>3</sup> — firmly persuaded that with a tolerably numerous and well-appointed Grecian force, combined with exemption from Grecian enemies, they could succeed in overthrowing or dismembering the Persian empire. This conviction, so important in the subsequent history of Greece, takes its date from the retreat of the Ten Thousand. We shall indeed find Persia exercising an important influence, for two generations to come, — and at the peace of Antalkidas an influence stronger than ever, — over the destinies of Greece. But this will be seen to arise from the treason of Sparta, the chief of the Hellenic world, who abandons the Asiatic Greeks, and even arms herself with the name and the force of Persia, for purposes of aggrandizement and dominion to herself. Persia is strong by being enabled to employ Hellenic strength against the Hellenic cause; by lending money or a fleet to one side of the Grecian intestine parties, and thus becoming artificially strengthened against both. But the Xenophontic Anabasis betrays her real weakness against any vigorous attack; while it at the same time exemplifies the discipline, the endurance, the power of self-action and adaptation, the susceptibility of influence from speech and discussion, the combination of the reflecting obedience of citizens with the mechanical regularity of soldiers, — which confer such immortal distinction on the Hellenic character. The importance of this expedition and retreat, as an illustration of the Hellenic qualities and excellence, will justify the large space which has been devoted to it in this History.

The last chapter of the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon (viii, 20, 21–26) expresses strenuously the like conviction, of the military feebleness and disorganization of the Persian empire, not defensible without Grecian aid.

<sup>1</sup> Isokrates, *Orat.* v, (Philipp.) s. 104–106. *ἡδὲ δ' ἡγεμονεῖς δοκοῦντας εἶναι* (i. e. the Greeks under Klearchus) *διὰ τὴν Κύρου προπέτειαν ἀνυχεῖναι*, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Isokrates, *Orat.* v, (Philipp.) s. 141; Xen. *Hellen.* vi, 1, 42.

<sup>3</sup> See the stress laid by Alexander the Great upon the adventures of the Ten Thousand, in his speech to encourage his soldiers before the battle of Issus (Arrian, *E. A.* ii, 7, 8).

## CHAPTER LXXII.

## GREECE UNDER THE LACEDÆMONIAN EMPIRE

THE three preceding Chapters have been devoted exclusively to the narrative of the Expedition and Retreat, immortalized by Xenophon, occupying the two years intervening between about April 401 B. C. and June 399 B. C. That event, replete as it is with interest and pregnant with important consequences, stands apart from the general sequence of Grecian affairs, — which sequence I now resume.

It will be recollected that as soon as Xenophon with his Ten Thousand warriors descended from the rugged mountains between Armenia and the Euxine to the hospitable shelter of Trapezus, and began to lay their plans for returning to Central Greece, — they found themselves within the Lacedæmonian empire, unable to advance a step without consulting Lacedæmonian dictation, and obliged, when they reached the Bosphorus, to endure without redress the harsh and treacherous usage of the Spartan officers, Anaxibius and Aristarchus.

Of that empire the first origin has been set forth in my last preceding volume. It began with the decisive victory of Ægospotami in the Hellespont (September or October 405 B. C.), where the Lacedæmonian Lysander, without the loss of a man, got possession of the entire Athenian fleet and a large portion of their crews, — with the exception of eight or nine triremes with which the Athenian admiral Konon effected his escape to Euagoras at Cyprus. The whole power of Athens was thus annihilated, and nothing remained for the Lacedæmonians to master except the city itself and Peiræus; a consummation certain to happen, and actually brought to pass in April 404 B. C., when Lysander entered Athens in triumph, dismantled Peiræus, and demolished a large portion of the Long Walls. With the exception of Athens herself, — whose citizens deferred the moment of subjection by an heroic, though unavailing, struggle against the horrors of famine,



— and of Samos, — no other Grecian city offered any resistance to Lysander after the battle of Ægospotami; which in fact not only took away from Athens her whole naval force, but transferred it all over to him, and rendered him admiral of a larger Grecian fleet than had ever been seen together since the battle of Salamis.

I have recounted in my sixty-fifth chapter, the sixteen months of bitter suffering undergone by Athens immediately after her surrender. The loss of her fleet and power was aggravated by an extremity of internal oppression. Her oligarchical party and her exiles, returning after having served with the enemy against her, extorted from the public assembly, under the dictation of Lysander who attended it in person, the appointment of an omnipotent council of thirty for the ostensible purpose of framing a new constitution. These thirty rulers, — among whom Kritias was the most violent, and Theramenes (seemingly) the most moderate, or at least the soonest satiated, — perpetrated cruelty and spoliation on the largest scale, being protected against all resistance by a Lacedæmonian harpost and garrison established in the acropolis. Besides numbers of citizens put to death, so many others were driven into exile with the loss of their property, that Thebes and the neighboring cities became crowded with them. After about eight months of unopposed tyranny, the Thirty found themselves for the first time attacked by Thrasybulus at the head of a small party of these exiles coming out of Bœotia. His bravery and good conduct, — combined with the enormities of the Thirty, which became continually more nefarious, and to which even numerous oligarchical citizens, as well as Theramenes himself, successively became victims, — enabled him soon to strengthen himself, to seize the Peiræus, and to carry on a civil war which ultimately put down the tyrants.

These latter were obliged to invoke the aid of a new Lacedæmonian force. And had that force still continued at the disposal of Lysander, all resistance on the part of Athens would have been unavailing. But fortunately for the Athenians, the last few months had wrought material change in the dispositions both of the allies of Sparta and of many among her leading men. The allies, especially Thebes and Corinth, not only relented in their hatred and fear of Athens, now that she had lost her power, — but even sym-

pathized with her suffering exiles, and became disgusted with the self-willed encroachments of Sparta; while the Spartan king Pausanias, together with some of the ephors, were also jealous of the arbitrary and oppressive conduct of Lysander. Instead of conducting the Lacedæmonian force to uphold at all price the Lysandrian oligarchy, Pausanias appeared rather as an equitable mediator to terminate the civil war. He refused to concur in any measure for obstructing the natural tendency towards a revival of the democracy. It was in this manner that Athens, rescued from that sanguinary and rapacious *regime* which has passed into history under the name of the Thirty Tyrants, was enabled to reappear as a humble and dependent member of the Spartan alliance, — with nothing but the recollection of her former power, yet with her democracy again in vigorous and tutelary action for internal government. The just and gentle bearing of her democratical citizens, and the absence of reactionary antipathies, after such cruel ill-treatment, — are among the most honorable features in her history.

The reader will find in my last volume, what I can only rapidly glance at here, the details of that system of bloodshed, spoliation, extinction of free speech and even of intellectual teaching, efforts to implicate innocent citizens as agents in judicial assassination, etc., — which stained the year of Anarchy (as it was termed in Athenian annals<sup>1</sup>) immediately following the surrender of the city. These details depend on evidence perfectly satisfactory; for they are conveyed to us chiefly by Xenophon, whose sympathies are decidedly oligarchical. From him too we learn another fact, not less pregnant with instruction; that the knights or horsemen, the body of richest proprietors at Athens, were the mainstay of the Thirty from first to last, notwithstanding all the enormities of their career.

We learn from these dark, but well-attested details, to appreciate the auspices under which that period of history called the Lacedæmonian empire was inaugurated. Such phenomena were by no means confined within the walls of Athens. On the contrary, the year of Anarchy (using that term in the sense in which it was employed by the Athenians) arising out of the same combination

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 1.



of causes and agents, was common to a very large proportion of the cities throughout Greece. The Lacedæmonian admiral Lysander, during his first year of naval command, had organized in most of the allied cities factious combinations of some of the principal citizens, corresponding with himself personally; by whose efforts in their respective cities he was enabled to prosecute the war vigorously, and whom he repaid, partly by seconding as much as he could their injustices in their respective cities, — partly by promising to strengthen their hands still farther as soon as victory should be made sure.<sup>1</sup> This policy, while it served as a stimulus against the common enemy, contributed still more directly to aggrandize Lysander himself; creating for him an ascendancy of his own, and imposing upon him personal obligations towards adherents, apart from what was required by the interests of Sparta.

The victory of Ægospotami, complete and decisive beyond all expectations either of friend or foe, enabled him to discharge these obligations with interest. All Greece at once made submission to the Lacedæmonians,<sup>2</sup> except Athens and Samos, — and these two only held out a few months. It was now the first business of the victorious commander to remunerate his adherents, and to take permanent security for Spartan dominion as well as for his own. In the greater number of cities, he established an oligarchy of ten citizens, or a dekarchy,<sup>3</sup> composed of his own partisans; while he at the same time planted in each a Lacedæmonian harmost or governor, with a garrison to uphold the new oligarchy. The dekarchy of ten Lysandrian partisans, with the Lacedæmonian harmost to sustain them, became the general scheme of Hellenic government throughout the Ægean, from Eubœa to the Thracian coast-towns, and from Myletus to Byzantium. Lysander sailed round in person, with his victorious fleet, to Byzantium and Chalkêdon, to the cities of Lesbos, to Thasos, and other places, — while he sent Eteonikus to Thrace, for the purpose of thus recasting the governments everywhere. Not merely those cities which had hitherto been on the Athenian side, but also those which had acted as allies

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 6.

<sup>3</sup> These Councils of Ten, organized by Lysander, are sometimes called *Dekarchies* — sometimes *Dekadarchies*. I use the former word by preference, since the word *Dekadarch* is also employed by Xenophon in another and very different sense — as meaning an officer who commands a *dekad*.

of Sparta, were subjected to the same intestine revolution and the same foreign constraint.<sup>1</sup> Everywhere the new Lysandrian dekarchy superseded the previous governments, whether oligarchical or democratical.

At Thasos, as well as in other places, this revolution was not accomplished without much bloodshed as well as treacherous stratagem, nor did Lysander himself scruple to enforce, personally and by his own presence, the execution and expulsion of suspected citizens.<sup>2</sup> In many places, however, simple terrorism probably sufficed. The new Lysandrian Ten overawed resistance and procured recognition of their usurpation by the menace of inviting the victorious admiral with his fleet of two hundred sail, and by the simple arrival of the Lacedæmonian harmost. Not only was each town obliged to provide a fortified citadel and maintenance for this governor with his garrison, but a scheme of tribute, amounting to one thousand talents annually, was imposed for the future, and assessed ratably upon each city by Lysander.<sup>3</sup>

In what spirit these new dekarchies would govern, consisting as they did of picked oligarchical partisans distinguished for audacity and ambition,<sup>4</sup> — who, to all the unscrupulous lust of power which characterized Lysander himself, added a thirst for personal gain, from which he was exempt, and were now about to reimburse

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13.

Καταλύων δὲ τοὺς δήμους καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας, ἕνα μὲν ἁρμοστήν ἐκάστω τῇ Λακεδαιμονίῳ κατέλιπε, δέκα δὲ ἄρχοντας ἐκ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ συγκεκροτημένων κατὰ πόλιν ἐταπεινῶν. Καὶ ταῦτα πράττων ὁμοίως ἐν τε ταῖς πολεμιαῖς καὶ ταῖς συμμάχοις γεγενημέναις πόλεσι, παρέπλει σχολαίως τρόπον τινα κατασκευαζόμενος ἐαυτῷ τὴν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡγεμονίαν. Compare Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 2-5; Diodor. xiii, 3, 10, 13.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13. πολλὰς παραγινόμενος αὐτὸς σφαγαῖς καὶ συνεκβάλλων τοὺς τῶν φίλων ἐχθροὺς οὐκ ἐπιεικὲς ἐδίδου τοῖς Ἕλλησι δείγματα τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων ἀρχῆς, etc.

Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14. Καὶ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων πόλεων ὁμαλῶς ἀπασῶν κατέλυε τὰς πολιτείας καὶ καθίστηε δεκαρχίας. πολλῶν μὲν ἐν ἐκάστῃ σφατομένων, πολλῶν δὲ φευγόντων, etc.

About the massacre at Thasos, see Cornelius Nepos, Lysand. c. 2; Polyæn. i, 45, 4. Compare Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19; and see Vol. VIII, Ch. lxv, p. 220 of this History.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiv, 10. Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyric) s. 151; Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 1.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13. τοῦ Λυσάνδρου τῶν ὀλίγων τοῖς θρασυτάτοις καὶ φιλονεικοτάτοις τὰς πόλεις ἐχειρίζοντος.



themselves for services already rendered to him,—the general analogy of Grecian history would sufficiently teach us, though we are without special details. But in reference to this point, we have not merely general analogy to guide us; we have farther the parallel case of the Thirty at Athens, the particulars of whose rule are well known and have already been alluded to. These Thirty, with the exception of the difference of number, were to all intents and purposes a Lysandrian dekarchy; created by the same originating force, placed under the like circumstances, and animated by the like spirit and interests. Every subject town would produce its Kritias and Theramenes, and its body of wealthy citizens like the knights or horsemen at Athens to abet their oppressions, under Lacedæmonian patronage and the covering guard of the Lacedæmonian harmost. Moreover, Kritias, with all his vices, was likely to be better rather than worse, as compared with his oligarchical parallel in any other less cultivated city. He was a man of letters and philosophy, accustomed to the conversation of Sokrates, and to the discussion of ethical and social questions. We may say the same of the knights or horsemen at Athens. Undoubtedly they had been better educated, and had been exposed to more liberalizing and improving influences, than the corresponding class elsewhere. If, then, these knights at Athens had no shame in serving as accomplices to the Thirty throughout all their enormities, we need not fear to presume that other cities would furnish a body of wealthy men yet more unscrupulous, and a leader at least as sanguinary, rapacious, and full of antipathies, as Kritias. As at Athens, so elsewhere; the dekarchs would begin by putting to death notorious political opponents, under the name of “the wicked men;”<sup>1</sup> they would next proceed to deal in the same manner with men of known probity and courage, likely to take a lead in resisting oppression.<sup>2</sup> Their career of blood would continue,—in spite of remonstrances from more moderate persons among their own num-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 13.

... ἐπεισαν Λυσάνδρου φρουροὺς σφισι συμπαῖσαι ἐλθεῖν, ὥς δὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκποδὸν ποιησάμενοι καταστήσαιεν τὴν πολιτείαν, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 14. Τῶν δὲ φρουρῶν τούτου (the harmost) συμπαίμεντος αὐτοῖς, οὓς ἐβούλοντο, ξυνελαμβάνον ἑκάς τε τὸς πονηροὺς καὶ ὀλίγους ἐξίους, ἀλλ’ ἤδη οὓς ἐνόμιζον ἡκιστα μὲν παρωθόμενους ἀνέχεσθαι, αἱ τριπλάσιον δὲ τι ἐπιχειροῦντας πλείστον τοὺς ξυνεθέλοντας λαμβάνειν.

ber, like Theramenes,—until they contrived some stratagem for disarming the citizens, which would enable them to gratify both their antipathies and their rapacity by victims still more numerous,—many of such victims being wealthy men, selected for purposes of pure spoliation.<sup>1</sup> They would next despatch by force any obtrusive monitor from their own number, like Theramenes; probably with far less ceremony than accompanied the perpetration of this crime at Athens, where we may trace the effect of those judicial forms and habits to which the Athenian public had been habituated,—overruled indeed, yet still not forgotten. There would hardly remain any fresh enormity still to commit, over and above the multiplied executions, except to banish from the city all but their own immediate partisans, and to reward these latter with choice estates confiscated from the victims.<sup>2</sup> If called upon to excuse such tyranny, the leader of a dekarchy would have sufficient invention to employ the plea of Kritias,—that all changes of government were unavoidably death-dealing, and that nothing less than such stringent measures would suffice to maintain his city in suitable dependence upon Sparta.<sup>3</sup>

Of course, it is not my purpose to affirm that in any other city, precisely the same phenomena took place as those which occurred in Athens. But we are nevertheless perfectly warranted in regarding the history of the Athenian Thirty as a fair sample, from whence to derive our idea of those Lysandrian dekarchies which now overspread the Grecian world. Doubtless, each had its own peculiar march; some were less tyrannical; but, perhaps, some even more tyrannical, regard being had to the size of the city. And in point of fact, Isokrates, who speaks with indignant horror of these dekarchies, while he denounces those features which they had in common with the triakontarchy at Athens,—extrajudicial murders, spoliations, and banishments,—notices one enormity besides, which we do not find in the latter, violent outrages upon boys and women.<sup>4</sup> Nothing of this kind is ascribed to Kritias and his

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 21.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 1.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 24–32. Καὶ εἰσὶ μὲν δῆπου πᾶσαι μεταβολαὶ πολιτικῶν θανάτηφοροι, etc.

<sup>4</sup> Isokrates Orat. iv, (Panegy.) s. 127–132 (c. 32).

He has been speaking, at some length, and in terms of energetic denunciation, against the enormities of the dekarchies. He concludes by saying

companions;<sup>1</sup> and it is a considerable proof of the restraining force of Athenian manners, that men who inflicted so much evil in gratification of other violent impulses, should have stopped short here. The decemvirs named by Lysander, like the decemvir Appius Claudius at Rome, would find themselves armed with power to satiate their lusts as well as their antipathies, and would not be more likely to set bounds to the former than to the latter. Lysander, in all the overweening insolence of victory, while rewarding his most devoted partisans with an exaltation comprising every sort of license and tyranny, stained the dependent cities with countless murders, perpetrated on private as well as on public grounds.<sup>2</sup> No individual Greek had ever before wielded so prodigious a power of enriching friends or destroying enemies, in this universal reorganization of Greece;<sup>3</sup> nor was there ever any power more deplorably abused.

It was thus that the Lacedæmonian empire imposed upon each of the subject cities a double oppression;<sup>4</sup> the native decemvirs, and the foreign harmost; each abetting the other, and forming together an aggravated pressure upon the citizens, from which scarce any escape was left. The Thirty at Athens paid the greatest possible court to the harmost Kallibius,<sup>5</sup> and put to death

— Φυγὰς δὲ καὶ στάσεις καὶ νόμων συγχύσεις καὶ πολιτειῶν μεταβολὰς, ἐτι δὲ παιδῶν ὕβρεις καὶ γυναικῶν αἰσχύνας καὶ χρημάτων ἀρπαγὰς, τίς ἂν δύναίτο διεξελθεῖν; πλὴν τοσούτον εἰπεῖν ἔχω καθ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐφ' ἡμῶν δεινὰ ῥαδίως ἂν τις ἐνὶ ψηφισματι διέλυσσε, τὰς δὲ σφαγὰς καὶ τὰς ἀνομίας τὰς ἐπὶ τούτων γενομένας οὐδεὶς ἂν ἴσασθαι δύναίτο.

See also, of the same author, Isokrates, Orat. v, (Philipp) s. 110; Orat. viii, (de Pace) s. 119-124; Or. xii, (Panath.) s. 58, 60, 106.

<sup>1</sup> We may infer that if Xenophon had heard anything of the sort respecting Kritias, he would hardly have been averse to mention it; when we read what he says (Memorab. i, 2, 29) Compare a curious passage about Kritias in Dion. Chrysostom. Or. xxi, p. 270.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch Lysand. c. 19. Ἦν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι δημοτικῶν φόνος οὐκ ἀριθμητὸς, αἵ τε δὴ μὴ κατ' ἰδίας μόνον αἰτίας αὐτοῦ κτείνοντο, ἀλλὰ πολλαῖς μὲν ἐχθραῖς, πολλαῖς δὲ πλεονεξίαις, τῶν ἐκαστάχοθι φίλων χαρίζομενον τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ συνεργούντος, also Pausanias, vii, 10, 1; ix, 32, 6.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 7.

<sup>4</sup> See the speech of the Theban envoys at Athens, about eight years after the surrender of Athens (Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 13).

... Οὐδὲ γὰρ φυγεῖν ἐξῆν (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19).

<sup>5</sup> Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 13.


SOCRATES,



PERICLES,



DEMOSTHENES



Greece, vol. nine.



individual Athenians offensive to him, in order to purchase his co-operation in their own violences. The few details which we possess respecting these harmosts (who continued throughout the insular and maritime cities for about ten years, until the battle of Knidus, or as long as the maritime empire of Sparta lasted, — but in various continental dependencies considerably longer, that is, until the defeat of Leuktra in 371 B. C.), are all for the most part discreditable. We have seen in the last chapter the description given by the philo-Laconian Xenophon, of the harsh and treacherous manner in which they acted towards the returning Cyreian soldiers, combined with their corrupt subservience to Pharnabazus. We learn from him that it depended upon the fiat of a Lacedæmonian harmost whether these soldiers should be proclaimed enemies and excluded forever from their native cities; and Kleander, the harmost of Byzantium, who at first threatened them with this treatment, was only induced by the most unlimited submission, combined with very delicate management, to withdraw his menace. The cruel proceeding of Anaxibius and Aristarchus, who went so far as to sell four hundred of these soldiers into slavery, has been recounted a few pages above. Nothing can be more arbitrary or reckless than their proceedings. If they could behave thus towards a body of Greek soldiers full of acquired glory, effective either as friends or as enemies, and having generals capable of prosecuting their collective interests and making their complaints heard, — what protection would a private citizen of any subject city, Byzantium or Perinthus, be likely to enjoy against their oppression?

The story of Aristodemus, the harmost of Oreus in Eubœa, evinces that no justice could be obtained against any of their enor-

*τὸν μὲν Καλλίβιον ἐθεράπευον πάση θεραπείᾳ, ὡς πάντα ἐπαινοῖν, ἃ πράττειν, etc.* (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15).

The Thirty seem to have outdone Lysander himself. A young Athenian of rank, distinguished as a victor in the pankratiun, Autolykus, — having been insulted by Kallibius, resented it, tripped him up, and threw him down. Lysander, on being appealed to, justified Autolykus, and censured Kallibius, telling him that he did not know how to govern freemen. The Thirty, however, afterwards put Autolykus to death, as a means of curtailing Kallibius (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15). Pausanias mentions *Eteonikus* (not *Kallibius*) as the person who struck Autolykus; but he ascribes the same decision to Lysander (ii. 32, 3).

mities from the ephors of Sparta. That harmost, among many other acts of brutal violence, seized a beautiful youth, son of a free citizen at Oreus, out of the palaestra, — carried him off, — and after vainly endeavoring to overcome his resistance, put him to death. The father of the youth went to Sparta, made known the atrocities, and appealed to the ephors and Senate for redress. But a deaf ear was turned to his complaints, and in anguish of mind he slew himself. Indeed, we know that these Spartan authorities would grant no redress, not merely against harmosts, but even against private Spartan citizens, who had been guilty of gross crime out of their own country. A Boeotian near Leuktra, named Skedasus, preferred complaint that two Spartans, on their way from Delphi, after having been hospitably entertained in his house, had first violated, and afterwards killed, his two daughters; but even for so flagitious an outrage as this, no redress could be obtained.<sup>1</sup> Doubtless, when a powerful foreign ally, like the Persian satrap Pharnabazus,<sup>2</sup> complained to the ephors of the conduct of a Lacedæmonian harmost or admiral, his representations would receive attention; and we learn that the ephors were thus induced not merely to recall Lysander from the Hellespont, but to put to death another officer, Thorax, for corrupt appropriation of money. But for a private citizen in any subject city, the superintending authority of Sparta would be not merely remote but deaf and immovable, so as to afford him no protection whatever, and to leave him altogether at the mercy of the harmost. It seems, too, that the rigor of Spartan training, and peculiarity of habits, rendered individual Lacedæmonians on foreign service more self-willed, more incapable of entering into the customs or feelings of others, and more liable to degenerate when set free from the strict watch of home, — than other Greeks generally.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Amator. Narration, p. 773; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 20. In Diodorus (xv, 54) and Pausanias, (ix, 13, 2), the damsels thus outraged are stated to have slain themselves. Compare another story in Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 56, 57.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Lysand. c, 19.

<sup>3</sup> This seems to have been the impression not merely of the enemies of Sparta, but even of the Spartan authorities themselves. Compare two remarkable passages of Thucydides, i, 77, and i, 95. Ἀμικτα γὰρ (says the Athenian envoy at Sparta) τὰ τε καθ' ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς νόμιμα τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχετε,

Taking all these causes of evil together, — the dekarchies, the harmosts, and the overwhelming dictatorship of Lysander, — and construing other parts of the Grecian world by the analogy of Athens under the Thirty, — we shall be warranted in affirming that the first years of the Spartan Empire, which followed upon the victory of Ægospotami, were years of all-pervading tyranny and multifarious intestine calamity, such as Greece had never before endured. The hardships of war, severe in many ways, were now at an end, but they were replaced by a state of suffering not the less difficult to bear because it was called peace. And what made the suffering yet more intolerable was, that it was a bitter disappointment, and a flagrant violation of promises proclaimed, repeatedly and explicitly, by the Lacedæmonians themselves.

For more than thirty years preceding, — from times earlier than the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, — the Spartans had professed to interfere only for the purpose of liberating Greece, and of putting down the usurped ascendancy of Athens. All the allies of Sparta had been invited into strenuous action, — all those of Athens had been urged to revolt, — under the soul-stirring cry of "Freedom to Greece." The earliest incitements addressed by the Corinthians to Sparta in 432 B. C., immediately after the Korkyræan dispute, called upon her to stand forward in fulfilment of her recognized function as "Liberator of Greece," and denounced her as guilty of connivance with Athens if she held back.<sup>1</sup> Athens was branded as the "despot city;" which had already absorbed the independence of many Greeks, and

καὶ προσέτι εἰς ἕκαστος ἐξῶν οὔτε τούτοις χρήται, οὐθ' οἷς ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλὰς νομίζει.

After the recall of the regent Pausanias and of Dorkis from the Hellespont (in 477 B. C.), the Lacedæmonians refuse to send out any successor, φοβούμενοι μὴ σφισιν οἱ ἐξιόντες χεῖρους γίγνωνται, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ Πανσανίᾳ ἐνείδον, etc. (i, 95.)

Compare Plutarch Apophtheg. Laconic. p. 220 F.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i, 69. οὐ γὰρ ὁ δουλωσάμενος, ἀλλ' ὁ δυνάμενος μὲν παῦσαι, περιορῶν δὲ, ἀληθεστερον αὐτὸ ὁρᾷ, εἴπερ καὶ τὴν ἀξίωσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς ὡς ἐλευθερίαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα φέρεται.

To the like purpose the second speech of the Corinthian envoys at Sparta, c. 122-124 — μὴ μελλετε Ποτιδαῖαίταις τε ποιείσθαι τιμωρίαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μετελθεῖν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, etc.



menaced that of all the rest. The last formal requisition borne by the Lacedæmonian envoys to Athens in the winter immediately preceding the war, ran thus, — "If you desire the continuance of peace with Sparta, restore to the Greeks their autonomy."<sup>1</sup> When Archidamus, king of Sparta, approached at the head of his army to besiege Plataea, the Plataeans laid claim to autonomy as having been solemnly guaranteed to them by King Pausanias after the great victory near their town. Upon which Archidamus replied, — "Your demand is just; we are prepared to confirm *your* autonomy, — but we call upon you to aid us in securing the like for those other Greeks who have been enslaved by Athens. This is the sole purpose of our great present effort."<sup>2</sup> And the banner of general enfranchisement, which the Lacedæmonians thus held up at the outset of the war, enlisted in their cause encouraging sympathy and good wishes throughout Greece.<sup>3</sup>

But the most striking illustration by far, of the seductive promises held out by the Lacedæmonians, was afforded by the conduct of Brasidas in Thrace, when he first came into the neighborhood of the Athenian allies during the eighth year of the war (424 B. C.). In his memorable discourse addressed to the public assembly at Akanthus, he takes the greatest pains to satisfy them that he came only for the purpose of realizing the promise of enfranchisement proclaimed by the Lacedæmonians at the beginning of the war.<sup>4</sup> Having expected, when acting in such a cause, nothing

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i, 139. Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, Panegy. c. 34, s. 140; Or. v, (Philipp.) s. 121; Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 43.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii, 72. Παρασκευῇ δὲ τόσῃδε καὶ πόλεμος γέγνηται αὐτῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐλευθερώσεως.

Read also the speech of the Theban orator, in reply to the Plataean, after the capture of the town by the Lacedæmonians (iii, 63).

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. ii, 8. ἡ δὲ εὐνοία παρὰ πολὺ ἐποίει τῶν ἀνθρώπων μᾶλλον ἐς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ἄλλως τε καὶ προειπόντων ὅτι τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦσιν.

See also iii, 13, 14 — the speech of the envoys from the revolted Mitylénæ, to the Lacedæmonians.

The Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas with his fleet, is announced as crossing over the Ægean to Ionia for the purpose of "liberating Greece;" accordingly, the Samian exiles remonstrate with him for killing his prisoners, as in contradiction with that object (iii, 32) — ἔλεγον οὐ καλῶς μὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦν αὐτὸν, εἰ ἄνδρας διέφθειρεν, etc.

<sup>4</sup> Thucyd. iv, 85. Ἡ μὲν ἐκπεμφίς μου καὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων,

less than a hearty welcome, he is astonished to find their gates closed against him. "I am come (said he) not to injure, but to liberate the Greeks; after binding the Lacedæmonian authorities by the most solemn oaths, that all whom I may bring over shall be dealt with as autonomous allies. We do not wish to obtain you as allies either by force or fraud, but to act as your allies at a time when you are enslaved by the Athenians. You ought not to suspect my purposes, in the face of these solemn assurances; least of all ought any man to hold back through apprehension of private enmities, and through fear lest I should put the city into the hands of a few chosen partisans. I am not come to identify myself with local faction: I am not the man to offer you an unreal liberty by breaking down your established constitution, for the purpose of enslaving either the Many to the Few, or the Few to the Many. That would be more intolerable even than foreign dominion; and we Lacedæmonians should incur nothing but reproach, instead of reaping thanks and honor for our trouble. We should draw upon ourselves those very censures, upon the strength of which we are trying to put down Athens; and that, too, in aggravated measure, worse than those who have never made honorable professions; since to men in high position, specious trick is more disgraceful than open violence."<sup>1</sup> — If (continued Brasidas) in spite of my assurances, you still withhold from me your cooperation, I shall think myself authorized to constrain you by force. We should not be warranted in forcing freedom on any

ὦ Ἀκάνθιοι, γέγνηται τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπαληθεύουσα ἣν ἀρχόμενοι τοῦ πολέμου προείπομεν, Ἀθηναίοις ἐλευθεροῦντες τὴν Ἑλλάδα πολεμήσειν.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv, 85. Αὐτὸς τε οὐκ ἐπὶ κακῷ, ἐπ' ἐλευθερώσει δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων παρελήλυθα, ὅρκους τε Λακεδαιμονίων καταλαβὼν τὰ τέλη τοῖς μεγίστοις, ἢ μὴν οὐδ' ἂν ἐγωγε προσαγάγωμαι συμμάχους ἐσεσθαι αὐτονόμους. . . . . Καὶ εἰ τις ἰδία τινα δεδιὼς ἄρα, μὴ ἐγὼ τισι προσθῶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀπρόθυμός ἐστι, πάντων μάλιστα πιστευσάτω. Οὐ γὰρ συστασιᾶσων ἦκω, οὐδὲ ἀσαφῆ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν νομίζω ἐπιφέρειν, εἰ, τὸ πάτριον παρεῖς, τὸ πλέον τοῖς ὀλίγοις, ἢ τὸ ἐλασσον τοῖς πᾶσι, δουλώσαιμι. Χαλεπώτερα γὰρ ἂν τῆς ἀλλοφύλου ἀρχῆς εἴη, καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις οὐκ ἂν ἀντὶ πόνων χάρις καθίστατο, ἀντὶ δὲ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης αἰτία μᾶλλον· οἷς τε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐγκλήμασι καταπολεμοῦμεν. αὐτοὶ ἂν φαινοίμεθα ἐχθίονα ἢ ὁ μὲν ὑποδείξας ἀρετὴν κατὰ τὸν νόμον.



unwilling parties, except with a view to some common good. But as we seek not empire for ourselves, — as we struggle only to put down the empire of others, — as we offer autonomy to each and all, — so we should do wrong to the majority if we allowed you to persist in your opposition.”<sup>1</sup>

Like the allied sovereigns of Europe in 1813, who, requiring the most strenuous efforts on the part of the people to contend against the Emperor Napoleon, promised free constitutions and granted nothing after the victory had been assured, — the Lacedæmonians thus held out the most emphatic and repeated assurances of general autonomy in order to enlist allies against Athens; disavowing, even ostentatiously, any aim at empire for themselves. It is true, that after the great catastrophe before Syracuse, when the ruin of Athens appeared imminent, and when the alliance with the Persian satraps against her was first brought to pass, the Lacedæmonians began to think more of empire,<sup>2</sup> and less of Grecian freedom; which, indeed, so far as concerned the Greeks on the continent of Asia, was surrendered to Persia. Nevertheless the old watchword still continued. It was still currently believed, though less studiously professed, that the destruction of the Athenian empire was aimed at as a means to the liberation of Greece.<sup>3</sup>

The victory of Ægospotami with its consequences cruelly undeceived every one. The language of Brasidas, sanctioned by the solemn oaths of the Lacedæmonian ephors, in 424 B. C. — and the proceedings of the Lacedæmonian Lysander in 405–404 B. C., the commencing hour of Spartan omnipotence, — stand in such literal and flagrant contradiction, that we might almost imagine the former to have foreseen the possibility of such a successor, and to have tried to disgrace and disarm him beforehand. The deklarchies of Ly-

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv, 87. Οὐδὲ ὀφείλομεν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὴ κοῖνου τίνος γὰρ τοῦ αἵτιος τοῦ μὴ βουλομένου εὐλευθεροῦν. Οὐδ’ αὖ ἀρχῆς ἐφιέμεθα, παῦσαι δὲ μᾶλλον ἑτέροισιν σπεύδοντες τοῦ πλείους ἀνδικοῦμεν, εἰ συμπασι αὐτονομίαν ἐπιφέροντες ὑμᾶς τοὺς ἐναντιούμενους περιδοίμεν. Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegy.) s. 140, 141.

<sup>2</sup> Feelings of the Lacedæmonians during the winter immediately succeeding the great Syracusan catastrophe (Thuc. viii, 2) — καὶ καθελόντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων αὐτοὶ τῆς πάσης Ἑλλάδος ἤδη ἀσφαλῶς ἡγήσεσθαι.

<sup>3</sup> Compare Thucyd. viii, 43, 3; viii, 46, 3.

sander realized that precise ascendancy of a few chosen partisans which Brasidas repudiates as an abomination worse than foreign dominion; while the harmosts and garrison, installed in the dependent cities along with the native decemvirs, planted the second variety of mischief as well as the first, each aggravating the other. Had the noble-minded Kallikratidas gained a victory at Arginusæ, and lived to close the war, he would probably have tried, with more or less of success, to make some approach to the promises of Brasidas. But it was the double misfortune of Greece, first that the closing victory was gained by such an admiral as Lysander, the most unscrupulous of all power-seekers, partly for his country, and still more for himself, — next, that the victory was so decisive, sudden and imposing, as to leave no enemy standing, or in a position to insist upon terms. The fiat of Lysander, acting in the name of Sparta, became omnipotent, not merely over enemies, but over allies; and to a certain degree even over the Spartan authorities themselves. There was no present necessity for conciliating allies, — still less for acting up to former engagements; so that nothing remained to oppose the naturally ambitious inspirations of the Spartan ephors, who allowed the admiral to carry out the details in his own way. But former assurances, though Sparta was in a condition to disregard them, were not forgotten by others; and the recollection of them imparted additional bitterness to the oppressions of the decemvirs and harmosts.<sup>1</sup> In perfect consistency

<sup>1</sup> This is emphatically set forth in a fragment of Theopompus the historian, preserved by Theodorus Metochita, and printed at the end of the collection of the Fragments of Theopompus the historian, both by Wicher and by M. Didot. Both these editors, however, insert it only as Fragmentum Spurious, on the authority of Plutarch (Lysander, c. 13), who quotes the same sentiment from the comic writer Theopompus. But the passage of Theodorus Metochita presents the express words Θεόπομπος ὁ ἱστορικός. We have, therefore, his distinct affirmation against that of Plutarch; and the question is, which of the two we are to believe.

Now if any one will read attentively the so-called Fragmentum Spurious as it stands at the end of the collections above referred to, he will see (I think) that it belongs much more naturally to the historian than to the comic writer. It is a strictly historical statement, illustrated by a telling, though coarse, comparison. The Fragment is thus presented by Theodorus Metochita (Fragm. Theopomp. 344, ed. Didot).

Θεόπομπος ὁ ἱστορικός ἀποσκώπτων εἰς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, εἰκάζεν αὐτοὺς τοὺς φαύλους καπηλίους, αἱ τοῖς χρωμένοις ἐγχεῖναι τὴν ἀρχὴν οἶνον ἢ δύν τε



with her misrule throughout Eastern Greece,<sup>1</sup> too, Sparta identified herself with the energetic tyranny of Dionysius at Syracuse, assisting both to erect and to uphold it; a contradiction to her former maxims of action which would have astounded the historian Herodotus.

The empire of Sparta thus constituted at the end of 405 B. C., maintained itself in full grandeur for somewhat above ten years, until the naval battle of Knidus,<sup>2</sup> in 394 B. C. That defeat de-

καὶ εὐχρηστον σοφιστικῶς ἐπὶ τῇ ληφεί τοῦ ἀργυρίου, μεθύστερον φανλὸν τινα καὶ ἐκτροπίαν καὶ ὀξύνην κατακρινῶσι καὶ παρέχονται καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους τοίνυν ἔλεγε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκείναις τρόπον, ἐν τῷ κατὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πολέμῳ, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἡδιστὶ πόματι τῆς ἀπ' Ἀθηναίων ἐλευθερίας καὶ προγράμματι καὶ κηρύγματι τοὺς Ἕλληνας δελεῶσαντας, ὕστερον πικρότατα σφίσιν ἐγχείαι καὶ ἀηδέστατα κράματα βιοτῆς ἐπωδύνου καὶ χρήσεως πραγμάτων ἀλγεινῶν, πάντι κατὰ τυραννοῦντας τὰς πόλεις δεκαρχίαις καὶ ἀρμοσταῖς βαρυστατοῖς, καὶ πραττομένοις, ἃ δυσχερὲς εἶναι σφόδρα καὶ ἀνύποιστον φέρειν, καὶ ἀποκτινύναι.

Plutarch, ascribing the statement to the comic Theopompus, affirms him to be silly (*ἔοικε ληρεῖν*) in saying that the Lacedæmonian empire began by being sweet and pleasant, and afterwards was corrupted and turned into bitterness and oppression; whereas the fact was, that it was bitterness and oppression from the very first.

Now if we read the above citation from Theodorus, we shall see that Theopompus did not really put forth that assertion which Plutarch contradicts as silly and untrue.

What Theopompus stated was, that the first Lacedæmonians, during the war against Athens, tempted the Greeks with a most delicious draught and programme and proclamation of freedom from the rule of Athens, — and that they afterwards poured in the most bitter and repulsive mixtures of hard oppression and tyranny, etc.

The sweet draught is asserted to consist — not, as Plutarch supposes, in the first taste of the actual Lacedæmonian empire after the war, but — in the seductive promises of freedom held out by them to the allies during the war. Plutarch's charge of *ἔοικε ληρεῖν* has thus no foundation. I have written *δελεῶσαντας* instead of *δελεῦσοντας* which stands in Didot's Fragment, because it struck me that this correction was required to construe the passage.

<sup>1</sup> Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegr.) s. 145; Or. viii, (de Pace) s. 122; Diodor. xiv, 10-44; xv, 23. Compare Herodot. v, 92; Thucyd. i, 18; Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegr.) s. 144.

<sup>2</sup> Isokrates, Panathen. s. 61. Σπαρτιάται μὲν γὰρ ἔτη δέκα μόλις ἐπεστάτησαν αὐτῶν. ἡμεῖς δὲ πέντε καὶ ἐξήκοντα συνεχῶς κατεσχομεν τὴν ἀρχήν. I do not hold myself bound to make out the exactness of the chronology of Isokrates. But here we may remark that his "hardly ten years" is a

stroyed her fleet and maritime ascendancy, yet left her in undiminished power on land, which she still maintained until her defeat by the Thebans<sup>1</sup> at Leuktra in 371 B. C. Throughout all this time, it was her established system to keep up Spartan harmosts and garrisons in the dependent cities on the continent as well as in the islands. Even the Chians, who had been her most active allies during the last eight years of the war, were compelled to submit to this hardship; besides having all their fleet taken away from them.<sup>2</sup> But the native dekarchies, though at first established by Lysander universally throughout the maritime dependencies, did not last as a system so long as the harmosts. Composed as they were to a great degree of the personal nominees and confederates of Lysander, they suffered in part by the reactionary jealousy which in time made itself felt against his overweening ascendancy. After continuing for some time, they lost the countenance of the Spartan ephors, who proclaimed permission to the cities (we do not precisely know when) to resume their preëxisting governments.<sup>3</sup> Some of the dekarchies thus became dissolved, or modified in various ways, but several probably still continued to subsist, if they had force enough to maintain themselves; for it does not appear that the ephors ever systematically put them down, as Lysander had systematically set them up.

The government of the Thirty at Athens would never have been overthrown if the oppressed Athenians had been obliged to rely on a tutelary interference of the Spartan ephors to help them in overthrowing it. My last volume has shown that this nefarious

term, though less than the truth by some months, if we may take the battle of Ægospotami as the beginning, is very near the truth if we take the surrender of Athens as the beginning, down to the battle of Knidus

<sup>1</sup> Pausanias, viii, 52, 2; ix, 6, 1.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 84; Isokrates, Orat. viii, (de Pace) s. 121.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 2.

Lysander accompanied King Agesilaus (when the latter was going to his Asiatic command in 396 B. C.). His purpose was — ὅπως τὰς δεκαρχίας τὰς κατασταθείσας ὑπ' ἐκείνου ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐκπεπτωκυίας δὲ διὰ τοὺς ἐφόρους, οἱ τὰς πατρίους πολιτείας παρήγγειλαν, πάλιν καταστήσει μετ' Ἀγησίου.

It shows the careless construction of Xenophon's Hellenica, or perhaps his reluctance to set forth the discreditable points of the Lacedæmonian rule, that this is the first mention which he makes (and that too, indirectly) of the dekarchies, nine years after they had been first set up by Lysander



oligarchy came to its end by the unassisted efforts of Thrasybulus and the Athenian democrats themselves. It is true, indeed, that the arrogance and selfishness of Sparta and of Lysander had alienated the Thebans, Corinthians, Megarians, and other neighboring allies, and induced them to sympathize with the Athenian exiles against the atrocities of the Thirty, — but they never rendered any positive assistance of moment. The inordinate personal ambition of Lysander had also offended King Pausanias and the Spartan ephors, so that they too became indifferent to the Thirty, who were his creatures. But this merely deprived the Thirty of that foreign support which Lysander, had he still continued in the ascendent, would have extended to them in full measure. It was not the positive cause of their downfall. That crisis was brought about altogether by the energy of Thrasybulus and his companions, who manifested such force and determination as could not have been put down without an extraordinary display of Spartan military power; a display not entirely safe when the sympathies of the chief allies were with the other side, — and at any rate adverse to the inclinations of Pausanias. As it was with the Thirty at Athens, so it probably was also with the dekarchies in the dependent cities. The Spartan ephors took no steps to put them down; but where the resistance of the citizens was strenuous enough to overthrow them, no Spartan intervention came to prop them up, and the harmost perhaps received orders not to consider his authority as indissolubly linked with theirs. The native forces of each dependent city being thus left to find their own level, the decemvirs, once installed, would doubtless maintain themselves in a great number; while in other cases they would be overthrown, — or, perhaps, would contrive to perpetuate their dominion by compromise and alliance with other oligarchical sections. This confused and unsettled state of the dekarchies, — some still existing, others half-existing, others again defunct, — prevailed in 396 B. C., when Lysander accompanied Agesilaus into Asia, in the full hope that he should have influence enough to reorganize them all.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Compare the two passages of Xenophon's Hellenica, iii, 4, 7; iii, 5, 13.

<sup>2</sup> Ἀτε συντεταραγμένων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ οὔτε δημοκρατίας ἐστὶ οὐσης, ὥσπερ ἐπ' Ἀθηναίων, οὔτε δεκαρχίας, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ Λυσάνδρου.

But that some of these dekarchies still continued, we know from the

We must recollect that no other dependent city would possess the same means of offering energetic resistance to its local decemvirs, as Athens offered to the Thirty; and that the insular Grecian cities were not only feeble individually, but naturally helpless against the lords of the sea.<sup>1</sup>

Such then was the result throughout Greece, when that long war, which had been undertaken in the name of universal autonomy, was terminated by the battle of Ægospotami. In place of imperial Athens was substituted, not the promised autonomy, but yet more imperial Sparta. An awful picture is given by the philo-Laonian Xenophon, in 399 B. C., of the ascendancy exercised throughout all the Grecian cities, not merely by the ephors and the public officers, but even by the private citizens, of Sparta. "The Lacedæmonians (says he in addressing the Cyreian army) are now the presidents of Greece; and even any single private Lacedæmonian can accomplish what he pleases."<sup>2</sup> "All the cities (he says in another place) then obeyed whatever order they might receive from a Lacedæmonian citizen."<sup>3</sup> Not merely was the general ascendancy thus omnipresent and irresistible, but it was enforced with a stringency of detail, and darkened by a thousand accompaniments of tyranny and individual abuse, such as had never been known under the much-decried empire of Athens.

We have more than one picture of the Athenian empire, in speeches made by hostile orators who had every motive to work up the strongest antipathies in the bosoms of their audience against it. We have the addresses of the Corinthian envoys at Sparta when stimulating the Spartan allies to the Peloponnesian war,<sup>4</sup> —

subsequent passage. The Theban envoys say to the public assembly at Athens, respecting the Spartans. —

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οὐς ὑμῶν ἀπεστήσαν φανεροὶ εἰσὶν ἐξηπατηκότες· ὑπο τε γὰρ τῶν ἀρμοστών τυραννοῦνται, καὶ ὑπὸ δέκα ἀνδρῶν, οὓς Λύσανδρος κατέστησεν ἐν ἑκάστη πόλει — where the decemvirs are noted as still subsisting, in 395 B. C. See also Xen. Agesilaus, i, 37.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 15.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 12. Εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἐγγὺς αἱ Ἑλληνίδες πόλεις (this was spoken at Kalpē in Bithynia) τῆς δὲ Ἑλλάδος Λακεδαιμόνιοι προεσθῆ-  
κασιν ἱκανοὶ δὲ εἰσὶ καὶ εἰς ἑκάστον Λακεδαιμονίων ἐσ-  
ταὶ πόλειςιν, ὅτι βούλονται διαπράττεσθαι.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 5. Πᾶσαι γὰρ τότε αἱ πόλεις ἐπειθοντο, ὅτι Λακε-  
δαιμόνιος ἀνὴρ ἐπιταττοί.

<sup>4</sup> Thucyd. i, 68-120.



that of the envoys from Mitylênê delivered at Olympia to the Spartan confederates, when the city had revolted from Athens and stood in pressing need of support, — the discourse of Brasidas in the public assembly at Akanthus, — and more than one speech also from Hermokrates, impressing upon his Sicilian countrymen hatred as well as fear of Athens.<sup>1</sup> Whoever reads these discourses, will see that they dwell almost exclusively on the great political wrong inherent in the very fact of her empire, robbing so many Grecian communities of their legitimate autonomy, over and above the tribute imposed. That Athens had thus already enslaved many cities, and was only watching for opportunities to enslave many more, is the theme upon which they expatiate. But of practical grievances, — of cruelty, oppression, spoliation, multiplied exiles, etc., of high-handed wrong committed by individual Athenians, — not one word is spoken. Had there been the smallest pretext for introducing such inflammatory topics, how much more impressive would have been the appeal of Brasidas to the sympathies of the Akanthians! How vehement would have been the denunciations of the Mitylenæan envoys, in place of the tame and almost apologetic language which we now read in Thucydides! Athens extinguished the autonomy of her subject-allies, and punished revolters with severity, sometimes even with cruelty. But as to other points of wrong, the silence of accusers, such as those just noticed, counts as a powerful exculpation.

The case is altered when we come to the period succeeding the battle of Ægospotami. Here indeed also, we find the Spartan empire complained of (as the Athenian empire had been before), in contrast with that state of autonomy to which each city laid claim, and which Sparta had not merely promised to ensure, but set forth as her only ground of war. Yet this is not the prominent grievance, — other topics stand more emphatically forward. The decemvirs and the harmosts (some of the latter being Helots), the standing instruments of Spartan empire, are felt as more sorely painful than the empire itself; as the language held by Brasidas at Akanthus admits them to be beforehand. At the time when Athens was a subject-city under Sparta, governed by the Lysandrian Thirty and by the Lacedæmonian harmost in the acropolis,

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iii, 9, iv, 59-85, vi, 76.

— the sense of indignity arising from the fact of subjection was absorbed in the still more terrible suffering arising from the enormities of those individual rulers whom the imperial state had set up. Now Athens set up no local rulers, — no native Ten or native Thirty, — no resident Athenian harmosts or garrisons. This was of itself an unspeakable exemption, when compared with the condition of cities subject, not only to the Spartan empire, but also under that empire to native decemvirs like Kritias, and Spartan harmosts like Aristarchus or Aristodêmus. A city subject to Athens had to bear definite burdens enforced by its own government, which was liable in case of default or delinquency to be tried before the popular Athenian Dikastery. But this same dikastery (as I have shown in a former volume, and as is distinctly stated by Thucydides)<sup>1</sup> was the harbor of refuge to each subject-city; not less against individual Athenian wrong-doers than against misconduct from other cities. Those who complained of the hardship suffered by a subject-city, from the obligation of bringing causes to be tried in the dikastery of Athens, — even if we take the case as they state it, and overlook the unfairness of omitting those numerous instances wherein the city was thus enabled to avert or redress wrong done to its own citizens, — would have complained both more loudly and with greater justice of an ever-present Athenian harmost; especially if there were coexistent a native government of Ten oligarchs, exchanging with him guilty connivances, like the partnership of the Thirty at Athens with the Lacedæmonian harmost Kallibius.<sup>2</sup>

In no one point can it be shown that the substitution of Spartan empire in place of Athenian was a gain, either for the subject-cities or for Greece generally; while in many points, it was a great and serious aggravation of suffering. And this abuse of power is the more deeply to be regretted, as Sparta enjoyed after the battle of Ægospotami a precious opportunity, — such as Athens had never had, and such as never again recurred, — of reorganizing the Grecian world on wise principles, and with a view to Pan-hellenic stability and harmony. It is not her greatest sin to have refused

<sup>1</sup> See the remarkable speech of Phrynichus in Thucyd. viii, 48, 5, which I have before referred to.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 14. Compare the analogous case of Thebes, after the Lacedæmonians had got possession of the Kadmeia (v. 2, 34-36).



to grant universal autonomy. She had indeed promised it; but we might pardon a departure from specific performance, had she exchanged the boon for one far greater, which it was within her reasonable power, at the end of 405 B. C., to confer. That universal town autonomy, towards which the Grecian instinct tended, though immeasurably better than universal subjection, was yet accompanied by much internal discord, and by the still more formidable evil of helplessness against any efficient foreign enemy. To ensure to the Hellenic world external safety as well as internal concord, it was not a new empire which was wanted, but a new political combination on equitable and comprehensive principles; divesting each town of a portion of its autonomy, and creating a common authority, responsible to all, for certain definite controlling purposes. If ever a tolerable federative system would have been practicable in Greece, it was after the battle of Ægospotami. The Athenian empire, — which, with all its defects, I believe to have been much better for the subject-cities than universal autonomy would have been, — had already removed many difficulties, and shown that combined and systematic action of the maritime Grecian world was no impossibility. Sparta might now have substituted herself for Athens, not as heir to the imperial power, but as president and executive agent of a new Confederacy of Delos, — reviving the equal, comprehensive, and liberal principles, on which that confederacy had first been organized.

It is true that sixty years before, the constituent members of the original synod at Delos had shown themselves insensible to its value. As soon as the pressing alarm from Persia had passed over, some had discontinued sending deputies, others had disobeyed requisitions, others again had bought off their obligations, and forfeited their rights as autonomous and voting members, by pecuniary bargain with Athens; who, being obliged by the duties of her presidency to enforce obedience to the Synod against all reluctant members, made successively many enemies, and was gradually converted, almost without her own seeking, from President into Emperor, as the only means of obviating the total dissolution of the Confederacy. But though such untoward circumstances had happened before, it does not follow that they would now have happened again, assuming the same experiment to have been retried by Sparta, with manifest sincerity of purpose and tolerable

wisdom. The Grecian world, especially the maritime portion of it, had passed through trials not less painful than instructive, during this important interval. Nor does it seem rash to suppose, that the bulk of its members might now have been disposed to perform steady confederate duties, at the call and under the presidency of Sparta, had she really attempted to reorganize a liberal confederacy, treating every city as autonomous and equal, except in so far as each was bound to obey the resolutions of the general synod. However impracticable such a scheme may appear, we must recollect that even Utopian schemes have their transient moments, if not of certain success, at least of commencement not merely possible but promising. And my belief is, that had Kallikratidas, with his ardent Pan-hellenic sentiment and force of resolution, been the final victor over imperial Athens, he would not have let the moment of pride and omnipotence pass over without essaying some noble project like that sketched above. It is to be remembered that Athens had never had the power of organizing any such generous Pan-hellenic combination. She had become depopularized in the legitimate execution of her trust, as president of the Confederacy of Delos, against refractory members;<sup>1</sup> and had been obliged to choose between breaking up the Confederacy, and keeping it together under the strong compression of an imperial chief. But Sparta had not yet become depopularized. She now stood without competitor as leader of the Grecian world, and might at that moment have reasonably hoped to carry the members of it along with her to any liberal and Pan-hellenic organization, had she attempted it with proper earnestness. Unfortunately she took the opposite course, under the influence of Lysander; founding a new empire far more oppressive and odious than that of Athens, with few of the advantages, and none of the excuses, attached to the latter. As she soon became even more unpopular than Athens, her moment of high tide, for beneficent Pan-hellenic combination, passed away also, — never to return.

Having thus brought all the maritime Greeks under her empire, with a tribute of more than one thousand talents imposed upon them, — and continuing to be chief of her landed alliance in

<sup>1</sup> Such is the justification offered by the Athenian envoy at Sparta, immediately before the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. i, 75, 76). And it is borne out in the main by the narrative of Thucydides himself (i, 99)



Central Greece, which now included Athens as a simple unit,—Sparta was the all-pervading imperial power in Greece.<sup>1</sup> Her new empire was organized by the victorious Lysander; but with so much arrogance, and so much personal ambition to govern all Greece by means of nominees of his own, decemvirs and harmosts,—that he raised numerous rivals and enemies, as well at Sparta itself as elsewhere. The jealousy entertained by king Pausanias, the offended feelings of Thebes and Corinth, and the manner in which these new phenomena brought about (in spite of the opposition of Lysander) the admission of Athens as a revived democracy into the Lacedæmonian confederacy,—has been already related.

In the early months of 403 B. C., Lysander was partly at home, partly in Attica, exerting himself to sustain the falling oligarchy of Athens against the increasing force of Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles in Peiræus. In this purpose he was directly thwarted by the opposing views of king Pausanias, and three out of the five ephors.<sup>2</sup> But though the ephors thus checked Lysander in regard to Athens, they softened the humiliation by sending him abroad to a fresh command on the Asiatic coast and the Hellespont; a step which had the farther advantage of putting asunder two such marked rivals as he and Pausanias had now become. That which Lysander had tried in vain to do at Athens, he was doubtless better able to do in Asia, where he had neither Pausanias nor the ephors along with him. He could lend effective aid to the dekarchies and harmosts in the Asiatic cities, against any internal opposition with which they might be threatened. Bitter were the complaints which reached Sparta, both against him and against his ruling partisans. At length the ephors were prevailed upon to disavow the dekarchies; and to proclaim that they would not hinder the cities from resuming their former governments at pleasure.<sup>3</sup>

But all the crying oppressions set forth in the complaints of the maritime cities would have been insufficient to procure the recall of Lysander from his command in the Hellespont, had not Pharnabazus joined his remonstrances to the rest. These last representations so strengthened the enemies of Lysander at Sparta, that a

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 3. *πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος προστάται*, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 28-30.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 2

peremptory order was sent to recall him. Constrained to obey, he came back to Sparta; but the comparative disgrace, and the loss of that boundless power which he had enjoyed on his command, was so insupportable to him, that he obtained permission to go on a pilgrimage to the temple of Zeus Ammon in Libya, under the plea that he had a vow to discharge.<sup>1</sup> He appears also to have visited the temples of Delphi and Dodona,<sup>2</sup> with secret ambitious projects which will be mentioned presently. This politic withdrawal softened the jealousy against him, so that we shall find him, after a year or two, reëstablished in great influence and ascendancy. He was sent as Spartan envoy, at what precise moment we do not know, to Syracuse, where he lent countenance and aid to the recently established despotism of Dionysius.<sup>3</sup>

The position of the Asiatic Greeks, along the coast of Ionia, Æo-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19, 20, 21.

The facts, which Plutarch states respecting Lysander, cannot be reconciled with the chronology which he adopts. He represents the recall of Lysander at the instance of Pharnabazus, with all the facts which preceded it, as having occurred prior to the reconstitution of the Athenian democracy, which event we know to have taken place in the summer of 403 B. C.

Lysander captured Samos in the latter half of 404 B. C., after the surrender of Athens. After the capture of Samos, he came home in triumph, in the autumn of 404 B. C. (Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9). He was at home, or serving in Attica, in the beginning of 403 B. C. (Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 30).

Now when Lysander came home at the end of 404 B. C., it was his triumphant return; it was not a recall provoked by complaints of Pharnabazus. Yet there can have been no other return before the restoration of the democracy at Athens.

The recall of Lysander must have been the termination, not of this command, but of a subsequent command. Moreover, it seems to me necessary, in order to make room for the facts stated respecting Lysander as well as about the dekarchies, that we should suppose him to have been again sent out (after his quarrel with Pausanias in Attica) in 403 B. C., to command in Asia. This is nowhere positively stated, but I find nothing to contradict it, and I see no other way of making room for the facts stated about Lysander.

It is to be noted that Diodorus has a decided error in chronology as to the date of the restoration of the Athenian democracy. He places it in 401 B. C. (Diod. xiv, 33), two years later than its real date, which is 403 B. C.; thus lengthening by two years the interval between the surrender of Athens and the reëstablishment of the democracy. Plutarch also seems to have conceived that interval as much longer than it really was.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 25.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Lysander, c. 2



lis, and the Hellespont, became very peculiar after the triumph of Sparta at Ægospotami. I have already recounted how, immediately after the great Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, the Persian king had renewed his grasp upon those cities, from which the vigorous hand of Athens had kept him excluded for more than fifty years; how Sparta, bidding for his aid, had consented by three formal conventions to surrender them to him, while her commissioner Lichas even reproved the Milesians for their aversion to this bargain; how Athens also, in the days of her weakness, competing for the same advantage, had expressed her willingness to pay the same price for it.<sup>1</sup> After the battle of Ægospotami, this convention was carried into effect; though seemingly not without disputes between the satrap Pharnabazus on one side, and Lysander and Derkyllidas on the other.<sup>2</sup> The latter was Lacedæmonian harmost at Abydos, which town, so important as a station on the Hellespont, the Lacedæmonians seem still to have retained. But Pharnabazus and his subordinates acquired more complete command of the Hellespontine Æolis and of the Troad, than ever they had enjoyed before, both along the coast and in the interior.<sup>3</sup>

Another element, however, soon became operative. The condition of the Greek cities on the coast of Ionia, though according to Persian regulations they belonged to the satrapy of Tissaphernes, was now materially determined, — first, by the competing claims of Cyrus, who wished to take them away from him, and tried to get such transfer ordered at court, — next, by the aspirations of that young prince to the Persian throne. As Cyrus rested his hope of success on Grecian coöperation, it was highly important to him to render himself popular among the Greeks, especially on his own side of the Ægean. Partly his own manifestations of just and conciliatory temper, partly the bad name and known perfidy of Tissaphernes, induced the Grecian cities with one accord to revolt from the latter. All threw themselves into the arms of Cyrus, except Miletus, where Tissaphernes interposed in time, slew the leaders of the intended revolt, and banished many of their partisans. Cyrus, receiving the exiles with distinguished favor, levied an army to besiege Miletus and procure their restoration; while

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. viii, 5, 18–37, 56–58, 84.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Lysander, c. 19, 20, Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 9.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 13.

he at the same time threw strong Grecian garrisons into the other cities to protect them against attack.<sup>1</sup>

This local quarrel was, however, soon merged in the more comprehensive dispute respecting the Persian succession. Both parties were found on the field of Kunaxa; Cyrus with the Greek soldiers and Milesian exiles on one side, — Tissaphernes on the other. How that attempt, upon which so much hinged in the future history both of Asia Minor and of Greece, terminated, I have already recounted. Probably the impression brought back by the Lacedæmonian fleet which left Cyrus on the coast of Syria, after he had surmounted the most difficult country without any resistance, was highly favorable to his success. So much the more painful would be the disappointment among the Ionian Greeks when the news of his death was afterwards brought; so much the greater their alarm, when Tissaphernes, having relinquished the pursuit of the Ten Thousand Greeks at the moment when they entered the mountains of Karduchia, came down as victor to the seaboard; more powerful than ever, — rewarded<sup>2</sup> by the Great King, for the services which he had rendered against Cyrus, with all the territory which had been governed by the latter, as well as with the title of commander-in-chief over all the neighboring satraps, — and prepared not only to reconquer, but to punish, the revolted maritime cities. He began by attacking Kymê;<sup>3</sup> ravaging the territory, with great loss to the citizens, and exacting from them a still larger contribution, when the approach of winter rendered it inconvenient to besiege their city.

In such a state of apprehension, these cities sent to Sparta, as the great imperial power of Greece, to entreat her protection against the aggravated slavery impending over them.<sup>4</sup> The Lacedæmonians had nothing farther to expect from the king of Persia, with whom they had already broken the peace by lending aid to Cyrus. Moreover, the fame of the Ten Thousand Greeks, who were now coming home along the Euxine towards Byzantium, had become diffused throughout Greece, inspiring signal contempt for Persian military efficiency, and hopes of enrichment by war against the Asiatic satraps. Accordingly, the Spartan ephors were induced

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. i, 1, 8.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 19, ii, 4, 8; Xen. Aellen. iii, 1, 3; iii, 3, 13.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiv, 35.

<sup>4</sup> Diodor. *ut sup.*



to comply with the petition of their Asiatic countrymen, and to send over to Asia Thimbron at the head of a considerable force: two thousand Neodamodes (or Helots who had been enfranchised) and four thousand Peloponnesians heavy-armed, accompanied by three hundred Athenian horsemen, out of the number of those who had been adherents of the Thirty, four years before; an aid granted by Athens at the special request of Thimbron. Arriving in Asia during the winter of 400-399 B. C., Thimbron was reinforced in the spring of 399 B. C. by the Cyreian army, who were brought across from Thrace as described in my last chapter, and taken into Lacedæmonian pay. With this large force he became more than a match for the satraps, even on the plains where they could employ their numerous cavalry. The petty Grecian princes of Pergamus and Teuthrania, holding that territory by ancient grants from Xerxes to their ancestors, joined their troops to his, contributing much to enrich Xenophon at the moment of his departure from the Cyreians. Yet Thimbron achieved nothing worthy of so large an army. He not only miscarried in the siege of Larissa, but was even unable to maintain order among his own soldiers, who pillaged indiscriminately both friends and foes.<sup>1</sup> Such loud complaints were transmitted to Sparta of his irregularities and inefficiency, that the ephors first sent him order to march into Karia, where Tissaphernes resided, — and next, before that order was executed, despatched Derkyllidas to supersede him; seemingly in the winter 399-398 B. C. Thimbron on returning to Sparta was fined and banished.<sup>2</sup>

It is highly probable that the Cyreian soldiers, though excellent in the field, yet having been disappointed of reward for the prodigious toils which they had gone through in their long march, and having been kept on short allowance in Thrace, as well as cheated by Seuthes, — were greedy, unscrupulous, and hard to be restrained, in the matter of pillage; especially as Xenophon, their most influential general, had now left them. Their conduct greatly improved under Derkyllidas. And though such improvement was doubtless owing partly to the superiority of the latter over Thimbron, yet it seems also partly ascribable to the fact that

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 5-8, Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 8-14.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 8, Diodor. xiv, 38.

Xenophon, after a few months of residence at Athens, accompanied him to Asia, and resumed the command of his old comrades.

Derkyllidas was a man of so much resource and cunning, as to have acquired the surname of Sisyphus.<sup>2</sup> He had served throughout all the concluding years of the war, and had been hardest at Abydus during the naval command of Lysander, who condemned him, on the complaint of Pharnabazus, to the disgrace of public exposure with his shield on his arm;<sup>3</sup> this was (I presume) a disgrace, because an officer of rank always had his shield carried for him by an attendant, except in the actual encounter of battle. Having never forgiven Pharnabazus for thus dishonoring him, Derkyllidas now took advantage of a misunderstanding between that satrap and Tissaphernes, to make a truce with the latter, and conduct his army, eight thousand strong, into the territory of the former.<sup>4</sup> The mountainous region of Ida generally known as the Troad, — inhabited by a population of Æolic Greeks (who had gradually Hellenized the indigenous inhabitants), and therefore known as the Æolis of Pharnabazus, — was laid open to him by a recent event, important in itself as well as instructive to read.

The entire Persian empire was parcelled into so many satrapies; each satrap being bound to send a fixed amount of annual tribute, and to hold a certain amount of military force ready, for the court at Susa. Provided he was punctual in fulfilling these obligations, little inquiry was made as to his other proceedings, unless in the rare case of his maltreating some individual Persian of high rank. In like manner, it appears, each satrapy was divided into sub-satrapies or districts; each of these held by a deputy, who paid to the satrap a fixed tribute and maintained for him a certain military force, — having liberty to govern in other respects as he

<sup>1</sup> There is no positive testimony to this; yet such is my belief, as I have stated at the close of the last chapter. It is certain that Xenophon was serving under Agesilaus in Asia three years after this time, the only matter left for conjecture is, at what precise moment he went out the second time. The marked improvement in the Cyreian soldiers, is one reason for the statement in the text; another reason is, the great detail with which the military operations of Derkyllidas are described, rendering it probable that the narrative is from an eye-witness.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 8; Ephorus, ap. Athenæ. xi, p. 530.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 9. *ἐσπάρθη τὴν ἀσπίδα ἔχων.*

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1. 10: iii, 2, 28.



pleased. Besides the tribute, however, presents of undefined amount were of constant occurrence, both from the satrap to the king, and from the deputy to the satrap. Nevertheless, enough was extorted from the people (we need hardly add), to leave an ample profit both to the one and to the other.<sup>1</sup>

This region, called Æolis, had been entrusted by Pharnabazus to a native of Dardanus named Zênis, who, after holding the post for some time and giving full satisfaction, died of illness, leaving a widow with a son and daughter still minors. The satrap was on the point of giving the district to another person, when Mania, the widow of Zênis, herself a native of Dardanus, preferred her petition to be allowed to succeed her husband. Visiting Pharnabazus with money in hand, sufficient not only to satisfy himself, but also to gain over his mistresses and his ministers,<sup>2</sup> — she said to him, — “My husband was faithful to you, and paid his tribute so regularly as to obtain your thanks. If I serve you no worse than he, why should you name any other deputy? If I fail in giving you satisfaction, you can always remove me, and give the place to another.” Pharnabazus granted her petition, and had no cause to repent it. Mania was regular in her payment of tribute, — frequent in bringing him presents, — and splendid, beyond any of his other deputies, in her manner of receiving him whenever he visited the district.

Her chief residence was at Skêpsis, Gergis, and Kebrên, — inland towns, strong both by position and by fortification, amidst the mountainous region once belonging to the Teukri Gergithes. It was here too that she kept her treasures, which, partly left by her husband, partly accumulated by herself, had gradually reached an enormous sum. But her district also reached down to the coast, comprising among other towns the classical name of Ilium, and prob-

<sup>1</sup> See the description of the satrapy of Cyrus (Xenoph. Anab. i, 9, 19, 21, 22). In the main, this division and subdivision of the entire empire into revenue-districts, each held by a nominee responsible for payment of the rent or tribute, to the government or to some higher officer of the government — is the system prevalent throughout a large portion of Asia to the present day.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 10. Ἀναζεύσασα τὸν στόλον, καὶ γρήματα λαβοῦσα, ὥστε καὶ αὐτῷ Φαρναβάζῳ δοῦναι, καὶ ταῖς παλλακίσιν αὐτοῦ χρίσασθαι καὶ τοῖς δυναμίσι μάλιστα παρὰ Φαρναβάζῳ, ἐπορεύετο.

ably her own native city, the neighboring Dardanus. She maintained, besides, a large military force of Grecian mercenaries in regular pay and excellent condition, which she employed both as garrison for each of her dependent towns, and as means for conquest in the neighborhood. She had thus reduced the maritime towns of Larissa, Hamaxitus, and Kolônæ, in the southern part of the Troad; commanding her troops in person, sitting in her chariot to witness the attack, and rewarding every one who distinguished himself. Moreover, when Pharnabazus undertook an expedition against the predatory Mysians or Pisidians, she accompanied him, and her military force formed so much the best part of his army, that he paid her the highest compliments, and sometimes condescended to ask her advice.<sup>1</sup> So, when Xerxes invaded Greece, Artemisia, queen of Halikarnassus, not only furnished ships among the best appointed in his fleet, and fought bravely at Salamis, but also, when he chose to call a council, stood alone, in daring to give him sound opinions contrary to his own leanings; opinions which, fortunately for the Grecian world, he could bring himself only to tolerate, not to follow.<sup>2</sup>

Under an energetic woman like Mania, thus victorious and well-provided, Æolis was the most defensible part of the satrapy of Pharnabazus, and might probably have defied Derkyllidas, had not a domestic traitor put an end to her life. Her son-in-law, Meidias, a Greek of Skêpsis, with whom she lived on terms of intimate confidence — “though she was scrupulously mistrustful of every one else, as it is proper for a despot to be,”<sup>3</sup> — was so inflamed by his own ambition and by the suggestions of evil counsellors, who told him it was a shame that a woman should thus be ruler while

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 15.

<sup>2</sup> Herod. viii, 69.

<sup>3</sup> Such is the emphatic language of Xenophon (Hellen. iii, 1, 14) — Μειδίας, θυγατρὸς ἀνὴρ αὐτῆς, ὢν, ἀναπτερωθεὶς ὑπο τινῶν, ὡς αἰσχρὸν εἶη, γυναῖκα μὲν ἀρχεῖν, αὐτὸν δ' ἰδιωτὴν εἶναι, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους μάλα φυλαττομένης αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ ἐν τυραννίδι προσήκει, ἐκείνῳ δὲ πιστευούσης καὶ ἀσπαζομένης, ὥσπερ ἂν γυνὴ γαμβρὸν ἀσπάζοιτο, — εἰσελθὼν ἀποκνίξαι αὐτὴν λέγεται.

For the illustration of this habitual insecurity in which the Grecian despot lived, see the dialogue of Xenophon called Hieron (i, 12, n. 8-10, vi, 10). He particularly dwells upon the multitude of family crimes which stained the houses of the Grecian despots, murders by fathers sons, brothers, wives, etc. (iii, 8).



he was only a private man, that he strangled her in her chamber. Following up his nefarious scheme, he also assassinated her son, a beautiful youth of seventeen. He succeeded in getting possession of the three strongest places in the district, Kebrên, Skêpsis, and Gergis, together with the accumulated treasure of Mania; but the commanders in the other towns refused obedience to his summons, until they should receive orders from Pharnabazus. To that satrap Meidias instantly sent envoys, bearing ample presents, with a petition that the satrap would grant to him the district which had been enjoyed by Mania. Pharnabazus, repudiating the presents, sent an indignant reply to Meidias,—“Keep them until I come to seize them, and seize you, too, along with them. I would not consent to live, if I were not to avenge the death of Mania.”<sup>1</sup>

At that critical moment, prior to the coming of the satrap, Derkyllidas presented himself with his army, and found Æolis almost defenceless. The three recent conquests of Mania,—Larissa, Hamaxitus, and Kolônæ, surrendered to him as soon as he appeared; while the garrisons of Ilium and some other places, who had taken special service under Mania, and found themselves worse off now that they had lost her, accepted his invitation to renounce Persian dependence, declare themselves allies of Sparta, and hold their cities for him. He thus became master of most part of the district, with the exception of Kebrên, Skêpsis, and Gergis, which he was anxious to secure before the arrival of Pharnabazus. On arriving before Kebrên, however, in spite of this necessity for haste, he remained inactive for four days,<sup>2</sup> because the sacrifices were unpropitious; while a rash, subordinate officer, hazarding an unwarranted attack during this interval, was repulsed and wounded. The sacrifices at length became favorable, and Derkyllidas was rewarded for his patience. The garrison, affected by the example of those at Ilium and the other towns, disobeyed

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 13.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 18; Diodor. xiv, 38.

The reader will remark here how Xenophon shapes the narrative in such a manner as to inculcate the pious duty in a general of obeying the warnings furnished by the sacrifice,—either for action or for inaction. I have already noticed (in my preceding chapters) how often he does this in the *Anabasis*.

Such an inference is never (I believe) to be found suggested in Thucydides

their commander, who tried to earn the satrap's favor by holding out and assuring to him this very strong place. Sending out heralds to proclaim that they would go with Greeks and not with Persians, they admitted the Lacedæmonians at once within the gates. Having thus fortunately captured, and duly secured this important town, Derkyllidas marched against Skêpsis and Gergis, the former of which was held by Meidias himself; who, dreading the arrival of Pharnabazus, and mistrusting the citizens within, thought it best to open negotiations with Derkyllidas. He sent to solicit a conference, demanding hostages for his safety. When he came forth from the town, and demanded from the Lacedæmonian commander on what terms alliance would be granted to him, the latter replied,—“On condition that the citizens shall be left free and autonomous;” at the same time marching on, without waiting either for acquiescence or refusal, straight up to the gates of the town. Meidias, taken by surprise, in the power of the assailants, and aware that the citizens were unfriendly to him, was obliged to give orders that the gates should be opened; so that Derkyllidas found himself by this manœuvre in possession of the strongest place in the district without either loss or delay,—to the great delight of the Skepsians themselves.<sup>1</sup>

Derkyllidas, having ascended the acropolis of Skêpsis to offer a sacrifice of thanks to Athênê, the great patron goddess of Ilium and most of the Teukrian towns,—caused the garrison of Meidias to evacuate the town forthwith, and consigned it to the citizens themselves, exhorting them to conduct their political affairs as became Greeks and freemen. This proceeding, which reminds us of Brasidas in contrast with Lysander, was not less politic than generous; since Derkyllidas could hardly hope to hold an inland town in the midst of the Persian satrapy except by the attachments of the citizens themselves. He then marched away to Gergis, still conducting along with him Meidias, who urgently entreated to be allowed to retain that town, the last of his remaining fortresses. Without giving any decided answer, Derkyllidas took him by his side, and marched with him at the head of his army, arrayed only in double file, so as to carry the appearance of peace, to the foot of the lofty towers of Gergis. The garrison on the

Xen. Hellen. iii, 20-23.



walls, seeing Meidias along with him, allowed him to approach without discharging a single missile. "Now, Meidias (said he), order the gates to be opened, and show me the way in, to the temple of Athênê, in order that I may there offer sacrifice." Again Meidias was forced, from fear of being at once seized as a prisoner, to give the order; and the Lacedæmonian forces found themselves in possession of the town. Derkyllidas, distributing his troops around the walls, in order to make sure of his conquest, ascended to the acropolis to offer his intended sacrifice; after which he proceeded to dictate the fate of Meidias, whom he divested of his character of prince and of his military force, — incorporating the latter in the Lacedæmonian army. He then called upon Meidias to specify all his paternal property, and restored to him the whole of what he claimed as such, though the bystanders protested against the statement given in as a flagrant exaggeration. But he laid hands on all the property, and all the treasures of Mania, — and caused her house, which Meidias had taken for himself, to be put under seal, — as lawful prey; since Mania had belonged to Pharnabazus,<sup>1</sup> against whom the Lacedæmonians were making war. On coming out after examining and verifying the contents of the house, he said to his officers, "Now, my friends, we have here already worked out pay for the whole army, eight thousand men, for nearly a year. Whatever we acquire besides, shall come to you also." He well knew the favorable effect which this intelligence would produce upon the temper, as well as upon the disci-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 26. Εἶπε μοι, ἔφη, Μανία δὲ τίνος ἦν; Οἱ δὲ πάντες εἶπον, ὅτι Φαρναβάζου. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ἐκείνης, ἔφη, Φαρναβάζου, Μαλιστα, ἔφασαν. Ἡμετέρῃ ἂν εἴη, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ κρατοῦμεν πόλεμος γὰρ ἡμῖν Φαρναβάζος.

Two points are remarkable here. 1. The manner in which Mania, the administratrix of a large district, with a prodigious treasure and a large army in pay, is treated as *belonging* to Pharnabazus — as the servant or slave of Pharnabazus. 2. The distinction here taken between public property and private property, in reference to the laws of war and the rights of the conqueror. Derkyllidas lays claim to that which had belonged to Mania (or to Pharnabazus), but *not* to that which had belonged to Meidias.

According to the modern rules of international law, this distinction is one allowed and respected, everywhere except at sea. But in the ancient world, it by no means stood out so clearly or prominently, and the observance of it here deserves notice.

pline of the army. — especially upon the Cyreians, who had tasted the discomfort of irregular pay and poverty.

"And where am I to live?" asked Meidias, who found himself turned out of the house of Mania. "In your rightful place of abode, to be sure (replied Derkyllidas); in your native town Skêpsis, and in your paternal house.<sup>1</sup>" What became of the assassin afterwards, we do not hear. But it is satisfactory to find that he did not reap the anticipated reward of his crime; the fruits of which were an important advantage to Derkyllidas and his army, — and a still more important blessing to the Greek cities which had been governed by Mania, — enfranchisement and autonomy.

This rapid, easy, and skilfully managed exploit, — the capture of nine towns in eight days, — is all which Xenophon mentions as achieved by Derkyllidas during the summer. Having acquired pay for so many months, perhaps the soldiers may have been disposed to rest until it was spent. But as winter approached, it became necessary to find winter quarters, without incurring the reproach which had fallen upon Thimbron of consuming the substance of allies. Fearing, however, that if he changed his position, Pharnabazus would employ the numerous Persian cavalry to harass the Grecian cities, he tendered a truce, which the latter willingly accepted. For the occupation of Æolis by the Lacedæmonian general was a sort of watch-post (like Dekeleia to Athens,) exposing the whole of Phrygia near the Propontis (in which was Daskylium the residence of Pharnabazus) to constant attack.<sup>2</sup> Derkyllidas accordingly only marched through Phrygia, to take up his winter quarters in Bithynia, the north-western corner of Asia Minor, between the Propontis and the Euxine; the same territory through which Xenophon and the Ten Thousand had marched, on their road from Kalpê to Chalkêdon. He procured

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 28.

Thus finishes the interesting narrative about Mania, Meidias, and Derkyllidas. The abundance of detail, and the dramatic manner, in which Xenophon has worked it out, impress me with a belief that he was actually present at the scene.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 1. νομίζων τὴν Αἰολίδα ἐπιτετειχίσθαι τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἀκῇσει Φρυγίᾳ.

The word ἐπιτετείχειν is capital and significant, in Grecian warfare.



abundant provisions and booty, slaves as well as cattle, by plundering the Bithynian villages; not without occasional losses on his own side, by the carelessness of marauding parties.<sup>1</sup>

One of these losses was of considerable magnitude. Derkyllidas had obtained from Seuthes in European Thrace (the same prince of whom Xenophon had so much reason to complain) a reinforcement of three hundred cavalry and two hundred peltasts, — Odrysian Thracians. These Odrysians established themselves in a separate camp, nearly two miles and a half from Derkyllidas, which they surrounded with a palisade about man's height. Being indefatigable plunderers, they prevailed upon Derkyllidas to send them a guard of two hundred hoplites, for the purpose of guarding their separate camp with the booty accumulated within it. Presently the camp became richly stocked, especially with Bithynian captives. The hostile Bithynians, however, watching their opportunity when the Odrysians were out marauding, suddenly attacked at daybreak the two hundred Grecian hoplites in the camp. Shooting at them over the palisade with darts and arrows, they killed and wounded some, while the Greeks with their spears were utterly helpless, and could only reach their enemies by pulling up the palisade and charging out upon them; but the light-armed assailants, easily evading the charge of warriors with shield and spear, turned round upon them when they began to retire, and slew several before they could get back. In each successive sally the same phenomena recurred, until at length all the Greeks were overpowered and slain, except fifteen of them, who charged through the Odrysians in the first sally, and marched onward to join Derkyllidas, instead of returning with their comrades to the palisade. Derkyllidas lost no time in sending a reinforcement, which, however, came too late, and found only the naked bodies of the slain. The victorious Bithynians carried away all their own captives.<sup>2</sup>

At the beginning of spring the Spartan general returned to Lampsakus, where he found Arakus and two other Spartans, just arrived out as commissioners sent by the ephors. Arakus came with instructions to prolong the command of Derkyllidas for another year; as well as to communicate the satisfaction of the ephors with the Cyreian army, in consequence of the great im-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 2-5.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 4.

provement in their conduct, compared with the year of Thimbron. He accordingly assembled the soldiers, and addressed them in a mingled strain of praise and admonition; expressing his hope that they would continue the forbearance which they had now begun to practise towards all Asiatic allies. The commander of the Cyreians (probably Xenophon himself), in his reply, availed himself of the occasion to pay a compliment to Derkyllidas. "We (said he) are the same men now as we were in the previous year; but we are under a different general; you need not look farther for the explanation."<sup>1</sup> Without denying the superiority of Derkyllidas over his predecessor, we may remark that the abundant wealth of Mania, thrown into his hands by accident (though he showed great ability in turning the accident to account), was an auxiliary circumstance, not less unexpected than weighty, for ensuring the good behavior of the soldiers.

It was among the farther instructions of Arakus to visit all the principal Asiatic Greeks, and report their condition at Sparta; and Derkyllidas was pleased to see them entering on this survey at a moment when they would find the cities in undisturbed peace and tranquillity.<sup>2</sup> So long as the truce continued both with Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, these cities were secure from aggression, and paid no tribute; the land-force of Derkyllidas affording to

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 6, 7.

Morus supposes (I think, with much probability) that ὁ τῶν Κυρείων προεστηκὼς here means Xenophon himself.

He could not with propriety advert to the fact that he himself had not been with the army during the year of Thimbron.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 9. ἐπεμψεν αὐτοὺς ἀπ' Ἐφέσου διὰ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν πόλεων, ἡδόμενος ὅτι ἐμελλόν ὀφείσθαι τὰς πόλεις ἐν εἰρήνῃ εὐδαιμονικῶς διαγούσας. I cannot but think that we ought here to read ἐπ' Ἐφέσου, not ἀπ' Ἐφέσου, or else ἀπὸ Λαμψάκου.

It was at Lampsakus that this interview and conversation between Derkyllidas and the commissioners took place. The commissioners were to be sent from Lampsakus to Ephesus through the Grecian cities.

The expression ἐν εἰρήνῃ εὐδαιμονικῶς διαγούσας has reference to the foreign relations of the cities, and to their exemption from annoyance by Persian arms, — without implying any internal freedom or good condition. There were Lacedæmonian harmosts in most of them, and dekarchies half broken up or modified in many; see the subsequent passages (iii, 2, 20; iii, 4, 7; iv, 8, 1).



them a protection<sup>1</sup> analogous to that which had been conferred by Athens and her powerful fleet, during the interval between the formation of the Confederacy of Delos and the Athenian catastrophe at Syracuse. At the same time, during the truce, the army had neither occupation nor subsistence. To keep it together and near at hand, yet without living at the cost of friends, was the problem. It was accordingly with great satisfaction that Derkylidas noticed an intimation accidentally dropped by Arakus. Some envoys (the latter said) were now at Sparta from the Thracian Chersonesus (the long tongue of land bordering westward on the Hellespont), soliciting aid against their marauding Thracian neighbors. That fertile peninsula, first hellenized a century and a half before by the Athenian Miltiades, had been a favorite resort for Athenian citizens, many of whom had acquired property there during the naval power of Athens. The battle of Ægospotami dispossessed and drove home these proprietors, at the same time depriving the peninsula of its protection against the Thracians. It now contained eleven distinct cities, of which Sestos was the most important; and its inhabitants combined to send envoys to Sparta, entreating the ephors to send out a force for the purpose of building a wall across the isthmus from Kardia to Paktyê; in recompense for which (they said) there was fertile land enough open to as many settlers as chose to come, with coast and harbors for export close at hand. Miltiades, on first going out to the Chersonese, had secured it by constructing a cross-wall on the same spot, which had since become neglected during the period of Persian supremacy; Perikles had afterwards sent fresh colonists, and caused the wall to be repaired. But it seems to have been unnecessary while the Athenian empire was in full vigor,—since the Thracian princes had been generally either conciliated, or kept off, by Athens, even without any such bulwark.<sup>2</sup> Informed that the request of the Chersonesites had been favorably listened to at Sparta, Derkylidas resolved to execute their project with his own army. Having prolonged his truce with Pharnabazus, he crossed the Hellespont into Europe, and employed his army during the whole summer in constructing this cross-wall, about four and a

<sup>1</sup> Compare Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 5.

<sup>2</sup> Herodot. vi, 36, Plutarch, Perikles, c. 19; Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.) s. 7.

quarter miles in length. The work was distributed in portions to different sections of the army, competition being excited by rewards for the most rapid and workmanlike execution; while the Chersonesites were glad to provide pay and subsistence for the army, during an operation which provided security for all the eleven cities, and gave additional value to their lands and harbors. Numerous settlers seem to have now come in, under Lacedæmonian auspices,—who were again disturbed, wholly or partially, when the Lacedæmonian maritime empire was broken up a few years afterwards.<sup>1</sup>

On returning to Asia in the autumn, after the completion of this work, which had kept his army usefully employed and amply provided during six months, Derkylidas undertook the siege of Artaneus, a strong post (on the continental coast eastward of Mitylênê) occupied by some Chian exiles, whom the Lacedæmonian admiral Kratesippidas had lent corrupt aid in expelling from their native island a few years before.<sup>2</sup> These men, living by predatory expeditions against Chios and Ionia, were so well supplied with provisions that it cost Derkylidas a blockade of eight months before he could reduce it. He placed in it a strong garrison well supplied, that it might serve him as a retreat in case of need,—under an Achæan named Drako, whose name remained long terrible from his ravages on the neighboring plain of Mysia.<sup>3</sup>

Derkylidas next proceeded to Ephesus, where orders presently reached him from the ephors, directing him to march into Karia and attack Tissaphernes. The temporary truce which had hitherto provisionally kept off Persian soldiers and tribute-gatherers from the Asiatic Greeks, was now renounced by mutual consent. These Greeks had sent envoys to Sparta, assuring the ephors that Tissaphernes would be constrained to renounce formally the sovereign rights of Persia, and grant to them full autonomy, if his residence in Karia were vigorously attacked. Accordingly Derkylidas marched southward across the Mæander into Karia, while the Lacedæmonian fleet under Pharax cooperated along the shore. At the same time Tissaphernes, on his side, had received reinforcements from Susa, together with the appointment of generalissimo over all the Persian force in Asia Minor; upon which Phar-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 10, iv, 8, 5. Diodor. xiv, 38.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiii, 65.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 11; Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyric) s. 167.



nabazus (who had gone up to court in the interval to concert more vigorous means of prosecuting the war, but had now returned)<sup>1</sup> joined him in Karia, prepared to commence vigorous operations for the expulsion of Derkyllidas and his army. Having properly garrisoned the strong places, the two satraps crossed the Mæander at the head of a powerful Grecian and Karian force, with numerous Persian cavalry, to attack the Ionian cities. As soon as he heard this news, Derkyllidas came back with his army from Karia, to cover the towns menaced. Having recrossed the Meander, he was marching with his army in disorder, not suspecting the enemy to be near, when on a sudden he came upon their scouts, planted on some sepulchral monuments in the road. He also sent some scouts up to the neighboring monuments and towers, who apprised him that the two satraps, with their joint force in good order, were planted here to intercept him. He immediately gave orders for his hoplites to form in battle array of eight deep, with the peltasts, and his handful of horsemen, on each flank. But such was the alarm caused among his troops by this surprise, that none could be relied upon except the Cyreians and the Peloponnesians. Of the insular and Ionian hoplites, from Priênê and other cities, some actually hid their arms in the thick standing corn, and fled; others, who took their places in the line, manifested dispositions which left little hope that they would stand a charge; so that the Persians had the opportunity of fighting a battle not merely with superiority of number, but also with advantage of position and circumstances. Pharnabazus was anxious to attack without delay. But Tissaphernes, who recollected well the valor of the Cyreian troops, and concluded that all the remaining Greeks were like them, forbade it; sending forward heralds to demand a conference. As they approached, Derkyllidas, surrounding himself with a body-guard of the finest and best-equipped soldiers,<sup>2</sup> advanced to the front of the line to meet them; saying that he, for his part, was prepared

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 39.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 18.

In the *Anabasis* (ii, 3, 3) Xenophon mentions the like care on the part of Klearchus, to have the best armed and most imposing soldiers around him, when he went to his interview with Tissaphernes.

Xenophon gladly avails himself of the opportunity, to pay an indirect compliment to the Cyreian army.

to fight, — but since a conference was demanded, he had no objection to grant it, provided hostages were exchanged. This having been assented to, and a place named for conference on the ensuing day, both armies were simultaneously withdrawn; the Persians to Tralles, the Greeks to Leukophrys, celebrated for its temple of Artemis Leukophryne.<sup>1</sup>

This backwardness on the part of Tissaphernes even at a time when he was encouraged by a brother satrap braver than himself, occasioned to the Persians the loss of a very promising moment, and rescued the Grecian army out of a position of much peril. It helps to explain to us the escape of the Cyreians, and the manner in which they were allowed to cross rivers and pass over the most difficult ground without any serious opposition; while at the same time it tended to confirm in the Greek mind the same impressions of Persian imbecility as that escape so forcibly suggested.

The conference, as might be expected, ended in nothing. Derkyllidas required on behalf of the Asiatic Greeks complete autonomy, — exemption from Persian interference and tribute; while the two satraps on their side insisted that the Lacedæmonian army should be withdrawn from Asia, and the Lacedæmonian harmosts from all the Greco-Asiatic cities. An armistice was concluded, to allow time for reference to the authorities at home; thus replacing matters in the condition in which they had been at the beginning of the year.<sup>2</sup>

Shortly after the conclusion of this truce, Agesilaus, king of Sparta, arrived with a large force, and the war in all respects began to assume larger proportions, — of which more in the next chapter.

But it was not in Asia alone that Sparta had been engaged in war. The prostration of the Athenian power had removed that common bond of hatred and alarm which attached the allies to her headship; while her subsequent conduct had given positive offence, and had even excited against herself the same fear of unmeasured imperial ambition which had before run so powerfully against Athens. She had appropriated to herself nearly the whole of the Athenian maritime empire, with a tribute scarcely inferior, if at all inferior, in amount. How far the total of one thousand talents was actually realised during each successive year, we are not in a

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 19, Diodor. xiv, 39.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 20.



condition to say; but such was the assessment imposed and the scheme laid down by Sparta for her maritime dependencies, — enforced too by omnipresent instruments of rapacity and oppression, decemvirs and harmosts, such as Athens had never paralleled. When we add to this great maritime empire the prodigious ascendancy on land which Sparta had enjoyed before, we shall find a total of material power far superior to that which Athens had enjoyed, even in her day of greatest exaltation, prior to the truce of 445 B. C.

This was not all. From the general dulness of character pervading Spartan citizens, the full resources of the state were hardly ever put forth. Her habitual short-comings at the moment of action are keenly criticised by her own friends, in contrast with the ardor and forwardness which animated her enemies. But at and after the battle of Ægospotami, the entire management of Spartan foreign affairs was found in the hands of Lysander; a man not only exempt from the inertia usual in his countrymen, but of the most unwearied activity and grasping ambition, as well for his country as for himself. Under his direction the immense advantages which Sparta enjoyed from her new position were at once systematized and turned to the fullest account. Now there was enough in the new ascendancy of Sparta, had it been ever so modestly handled, to spread apprehension through the Grecian world. But apprehension became redoubled, when it was seen that her ascendancy was organized and likely to be worked by her most aggressive leader for the purposes of an insatiable ambition. Fortunately for the Grecian world, indeed, the power of Sparta did not long continue to be thus absolutely wielded by Lysander, whose arrogance and overweening position raised enemies against him at home. Yet the first impressions received by the allies respecting Spartan empire, were derived from his proceedings and his plans of dominion, manifested with ostentatious insolence; and such impressions continued, even after the influence of Lysander himself had been much abated by the counterworking rivalry of Pausanias and others.

While Sparta separately had thus gained so much by the close of the war, not one of her allies had received the smallest remuneration or compensation, except such as might be considered to be involved in the destruction of a formidable enemy. Even the

pecuniary result or residue which Lysander had brought home with him (four hundred and seventy talents remaining out of the advances made by Cyrus), together with the booty acquired at Dekeleia, was all detained by the Lacedæmonians themselves. Thebes and Corinth indeed presented demands, in which the other allies did not (probably durst not) join, to be allowed to share. But though all the efforts and sufferings of the war had fallen upon these allies no less than upon Sparta, the demands were refused, and almost resented as insults.<sup>1</sup> Hence there arose among the allies not merely a fear of the grasping dominion, but a hatred of the monopolizing rapacity, of Sparta. Of this new feeling, an early manifestation, alike glaring and important, was made by the Thebans and Corinthians, when they refused to join Pausanias in his march against Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles in Peiræus,<sup>2</sup> — less than a year after the surrender of Athens, the enemy whom these two cities had hated with such extreme bitterness down to the very moment of surrender. Even Arcadians and Achæans too, habitually obedient as they were to Lacedæmon, keenly felt the different way in which she treated them, as compared with the previous years of war, when she had been forced to keep alive their zeal against the common enemy.<sup>3</sup>

The Lacedæmonians were however strong enough not merely to despise this growing alienation of their allies, but even to take revenge upon such of the Peloponnesians as had incurred their displeasure. Among these stood conspicuous the Eleians; now under a government called democratical, of which the leading man was Thrasydæus, — a man who had lent considerable aid in 404 B. C. to Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles in Peiræus. The Eleians, in the year 420 B. C., had been engaged in a controversy with Sparta, — had employed their privileges as administrators

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 5, 5; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 27; Justin, v, 10.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 30.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 12. Κορινθίους δὲ καὶ Ἀρκαδας καὶ Ἀχαιοὺς τι φάμεν; οἱ ἐν μὲν τῷ πρὸς ὑμᾶς (it is the Theban envoys who are addressing the public assembly at Athens) πολέμῳ μάλα λιπαρούμενοι ὑπ' ἐκεῖνων (the Lacedæmonians), παντῶν καὶ πόνων καὶ κινδύνων καὶ δαπανημάτων μετείχον· ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπραξαν ἃ ἐβούλοντο οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ποίας ἡ ἀρχῆς ἡ τιμῆς ἡ ποίων χρημάτων μετὰ δέδωκασιν αὐτοῖς; ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν εἰλώτας ἀρμοστὰς καθιστάναι ἀξιούσι, τῶν δὲ ζυμμάχων ἐλευθέρων ὄντων, ἐπεὶ εὐτύχῃσαι δεσποταὶ ἀναπεφύνησιν.



of the Olympic festival to exclude her from attendance on that occasion, — and had subsequently been in arms against her along with Argos and Mantinea. To these grounds of quarrel, now of rather ancient date, had been added afterwards, a refusal to furnish aid in the war against Athens since the resumption of hostilities in 414 B. C., and a recent exclusion of king Agis, who had come in person to offer sacrifice and consult the oracle of Zeus Olympius; such exclusion being grounded on the fact that he was about to pray for victory in the war then pending against Athens, contrary to the ancient canon of the Olympic temple, which admitted no sacrifice or consultation respecting hostilities of Greek against Greek.<sup>1</sup> These were considered by Sparta as affronts; and the season was now favorable for resenting them, as well as for chastising and humbling Elis.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly Sparta sent an embassy, requiring the Eleians to make good the unpaid arrears of the quota assessed upon them for the cost of the war against Athens; and farther, — to relinquish their authority over their dependent townships or Perioeci, leaving the latter autonomous.<sup>3</sup> Of these dependencies there were several, no one very considerable individually, in the region called Triphylia, south of the river Alpheus, and north of the Neda. One of them was Lepreum, the autonomy of which the Lacedæmonians had vindicated against Elis in 420 B. C., though during the subsequent period it had again become subject.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 22.

Τούτων δ' ὕστερον, καὶ Ἀγίδος πεμφθέντος θῦσαι τῷ Διὶ κατὰ μαντεῖαν τινα, ἐκώλυον οἱ Ἡλείοι, μὴ προσέχεσθαι νικην πολέμου, λέγοντες, ὡς καὶ τὸ ἀρχαῖον εἶη οὕτω νόμιμον, μὴ χρηστηριάζεσθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐφ' Ἑλλήνων πολέμῳ, ὥστε ἄνθρωπος ἀπῆλθεν.

This canon seems not unnatural, for one of the greatest Pan-hellenic temples and establishments. Yet it was not constantly observed at Olympia (compare another example — Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 2); nor yet at Delphi, which was not less Pan-hellenic than Olympia (see Thucyd. i, 118). We are therefore led to imagine that it was a canon which the Eleians invoked only when they were prompted by some special sentiment or aversion.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 23. Ἐκ τούτων οὖν παντῶν ὀργιζόμενοι, ἔδοξε τοῖς ἑφόροις καὶ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, σωφρονίσαι αὐτούς.

<sup>3</sup> Diodorus (xiv, 17) mentions this demand for the arrears; which appears very probable. It is not directly noticed by Xenophon, who however mentions (see the passage cited in the note of page preceding) the general assessment levied by Sparta upon all her Peloponnesian allies during the war.

The Eleians refused compliance with the demand thus sent, alleging that their dependent cities were held by the right of conquest. They even retorted upon the Lacedæmonians the charge of enslaving Greeks;<sup>1</sup> upon which Agis marched with an army to invade their territory, entering it from the north side where it joined Achaia. Hardly had he crossed the frontier river Larissus and begun his ravages, when an earthquake occurred. Such an event, usually construed in Greece as a divine warning, acted on this occasion so strongly on the religious susceptibilities of Agis, that he not only withdrew from the Eleian territory, but disbanded his army. His retreat gave so much additional courage to the Eleians, that they sent envoys and tried to establish alliances among those cities which they knew to be alienated from Sparta. Not even Thebes and Corinth, however, could be induced to assist them; nor did they obtain any other aid except one thousand men from Ætolia.

In the next summer Agis undertook a second expedition, accompanied on this occasion by all the allies of Sparta; even by the Athenians, now enrolled upon the list. Thebes and Corinth alone stood aloof. On this occasion he approached from the opposite or southern side, that of the territory once called Messenia; passing through Aulon, and crossing the river Neda. He marched through Triphylia to the river Alpheius, which he crossed, and then proceeded to Olympia, where he consummated the sacrifice from which the Eleians had before excluded him. In his march he was joined by the inhabitants of Lepreum, Makistus, and other dependent towns, which now threw off their subjection to Elis. Thus reinforced, Agis proceeded onward towards the city of Elis, through a productive country under flourishing agriculture, enriched by the crowds and sacrifices at the neighboring Olympic temple, and for

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 17.

Diodorus introduces in these transactions King Pausanias, not King Agis, as the acting person.

Pausanias states (iii, 8, 2) that the Eleians, in returning a negative answer to the requisition of Sparta, added that they would enfranchise their Perioeci, when they saw Sparta enfranchise her own. This answer appears to me highly improbable, under the existing circumstances of Sparta and her relations to the other Grecian states. Allusion to the relations between Sparta and her Perioeci was a novelty, even in 371 B. C., at the congress which preceded the battle of Leuktra.

a long period unassailed. After attacking, not very vigorously, the half-fortified city, — and being repelled by the Ætolian auxiliaries, — he marched onward to the harbor called Kyllênê, still plundering the territory. So ample was the stock of slaves, cattle, and rural wealth generally, that his troops not only acquired riches for themselves by plunder, but were also joined by many Arcadian and Achæan volunteers, who crowded in to partake of the golden harvest.<sup>1</sup>

The opposition or wealthy oligarchical party in Elis availed themselves of this juncture to take arms against the government; hoping to get possession of the city, and to maintain themselves in power by the aid of Sparta. Xenias their leader, a man of immense wealth, with several of his adherents, rushed out armed, and assailed the government-house, in which it appears that Thrasydæus and his colleagues had been banqueting. They slew several persons, and among them one, whom, from great personal resemblance, they mistook for Thrasydæus. The latter was however at that moment intoxicated, and asleep in a separate chamber.<sup>2</sup> They then assembled in arms in the market-place, believing themselves to be masters of the city; while the people, under the like impression that Thrasydæus was dead, were too much dismayed to offer resistance. But presently it became known that he was yet alive; the people crowded to the government-house "like a swarm of bees,"<sup>3</sup> and arrayed themselves for his protection as well as under his guidance. Leading them forth at once to battle, he completely defeated the oligarchical insurgents, and forced them to flee for protection to the Lacedæmonian army.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 23, 26; Diodor. xiv, 17.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 27; Pausanias, iii, 8, 2; v, 4, 5.

The words of Xenophon are not very clear — *Βουλόμενοι δὲ οἱ περὶ Ξενίαν τὸν λεγόμενον μεδίμνῳ ἀπομετρήσασθαι τὸ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀργύριον (τὴν πόλιν) δι' αὐτῶν προσχωρήσαι Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἐκπεσόντες ἐξ οἰκίας ξίφη ἔχοντες σφαγὰς ποιοῦσι, καὶ ἄλλους τε τινὰς κτείνουσι, καὶ ὁμοίον τινα Θρασυδαίῳ ἀποκτείναντες, τῷ τοῦ δήμου προστάτῃ, ὦντο Θρασυδαίον ἀπεκτονέναι...* 'Ο δὲ Θρασυδαῖος ἐτι καθεύδων ἐτύγχανεν, οὐπερ ἐμεθύσθη.

Both the words and the narrative are here very obscure. It seems as if a sentence had dropped out, when we come suddenly upon the mention of the drunken state of Thrasydæus, without having before been told of any circumstance either leading to or implying this condition.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 28.

Agis presently evacuated the Eleian territory, yet not without planting a Lacedæmonian harmost and a garrison, together with Xenias and the oligarchical exiles, at Epitalium, a little way south of the river Alpheius. Occupying this fort (analogous to Dekeleia in Attica), they spread ravage and ruin all around throughout the autumn and winter, to such a degree, that in the early spring, Thrasydæus and the Eleian government were compelled to send to Sparta and solicit peace. They consented to raze the imperfect fortifications of their city, so as to leave it quite open. They farther surrendered their harbor of Kyllênê with their ships of war, and relinquished all authority over the Triphylian townships, as well as over Lasion, which was claimed as an Arcadian town.<sup>1</sup> Though they pressed strenuously their claim to preserve the town of Epeium (between the Arcadian town of Heræa and the Triphylian town of Makistus), on the plea that they had bought it from its previous inhabitants at the price of thirty talents paid down, — the Lacedæmonians, pronouncing this to be a compulsory bargain imposed upon weaker parties by force, refused to recognize it. The town was taken away from them, seemingly without any reimbursement of the purchase money either in part or in whole. On these terms the Eleians were admitted to peace, and enrolled again among the members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 30. There is something perplexing in Xenophon's description of the Triphylian townships which the Eleians surrendered. First, he does not name Lepreum or Makistus, both of which nevertheless had joined Agis on his invasion, and were the most important places in Triphylia (iii, 2, 25). Next, he names Letrini, Amphidoli, and Marganeis, as Triphylian; which yet were on the north of the Alpheius, and are elsewhere distinguished from Triphylian. I incline to believe that the words in his text, *καὶ τὰς Τριφυλίας πόλεις ἀφείναι*, must be taken to mean Lepreum and Makistus, perhaps with some other places which we do not know; but that a *καὶ* after *ἀφείναι*, has fallen out of the text, and that the cities, whose names follow, are to be taken as *not* Triphylian. Phrixa and Epitalium were both south, but only just south, of the Alpheius; they were not on the borders of Triphylia, — and it seems doubtful whether they were properly Triphylian.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 30; Diodor. xiv, 34; Pausan. iii, 8, 2.

This war between Sparta and Elis reaches over three different years, it began in the first, occupied the whole of the second, and was finished in the third. Which years these three were (out of the seven which separate B. C. 403–396), critics have not been unanimous.



The time of the Olympic festival seems to have been now approaching, and the Eleians were probably the more anxious to obtain peace from Sparta, as they feared to be deprived of their privilege as superintendents. The Pisatans, — inhabitants of the district immediately around Olympia, — availed themselves of the Spartan invasion of Elis to petition for restoration of their original privilege, as administrators of the temple of Zeus at Olympia with its great periodical solemnity, — by the dispossession of the Eleians as usurpers of that privilege. But their request met with no success. It was true indeed that such right had belonged to the Pisatans in early days, before the Olympic festival had acquired its actual Pan-hellenic importance and grandeur; and that the Eleians had only appropriated it to themselves after conquering

Following the chronology of Diodorus, who places the beginning of the war in 402 B. C., I differ from Mr. Clinton, who places it in 401 B. C. (*Fasti Hellen. ad ann.*), and from Sievers (*Geschichte von Griechenland bis zur Schlacht von Mantinea*, p. 382), who places it in 398 B. C.

According to Mr. Clinton's view, the principal year of the war would have been 400 B. C., the year of the Olympic festival. But surely, had such been the fact, the coincidence of war in the country with the Olympic festival, must have raised so many complications, and acted so powerfully on the sentiments of all parties, as to be specifically mentioned. In my judgment, the war was brought to a close in the early part of 400 B. C., before the time of the Olympic festival arrived. Probably the Eleians were anxious, on this very ground, to bring it to a close before the festival did arrive.

Sievers, in his discussion of the point, admits that the date assigned by Diodorus to the Eleian war, squares both with the date which Diodorus gives for the death of Agis, and with that which Plutarch states about the duration of the reign of Agesilaus, — better than the chronology which he himself (Sievers) prefers. He founds his conclusion on Xenophon, *Hell.* iii, 2, 21. *Τούτων δὲ πραττομένων ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ ὑπὸ Δερκυλλίδα, Λακεδαιμόνιοι κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον πάλαι ἐργιζόμενοι τοῖς Ἡλείοις*, etc.

This passage is certainly of some weight; yet I think in the present case it is not to be pressed with rigid accuracy as to date. The whole third Book down to these very words, has been occupied entirely with the course of Asiatic affairs. Not a single proceeding of the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus, since the amnesty at Athens, has yet been mentioned. The command of Derkyllidas included only the last portion of the Asiatic exploits, and Xenophon has here loosely referred to it as if it comprehended the whole. Sievers moreover compresses the whole Eleian war into one year and a fraction; an interval, shorter, I think, than that which is implied in the statements of Xenophon.

the territory of Pisa. But taking the festival as it then stood, the Pisatans, mere villagers without any considerable city, were incompetent to do justice to it, and would have lowered its dignity in the eyes of all Greece.

Accordingly the Lacedæmonians, on this ground, dismissed the claimants, and left the superintendence of the Olympic games still in the hands of the Eleians.<sup>1</sup>

This triumphant dictation of terms to Elis, placed the Lacedæmonians in a condition of overruling ascendancy throughout Peloponnesus, such as they had never attained before. To complete their victory, they rooted out all the remnants of their ancient enemies the Messenians, some of whom had been planted by the Athenians at Naupaktus, others in the island of Kephallenia. All of this persecuted race were now expelled, in the hour of Lacedæmonian omnipotence, from the neighborhood of Peloponnesus, and forced to take shelter, some in Sicily, others at Kyrênê.<sup>2</sup> We shall in a future chapter have to commemorate the turn of fortune in their favor.

<sup>1</sup> *Xen. Hellen.* iii, 2, 31.

<sup>2</sup> *Diodor.* xiv, 34, *Pausan.* iv, 26, 2.

## CHAPTER LXXIII.

## AGESILAUS KING OF SPARTA. — THE CORINTHIAN WAR.

THE close of the Peloponnesian war, with the victorious organization of the Lacedæmonian empire by Lysander, has already been described as a period carrying with it increased sufferings to those towns which had formerly belonged to the Athenian empire, as compared with what they had endured under Athens, — and harder dependence, unaccompanied by any species of advantage, even to those Peloponnesians and inland cities which had always been dependent allies of Sparta. To complete the melancholy picture of the Grecian world during these years, we may add (what will be hereafter more fully detailed) that calamities of a still more deplorable character overtook the Sicilian Greeks; first, from the invasion of the Carthaginians, who sacked Himera, Selinus, Agrigentum, Gela, and Kamarina, — next from the overruling despotism of Dionysius at Syracuse.

Sparta alone had been the gainer; and that to a prodigious extent, both in revenue and power. It is from this time, and from the proceedings of Lysander, that various ancient authors dated the commencement of her degeneracy, which they ascribe mainly to her departure from the institutions of Lykurgus by admitting gold and silver money. These metals had before been strictly prohibited; no money being tolerated except heavy pieces of iron, not portable except to a very trifling amount. That such was the ancient institution of Sparta, under which any Spartan having in his possession gold and silver money, was liable, if detected, to punishment, appears certain. How far the regulation may have been in practice evaded, we have no means of determining. Some of the ephors strenuously opposed the admission of the large sum brought home by Lysander as remnant of what he had received from Cyrus towards the prosecution of the war. They contended that the admission of so much gold and silver into the public treasury was a flagrant transgression of the Lykurgæan ordinances. But their resistance was unavailing, and the new ac-

quisitions were received; though it still continued to be a penal offence (and was even made a capital offence, if we may trust Plutarch) for any individual to be found with gold and silver in his possession.<sup>1</sup> To enforce such a prohibition, however, even if practicable before, ceased to be practicable so soon as these metals were recognized and tolerated in the possession, and for the purposes of the government.

There can be no doubt that the introduction of a large sum of coined gold and silver into Sparta was in itself a striking and important phenomenon, when viewed in conjunction with the peculiar customs and discipline of the state. It was likely to raise strong antipathies in the bosom of an old fashioned Spartan, and probably king Archidamus, had he been alive, would have taken part with the opposing ephors. But Plutarch and others have criticised it too much as a phenomenon by itself; whereas, it was really one characteristic mark and portion of a new assemblage of circumstances, into which Sparta had been gradually arriving during the last years of the war, and which were brought into the most effective action by the decisive success at Ægospotami. The institutions of Lykurgus, though excluding all Spartan citizens, by an unremitting drill and public mess, from trade and industry, from ostentation, and from luxury, — did not by any means extinguish in their bosoms the love of money;<sup>2</sup> while it had a positive tendency to exaggerate, rather than to abate, the love of power. The Spartan kings, Leotychides and Pleistoanax, had

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 17. Compare Xen. Rep. Laced. vii, 6.

Both Ephorus and Theopompus recounted the opposition to the introduction of gold and silver into Sparta, each mentioning the name of one of the ephors as taking the lead in it.

There was a considerable body of ancient sentiment, and that too among high-minded and intelligent men, which regarded gold and silver as a cause of mischief and corruption, and of which the stanza of Horace (Od. iii, 3, is an echo: —

Aurum irreperit, et sic melius situm  
Cum terra celat, spernere fortior  
Quam cogere humanos in usus,  
Omne sacrum rapiente dextrâ.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 23.

Ἀποβέβηκε δὲ τοῦναντίον τῷ νομοθετῇ τοῦ συμφέροντος τὴν μὲν γὰρ πόλιν πεποίηκεν ἀχρήματον, τοὺς δ' ἰδιώτας φιλοχρημάτων.



both been guilty of receiving bribes; Tissaphernes had found means (during the twentieth year of the Peloponnesian war) to corrupt not merely the Spartan admiral Astyochus, but also nearly all the captains of the Peloponnesian fleet, except the Syracusan Hermokrates; Gylippus, as well as his father Kleandrides, had degraded himself by the like fraud; and Anaxibius at Byzantium was not at all purer. Lysander, enslaved only by his appetite for dominion, and himself a remarkable instance of superiority to pecuniary corruption, was thus not the first to engraft that vice on the minds of his countrymen. But though he found it already diffused among them, he did much to impart to it a still more decided predominance, by the immense increase of opportunities, and enlarged booty for peculation, which his newly-organized Spartan empire furnished. Not merely did he bring home a large residue in gold and silver, but there was a much larger annual tribute imposed by him on the dependent cities, combined with numerous appointments of harmosts to govern these cities. Such appointments presented abundant illicit profits, easy to acquire, and even difficult to avoid, since the decemvirs in each city were eager thus to purchase forbearance or connivance for their own misdeeds. So many new sources of corruption were sufficient to operate most unfavorably on the Spartan character, if not by implanting any fresh vices, at least by stimulating all its inherent bad tendencies.

To understand the material change thus wrought in it, we have only to contrast the speeches of king Archidamus and of the Corinthians, made in 432 B. C. at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, with the state of facts at the end of the war, — during the eleven years between the victory of Ægospotami and the defeat of Knidus (405–394 B. C.) At the former of the two epochs, Sparta had no tributary subjects, nor any funds in her treasury, while her citizens were very reluctant to pay imposts.<sup>1</sup> About 334 B. C., thirty-seven years after her defeat at Leuktra and her loss of Messenia, Aristotle remarks the like fact, which had then again become true;<sup>2</sup> but during the continuance of her empire

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i, 80. ἀλλὰ πολλῶ ἐτι πλέον τούτου (χρημάτων) ἔλλ' ἵππευεν καὶ οὐτε ἐν κοίνῳ ἔχομεν, οὐτε ἐτοίμως ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων φέρομεν

<sup>2</sup> Aristotel. Polit. ii, 6, 23. Φαύλως δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰ κοινὰ χρήματα τοῖς

between 405 and 394 B. C., she possessed a large public revenue, derived from the tribute of the dependent cities. In 432 B. C., Sparta is not merely cautious but backward; especially averse to any action at a distance from home.<sup>1</sup> In 404 B. C., after the close of the war, she becomes aggressive, intermeddling, and ready for dealing with enemies, or making acquisitions remote as well as near.<sup>2</sup> In 432 B. C., her unsocial and exclusive manners, against the rest of Greece, with her constant expulsion of other Greeks from her own city, stand prominent among her attributes;<sup>3</sup> while at the end of the war, her foreign relations had acquired such great development as to become the principal matter of attention for her leading citizens as well as for her magistrates; so that the influx of strangers into Sparta, and the efflux of Spartans into other parts of Greece became constant and inevitable. Hence the strictness of the Lykurgian discipline gave way on many points, and the principal Spartans especially struggled by various shifts to evade its obligations. It was to these leading men that the great prizes fell, enabling them to enrich themselves at the expense either of foreign subjects or of the public treasury, and tending more and more to aggravate that inequality of wealth among the Spartans which Aristotle so emphatically notices in his time;<sup>4</sup> since the smaller citizens had no similar opportunities opened to them, nor any industry of their own, to guard their properties against gradual subdivision and absorption, and to keep them in a permanent state of ability to furnish that contribution to the mess-table, for themselves and their sons, which formed the groundwork of Spartan political franchise. Moreover, the spec-

Σπαρτιώταις· οὐτε γὰρ ἐν τῇ κοινῇ τῆς πόλεως ἐστὶν οὐδὲν, πολέμους μεγάλους ἀναγκαζομένους φέρειν· εἰσφέρουσι τε κακῶς, etc.

Contrast what Plato says in his dialogue of Alkibiades, i, c. 39, p. 122 E. about the great quantity of gold and silver then at Sparta. The dialogue must bear date at some period between 400–371 B. C.

<sup>1</sup> See the speeches of the Corinthian envoys and of King Archidamus at Sparta (Thucyd. i, 70–84; compare also viii, 24–96).

<sup>2</sup> See the criticisms upon Sparta, about 395 B. C. and 372 B. C. (Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 5, 11–15; vi, 3, 8–11).

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. i, 77. Ἀμικτα γὰρ τὰ τε καθ' ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς νόμιμα τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχετε, etc. About the ξενηλασίαι of the Spartans — see the speech of Perikles in Thucyd. i. 138.

<sup>4</sup> Aristotel. Politic. ii. 6, 10



tacle of such newly-opened lucrative prizes, — accessible only to that particular section of influential Spartan families who gradually became known apart from the rest under the title of the Equals or Peers, — embittered the discontent of the energetic citizens beneath that privileged position, in such a manner as to menace the tranquillity of the state, — as will presently be seen. That sameness of life, habits, attainments, aptitudes, enjoyments, fatigues, and restraints, which the Lykurgian regulations had so long enforced, and still continued to prescribe, — divesting wealth of its principal advantages, and thus keeping up the sentiment of personal equality among the poorer citizens, — became more and more eluded by the richer, through the venality as well as the example of ephors and senators;<sup>1</sup> while for those who had no means of corruption, it continued unrelaxed, except in so far as many of them fell into a still more degraded condition by the loss of their citizenship.

It is not merely Isokratês,<sup>2</sup> who attests the corruption wrought in the character of the Spartans by the possession of that foreign empire which followed the victory of Ægospotami, — but also their earnest panegyrist Xenophon. After having warmly extolled the laws of Lykurgus or the Spartan institutions, he is constrained to admit that his eulogies, though merited by the past, have become lamentably inapplicable to that present which he himself witnessed. "Formerly (says he,<sup>3</sup>) the Lacedæmonians used to prefer their

<sup>1</sup> Aristot. Politic. ii, 6, 16-18; ii, 7, 3. <sup>2</sup> Isokrates, de Pace, s. 118-127.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. de Republ. Laced. c. 14.

Οἶδα γὰρ πρότερον μὲν Λακεδαιμονίους αἰρουμένους, οἴκοι τὰ μέτρια ἔχοντας ἁλλήλοισι συνεῖναι μᾶλλον, ἢ ἀρμόζοντας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ κολακνευμένους διαφθεῖρεσθαι. Καὶ πρόσθεν μὲν οἶδα αὐτοὺς φοβουμένους, χρύσιον ἔχοντας φαίνεσθαι· νῦν δ' ἔστιν οὗς καὶ καλλωπιζομένους ἐπὶ τῷ κεκτημένῳ. Ἐπίσταμαι δὲ καὶ πρόσθεν τούτου ἕνεκα ξενηλασίας γιγνομένης, καὶ ἀποδημεῖν οὐκ ἔχον, ὅπως μὴ βαδισουργίας οἱ πολῖται ἀπὸ τῶν ξένων ἐμπιμπλαιντο· νῦν δ' ἐπίσταμαι τοὺς δοκοῦντας πρώτους εἶναι ἐσπονδακῶτα, ὥς μηδεπότε παύονται ἀρμόζοντες ἐπὶ ξένης. Καὶ ἦν μὲν, ὅτε ἐπεμελοῦντο, ὅπως ἀξιοὶ εἴεν ἡγεῖσθαι· νῦν δὲ τολὸν μᾶλλον πραγματεύονται, ὅπως ἀρξουσιν, ἢ ὅπως ἀξιοὶ τοῦτο ἔσονται. Τοιγαροῦν οἱ Ἕλληνες πρότερον μὲν ἴοντες εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐδέοντο αὐτῶν, ἡγεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς δοκοῦντας ἀδικεῖν· νῦν δὲ πολλοὶ παρακαλοῦσιν ἁλλήλους ἐπὶ τῷ διακωλύειν ἀρξαι πάλιν αὐτοὺς. Οὐδὲν μὲντοι δεῖ θαυμάζειν τούτων τῶν ἐπιπόρων αὐτοῖς γιγνομένων, ἐπειδὴ φανεροὶ εἴσιν ὅτε τῷ θεῷ πειθόμενοι οὐτε τοῖς Λυκούργου νόμοις.

The expression, "taking measures to hinder the Lacedæmonians from again exercising empire," — marks this treatise as probably composed some

own society and moderate way of life at home, to appointments as harmosts in foreign towns, with all the flattery and all the corruption attending them. Formerly, they were afraid to be seen with gold in their possession; now, there are some who make even an ostentatious display of it. Formerly, they enforced their (Xenêlasy or) expulsion of strangers, and forbade foreign travel, in order that their citizens might not be filled with relaxed habits of life from contact with foreigners; but now, those who stand first in point of influence among them, study above all things to be in perpetual employment as harmosts abroad. There was a time when they took pains to be worthy of headship; but now they strive much rather to get and keep the command, than to be properly qualified for it. Accordingly, the Greeks used in former days to come and solicit, that the Spartans would act as their leaders against wrong-doers; but now they are exhorting each other to concert measures for shutting out Sparta from renewed empire. Nor can we wonder that the Spartans have fallen into this discredit, when they have manifestly renounced obedience both to the Delphian god, and to the institutions of Lykurgus!"

This criticism (written at some period between 394-371 B. C.) from the strenuous eulogist of Sparta is highly instructive. We know from other evidences how badly the Spartan empire worked for the subject cities; we here learn how badly it worked for the character of the Spartans themselves, and for those internal institutions which even an enemy of Sparta, who detested her foreign policy, still felt constrained to admire.<sup>1</sup> All the vices, here insisted upon by Xenophon, arise from various incidents connected with her empire. The moderate, home-keeping, old-fashioned, backward disposition, — of which the Corinthians complain,<sup>2</sup> but

time between their naval defeat at Knidus, and their land-defeat at Leuktra. The former put an end to their maritime empire, — the latter excluded them from all possibility of recovering it; but during the interval between the two, such recovery was by no means impossible.

<sup>1</sup> The Athenian envoy at Melos says, — Λακεδαιμόνιοι γὰρ πρὸς μὲν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἐπιχώρια νόμιμα, πλεῖστα ἀρετῇ χρῶνται· πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους — ἐπιφανέστατα ὧν ἴσμεν τὰ μὲν ἡδέα καλὰ νομίζουσι, τὰ δὲ συμφέροντα δίκαια (Thucyd. v. 105). A judgment almost exactly the same, is pronounced by Polybius (vi, 48).

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. i, 69, 70, 71, 34. ἀρχαῖοτροπα ἡμῶν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα — ἄσκησις πρὸς ἡμᾶς μελλητὰς καὶ ἀτοδημητὰς πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους: also viii, 24.



for which king Archidamus takes credit, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, — is found exchanged, at the close of the war, for a spirit of aggression and conquest, for ambition public as well as private, and for emancipation of the great men from the subduing equality of the discipline enacted by Lykurgus.

Agis the son of Archidamus (426–399 B. C.), and Pausanias son of Pleistoanax (408–394 B. C.), were the two kings of Sparta at the end of the war. But Lysander, the admiral or commander of the fleet, was for the time<sup>2</sup> greater than either of the two kings, who had the right of commanding only the troops on land. I have already mentioned how his overweening dictation and insolence offended not only Pausanias, but also several of the ephors and leading men at Sparta, as well as Pharnabazus the Persian satrap; thus indirectly bringing about the emancipation of Athens from the Thirty, the partial discouragement of the dekharchies throughout Greece, and the recall of Lysander himself from his command. It was not without reluctance that the conqueror of Athens submitted to descend again to a private station. Amidst the crowd of flatterers who heaped incense on him at the moment of his omnipotence, there were not wanting those who suggested that he was much more worthy to reign than either Agis or Pausanias; that the kings ought to be taken, not from the first-born of the lineage of Eurysthenes and Proklès, but by selection out of all the Herakleids, of whom Lysander himself was one;<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Σπαρτην δαμασίμβροτον (Simonides ap Plutarch. Agesilaum, c. 1).

<sup>2</sup> See an expression of Aristotle (Polit. ii, 6, 22) about the function of admiral among the Lacedæmonians, — ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν, οὐαὶ στρατηγοῖς αἰδίοις, ἡ ναυαρχία σχεδὸν ἑτέρα βασιλεία καθέστηκε.

This reflection, — which Aristotle intimates that he has borrowed from some one else, though without saying from whom, — must in all probability have been founded upon the case of Lysander; for never after Lysander, was there any Lacedæmonian admiral enjoying a power which could by possibility be termed exorbitant or dangerous. We know that during the later years of the Peloponnesian war, much censure was cast upon the Lacedæmonian practice of annually changing the admiral (Xen. Hellen. i, 6, 4).

The Lacedæmonians seem to have been impressed with these criticisms, for in the year 395 B. C. (the year before the battle of Knidus) they conferred upon King Agesilaus, who was then commanding the land army in Asia Minor, the command of the fleet also — in order to secure unity of operations. This had never been done before (Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 28).

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 24. Perhaps he may have been simply a member

and that the person elected ought to be not merely a descendant of Hēraklēs, but a worthy parallel of Hēraklēs himself, while pæans were sung to the honor of Lysander at Samos,<sup>1</sup> — while Chœrilus and Antiochus composed poems in his praise, — while Antimachus (a poet highly esteemed by Plato) entered into a formal competition of recited epic verses called *Lysandria*, and was surpassed by Nikêratus, there was another warm admirer, a rhetor or sophist of Halikarnassus, named Kleon,<sup>2</sup> who wrote a discourse proving that Lysander had well earned the regal dignity, — that personal excellence ought to prevail over legitimate descent, and that the crown ought to be laid open to election from the most worthy among the Herakleids. Considering that rhetoric was neither employed nor esteemed at Sparta, we cannot reasonably believe that Lysander really ordered the composition of this discourse as an instrument of execution for projects preconceived by himself, in the same manner as an Athenian prosecutor or defendant before the dikastery used to arm himself with a speech from Lysias or Demosthenes. Kleon would make his court professionally through such a prose composition, whether the project were first recommended by himself, or currently discussed among a circle of admirers; while Lysander would probably requite the compliment by a reward not less munificent than that which he gave to the indifferent poet Antiochus.<sup>3</sup> And the composition would be put into the form of an harangue from the admiral to his countrymen, without any definite purpose that it should be ever so delivered. Such hypothesis of a speaker and an audience was frequent with the rhetors in their writings, as we may see in Isokrates, — especially in his sixth discourse, called Archidamus.

Either from his own ambition, or from the suggestions of others, Lysander came now to conceive the idea of breaking the succession of the two regal families, and opening for himself a door to reach the crown. His projects have been characterized as revolu-

of the tribe called Hylleis, who, probably, called themselves Herakleids. Some affirmed that Lysander wished to cause the kings to be elected out of all the Spartans, not simply out of the Herakleids. This is less probable.

<sup>1</sup> Duris ap Athenæum, xv, p. 696.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 18; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 20.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 17.



tionary; but there seems nothing in them which fairly merits the appellation, in the sense which that word now bears, if we consider accurately what the Spartan kings were in the year 400 B. C. In this view the associations connected with the title of king, are to a modern reader misleading. The Spartan kings were not kings at all, in any modern sense of the term; not only they were not absolute, but they were not even constitutional kings. They were not sovereigns, nor was any Spartan their subject; every Spartan was the member of a free Grecian community. The Spartan king did not govern; nor did he reign, in the sense of having government carried on in his name and by his delegates. The government of Sparta was carried on by the ephors, with frequent consultation of the senate, and occasional, though rare appeals, to the public assembly of citizens. The Spartan king was not legally inviolable. He might be, and occasionally was, arrested, tried, and punished for misbehavior in the discharge of his functions. He was a self-acting person, a great officer of state; enjoying certain definite privileges, and exercising certain military and judicial functions, which passed as an *universitas* by hereditary transmission in his family; but subject to the control of the ephors as to the way in which he performed these duties.<sup>1</sup> Thus, for example, it was his privilege to command the army when sent on foreign service; yet a law was made, requiring him to take deputies along with him, as a council of war, without whom nothing was to be done. The ephors recalled Agesilaus when they thought fit; and they brought Pausanias to trial

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle (Polit. v, 1, 5) represents justly the schemes of Lysander as going *πρὸς τὸ μέρος τι κινῆσαι τῆς πολιτείας οἷον ἀρχὴν τινα καταστήσαι ἢ ἐνελεῖν*. The Spartan kingship is here regarded as *ἀρχή τις*—one office of state, among others. But Aristotle regards Lysander as having intended to destroy the kingship—*καταλῦσαι τὴν βασιλείαν*—which does not appear to have been the fact. The plan of Lysander was to retain the kingship, but to render it elective instead of hereditary. He wished to place the Spartan kingship substantially on the same footing, as that on which the office of the kings or suffetes of Carthage stood, who were not hereditary, nor confined to members of the same family or Gens, but chosen out of the principal families or Gentes. Aristotle, while comparing the *βασιλεῖς* at Sparta with those at Carthage, as being generally analogous, pronounces in favor of the Carthaginian election as better than the Spartan hereditary transmission. (Arist. Polit. ii, 8, 2.)

and punishment, for alleged misconduct in his command.<sup>1</sup> The only way in which the Spartan kings formed part of the sovereign power in the state, or shared in the exercise of government properly so called, was that they had votes *ex officio* in the Senate, and could vote there by proxy when they were not present. In ancient times, very imperfectly known, the Spartan kings seem really to have been sovereigns; the government having then been really carried on by them, or by their orders. But in the year 400 B. C., Agis and Pausanias had become nothing more than great and dignified hereditary officers of state, still bearing the old title of their ancestors. To throw open these hereditary functions to all the members of the Herakleid Gens, by election from their number, might be a change better or worse; it was a startling novelty (just as it would have been to propose, that any of the various priesthoods, which were hereditary in particular families, should be made elective), because of the extreme attachment of the Spartans to old and sanctified customs; but it cannot properly be styled revolutionary. The ephors, the senate, and the public assembly, might have made such a change in full legal form, without any appeal to violence; the kings might vote against it, but they would have been outvoted. And if the change had been made, the Spartan government would have remained, in form as well as in principle, just what it was before; although the Eurystheneid and Prokleid families would have lost their privileges. It is not meant here to deny that the Spartan kings were men of great importance in the state, especially when (like Agesilaus) they combined with their official station a marked personal energy. But it is not the less true, that the associations, connected with the title of *king* in the modern mind, do not properly apply to them.

To carry his point at Sparta, Lysander was well aware that agencies of an unusual character must be employed. Quitting Sparta soon after his recall, he visited the oracles of Delphi, Dodona, and Zeus Ammon in Libya,<sup>2</sup> in order to procure, by persuasion or corruption, injunctions to the Spartans, countenancing his projects. So great was the general effect of oracular injunctions on the Spartan mind, that Kleomenes had thus obtained the deposition of king Demaratus, and the exiled Pleistoanax, his own

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v, 63; Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 25; iv, 2, 1.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 13; Cicero, de Divinat. i, 43, 96, Cornel. Nepos, Lysand. c. 2.



return;<sup>1</sup> bribery having been in both cases the moving impulse. But Lysander was not equally fortunate. None of these oracles could be induced, by any offers, to venture upon so grave a sentence as that of repealing the established law of succession to the Spartan throne. It is even said that the priests of Ammon, not content with refusing his offers, came over to Sparta to denounce his proceeding; upon which accusation Lysander was put on his trial, but acquitted. The statement that he was thus tried and acquitted, I think untrue. But his schemes so far miscarried, — and he was compelled to resort to another stratagem, yet still appealing to the religious susceptibilities of his countrymen. There had been born some time before, in one of the cities of the Euxine, a youth named Silenus, whose mother affirmed that he was the son of Apollo; an assertion which found extensive credence, notwithstanding various difficulties raised by the sceptics. While making at Sparta this new birth of a son to the god, the partisans of Lysander also spread abroad the news that there existed sacred manuscripts and inspired records, of great antiquity, hidden and yet unread, in the custody of the Delphian priests; not to be touched or consulted until some genuine son of Apollo should come forward to claim them. With the connivance of some among the priests, certain oracles were fabricated agreeable to the views of Lysander. The plan was concerted that Silenus should present himself at Delphi, tender the proofs of his divine parentage, and then claim the inspection of these hidden records; which the priests, after an apparently rigid scrutiny, were prepared to grant. Silenus would then read them aloud in the presence of all the spectators; and one would be found among them, recommending to the Spartans to choose their kings out of all the best citizens.<sup>2</sup>

So nearly did this project approach to consummation, that Silenus actually presented himself at Delphi, and put in his claim. But one of the confederates either failed in his courage, or broke down, at the critical moment; so that the hidden records still remained hidden. Yet though Lysander was thus compelled to abandon his plan, nothing was made public about it until after his

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, *Lysand.* c. 25, from Ephorus. Compare Herodot. vi, 66; Thucyd. v, 12.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, *Lysand.* c. 26

death. It might probably have succeeded, had he found temple-confederates of proper courage and cunning, — when we consider the profound and habitual deference of the Spartans to Delphi; upon the sanction of which oracle the Lykurgian institutions themselves were mainly understood to rest. And an occasion presently arose, on which the proposed change might have been tried with unusual facility and pertinence; though Lysander himself, having once miscarried, renounced his enterprise, and employed his influence, which continued unabated, in giving the sceptre to another instead of acquiring it for himself,<sup>1</sup> — like Mucian in reference to the emperor Vespasian.

It was apparently about a year after the campaigns in Elis, that king Agis, now an old man, was taken ill at Heræa in Arcadia, and carried back to Sparta, where he shortly afterwards expired. His wife Mimæa had given birth to a son named Leotychides, now

<sup>1</sup> Tacit. *Histor.* i, 10. "Cui expeditius fuerit tradere imperium, quam obtinere."

The general fact of the conspiracy of Lysander to open for himself a way to the throne, appears to rest on very sufficient testimony, — that of Ephorus; to whom perhaps the words *φασὶ τινες* in Aristotle may allude, where he mentions this conspiracy as having been narrated (*Polit.* v, 1, 5). But Plutarch, as well as K. O. Müller (*Hist. of Dorians*, iv, 9, 5) and others, erroneously represent the intrigues with the oracle as being resorted to after Lysander returned from accompanying Agesilaus to Asia; which is certainly impossible, since Lysander accompanied Agesilaus out, in the spring of 396 B. C. — did not return to Greece until the spring of 395 B. C. — and was then employed, with an interval not greater than four or five months, on that expedition against Bœotia wherein he was slain.

The tampering of Lysander with the oracle must undoubtedly have taken place prior to the death of Agis, — at some time between 403 B. C. and 399 B. C. The humiliation which he received in 396 B. C. from Agesilaus might indeed have led him to revolve in his mind the renewal of his former plans, but he can have had no time to do anything towards them. Aristotle (*Polit.* v, 6, 2) alludes to the humiliation of Lysander by the kings as an example of incidents tending to raise disturbance in an aristocratical government; but this humiliation, probably, alludes to the manner in which he was thwarted in Attica by Pausanias in 403 B. C. — which proceeding is ascribed by Plutarch to both kings, as well as to their jealousy of Lysander (see Plutarch, *Lysand.* c. 21) — not to the treatment of Lysander by Agesilaus in 396 B. C. The mission of Lysander to the despot Dionysius at Syracuse (Plutarch, *Lysand.* c. 2) must also have taken place prior to the death of Agis in 399 B. C.; whether before or after the failure of the stratagem at Delphi, is uncertain, perhaps after it.



a youth about fifteen years of age.<sup>1</sup> But the legitimacy of this youth had always been suspected by Agis, who had pronounced, when the birth of the child was first made known to him, that it could not be his. He had been frightened out of his wife's bed by the shock of an earthquake, which was construed as a warning from Poseidon, and was held to be a prohibition of intercourse for a certain time; during which interval Leotychides was born. This was one story; another was, that the young prince was the son of Alkibiades, born during the absence of Agis in his command at Dekeleia. On the other hand, it was alleged that Agis, though originally doubtful of the legitimacy of Leotychides, had afterwards retracted his suspicions, and fully recognized him; especially, and with peculiar solemnity, during his last illness.<sup>2</sup> As in the case of Demaratus about a century earlier,<sup>3</sup>—advantage was taken of these doubts by Agesilaus, the younger brother of Agis, powerfully seconded by Lysander, to exclude Leotychides, and occupy the throne himself.

Agesilaus was the son of king Archidamus, not by Lampito the mother of Agis, but by a second wife named Eupolia. He was now at the mature age of forty,<sup>4</sup> and having been brought up without any prospect of becoming king, — at least until very recent times, — had passed through the unmitigated rigor of Spartan drill and training. He was distinguished for all Spartan virtues; exemplary obedience to authority, in the performance of his trying exercises, military as well as civil, — intense emulation, in trying to surpass every competitor, — extraordinary courage, unremitting energy, as well as facility in enduring hardship, — perfect simplicity and frugality in all his personal habits, — extreme sensibility to the opinion of his fellow-citizens. Towards his personal friends or

<sup>1</sup> The age of Leotychides is approximately marked by the date of the presence of Alkibiades at Sparta 414–413 B. C. The mere rumor, true or false, that this young man was the son of Alkibiades, may be held sufficient as chronological evidence to certify his age.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 2, Pausanias, iii, 8, 4, Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Herodot. v, 66

<sup>4</sup> I confess I do not understand how Xenophon can say, in his Agesilaus, c. 6, Ἀγησίλαος τοίνυν ἔτι μὲν νέος ὡν ἔτυχε τῆς βασιλείας. For he himself says (ii, 28), and it seems well established, that Agesilaus died at the age of above 80 (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 40), and his death must have been about 360 B. C.

adherents, he was remarkable for fervor of attachment, even for unscrupulous partisanship, with a readiness to use all his influence in screening their injustices or short-comings; while he was comparatively placable and generous in dealing with rivals at home, notwithstanding his eagerness to be first in every sort of competition.<sup>1</sup> His manners were cheerful and popular, and his physiognomy pleasing; though in stature he was not only small but mean, and though he labored under the additional defect of lameness on one leg,<sup>2</sup> which accounts for his constant refusal to suffer his statue to be taken.<sup>3</sup> He was indifferent to money, and exempt from excess of selfish feeling, except in his passion for superiority and power.

In spite of his rank as brother of Agis, Agesilaus had never yet been tried in any military command, though he had probably served in the army either at Dekeleia or in Asia. Much of his character, therefore, lay as yet undisclosed. And his popularity may perhaps have been the greater at the moment when the throne became vacant, inasmuch as, having never been put in a position to excite jealousy, he stood distinguished only for accomplishments, efforts, endurances, and punctual obedience, wherein even the poorest citizens were his competitors on equal terms. Nay, so complete was the self-constraint, and the habit of smothering emotions, generated by a Spartan training, that even the cunning Lysander himself did not at this time know him. He and Agesilaus had been early and intimate friends,<sup>4</sup> both having been placed as boys in the same herd or troop for the purposes of discipline; a strong illustration of the equalizing character of this discipline, since we know that Lysander was of poor parents and condition.<sup>5</sup> He made the mistake of supposing Agesilaus to be of a disposition particularly gentle and manageable; and this was his main inducement for espousing the pretensions of the latter to the throne, after the

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 2–5, Xenoph. Agesil. vii, 3; Plutarch, Apophth. Laconic. p. 212 D

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 2, Xenoph. Agesil. viii, 1

It appears that the mother of Agesilaus was a very small woman, and that Archidamus had incurred the censure of the ephors, on that especial ground, for marrying her.

<sup>3</sup> Xenoph. Agesil. xi, 7; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 2

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 2.

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 2.



decease of Agis. Lysander reckoned, if by his means Agesilaus became king, on a great increase of his own influence, and especially on a renewed mission to Asia, if not as ostensible general, at least as real chief under the tutelar headship of the new king.

Accordingly, when the imposing solemnities which always marked the funeral of a king of Sparta were terminated,<sup>1</sup> and the day arrived for installation of a new king, Agesilaus, under the promptings of Lysander, stood forward to contest the legitimacy and the title of Leotychides, and to claim the sceptre for himself, — a true Herakleid, brother of the late king Agis. In the debate, which probably took place not merely before the ephors and the senate but before the assembled citizens besides, Lysander warmly seconded his pretensions. Of this debate unfortunately we are not permitted to know much. We cannot doubt that the mature age and excellent reputation of Agesilaus would count as a great recommendation, when set against an untried youth; and this was probably the real point (since the relationship of both was so near) upon which decision turned;<sup>2</sup> for the legitimacy of Leotychides was positively asseverated by his mother Timæa,<sup>3</sup> and we do not find that the question of paternity was referred to the Delphian oracle, as in the case of Demaratus.

There was, however, one circumstance which stood much in the way of Agesilaus, — his personal deformity. A lame king of Sparta had never yet been known. And if we turn back more than a century to the occurrence of a similar deformity in one of the Battiad princes at Kyrênê,<sup>4</sup> we see the Kyrenians taking it so deeply to heart, that they sent to ask advice from Delphi, and invited over the Mantineian reformer Demônax. Over and above this sentiment of repugnance, too, the gods had specially forewarned Sparta to beware of "a lame reign." Deiopeithes, a prophet and religious

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 1.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 2; Xen. Agesil. 1, 5 — κρίνασα ἡ πόλις ἀνεπικλετότερον εἶναι Ἀγησίλαον καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 2. This statement contradicts the talk imputed to Timæa by Duris (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 23).

<sup>4</sup> Herodot. iv, 161. Διεδέξατο δὲ τὴν βασιλείην τοῦ Ἀρκεσίλεω ὁ παῖς Βάττος, χωλὸς τε ἐὼν καὶ οὐκ ἄρτίπους. Οἱ δὲ Κυρηναῖοι πρὸς τὴν καταλαβοῦσαν συμφορὴν ἐπεμπον ἐς Δελφούς, ἐπιμνησμένους δυνάμει τούτων καταστησάμενοι κάλλιστα ἂν οἰκείουν

adviser of high reputation, advocated the cause of Leotychides. He produced an ancient oracle, telling Sparta, that "with all her pride she must not suffer a lame reign to impair her stable footing;<sup>1</sup> for if she did so, unexampled suffering and ruinous wars would long beset her." This prophecy had already been once invoked, about eighty years earlier,<sup>2</sup> but with a very different interpretation. To Grecian leaders, like Themistokles or Lysander, it was an accomplishment of no small value to be able to elude inconvenient texts or intractable religious feelings, by expository ingenuity. And Lysander here raised his voice (as Themistokles had done on the momentous occasion before the battle of Salamis),<sup>3</sup> to combat the professional expositors; contending that by "a lame reign," the god meant, not a bodily defect in the king, — which might not even be congenital, but might arise from some positive hurt,<sup>4</sup> — but the reign of any king who was not a genuine descendant of Heraklēs.

The influence of Lysander,<sup>5</sup> combined doubtless with a preponderance of sentiment already tending towards Agesilaus, caused this effort of interpretative subtlety to be welcomed as convincing, and led to the nomination of the lame candidate as king. There was, however, a considerable minority, to whom this decision appeared a sin against the gods and a mockery of the oracle. And though the murmurs of such dissentients were kept down by the ability and success of Agesilaus during the first years of his reign; yet when, in his ten last years, calamity and humiliation were poured thickly upon this proud city, the public sentiment came decidedly round to their view. Many a pious Spartan then

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Pausanias, iii, 8, 5.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xi, 50.

<sup>3</sup> Herodot. vii, 143.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 3. ὡς οὐκ οἶοιτο, τὸν θεὸν τοῦτο κελεύειν φυλάσσειν, μὴ προσπταίσας τις χωλεύσῃ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, μὴ οὐκ ὥν τοῖ γένους βασιλεύσῃ.

Congenital lameness would be regarded as a mark of divine displeasure and therefore a disqualification from the throne, as in the case of Battus of Kyrênê above noticed. But the words *χωλὴ βασιλεία* were general enough to cover both the cases, — superinduced as well as congenital lameness. It is upon this that Lysander founds his inference — that the god did not mean to allude to bodily lameness at all.

<sup>5</sup> Pausanias, iii, 8, 5; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3, Plutarch, Lysand. c. 22 Justin, vi, 2.



exclaimed, with feelings of bitter repentance, that the divine word never failed to come true at last,<sup>1</sup> and that Sparta was justly punished for having wilfully shut her eyes to the distinct and merciful warning vouchsafed to her, about the mischiefs of a "lame reign."<sup>2</sup>

Besides the crown, Agesilaus at the same time acquired the large property left by the late king Agis; an acquisition which enabled him to display his generosity by transferring half of it at once to his maternal relatives, — for the most part poor persons.<sup>3</sup> The popularity acquired by this step was still farther increased by his manner of conducting himself towards the ephors and senate. Between these magistrates and the kings, there was generally a bad understanding. The kings, not having lost the tradition of the plenary power once enjoyed by their ancestors, displayed as much haughty reserve as they dared, towards an authority now become essentially superior to their own. But Agesilaus, — not less from his own preestablished habits, than from anxiety to make up for the defects of his title, — adopted a line of conduct studiously opposite. He not only took pains to avoid collision with the ephors, but showed marked deference both to their orders and to their persons. He rose from his seat whenever they appeared; he conciliated both ephors and senators by timely presents.<sup>4</sup> By such judicious proceeding, as well as by his exact observance of the laws and customs,<sup>5</sup> he was himself the greatest gainer. Combined with that ability and energy in which he was never deficient, it ensured to him more real power than had ever fallen to the lot of any king of Sparta; power not merely over the military operations abroad

<sup>1</sup> Ἰδ' οἶον, ὧν παῖδες, προσεμῖξεν ἄσπερ  
Τούπος τὸ θεοπροπον ἡμῖν  
Τῆς παλαιφάτου προνοίας,  
Ὅν ἔλακεν, etc.

This is a splendid chorus of the Trachiniæ of Sophokles (822) proclaiming their sentiments on the awful death of Herakles, in the tunic of Nessus, which has just been announced as about to happen.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30; Plutarch, Compar. Agesil. and Pomp. c. 1. Ἀγησίλαος δὲ τὴν βασιλείαν ἔδοξε λαβεῖν, οὔτε τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀμειψ-  
τε, οὔτε τὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, κρίνας νοθείας Λεωτυχίδην, ὃν νῖδον αὐτοῦ ἀπε-  
δείξεν ὁ ἀδελφὸς γνήσιον, τὸν δὲ χρησμὸν κατειρωνευσαμένος ἔδινε περὶ τῆς  
γλώττης. Again, ib. c. 2. δι' Ἀγησίλαον ἐπεσκοπήσε τῷ χρησμῷ Λύσανδρος.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Agesil. iv. 5, Plutarch, Ages. c. 4.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 4.

<sup>5</sup> Xen. Agesil. vii. 2.

which usually fell to the kings, — but also over the policy of the state at home. On the increase and maintenance of that real power, his chief thoughts were concentrated; new dispositions generated by kingship, which had never shown themselves in him before. Despising, like Lysander, both money, luxury, and all the outward show of power, — he exhibited, as a king, an ultra-Spartan simplicity, carried almost to affectation, in diet, clothing, and general habits. But like Lysander also, he delighted in the exercise of dominion through the medium of knots or factions of devoted partisans, whom he rarely scrupled to uphold in all their career of injustice and oppression. Though an amiable man, with no disposition to tyranny, and still less to plunder, for his own benefit, — Agesilaus thus made himself the willing instrument of both, for the benefit of his various coadjutors and friends, whose power and consequence he identified with his own.<sup>1</sup>

At the moment when Agesilaus became king, Sparta was at the maximum of her power, holding nearly all the Grecian towns as subject allies, with or without tribute. She was engaged in the task (as has already been mentioned) of protecting the Asiatic Greeks against the Persian satraps in their neighborhood. And the most interesting portion of the life of Agesilaus consists in the earnestness with which he espoused, and the vigor and ability with which he conducted, this great Pan-hellenic duty. It will be seen that success in his very promising career was intercepted<sup>2</sup> by his bad, factious subservience to partisans, at home and abroad, — by his unmeasured thirst for Spartan omnipotence, — and his indifference or aversion to any generous scheme of combination with the cities dependent on Sparta.

His attention, however, was first called to a dangerous internal conspiracy with which Sparta was threatened. The "lame reign" was as yet less than twelve months old, when Agesilaus, being engaged in sacrificing at one of the established state solemnities, was apprised by the officiating prophet, that the victims exhibited menacing symptoms, portending a conspiracy of the most formida-

<sup>1</sup> Isokrates, Orat. v. (Philipp.) s. 100; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 3, 13-23; Plutarch, Apophthegm. Laconica, p. 209 F—212 D.

<sup>2</sup> See the incident alluded to by Theopompus ap. Athenæum, xiii, p. 609.

<sup>3</sup> Isokrates (Orat. v, *ut sup.*) makes a remark in substance the same.



ble character. A second sacrifice gave yet worse promise; and on the third, the terrified prophet exclaimed, "Agesilaus, the revelation before us imports that we are actually in the midst of our enemies." They still continued to sacrifice, but victims were now offered to the averting and preserving gods, with prayers that these latter, by tutelary interposition, would keep off the impending peril. At length, after much repetition, and great difficulty, favorable victims were obtained; the meaning of which was soon made clear. Five days afterwards, an informer came before the ephors, communicating the secret, that a dangerous conspiracy was preparing, organized by a citizen named Kinadon.<sup>1</sup>

The conspirator thus named was a Spartan citizen, but not one of that select number called The Equals or The Peers. It has already been mentioned that inequalities had been gradually growing up among qualified citizens of Sparta, tending tacitly to set apart a certain number of them under the name of The Peers, and all the rest under the correlative name of The Inferiors. Besides this, since the qualification of every family lasted only so long as the citizen could furnish a given contribution for himself and his sons to the public mess-table, and since industry of every kind was inconsistent with the rigid personal drilling imposed upon all of them,—the natural consequence was, that in each generation a certain number of citizens became disfranchised and dropped off. But these disfranchised men did not become Perioeki or Helots. They were still citizens, whose qualification, though in abeyance, might be at any time renewed by the munificence of a rich man;<sup>2</sup> so that they too, along with the lesser citizens, were known under the denomination of The Inferiors. It was to this class that Kinadon belonged. He was a young man of remarkable strength and courage, who had discharged with honor his duties in the Lykurgian discipline,<sup>3</sup> and had imbibed from it that sense of personal

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 3, 4.

<sup>2</sup> See Vol. II, Ch. vi, p. 359 of this History.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 5. Οὗτος (Kinadon) δ' ἦν νεανισκος καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εὐρωστος, οὐ μέντοι τῶν ὁμοίων.

The meaning of the term Οἱ ὅμοιοι fluctuates in Xenophon; it sometimes, as here, is used to signify the privileged Peers — again De Repub. Laced. xiii, 1; and Anab. iv, 6, 14. Sometimes again it is used agreeably to the Lykurgian theory; whereby every citizen, who rigorously discharged his duty in the public drill, belonged to the number (De Rep. Lac. x, 7).

There was a variance between the theory and the practice

equality, and that contempt of privilege, which its theory as well as its practice suggested. Notwithstanding all exactness of duty performed, he found that the constitution, as practically worked, excluded him from the honors and distinctions of the state; reserving them for the select citizens known under the name of Peers. And this exclusion had become more marked and galling since the formation of the Spartan empire after the victory of Ægospotami; whereby the number of lucrative posts (harmosties and others) all monopolized by the Peers, had been so much multiplied. Debarred from the great political prizes, Kinadon was still employed by the ephors, in consequence of his high spirit and military sufficiency, in that standing force which they kept for maintaining order at home.<sup>1</sup> He had been the agent ordered on several of those arbitrary seizures which they never scrupled to employ towards persons whom they regarded as dangerous. But this was no satisfaction to his mind; nay, probably, by bringing him into close contact with the men in authority, it contributed to lessen his respect for them. He desired "to be inferior to no man in Sparta,"<sup>2</sup> and his conspiracy was undertaken to realize this object by breaking up the constitution.

It has already been mentioned that amidst the general insecurity which pervaded the political society of Laconia, the ephors maintained a secret police and system of espionage which reached its height of unscrupulous efficiency under the title of the Krypteia. Such precautions were now more than ever requisite; for the changes in the practical working of Spartan politics tended to multiply the number of malcontents, and to throw the Inferiors as well as the Perioeki and the Neodamodes (manumitted Helots), into one common antipathy with the Helots, against the exclusive partnership of the Peers. Informers were thus sure of encouragement and reward, and the man who now came to the ephors either

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9. Ὑπηρετῆται δὲ καὶ ἄλλ' ἤδη ὁ Κινάδων τοῖς ἑφόροις τοιαῦτα. iii, 3, 7. Οἱ συντεταγμένοι ἡμῶν (Kinadon says) αὐτοὶ ὀπλὰ κεκτῆμεθα.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 11. μηδενὸς ἡττων εἶναι τῶν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι — was the declaration of Kinadon when seized and questioned by the ephors concerning his purposes. Substantially it coincides with Aristotle (Polit. v, 6 2) — ἡ δὲ ἀνδρῶδες τις ὧν μὴ μετέχη τῶν τιμῶν, οἷον Κινάδων ὁ τὴν ἐπ' Ἀγησίου συστήσας ἐπιθεσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις.



was really an intimate friend of Kinadon, or had professed himself such in order to elicit the secret. "Kinadon (said he to the ephors) brought me to the extremity of the market-place, and bade me count how many Spartans there were therein. I reckoned up about forty, besides the king, the ephors and the senators. Upon my asking him why he desired me to count them, he replied, — Because these are the men, and the only men, whom you have to look upon as enemies;<sup>1</sup> all others in the market-place, more than four thousand in number, are friends and comrades. Kinadon also pointed out to me the one or two Spartans whom we met in the roads, or who were lords in the country districts, as our only enemies; every one else around them being friendly to our purpose." "How many did he tell you were the accomplices actually privy to the scheme?" — asked the ephors. "Only a few (was the reply); but those thoroughly trustworthy; these confidants themselves, however, said that all around them were accomplices, — Inferiors, Perioeci, Neodamodes, and Helots, all alike; for whenever any one among the classes talked about a Spartan, he could not disguise his intense antipathy, — he talked as if he could eat the Spartans raw."<sup>2</sup>

"But how (continued the ephors) did Kinadon reckon upon getting arms?" "His language was (replied the witness) — We of the standing force have our own arms all ready; and here are plenty of knives, swords, spits, hatchets, axes and scythes — on sale in this market-place, to suit an insurgent multitude; besides, every man who tills the earth, or cuts wood and stone, has tools by him which will serve as weapons in case of need; especially in a struggle with enemies themselves unarmed." On being asked what was the moment fixed for execution, the witness could not tell; he had been instructed only to remain on the spot, and be ready.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 5.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 6. Αὐτοὶ μὲντοι πᾶσιν ἴφασαν συνειδέναι καὶ εἰλῶσι καὶ νεοδαμώδεσι, καὶ τοῖς ὑπομειοῖσι, καὶ τοῖς τριτοῖσι· ὅπου γὰρ ἐν τούτοις τις λόγος γένοιτο περὶ Σπαρτιῶν, οὐδένα δύνασθαι κρύπτειν τὸ μὴ οὐχ ἡδέως ἀν καὶ ὤμων ἐσθίειν αὐτῶν.

The expression is Homeric — ὤμων βεβρώθους Πριάμον, etc. (Iliad. iv, 35) The Greeks did not think themselves obliged to restrain the full expression of vindictive feeling. The poet Theognis wishes, "that he may one day come to drink the blood of those who had ill-used him" v. 349 Gaisf.)

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 7. ὅτι ἐπιδημεῖν οἱ παρηγγελμένον εἶη.

It does not appear that this man knew the name of any person concerned, except Kinadon himself. So deeply were the ephors alarmed, that they refrained from any formal convocation even of what was called the Lesser Assembly, — including the senate, of which the kings were members *ex officio*, and, perhaps, a few other principal persons besides. But the members of this assembly were privately brought together to deliberate on the emergency; Agesilaus, probably, among them. To arrest Kinadon at once in Sparta appeared imprudent; since his accomplices, of number as yet unknown, would be thus admonished either to break out in insurrection, or at least to make their escape. But an elaborate stratagem was laid for arresting him out of Sparta, without the knowledge of his accomplices. The ephors, calling him before them, professed to confide to him (as they had done occasionally before) a mission to go to Aulon (a Laconian town on the frontier towards Arcadia and Triphylia) and there to seize some parties designated by name in a formal skytalê or warrant; including some of the Aulonite Perioeci, — some Helots, — and one other person by name, a woman of peculiar beauty, resident at the place, whose influence was understood to spread disaffection among all the Lacedæmonians who came thither, old as well as young.<sup>1</sup> When Kinadon inquired what force he was to take with him on the mission, the ephors, to obviate all suspicion that they were picking out companions with views hostile to him, desired him to go to the Hippagretês (or commander of the three hundred youthful guards called horsemen, though they were not really mounted) and ask for the first six or seven men of the guard<sup>2</sup> who might happen to be in the way. But they (the ephors) had already held secret communication with the Hippagretês, and had informed him both whom they wished to be sent, and what the persons sent were to

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 8. Ἀγαγεῖν δὲ ἐκέλευον καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα, ἥ καλλίστη μὲν ἐλέγετο αὐτῷ εἶναι, λυμαινέσθαι δὲ ἔρκει τοὺς ἀφικνουμένους Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ πρεσβυτέρους καὶ νεωτέρους.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9, 10.

The persons called Hippeis at Sparta were not mounted, they were a select body of three hundred youthful citizens, employed either on home police or on foreign service.

See Herodot. viii, 124, Strabo, x, p 481; E. O. Müller, History of the Dorians, B. iii. ch. 12, s. 5, 6.



do. They then despatched Kinadon on his pretended mission telling him that they should place at his disposal three carts, in order that he might more easily bring home the prisoners.

Kinadon began his journey to Aulon, without the smallest suspicion of the plot laid for him by the ephors; who, to make their purpose sure, sent an additional body of the guards after him, to quell any resistance which might possibly arise. But their stratagem succeeded as completely as they could desire. He was seized on the road, by those who accompanied him ostensibly for his pretended mission. These men interrogated him, put him to the torture,<sup>1</sup> and heard from his lips the names of his accomplices;

<sup>1</sup> Xen Hellen. iii, 3, 9

Ἐμελλον δὲ οἱ συλλαβόντες αὐτὸν μὲν κατέχειν, τοὺς δὲ ξυνειδότας, πῶς οὐ μὲν οὖν αὐτοῦ, γράψαντες ἀποπέμψουσιν τὴν ταχίστην τοῖς ἐφόροις. Οὕτω δ' εἶχον οἱ ἐφοροὶ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥστε καὶ μορὰν ἱππέων ἐπεμψάν τοῖς ἐπ' Αὐλώνας. Ἐπεὶ δ' εἰλημμένου τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἦκεν ἱππεὺς, φέρων τὰ ὀνόματα ὧν Κινάδων ἀπέγραψε, παραρρήμα τὸν τε μῦθον Τισάμενον καὶ τοὺς ἐπικαιριωτάτους ξυνελάμβανον. Ὡς δ' ἀνῆχθη ὁ Κινάδων, καὶ ἠλέγχετο, καὶ ὁμολόγει πάντα, καὶ τοὺς ξυνειδότας ἔλεγε, τέλος αὐτὸν ἤρουντο, τι καὶ βουλόμενος ταῦτα πρᾶττοι.

Polyænus (ii, 14, 1) in his account of this transaction, expressly mentions that the Hippeis or guards who accompanied Kinadon, put him to the torture (στρεβλώσαντες) when they seized him, in order to extort the names of his accomplices. Even without express testimony, we might pretty confidently have assumed this. From a man of spirit like Kinadon, they were not likely to obtain such betrayal without torture.

I had affirmed that in the description of this transaction given by Xenophon, it did not appear whether Kinadon was able to write or not. My assertion was controverted by Colonel Mure (in his Reply to my Appendix), who cited the words φέρων τὰ ὀνόματα ὧν Κινάδων ἀπέγραψε, as containing an affirmation from Xenophon that Kinadon could write.

In my judgment, these words, taken in conjunction with what precedes, and with the probabilities of the fact described, do not contain such an affirmation.

The guards were instructed to seize Kinadon, and after having heard from Kinadon who his accomplices were, to write the names down and send them to the ephors. It is to be presumed that they executed these instructions as given, the more so, as what they were commanded to do, was at once the safest and the most natural proceeding. For Kinadon was a man distinguished for personal stature and courage (τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εὐρωστος, iii, 3, 5) so that those who seized him would find it an indispensable precaution to pinion his arms. Assuming even that Kinadon could write, — yet, if he were to write, he must have his right arm free. And why should the guards

the list of whom they wrote down, and forwarded by one of the guards to Sparta. The ephors, on receiving it, immediately arrested the parties principally concerned, especially the prophet Tisamenus; and examined them along with Kinadon, as soon as

take this risk, when all which the ephors required was, that Kinadon should pronounce the names, to be written down by others? With a man of the qualities of Kinadon, it probably required the most intense pressure to force him to betray his comrades, even by word of mouth; it would probably be more difficult still, to force him to betray them by the more deliberate act of writing.

I conceive that ἦκεν ἱππεὺς, φέρων τὰ ὀνόματα ὧν ὁ Κινάδων ἀπέγραψε is to be construed with reference to the preceding sentence, and announces the carrying into effect of the instructions then reported as given by the ephors. "A guard came, bearing the names of those whom Kinadon had given in." It is not necessary to suppose that Kinadon had written down these names with his own hand.

In the beginning of the Oration of Andokides (De Mysteriis), Pythonikus gives information of a mock celebration of the mysteries, committed by Alkibiades and others; citing as his witness the slave Andromachus; who is accordingly produced, and states to the assembly *in voce* what he had seen and who were the persons present — Πρῶτος μὲν οὗτος (Andromachus) ταῦτα ἐμήνυσε, καὶ ἀπέγραψε τούτους (s. 13). It is not here meant to affirm that the slave Andromachus wrote down the names of these persons, which he had the moment before publicly announced to the assembly. It is by the words ἀπέγραψε τούτους that the orator describes the public oral announcement made by Andromachus, which was formally taken note of by a secretary, and which led to legal consequences against the persons whose names were given in.

So again, in the old law quoted by Demosthenes (adv. Makast. p. 1068), Ἀπογραφέτω δὲ τὸν μὴ ποιούντα ταῦτα ὁ βουλόμενος πρὸς τὸν ἄρχοντα; and in Demosthenes adv. Nikostrat. p. 1247. Ἄ ἐκ τῶν νόμων τῷ ἰδιώτῃ τῷ ἀπογράφαντι γίγνεται, τῇ πόλει ἀφίημι. compare also Lysias, De Bonis Aristophanis, Or. xix, s. 53; it is not meant to affirm that ὁ ἀπογράφων was required to perform his process in writing, or was necessarily able to write. A citizen who could not write might do this, as well as one who could. He informed against a certain person as delinquent; he informed of certain articles of property, as belonging to the estate of one whose property had been confiscated to the city. The information, as well as the name of the informer, was taken down by the official person, — whether the informer could himself write or not.

It appears to me that Kinadon, having been interrogated, told to the guards who first seized him, the names of his accomplices, — just as he told these names afterwards to the ephors (καὶ τοὺς ξυνειδότας ἔλεγε); and this, whether he was, or was not, able to write; a point, which the passage of Xenophon noway determines.



he was brought prisoner. They asked the latter, among other questions, what was his purpose in setting on foot the conspiracy; to which he replied,—"I wanted to be inferior to no man at Sparta." His punishment was not long deferred. Having been manacled with a clog round his neck to which his hands were made fast,—he was in this condition conducted round the city, with men scourging and pricking him during the progress. His accomplices were treated in like manner, and at length all of them were put to death.<sup>1</sup>

Such is the curious narrative, given by Xenophon, of this unsuccessful conspiracy. He probably derived his information from Agesilaus himself; since we cannot easily explain how he could have otherwise learnt so much about the most secret manœuvres of the ephors, in a government proverbial for constant secrecy, like that of Sparta. The narrative opens to us a glimpse, though sadly transient and imperfect, of the internal dangers of the Spartan government. We were aware, from earlier evidences, of great discontent prevailing among the Helots, and to a certain extent among the Perioeki. But the incident here described presents to us the first manifestation of a body of malcontents among the Spartans themselves; malcontents formidable both from energy and position, like Kinadon and the prophet Tisamenus. Of the state of disaffected feeling in the provincial townships of Laconia, an impressive proof is afforded by the case of that beautiful woman who was alleged to be so active in political proselytism at Aulon; not less than by the passionate expressions of hatred revealed in the deposition of the informer himself. Though little is known about the details, yet it seems that the tendency of affairs at Sparta was to concentrate both power and property in the hands of an oligarchy ever narrowing among the citizens; thus aggravating the dangers at home, even at the time when the power of the state was greatest abroad, and preparing the way for that irreparable humiliation which began with the defeat of Leuktra.

It can hardly be doubted that much more wide-spread discontent came to the knowledge of the ephors than that which is specially indicated in Xenophon. And such discovery may probably have been one of the motives (as had happened in 424 B. C. on occasion

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 3. 11.

of the expedition of Brasidas into Thrace) which helped to bring about the Asiatic expedition of Agesilaus, as an outlet for brave malcontents on distant and lucrative military service.

Derkyllidas had now been carrying on war in Asia Minor for near three years, against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, with so much efficiency and success, as both to protect the Asiatic Greeks on the coast, and to intercept all the revenues which those satraps either transmitted to court or enjoyed themselves. Pharnabazus had already gone up to Susa (during his truce with Derkyllidas in 397 B. C.), and besides obtaining a reinforcement which acted under himself and Tissaphernes in 396 B. C. against Derkyllidas in Lydia, had laid schemes for renewing the maritime war against Sparta.<sup>1</sup>

It is now that we hear again mentioned the name of Konon, who, having saved himself with nine triremes from the defeat of Ægospotami, had remained for the last seven years under the protection of Evagoras, prince of Salamis, in Cyprus, Konon, having married at Salamis, and having a son<sup>2</sup> born to him there, indulged but faint hopes of ever returning to his native city, when, fortunately for him as well as for Athens, the Persians again became eager for an efficient admiral and fleet on the coast of Asia Minor. Through representations from Pharnabazus, as well as from Evagoras in Cyprus,—and through correspondence of the latter with the Greek physician Ktesias, who wished to become personally employed in the negotiation, and who seems to have had considerable influence with queen Parysatis,<sup>3</sup>—orders were obtained, and funds provided, to equip in Phœnicia and Kilikia a numerous fleet, under the command of Konon. While that officer began to show himself, and to act with such triremes as he

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv. 39; Xen. Hellen. iii. 3. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Lysias, Orat. xix, (De Bonis Aristophanis) s. 38.

<sup>3</sup> See Ktesias, Fragmenta, Persica, c. 63, ed. Bähr; Plutarch, Artax. c. 21. We cannot make out these circumstances with any distinctness; but the general fact is plainly testified, and is besides very probable. Another Grecian surgeon (besides Ktesias) is mentioned as concerned,—Polykritus of Mendê; and a Kretan dancer named Zeno,—both established at the Persian court.

There is no part of the narrative of Ktesias, the loss of which is so much to be regretted as this; relating transactions, in which he was himself concerned, and seemingly giving original letters.



found in readiness (about forty in number) along the southern coast of Asia Minor from Kilikia to Kaunos,<sup>1</sup> — further preparations were vigorously prosecuted in the Phœnician ports, in order to make up the fleet to three hundred sail.<sup>2</sup>

It was by a sort of accident that news of such equipment reached Sparta, — in an age of the world when diplomatic residents were as yet unknown. A Syracusan merchant named Herodas, having visited the Phœnician ports for trading purposes, brought back to Sparta intelligence of the preparations which he had seen, sufficient to excite much uneasiness. The Spartans were taking counsel among themselves, and communicating with their neighboring allies, when Agesilaus, at the instance of Lysander, stood forward as a volunteer to solicit the command of a land-force for the purpose of attacking the Persians in Asia. He proposed to take with him only thirty full Spartan citizens or peers, as a sort of Board or Council of Officers; two thousand Neodamodes or enfranchised Helots, whom the ephors were probably glad to send away, and who would be selected from the bravest and most formidable; and six thousand hoplites from the land-allies, to whom the prospect of a rich service against Asiatic enemies would be tempting. Of these thirty Spartans, Lysander intended to be the leader; and thus, reckoning on his preestablished influence over Agesilaus, to exercise the real command himself, without the name. He had no serious fear of the Persian arms, either by land or sea. He looked upon the announcement of the Phœnician fleet to be an empty threat, as it had so often proved in the mouth of Tissaphernes during the late war; while the Cyreian expedition had inspired him further with ardent hopes of another successful Anabasis, or conquering invasion of Persia from the sea-coast inwards. But he had still more at heart to employ his newly-acquired ascendancy in reestablishing everywhere the dekharchies, which had excited such intolerable hatred and exercised so much oppression, that even the ephors had refused to lend positive aid in upholding them, so that they had been in several places broken up or modified.<sup>3</sup> If the ambition of Agesilaus was comparatively less stained by personal and factious antipathies, and more Pan-hellenic

<sup>1</sup> Diodor xiv, 39-79.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 2.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 1.

in its aim, than that of Lysander, — it was at the same time yet more unmeasured in respect to victory over the Great King, whom he dreamed of dethroning, or at least of expelling from Asia Minor and the coast.<sup>1</sup> So powerful was the influence exercised by the Cyreian expedition over the schemes and imagination of energetic Greeks: so sudden was the outburst of ambition in the mind of Agesilaus, for which no one before had given him credit.

Though this plan was laid by two of the ablest men in Greece, it turned out to be rash and improvident, so far as the stability of the Lacedæmonian empire was concerned. That empire ought to have been made sure by sea, where its real danger lay, before attempts were made to extend it by new inland acquisitions. And except for purposes of conquest, there was no need of farther reinforcements in Asia Minor; since Derkyllidas was already there with a force competent to make head against the satraps. Nevertheless, the Lacedæmonians embraced the plan eagerly; the more so, as envoys were sent from many of the subject cities, by the partisans of Lysander and in concert with him, to entreat that Agesilaus might be placed at the head of the expedition, with as large a force as he required.<sup>2</sup>

No difficulty probably was found in levying the proposed number of men from the allies, since there was great promise of plunder for the soldiers in Asia. But the altered position of Sparta with respect to her most powerful allies was betrayed by the refusal of Thebes, Corinth, and Athens to take any part in the expedition. The refusal of Corinth, indeed, was excused professedly on the ground of a recent inauspicious conflagration of one of the temples in the city; and that of Athens, on the plea of weakness and exhaustion not yet repaired. But the latter, at least, had already begun to conceive some hope from the projects of Konon.<sup>3</sup>

The mere fact that a king of Sparta was about to take the command and pass into Asia, lent peculiar importance to the enterprise. The Spartan kings, in their function of leaders of Greece, conceived themselves to have inherited the sceptre of Agamemnon

Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 1 *ἐλπίδας ἔχοντα με, λαὸς αἰρήσειν βασιλέα*, etc. Compare iv, 2, 3.

Xen. Agesilaus, i, 36. *ἐπινοῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων καταλύσειν τὴν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα στρατεύσαντες πρότερον ἀρχὴν*, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch. Agesil. c. 5.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 5, Pausan. iii, 9, 1.



and Orestes;<sup>1</sup> and Agesilaus, especially, assimilated his expedition to a new Trojan war, — an effort of united Greece, for the purpose of taking vengeance on the common Asiatic enemy of the Hellenic name. The sacrifices having been found favorable, Agesilaus took measures for the transit of the troops from various ports to Ephesus. But he himself, with one division, touched in his way at Geræstus, the southern point of Eubœa; wishing to cross from thence and sacrifice at Aulis, (the port of Bœotia nearly opposite to Geræstus on the other side of the strait) where Agamemnon had offered his memorable sacrifice immediately previous to departure for Troy. It appears that he both went to the spot, and began the sacrifice, without asking permission from the Thebans; moreover, he was accompanied by his own prophet, who conducted the solemnities in a manner not consistent with the habitual practice of the temple or chapel of Artemis at Aulis. On both these grounds, the Thebans, resenting the proceeding as an insult, sent a body of armed men, and compelled him to desist from the sacrifice.<sup>2</sup> Not taking part themselves in the expedition, they probably considered that the Spartan king was presumptuous in assuming to himself the Pan-hellenic character of a second Agamemnon; and they thus inflicted a humiliation which Agesilaus never forgave.

Agesilaus seems to have reached Asia about the time when Derkyllidas had recently concluded his last armistice with Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus; an armistice, intended to allow time for mutual communication both with Sparta and the Persian court. On being asked by the satrap what was his purpose in coming, Agesilaus merely renewed the demand which had before been made by Derkyllidas — of autonomy for the Asiatic Greeks. Tissaphernes replied by proposing a continuation of the same armistice, until he could communicate with the Persian court, — adding that he hoped to be empowered to grant the demand. A fresh armistice was accordingly sworn to on both sides, for three months; Derkyllidas (who with his army came now under the command of Agesilaus) and Herippidas being sent to the satrap to receive his oath, and take oaths to him in return.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Herodot. i, 68; vii, 159; Pausan. iii, 16, 6.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 3, 4; iii, 5, 5; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 6; Pausan. iii, 9, 2.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 5, 6; Xen. Agesilaus, i, 10.

The term of three months is specified only in the latter passage. The

While the army was thus condemned to temporary inaction at Ephesus, the conduct and position of Lysander began to excite intolerable jealousy in the superior officers; and most of all Agesilaus. So great and established was the reputation of Lysander, — whose statue had been erected at Ephesus itself in the temple of Artemis,<sup>1</sup> as well as in many other cities, — that all the Asiatic Greeks looked upon him as the real chief of the expedition. That he should be real chief, under the nominal command of another, was nothing more than what had happened before, in the year wherein he gained the great victory of Ægospotami, — the Lacedæmonians having then also sent him out in the ostensible capacity of secretary to the admiral Arakus, in order to save the inviolability of their own rule, that the same man should not serve twice as admiral.<sup>2</sup> It was through the instigation of Lysander, and with a view to his presence, that the decemvirs and other partisans in the subject cities had sent to Sparta to petition for Agesilaus; a prince as yet untried and unknown. So that Lysander, — taking credit, with truth, for having ensured to Agesilaus first the crown, next this important appointment, — intended for himself, and was expected by others, to exercise a fresh turn of command, and to renovate in every town the discomfited or enfeebled dekarchies. Numbers of his partisans came to Ephesus to greet his arrival, and a crowd of petitioners were seen following his steps everywhere; while Agesilaus himself appeared comparatively neglected. Moreover, Lysander resumed all that insolence of manner which he had contracted during his former commands, and which on this occasion gave the greater offence, since the manner of Agesilaus was both courteous and simple in a peculiar degree.<sup>3</sup>

The thirty Spartan counsellors, over whom Lysander had been named to preside, finding themselves neither consulted by him, nor solicited by others, were deeply dissatisfied. Their complaints

former armistice of Derkyllidas had probably not expired when Agesilaus first arrived.

<sup>1</sup> Pausan. vi, 3, 6.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 7. This rule does not seem to have been adhered to afterwards. Lysander was sent out again as commander in 403 B. C. It is possible, indeed, that he may have been again sent out as nominal secretary to some other person named as commander.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 7.



helped to encourage Agesilaus, who was still more keenly wounded in his own personal dignity, to put forth a resolute and imperious strength of will, such as he had not before been known to possess. He successively rejected every petition preferred to him by or through Lysander; a systematic purpose which, though never formally announced,<sup>1</sup> was presently discerned by the petitioners, by the Thirty, and by Lysander himself. The latter thus found himself not merely disappointed in all his calculations, but humiliated to excess, though without any tangible ground of complaint. He was forced to warn his partisans, that L's intervention was an injury and not a benefit to them; that they must desist from obsequious attentions to him, and must address themselves directly to Agesilaus. With that prince he also remonstrated on his own account, — "Truly, Agesilaus, you know how to degrade your friends." — "Ay, to be sure (was the reply), those among them who want to appear greater than I am; but such as seek to uphold me, I should be ashamed if I did not know how to repay with due honor." — Lysander was constrained to admit the force of this reply, and to request, as the only means of escape from present and palpable humiliation, that he might be sent on some mission apart; engaging to serve faithfully in whatever duty he might be employed.<sup>2</sup>

This proposition, doubtless even more agreeable to Agesilaus than to himself, being readily assented to, he was despatched on a mission to the Hellespont. Faithful to his engagement of forgetting past offences and serving with zeal, he found means to gain over a Persian grandee named Spithridates, who had received some offence from Pharnabazus. Spithridates revolted openly, carrying a regiment of two hundred horse to join Agesilaus; who was thus enabled to inform himself fully about the sa-

<sup>1</sup> The sarcastic remarks which Plutarch ascribes to Agesilaus, calling Lysander "my meat-distributor" (*κρεοδαιτην*), are not warranted by Xenophon, and seem not to be probable under the circumstances (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 23; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 8).

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 7-10; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 7-8, Plutarch, Lysand. c. 23.

It is remarkable that in the Opusculum of Xenophon, a special Panegyric called *Agesilaus*, not a word is said about this highly characteristic proceeding between Agesilaus and Lysander at Ephesus; nor indeed is the name of Lysander once mentioned.

trapy of Pharnabazus, comprising the territory called Phrygia, in the neighborhood of the Propontis and the Hellespont.<sup>1</sup>

The army under Tissaphernes had been already powerful at the moment when his timidity induced him to conclude the first armistice with Derkyllidas. But additional reinforcements, received since the conclusion of the second and more recent armistice, had raised him to such an excess of confidence, that even before the stipulated three months had expired, he sent to insist on the immediate departure of Agesilaus from Asia, and to proclaim war forthwith, if such departure were delayed. While this message, accompanied by formidable reports of the satrap's force, filled the army at Ephesus with mingled alarm and indignation, Agesilaus accepted the challenge with cheerful readiness; sending word back that he thanked the satrap for perjuring himself in so flagrant a manner, as to set the gods against him and ensure their favor to the Greek side.<sup>2</sup> Orders were forthwith given, and contingents summoned from the Asiatic Greeks, for a forward movement southward, to cross the Mæander, and attack Tissaphernes in Karia, where he usually resided. The cities on the route were required to provide magazines, so that Tissaphernes, fully anticipating attack in this direction, caused his infantry to cross into Karia, for the purpose of acting on the defensive; while he kept his numerous cavalry in the plain of the Mæander, with a view to overwhelm Agesilaus, who had no cavalry, in his march over that level territory towards the Karian hills and rugged ground. But the Lacedæmonian king, having put the enemy on this false scent, suddenly turned his march northward towards Phrygia and the satrapy of Pharnabazus. Tissaphernes took no pains to aid his brother satrap, who on his side had made few preparations for defence. Accordingly Agesilaus, finding little or no resistance, took many towns and villages, and collected abundance of provisions, plunder, and slaves. Profiting by the guidance of the revolted Spithridates, and marching as little as possible over the plains, he carried on lucrative and unopposed incursions as far as the neighborhood of Daskylium, the residence of the satrap himself, near the Propontis. Near the satrapic residence, however, his small

Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 10

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 11, 12 Xen. Agesil. i, 12-14, Plutarch, Agesil.



body of cavalry, ascending an eminence, came suddenly upon an equal detachment of Persian cavalry, under Rhathines and Bagæus; who attacked them vigorously, and drove them back with some loss, until they were protected by Agesilaus himself coming up with the hoplites. The effect of such a check (and there were probably others of the same kind, though Xenophon does not specify them) on the spirits of the army was discouraging. On the next morning, the sacrifices being found unfavorable for farther advance, Agesilaus gave orders for retreating towards the sea. He reached Ephesus about the close of autumn; resolved to employ the winter in organizing a more powerful cavalry, which experience proved to be indispensable.<sup>1</sup>

This autumnal march through Phrygia was more lucrative than glorious. Yet it enables Xenophon to bring to view different merits of his hero Agesilaus; in doing which he exhibits to us ancient warfare and Asiatic habits on a very painful side. In common both with Kallikratidas and Lysander, though not with the ordinary Spartan commanders, Agesilaus was indifferent to the acquisition of money for himself. But he was not the less anxious to enrich his friends, and would sometimes connive at unwarrantable modes of acquisition for their benefit. Deserters often came in to give information of rich prizes or valuable prisoners; which advantages, if he had chosen, he might have appropriated to himself. But he made it a practice to throw both the booty and the honor in the way of some favorite officer; just as we have seen (in a former chapter) that Xenophon himself was allowed by the army to capture Asidates and enjoy a large portion of his ransom.<sup>2</sup> Again, when the army in the course of its march was at a considerable distance from the sea, and appeared to be advancing farther inland, the authorized auctioneers, whose province it was to sell the booty, found the buyers extremely slack. It was difficult to keep or carry what was bought, and opportunity for resale did not

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 13-15; Xen. Agesil. i, 23. Ἐπεὶ μέντοι οὐδὲ ἐν τῇ Φρυγίᾳ ἀνὰ τὰ πεδία ἐδύνατο στρατεῦσθαι, διὰ τὴν Φαρναβάζου ἰππείαν, etc. Plutarch, Agesil. c. 9.

These military operations of Agesilaus are loosely adverted to in the early part of c. 79 of the fourteenth Book of Diodorus.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Agesil. i, 19; Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 20-23; Plutarch, Reipub. Græc. Præcept. p. 809, B. See above, Chapter lxxii, of this History.

seem at hand. Agesilaus, while he instructed the auctioneers to sell upon credit, without insisting on ready money, — at the same time gave private hints to a few friends that he was very shortly about to return to the sea. The friends thus warned, bidding for the plunder on credit and purchasing at low prices, were speedily enabled to dispose of it again at a seaport, with large profits.<sup>1</sup>

We are not surprised to hear that such lucrative graces procured for Agesilaus many warm admirers; though the eulogies of Xenophon ought to have been confined to another point in his conduct, now to be mentioned. Agesilaus, while securing for his army the plunder of the country over which he carried his victorious arms, took great pains to prevent both cruelty and destruction of property. When any town surrendered to him on terms, his exactions were neither ruinous nor grossly humiliating.<sup>2</sup> Amidst all the plunder realized, too, the most valuable portion was the adult natives of both sexes, hunted down and brought in by the predatory light troops of the army, to be sold as slaves. Agesilaus was vigilant in protecting these poor victims from ill-usage; inculcating upon his soldiers the duty, “not of punishing them like wrong-doers, but simply of keeping them under guard as men.”<sup>3</sup> It was the practice of the poorer part of the native population often to sell their little children for exportation to travelling slave-merchants, from inability to maintain them. The children thus purchased, if they promised to be handsome, were often mutilated, and fetched large prices as eunuchs, to supply the large demand for the harems and religious worship of many Asiatic towns. But in their haste to get out of the way of a plundering army, these slave-merchants were forced often to leave by the way-side the little children whom they had purchased, exposed to the wolves, the dogs, or starvation. In this wretched condition, they were found by Agesilaus on his march. His humane disposition prompted him to see them carried to a place of safety, where he gave them in charge of those old natives whom age and feebleness had

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Agesil. i, 18. πάντες παμπλήθη χρήματα ἔλαβον

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Agesil. i, 20-22

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 19; Xen. Agesil. i, 28. τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ληστῶν ἀλίσκομένους βαρβάρους.

So the word ληστής, used in reference to the fleet, means the commander of a predatory vessel or privateer (Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 30).



caused to be left behind as not worth carrying off. By such active kindness, rare, indeed, in a Grecian general, towards the conquered, he earned the gratitude of the captives, and the sympathies of every one around.<sup>1</sup>

This interesting anecdote, imparting a glimpse of the ancient world in reference to details which Grecian historians rarely condescend to unveil, demonstrates the compassionate disposition of Agesilaus. We find in conjunction with it another anecdote, illustrating the Spartan side of his character. The prisoners who had been captured during the expedition were brought to Ephesus, and

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Agesil. i, 21. Καὶ πολλάκις μὲν προηγόρευε τοῖς στρατιώταις τοὺς ἀλίσκομένους μὴ ὡς ἀδίκους τιμωρεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀνθρώπους ὄντας φυλάσσειν. Πολλάκις δὲ, ὅποτε μεταστρατοπεδεύοντο, εἰ αἰσθοῖτο καταλελειμμένα παιδάρια μικρὰ ἐμπόρων, (ἂ πολλοὶ ἐπώλουν, διὰ τὸ νομίζειν μὴ δύνασθαι ἂν φέρειν αὐτὰ καὶ τρέφειν) ἐπεμέλετο καὶ τούτων, ὅπως συγκομιζοῖτό ποί· τοῖς δ' αὖ διὰ γῆρας καταλελειμμένοις αἰχμαλώτοις προσέταττεν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι αὐτῶν, ὥς μήτε ὑπὸ κυνῶν, μήθ' ὑπὸ λύκων, διαφθείροντο. Ὡστε οὐ μόνον οἱ πυνθανόμενοι ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀλίσκόμενοι, εὐμενεῖς αὐτῷ ἐγίνοντο.

Herodotus affirms that the Thracians also sold their children for exportation, — πωλεῖσι τὰ τέκνα ἐπ' ἐξαγωγή (Herod. v, 6). compare Philostratus, Vit. Apollon viii, 7-12, p. 346, and Ch. xvi, Vol. III, p. 216 of this History.

Herodotus mentions the Chian merchant Panionius (like the "Mitylenæus mango" in Martial, — "Sed Mitylenæi roseus mangonis ephebus" Martial, vii, 79) — as having conducted on a large scale the trade of purchasing boys, looking out for such as were handsome, to supply the great demand in the East for eunuchs, who were supposed to make better and more attached servants. Herodot. viii, 105. ὅπως γὰρ κτήσεται (Panionius) παῖδας εἶδος ἐπαμμένους, ἐκτάμων, ἀγινέων ἐπώλεε ἐς Σάρδεις τε καὶ Ἐφεσον χρημάτων μεγάλων· παρὰ γὰρ τοῖσι βαρβάροισι τιμιώτεροι εἰσι οἱ εὐνούχοι, πιστοὶ εἶνεκα τῆς πασης, τῶν εὐνούχων. Boys were necessary, as the operation was performed in childhood or youth, — παῖδες ἐκτομῆαι (Herodot. vi, 6-32: compare iii, 48). The Babylonians, in addition to their large pecuniary tribute, had to furnish to the Persian court annually five hundred παῖδας ἐκτομῆαι (Herodot. iii, 92). For some farther remarks on the preference of the Persians both for the persons and the services of εὐνούχοι, see Dio Chrysostom, Orat. xxi, p. 270, Xenoph. Cyropæd. vii, 5, 61-65. Hellanikus (Fr 169, ed. Didot) affirmed that the Persians had derived both the persons so employed, and the habit of employing them, from the Babylonians.

When Mr Hanway was travelling near the Caspian, among the Kal mucks, little children of two or three years of age, were often tendered to him for sale, at two rubles per head (Hanway's Travels, ch. xvi, pp 65, 66).

sold during the winter as slaves for the profit of the army. Agesilaus, — being then busily employed in training his troops to military efficiency, especially for the cavalry service during the ensuing campaign, — thought it advisable to impress them with contempt for the bodily capacity and prowess of the natives. He therefore directed the heralds who conducted the auction, to put the prisoners up to sale in a state of perfect nudity. To have the body thus exposed, was a thing never done, and even held disgraceful by the native Asiatics; while among the Greeks the practice was universal for purposes of exercise, — or at least, had become universal during the last two or three centuries, — for we are told that originally the Asiatic feeling on this point had prevailed throughout Greece. It was one of the obvious differences between Grecian and Asiatic customs,<sup>1</sup> — that in the former, both the exercises of the palaestra, as well as the matches in the solemn games, required competitors of every rank to contend naked. Agesilaus himself stripped thus habitually; Alexander, prince of Macedon, had done so, when he ran at the Olympic stadium,<sup>2</sup> — also the combatants out of the great family of the Diagorids of Rhodes, when they gained their victories in the Olympic pankratium, — and all those other noble pugilists, wrestlers, and runners, descended from gods and heroes, upon whom Pindar pours forth his complimentary odes.

On this occasion at Ephesus, Agesilaus gave special orders to put up the Asiatic prisoners to auction naked; not at all by way of insult, but in order to exhibit to the eye of the Greek soldier, as he contemplated them, how much he gained by his own bodily training and frequent exposure, and how inferior was the condition of men whose bodies never felt the sun or wind. They displayed a white skin, plump and soft limbs, weak and undeveloped muscles, like men accustomed to be borne in carriages instead of walking or running; from whence we indirectly learn that many of them were men in wealthy circumstances. And the purpose of Agesilaus was completely answered; since his soldiers, when they witnessed such evidences of bodily incompetence, thought that "the

<sup>1</sup> Herodot. i, 10. παρὰ γὰρ τοῖσι Λυδοῖσι, σχεδὸν δὲ παρὰ τοῖσι ἄλλοις βαρβάροισι, καὶ ἄνδρα ὀφθῆναι γυμνὸν, ἐς αἰσχύνην μεγάλην φέρει. Compare Thucyd. i, 6, Plato, Republic, vii, 3, p. 452, D.

<sup>2</sup> Herodot. v, 22.



enemies against whom they had to contend were not more formidable than women."<sup>1</sup> Such a method of illustrating the difference between good and bad physical training, would hardly have occurred to any one except a Spartan, brought up under the Lykurgian rules.

While Agesilaus thus brought home to the vision of his soldiers the inefficiency of untrained bodies, he kept them throughout the winter under hard work and drill, as well in the palæstra as in arms. A force of cavalry was still wanting. To procure it, he enrolled all the richest Greeks in the various Asiatic towns, as conscripts to serve on horseback; giving each of them leave to exempt himself, however, by providing a competent substitute and equipment, — man, horse, and arms.<sup>2</sup> Before the commencement of spring, an adequate force of cavalry was thus assembled at Ephesus, and put into tolerable exercise. Throughout the whole winter, that city became a place of arms, consecrated to drilling and gymnastic exercises. On parade as well as in the palæstra, Agesilaus himself was foremost in setting the example of obedience and hard work. Prizes were given to the diligent and improving among hoplites, horsemen, and light troops; while the armorers, braziers, leather-cutters, etc., — all the various artisans, whose trade lay in muniments of war, were in the fullest employment. "It was a sight full of encouragement (says Xenophon, who was doubtless present and took part in it), to see Agesilaus and the soldiers leaving the gymnasium, all with wreaths on their heads,

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 19. Ἡγούμενος δὲ καὶ τὸ καταφρονεῖν τῶν πολεμίων βώμην τινα ἐμβάλλειν πρὸς τὸ μάχεσθαι, προεῖπε τοῖς κήρυξι, τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ληστῶν ἀλισκομένους βαρβάρους γυμνοὺς πωλεῖ. Ὁρῶντες οὖν οἱ στρατιῶται λευκοὺς μὲν, διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ἐκδύεσθαι, μαλακοὺς δὲ καὶ ἀπόνους, διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ ἐπ' ὀχημάτων εἶναι, ἐνόμισαν, οὐδὲν ἰοίσειν τὸν πόλεμον ἢ εἰ γυναιξὶ δέοι μάχεσθαι.

Xen. Agesil. i, 28 — where he has it — πίονας σε καὶ ἀπόνους, διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ ἐπ' ὀχημάτων εἶναι (Polyænus, ii, 1, 5; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 9).

Frontinus (i, 18) recounts a proceeding somewhat similar on the part of Gelon, after his great victory over the Carthaginians at Himera in Sicily: — "Gelo Syracusarum tyrannus, bello adversus Pœnos suscepto, cum multos cepisset, infirmissimum quemque præcipue ex auxiliaribus, qui nigerri mi erant, nudatum in conspectu suorum produxit, ut persuaderet contem nondos."

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 15; Xen. Agesil. i, 23. Compare what is related about Scipio Africanus — Livy, xxix, 1.

and marching to the temple of Artemis to dedicate their wreaths to the goddess."<sup>1</sup>

Before Agesilaus was in condition to begin his military operations for the spring, the first year of his command had passed over. Thirty fresh counsellors reached Ephesus from Sparta, superseding the first thirty under Lysander, who forthwith returned home. The army was now not only more numerous, but better trained, and more systematically arranged than in the preceding campaign. Agesilaus distributed the various divisions under the command of different members of the new Thirty; the cavalry being assigned to Xenoklês, the Neodamode hoplites to Skythês, the Cyreians to Herippidas, the Asiatic contingents to Migdon. He then gave out that he should march straight against Sardis. Nevertheless, Tissaphernes, who was in that place, construing this proclamation as a feint, and believing that the real march would be directed against Karia, disposed his cavalry in the plain of the Mæander as he had done in the preceding campaign; while his infantry were sent still farther southward within the Karian frontier. On this occasion, however, Agesilaus marched as he had announced, in the direction of Sardis. For three days he plundered the country without seeing an enemy; nor was it until the fourth day that the cavalry of Tissaphernes could be summoned back to oppose him; the infantry being even yet at a distance. On reaching the banks of the river Paktôlus, this Persian cavalry found the Greek light troops dispersed for the purpose of plunder, attacked them by surprise, and drove them in with considerable loss. Presently, however, Agesilaus came up, and ordered his cavalry to charge, anxious to bring on a battle before the Persian infantry could arrive in the field. In efficiency, it appears, the Persian cavalry was a full match for his cavalry, and in number apparently superior. But when he brought up his infantry, and caused his peltasts and younger hoplites to join the cavalry in a vigorous attack, — victory soon declared on his side. The Persians were put to flight and many of them drowned in the Paktôlus. Their camp, too, was taken, with a valuable booty; including several camels, which Agesilaus afterwards took with him into Greece. This success ensured to him the unopposed mastery of all the ter

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 17, 18; Xen. Agesil. i, 26, 27.



ritory around Sardis. He carried his ravages to the very gates of that city, plundering the gardens and ornamented ground, proclaiming liberty to those within, and defying Tissaphernes to come out and fight.<sup>1</sup>

The career of that timid and treacherous satrap now approached its close. The Persians in or near Sardis loudly complained of him as leaving them undefended, from cowardice and anxiety for his own residence in Karia; while the court of Susa was now aware that the powerful reinforcement which had been sent to him last year, intended to drive Agesilaus out of Asia, had been made to achieve absolutely nothing. To these grounds of just dissatisfaction was added a court intrigue; to which, and to the agency of a person yet more worthless and cruel than himself, Tissaphernes fell a victim. The queen mother, Parysatis, had never forgiven him for having been one of the principal agents in the defeat and death of her son Cyrus. Her influence being now reestablished over the mind of Artaxerxes, she took advantage of the existing discredit of the satrap to get an order sent down for his deposition and death. Tithraustes, the bearer of this order, seized him by stratagem at Kolossæ in Phrygia, while he was in the bath, and caused him to be beheaded.<sup>2</sup>

The mission of Tithraustes to Asia Minor was accompanied by increased efforts on the part of Persia for prosecuting the war against Sparta with vigor, by sea as well as by land; and also for fomenting the anti-Spartan movement which burst out into hostilities this year in Greece. At first, however, immediately after the death of Tissaphernes, Tithraustes endeavored to open negotiations with Agesilaus, who was in military possession of the country around Sardis, while that city itself appears to have been occupied by Ariæus, probably the same Persian who had formerly been

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 21-24; Xen. Agesil. i, 32, 33; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 10.

Diodorus (xiv, 80) professes to describe this battle; but his description is hardly to be reconciled with that of Xenophon, which is better authority. Among other points of difference, Diodorus affirms that the Persians had fifty thousand infantry; and Pausanias also states (iii, 9, 3) that the number of Persian infantry in this battle was greater than had ever been got together since the times of Darius and Xerxes. Whereas, Xenophon expressly states that the Persian infantry had not come up, and took no part in the battle.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 23; Diodor. xiv, 80, Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 25.

general under Cyrus, and who had now again revolted from Artaxerxes.<sup>1</sup> Tithraustes took credit to the justice of the king for having punished the late satrap; out of whose perfidy (he affirmed) the war had arisen. He then summoned Agesilaus, in the king's name, to evacuate Asia, leaving the Asiatic Greeks to pay their original tribute to Persia, but to enjoy complete autonomy, subject to that one condition. Had this proposition been accepted and executed, it would have secured these Greeks against Persian occupation or governors; a much milder fate for them than that to which the Lacedæmonians had consented in their conventions with Tissaphernes sixteen years before,<sup>2</sup> and analogous to the position in which the Chalkidians of Thrace had been placed with regard to Athens, under the peace of Nikias;<sup>3</sup> subject to a fixed tribute, yet autonomous, — with no other obligation or interference. Agesilaus replied that he had no power to entertain such a proposition without the authorities at home, whom he accordingly sent to consult. But in the interim he was prevailed upon by Tithraustes to conclude an armistice for six months, and to move out of his satrapy into that of Pharnabazus; receiving a contribution of thirty talents towards the temporary maintenance of the army.<sup>4</sup> These satraps generally acted more like independent or even hostile princes, than coöperating colleagues; one of the many causes of the weakness of the Persian empire.

When Agesilaus had reached the neighborhood of Kymê, on his march northward to the Hellespontine Phrygia, he received a despatch from home, placing the Spartan naval force in the Asiatic seas under his command, as well as the land-force, and empowering him to name whomsoever he chose as acting admiral.<sup>5</sup> For the first time since the battle of Ægospotami, the maritime empire of Sparta was beginning to be threatened, and increased efforts on her part were becoming requisite. Pharnabazus, going up in person to the court of Artaxerxes, had by pressing representations obtained a large subsidy for fitting out a fleet in Cyprus and Phœnicia, to act under the Athenian admiral Konon against the Lacedæmonians.<sup>6</sup> That officer, — with a fleet of forty triremes, before

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 14, 25; iv, 1, 27.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. viii, 18, 37, 58.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. v, 18, 5.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 26; Diodor. xiv, 80. *ἐξαμνηταίως ἀνοχάς.*

<sup>5</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 27.

<sup>6</sup> Diodor. xiv, 39; Justin, vi, 1.



the equipment of the remainder was yet complete, — had advanced along the southern coast of Asia Minor to Kaunus, at the south-western corner of the peninsula, on the frontier of Karia and Lykia. In this port he was besieged by the Lacedæmonian fleet of one hundred and twenty triremes under Pharax. But a Persian reinforcement strengthened the fleet of Konon to eighty sail, and put the place out of danger; so that Pharax, desisting from the siege, retired to Rhodes.

The neighborhood of Konon, however, who was now with his fleet of eighty sail near the Chersonesus of Knidus, emboldened the Rhodians to revolt from Sparta. It was at Rhodes that the general detestation of the Lacedæmonian empire, disgraced in so many different cities by the local dekharchies and by the Spartan harmosts, first manifested itself. And such was the ardor of the Rhodian population, that their revolt took place while the fleet of Pharax was (in part at least) actually in the harbor, and they drove him out of it.<sup>1</sup> Konon, whose secret encouragements had helped to excite this insurrection, presently sailed to Rhodes with his fleet, and made the island his main station. It threw into his hands an unexpected advantage; for a numerous fleet of vessels arrived there shortly afterwards, sent by Nephareus, the native king of Egypt (which was in revolt against the Persians), with marine stores and grain to the aid of the Lacedæmonians. Not having been apprized of the recent revolt, these vessels entered the harbor of Rhodes as if it were still a Lacedæmonian island; and their cargoes were thus appropriated by Konon and the Rhodians.<sup>2</sup>

In recounting the various revolts of the dependencies of Athens which took place during the Peloponnesian war, I had occasion to point out more than once that all of them took place not merely in the absence of any Athenian force, but even at the instigation

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 79. 'Ρόδιοι δὲ ἐκβαλόντες τὸν τῶν Πελοποννησίων στόλον, ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ τὸν Κόνωνα προσεδέξαντο μετὰ τοῦ στόλου παντὸς εἰς τὴν πόλιν.

Compare Androtion apud Pausaniam, vi, 7, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 79; Justin (vi, 2) calls this native Egyptian king *Hecynion*.

It seems to have been the uniform practice, for the corn-ships coming from Egypt to Greece to halt at Rhodes (Demosthen. cont. Dionysodor p. 1285: compare Herodot. ii, 182).

(in most cases) of a present hostile force, — by the contrivance of a local party, — and without privity or previous consent of the bulk of the citizens. The present revolt of Rhodes, forming a remarkable contrast on all these points, occasioned the utmost surprise and indignation among the Lacedæmonians. They saw themselves about to enter upon a renewed maritime war, without that aid which they had reckoned on receiving from Egypt, and with aggravated uncertainty in respect to their dependencies and tribute. It was under this prospective anxiety that they took the step of nominating Agesilaus to the command of the fleet as well as of the army, in order to ensure unity of operations; <sup>1</sup> though a distinction of functions, which they had hitherto set great value upon maintaining, was thus broken down, — and, though the two commands had never been united in any king before Agesilaus.<sup>2</sup> Pharax, the previous admiral, was recalled.<sup>3</sup>

But the violent displeasure of the Lacedæmonians against the revolted Rhodians was still better attested by another proceeding. Among all the great families at Rhodes, none were more distinguished than the Diagoridæ. Its members were not only generals and high political functionaries in their native island, but had attained even Pan-hellenic celebrity by an unparalleled series of victories at the Olympic and other great solemnities. Doriæus, a member of this family, had gained the victory in the pankration at Olympia on three successive solemnities. He had obtained seven prizes in the Nemean, and eight in the Isthmian games. He had carried off the prize at one Pythian solemnity without a contest, — no one daring to stand up against him in the fearful struggle of the pankration. As a Rhodian, while Rhodes was a subject ally of Athens during the Peloponnesian war, he had been so pronounced in his attachment to Sparta as to draw on himself a sentence of banishment; upon which he had retired to Thurii, and had been active in hostility to Athens after the Syracusan

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 27.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 10; Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 22.

<sup>3</sup> The Lacedæmonian named Pharax, mentioned by Theopompus (Fragm. 218, ed. Didot: compare Athenæus, xii, p. 536) as a profligate and extravagant person, is more probably an officer who served under Dionysius in Sicily and Italy, about forty years after the revolt of Rhodes. The difference of time appears so great, that we must probably suppose two different men bearing the same name.



catastrophe. Serving against her in ships fitted out at his own cost, he had been captured in 407 B. C. by the Athenians, and brought in as prisoner to Athens. By the received practice of war in that day, his life was forfeited; and over and above such practice, the name of Dorieus was peculiarly odious to the Athenians. But when they saw before the public assembly a captive enemy, of heroic lineage, as well as of unrivalled athletic majesty and renown, their previous hatred was so overpowered by sympathy and admiration, that they liberated him by public vote, and dismissed him unconditionally.<sup>1</sup>

This interesting anecdote, which has already been related in my eighth volume,<sup>2</sup> is here again noticed as a contrast to the treatment which the same Dorieus now underwent from the Lacedæmonians. What he had been doing since, we do not know; but at the time when Rhodes now revolted from Sparta, he was not only absent from the island, but actually in or near Peloponnesus. Such, however, was the wrath of the Lacedæmonians against Rhodians generally, that Dorieus was seized by their order, brought to Sparta, and there condemned and executed.<sup>3</sup> It seems hardly possible that he can have had any personal concern in the revolt. Had such been the fact, he would have been in the island, — or would at least have taken care not to be within the reach of the Lacedæmonians when the revolt happened. Perhaps, however, other members of the Diagoridæ, his family, once so much attached to Sparta, may have taken part in it; for we know, by the example of the Thirty at Athens, that the Lysandrian dekharchies and Spartan harmosts made themselves quite as formidable to oligarchical as to democratical politicians, and it is very conceivable that the Diagoridæ may have become less philo-Laonian in their politics.

This extreme difference in the treatment of the same man by Athens and by Sparta raises instructive reflections. It exhibits the difference both between Athenian and Spartan sentiment, and between the sentiment of a multitude and that of a few. The

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 19.

Compare a similar instance of merciful dealing, on the part of the Syracusan assembly, towards the Sikeli prince Duketius (Diodor. xi, 92).

<sup>2</sup> Hist. of Greece, Vol. VIII, Ch. lxiv, p. 159.

<sup>3</sup> Pausanias, vi, 7, 2.

grand and sacred personality of the Hieronike Dorieus, when exhibited to the senses of the Athenian multitude, — the spectacle of a man in chains before them, who had been proclaimed victor and crowned on so many solemn occasions before the largest assemblages of Greeks ever brought together, — produced an overwhelming effect upon their emotions; sufficient not only to efface a strong preëstablished antipathy founded on active past hostility, but to countervail a just cause of revenge, speaking in the language of that day. But the same appearance produced no effect at all on the Spartan ephors and senate; not sufficient even to hinder them from putting Dorieus to death, though he had given them no cause for antipathy or revenge, simply as a sort of retribution for the revolt of the island. Now this difference depended partly upon the difference between the sentiment of Athenians and Spartans, but partly also upon the difference between the sentiment of a multitude and that of a few. Had Dorieus been brought before a select judicial tribunal at Athens, instead of before the Athenian public assembly, — or, had the case been discussed before the assembly in his absence, — he would have been probably condemned, conformably to usage, under the circumstances; but the vehement emotion worked by his presence upon the multitudinous spectators of the assembly, rendered such a course intolerable to them. It has been common with historians of Athens to dwell upon the passions of the public assembly as if it were susceptible of excitement only in an angry or vindictive direction; whereas, the truth is, and the example before us illustrates, that they were open-minded in one direction as well as in another, and that the present emotion, whatever it might be, merciful or sympathetic as well as resentful, was intensified by the mere fact of multitude. And thus, where the established rule of procedure happened to be cruel, there was some chance of moving an Athenian assembly to mitigate it in a particular case, though the Spartan ephors or senate would be inexorable in carrying it out, — if, indeed, they did not, as seems probable in the case of Dorieus, actually go beyond it in rigor.

While Konon and the Rhodians were thus raising hostilities against Sparta by sea, Agesilaus, on receiving at Kymê the news of his nomination to the double command, immediately despatched orders to the dependent maritime cities and islands, requiring the



construction and equipment of new triremes. Such was the influence of Sparta, and so much did the local governments rest upon its continuance, that these requisitions were zealously obeyed. Many leading men incurred considerable expense, from desire to acquire his favor; so that a fleet of one hundred and twenty new triremes was ready by the ensuing year. Agesilaus, naming his brother-in-law, Peisander, to act as admiral, sent him to superintend the preparations; a brave young man, but destitute both of skill and experience.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile, he himself pursued his march (about the beginning of autumn) towards the satrapy of Pharnabazus, — Phrygia south and south-east of the Propontis. Under the active guidance of his new auxiliary, Spithridates, he plundered the country, capturing some towns, and reducing others to capitulate; with considerable advantage to his soldiers. Pharnabazus, having no sufficient army to hazard a battle in defence of his satrapy, concentrated all his force near his own residence at Daskylum, offering no opposition to the march of Agesilaus; who was induced by Spithridates to traverse Phrygia and enter Paphlagonia, in hopes of concluding an alliance with the Paphlagonian prince Otys. That prince, in nominal dependence on Persia, could muster the best cavalry in the Persian empire. But he had recently refused to obey an invitation from the court at Susa, and he now not only welcomed the appearance of Agesilaus, but concluded an alliance with him, strengthening him with an auxiliary body of cavalry and peltasts. Anxious to requite Spithridates for his services, and vehemently attached to his son, the beautiful youth Megabates, — Agesilaus persuaded Otys to marry the daughter of Spithridates. He even caused her to be conveyed by sea in a Lacedæmonian trireme, — probably from Abydos to Sinopé.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 28, 29; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 1-15.

The negotiation of this marriage by Agesilaus is detailed in a curious and interesting manner by Xenophon. His conversation with Otys took place in the presence of the thirty Spartan counsellors, and probably in the presence of Xenophon himself.

The attachment of Agesilaus to the youth Megabates or Megabates, is marked in the Hellenica (iv, 1, 6-28) — but is more strongly brought out in the Agesilaus of Xenophon (v, 6), and in Plutarch, Agesil. c. 11.

In the retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks (five years before) along the

Reinforced by the Paphlagonian auxiliaries, Agesilaus prosecuted the war with augmented vigor against the satrapy of Pharnabazus. He now approached the neighborhood of Daskylum, the residence of the satrap himself, inherited from his father Pharnakês, who had been satrap before him. This was a well-supplied country, full of rich villages, embellished with parks and gardens for the satrap's hunting and gratification: the sporting tastes of Xenophon lead him also to remark that there were plenty of birds for the fowler, with rivers full of fish.<sup>1</sup> In this agreeable region Agesilaus passed the winter. His soldiers, abundantly supplied with provisions, became so careless, and straggled with so much contempt of their enemy, that Pharnabazus, with a body of four hundred cavalry and two scythed chariots, found an opportunity of attacking seven hundred of them by surprise; driving them back with considerable loss, until Agesilaus came up to protect them with the hoplites.

This partial misfortune, however, was speedily avenged. Fearful of being surrounded and captured, Pharnabazus refrained from occupying any fixed position. He hovered about the country, carrying his valuable property along with him, and keeping his place of encampment as secret as he could. The watchful Spithridates, nevertheless, having obtained information that he was encamped for the night in the village of Kanê, about eighteen miles distant, Herippidas (one of the thirty Spartans) undertook a night-march with a detachment to surprise him. Two thousand Grecian hoplites, the like number of light-armed peltasts, and Spithridates with the Paphlagonian horse, were appointed to accompany him. Though many of these soldiers took advantage of the darkness to evade attendance, the enterprise proved completely successful. The camp of Pharnabazus was surprised at break of day; his Mysian advanced guards were put to the sword, and he himself, with all his troops, was compelled to take flight with scarcely any resistance. All his stores, plate, and personal furniture, together with a large baggage-train and abundance of prisoners, fell into the hands

southern coast of the Euxine, a Paphlagonian prince named Korylas is mentioned (Xen. Anab. v, 5, 22; v, 6, 8). Whether there was more than one Paphlagonian prince — or whether Otys was successor of Korylas — we cannot tell.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 16-38.



of the victors. As the Paphlagonians under Spithridates formed the cavalry of the victorious detachment, they naturally took more spoil and more prisoners than the infantry. They were proceeding to carry off their acquisitions, when Herippidas interfered and took everything away from them; placing the entire spoil of every description, under the charge of Grecian officers, to be sold by formal auction in a Grecian city; after which the proceeds were to be distributed or applied by public authority. The orders of Herippidas were conformable to the regular and systematic proceeding of Grecian officers; but Spithridates and the Paphlagonians were probably justified by Asiatic practice in appropriating that which they had themselves captured. Moreover, the order, disagreeable in itself, was enforced against them with Lacedæmonian harshness of manner,<sup>1</sup> unaccompanied by any guarantee that they would be allowed, even at last, a fair share of the proceeds. Resenting the conduct of Herippidas as combining injury with insult, they deserted in the night and fled to Sardis, where the Persian Ariæus was in actual revolt against the court of Susa. This was a serious loss, and still more serious chagrin, to Agesilaus. He was not only deprived of valuable auxiliary cavalry, and of an enterprising Asiatic informant; but the report would be spread that he defrauded his Asiatic allies of their legitimate plunder, and others would thus be deterred from joining him. His personal sorrow too was aggravated by the departure of the youth Megabazus, who accompanied his father Spithridates to Sardis.<sup>2</sup>

It was towards the close of this winter that a personal conference took place between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus, managed by the intervention of a Greek of Kyzikus named Apollopheanês; who was connected by ties of hospitality with both, and served to each as guarantee for the good faith of the other. We have from Xenophon, himself probably present, an interesting detail of this interview. Agesilaus, accompanied by his thirty Spartan counsel-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 11. *πικρὸς δὲ ἐν ἐξεταστῇ τῶν κλαπέτων*, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 27; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 11.

Since the flight of Spithridates took place secretly by night, the scene which Plutarch asserts to have taken place between Agesilaus and Megabazus cannot have occurred on the departure of the latter, but must belong to some other occasion; as, indeed, it seems to be represented by Xenophon (Agesil. v 4).

lors, being the first to arrive at the place of appointment, all of them sat down upon the grass to wait. Presently came Pharnabazus, with splendid clothing and retinue. His attendants were beginning to spread fine carpets for him, when the satrap, observing how the Spartans were seated, felt ashamed of such a luxury for himself, and sat down on the grass by the side of Agesilaus. Having exchanged salutes, they next shook hands; after which Pharnabazus, who as the older of the two had been the first to tender his right hand, was also the first to open the conversation. Whether he spoke Greek well enough to dispense with the necessity of an interpreter, we are not informed. "Agesilaus (said he), I was the friend and ally of you Lacedæmonians while you were at war with Athens; I furnished you with money to strengthen your fleet, and fought with you myself ashore on horseback, chasing your enemies into the sea. You cannot charge me with having ever played you false, like Tissaphernes, either by word or deed. Yet, after this behavior, I am now reduced by you to such a condition, that I have not a dinner in my own territory, except by picking up your leavings, like the beasts of the field. I see the fine residences, parks, and hunting-grounds, bequeathed to me by my father, which formed the charm of my life, cut up or burnt down by you. Is this the conduct of men mindful of favors received, and eager to requite them? Pray answer me this question; for, perhaps, I have yet to learn what is holy and just."

The thirty Spartan counsellors were covered with shame by this emphatic appeal. They all held their peace; while Agesilaus, after a long pause, at length replied, — "You are aware, Pharnabazus, that in Grecian cities, individuals become private friends and guests of each other. Such guests, if the cities to which they belong go to war, fight with each other, and sometimes by accident even kill each other, each in behalf of his respective city. So then it is that we, being at war with your king, are compelled to hold all his dominions as enemy's land. But in regard to you, we would pay any price to become your friends. I do not invite you to accept us as masters, in place of your present master; I ask you to become our ally, and to enjoy your own property as a freeman, — bowing before no man and acknowledging no master. Now freedom is in itself a possession of the highest value. But this is not all. We do not call upon you to be a freeman, and yet poor.



We offer you our alliance, to acquire fresh territory, not for the king, but for yourself; by reducing those who are now your fellow-slaves to become your subjects. Now tell me,—if you thus continue a freeman and become rich, what can you want farther to make you a thoroughly prosperous man?"

"I will speak frankly to you in reply (said Pharnabazus). If the king shall send any other general, and put me under him, I shall willingly become your friend and ally. But if he imposes the duty of command on me, so strong is the point of honor, that I shall continue to make war upon you to the best of my power. Expect nothing else."<sup>1</sup>

Agesilaus, struck with this answer, took his hand and said,— "Would that with such high-minded sentiments you *could* become our friend! At any rate, let me assure you of this,—that I will immediately quit your territory; and for the future, even should the war continue, I will respect both you and all your property, as long as I can turn my arms against any other Persians."

Here the conversation closed; Pharnabazus mounted his horse, and rode away. His son by Parapita, however,—at that time still a handsome youth,—lingered behind, ran up to Agesilaus, and exclaimed,— "Agesilaus, I make you my guest."—"I accept it with all my heart,"—was the answer. "Remember me by this,"—rejoined the young Persian,—putting into the hands of Agesilaus the fine javelin which he carried. The latter immediately took off the ornamental trappings from the horse of his secretary Idæus, and gave them as a return present; upon which the young man rode away with them, and rejoined his father.<sup>2</sup>

There is a touching interest and emphasis in this interview as described by Xenophon, who here breathes into his tame Hellenic chronicle something of the romantic spirit of the *Cyropædia*. The pledges exchanged between Agesilaus and the son of Pharnabazus were not forgotten by either. The latter,—being in after days impoverished and driven into exile by his brother, during the

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 38. Ἐὰν μέντοι μοι τὴν ἀρχὴν προστάτῃ τοιοῦτον τι, ὥς ἔοικε, φιλοτιμία ἐστὶ, εὐχρὴ εἰδέναι, ὅτι πολέμησω ὑμῖν ὥς ἐδύναμαι ἄριστα.

Compare about *φιλοτιμία*, Herodot. iii, 53.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 29-41; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 13, 14; Xen. Agesil. vi, 5.

absence of Pharnabazus in Egypt,—was compelled to take refuge in Greece; where Agesilaus provided him with protection and a home, and even went so far as to employ influence in favor of an Athenian youth, to whom the son of Pharnabazus was attached. This Athenian youth had outgrown the age and size of the boy-runners in the Olympic stadium; nevertheless Agesilaus, by strenuous personal interference, overruled the reluctance of the Eleian judges, and prevailed upon them to admit him as a competitor with the other boys.<sup>1</sup> The stress laid by Xenophon upon this favor illustrates the tone of Grecian sentiment, and shows us the variety of objects which personal ascendancy was used to compass. Disinterested in regard to himself, Agesilaus was unscrupulous both in promoting the encroachments, and screening the injustices, of his friends.<sup>2</sup> The unfair privilege which he procured for this youth, though a small thing in itself, could hardly fail to offend a crowd of spectators familiar with the established conditions of the stadium, and to expose the judges to severe censure.

Quitting the satrapy of Pharnabazus,—which was now pretty well exhausted, while the armistice concluded with Tithraustes must have expired,—Agesilaus took up his camp near the temple of Artemis, at Astyra in the plain of Thêbê (in the region commonly known as Æolis, near the Gulf of Elæus. He here employed himself in bringing together an increased number of troops, with a view to penetrate farther into the interior of Asia Minor during the summer. Recent events had greatly increased the belief entertained by the Asiatics in his superior strength; so that he received propositions from various districts in the interior, inviting his presence, and expressing anxiety to throw off the Persian yoke. He sought also to compose the dissensions and misrule which had arisen out of the Lysandrian dekharchies in the Greco-Asiatic cities, avoiding as much as possible sharp inflictions of death or exile. How much he achieved in this direction, we cannot tell,<sup>3</sup> nor can it have been possible, indeed, to achieve

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 40. πάντ' ἐποίησεν, ὅπως ἂν δι' ἐκείνον ἐγκριθεῖν εἰς τὸ στάδιον ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ, μέγιστος ὢν παιδῶν.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 5-13.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 41; Xen. Agesil. i, 35-38; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 14, 15; Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.) s. 100.



much, without dismissing the Spartan harmosts and lesserizing the political power of his own partisans; neither of which he did.

His plans were now all laid for penetrating farther than ever into the interior, and for permanent conquest, if possible, of the western portion of Persian Asia. What he would have permanently accomplished towards this scheme, cannot be determined; for his aggressive march was suspended by a summons home, the reason of which will appear in the next chapter.

Meanwhile, Pharnabazus had been called from his satrapy to go and take the command of the Persian fleet in Kilikia and the south of Asia Minor, in conjunction with Konon. Since the revolt of Rhodes from the Lacedæmonians, (in the summer of the preceding year, 395 B. C.) that active Athenian had achieved nothing. The burst of activity, produced by the first visit of Pharnabazus at the Persian court, had been paralyzed by the jealousies of the Persian commanders, reluctant to serve under a Greek, — by peculation of officers who embezzled the pay destined for the troops, — by mutiny in the fleet from absence of pay, — and by the many delays arising while the satraps, unwilling to spend their own revenues in the war, waited for orders and remittances from court.<sup>1</sup> Hence Konon had been unable to make any efficient use of his fleet, during those months when the Lacedæmonian fleet was increased to nearly double its former number. At length he resolved, — seemingly at the instigation of his countrymen at home<sup>2</sup> as well as of Euagoras prince of Salamis in Cyprus, and through the encouragement of Ktésias, one of the Grecian physicians resident at the Persian court, — on going himself into the interior to communicate personally with Artaxerxes. Landing on the Kilikian coast, he crossed by land to Thapsakus on the Eu-

<sup>1</sup> Compare Diodor. xv, 41 *ad fin.*; and Thucyd. viii, 45.

<sup>2</sup> Isokrates Or. viii, De Pace, s. 82) alludes to "many embassies" as having been sent by Athens to the king of Persia, to protest against the Lacedæmonian dominion. But this mission of Konon is the only one which we can verify, prior to the battle of Knidus.

Probably Demus, the son of Pyrilampês, an eminent citizen and trierarch of Athens, must have been one of the companions of Konon in this mission. He is mentioned in an oration of Lysias as having received from the Great King a present of a golden drinking-bowl or (φιάλη); and I do not know on what other occasion he can have received it, except in this embassy (Lysias, Or. xix, De Bonis Aristoph. s. 27).

phrates (as the Cyreian army had marched), from whence he sailed down the river in a boat to Babylon. It appears that he did not see Artaxerxes, from repugnance to that ceremony of prostration which was required from all who approached the royal person. But his messages, transmitted through Ktesias and others, — with his confident engagement to put down the maritime empire of Sparta and counteract the projects of Agesilaus, if the Persian forces and money were put into efficient action, — produced a powerful effect on the mind of the monarch; who doubtless was not merely alarmed at the formidable position of Agesilaus in Asia Minor, but also hated the Lacedæmonians as main agents in the aggressive enterprise of Cyrus. Artaxerxes not only approved his views, but made to him a large grant of money, and transmitted peremptory orders to the coast that his officers should be active in prosecuting the maritime war.

What was of still greater moment, Konon was permitted to name any person whom he chose, as admiral jointly with himself. It was by his choice that Pharnabazus was called from his satrapy, and ordered to act jointly as commander of the fleet. This satrap, the bravest and most straightforward among all the Persian grandees, and just now smarting with resentment at the devastation of his satrapy<sup>1</sup> by Agesilaus, coöperated heartily with Konon. A powerful fleet, partly Phœnician, partly Athenian or Grecian, was soon equipped, superior in number even to the newly-organized Lacedæmonian fleet under Peisander.<sup>2</sup> Euagoras, prince of Sa-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 6.

<sup>2</sup> The measures of Konon and the transactions preceding the battle of Knidus, are very imperfectly known to us; but we may gather them generally from Diodorus, xiv, 81; Justin, vi, 3, 4; Cornelius Nepos, Vit. Konon. c. 2, 3; Ktesias Fragment, c. 62, 63, ed. Bähr.

Isokrates (Orat. iv, (Panegy.) s. 165; compare Orat. ix, (Euagor.) s. 77) speaks loosely as to the duration of time that the Persian fleet remained blocked up by the Lacedæmonians before Konon obtained his final and vigorous orders from Artaxerxes, unless we are to understand his *three years* as referring to the first news of outfit of ships of war in Phœnicia, brought to Sparta by Hérodas, as Schneider understands them; and even then the statement that the Persian fleet remained *πολιορκούμενον* for all this time, would be much exaggerated. Allowing for exaggeration, however, Isokrates coincides generally with the authorities above noticed.

It would appear that Ktesias the physician obtained about this time permission to quit the court of Persia and come back to Greece. Perhaps he

lamis in Cyprus,<sup>1</sup> not only provided many triremes, but served himself, personally, on board.

It was about the month of July, 394 B. C., that Pharnabazus and Konon brought their united fleet to the south-western corner of Asia Minor; first, probably, to the friendly island of Rhodes, next, off Loryma<sup>2</sup> and the mountain called Dorion on the peninsula of Knidus.<sup>3</sup> Peisander, with the fleet of Sparta and her allies, sailed out from Knidus to meet them, and both parties prepared for a battle. The numbers of the Lacedæmonians are reported by Diodorus at eighty-five triremes; those of Konon and Pharnabazus at above ninety. But Xenophon, without particularizing the number on either side, seems to intimate the disparity as far greater; stating that the entire fleet of Peisander was considerably inferior even to the Grecian division under Konon, without reckoning the Phœnician ships under Pharnabazus.<sup>4</sup> In spite of such inferiority, Peisander did not shrink from the encounter. Though a young man without military skill, he possessed a full measure of Spartan courage and pride; moreover,—since the Spartan maritime empire was only maintained by the assumed superior-

may have been induced (like Demokêdes of Kroton, one hundred and twenty years before) to promote the views of Konon in order to get for himself this permission.

In the meagre abstract of Ktesias given by Photius (c. 63) mention is made of some Lacedæmonian envoys who were now going up to the Persian court, and were watched or detained on the way. This mission can hardly have taken place before the battle of Knidus; for then Agesilaus was in the full tide of success, and contemplating the largest plans of aggression against Persia. It must have taken place, I presume, after the battle.

<sup>1</sup> Isokrates, Or. ix, (Euagoras) s. 67. *Εὐαγόρου δὲ αὐτόν τε παρασχόντος, καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως τὴν πλείστην παρασκευάσαντος.* Compare s. 83 of the same oration. Compare Pausanias, i, 3, 1.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 83. *διέτριβον περὶ Λώρυμα τῆς Χερσονήσου.*

It is hardly necessary to remark, that the word *Chersonesus* here (and ix, xiv, 89) does not mean the peninsula of Thrace commonly known by that name, forming the European side of the Hellespont,—but the peninsula on which Knidus is situated.

<sup>3</sup> Pausan. vi, 3, 6. *περὶ Κνίδον καὶ ὄρος τὸ Δώριον ὀνομαζόμενον.*

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 12. *Φαρνάβαζον, ναυαρχὸν ὄντα, ξὺν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις εἶναι. Κόνωνα δὲ, τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἔχοντα, τετάχθαι ἐμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ. Ἄν τι παραταξαμένον δὲ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου, καὶ πολλὰ ἐλαττόνων αὐτῷ τῶν νεῶν φανεισῶν τῶν αὐτοῦ τοῦ μετὰ Κόνωνος Ἑλληνικοῦ etc.*

ity of his fleet,—had he confessed himself too weak to fight, his enemies would have gone unopposed around the islands to excite revolt. Accordingly, he sailed forth from the harbor of Knidus. But when the two fleets were ranged opposite to each other, and the battle was about to commence,—so manifest and alarming was the superiority of the Athenians and Persians, that his Asiatic allies on the left division, noway hearty in the cause, fled almost without striking a blow. Under such discouraging circumstances, he nevertheless led his fleet into action with the greatest valor. But his trireme was overwhelmed by numbers, broken in various places by the beaks of the enemy's ships, and forced back upon the land, together with a large portion of his fleet. Many of the crews jumped out and got to land, abandoning their triremes to the conquerors. Peisander, too, might have escaped in the same way; but disdaining either to survive his defeat or to quit his ship, fell gallantly fighting aboard. The victory of Konon and Pharnabazus was complete. More than half of the Spartan ships were either captured or destroyed, though the neighborhood of the land enabled a large proportion of the crews to escape to Knidus, so that no great number of prisoners were taken.<sup>1</sup> Among the allies of Sparta, the chief loss of course fell upon those who were most attached to her cause; the disaffected or lukewarm were those who escaped by flight at the beginning.

Such was the memorable triumph of Konon at Knidus; the reversal of that of Lysander at Ægospotami eleven years before. Its important effects will be recounted in the coming chapter.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3 12-14; Diodor. xiv, 83; Cornelius Nepos, *Konon*, c. 4; Justin, vi, 3.



## CHAPTER LXXIV.

FROM THE BATTLE OF KNIDUS TO THE REBUILDING OF THE  
LONG WALLS OF ATHENS.

HAVING in my last chapter carried the series of Asiatic events down to the battle of Knidus, in the beginning of August, B. C. 394, at which period war was already raging on the other side of the Ægean, in Greece Proper, — I now take up the thread of events from a period somewhat earlier, to show how this last-mentioned war, commonly called the Corinthian war, began.

At the accession of Agesilaus to the throne, in 398 B. C., the power of Sparta throughout all Greece from Laconia to Thessaly, was greater than it had ever been, and greater than any Grecian state had ever enjoyed before. The burden of the long war against Athens she had borne in far less proportion than her allies; its fruits she had reaped exclusively for herself. There prevailed consequently among her allies a general discontent, which Thebes as well as Corinth manifested by refusing to take part in the recent expeditions; either of Pausanias against Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles in Peiræus, — or of Agis against the Eleians, — or of Agesilaus against the Persians in Asia Minor. The Eleians were completely humbled by the invasions of Agis; all the other cities in Peloponnesus, from apprehension, from ancient habit, and from being governed by oligarchies who leaned on Sparta for support, were obedient to her authority, — with the single exception of Argos, which remained, as before, neutral and quiet, though in sentiment unfriendly. Athens was a simple unit in the catalogue of Spartan allies, furnishing her contingent, like the rest, to be commanded by the *xenâgus*, — or officer sent from Sparta for the special purpose of commanding such foreign contingents.

In the northern regions of Greece, the advance of Spartan power is yet more remarkable. Looking back to the year 419 B. C. (about two years after the peace of Nikias), Sparta had been so unable to protect her colony of Herakleia, in Trachis on the Maliac Gulf, near the strait of Thermopylæ, that the *Bœotians* were



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obliged to send a garrison thither, in order to prevent it from falling into the hands of Athens. They even went so far as to dismiss the Lacedæmonian harmost.<sup>1</sup> In the winter of 409-408 B. C., another disaster had happened at Herakleia, in which the Lacedæmonian harmost was slain.<sup>2</sup> But about 399 B. C., we find Sparta exercising an energetic ascendancy at Herakleia, and even making that place a central post for keeping down the people in the neighborhood of Mount Ceta and a portion of Thessaly. Herippidas, the Lacedæmonian, was sent thither to repress some factious movements, with a force sufficient to enable him to overawe the public assembly, to seize the obnoxious party in the place, and to put them to death, five hundred in number, outside of the gates.<sup>3</sup> Carrying his arms farther against the Ceteans and Trachinians in the neighborhood, who had been long at variance with the Lacedæmonian colonists at Herakleia, he expelled them from their abodes, and forced them to migrate with their wives and children into Thessaly.<sup>4</sup> Hence, the Lacedæmonians were enabled to extend their influence into parts of Thessaly, and to place a harmost with a garrison in Pharsalus, resting upon Herakleia as a basis, — which thus became a position of extraordinary importance for their dominion over the northern regions.

With the real power of Sparta thus greatly augmented on land, in addition to her vast empire at sea, bringing its ample influx of tribute, — and among cities who had not merely long recognized her as leader, but had never recognized any one else, — it required an unusual stimulus to raise any formidable hostile combination against her, notwithstanding a large spread of disaffection and antipathy. The stimulus came from Persia, from whose treasures the means had been before furnished to Sparta herself for subduing Athens. The news that a formidable navy was fitting out in Phœnicia, which had prompted the expedition of Agesilaus in the spring of 396 B. C., was doubtless circulated and heard with satisfaction among the Grecian cities unfriendly to Sparta; and the refusal of Thebes, Corinth, and Athens, to take service under that

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v, 52.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen i 2. 18

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiv, 38; Polyæn. ii, 21.

<sup>4</sup> Diodorus, *ut sup.*; compare xiv, 81 τῶν Τραχινίων φεύγοντας ἐκ τῶν λατρίων ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, etc



prince, — aggravated in the case of the Thebans by a positive offence given to him on the occasion of his sacrifice at Aulis, — was enough to warn Sparta of the dangerous sentiments and tendencies by which she was surrounded near home.

It was upon these tendencies that the positive instigation and promises of Persia were brought to bear, in the course of the following year; and not merely promises, but pecuniary supplies, with news of revived naval warfare threatening the insular dominion of Sparta. Tithraustes, the new satrap, who had put to death and succeeded Tissaphernes, had no sooner concluded the armistice mentioned above, and prevailed upon Agesilaus to remove his army into the satrapy of Pharnabazus, than he employed active measures for kindling war against Sparta in Greece, in order to create a necessity for the recall of Agesilaus out of Asia. He sent a Rhodian named Timokrates into Greece, as envoy to the cities most unfriendly to the Lacedæmonians, with a sum of fifty talents;<sup>1</sup> directing him to employ this money in gaining over the leading men in these cities, and to exchange solemn oaths of alliance and aid with Persia, for common hostility against Sparta. The island of Rhodes having just revolted from the Spartan dominion, had admitted Konon with the Persian fleet (as I have mentioned in the last chapter), so that probably the Rhodian envoy was on a mission to Tithraustes on behalf of his countrymen. He was an appropriate envoy on this occasion, as having an animated interest in raising up new enemies to Sparta, and as being hearty in stirring up among the Thebans and Corinthians the same spirit which had led to the revolt of Rhodes. The effect which that revolt produced in alarming and exasperating the Spartans, has been

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 1. Πέμπει Τιμοκράτην Ῥωδιὸν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, δαΐς χρυσίον ἐς πεντήκοντα τάλαντα ἀργυρίου, καὶ κελεύει πειράσθαι, πιστὰ τὰ μέγιστα λαμβάνοντα, δίδοναι τοῖς προσηκόσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐφ' ᾧ τὸ πλεονέκτημα ἐξοίσειν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους.

Timokrates is ordered to give the money; yet not absolutely, but only on a certain condition, in case he should find that such condition could be realized; that is, if by giving it he could procure from various leading Greeks sufficient assurances and guarantees that they would raise war against Sparta. As this was a matter more or less doubtful, Timokrates is ordered to *try to give the money for this purpose*. Though the construction of *πειράσθαι* couples it with *δίδοναι*, the sense of the word more properly belongs to *ἐξοίσειν* — which designates the purpose to be accomplished.

already noticed; and we may fairly presume that its effect on the other side, in encouraging their Grecian enemies, was considerable. Timokrates visited Thebes, Corinth, and Argos, distributing his funds. He concluded engagements on behalf of the satrap, with various leading men in each, putting them into communication with each other; Ismenias, Androkleidas, and others in Thebes, — Timolaus and Polyantes at Corinth, — Kylon and others at Argos. It appears that he did not visit Athens; at least, Xenophon expressly says that none of his money went there. The working of this mission, — coupled, we must recollect, with the renewed naval warfare on the coast of Asia, and the promise of a Persian fleet against that of Sparta, — was soon felt in the more pronounced manifestation of anti-Laconian sentiments in these various cities, and in the commencement of attempts to establish alliance between them.<sup>1</sup>

With that Laconian bias which pervades his Hellenica, Xenophon represents the coming war against Sparta, as if it had been brought about mainly by these bribes from Persia to the leading men in these various cities. I have stated on more than one occasion, that the average public morality of Grecian individual politicians in Sparta, Athens, and other cities, was not such as to exclude personal corruption; that it required a morality higher than the average, when such temptation was resisted, — and a morality considerably higher than the average, if it were systematically resisted, and for a long life, as by Perikles and Nikias. There would be nothing therefore surprising, if Ismenias and the rest had received bribes under the circumstances here mentioned. But it appears highly improbable that the money given by Timokrates could have been a bribe; that is, given privately, and for the separate use of these leaders. It was furnished for the promotion of a certain public object, which could not be accomplished without heavy disbursements; it was analogous to that sum of thirty talents which (as Xenophon himself tells us) Tithraustes had just given to Agesilaus, as an inducement to carry away his army into the satrapy of Pharnabazus (not as a present for the private purse of the Spartan king, but as a contribution to the

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 2; Pausan. iii, 9, 4; Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 20.



wants of the army),<sup>1</sup> or to that which the satrap Tiribazus gave to Antalkidas afterwards,<sup>2</sup> also for public objects. Xenophon affirms, that Ismenias and the rest, having received these presents from Timokrates, accused the Lacedæmonians and rendered them odious, — each in his respective city.<sup>3</sup> But it is certain, from his own showing, that the hatred towards them existed in these cities, before the arrival of Timokrates. In Argos, such hatred was of old standing; in Corinth and Thebes, though kindled only since the close of the war, it was not the less pronounced. Moreover, Xenophon himself informs us, that the Athenians, though they received none of the money,<sup>4</sup> were quite as ready for war as the other cities. If we therefore admit his statement as a matter of fact, that Timokrates gave private presents to various leading politicians, which is by no means improbable, — we must dissent from the explanatory use which he makes of this fact by setting it out prominently as the cause of the war. What these leading men would find it difficult to raise was, not hatred to Sparta, but confidence and courage to brave the power of Sparta. And for this purpose the mission of Timokrates would be a valuable aid, by conveying assurances of Persian coöperation and support against Sparta. He must have been produced publicly either before the people, the senate, or at least the great body of the anti-Laconian party in each city. And the money which he brought with him, though a portion of it may have gone in private presents, would serve to this party as the best warrant for the sincerity of the satrap.

Whatever negotiations may have been in progress between the cities visited by Timokrates, no union had been brought about between them when the war, kindled by an accident, broke out as

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 26.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 16.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 2. Οἱ μὲν δὲ δεξαμένοι τὰ χρήματα ἐς τὰς οἰκίας πόλεις διέβαλλον τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους· ἐπεὶ δὲ ταύτας ἐς μίσος αὐτῶν προήγαγον, συνίστασαν καὶ τὰς μεγίστας πόλεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας.

<sup>4</sup> Xenophon, *ut sup.*

Pausanias (iii, 9, 4) names some Athenians as having received part of the money. So Plutarch also, in general terms (Agesil. c. 15).

Diodorus mentions nothing respecting either the mission or the presents of Timokrates.

a "Bæotian war,"<sup>1</sup> between Thebes and Sparta separately. Between the Opuntian Lokrians and the Phokians, north of Bæotia, there was a strip of disputed border land; respecting which the Phokians, imputing wrongful encroachment to the Lokrians, invaded their territory. The Lokrians, allied with Thebes, entreated her protection; upon which a body of Bæotians invaded Phokis: while the Phokians on their side threw themselves upon Lacedæmon, invoking her aid against Thebes.<sup>2</sup> "The Lacedæmonians (says Xenophon) were delighted to get a pretence for making war against the Thebans, — having been long angry with them on several different grounds. They thought that the present was an excellent time for marching against them, and putting down their insolence; since Agesilaus was in full success in Asia, and there was no other war to embarrass them in Greece."<sup>3</sup> The various

<sup>1</sup> Πόλεμος Βοιωτικός (Diodor. xiv, 81).

<sup>2</sup> Xenophon (Hellen. iii, 5, 3) says, — and Pausanias (iii, 9, 4) follows him, — That the Theban leaders, wishing to bring about a war with Sparta, and knowing that Sparta would not begin it, purposely incited the Lokrians to encroach upon this disputed border, in order that the Phokians might resent it, and that thus a war might be lighted up. I have little hesitation in rejecting this version, which I conceive to have arisen from Xenophon's philo-Laconian and miso-Theban tendency, and in believing that the fight between the Lokrians and Phokians, as well as that between the Phokians and Thebans, arose without any design on the part of the latter to provoke Sparta. So Diodorus recounts it, in reference to the war between the Phokians and the Thebans; for about the Lokrians he says nothing (xiv, 81).

The subsequent events, as recounted by Xenophon himself, show that the Spartans were not only ready in point of force, but eager in regard to will, to go to war with the Thebans; while the latter were not at all ready to go to war with Sparta. They had not a single ally; for their application to Athens, in itself doubtful, was not made until after Sparta had declared war against them.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 5. Οἱ μὲντοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἄσμενοι ἐλαβον προφύσιν στρατεύειν ἐπὶ τοὺς Θηβαίους, πάλαι ὀργιζόμενοι αὐτοῖς, τῆς τε ἀντιλήψεως τῆς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος δεκάτης ἐν Δεκελείᾳ, καὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ μὴ ἐθελῆσαι ἀκολουθῆσαι· ἤτιόντο δ' αὐτοὺς, καὶ Κορινθίους πείσαι μὴ συστρατεύειν. Ἀνεμνήσκοντο δὲ καὶ, ὡς θύοντ' ἐν Αἰλίδι τὸν Ἀγχιλαὸν οὐκ εἶων, καὶ τὰ τεθνημένα ἱερὰ ὡς ἐρρίψαν ἀπὸ τοῦ βωμοῦ καὶ οὐδ' εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν συνεστράτευον Ἀγχιλάῳ. Ἐλογίζοντο δὲ καὶ καλὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἐξάγειν στρατιὰν ἐπ' αὐτοὺς, καὶ παῖσαι τῆς ἐς αὐτοὺς ὕβρεως· τὰ τε γὰρ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ καλῶς σφίσιν ἔχειν, κρατοῦντος Ἀγχιλαίου, καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι οὐδένα ἄλλον πόλεμον ἐμποδῶν σφίσιν εἶναι. Compare vii, 1, 34.

The description here given by Xenophon himself, — of the past dealing  
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grounds on which the Lacedæmonians rested their displeasure against Thebes, begin from a time immediately succeeding the close of the war against Athens, and the sentiment was now both established and vehement. It was they who now began the Bœotian war; not the Thebans, nor the bribes brought by Timokrates.

The energetic and ambitious Lysander, who had before instigated the expedition of Agesilaus across the Ægean, and who had long hated the Thebans, — was among the foremost advisers of the expedition now decreed by the ephors against Thebes,<sup>1</sup> as well as the chief commander appointed to carry it into execution. He was despatched with a small force to act on the north of Bœotia. He was directed to start from Herakleia, the centre of Lacedæmonian influence in those regions, — to muster the Herakleots, together with the various dependent populations in the neighborhood of Ceta, Cetaeans, Malians, Ænians, etc. — to march towards Bœotia, taking up the Phokians in his way, — and to attack Haliartus. Under the walls of this town king Pausanias engaged to meet him on a given day, with the native Lacedæmonian force and the Peloponnesian allies. For this purpose, having obtained favorable border sacrifices, he marched forth to Tegea, and there employed himself in collecting the allied contingents from Peloponnesus.<sup>2</sup> But the allies generally were tardy and reluctant in the cause; while the Corinthians withheld all concurrence and support,<sup>3</sup> — though neither did they make any manifestation in favor of Thebes.

Finding themselves thus exposed to a formidable attack on two sides, from Sparta at the height of her power, and from a Spartan officer of known ability, — being, moreover, at the same time without a single ally, — the Thebans resolved to entreat succor from Athens. A Theban embassy to Athens for any purpose, and especially for this purpose, was itself among the strongest marks of the revolution which had taken place in Grecian politics.

and established sentiment between Sparta and Thebes, — refutes his allegation, that it was the bribes brought by Timokrates to the leading Thebans which first blew up the hatred against Sparta; and shows farther, that Sparta did not need any circuitous manœuvres of the Thebans, to furnish her with a pretext for going to war.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 28.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 6, 7.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 23.

The conduct of the Corinthians here contributes again to refute the assertion of Xenophon about the effect of the bribes of Timokrates.

The antipathy between the two cities had been so long and virulent, that the Thebans, at the close of the war, had endeavored to induce Sparta to root out the Athenian population. Their conduct subsequently had been favorable and sympathizing towards Thrasybulus in his struggle against the Thirty, and that leader had testified his gratitude by dedicating statues in the Theban Herakleion.<sup>1</sup> But it was by no means clear that Athens would feel herself called upon, either by policy or by sentiment, to assist them in the present emergency; at a moment when she had no Long Walls, no fortifications at Peiræus, no ships, nor any protection against the Spartan maritime power.

It was not until Pausanias and Lysander were both actually engaged in mustering their forces, that the Thebans sent to address the Athenian assembly. The speech of the Theban envoy sets forth strikingly the case against Sparta as it then stood. Disclaiming all concurrence with that former Theban deputy, who, without any instructions, had taken on himself to propose, in the Spartan assembly of allies, extreme severity towards the conquered Athenians, — he reminded the Athenians that Thebes had by unanimous voice declined obeying the summons of the Spartans, to aid in the march against Thrasybulus and the Peiræus; and that this was the first cause of the anger of the Spartans against her. On that ground, then, he appealed to the gratitude of democratical Athens against the Lacedæmonians. But he likewise invoked against them, with yet greater confidence, the aid of oligarchical Athens, — or of those who at that time had stood opposed to Thrasybulus and the Peiræus; for it was Sparta who, having first set up the oligarchy at Athens, had afterwards refused to sustain it, and left its partisans to the generosity of their democratical opponents, by whom alone they were saved harmless.<sup>2</sup> Of course Athens was eager, if possible (so he presumed), to regain her lost empire; and in this enterprise he tendered the cordial aid

<sup>1</sup> Pausanias, ix, 11, 4.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 9.

Πολὺν δ' ἐτι μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦμεν, ὅσοι τῶν ἐν ἡστέι ἐγένεσθε, προθύμως ἐπὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἵεναι. Ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ, καταστήσαντες ἡμᾶς ἐς ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ ἐς ἐχθρὰν τῷ δήμῳ, ἀφικόμενοι πολλῇ δυνάμει, ὡς ἡμῖν σύμμαχοι, παρέδοσαν ἡμᾶς τῷ πλήθει· ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἐπ' ἐκείνοις εἶναι, ἀπολώλατε, ὃ δὲ δῆμος σὺν τοῖς ἡμῶς ἔσωσε.



of Thebes as an ally. He pointed out that it was by no means an impracticable enterprise; looking to the universal hatred which Sparta had now drawn upon herself, not less on the part of ancient allies than of prior enemies. The Athenians knew by experience that Thebes could be formidable as a foe; she would now show that she could be yet more effective as a friend, if the Athenians would interfere to rescue her. Moreover, she was now about to fight, not for Syracusans or Asiatics, but for her own preservation and dignity. "We hesitate not to affirm, men of Athens (concluded the Theban speaker), that what we are now invoking at your hands is a greater benefit to you than it is to ourselves."<sup>1</sup>

Eight years had now elapsed since the archonship of Eukleides and the renovation of the democracy after the crushing visitation of the Thirty. Yet we may see, from the important and well-turned allusion of the Theban speaker to the oligarchical portion of the assembly, that the two parties still stood in a certain measure distinguished. Enfeebled as Athens had been left by the war, she had never since been called upon to take any decisive and emphatic vote on a question of foreign policy; and much now turned upon the temper of the oligarchical minority, which might well be conceived likely to play a party game and speculate upon Spartan countenance. But the comprehensive amnesty decreed on the reestablishment of the democratical constitution, — and the wise and generous forbearance with which it had been carried out, in spite of the most torturing recollections, — were now found to have produced their fruits. Majority and minority, — democrats and oligarchs, — were seen confounded in one unanimous and hearty vote to lend assistance to Thebes, in spite of all risk from hostility with Sparta. We cannot indeed doubt that this vote was considerably influenced also by the revolt of Rhodes, by the re-appearance of Konon with a fleet in the Asiatic seas, and by private communications from that commander intimating his hope of acting triumphantly against the maritime power of Sparta, through enlarged aid from Persia. The vote had thus a double meaning. It proclaimed not merely the restored harmony between democrats and oligarchs at Athens, but also their common resolution to break the chain by which they were held as mere satellites

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 9, 16.

and units in the regiment of Spartan allies, and to work out anew the old traditions of Athens as a self-acting and primary power, at least, — if not once again an imperial power. The vote proclaimed a renovated life in Athens, and its boldness under the existing weakness of the city, is extolled two generations afterwards by Demosthenes.<sup>1</sup>

After having heard the Theban orator (we are told even by the philo-Laconian Xenophon),<sup>2</sup> "very many Athenian citizens rose and spoke in support of his prayer, and the whole assembly with one accord voted to grant it." Thrasybulus proposed the resolution, and communicated it to the Theban envoys.

He told them that Athens knew well the risk which she was incurring while Peiræus was undefended; but nevertheless she was prepared to show her gratitude by giving more in requital than she had received; for she was prepared to give the Thebans positive aid, in case they were attacked — while the Thebans had done nothing more for *her* than to refuse to join in an aggressive march against her.<sup>3</sup>

Without such assurance of succor from Athens, it is highly probable that the Thebans might have been afraid to face, single-handed, Lysander and the full force of Sparta. But they now prepared for a strenuous defence. The first approach of Lysander with his army of Herakleots, Phokians, and others, from the north, was truly menacing; the more so, as Orchomenus, the second city next to Thebes in the Bœotian confederacy, broke off its allegiance and joined him. The supremacy of Thebes over the cities composing the Bœotian confederacy appears to have been often harsh and oppressive, though probably not equally oppressive towards all, and certainly not equally odious to all. To Plataea on the extreme south of Bœotia, it had been long

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. de Coronâ, c. 28, p. 258; also Philipp. i, c. 7, p. 44. Compare also Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo, s. 15).

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 16. Τῶν δ' Ἀθηναίων παμπολλοὶ μὲν ξυνηγόρευον, πάντες δ' ἐψηφίσαντο βοηθεῖν αὐτοῖς.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. *ut sup.*

Pausanias (iii, 9, 6) says that the Athenians sent envoys to the Spartans to entreat them not to act aggressively against Thebes, but to submit their complaint to equitable adjustment. This seems to me improbable. Diodorus (xiv, 81) briefly states the general fact in conformity with Xenophon



intolerable, and the unhappy fate of that little town has saddened many pages of my preceding volumes; to Orchomenus, on the extreme north, it was also unpalatable, — partly because that town stood next in power and importance to Thebes, — partly because it had an imposing legendary antiquity, and claimed to have been once the ascendant city receiving tribute from Thebes. The Orchomenians now joined Lysander, threw open to him the way into Bœotia, and conducted him with his army, after first ravaging the fields of Lebadeia, into the district belonging to Haliartus.<sup>1</sup>

Before Lysander quitted Sparta, the plan of operations concerted between him and Pausanias, was that they should meet on a given day in the territory of Haliartus. And in execution of this plan Pausanias had already advanced with his Peloponnesian army as far as Platæa in Bœotia. Whether the day fixed between them had yet arrived, when Lysander reached Haliartus, we cannot determine with certainty. In the imperfection of the Grecian calendar, a mistake on this point would be very conceivable, — as had happened between the Athenian generals Hippokrates and Demosthenes in those measures which preceded the battle of Delium in 424 B. C.<sup>2</sup> But the engagement must have been taken by both parties, subject to obstructions in the way, — since each would have to march through a hostile country to reach the place of meeting. The words of Xenophon, however, rather indicate that the day fixed had not arrived; nevertheless, Lysander resolved at once to act against Haliartus, without waiting for Pausanias. There were as yet only a few Thebans in the town, and he, probably, had good reasons for judging that he would better succeed by rapid measures, before any more Thebans could arrive, than by delaying until the other Spartan army should join him; not to mention anxiety that the conquest should belong to himself exclusively, and confidence arising from his previous success at Orchomenus. Accordingly, he sent in an invitation to the Haliartians to follow the example of the Orchomenians, to revolt from Thebes, and to stand upon their autonomy under Lacedæmonian protection. Perhaps there may have been a party in the town disposed to comply. But the majority, encouraged too by

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 17; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 28.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iv, 89. γενομένης διαμαρτίας τῶν ἡμερῶν, etc.

the Thebans within, refused the proposition; upon which Lysander marched up to the walls and assaulted the town. He was here engaged, close by the gates, in examining where he could best effect an entrance, when a fresh division of Thebans, apprised of his proceedings, was seen approaching from Thebes, at their fastest pace, — cavalry, as well as hoplites. They were probably seen from the watch-towers in the city earlier than they became visible to the assailants without; so that the Haliartians, encouraged by the sight, threw open their gates, and made a sudden sally. Lysander, seemingly taken by surprise, was himself slain among the first, with his prophet by his side, by a Haliartian hoplite named Neochôrus. His troops stood some time, against both the Haliartians from the town, and the fresh Thebans who now came up. But they were at length driven back with considerable loss, and compelled to retreat to rugged and difficult ground at some distance in their rear. Here, however, they made good their position, repelling their assailants with the loss of more than two hundred hoplites.<sup>1</sup>

The success here gained, though highly valuable as an encouragement to the Thebans, would have been counterbalanced by the speedy arrival of Pausanias, had not Lysander himself been among the slain. But the death of so eminent a man was an irreparable loss to Sparta. His army, composed of heterogeneous masses, both collected and held together by his personal ascendancy, lost confidence and dispersed in the ensuing night.<sup>2</sup> When Pausanias arrived soon afterwards, he found no second army to join with him. Yet his own force was more than sufficient to impress terror on the Thebans, had not Thrasybulus, faithful to the recent promise, arrived with an imposing body of Athenian hoplites, together with cavalry under Orthobulus<sup>3</sup> — and imparted fresh courage as well as adequate strength to the Theban cause.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 18, 19, 20; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 28, 29; Pausan. iii, 5, 4.

The two last differ in various matters from Xenophon, whose account, however, though brief, seems to me to deserve the preference.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 21. ἀπεληλυθότας ἐν νυκτὶ τοὺς τε Φωκέας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας οἴκαδε ἐκάστους, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Lysias, Or. xvi, (pro Mantitheo) s. 15, 16.



Pausanias had first to consider what steps he would take to recover the bodies of the slain, — that of Lysander among them; whether he would fight a battle and thus take his chance of becoming master of the field, — or send the usual petition for burial-truce, which always implied confession of inferiority. On submitting the point to a council of officers and Spartan elders, their decision as well as his own was against fighting; not, however, without an indignant protest from some of the Spartan elders. He considered that the whole original plan of operations was broken up, since not only the great name and genius of Lysander had perished, but his whole army had spontaneously disbanded; that the Peloponnesian allies were generally lukewarm and reluctant, not to be counted upon for energetic behavior in case of pressing danger; that he had little or no cavalry,<sup>1</sup> while the Theban cavalry was numerous and excellent; lastly, that the dead body of Lysander himself lay so close to the walls of Haliartus, that even if the Lacedæmonians were victorious, they could not carry it off without serious loss from the armed defenders in their towers.<sup>2</sup> Such were the reasons which determined Pausanias and the major part of the council to send and solicit a truce. But the Thebans refused to grant it except on condition that they should immediately evacuate Bœotia. Though such a requisition was contrary to the received practice of Greece,<sup>3</sup> which imposed on the victor the duty of granting the burial-truce unconditionally, whenever it was asked and inferiority thus publicly confessed, — nevertheless, such was the reluctant temper of the army, that they heard not merely with acquiescence, but with joy,<sup>4</sup> the proposition of departing. The bodies were duly buried, — that of Lysander in the territory of Panopê, immediately across the Phokian border, but

<sup>1</sup> Accordingly we learn from an oration of Lysias, that the service of the Athenian horsemen in this expedition, who were commanded by Orthobulus, was judged to be extremely safe and easy; while that of the hoplites was dangerous (Lysias, Orat. xvi, pro Mantith. s. 15).

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 23. Κορίνθιοι μὲν παντάπασιν οὐκ ἠκολούθουν αὐτοῖς, οἱ δὲ παρόντες οὐ προθύμως στρατεύοντο, etc.

<sup>3</sup> See the conduct of the Thebans on this very point (of giving up the slain at the solicitation of the conquered Athenians for burial) after the battle of Delium, and the discussion thereupon, — in this History, Vol VI, ch. iii, p. 393 seq.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 24. Οἱ δὲ ἄσμενοί τε ταῖς ἡκούσαν, etc.

not far from Haliartus. And no sooner were these solemnities completed, than the Lacedæmonian army was led back to Peloponnesus; their dejection forming a mournful contrast to the triumphant insolence of the Thebans, who watched their march and restrained them, not without occasional blows, from straggling out of the road into the cultivated fields.<sup>1</sup>

The death of Lysander produced the most profound sorrow and resentment at Sparta. On returning thither, Pausanias found himself the subject of such virulent accusation, that he thought it prudent to make his escape, and take sanctuary in the temple of Athênê Alea, at Tegea. He was impeached, and put on trial during his absence, on two counts; first, for having been behind the time covenanted, in meeting Lysander at Haliartus; next for having submitted to ask a truce from the Thebans, instead of fighting a battle for the purpose of obtaining the bodies of the slain.

As far as there is evidence to form a judgment, it does not appear that Pausanias was guilty upon either of the two counts. The first is a question of fact; and it seems quite as likely that Lysander was before his time, as that Pausanias was behind his time, in arriving at Haliartus. Besides, Lysander, arriving there first, would have been quite safe, had he not resolved to attack without delay; in which the chances of war turned out against him; though the resolution in itself may have been well conceived. Next, as to the truce solicited for burying the dead bodies, — it does not appear that Pausanias could with any prudence have braved the chances of a battle. The facts of the case, — even as summed up by Xenophon, who always exaggerates everything in favor of the Spartans, — lead us to this conclusion. A few of the Spartan elders would doubtless prefer perishing on the field of battle, to the humiliation of sending in the herald to ask for a truce. But the mischief of fighting a battle under the influence of such a point of honor, to the exclusion of a rational estimate of consequences, will be seen when we come to the battle of Leuktra, where Kleombrotus, son of Pausanias was thus piqued into an imprudence (at least this is alleged as one of the motives) to which his own life and the dominion of Sparta became forfeit.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the army of Pausanias, comprising very few Spartans, con-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. ii., 5, 24.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi 4, 5



sisted chiefly of allies who had no heart in the cause, and who were glad to be required by the Thebans to depart. If he had fought a battle and lost it, the detriment to Sparta would have been most serious in every way; whereas, if he had gained a victory, no result would have followed except the acquisition of the bodies for burial; since the execution of the original plan had become impracticable through the dispersion of the army of Lysander.

Though a careful examination of the facts leads us (and seems also to have led Xenophon<sup>1</sup>) to the conclusion that Pausanias was innocent, he was nevertheless found guilty in his absence. He was in great part borne down by the grief felt at Sparta for the loss of Lysander, with whom he had been before in political rivalry, and for whose death he was made responsible. Moreover, the old accusation was now revived against him,<sup>2</sup> — for which he had been tried, and barely acquitted, eight years before, — of having tolerated the reëstablishment of the Athenian democracy at a time when he might have put it down. Without doubt this argument told prodigiously against him at the present juncture, when the Athenians had just now, for the first time since the surrender of their city, renounced their subjection to Sparta and sent an army to assist the Thebans in their defence. So violent was the sentiment against Pausanias, that he was condemned to death in his absence, and passed the remainder of his life as an exile in sanctuary at Tegæa. His son, Agesipolis, was invested with the sceptre in his place.

A brief remark will not be here misplaced. On no topic have Grecian historians been more profuse in their reproaches, than upon the violence and injustice of democracy, at Athens and elsewhere, in condemning unsuccessful, but innocent generals. Out of the many cases in which this reproach is advanced, there are very few

<sup>1</sup> The traveller Pausanias justifies the prudence of his regal namesake in avoiding a battle, by saying that the Athenians were in his rear, and the Thebans in his front; and that he was afraid of being assailed on both sides at once, like Leonidas at Thermopylæ, and like the troops enclosed in Sphacteria (Paus. iii, 5, 5).

But the matter of fact, on which this justification rests, is contradicted by Xenophon, who says that the Athenians had actually joined the Thebans and were in the same ranks — ἐλθόντες συμπαρετάξαντο (Hellen. iii, 5, 22).

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 25. Καὶ ὅτι τὸν δῆμον τῶν Ἀθηναίων λαβὼν ἐν τῇ Πειραιεὶ ἀνῆκε, etc. Compare Pausanias, iii, 5, 3.

wherein it has been made good; but even if we grant it to be valid against Athens and her democracy, the fate of Pausanias will show us that the ephors and senate of anti-democratical Sparta were capable of the like unjust misjudgment. Hardly a single instance of Athenian condemnation occurs, which we can so clearly prove to be undeserved, as this of a Spartan king.

Turning from the banished king to Lysander, — the Spartans had indeed valid reasons for deploring the fall of the latter. He had procured for them their greatest and most decisive victories, and the time was coming when they needed his services to procure them more; for he left behind him no man of equal warlike resource, cunning, and power of command. But if he possessed those abilities which powerfully helped Sparta to triumph over her enemies, he at the same time did more than any man to bring her empire into dishonor, and to render its tenure precarious. His decemviral governments or dekarchies, diffused through the subject cities, and each sustained by a Lacedæmonian harmost and garrison, were aggravations of local tyranny such as the Grecian world had never before undergone. And though the Spartan authorities presently saw that he was abusing the imperial name of the city for unmeasured personal aggrandizement of his own, and partially withdrew their countenance from his dekarchies, — yet the general character of their empire still continued to retain the impress of partisanship and subjugation which he had originally stamped upon it. Instead of that autonomy which Sparta had so repeatedly promised, it became subjection every way embittered. Such an empire was pretty sure to be short-lived; but the loss to Sparta herself, when her empire fell away, is not the only fault which the historian of Greece has to impute to Lysander. His far deeper sin consists in his having thrown away an opportunity, — such as never occurred either before or afterwards, — for organizing some permanent, honorable, self-maintaining, Pan-hellenic combination under the headship of Sparta. This is (as I have before remarked) what a man like Kallikratidas would have attempted, if not with far-sighted wisdom, at least with generous sincerity, and by an appeal to the best veins of political sentiment in the chief city as well as in the subordinates. It is possible that with the best intentions even he might have failed: so strong was the centrifugal instinct in the Grecian political mind. But what



we have to reproach in Lysander is, that he never tried; that he abused the critical moment of cure for the purpose of infusing new poison into the system; that he not only sacrificed the interests of Greece to the narrow gains of Sparta, but even the interests of Sparta to the still narrower monopoly of dominion in his own hands. That his measures worked mischievously not merely for Greece, but for Sparta herself, aggravating all her bad tendencies, — has been already remarked in the preceding pages.

That Lysander, with unbounded opportunities of gain, both lived and died poor, exhibits the honorable side of his character. Yet his personal indifference to money seems only to have left the greater space in his bosom for that thirst of power which made him unscrupulous in satiating the rapacity, as well as in upholding the oppressions, of coadjutors like the Thirty at Athens and the decemvirs in other cities. In spite of his great success and ability in closing the Peloponnesian war, we shall agree with Pausanias<sup>1</sup> that he was more mischievous than profitable even to Sparta, — even if we take no thought of Greece generally. What would have been the effect produced by his projects in regard to the regal succession, had he been able to bring them to bear, we have no means of measuring. We are told that the discourse composed and addressed to him by the Halicarnassian rhetor Kleon, was found after his death among his papers by Agesilaus; who first learnt from it, with astonishment and alarm, the point to which the ambition of Lysander had tended, and was desirous of exposing his real character by making the discourse public, — but was deterred by dissuasive counsel of the ephor Lakratidas. But this story (attested by Ephorus<sup>2</sup>) looks more like an anecdote of the rhetorical schools than like a reality. Agesilaus was not the man to set much value on sophists or their compositions; nor is it easy to believe that he remained so long ignorant of those projects which Lysander had once entertained but subsequently dropped. Moreover the probability is, that Kleon himself would make the discourse public as a sample of his own talents, even in the lifetime of Lysander; not only without shame, but as representing the feelings of a considerable section of readers throughout the Grecian world.

<sup>1</sup> Pausanias, ix, 32, 6.

<sup>2</sup> Ephorus, Fr. 127, ed. Didot; Plutarch, Lysander, c 30

Most important were the consequences which ensued from the death of Lysander and the retreat of Pausanias out of Bœotia. Fresh hope and spirits were infused into all the enemies of Sparta. An alliance was immediately concluded against her by Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos. Deputies from these four cities were appointed to meet at Corinth, and to take active measures for inviting the coöperation of fresh allies; so that the war which had begun as a Bœotian war, now acquired the larger denomination of Corinthian war, under which it lasted until the peace of Antalkidas. The alliance was immediately strengthened by the junction of the Eubœans, — the Akarnanians, — the Ozolian Lokrians, — Ambrakia and Leukas (both particularly attached to Corinth), — and the Chalkidians of Thrace.<sup>1</sup>

We now enter upon the period when, for the first time, Thebes begins to step out of the rank of secondary powers, and gradually raises herself into a primary and ascendant city in Grecian politics. Throughout the Peloponnesian war, the Thebans had shown themselves excellent soldiers, both on horseback and on foot, as auxiliaries to Sparta. But now the city begins to have a policy of its own, and individual citizens of ability become conspicuous. While waiting for Pelopidas and Epaminondas, with whom we shall presently become acquainted, we have at the present moment Ismenias; a wealthy Theban, a sympathizer with Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles eight years before, and one of the great organizers of the present anti-Spartan movement; a man, too, honored by his political enemies,<sup>2</sup> when they put him to death fourteen years afterwards, with the title of "a great wicked man," — the same combination of epithets which Clarendon applies to Oliver Cromwell.

It was Ismenias, who, at the head of a body of Bœotians and Argeians, undertook an expedition to put down the Spartan influence in the regions north of Bœotia. At Pharsalus in Thessaly the Lacedæmonians had an harmost and garrison; at Pheræ,

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 81, 82; Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 17.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 36. 'Ο δ' (Ismenias) ἀπελλεγέτο μὲν πρὸς πάντα ταῦτα οὐ μόντοι ἐπειδὴ γε τὸ μὴ οὐ μεγαλοπράγμων τε καὶ κακοπράγμων εἶναι.

It is difficult to make out anything from the two allusions in Plato, except that Ismenias was a wealthy and powerful man (Plato, Menon, p. 90 B.; Republ. i, p. 336 A.).



Lykophron the despot was their ally; while Larissa, with Medius the despot, was their principal enemy. By the aid of the Bœotians, Medius was now enabled to capture Pharsalus; Larissa, with Krannon and Skotusa, was received into the Theban alliance,<sup>1</sup> and Ismenias obtained also the more important advantage of expelling the Lacedæmonians from Herakleia. Some malcontents, left after the violent interference of the Spartan Herippidas two years before, opened the gates of Herakleia by night to the Bœotians and Argeians. The Lacedæmonians in the town were put to the sword, but the other Peloponnesian colonists were permitted to retire in safety; while the old Trachinian inhabitants, whom the Lacedæmonians had expelled to make room for their new settlers, together with the Cætæans, whom they had driven out of the districts in the neighborhood, — were now called back to repossess their original homes.<sup>2</sup> The loss of Herakleia was a serious blow to the Spartans in those regions, — protecting Eubœa in its recent revolt from them, and enabling Ismenias to draw into his alliance the neighboring Malians, Ænians, and Athamanes, — tribes stretching along the valley of the Spercheius westward to the vicinity of Pindus. Assembling additional troops from these districts (which, only a few months before, had supplied an army to Lysander<sup>3</sup>), Ismenias marched against the Phokians, among whom the Spartan Lakisthenes had been left as harmost in command. After a severe battle, this officer with his Phokians was defeated near the Lokrian town of Naryx; and Ismenias came back victorious to the synod at Corinth.<sup>4</sup>

By such important advantages, accomplished during the winter of 395–394 B. C., the prospects of Grecian affairs as they stood in the ensuing spring became materially altered. The allies assembled at Corinth, full of hope, and resolved to levy a large combined force to act against Sparta; who on her side seemed to be threatened with the loss of all her extra-Peloponnesian land-empire. Accordingly, the ephors determined to recall without delay Agesilaus with his army from Asia, and sent Epikydidas with orders to that effect. But even before this reinforcement could arrive, they thought it expe-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 82; Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 3; Xen. Agesil. ii, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 38–82.

<sup>3</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 5, 6.

<sup>4</sup> Diodor. xiv, 82.

dient to muster their full Peloponnesian force and to act with vigor against the allies at Corinth, who were now assembling in considerable numbers. Aristodemus, — guardian of the youthful king Agesipolis son of Pausanias, and himself of the Eurystheneid race, — marched at the head of a body of six thousand Lacedæmonian hoplites;<sup>1</sup> the Spartan xenâgi (or officers sent on purpose to conduct the contingents from the outlying allies), successively brought in three thousand hoplites from Elis, Triphylia, Akroreia, and Lasion, — fifteen hundred from Sikyon, — three thousand from Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis. None were sent from Phlias, on the plea (true or false<sup>2</sup>) that in that city the moment was one of solemnity and holy truce. There were also hoplites from Tegea, Mantinea, and the Achæan towns, but their number is not given; so that we do not know the full muster-roll on the Lacedæmonian side. The cavalry, six hundred in number, were all Lacedæmonian; there were, moreover, three hundred Kretan bowmen, — and four hundred slingers from different rural districts of Triphylia.<sup>3</sup>

The allied force of the enemy was already mustered near Cor-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 16. Xenophon gives this total of six thousand as if it were of Lacedæmonians alone. But if we follow his narrative, we shall see that there were unquestionably in the army troops of Tegea, Mantinea, and the Achæan towns (probably also some of other Arcadian towns,) present in the battle (iv, 2, 13, 18, 20). Can we suppose that Xenophon meant to include these allies in the total of six thousand, along with the Lacedæmonians, — which is doubtless a large total for Lacedæmonians alone? Unless this supposition be admitted, there is no resource except to assume an omission, either of Xenophon himself, or of the copyist; which omission in fact Gail and others do suppose. On the whole, I think they are right; for the number of hoplites on both sides would otherwise be prodigiously unequal; while Xenophon says nothing to imply that the Lacedæmonian victory was gained in spite of great inferiority of number, and something which even implies that it must have been nearly equal (iv, 2, 13), — though he is always disposed to compliment Sparta wherever he can.

<sup>2</sup> From a passage which occurs somewhat later (iv, 4, 15), we may suspect that this was an excuse, and that the Phliasians were not very well affected to Sparta. Compare a similar case of excuse ascribed to the Mantineians (v, 2, 2).

<sup>3</sup> Diodorus (xiv, 83) gives a total of twenty-three thousand foot and five hundred horse, on the Lacedæmonian side, but without enumerating items. On the side of the confederacy he states a total of more than fifteen thousand foot and five hundred horse (c. 82).

inth; six thousand Athenian hoplites, — seven thousand Argæan, — five thousand Bœotian, those from Orchomenus being absent, — three thousand Corinthian, — three thousand from the different towns of Eubœa; making twenty-four thousand in all. The total of cavalry was fifteen hundred and fifty; composed of eight hundred Bœotian, six hundred Athenian, one hundred from Chalkis in Eubœa, and fifty from the Lokrians. The light troops also were numerous, — partly Corinthian, drawn probably from the serf-population which tilled the fields,<sup>1</sup> — partly Lokrians, Malians, and Akarnanians.

The allied leaders, holding a council of war to arrange their plans, came to a resolution that the hoplites should not be drawn up in deeper files than sixteen men,<sup>2</sup> in order that there might be no chance of their being surrounded; and that the right wing, carrying with it command for the time, should be alternated from day to day between the different cities. The confidence which the events of the last few months had infused into these leaders, now for the first time acting against their old leader Sparta, is surprising. "There is nothing like marching to Sparta (said the Corinthian Timolaus) and fighting the Lacedæmonians at or near their own home. We must burn out the wasps in their nest, without letting them come forth to sting us. The Lacedæmonian force is like that of a river; small at its source, and becoming formidable only by the affluents which it receives, in proportion to the length of its course."<sup>3</sup> The wisdom of this advice was remarkable; but its boldness was yet more remarkable, when viewed in conjunction with the established feeling of awe towards Sparta. It was adopted by the general council of the allies; but unfortunately the time for executing it had already passed; for the Lacedæmonians were already in march and had crossed their own border. They took the line of road by Tegea and Mantinea (whose troops joined the

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 17. Καὶ ψιλὸν δὲ, ξὺν τοῖς τῶν Κορινθίων, πλεονήν, etc. Compare Hesychius, v. Κυνόβαλοι; Welcker, Præfat. ad. Theog. idem, p. xxxv; K. O. Müller, History of the Dorians, iii, 4, 3.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 13; compare iv, 2, 18, — where he says of the Thebans — ἀμελήσαντες τοῦ ἐς ἑκαταίδεκα, βαθεῖαν παντελῶς ἐποιήσαντες τὴν φάλαγγα, etc., which implies and alludes to the resolution previously taken.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 11, 12.

march), and advanced as far as Sikyon, where probably all the Arcadian and Achaean contingents were ordered to rendezvous.

The troops of the confederacy had advanced as far as Nemea when they learnt that the Lacedæmonian army was at Sikyon; but they then altered their plan, and confined themselves to the defensive. The Lacedæmonians on their side crossed over the mountainous post called Epieikia, under considerable annoyance from the enemy's light troops, who poured missiles upon them from the high ground. But when they had reached the level country, on the other side, along the shore of the Saronic Gulf, where they probably received the contingents from Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis, — the whole army thus reinforced marched forward without resistance, burning and ravaging the cultivated lands. The confederates retreated before them, and at length took up a position close to Corinth, amidst some rough ground with a ravine in their front.<sup>1</sup> The Lacedæmonians advanced forward until they were little more than a mile distant from this position, and there encamped.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 14, 15.

In the passage, — καὶ οἱ ἕτεροι μέντοι ἐλθόντες κατεστρατοπεδεύσαντο, ἐμπροσθεν ποιησάμενοι τὴν χαράδραν, — I apprehend that ἀπελθόντες (which is sanctioned by four MSS., and preferred by Leunclavius) is the proper reading, in place of ἐλθόντες. For it seems certain that the march of the confederates was one of retreat, and that the battle was fought very near to the walls of Corinth; since the defeated troops sought shelter within the town, and the Lacedæmonian pursuers were so close upon them, that the Corinthians within were afraid to keep open the gates. Hence we must reject the statement of Diodorus, — that the battle was fought on the banks of the river Nemea (xiv, 83) as erroneous.

There are some difficulties and obscurities in the description which Xenophon gives of the Lacedæmonian march. His words run — ἐν τούτῳ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ δὴ Τεγεάτας παρείληφότες καὶ Μαντινέας, ἐξῆσαν τῇ ἀμφιάλῳ. These last three words are not satisfactorily explained. Weiske and Schneider construe τὴν ἀμφιάλῳ (very justly) as indicating the region lying immediately on the Peloponnesian side of the isthmus of Corinth and having the Saronic Gulf on one side, and the Corinthian Gulf on the other; in which was included Sikyon. But then it would not be correct to say, that "the Lacedæmonians had gone out by the bimarine way." On the contrary, the truth is, that "they had gone out into the bimarine road or region, — which meaning however would require a preposition — ἐξῆσαν εἰς τὴν ἀμφιάλῳ. Sturz in his Lexicon (v. ἐξιέναι) renders τὴν ἀμφιάλῳ — *viam ad mare* — which seems an extraordinary sense of



After an interval seemingly of a few days, the Bœotians, on the day when their turn came to occupy the right wing and to take the lead, gave the signal for battle.<sup>1</sup> The Lacedæmonians, prevented by the wooded ground from seeing clearly, were only made aware of the coming attack by hearing the hostile pæan. Taking order of battle immediately, they advanced forward to meet the assailants when within a furlong of their line. In each army, the right division took the lead, — slanting to the right, or keeping the left shoulder forward, according to the tendency habitual with Grecian hoplites, through anxiety to keep the right or unshielded side from

the word, unless instances were produced to support it; and even if instances were produced, we do not see why the way from Sparta to Sikyon should be called by that name; which would more properly belong to the road from Sparta down the Eurotas to Helos.

Again, we do not know distinctly the situation of the point or district called τὴν Ἐπεικίαν (mentioned again, iv, 4, 13). But it is certain from the map, that when the confederates were at Nemea, and the Lacedæmonians at Sikyon, — the former must have been exactly placed so as to intercept the junction of the contingents from Epidaurus, Træzen, and Hermione, with the Lacedæmonian army. To secure this junction, the Lacedæmonians were obliged to force their way across that mountainous region which lies near Kleônæ and Nemea, and to march in a line pointing from Sikyon down to the Saronic Gulf. Having reached the other side of these mountains near the sea, they would be in communication with Epidaurus and the other towns of the Argolic peninsula.

The line of march which the Lacedæmonians would naturally take from Sparta to Sikyon and Lechæum, by Tegea, Mantinea, Orchomenus, etc., is described two years afterwards in the case of Agesilaus (iv, 5, 19).

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 18. The coloring which Xenophon puts upon this step is hardly fair to the Thebans, as is so constantly the case throughout his history. He says that "they were in no hurry to fight" (οὐδὲν τι κατὰ πείρον τὴν μάχην ξυνάπτειν) so long as they were on the left, opposed to the Lacedæmonians on the opposite right; but that as soon as they were on the right (opposed to the Achæans on the opposite left), they forthwith gave the word. Now it does not appear that the Thebans had any greater privilege on the day when they were on the right, than the Argeians or Athenians had when each were on the right respectively. The command had been determined to reside in the right division, which post alternated from one to the other; why the Athenians or Argeians did not make use of this post to order the attack, we cannot explain.

So again, Xenophon says, that in spite of the resolution taken by the Council of War to have files sixteen deep, and no more, — the Thebans made their files much deeper. Yet it is plain, from his own account, that no mischievous consequences turned upon this greater depth.

being exposed to the enemy, and at the same time to be protected by the shield of a right-hand neighbor.<sup>1</sup> The Lacedæmonians in the one army, and the Thebans in the other, each inclined themselves, and caused their respective armies to incline also, in a direction slanting to the right, so that the Lacedæmonians on their side considerably outflanked the Athenians on the opposite left. Out of the ten tribes of Athenian hoplites, it was only the six on the extreme left who came into conflict with the Lacedæmonians; while the remaining four contended with the Tegeans who stood next to the Lacedæmonians on their own line. But the six extreme Athenian tribes were completely beaten, and severely handled, being taken in flank as well as in front by the Lacedæmonians. On the other hand, the remaining four Athenian tribes vanquished and drove before them the Tegeans; and generally, along all the rest of the line, the Thebans, Argeians, and Corinthians were victorious, — except where the troops of the Achæan Pellênê stood opposed to those of the Bœotian Thespiæ, where the battle was equal and the loss severe on both sides. The victorious confederates, however, were so ardent and incautious in pursuit, as to advance a considerable distance and return with disordered ranks; while the Lacedæmonians, who were habitually self-restraining in this particular, kept their order perfectly, attacking the Thebans, Argeians, and Corinthians to great advantage when returning to their camp. Several of the Athenian fugitives obtained shelter within the walls of Corinth; in spite of the opposition of the philo-Laconian Corinthians, who insisted upon shutting the gates against them, and opening negotiations with Sparta. The Lacedæmonians however came so near that it was at last thought impossible to keep the gates open longer. Many of the remaining confederates were therefore obliged to be satisfied with the protection of their ancient camp;<sup>2</sup> which seems, however, to have been situated in such defensible ground,<sup>3</sup> that the Lacedæmonians did not molest them in it.

<sup>1</sup> See the instructive description of the battle of Mantinea — in Thucyd. v, 71.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 20-23.

The allusion to this incident in Demosthenes (adv. Leptinem, c. 13, p. 472) is interesting, though indistinct.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 19. καὶ γὰρ ἦν λάσιον τὸ χωρίον — which illustrates



So far as the Lacedæmonians separately were concerned, the battle of Corinth was an important victory, gained (as they affirmed) with the loss of only eight men, and inflicting heavy loss upon the Athenians in the battle, as well as upon the remaining confederates in their return from pursuit. Though the Athenian hoplites suffered thus severely, yet Thrasybulus their commander,<sup>1</sup> who kept the field until the last, with strenuous efforts to rally them, was not satisfied with their behavior. But on the other hand, all the allies of Sparta were worsted, and a considerable number of them slain. According to Diodorus, the total loss on the Lacedæmonian side was eleven hundred; on the side of the confederates twenty-eight hundred.<sup>2</sup> On the whole, the victory of the Lacedæmonians was not sufficiently decisive to lead to important results, though it completely secured their ascendancy within Peloponnesus. We observe here, as we shall have occasion to observe elsewhere, that the Peloponnesian allies do not fight heartily in the cause of Sparta. They seem bound to her more by fear than by affection.

The battle of Corinth took place about July 394 B. C., seemingly about the same time as the naval battle near Knidus (or perhaps a little earlier), and while Agesilaus was on his homeward march after being recalled from Asia. Had the Lacedæmonians been able to defer the battle until Agesilaus had come up so as to threaten Bœotia on the northern side, their campaign would probably have been much more successful. As it is, their defeated allies doubtless went home in disgust from the field of Corinth, so that the confederates were now enabled to turn their whole attention to Agesilaus.

That prince had received in Asia his summons of recall from the ephors with profound vexation and disappointment, yet at the same time with patriotic submission. He had augmented his army,

the expression in Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo) s. 20. *ἐν Κορίνθῳ χωρίων ἰσχυρῶν κατελημμένων.*

<sup>1</sup> Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo) s. 19.

Plato in his panegyric discourse (Menexenus, c. 17, p. 245 E.) ascribes the defeat and loss of the Athenians to "bad ground"—*χρησαμένων δυσχωρία.*

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 83.

The statement in Xenophon (Agesil. vii, 5) that near ten thousand men were slain on the side of the confederates, is a manifest exaggeration: it indeed the reading be correct.

and was contemplating more extensive schemes of operations against the Persian satrapies in Asia Minor. He had established such a reputation for military force and skill, that numerous messages reached him from different inland districts, expressing their anxiety to be emancipated from Persian dominion; and inviting him to come to their aid. His ascendancy was also established over the Grecian cities on the coast, whom he still kept under the government of partisan oligarchies and Spartan harmosts,—yet seemingly with greater practical moderation, and less license of oppression, than had marked the conduct of these men when they could count upon so unprincipled a chief as Lysander. He was thus just now not only at a high pitch of actual glory and ascendancy, but nourishing yet brighter hopes of farther conquests for the future. And what filled up the measure of his aspirations,—all the conquests were to be made at the expense, not of Greeks, but of the Persians. He was treading in the footsteps of Agamemnon, as Pan-hellenic leader against a Pan-hellenic enemy.

All these glorious dreams were dissipated by Epikydidias, with his sad message, and peremptory summons, from the ephors. In the chagrin and disappointment of Agesilaus we can sincerely sympathize; but the panegyric which Xenophon and others pronounce upon him for his ready obedience is altogether unreasonable.<sup>1</sup> There was no merit in renouncing his projects of conquest at the bidding of the ephors; because, if any serious misfortune had befallen Sparta at home, none of those projects could have been executed. Nor is it out of place to remark, that even if Agesilaus had not been recalled, the extinction of the Lacedæmonian naval superiority by the defeat of Knidus, would have rendered all large plans of inland conquest impracticable. On receiving his orders of recall, he convened an assembly both of his allies and of his army, to make known the painful necessity of his departure; which was heard with open and sincere manifestations

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Agesil. i, 37; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 15. Cornelius Nepos (Agesilaus, c. 4) almost translates the Agesilaus of Xenophon; but we can better feel the force of his panegyric, when we recollect that he had had personal cognizance of the disobedience of Julius Cæsar in his province to the orders of the Senate, and that the omnipotence of Sylla and Pompey in their provinces were then matter of recent history. "Cujus exemplum (says Cornelius Nepos about Agesilaus) utinam imperatores nostri sequi voluissent!"



of sorrow. He assured them that as soon as he had dissipated the clouds which hung over Sparta at home, he should come back to Asia without delay, and resume his efforts against the Persian satraps; in the interim he left Euxenus, with a force of four thousand men for their protection. Such was the sympathy excited by his communication, combined with esteem for his character, that the cities passed a general vote to furnish him with contingents of troops for his march to Sparta. But this first burst of zeal abated, when they came to reflect that it was a service against Greeks; not merely unpopular in itself, but presenting a certainty of hard fighting with little plunder. Agesilaus tried every means to keep up their spirits, by proclaiming prizes both to the civic soldiers and to the mercenaries, to be distributed at Sestus in the Chersonesus, as soon as they should have crossed into Europe, — prizes for the best equipment, and best disciplined soldiers in every different arm.<sup>1</sup> By these means he prevailed upon the bravest and most effective soldiers in his army to undertake the march along with him; among them many of the Cyreians, with Xenophon himself at their head.

Though Agesilaus, in leaving Greece, had prided himself on hoisting the flag of Agamemnon, he was now destined against his will to tread in the footsteps of the Persian Xerxes in his march from the Thracian Chersonese through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, to Thermopylæ and Bœotia. Never, since the time of Xerxes, had any army undertaken this march; which now bore an Oriental impress, from the fact that Agesilaus brought with him some camels, taken in the battle of Sardis.<sup>2</sup> Overawing or defeating the various Thracian tribes, he reached Amphipolis on the Strymon where he was met by Derkyllidas, who had come fresh from the battle of Corinth and informed him of the victory. Full as his heart was of Pan-hellenic projects against Persia, he burst into exclamations of regret on hearing of the death of so many Greeks in battle, who could have sufficed, if united, to emancipate Asia Minor.<sup>3</sup> Sending Derkyllidas forward to Asia to make known the victory to the Grecian cities in his alliance, he pursued his march through Macedonia and Thessaly. In the latter coun-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv. 2, 2-5; Xen. Agesil. i, 38; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 16.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 24.

<sup>3</sup> Xenoph. Agesil. vii, 5; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 16.

try, Larissa, Krannon, and other cities in alliance with Thebes, raised opposition to bar his passage. But in the disunited condition of this country, no systematic resistance could be organized against him. Nothing more appeared than detached bodies of cavalry, whom he beat and dispersed, with the death of Polycharmus, their leader. As the Thessalian cavalry, however, was the best in Greece, he took great pride in having defeated them with cavalry disciplined by himself in Asia; backed, however, it must be observed, by skilful and effective support from his hoplites.<sup>1</sup> After having passed the Achæan mountains or the line of Mount Othrys, he marched the rest of the way without opposition, through the strait of Thermopylæ to the frontier of Phokis and Bœotia.

In this latter part of his march, Agesilaus was met by the ephor Diphridas in person, who urged him to hasten his march as much as possible, and attack the Bœotians. He was further joined by two Lacedæmonian regiments<sup>2</sup> from Corinth, and by fifty young Spartan volunteers as a body-guard, who crossed by sea from Sikyon. He was reinforced also by the Phokians and the Orchomenians, — in addition to the Peloponnesian troops who had accompanied him to Asia, the Asiatic hoplites, the Cyreians, the peltasts, and the cavalry, whom he had brought with him from the Hellespont, and some fresh troops collected in the march. His army was thus in imposing force when he reached the neighborhood of Chæroneia on the Bœotian border. It was here that they were alarmed by an eclipse of the sun, on the fourteenth of August, 394 B. C.; a fatal presage, the meaning of which was soon interpreted for them by the arrival of a messenger bearing news of the naval defeat of Knidus, with the death of Peisander, brother-in-law of Agesilaus. Deeply was the latter affected by this irreparable blow. He foresaw that, when known, it would spread dismay and dejection among his soldiers, most of whom would remain attached to him only so long as they believed the cause of Sparta

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 4-9; Diodor. xiv, 83.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch (Agesil. c. 17; compare also Plutarch, Apophth. p. 795, as corrected by Morus ad Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 15) states two *moræ* or regiments as having joined Agesilaus from Corinth; Xenophon alludes only to one besides that *mora* which was in garrison at Orchomenus (Hellen. iv, 3, 15; Agesil. ii, 6).

to be ascendant and profitable.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, he resolved, being now within a day's march of his enemies, to hasten on a battle without making known the bad news. Proclaiming that intelligence had been received of a sea-fight having taken place, in which the Lacedæmonians had been victorious, though Peisander himself was slain,—he offered a sacrifice of thanksgiving and sent round presents of congratulation,—which produced an encouraging effect, and made the skirmishers especially both forward and victorious.

To his enemies, now assembled in force on the plain of Koroneia, the real issue of the battle of Knidus was doubtless made known, spreading hope and cheerfulness through their ranks; though we are not informed what interpretation they put upon the solar eclipse. The army was composed of nearly the same contingents as those who had recently fought at Corinth, except that we hear of the Ænians in place of the Malians; but probably each contingent was less numerous, since there was still a necessity for occupying and defending the camp near Corinth. Among the Athenian hoplites, who had just been so roughly handled in the preceding battle, and who were now drafted off by lot to march into Bœotia, against both a general and an army of high reputation,—there prevailed much apprehension and some reluctance; as we learn from one of them, Mantitheus, who stood forward to volunteer his services, and who afterwards makes just boast of it before an Athenian dikastery.<sup>2</sup> The Thebans and Bœotians were probably in full force, and more numerous than at Corinth, since it was their own country which was to be defended. The camp was established in the territory of Korōneia, not far from the great

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 13.

<sup>2</sup> Ο μὲν οὖν Ἀθηναῖος πυνθόμενος ταῦτα, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον χαλεπῶς ἔφερον· ἐπεὶ μὲντοι ἐνεθυμίσθη, ὅτι τοῦ στρατεύματος τὸ πλεῖστον εἴη αὐτῷ, οἷον ἀγαθῶν μὲν γιγνομένων ἡδῶς μετέχειν, εἰ δέ τι χαλεπὸν ὄρῳεν, οὐκ ἀνάγκην εἶναι κοινωνεῖν αὐτοῖς, etc.

These indirect intimations of the real temper even of the philo-Spartan allies towards Sparta are very valuable when coming from Xenophon, as they contradict all his partialities, and are dropped here almost reluctantly, from the necessity of justifying the conduct of Agesilaus in publishing a false proclamation to his army.

<sup>3</sup> Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo) s. 20. φοβουμένων πάντων εὐκότως, etc.

temple of Itonian Athênê, where the Pambœotia, or general Bœotian assemblies were held, and where there also stood the trophy erected for the great victory over Tolmides and the Athenians, about fifty years before.<sup>1</sup> Between the two armies there was no great difference of numbers, except as to the peltasts, who were more numerous in the army of Agesilaus, though they do not seem to have taken much part in the battle.

Having marched from Chæroneia, Agesilaus approached the plain of Koroneia from the river Kephissus, while the Thebans met him from the direction of Mount Helikon. He occupied the right wing of his army, the Orchomenians being on the left, and the Cyreians with the Asiatic allies in the centre. In the opposite line, the Thebans were on the right, and the Argeians on the left. Both armies approached slowly and in silence until they were separated only by an interval of a furlong, at which moment the Thebans on the right began the war-shout, and accelerated their march to a run,—the rest of the line following their example. When they got within half a furlong of the Lacedæmonians, the centre division of the latter, under the command of Herippidas (comprising the Cyreians, with Xenophon himself, and the Asiatic allies) started forward on their side, and advanced at a run to meet them; seemingly, getting beyond their own line,<sup>2</sup> and coming first to cross spears with the enemy's centre. After a sharp struggle, the division of Herippidas was here victorious, and drove back its opponents. Agesilaus, on his right, was yet more victorious, for the Argeians opposed to him, fled without even crossing spears. These fugitives found safety on the high ground of Mount Helikon. But on the other hand, the Thebans on their own right completely beat back the Orchomenians, and pursued them so far as to get to the baggage in the rear of the army. Agesilaus, while his friends around were congratulating him as conqueror, immediately wheeled round to complete his victory by attacking the Thebans; who, on their side also faced about, and prepared to fight their way, in close and deep order, to rejoin their comrades on Helikon. Though Agesilaus might have let them pass, and assailed them in the rear with greater safety and equal effect, he pre-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 17. ἀντεξεδράμουν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀνησιλάου φύλαγος, etc.



ferred the more honorable victory of a conflict face to face. Such is the coloring which his panegyrist, Xenophon,<sup>1</sup> puts upon his manoeuvre. Yet we may remark that if he had let the Thebans pass, he could not have pursued them far, seeing that their own comrades were at hand to sustain them,—and also that having never yet fought against the Thebans, he had probably no adequate appreciation of their prowess.

The crash which now took place was something terrific beyond all Grecian military experience,<sup>2</sup> leaving an indelible impression upon Xenophon, who was personally engaged in it. The hoplites on both sides came to the fiercest and closest bodily struggle, pushing shields against each other, with all the weight of the incumbent mass behind impelling forward the foremost ranks,—especially in the deep order of the Thebans. The shields of the foremost combatants were thus stove in, their spears broken, and each man was engaged in such close embrace with his enemy, that the dagger was the only weapon which he could use. There was no systematic shout, such as usually marked the charge of a Grecian army; the silence was only broken by a medley of furious exclamations and murmurs.<sup>3</sup> Agesilaus himself, who was among the front ranks, and whose size and strength were by no means on a level with his personal courage, had his body covered with wounds from different weapons,<sup>4</sup>—was trodden down,—and only escaped by the devoted courage of those fifty Spartan volunteers who formed his body-guard. Partly from his wounds, partly from the irresistible courage and stronger pressure of the Thebans, the Spartans were at length compelled to give way, so far as to afford a free passage to the former, who were thus enabled to

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv. 3. 19; Xen. Agesil. ii. 12.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv. 3. 16; Xen. Agesil. ii. 9.

<sup>3</sup> Διηγήσομαι δὲ καὶ τὴν μάχην· καὶ γὰρ ἐγένετο οἷα οὐκ ἄλλη των γ' ἐσ ἡμῶν.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv. 3. 19; Xen. Agesil. ii. 12.

Καὶ συμβαλόντες τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐώνοντο, ἐμαχόντο, ἀπεκτείνον, ἀπέδνησκον· καὶ κραυγὴ μὲν οὐδεμία παρ' αὐτοῖς, οὐ μὲν οὐδὲ σιγὴ φωνὴ δὲ τῇ ἑν ταύτῃ, οἷον ὅρῃ τε καὶ μάχῃ παρίσχοιτο ἄν.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Agesil. ii. 13. 'Ο δὲ καίπερ πολλὰ τραύματα ἔχων πάντοσι καὶ παντοίοις ὅπλοις, etc.

Plutarch. Agesil. c. 19.

march onward and rejoin their comrades; not without sustaining some loss by attacks on their rear.<sup>1</sup>

Agesilaus thus remained master of the field of battle, having gained a victory over his opponents taken collectively. But so far as concerns the Thebans separately, he had not only gained no victory, but had failed in his purpose of stopping their progress, and had had the worst of the combat. His wounds having been dressed, he was brought back on men's shoulders to give his final orders, and was then informed that a detachment of eighty Theban hoplites, left behind by the rest, had taken refuge in the temple of Itonian Athênê as suppliants. From generosity mingled with respect to the sanctity of the spot, he commanded that they should be dismissed unhurt, and then proceeded to give directions for the night-watch, as it was already late. The field of battle presented a terrible spectacle; Spartan and Theban dead lying intermingled, some yet grasping their naked daggers, others pierced with the daggers of their enemies; around, on the blood-stained ground, were seen broken spears, smashed shields, swords and daggers scattered apart from their owners.<sup>2</sup> He directed the Spartan and Theban dead to be collected in separate heaps, and placed in safe custody for the night, in the interior of his phalanx; the troops then took their supper, and rested for the night. On the next morning, Gylis the Polemarch was ordered to draw up the army in battle-array, to erect a trophy, and to offer sacrifices of cheerfulness and thanksgiving, with the pipers solemnly playing, according to Spartan fashion. Agesilaus was anxious to make these demonstrations of victory as ostentatious as possible, because he really doubted whether he had gained a victory. It was very possible that the Thebans might feel confidence enough to renew the attack, and try to recover the field of battle, with their own dead upon it; which Agesilaus had, for that reason, caused to be collected in a sepa-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv. 3. 19; Xen. Agesil. ii. 12.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Agesil. ii. 14. 'Ἐπεὶ γὰρ μὲν ἔληξεν ἡ μάχη, παρὴν δὲ ἀνάσσαντι ἐνθα συνέπεσον ἀλλήλοις, τὴν μὲν γῆν αἵματι πεοῦρμένην, νεκρῶν δὲ κομιέ- νους φίλους καὶ πολέμιους μετ' ἀλλήλων, ἀσπίδας δὲ διατεταραγμένας, δοῦντας συντεθραυσμένα, ἐγχειρίδια γυναικῶν καὶ κουλεῶν τὰ μὲν χαλαῖ, τὰ δ' ἐν σώμασι, τὰ δ' ἐτι μετὰ χειρὸς.

rate heap and placed within the Lacedæmonian line.<sup>1</sup> He was, however, soon relieved from doubt by a herald coming from the Thebans to solicit the customary truce for the burial of their dead; the understood confession of defeat. The request was immediately granted; each party paid the last solemnities to its own dead, and the Spartan force was then withdrawn from Bœotia. Xenophon does not state the loss on either side, but Diodorus gives it at six hundred on the side of the confederates, three hundred and fifty on that of the Lacedæmonians.<sup>2</sup>

Disqualified as he was by his wounds for immediate action, Agesilaus caused himself to be carried to Delphi, where the Pythian games were at that moment going on. He here offered to Apollo the tithe of the booty acquired during his two years' campaigns in Asia; a tithe equal to one hundred talents.<sup>3</sup> Meanwhile the polemarch Gylis conducted the army first into Phokis, next on a predatory excursion into the Lokrian territory, where the nimble attack of the Lokrian light troops, amidst hilly ground, inflicted upon his troops a severe check, and cost him his life. After this the contingents in the army were dismissed to their respective homes, and Agesilaus himself, when tolerably recovered, sailed with the Peloponnesians homeward from Delphi across the Corinthian Gulf.<sup>4</sup> He was received at Sparta with every demonstration of esteem and gratitude, which was still farther strengthened by his exemplary simplicity and exact observance of the public discipline; an exactness not diminished either by long absence or

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Agesil. ii, 15. Τότε μὲν οὖν (καὶ γὰρ ἦν ἡδὴ ὕψι) συνελκύσαντες τοὺς τῶν πολεμίων νεκροὺς εἰς φάλαγγος, ἐδειπνοποίησαντο καὶ ἐκοιμήθησαν.

Schneider in his note on this passage, as well as ad. Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 21 — condemns the expression τῶν πολεμίων as spurious and unintelligible. But in my judgment, these words bear a plain and appropriate meaning, which I have endeavored to give in the text. Compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 84.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 21; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19. The latter says — εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀπεκομίσθη Πυθίων ὑγομένων, etc. Manso, Dr. Arnold, and others, contest the accuracy of Plutarch in this assertion respecting the time of year at which the Pythian games were celebrated, upon grounds which seem to me very insufficient.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 22, 23; iv, 4, ;

enjoyment of uncontrolled ascendancy. From this time forward he was the effective leader of Spartan policy, enjoying an influence greater than had ever fallen to the lot of any king before. His colleague, Agesipolis, both young and of feeble character, was won over by his judicious and conciliatory behavior, into the most respectful deference.<sup>1</sup>

Three great battles had thus been fought in the space of little more than a month (July and August) — those of Corinth, Knidus, and Korôneia; the first and third on land, the second at sea, as described in my last chapter. In each of the two land-battles the Lacedæmonians had gained a victory; they remained masters of the field, and were solicited by the enemy to grant the burial-truce. But if we inquire what results these victories had produced, the answer must be that both were totally barren. The position of Sparta in Greece as against her enemies had undergone no improvement. In the battle of Corinth, her soldiers had indeed manifested signal superiority, and acquired much honor. But at the field of Korôneia, the honor of the day was rather on the side of the Thebans, who broke through the most strenuous opposition, and carried their point of joining their allies. And the purpose of Agesilaus (ordered by the ephor Diphridas) to invade Bœotia, completely failed.<sup>2</sup> Instead of advancing, he withdrew from Korôneia, and returned to Peloponnesus across the gulf from Delphi; which he might have done just as well without fighting this murderous and hardly contested battle. Even the narrative of Xenophon, deeply colored as it is both by his sympathies and his antipathies, indicates to us that the predominant impression carried off by every one from the field of Korôneia was that of the tremendous force and obstinacy of the Theban hoplites, — a foretaste of what was to come at Leuktra!

If the two land-victories of Sparta were barren of results, the case was far otherwise with her naval defeat at Knidus. That defeat was pregnant with consequences following in rapid succession, and of the most disastrous character. As with Athens at Ægospotami, — the loss of her fleet, serious as that was, served

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 17, 20; Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 20.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 17. Cornelius Nepos, Agesil. c. 4. "Obsistere ei conati sunt Athenienses et Bœoti," etc. They succeeded in barring his way, and compelling him to retreat.



only as the signal for countless following losses. Pharnabazus and Konon, with their victorious fleet, sailed from island to island, and from one continental seaport to another, in the Ægean, to expel the Lacedæmonian harmosts, and terminate the empire of Sparta. So universal was the odium which it had inspired, that the task was found easy beyond expectation. Conscious of their unpopularity, the harmosts in almost all the towns, on both sides of the Hellespont, deserted their posts and fled, on the mere news of the battle of Knidus.<sup>1</sup> Everywhere Pharnabazus and Konon found themselves received as liberators, and welcomed with presents of hospitality. They pledged themselves not to introduce any foreign force or governor, nor to fortify any separate citadel, but to guarantee to each city its own genuine autonomy. This policy was adopted by Pharnabazus at the urgent representation of Konon, who warned him that if he manifested any design of reducing the cities to subjection, he would find them all his enemies; that each of them severally would cost him a long siege; and that a combination would ultimately be formed against him. Such liberal and judicious ideas, when seen to be sincerely acted upon, produced a strong feeling of friendship and even of gratitude, so that the Lacedæmonian maritime empire was dissolved without a blow, by the almost spontaneous movements of the cities themselves. Though the victorious fleet presented itself in many different places, it was nowhere called upon to put down resistance, or to undertake a single siege. Kos, Nisyra, Teos, Chios, Erythræ, Ephesus, Mitylênê, Samos, all declared themselves independent, under the protection of the new conquerors.<sup>2</sup> Pharnabazus presently disembarked at Ephesus and marched by land northward to his own satrapy; leaving a fleet of forty triremes under the command of Konon.

To this general burst of anti-Spartan feeling, Abydos, on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, formed the solitary exception. That town, steady in hostility to Athens,<sup>3</sup> had been the great military

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 1-5.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 1-3; Diodor. xiv, 84. About Samos, xiv, 97.

Compare also the speech of Derkyllidas to the Abydenes (Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 4) — 'Ὅσῳ δὲ μᾶλλον αἱ ἄλλαι πόλεις ἐν τῇ τύχῃ ἀπεστράφησαν ἡμῶν τοσούτῳ ὄντως ἡ ὑμετέρα πιστότης μείζων φανείη, ἂν, etc.

<sup>3</sup> 'Εκ γὰρ Ἀβύδου, τῆς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ὑμῖν ἐχθρᾶς — says Demos-

station of Sparta for her northern Asiatic warfare, during the last twenty years. It was in the satrapy of Pharnabazus, and had been made the chief place of arms by Derkyllidas and Agesilaus, for their warfare against that satrap as well as for the command of the strait. Accordingly, while it was a main object with Pharnabazus to acquire possession of Abydos, — there was nothing which the Abydenes dreaded so much as to become subject to him. In this view they were decidedly disposed to cling to Lacedæmonian protection; and it happened by a fortunate accident for Sparta, that the able and experienced Derkyllidas was harmost in the town at the moment of the battle of Knidus. Having fought in the battle of Corinth, he had been sent to announce the news to Agesilaus, whom he had met on his march at Amphipolis, and who had sent him forward into Asia to communicate the victory to the allied cities;<sup>1</sup> neither of them at that moment anticipating the great maritime defeat then impending. The presence in Abydos of such an officer, who had already acquired a high military reputation in that region, and was at marked enmity with Pharnabazus, — combined with the standing apprehensions of the Abydenes, — was now the means of saving a remnant at least of maritime ascendancy to Sparta. During the general alarm which succeeded the battle of Knidus, when the harmosts were everywhere taking flight, and when anti-Spartan manifestations often combined with internal revolutions to overthrow the dekarchs or their substitutes, were spreading from city to city. — Derkyllidas assembled the Abydenes, heartened them up against the reigning contagion, and exhorted them to earn the gratitude of Sparta by remaining faithful to her while others were falling off; assuring them that she would still be found capable of giving them protection. His exhortations were listened to with favor. Abydos remained attached to Sparta, was put in a good state of defence, and became the only harbor of safety for the fugitive harmosts out of the other cities, Asiatic and European.

Having secured his hold upon Abydos, Derkyllidas crossed the strait to make sure also of the strong place of Sestos, on the Eu-

thenes in the Athenian assembly (cont. Aristokrat. c. 39, p. 672; comp. c. 52, p. 688).

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 2.

ropean side, in the Thracian Chersonese.<sup>1</sup> In that fertile peninsula there had been many new settlers, who had come in and acquired land under the Lacedæmonian supremacy, especially since the building of the cross-wall by Derkyllidas to defend the isthmus against Thracian invasion. By means of these settlers, dependent on Sparta for the security of their tenures, — and of the refugees from various cities all concentrated under his protection, — Derkyllidas maintained his position effectively both at Abydos and at Sestos; defying the requisition of Pharnabazus that he should forthwith evacuate them. The satrap threatend war, and actually ravaged the lands around Abydos, — but without any result. His wrath against the Lacedæmonians, already considerable, was so aggravated by disappointment when he found that he could not yet expel them from his satrapy, that he resolved to act against them with increased energy, and even to strike a blow at them near their own home. For this purpose he transmitted orders to Konon to prepare a commanding naval force for the ensuing spring, and in the mean time to keep both Abydos and Sesto under blockade.<sup>2</sup>

As soon as spring arrived, Pharnabazus embarked on board a powerful fleet equipped by Konon; directing his course to Melos to various islands among the Cyclades, and lastly to the coast of Peloponnesus. They here spent some time on the coast of Laconia and Messenia, disembarking at several points to ravage the country. They next landed on the island of Kythêra, which they captured, granting safe retirement to the Lacedæmonian garrison, and leaving in the island a garrison under the Athenian Nikophêmus. Quitting then the harborless, dangerous, and ill-provided coast of Laconia, they sailed up the Saronic gulf to the isthmus of Corinth. Here they found the confederates, — Corinthian, Bœotian, Athenian, etc., carrying on war with Corinth as their central post, against the Lacedæmonians at Sikyon. The line across the

<sup>1</sup> Lysander, after the victory of Ægospotami and the expulsion of the Athenians from Sestos, had assigned the town and district as a settlement for the pilots and Keleustæ aboard his fleet. But the ephors are said to have reversed the assignment, and restored the town to the Sestians (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14). Probably, however, the new settlers would remain in part upon the lands vacated by the expelled Athenians.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 4-6

isthmus from Lechæum to Kenchreæ (the two ports of Corinth) was now made good by a defensive system of operations, so as to confine the Lacedæmonians within Peloponnesus; just as Athens, prior to her great losses in 446 B. C., while possessing both Megara and Pegæ, had been able to maintain the inland road midway between them, where it crosses the high and difficult crest of Mount Geraneia, thus occupying the only three roads by which a Lacedæmonian army could march from the isthmus of Corinth into Attica or Bœotia. Pharnabazus communicated in the most friendly manner with the allies, assured them of his strenuous support against Sparta, and left with them a considerable sum of money.<sup>2</sup>

The appearance of a Persian satrap with a Persian fleet, as master of the Peloponnesian sea and the Saronic Gulf, was a phenomenon astounding to Grecian eyes. And if it was not equally offensive to Grecian sentiment, this was in itself a melancholy proof of the degree to which Pan-hellenic patriotism had been stifled by the Peloponnesian war and the Spartan empire. No Persian tiara had been seen near the Saronic Gulf since the battle of Salamis; nor could anything short of the intense personal wrath of Pharnabazus against the Lacedæmonians, and his desire to revenge upon them the damage inflicted by Derkyllidas and Agesilaus, have brought him now so far away from his own satrapy. It was this wrathful feeling of which Konon took advantage to procure from him a still more important boon.

Since 404 B. C., a space of eleven years, Athens had continued without any walls around her seaport town Peiræus, and without any Long Walls to connect her city with Peiræus. To this state she had been condemned by the sentence of her enemies, in the full knowledge that she could have little trade, — few ships either armed or mercantile, — poor defence even against pirates, and no defence at all against aggression from the mistress of the sea. Konon now entreated Pharnabazus, who was about to go home, to leave the fleet under his command, and to permit him to use it in rebuilding the fortifications of Peiræus as well as the Long Walls of Athens. While he engaged to maintain the fleet by contributions from the islands, he assured the satrap that no blow could be

<sup>1</sup> See Sir William Gell's Itinerary of Greece, p. 4. Ernst Curtius — Peloponnesos — p. 25, 26, and Thucyd. i, 108.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 7, 8; Diodor. xiv, 84.



inflicted upon Sparta so destructive or so mortifying, as the renovation of Athens and Peiræus with their complete and connected fortifications. Sparta would thus be deprived of the most important harvest which she had reaped from the long struggle of the Peloponnesian war. Indignant as he now was against the Lacedæmonians, Pharnabazus sympathized cordially with these plans, and on departing not only left the fleet under the command of Konon, but also furnished him with a considerable sum of money towards the expense of the fortifications.<sup>1</sup>

Konon betook himself to the work energetically and without delay. He had quitted Athens in 407 B. C., as one of the joint admirals nominated after the disgrace of Alkibiades. He had parted with his countrymen finally at the catastrophe of Ægospotami in 405 B. C., preserving the miserable fraction of eight or nine ships out of that noble fleet which otherwise would have passed entire into the hands of Lysander. He now returned, in 393 B. C., as a second Themistoklès, the deliverer of his country, and the restorer of her lost strength and independence. All hands were set to work; carpenters and masons being hired with the funds furnished by Pharnabazus, to complete the fortifications as quickly as possible. The Boeotians and other neighbors lent their aid zealously as volunteers,<sup>2</sup> — the same who eleven years before had danced to the sound of joyful music when the former walls were demolished; so completely had the feelings of Greece altered since that period. By such hearty coopération the work was finished during the course of the present summer and autumn without any opposition; and Athens enjoyed again her fortified Peiræus and harbor, with a pair of Long Walls, straight and parallel, joining it securely to the city. The third, or Phalêric Wall (a single wall stretching from Athens to Phalêrum), which had existed down to the capture of the city by Lysander, was not restored; nor was it indeed by any means necessary to the security either of the city or of the port. Having thus given renewed life and security

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 9, 10.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 10; Diodor. xiv, 85.

Cornelius Nepos (Konon, c. 4) mentions fifty talents as a sum received by Konon from Pharnabazus as a present, and devoted by him to this public work. This is not improbable; but the total sum contributed by the sea-  
trap towards the fortifications must, probably, have been much greater.

to Peiræus, Konon commemorated his great naval victory by a golden wreath in the acropolis, as well as by the erection of a temple in Peiræus to the honor of the Knidian Aphroditê, who was worshipped at Knidus with peculiar devotion by the local population.<sup>1</sup> He farther celebrated the completion of the walls by a splendid sacrifice and festival banquet. And the Athenian people not only inscribed on a pillar a public vote gratefully recording the exploits of Konon, but also erected a statue to his honor.<sup>2</sup>

The importance of this event in reference to the future history of Athens was unspeakable. Though it did not restore to her either her former navy, or her former empire, it reconstituted her as a city, not only self-determining, but even partially ascendant. It reanimated her, if not into the Athens of Perikles, at least into that of Isokrates and Demosthenes; it imparted to her a second fill of strength, dignity, and commercial importance, during the half century destined to elapse before she was finally overwhelmed by the superior military force of Macedon. Those who recollect the extraordinary stratagem whereby Themistokles had contrived (eighty-five years before) to accomplish the fortification of Athens, in spite of the base but formidable jealousy of Sparta and her Peloponnesian allies, will be aware how much the consummation of the Themistoklean project had depended upon accident. Now, also, Konon in his restoration was favored by unusual combinations, such as no one could have predicted. That Pharnabazus should conceive the idea of coming over himself to Peloponnesus with a fleet of the largest force, was a most unexpected contingency. He was influenced neither by attachment to Athens, nor seemingly by considerations of policy, though the proceeding was one really conducive to the interests of Persian power, — but simply by his own violent personal wrath against the Lacedæmonians. And this wrath probably would have been satisfied, if, after the battle of Knidus, he could have cleared his own satrapy of them completely. It was his vehement impatience, when he found himself unable to expel his old enemy, Derkyllidas, from the important position of

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. cont. Androtion. p. 616. c. 21. Pausanias (i, 1, 3) still saw this temple in Peiræus — very near to the sea; five hundred and fifty years afterwards.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. cont. Androtion. p. 477, 478; Athenæus, i, 3; Cornelius Nepos, Konon, c. 4.

Abydos, which chiefly spurred him on to take revenge on Sparta in her own waters. Nothing less than the satrap's personal presence would have placed at the disposal of Konon either a sufficient naval force, or sufficient funds for the erection of the new walls, and the defiance of all impediment from Sparta. So strangely did events thus run, that the energy, by which Derkyllidas preserved Abydos, brought upon Sparta, indirectly, the greater mischief of the new Kononian walls. It would have been better for Sparta that Pharnabazus should at once have recovered Abydos as well as the rest of his satrapy; in which case he would have had no wrongs remaining unavenged to incense him, and would have kept on his own side of the Ægean; feeding Konon with a modest squadron sufficient to keep the Lacedæmonian navy from again becoming formidable on the Asiatic side, but leaving the walls of Peiræus (if we may borrow an expression of Plato) "to continue asleep in the bosom of the earth."<sup>1</sup>

But the presence of Konon with his powerful fleet was not the only condition indispensable to the accomplishment of this work. It was requisite further, that the interposition of Sparta should be kept off, not merely by sea, but by land, and that, too, during all the number of months that the walls were in progress. Now the barrier against her on land was constituted by the fact, that the confederate force held the cross line within the isthmus from Lechæum to Kenchreæ, with Corinth as a centre.<sup>2</sup> But they were unable to sustain this line even through the ensuing year, — during which Sparta, aided by dissensions at Corinth, broke through it, as will appear in the next chapter. Had she been able to break through it while the fortifications of Athens were yet incomplete, she would have deemed no effort too great to effect an entrance into Attica and interrupt the work, in which she might very probably have succeeded. Here, then, was the second condition, which was realized during the summer and autumn of 393 B. C., but which did not continue to be realized longer. So fortunate was it for Athens, that the two conditions were fulfilled both together during this particular year!

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Legg. vi, p. 778; *καθεύδειν ἐπὶ ἐν τῇ γῇ κατακείμενα τὰ τεῖχη*, etc.

<sup>2</sup> The importance of maintaining these lines, as a protection to Athens against invasion from Sparta, is illustrated in Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 19, and Andokides. Or. iii, De Pace, s. 26.

## CHAPTER LXXV.

## FROM THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF ATHENS TO THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS.

THE presence of Pharnabazus and Konon with their commanding force in the Saronic Gulf, and the liberality with which the former furnished pecuniary aid to the latter for rebuilding the full fortifications of Athens, as well as to the Corinthians for the prosecution of the war, — seem to have given preponderance to the confederates over Sparta for that year. The plans of Konon were extensive. He was the first to organize for the defence of Corinth, a mercenary force which was afterwards improved and conducted with greater efficiency by Iphikrates; and after he had finished the fortifications of Peiræus with the Long Walls, he employed himself in showing his force among the islands, for the purpose of laying the foundations of renewed maritime power for Athens. We even hear that he caused an Athenian envoy to be despatched to Dionysius at Syracuse, with the view of detaching that despot from Sparta, and bringing him into connection with Athens. Evagoras, despot of Salamis in Cyprus, the steady friend of Konon, was a party to this proposition, which he sought to strengthen by offering to Dionysius his sister in marriage.<sup>3</sup> There was a basis of sympathy between them arising from the fact that Evagoras was at variance with the Phenicians both in Phenicia and Cyprus, while Dionysius was in active hostilities with the Carthaginians (their kinsmen and Colonists) in Sicily. Nevertheless, the proposition met with little or no success. We find Dionysius afterwards still continuing to act as an ally of Sparta.

Profiting by the aid received from Pharnabazus, the Corinthians strengthened their fleet at Lechæum (their harbor in the Corinthian Gulf) so considerably, as to become masters of the Gulf, and

<sup>1</sup> Harpokration, v. *ξενικὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ*. Philochorus, Fragm. 150, ed. Dindorf.

<sup>2</sup> Lysias, Orat. xix, (De Bonis Aristophanis) s. 21.



to occupy Rhium, one of the two opposite capes which bound its narrow entrance. To oppose them, the Lacedæmonians on their side were driven to greater maritime effort. More than one naval action seems to have taken place, in those waters where the prowess and skill of the Athenian admiral Phormion had been so signally displayed at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. At length the Lacedæmonian admiral Herippidas, who succeeded to the command of the fleet after his predecessor Polemarchus had been slain in battle, compelled the Corinthians to abandon Rhium, and gradually recovered his ascendancy in the Corinthian Gulf; with his successor Teletias, brother of Agesilaus, still farther completed.<sup>1</sup>

While these transactions were going on (seemingly during the last half of 393 B. C. and the full year of 392 B. C.), so as to put an end to the temporary naval preponderance of the Corinthians, — the latter were at the same time bearing the brunt of a desultory, but continued, land-warfare against the garrison of Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesians established at Sikyon. Both Corinth and Lechæum were partly defended by the presence of confederate troops, Bœotians, Argeians, Athenians, or mercenaries paid by Athens. But this did not protect the Corinthians against suffering great damage, in their lands and outlying properties, from the incursions of the enemy.

The plain between Corinth and Sikyon, — fertile and extensive (speaking by comparison with Peloponnesus generally), and constituting a large part of the landed property of both cities, was rendered uncultivable during 393 and 392 B. C.; so that the Corinthian proprietors were obliged to withdraw their servants and cattle to Peiræum<sup>2</sup> (a portion of the Corinthian territory without the Isthmus properly so called, north-east of the Akrokorinthus, in a line between that eminence and the Megarian harbor of Pegæ). Here the Sikyonian assailants could not reach them, because of the Long Walls of Corinth, which connected that city by a continuous fortification of twelve stadia (somewhat less than a mile and a half) with its harbor of Lechæum. Nevertheless, the loss to the proprietors of the deserted plain was still so great, that two successive seasons of it were quite enough to inspire them

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 11.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 1; iv, 5, 1

with a strong aversion to the war;<sup>1</sup> the more so, as the damage fell exclusively upon them — their allies in Bœotia, Athens, and

<sup>1</sup> I dissent from Mr. Fynes Clinton as well as from M. Rehdantz (*Vita Iphicratis*, etc., c. 4, who in the main agrees with Dodwell's *Annales Xenophonteï*) in their chronological arrangement of these events.

They place the battle fought by Praxitas within the Long Walls of Corinth in 393 B. C., and the destruction of the Lacedæmonian *mora* or division by Iphikrates (the monthly date of which is marked by its having immediately succeeded the Isthmian games), in 392 B. C. I place the former event in 392 B. C.; the latter in 390 B. C., immediately after the Isthmian games of 390 B. C.

If we study the narrative of Xenophon, we shall find, that after describing (iv, 3) the battle of Koroneia (August 394 B. C.) with its immediate consequences, and the return of Agesilaus home, — he goes on in the next chapter to narrate the land-war about or near Corinth, which he carries down without interruption (through Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, of Book iv.) to 389 B. C.

But in Chapter 8 of Book iv, he leaves the land-war, and takes up the naval operations, from and after the battle of Knidus (Aug. 394 B. C.). He recounts how Pharnabazus and Konon came across the Ægean with a powerful fleet in the spring of 393 B. C., and how after various proceedings, they brought the fleet to the Saronic Gulf and the Isthmus of Corinth, where they must have arrived at or near midsummer 393 B. C.

Now it appears to me certain, that these proceedings of Pharnabazus with the fleet, recounted in the eighth chapter, come, in point of date, *before* the seditious movements and the *coup d'état* at Corinth, which are recounted in the fourth chapter. At the time when Pharnabazus was at Corinth in midsummer 393 B. C., the narrative of Xenophon (iv, 8, 8-10) leads us to believe that the Corinthians were prosecuting the war zealously, and without discontent: the money and encouragement which Pharnabazus gave them was calculated to strengthen such ardor. It was by aid of this money that the Corinthians fitted out their fleet under Agamemnon, and acquired for a time the maritime command of the Gulf.

The discontents against the war (recounted in chap. 4 *seq.*) could not have commenced until a considerable time after the departure of Pharnabazus. They arose out of causes which only took effect after a long continuance, — the hardships of the land-war, the losses of property and slaves, the jealousy towards Attica and Bœotia as being undisturbed, etc. The Lacedæmonian and Peloponnesian aggressive force at Sikyon cannot possibly have been established before the autumn of 494 B. C., and was most probably placed there early in the spring of 393 B. C. Its effects were brought about, not by one great blow, but by repetition of ravages and destructive annoyance; and all the effects which it produced previous to midsummer 393 B. C. would be more than compensated by the presence, the gifts, and the encouragement of Pharnabazus with his powerful fleet. Moreover, after his departure, too, the Corinthians were at first successful at sea, and ac-



Argos, having as yet suffered nothing. Constant military service for defence, with the conversion of the city into a sort of besieged post, aggravated their discomfort. There was another circumstance also, doubtless not without influence. The consequences of the battle of Knidus had been, first, to put down the maritime empire of Sparta, and thus to diminish the fear which she inspired to the Corinthians; next, to rebuild the fortifications, and renovate the shipping, commercial as well as warlike, of Athens;—a revival well calculated to bring back a portion of that anti-Athenian jealousy and apprehension which the Corinthians had felt so strongly a few years before. Perhaps some of the trade at Corinth may have been actually driven away by the disturbance of the war, to the renewed fortifications and greater security of Peiræus.

Fostered by this pressure of circumstances, the discontented philo-Laconian or peace-party which had always existed at Corinth, presently acquired sufficient strength, and manifested itself with sufficient publicity to give much alarm to the government. The Corinthian government had always been, and still was, oligarchical. In what manner the administrators or the council were renovated, or how long individuals continued in office, indeed, we do not know. But of democracy, with its legal, popular assemblies, open discussions and authoritative resolves, there was

quired the command of the Gulf, which, however, they did not retain for more than a year, if so much. Hence, it is not likely that any strong discontent against the war began before the early part of 392 B. C.

Considering all these circumstances, I think it reasonable to believe that the *coup d'état* and massacre at Corinth took place (not in 393 B. C., as Mr. Clinton and M. Rehdantz place it, but) in 392 B. C.; and the battle within the Long Walls rather later in the same year.

Next, the opinion of the same two authors, as well as of Dodwell, — that the destruction of the Lacedæmonian *mora* by Iphicrates took place in the spring of 392 B. C., — is also, in my view, erroneous. If this were true, it would be necessary to pack all the events mentioned in Xenophon, iv, 4 into the year 393 B. C.; which I hold to be impossible. If the destruction of the *mora* did not occur in the spring of 393 B. C., we know that it could not have occurred until the spring of 390 B. C.; that is, the next ensuing Isthmian games, two years afterwards. And this last will be found to be its true date; thus leaving full time, but not too much time, for the antecedent occurrences.

nothing.<sup>1</sup> Now the oligarchical persons actually in power were vehemently anti-Laconian, consisting of men who had partaken of the Persian funds and contracted alliance with Persia, besides compromising themselves irrevocably (like Timolaus) by the most bitter manifestations of hostile sentiment towards Sparta. These men found themselves menaced by a powerful opposition party, which had no constitutional means for making its sentiments predominant, and for accomplishing peaceably either a change of administrators or a change of public policy. It was only by an appeal to arms and violence that such a consummation could be brought about; a fact notorious to both parties, — so that the oligarchical administrators, informed of the meetings and conversations going on, knew well that they had to expect nothing less than the breaking out of a conspiracy. That such anticipations were well-founded, we gather even from the partial recital of Xenophon; who states that Pasimélus, the philo-Laconian leader, was on his guard and in preparation,<sup>2</sup> — and counts it to him as a virtue that shortly afterwards he opened the gates to the Lacedæmonians.

Anticipating such conspiracy, the government resolved to prevent it by a *coup d'état*. They threw themselves upon the assistance of their allies, invited in a body of Argeians, and made their blow the more sure by striking it on the last day of the festival called Eukleia, when it was least expected. Their proceeding, though dictated by precaution, was executed with the extreme of brutal ferocity aggravated by sacrilege; in a manner very different from the deep-laid artifices recently practised by the Spartan ephors when they were in like manner afraid of the conspiracy of Kinadon, — and more like the oligarchical conspirators at Korkyra (in the third year of the Peloponnesian war) when they broke into the assembled Senate, and massacred Peithias, with sixty

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion. c. 53

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 2. Γνόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Βοιωτοὶ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Κορινθίῳ οἱ τε τῶν παρὰ βασιλείῳ χρημάτων μετεσχηκότες, καὶ οἱ τοῦ πολέμου αἰτιώτατοι γεγενημένοι, ὥς, εἰ μὴ ἐκποδὸν ποιήσαιτο τοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν εἰρήνην τετραμμένους, κινδυνεύσει πάλιν ἡ πόλις λακωνίσαι — οὕτω δὲ καὶ σφαγὰς ἐπεχείρουν ποιεῖσθαι.

iv, 4, 4. Οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι, ὑποπτεύσαντες Πασιμήλου τὸ μέλλον εἶσθαι, ἤσυχίαν ἔσχον ἐν τῷ Κρανίῳ· ὥς δὲ τῆς κραυγῆς ἤσθοντο, καὶ φεύγοντες τινες ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος ἀφίκοντο πρὸς αὐτοὺς, ἐκ τούτου ἀναδραμόντες κατὰ τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον, προσβαλόντας μὲν Ἀργεῖους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπεκρούσαν· αἱ εἰρη-



others in the senate-house.<sup>1</sup> While the choice performers at Corinth were contending for the prize in the theatre, with judges formally named to decide, — and while the market-place around was crowded with festive spectators, — a number of armed men were introduced, probably Argeians, with leaders designating the victims whom they were to strike. Some of these select victims were massacred in the market-place, others in the theatre, and one even while sitting as a judge in the theatre. Others again fled in terror to embrace the altars or statues in the market-place, — which sanctuary, nevertheless, did not save their lives. Nor was such sacrilege arrested, — repugnant as it was to the feelings of the assembled spectators and to Grecian feelings generally, — until one hundred and twenty persons had perished.<sup>2</sup> But the persons slain were chiefly elderly men; for the younger portion of the philo-Laconian party, suspecting some mischief, had declined attending the festival, and kept themselves separately assembled under their leader Pasimélus in the gymnasium and cypress-grove called Kranium, just without the city-gates. We find, too, that they were not only assembled, but actually in arms. For the moment that they heard the clamor in the market-place, and learned from some fugitives what was going on, they rushed up at once to the Akrokorinthus (or eminence and acropolis overhanging the city) and got possession of the citadel, — which they maintained with such force and courage that the Argeians and the Corinthians, who took part with the government, were repulsed in the attempt to dislodge them. This circumstance, indirectly revealed in the one-sided narrative of Xenophon, lets us into the real state of the city, and affords good ground for believing that Pasimélus and his friends were prepared beforehand for an armed outbreak, but waited to execute it, until the festival was over, — a scruple which the government, in their eagerness to forestall the plot, disregarded, — employing the hands and weapons of Argeians who were comparatively unimpressed by solemnities peculiar to Corinth.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iii, 70.

<sup>2</sup> Diodorus (xiv, 86) gives this number, which seems very credible. Xenophon (iv, 4, 4) only says πολλοί.

<sup>3</sup> In recounting this alternation of violence projected, violence perpetrated, recourse on the one side to a foreign ally, treason on the other by admitting an avowed enemy, — which formed the *modus operandi* of opposing

Though Pasimélus and his friends were masters of the citadel and had repulsed the assault of their enemies, yet the *coup d'état*

parties in the oligarchical Corinth, — I invite the reader to contrast it with the democratical Athens.

At Athens, in the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, there were precisely the same causes at work, and precisely the same marked antithesis of parties, as those which here disturbed Corinth. There was first, a considerable Athenian minority who opposed the war with Sparta from the first; next, when the war began, the proprietors of Attica saw their lands ruined, and were compelled either to carry away, or to lose, their servants and cattle, so that they obtained no returns. The intense discontent, the angry complaints, the bitter conflict of parties, which these circumstances raised among the Athenian citizens, — not to mention the aggravation of all these symptoms by the terrible epidemic, — are marked out in Thucydides, and have been recorded in the fifth volume of this history. Not only the positive loss and suffering, but all other causes of exasperation, stood at a higher pitch at Athens in the early part of the Peloponnesian war, than at Corinth in 392 B. C.

Yet what were the effects which they produced? Did the minority resort to a conspiracy, — or the majority to a *coup d'état* — or either of them to invitation of foreign aid against the other? Nothing of the kind. The minority had always open to them the road of pacific opposition, and the chance of obtaining a majority in the Senate or in the public assembly, which was practically identical with the totality of the citizens. Their opposition, though pacific as to acts, was sufficiently animated and violent in words and propositions, to serve as a real discharge for imprisoned angry passion. If they could not carry the adoption of their general policy, they had the opportunity of gaining partial victories which took off the edge of a fierce discontent; witness the fine imposed upon Perikles (Thucyd. ii, 65) in the year before his death, which both gratified and mollified the antipathy against him, and brought about shortly afterwards a strong reaction in his favor. The majority, on the other hand, knew that the predominance of its policy depended upon its maintaining its hold on a fluctuating public assembly, against the utmost freedom of debate and attack, within certain forms and rules prescribed by the constitution; attachment to the latter being the cardinal principle of political morality in both parties. It was this system which excluded on both sides the thought of armed violence. It produced among the democratical citizens of Athens that characteristic insisted upon by Kleon in Thucydides, — “constant and fearless security and absence of treacherous hostility among one another” (διὰ γὰρ τὸ καθ’ ἡμέραν ἀδεῆς καὶ ἀνεπιβόλευτον πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἐς τοὺς ἐνυμμάχους τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχετε — Thuc. iii, 37), the entire absence of which stands so prominently forward in these deplorable proceedings of the oligarchical Corinth. Pasimélus and his Corinthian minority had no assemblies, *dikasteries*, annual Senate, or constant habit of free debate and accusation, to



had been completely successful in overawing their party in the city, and depriving them of all means of communicating with the Lacedæmonians at Sikyon. Feeling unable to maintain themselves, they were besides frightened by menacing omens, when they came to offer sacrifice, in order that they might learn whether the gods encouraged them to fight or not. The victims were found so alarming, as to drive them to evacuate the post and prepare for voluntary exile. Many of them (according to Diodorus five hundred)<sup>1</sup> actually went into exile; while others, and among them Pasimêlus himself, were restrained by the entreaties of their friends and relatives, combined with solemn assurances of peace and security from the government; who now, probably, felt themselves victorious, and were anxious to mitigate the antipathies which their recent violence had inspired. These pacific assurances were faithfully kept, and no farther mischief was done to any citizen.

But the political condition of Corinth was materially altered, by an extreme intimacy of alliance and communion now formed with Argos; perhaps combined with reciprocal rights of inter-marriage, and of purchase and sale. The boundary pillars or hedges which separated the two territories, were pulled up, and the city was entitled *Argos* instead of *Corinth* (says Xenophon); such was probably the invidious phrase in which the opposition party described the very close political union now formed between the two cities; upheld by a strong Argeian force in the city and acropolis, together with some Athenian mercenaries under Iphikrates, and some Boeotians as a garrison in the port of Lechæum. Most probably the government remained still Corinthian, and still oligarchical, as before. But it now rested upon Argeian aid, and was therefore dependent chiefly upon Argos, though partly also upon the other two allies.

To Pasimêlus and his friends such a state of things was intol-

appeal to; their only available weapon was armed violence, or treacherous correspondence with a foreign enemy. On the part of the Corinthian government, superior or more skilfully used force, or superior alliance abroad, was the only weapon of defence, in like manner.

I shall return to this subject in a future chapter, where I enter more at large into the character of the Athenians.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 86; Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 5.

erable. Though personally they had no ill-usage to complain of, yet the complete predominance of their political enemies was quite sufficient to excite their most vehement antipathies. They entered into secret correspondence with Praxitas, the Lacedæmonian commander at Sikyon, engaging to betray to him one of the gates in the western Long Wall between Corinth and Lechæum. The scheme being concerted, Pasimêlus and his partisans got themselves placed,<sup>1</sup> partly by contrivance and partly by accident, on the night-watch at this gate; an imprudence, which shows that the government not only did not maltreat them, but even admitted them to trust. At the moment fixed, Praxitas, — presenting himself with a Lacedæmonian *mora* or regiment, a Sikyonian force, and the Corinthian exiles, — found the treacherous sentinels prepared to open the gates. Having first sent in a trusty soldier to satisfy him that there was no deceit,<sup>2</sup> he then conducted all his force within the gates, into the mid-space between the two Long Walls. So broad was this space, and so inadequate did his numbers appear to maintain it, that he took the precaution of digging a cross-ditch with a palisade to defend himself on the side towards the city; which he was enabled to do undisturbed, since the enemy (we are not told why) did not attack him all the next day. On the ensuing day, however, Argeians, Corinthians, and Athenian mercenaries under Iphikrates, all came down from the city in full force; the latter stood on the right of the line, along the eastern wall, opposed to the Corinthian exiles on the Lacedæmonian left; while the Lacedæmonians themselves were on their own right, opposed to the Corinthians from the city; and the Argeians, opposed to the Sikyonians, in the centre.

It was here that the battle began; the Argeians, bold from superior numbers, attacked and broke the Sikyonians, tearing up the palisade, and pursuing them down to the sea with much slaughter.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 8. καὶ κατὰ τύχην καὶ κατ' ἐπιμελίαν, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 8. Nothing can show more forcibly the Lacedæmonian bias of Xenophon, than the credit which he gives to Pasimêlus for his good faith towards the Lacedæmonians whom he was letting in; overlooking or approving his treacherous betrayal towards his own countrymen, in thus opening a gate which he had been trusted to watch. τῷ δ' εἰσπαγέτην, καὶ οὕτως ἀπλῶς ἔπεδεξάτην, ὥστε ὁ εἰσελθὼν ἐξήγγειλε, πάντα εἶνα ἑσθλῶς, εἰά τερ ἐλεγέτην.



ter;<sup>1</sup> upon which Pasimachus the Lacedæmonian commander of cavalry, coming to their aid, caused his small body of horsemen to dismount and tie their horses to trees, and then armed them with shields taken from the Sikyonians, inscribed on the outside with the letter Sigma (Σ). With these he approached on foot to attack the Argeians, who, mistaking them for Sikyonians, rushed to the charge with alacrity; upon which Pasimachus exclaimed, — "By the two gods, Argeians, these Sigmas which you see here will deceive you;" he then closed with them resolutely, but his number was so inferior that he was soon overpowered and slain. Meanwhile, the Corinthian exiles on the left had driven back Iphikrates with his mercenaries (doubtless chiefly light troops) and pursued them even to the city gates; while the Lacedæmonians, easily repelling the Corinthians opposed to them, came out of their palisade, and planted themselves with their faces towards the eastern wall, but at a little distance from it, to intercept the Argeians on their return. The latter were forced to run back as they could, huddling close along the eastern wall, with their right or unshielded side exposed, as they passed, to the spears of the Lacedæmonians. Before they could get to the walls of Corinth, they were met and roughly handled by the victorious Corinthian exiles. And even when they came to the walls, those within, unwilling to throw open the gates for fear of admitting the enemy, contented themselves with handing down ladders, over which the defeated Argeians clambered with distress and difficulty. Altogether, their loss in this disastrous retreat was frightful. Their dead (says Xenophon) lay piled up like heaps of stones or wood.<sup>2</sup>

This victory of Praxitas and the Lacedæmonians, though it did not yet make them masters of Lechæum,<sup>3</sup> was, nevertheless, of

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 10. Καὶ τοὺς μὲν Σικωνίους ἐκράτησαν καὶ διασπάρσαντες τὸ σταύρωμα ἐδίωκον ἐπὶ θάλασσαν, καὶ ἐκεῖ πολλοὺς αὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν.

It would appear from hence that there must have been an open portion of Lechæum, or a space apart from (but adjoining to) the wall which encircled Lechæum, yet still within the Long Walls. Otherwise the fugitive Sikyonians could hardly have got down to the sea.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 12. Οὕτως ἐν ὀλίγῳ πολλοὶ ἔπεσον, ὥστε εἰδυμένοι ἦσαν οἱ ἄνθρωποι σωροὺς αἰτον, ξύλων, λίθων, τότε ἐθεύσαντο σωροὺς νεκρῶν. A singular form of speech.

<sup>3</sup> Diodorus (xiv, 87) represents that the Lacedæmonians on this occasion

considerable importance. Shortly afterwards they received reinforcements which enabled them to turn it to still better account. The first measure of Praxitas was to pull down a considerable breadth of the two walls, leaving a breach which opened a free passage for any Lacedæmonian army from Sikyon to reach and pass the isthmus. He then marched his troops through the breach, forward on the road to Megara, capturing the two Corinthian dependencies of Krommyon and Sidus on the Saronic gulf, in which he placed garrisons. Returning back by the road south of Corinth, he occupied Epieikia on the frontier of Epidaurus, as a protection to the territory of the latter against incursions from Corinth, — and then disbanded his army.

A desultory warfare was carried on during the ensuing winter and spring between the opposite garrisons in Corinth and Sikyon. It was now that the Athenian Iphikrates, in the former place, began to distinguish himself at the head of his mercenary peltasts whom, after their first organization by Konon, he had trained to effective tactics under the strictest discipline, and whose movements he conducted with consummate skill. His genius introduced improvements both in their armor and in their clothing. He lengthened by one half both the light javelin and the short sword, which the Thracian peltasts habitually carried; he devised a species of leggings, known afterwards by the name of Iphikratides; and he thus combined, better than had ever been done before, rapid motion, — power of acting in difficult ground and open order, — effective attack, either by missiles or hand to hand, and dexterous retreat in case of need.<sup>1</sup> As yet, he was but a young officer, in

surprised and held Lechæum, defeating the general body of the confederates who came out from Corinth to retake it. But his narrative of all these circumstances differs materially from that of Xenophon; whom I here follow in preference, making allowance for great partiality, and for much confusion and obscurity.

Xenophon gives us plainly to understand, that Lechæum was *not* captured by the Lacedæmonians until the following year, by Agesilaus and Teleutias.

It is to be recollected that Xenophon had particular means of knowing what was done by Agesilaus, and therefore deserves credit on that head, — always allowing for partiality. Diodorus does not mention Agesilaus in connection with the proceedings at Lechæum.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 44; Cornelius Nepos, Vit. Iphicrat. c. 2, Polyæn. iii, 9, 10.



Compare Rehdantz, *Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei*, c. 2, 7 (Berlin, 1845) — a very useful and instructive publication.

In describing the improvements made by Iphikrates in the armature of his peltasts, I have not exactly copied either Nepos or Diodorus, who both appear to me confused in their statements. You would imagine, in reading their account (and so it has been stated by Weber, *Prolegg. ad Demosth. cont. Aristokr.* p. xxxv., that there were no peltasts in Greece prior to Iphikrates; that he was the first to transform heavy-armed hoplites into light-armed peltasts, and to introduce from Thrace the light shield or *pelta*, not only smaller in size than the round *ἀσπίς* carried by the hoplite, but also without the *ἵνυς* (or surrounding metallic rim of the *ἀσπίς*), seemingly connected by outside bars or spokes of metal with the exterior central knob or projection (*umbo*) which the hoplite pushed before him in close combat. The *pelta*, smaller and lighter than the *ἀσπίς*, was seemingly square or oblong and not round; though it had no *ἵνυς*, it often had thin plates of brass, as we may see by Xenophon, *Anab.* v, 2, 29, so that the explanation of it given in the *Scholia ad Platon. Legg.* vii, p. 813 must be taken with reserve.

But Grecian peltasts existed before the time of Iphikrates (*Xen. Hellen.* i, 2, 1 and elsewhere); he did not first introduce them; he found them already there, and improved their armature. Both Diodorus and Nepos affirm that he lengthened the spears of the peltasts to a measure half as long again as those of the hoplites (or twice as long, if we believe Nepos), and the swords in proportion — “*ἡξήσατο μὲν τὰ δόρατα ἡμισυ μὲν γὰρ — hastæ modum duplicavit.*” Now this I apprehend to be not exact; nor is it true (as Nepos asserts) that the Grecian hoplites carried “short spears” — “*brevibus hastis.*” The spear of the Grecian hoplite was long (though not so long as that of the heavy and compact Macedonian phalanx afterwards became), and it appears to me incredible that Iphikrates should have given to his light and active peltast a spear twice as long, or half as long again, as that of the hoplite. Both Diodorus and Nepos have mistaken by making their comparison with the arms of the hoplite, to which the changes of Iphikrates had no reference. The peltast both before and after Iphikrates did not carry a spear, but a javelin, which he employed as a missile, to hurl, not to thrust; he was essentially an *ἀκοντιστής* or javelin-shooter (See *Xenoph. Hellen.* iv, 5, 14; vi, 1, 9). Of course the javelin might, in case of need, serve to thrust, but this was not its appropriate employment; *e converso*, the spear might be hurled (under advantageous circumstances, from the higher ground against an enemy below — *Xen. Hellen.* ii, 4, 15; v, 4, 52), but its proper employment was, to be held and thrust forward.

What Iphikrates really did, was, to lengthen both the two offensive weapons which the peltast carried, before his time, — the javelin, and the sword. He made the javelin a longer and heavier weapon, requiring a more practised hand to throw — but also competent to inflict more serious wounds, and capable of being used with more deadly effect if the peltast saw an opportunity of coming to close fight or advantageous terms. Pos-

the beginning of his military career.<sup>1</sup> We must therefore presume that these improvements were chiefly of later date, the suggestions of his personal experience; but even now, the successes of his light troops were remarkable. Attacking Phlius, he entrapped the Phliasians into an ambushade, and inflicted on them a defeat so destructive that they were obliged to invoke the aid of a Lacedæmonian garrison for the protection of their city. He gained a victory near Sikyon, and carried his incursions over all Arcadia, to the very gates of the cities; damaging the Arcadian hoplites so severely, that they became afraid to meet him in the field. His own peltasts, however, though full of confidence against these Peloponnesian hoplites, still retained their awe and their reluctance to fight against Lacedæmonians;<sup>2</sup> who, on their side, despised them, but despised their own allies still more. “Our friends fear these peltasts, as children fear hobgoblins,” — said the Lacedæmonians, sarcastically, endeavoring to set the example of courage by ostentatious demonstrations of their own around the walls of Corinth.<sup>3</sup>

The breach made in the Long Walls of Corinth by Praxitas had laid open the road for a Peloponnesian army to march either into Attica or Bœotia.<sup>4</sup> Fortunately for the Athenians, they had

sibly Iphikrates not only lengthened the weapon, but also improved its point and efficacy in other ways; making it more analogous to the formidable Roman *pilum*. Whether he made any alteration in the *pelta* itself, we do not know.

The name *Iphikratides*, given to these new-fashioned leggings or boots, proves to us that Wellington and Blücher are not the first eminent generals who have lent an honorable denomination to boots and shoes.

<sup>1</sup> Justin, vi, 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Xen. Hellen.* iv, 4, 16; *Diodor.* xiv, 91.

Τοὺς μέντοι Λακεδαιμονίους οὕτως αὐτοὶ οἱ πελτασταὶ ἐδίδισαν, ὡς ἐντοῦ ἀκοντισματος οὐ προσήεσαν τοῖς ὀπλίταις, etc.

Compare the sentiment of the light troops in the attack of Sphakteria, when they were awe-struck and afraid at first to approach the Lacedæmonian hoplites — τῇ γνώμῃ δειδωμένοι ὡς ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, etc. (*Thucyd.* iv, 34).

<sup>3</sup> *Xen. Hellen.* iv, 4, 17. ὥστε οἱ μὲν Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ἐπισκώπτειν ἐτόλμων, ὡς οἱ σύμμαχοι φοβοῖντο τοὺς πελταστὰς, ὥσπερ μορῶνας παιδάρια, etc.

This is a camp-jest of the time, which we have to thank Xenophon for preserving.

<sup>4</sup> *Xenoph.* *Agesil.* ii, 17. ἀναπετάσας τῆς Πελοποννήσου τὰς πύλας, etc. Respecting the Long Walls of Corinth, as part of a line of defence.



already completed the rebuilding of their own Long Walls; but they were so much alarmed by the new danger, that they marched with their full force, and with masons and carpenters accompanying,<sup>1</sup> to Corinth. Here, with that celerity of work for which they were distinguished,<sup>2</sup> they in a few days reestablished completely the western wall; the more important of the two, since it formed the barrier against the incursions of the Lacedæmonians from Sikyon. They had then a secure position, and could finish the eastern wall at their leisure; which they accordingly did, and then retired, leaving it to the confederate troops in Corinth to defend.

This advantage, however, — a very material one, — was again overthrown by the expedition of the Lacedæmonian king, Agesilaus, during the same summer. At the head of a full Lacedæmonian and Peloponnesian force, he first marched into the territory of Argos, and there spent some time in ravaging all the cultivated plain. From hence he passed over the mountain-road, by Tenea,<sup>3</sup>

which barred ingress to, or egress from, Peloponnesus, — Colonel Leake remarks, — “The narrative of Xenophon shows the great importance of the Corinthian Long Walls in time of war. They completed a line of fortification from the summit of the Acro-Corinthus to the sea, and thus intercepted the most direct and easy communication from the Isthmus into Peloponnesus. For the rugged mountain, which borders the southern side of the Isthmian plain, has only two passes, — one, by the opening on the eastern side of Acro-Corinthus, which obliged an enemy to pass under the eastern side of Corinth, and was, moreover, defended by a particular kind of fortification, as some remains of walls still testify, — the other, along the shore at Cenchreia, which was also a fortified place in the hands of the Corinthians. Hence the importance of the pass of Cenchreia, in all operations between the Peloponnesians, and an enemy without the Isthmus” (Leake, *Travels in Morea*, vol. iii, ch. xxviii, p. 254).

Compare Plutarch, *Aratus*, c. 16; and the operations of Epaminondas as described by Diodorus, xv, 68.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. *Hellen.* iv, 4, 18. ἐλθόντες πανόημεϊ μετὰ λοδογῶν καὶ τεκτόνων, etc. The word *πανόημεϊ* shows how much they were alarmed.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. vi, 98.

<sup>3</sup> The words stand in the text of Xenophon, — εὐθὺς ἐκείθεν ὑπερβαλὼν κατὰ Τεγέαν εἰς Κόρινθον. A straight march from the Argeian territory to Corinth could not possibly carry Agesilaus by *Tenea*; Kappeler proposes *Τεγέαν*, which I accept, as geographically suitable. I am not certain, however, that it is right; the *Agesilaus* of Xenophon has the words κατὰ τὰ στενά.

About the probable situation of Tenea, see Colonel Leake, *Travels in Morea*, vol. iii, p. 321; also his *Peloponnesiaica*, p. 400.

into the plain of Corinth, to the foot of the newly-repaired Long Walls. Here his brother Teleutias, who had recently superseded Herippidas as admiral in the Corinthian Gulf, came to coöperate with him in a joint attack, by sea and land, on the new walls and on Lechæum.<sup>1</sup> The presence of this naval force rendered the Long Walls difficult to maintain, since troops could be disembarked in the interval between them, where the Sikyonians in the previous battle had been beaten and pursued down to the sea. Agesilaus and Teleutias were strong enough to defeat the joint force of the four confederated armies, and to master not only the Long Walls, but also the port of Lechæum,<sup>2</sup> with its docks, and the ships

<sup>1</sup> Xen. *Hellen.* iv, 4, 19—iv, 8, 10, 11.

It was rather late in the autumn of 393 B.C. that the Lacedæmonian maritime operations in the Corinthian Gulf began, against the fleet recently equipped by the Corinthians out of the funds lent by Pharnabazus. First, the Lacedæmonian Polemarchus was named admiral; he was slain, — and his secretary Pollis, who succeeded to his command, retired afterwards wounded. Next came Herippidas to the command, who was succeeded by Teleutias. Now if we allow to Herippidas a year of command (the ordinary duration of a Lacedæmonian admiral's appointment), and to the other two something less than a year, since their time was brought to an end by accidents, — we shall find that the appointment of Teleutias will fall in the spring or early summer of 391 B.C., the year of this expedition of Agesilaus.

<sup>2</sup> Andokides de Pace, s. 18; Xen. *Hellen.* iv, 4, 19. Παρεγένετο δὲ αὐτῷ (Ἀγησίλαῳ) καὶ ὁ ἀδελφὸς Τελευτίας κατὰ θάλασσαν, ἔχων τριήρεις περὶ δώδεκα· ὥστε μακαρίζεσθαι αὐτῶν τὴν μητέρα, ὅτι τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὧν ἔτεκεν ὁ μὲν κατὰ γῆν τὰ τεῖχη τῶν πολεμίων, ὁ δὲ κατὰ θάλασσαν τὰς ναῦς καὶ τὰ νεώρια ᾗρεκε.

This last passage indicates decidedly that Lechæum was not taken until this joint attack by Agesilaus and Teleutias. And the authority of Xenophon on the point is superior, in my judgment, to that of Diodorus (xiv, 86), who represents Lechæum to have been taken in the year before, on the occasion when the Lacedæmonians were first admitted by treachery within the Long Walls.

The passage from Aristides the rhetor, referred to by Wesseling, Mr. Clinton, and others, only mentions the battle at Lechæum — not the capture of the port. Xenophon also mentions a battle as having taken place close to Lechæum, between the two long walls, on the occasion when Diodorus talks of the capture of Lechæum; so that Aristides is more in harmony with Xenophon than with Diodorus.

A few months prior to this joint attack of Agesilaus and Teleutias, the Athenians had come with an army, and with masons and carpenters, for the



within them; thus breaking up the naval power of Corinth in the Krissæan Gulf. Lechæum now became a permanent post of hostility against Corinth, occupied by a Lacedæmonian garrison, and occasionally by the Corinthian exiles, while any second rebuilding of the Corinthian Long Walls by the Athenians became impossible. After this important success, Agesilaus returned to Sparta. Neither he nor his Lacedæmonian hoplites, especially the Amyklæans, were ever willingly absent from the festival of the Hyakinthia; nor did he now disdain to take his station in the chorus,<sup>1</sup> under the orders of the choric conductor, for the pæan in honor of Apollo.

It was thus that the Long Walls, though rebuilt by the Athenians in the preceding year, were again permanently overthrown, and the road for Lacedæmonian armies to march beyond the isthmus once more laid open. So much were the Athenians and the Bœotians alarmed at this new success, that both appear to have

express purpose of rebuilding the Long Walls which Praxitas had in part broken down. This step would have been both impracticable and useless, if the Lacedæmonians had stood then in possession of Lechæum.

There is one passage of Xenophon, indeed, which looks as if the Lacedæmonians had been in possession of Lechæum before this expedition of the Athenians to reestablish the Long Walls, — *Αὐτοὶ* (the Lacedæmonians) *δ' ἐκ τοῦ Λεχαιίου ὁρμώμενοι σὺν μὲν καὶ τοῖς τῶν Κορινθίων φυγάσι, κύκλῳ περὶ τὸ ἄστυ τῶν Κορινθίων ἐστρατεύοντο* (iv, 4, 17). But whoever reads attentively the sections from 15 to 19 inclusive, will see (I think) that this affirmation may well refer to a period after, and not before, the capture of Lechæum by Agesilaus; for it has reference to the general contempt shown by the Lacedæmonians for the peltasts of Iphikrates, as contrasted with the terror displayed by the Mantineians and others, of these same peltasts. Even if this were otherwise, however, I should still say that the passages which I have produced above from Xenophon show plainly that *he* represents Lechæum to have been captured by Agesilaus and Teletias; and that the other words, *ἐκ τοῦ Λεχαιίου ὁρμώμενοι*, if they really implied anything inconsistent with this, must be regarded as an inaccuracy.

I will add that the chapter of Diodorus, xiv, 86, puts into one year events which cannot all be supposed to have taken place in that same year.

Had Lechæum been in possession and occupation by the Lacedæmonians in the year preceding the joint attack by Agesilaus and Teletias, Xenophon would surely have mentioned it in iv, 4, 14; for it was a more important post than Sikyon, for acting against Corinth.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Agesilaus, ii, 17.

become desirous of peace, and to have sent envoys to Sparta. The Thebans are said to have offered to recognize Orchomenus (which was now occupied by a Lacedæmonian garrison) as autonomous and disconnected from the Bœotian federation; while the Athenian envoys seem to have been favorably received at Sparta, and to have found the Lacedæmonians disposed to make peace on better terms than those which had been proposed during the late discussions with Tiribazus (hereafter to be noticed;) recognizing the newly built Athenian walls, restoring Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros to Athens, and guaranteeing autonomy to each separate city in the Grecian world. The Athenian envoys at Sparta having provisionally accepted these terms, forty days were allowed for reference to the people of Athens; to which place Lacedæmonian envoys were sent as formal bearers of the propositions. The Argæians and Corinthians, however, strenuously opposed the thoughts of peace, urging the Athenians to continue the war; besides which, it appears that many Athenian citizens thought that large restitution ought to have been made of Athenian property forfeited at the end of the late war, and that the Thracian Chersonese ought to have been given back as well as the three islands. On these and other grounds, the Athenian people refused to sanction the recommendation of their envoys; though Andokides, one of those envoys, in a discourse still extant, earnestly advised that they should accept the peace.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Our knowledge of the abortive negotiations adverted to in the text, is derived, partly from the third Oration of Andokides called *de Pace*, — partly from a statement contained in the Argument of that Oration, and purporting to be borrowed from Philochorus — *Φιλόχορος μὲν οὖν λέγει καὶ ἐλθεῖν τοὺς πρέσβεις ἐκ Λακεδαιμόνος, καὶ ἀπράκτους ἀνελθεῖν, μὴ πείσαντος τοῦ Ἀνδοκίδου*.

Whether Philochorus had any additional grounds to rest upon, other than this very oration itself, may appear doubtful. But at any rate, this important fragment (which I do not see noticed among the fragments of Philochorus in M. Didot's collection) counts for some farther evidence as to the reality of the peace proposed and discussed, but not concluded.

Neither Xenophon nor Diodorus make any mention of such mission to Sparta, or discussion at Athens, as that which forms the subject of the Andokidean oration. But on the other hand, neither of them says anything which goes to contradict the reality of the event; nor can we in this case found any strong negative inference on the mere silence of Xenophon, in the case of a pacific proposition which ultimately came to nothing.

If indeed we could be certain that the oration of Andokides was genuine



The war being thus continued, Corinth, though defended by a considerable confederate force, including Athenian hoplites under

it would of itself be sufficient to establish the reality of the mission to which it relates. It would be sufficient evidence, not only without corroboration from Xenophon, but even against any contradictory statement proceeding from Xenophon. But unfortunately, the rhetor Dionysius pronounced this oration to be spurious; which introduces a doubt and throws us upon the investigation of collateral probabilities. I have myself a decided opinion (already stated more than once), that another out of the four orations ascribed to Andokides (I mean the fourth oration, entitled against Alkibiades) is spurious; and I was inclined to the same suspicion with respect to this present oration De Pace; a suspicion which I expressed in a former volume (Vol. V, Ch. xlv, p. 334). But on studying over again with attention this oration De Pace, I find reason to retract my suspicion, and to believe that the oration may be genuine. It has plenty of erroneous allegations as to matter of fact, especially in reference to times prior to the battle of Ægospotami; but not one, so far as I can detect, which conflicts with the situation to which the orator addresses himself, — nor which requires us to pronounce it spurious.

Indeed, in considering this situation (which is the most important point to be studied when we are examining the genuineness of an oration), we find a partial coincidence in Xenophon, which goes to strengthen our affirmative confidence. One point much insisted upon in the oration is, that the Bœotians were anxious to make peace with Sparta, and were willing to relinquish Orchomenus (s. 13–20). Now Xenophon also mentions, three or four months afterwards, the Bœotians as being anxious for peace, and as sending envoys to Agesilaus to ask on what terms it would be granted to them (Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 6). This coincidence is of some value in reference to the authenticity of the oration.

Assuming the oration to be genuine, its date is pretty clearly marked, and is rightly placed by Mr. Fynes Clinton in 391 B. C. It was in the autumn or winter of that year, four years after the commencement of the war in Bœotia which began in 395 B. C. (s. 20). It was after the capture of Lechæum, which took place in the summer of 391 B. C. — and before the destruction of the Lacedæmonian *mora* by Iphikrates, which took place in the spring of 390 B. C. For Andokides emphatically intimates, that at the moment when he spoke, not one military success had yet been obtained against the Lacedæmonians — *καίτοι ποίας τινας ἀν ἐκεῖνοι παρ' ἡμῶν εἰρήνης ἐτυχον, εἰ μίαν μόνον μάχην ἡττήθησαν*; (s. 19). This could never have been said after the destruction of the Lacedæmonian *mora*, which made so profound a sensation throughout Greece, and so greatly altered the temper of the contending parties. And it seems to me one proof (among others) that Mr. Fynes Clinton has not placed correctly the events subsequent to the battle of Corinth, when I observe that he assigns the destruction of the *mora* to the year 392 B. C., a year before the date which he rightly allots to

Kallias, and peltasts under Iphikrates, became much pressed by the hostile posts at Lechæum as well as at Krommyon and Sidus, — and by its own exiles as the most active of all enemies. Still, however, there remained the peninsula and the fortification of Peiræum as an undisturbed shelter for the Corinthian servants and cattle, and a source of subsistence for the city. Peiræum was an inland post north-east of Corinth, in the centre of that peninsula which separates the two innermost recesses of the Krissæan Gulf, — the bay of Lechæum on its south-west, the bay called Alkyonis, between Kreusis and Olmiæ (now Psatho Bay), on its north-east. Across this latter bay Corinth communicated easily, through Peiræum and the fortified port of Cenoë, with Kreusis the port of Thespiæ in Bœotia.<sup>1</sup> The Corinthian exiles now prevailed upon Agesilaus to repeat his invasion of the territory, partly in order that they might deprive the city of the benefits which it derived from Peiræum, — partly in order that they might also appropriate to themselves the honor of celebrating the Isthmian games, which were just approaching. The Spartan king accordingly marched forth, at the head of a force composed of Lacedæmonians and of the Peloponnesian allies, first to Lechæum, and thence to the Isthmus, specially so called; that is, the sacred precinct of Poseidon near Schoenus on the Saronic Gulf, at the narrowest breadth of the Isthmus, where the biennial Isthmian festival was celebrated.

It was the month of April, or beginning of May, and the festival had actually begun, under the presidency of the Corinthians from the city who were in alliance with Argos; a body of Argeians being present as guards.<sup>2</sup> But on the approach of Agesi-

the Andokidean oration. I have placed (though upon other grounds) the destruction of the *mora* in the spring of 390 B. C., which receives additional confirmation from this passage of Andokides.

Both Valekenaer and Sluiter (Lect. Andocid. c. x.) consider the oration of Andokides de Pace as genuine; Taylor and other critics hold the contrary opinion.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Agesil. ii, 18.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 1; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 21.

Xenophon, who writes his history in the style and language of a partisan, says that "the Argeians celebrated the festival, Corinth having now become Argos." But it seems plain that the truth was as I have stated in the text — and that the Argeians stood by (with others of the confederates probably



laus, they immediately retired to the city by the road to Kenchreæ, leaving their sacrifices half-finished. Not thinking fit to disturb their retreat, Agesilaus proceeded first to offer sacrifice himself, and then took a position close at hand, in the sacred ground of Poseidon, while the Corinthian exiles went through the solemnities in due form, and distributed the parsley wreaths to the victors. After remaining three days, Agesilaus marched away to attack Peiræum. He had no sooner departed, than the Corinthians from the city came forth, celebrated the festival and distributed the wreaths a second time.

Peiræum was occupied by so numerous a guard, comprising Iphikrates and his peltasts, that Agesilaus, instead of directly attacking it, resorted to the stratagem of making a sudden retrograde march directly towards Corinth. Probably, many of the citizens were at that moment absent for the second celebration of the festival; so that those remaining within, on hearing of the approach of Agesilaus, apprehended a plot to betray the city to him, and sent in haste to Peiræum to summon back Iphikrates with his peltasts. Having learned that these troops had passed by in the

also) to protect the Corinthians of the city in the exercise of their usual privilege; just as Agesilaus, immediately afterwards, stood by to protect the Corinthian exiles while they were doing the same thing.

The Isthmian games were *triêtêric*, that is, celebrated in every alternate year; in one of the spring months, about April or perhaps the beginning of May (the Greek months being lunar, no one of them would coincide regularly with any one of our calendar months, year after year); and in the second and fourth Olympic years. From Thucydides, viii, 9, 10, we know that this festival was celebrated in April 412 B. C.; that is, towards the end of the fourth year of Olympiad 91, about two or three months before the festival of Olympiad 92.

Dodwell (De Cyclis Diss. vi, 2, just cited), Corsini, (Diss. Agonicæ. iv, 3), and Schneider in his note to this passage of Xenophon, — all state the Isthmian games to have been celebrated in the first and third Olympic years; which is, in my judgment, a mistake. Dodwell erroneously states the Isthmian games mentioned in Thucydides, viii, 9, to have been celebrated at the beginning of Olympiad 92, instead of the fourth quarter of the fourth year of Olympiad 91; a mistake pointed out by Krüger (*ad loc.*) as well as by Poppo and Dr. Arnold; although the argumentation of the latter, founded upon the time of the Lacedæmonian festival of the Hyakinthia, is extremely uncertain. It is a still more strange idea of Dodwell, that the Isthmian games were celebrated at the same time as the Olympic games (Annot. Xenoph. ad ann. 392,

night, Agesilaus forthwith again turned his course and marched back to Peiræum, which he himself approached by the ordinary road, coasting round along the bay of Lechæum, near the Therma, or warm springs, which are still discernible: <sup>1</sup> while he sent a mora or division of troops to get round the place by a mountain-road more in the interior, ascending some woody heights commanding the town, and crowned by a temple of Poseidon.<sup>2</sup> The movement was quite effectual. The garrison and inhabitants of Peiræum, seeing that the place had become indefensible, abandoned it the next day with all their cattle and property, to take refuge in the Heræum, or sacred ground of Hêrê Akraæ near the western cape of the peninsula. While Agesilaus marched thither towards the coast in pursuit of them, the troops descending from the heights attacked and captured CEnoê,<sup>3</sup> — the Corinthian town of that name situated near the Alkyonian bay over against Kreusis in Bœotia. A large booty here fell into their hands, which was still farther augmented by the speedy surrender of all in the Heræum to Agesilaus, without conditions. Called upon to determine the fate of the prisoners, among whom were included men,

<sup>1</sup> See Ulrichs, *Reisen und Forschungen in Griechenland*, chap. i, p. 3. The modern village and port of Lutrâki derives its name from these warm springs, which are quite close to it and close to the sea, at the foot of the mountain of Perachora or Peiræum; on the side of the bay opposite to Lechæum, but near the point where the level ground constituting the Isthmus (properly so-called), ends, — and where the rocky or mountainous region, forming the westernmost portion of Geraneia (or the peninsula of Peiræum), begins. The language of Xenophon, therefore, when he comes to describe the back-march of Agesilaus is perfectly accurate, — ἡδὲ δ' ἐκ πεπερακότος αὐτοῦ τὰ θερμὰ ἐς τὸ πλατὺ τοῦ Λεχαιῶν, etc. (iv, 5, 8).

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 4.

Xenophon here recounts how Agesilaus sent up ten men with fire in pans, to enable those on the heights to make fires and warm themselves; the night being very cold and rainy, the situation very high, and the troops not having come out with blankets or warm covering to protect them. They kindled large fires, and the neighboring temple of Poseidon was accidentally burnt.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 5.

This CEnoê must not be confounded with the Athenian town of that name, which lay on the frontiers of Attica towards Bœotia.

So also the town of Peiræum here noticed must not be confounded with another Peiræum, which was also in the Corinthian territory, but on the Saronic Gulf, and on the frontiers of Epidaurus (Thucyd. viii, 10).



women, and children,—freemen and slaves,—with cattle and other property,—Agesilaus ordered that all those who had taken part in the massacre at Corinth, in the market-place, should be handed over to the vengeance of the exiles; and that all the rest should be sold as slaves.<sup>1</sup> Though he did not here inflict any harder measure than was usual in Grecian warfare, the reader who reflects that this sentence, pronounced by one on the whole more generous than most contemporary commanders, condemned numbers of free Corinthian men and women to a life of degradation, if not of misery,—will understand by contrast the encomiums with which in my last volume I set forth the magnanimity of Kallikratidas after the capture of Methymna; when he refused, in spite of the importunity of his allies, to sell either the Methymnaean or the Athenian captives,—and when he proclaimed the exalted principle, that no free Greek should be sold into slavery by any permission of his.<sup>2</sup>

As the Lacedæmonians had been before masters of Lechæum, Krommyon, and Sidus, this last success shut up Corinth on its other side, and cut off its communication with Bœotia. The city not being in condition to hold out much longer, the exiles already began to lay their plans for surprising it by aid of friends within.<sup>3</sup> So triumphant was the position of Agesilaus, that his enemies were all in alarm, and the Thebans, as well as others, sent fresh envoys to him to solicit peace. His antipathy towards the Thebans was so vehement, that it was a great personal satisfaction to him to see them thus humiliated. He even treated their envoys with marked contempt, affecting not to notice them when they stood close by, though Pharax, the proxenus of Thebes at Sparta, was preparing to introduce them.

Absorbed in this overweening pride and exultation over conquered enemies, Agesilaus was sitting in a round pavilion, on the

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 5-8.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 14. See Vol. VIII, Ch. lxiv, p. 165 of this History. The sale of prisoners here directed by Agesilaus belies the encomiums of his biographers (Xen. Agesil. vii, 6; Cornel. Nep. Agesil. c. 5).

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Agesil. vii, 6; Cornelius Nepos, Ages. c. 5.

The story of Polyænus (iii, 9, 45) may perhaps refer to this point of time. But it is rare that we can verify his anecdotes or those of the other *Tactica* writers. M. Rehdantz strives in vain to find proper places for the sixty three different stratagems which Polyænus ascribes to Iphikrates.

banks of the lake adjoining the Heræum,<sup>1</sup> — with his eyes fixed on the long train of captives brought out under the guard of armed Lacedæmonian hoplites, themselves the object of admiration to a crowd of spectators,<sup>2</sup> — when news arrived, as if under the special intervention of retributive Nemesis, which changed unexpectedly the prospect of affairs.<sup>3</sup> A horseman was seen galloping up, his horse foaming with sweat. To the many inquiries addressed, he returned no answer, nor did he stop until he sprang from his horse at the feet of Agesilaus; to whom, with sorrowful tone and features, he made his communication. Immediately Agesilaus started up, seized his spear, and desired the herald to summon his principal officers. On their coming near, he directed them, together with the guards around, to accompany him without a moment's delay; leaving orders with the general body of the troops to follow as soon as they should have snatched some rapid refreshment. He then immediately put himself in march; but he had not gone far when three fresh horsemen met and informed him, that the task which he was hastening to perform had already been accomplished. Upon this he ordered a halt and returned to the Heræum; where on the ensuing day, to countervail the bad news, he sold all his captives by auction.<sup>4</sup>

This bad news, — the arrival of which has been so graphically

<sup>1</sup> This Lake is now called Lake Vuliasmeni. Considerable ruins were noticed by M. Dutroyat, in the recent French survey, near its western extremity; on which side it adjoins the temple of Hêrê Akreæ, or the Heræum. See M. Boblaye, *Recherches Géographiques sur les Ruines de la Morée*, p. 36; and Colonel Leake's *Peloponnesiaca*, p. 399.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 6.

Τῶν δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων ἀπὸ τῶν δπλων σὺν τοῖς δόρασι παρηκολούθουν φύλακες τῶν αἰχμαλώτων, μάλιστα ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων θεωρούμενοι· οἱ γὰρ εὐτυχ- οῦντες καὶ κρατοῦντες αἰεὶ πως ἀξιούεσθαι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. Ἐπεὶ δὲ καθημένον τοῦ Ἀγησιλάου, καὶ τοῖς ἀγαλλομένῳ τοῖς πεπραγμένοις, ἰππεὺς τις προσήλανε, καὶ μάλιστα ἰσχυρῶς ἰδρῶντι τῷ ἰππῷ· ὑπὸ πολλῶν δὲ ἐρωτώμενος, δτι ἀγγελλοι, οὐδενὶ ἀπεκρίνατο, etc.

It is interesting to mark in Xenophon the mixture of Philo-Laonian complacency, — of philosophical reflection, — and of that care in bringing out the contrast of good fortune, with sudden reverse instantly following upon it, which forms so constant a point of effect with Grecian poets and historians.

<sup>3</sup> *Παραρτηρ. Agesil. c. 22* ἔπαθε δὲ πρᾶγμα νεμεσητόν, etc.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 7-9.



described by Xenophon, himself probably among the bystanders and companions of Agesilaus, — was nothing less than the defeat and destruction of a Lacedæmonian *mora* or military division by the light troops under Iphikrates. As it was an understood privilege of the Amyklæan hoplites in the Lacedæmonian army always to go home, even when on actual service, to the festival of the Hyakinthia, Agesilaus had left all of them at Lechæum. The festival day being now at hand, they set off to return. But the road from Lechæum to Sikyon lay immediately under the walls of Corinth, so that their march was not safe without an escort. Accordingly the polemarch commanding at Lechæum, leaving that place for the time under watch by the Peloponnesian allies, put himself at the head of the Lacedæmonian *mora* which formed the habitual garrison, consisting of six hundred hoplites, and of a *mora* of cavalry (number unknown) — to protect the Amyklæans until they were out of danger from the enemy at Corinth. Having passed by Corinth, and reached a point within about three miles of the friendly town of Sikyon, he thought the danger over, and turned back with his *mora* of hoplites to Lechæum; still, however, leaving the officer of cavalry with orders to accompany the Amyklæans as much farther as they might choose, and afterwards to follow him on the return march.<sup>1</sup>

Though the Amyklæans (probably not very numerous) were presumed to be in danger of attack from Corinth in their march, and though the force in that town was known to be considerable, it never occurred to the Lacedæmonian polemarch that there was any similar danger for his own *mora* of six hundred hoplites; so contemptuous was his estimate of the peltasts, and so strong was the apprehension which these peltasts were known to entertain of the Lacedæmonians. But Iphikrates, who had let the whole body march by undisturbed, when he now saw from the walls of Corinth the six hundred hoplites returning separately, without either cavalry or light troops, conceived the idea, — perhaps, in the existing state of men's minds, no one else would have conceived it, — of attacking them with his peltasts as they repassed near the town. Kallias, the general of the Athenian hoplites in Corinth, warmly seconding the project, marched out his troops, and arrayed them

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 11, 12.

in battle order not far from the gates; while Iphikrates with his peltasts began his attack upon the Lacedæmonian *mora* in flanks and rear. Approaching within missile distance, he poured upon them a shower of darts and arrows, which killed or wounded several, especially on the unshielded side. Upon this the polemarch ordered a halt, directed the youngest soldiers to drive off the assailants, and confided the wounded to the care of attendants to be carried forward to Lechæum.<sup>1</sup> But even the youngest soldiers, encumbered by their heavy shields, could not reach their nimbler enemies, who were trained to recede before them. And when, after an unavailing pursuit, they sought to resume their places in the ranks, the attack was renewed, so that nine or ten of them were slain before they could get back. Again did the polemarch give orders to march forward; again the peltasts renewed their attack, forcing him to halt; again he ordered the younger soldiers (this time, all those between eighteen and thirty-three years of age, whereas on the former occasion, it had been those between eighteen and twenty-eight) to rush out and drive them off.<sup>2</sup> But the result was just the same: the pursuers accomplished nothing, and only suffered increased loss of their bravest and most forward

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 14. Τούτους μὲν ἐκελευον τοὺς ὑπασπιστὰς ἀραμέ-  
νους ἀποφέρειν ἐς Λέχαιον· οὗτοι καὶ μόνοι τῆς μόρας τῇ ἀληθείᾳ  
ἐσώθησαν.

We have here a remarkable expression of Xenophon, — "These were the only men in the *mora* who were really and truly saved." He means, I presume, that they were the only men who were saved without the smallest loss of honor; being carried off wounded from the field of battle, and not having fled or deserted their posts. The others who survived, preserved themselves by flight; and we know that the treatment of those Lacedæmonians who ran away from the field (οἱ τρέσαντες), on their return to Sparta, was insupportably humiliating. See Xenoph. Rep. Laced. ix, 4; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30. We may gather from these words of Xenophon, that a distinction was really made at Sparta between the treatment of these wounded men here carried off, and that of the other survivors of the beaten *mora*.

The ὑπασπισταί, or shield-bearers, were, probably, a certain number of attendants, who habitually carried the shields of the officers (compare Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 39; Anab. iv, 2, 20), persons of importance, and rich hoplites. It seems hardly to be presumed that every hoplite had an ὑπασπιστής, in spite of what we read about the attendant Helots at the battle of Platæa (Herod. ix, 10-29) and in other places.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 15, 16. τὰ δέκα ἀφ' ἧθης — τὰ πεντεκαίδεκα ἀφ' ἧθης



soldiers, when they tried to rejoin the main body. Whenever the Lacedæmonians attempted to make progress, these circumstances were again repeated, to their great loss and discouragement; while the peltasts became every moment more confident and vigorous.

Some relief was now afforded to the distressed *mora* by the coming up of their cavalry, which had finished the escort of the Amyklæans. Had this cavalry been with them at the beginning, the result might have been different; but it was now insufficient to repress the animated assaults of the peltasts. Moreover, the Lacedæmonian horsemen were at no time very good, nor did they on this occasion venture to push their pursuit to a greater range than the younger hoplites could keep up with them. At length, after much loss in killed and wounded, and great distress to all, the polemarch contrived to get his detachment as far as an eminence about a quarter of a mile from the sea and about two miles from Lechæum. Here, while Iphikrates still continued to harass them with his peltasts, Kallias also was marching up with his hoplites to charge them hand to hand, — when the Lacedæmonians, enfeebled in numbers, exhausted in strength, and too much dispirited for close fight with a new enemy, broke and fled in all directions. Some took the road to Lechæum, which place a few of them reached, along with the cavalry; the rest ran towards the sea at the nearest point, and observing that some of their friends were rowing in boats from Lechæum along the shore to rescue them, threw themselves into the sea, to wade or swim towards this new succor. But the active peltasts, irresistible in the pursuit of broken hoplites, put the last hand to the destruction of the unfortunate *mora*. Out of its full muster of six hundred, a very small proportion survived to reënter Lechæum.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 17.

Xenophon affirms the number of slain to have been about two hundred and fifty — *ἐν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς μάχαις καὶ τῇ φυγῇ ἀπέθανον περὶ πεντήκοντα καὶ διακοσίους*. But he had before distinctly stated that the whole *mora* marching back to Lechæum under the polemarch, was six hundred in number — *ὁ μὲν πολέμαρχος σὺν τοῖς ὀπλίταις, οὕσιν ὡς ἑξακοσίους, ἀπῆλθεν ἐπὶ τὸ Λέχαιον* (iv. 5, 12). And it is plain, from several different expressions, that all of them were slain, excepting a very few survivors.

I think it certain, therefore, that one or other of these two numbers is er

The horseman who first communicated the disaster to Agesilaus, had started off express immediately from Lechæum, even before the bodies of the slain had been picked up for burial. The hurried movement of Agesilaus had been dictated by the desire of reaching the field in time to contend for the possession of the bodies, and to escape the shame of soliciting the burial-truce. But the three horsemen who met him afterwards, arrested his course by informing him that the bodies had already been buried, under truce asked and obtained; which authorized Iphikrates to erect his well-earned trophy on the spot where he had first made the attack.<sup>1</sup>

Such a destruction of an entire division of Lacedæmonian hoplites, by light troops who stood in awe of them and whom they despised, was an incident, not indeed of great political importance, but striking in respect of military effect and impression upon the Grecian mind. Nothing at all like it had occurred since the memorable capture of Sphacteria, thirty-five years before; a disaster less considerable in one respect, that the number of hoplites beaten was inferior by one-third, — but far more important in another respect, that half the division had surrendered as prisoners; whereas in the battle near Corinth, though the whole *mora* (except a few fugitives) perished, it does not seem that a single prisoner was taken. Upon the Corinthians, Bœotians, and other enemies of Sparta, the event operated as a joyous encouragement, reviving them out of all their previous despondency. Even by the allies of Sparta, jealous of her superiority and bound to her by fear more than by attachment, it was welcomed with ill-suppressed satisfaction. But upon the army of Agesilaus (and doubtless upon the Lacedæmonians at home) it fell like a sudden thunderbolt, causing the strongest manifestations of sorrow and

roncous; either the original aggregate of six hundred is *above* the truth, — or the total of slain, two hundred and fifty, is *below* the truth. Now the latter supposition appears to me by far the more probable of the two. The Lacedæmonians, habitually secret and misleading in their returns of their own numbers (see Thucyd. v, 74), probably did not choose to admit publicly a greater total of slain than two hundred and fifty. Xenophon has inserted this in his history, forgetting that his own details of the battle refuted the numerical statement. The total of six hundred is more probable, than any smaller number, for the entire *mora*; and it is impossible to assign any reasons why Xenophon should overstate it.

Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 8–10.



sympathy. To these manifestations there was only one exception, — the fathers, brothers, or sons of the slain warriors; who not only showed no sorrow, but strutted about publicly with cheerful and triumphant countenances, like victorious athletes.<sup>1</sup> We shall find the like phenomenon at Sparta a few years subsequently, after the far more terrible defeat at Leuktra; the relatives of the slain were joyous and elate, — those of the survivors, downcast and mortified;<sup>2</sup> a fact strikingly characteristic both of the intense mental effect of the Spartan training, and of the peculiar associations which it generated. We may understand how terrible was the contempt which awaited a Spartan who survived defeat, when we find fathers positively rejoicing that their sons had escaped such treatment by death.

Sorely was Agesilaus requited for his supercilious insult towards the Theban envoys. When he at last consented to see them, after the news of the battle, their tone was completely altered. They said not a word about peace, but merely asked permission to pass through and communicate with their countrymen in Corinth. "I understand your purpose (said Agesilaus, smiling), — you want to witness the triumph of your friends, and see what it is worth. Come along with me, and I will teach you." Accordingly, on the next day, he caused them to accompany him while he marched his army up to the very gates of Corinth, — defying those within to come out and fight. The lands had been so ravaged, that there remained little to destroy. But wherever there were any fruit-trees yet standing, the Lacedæmonians now cut them down. Iphikrates was too prudent to compromise his recent advantage by hazarding a second battle; so that Agesilaus had only the satisfaction of showing that he was master of the field, and then retired to encamp at Lechæum; from whence he sent back the Theban envoys by sea to Kreusis. Having then left a fresh mora or division at Lechæum, in place of that which had been defeated,

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 10. Ἄτε δὲ ἀήθους τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις γεγεννημένης τῆς τοιαύτης συμφορᾶς, πολλὸν πένθος ἦν κατὰ τὸ Λακωνικὸν στρατεύμα, πλὴν δὲ τῶν ἐτέθνασαν ἐν χώρᾳ ἢ υἱοὶ ἢ πατέρες ἢ ἀδελφοί· οὗτοι δὲ, ὥσπερ νικηφόροι, λαμπροὶ καὶ ἀγαλλόμενοι τῷ οἰκείῳ πάθει περιΐεσαν.

If any reader objects to the words which I have used in the text I request him to compare them with the Greek of Xenophon.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 16.

he marched back to Sparta. But the circumstances of the march betrayed his real feelings, thinly disguised by the recent bravado of marching up to the gates of Corinth. He feared to expose his Lacedæmonian troops even to the view of those allies through whose territory he was to pass; so well was he aware that the latter (especially the Mantineians) would manifest their satisfaction at the recent defeat. Accordingly, he commenced his day's march before dawn, and did not halt for the night till after dark; at Mantinea, he not only did not halt at all, but passed by, outside of the walls, before day had broken.<sup>1</sup> There cannot be a more convincing proof of the real dispositions of the allies towards Sparta, and of the sentiment of compulsion which dictated their continued adherence; a fact which we shall see abundantly illustrated as we advance in the stream of the history.

The retirement of Agesilaus was the signal for renewed enterprise on the part of Iphikrates; who retook Sidus and Krommyon, which had been garrisoned by Praxitas, — as well as Peiræum and Cenoë, which had been left under occupation by Agesilaus. Corinth was thus cleared of enemies on its eastern and north-eastern sides. And though the Lacedæmonians still carried on a desultory warfare from Lechæum, yet such was the terror impressed by the late destruction of their mora, that the Corinthian exiles at Sikyon did not venture to march by land from that place to Lechæum, under the walls of Corinth, — but communicated with Lechæum only by sea.<sup>2</sup> In truth, we hear of no farther serious military operations undertaken by Sparta against Corinth, before the peace of Antalkidas. And the place became so secure, that the Corinthian leaders and their Argeian allies were glad to dispense with the presence of Iphikrates. That officer had gained so much glory by his recent successes, which the Athenian orators<sup>3</sup> even in the next generation never ceased to extol, that his temper, naturally haughty, became domineering; and he tried to procure, either for Athens or for himself, the mastery of Corinth, — putting to death some of the philo-Argeian leaders. We know these circumstances only by brief and meagre allusion; but they caused

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 16.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes — περὶ Συντάξεως — c. 8, p. 172.

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<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 19.



the Athenians to recall Iphikrates with a large portion of his pel-  
tasts, and to send Chabrias to Corinth in his place.<sup>1</sup>

It was either in the ensuing summer, — or perhaps immediately afterwards during the same summer, — 390 B. C., that Agesilaus undertook an expedition into Akarnania; at the instance of the Achæans, who threatened, if this were not done, to forsake the Lacedæmonian alliance. They had acquired possession of the Ætolian district of Kalydon, had brought the neighboring villagers into a city residence, and garrisoned it as a dependence of the Achæan confederacy. But the Akarnanians, — allies of Athens as well as Thebes, and aided by an Athenian squadron at Ceniadæ, — attacked them there, probably at the invitation of a portion of the inhabitants, and pressed them so hard, that they employed the most urgent instances to obtain aid from Sparta. Agesilaus crossed the Gulf at Rhium with a considerable force of Spartans and allies, and the full muster of the Achæans. On his arrival the Akarnanians all took refuge in their cities, sending their cattle up into the interior highlands, to the borders of a remote lake. Agesilaus, having sent to Stratus to require them not merely to forbear hostilities against the Achæans, but to relinquish their alliance with Athens and Thebes, and to become allies of Sparta, — found his demands resisted, and began to lay waste the country. Two or three days of operations designedly slack, were employed to lull the Akarnanians into security; after which, by a rapid forced march, Agesilaus suddenly surprised the remote spot in which their cattle and slaves had been deposited for safety. He spent a day here to sell this booty; merchants, probably, accompanying his army. But he had considerable difficulty in his return march, from the narrow paths and high mountains through which he had to thread his way. By a series of brave and well-combined hill-movements, — which, probably, reminded Xenophon of his own operations against the Karduchians in the retreat of the Ten-Thousand, — he defeated and dispersed the Akarnanians, though not without suffering considerably from the excellence of their light troops. Yet he was not successful in his attack upon any

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv. 92; Xen. Hellen. iv. 8, 34.

Aristeides (Panathen. p. 168) boasts that the Athenians were masters of the Aero-Corinthus, and might have kept the city as their own, but that they generously refused to do so.

one of their cities, nor would he consent to prolong the war until seed-time, notwithstanding earnest solicitation from the Achæans, whom he pacified by engaging to return the next spring. He was, indeed, in a difficult and dangerous country, had not his retreat been facilitated by the compliance of the Ætolians; who calculated (though vainly) on obtaining from him the recovery of Naupaktus, then held (as well as Kalydon) by the Achæans.<sup>1</sup> Partial as the success of this expedition had been, however, it inflicted sufficient damage on the Akarnanians to accomplish its purpose. On learning that it was about to be repeated in the ensuing spring, they sent envoys to Sparta to solicit peace; consenting to abstain from hostilities against the Achæans, and to enrol themselves as members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy.<sup>2</sup>

It was in this same year that the Spartan authorities resolved on an expedition against Argos, of which Agesipolis, the other king, took the command. Having found the border sacrifices favorable, and crossed the frontier, he sent forward his army to Phlius, where the Peloponnesian allies were ordered to assemble; but he himself first turned aside to Olympia, to consult the oracle of Zeus.

It had been the practice of the Argeians, seemingly on more than one previous occasion,<sup>3</sup> when an invading Lacedæmonian army was approaching their territory, to meet them by a solemn message, intimating that it was the time of some festival (the Karneian, or other) held sacred by both parties, and warning them not to violate the frontier during the holy truce. This was in point of fact nothing better than a fraud; for the notice was sent, not at the moment when the Karneian festival (or other, as the case might be) ought to come on according to the due course of seasons, but at any time when it might serve the purpose of arresting a Lacedæmonian invasion. But though the duplicity of the Argeians was thus manifest, so strong were the pious scruples of the Spartan king, that he could hardly make up his mind to disregard the warning. Moreover, in the existing confusion of the calendar, there was always room for some uncertainty as to the question,

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv. 73.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv. 6, 1-14; iv. 7, 1.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv. 7, 3. Οἱ δ' Ἀργεῖοι, ἐπεὶ ἐγνώσαν ὅθ' ὀνησόμενοι καὶ λυεῖν, ἐπεμψαν, ὥσπερ εἰώθεσθαι, ἐστεφανωμένους δύο κήρυκας, ὑποφείροντας σπονδάς.



which was the true Karneian moon; no Dorian state having any right to fix it imperatively for the others, as the Eleians fixed the Olympic truce, and the Corinthians the Isthmian. It was with a view to satisfy his conscience on this subject that Agesipolis now went to Olympia, and put the question to the oracle of Zeus,—whether he might with a safe religious conscience refuse to accept the holy truce, if the Argeians should now tender it. The oracle, habitually dexterous in meeting a specific question with a general reply, informed him, that he might with a safe conscience decline a truce demanded wrongfully and for underhand purposes.<sup>1</sup> This

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 2. 'Ο δὲ Ἀγησίπολις — ἐλθὼν εἰς τὴν Ὀλυμπίαν καὶ χρηστηριαζόμενος, ἐπηρώτα τὸν θεὸν, εἰ ὁσίως ἂν ἔχοι αὐτῷ, μὴ δεχομένῳ τὰς σπονδὰς τῶν Ἀργείων· ὅτε οὐχ, ὅποτε καθήκοι ὁ χρόνος ἀλλ' ὅποτε ἐμβάλλειν μέλλοιεν Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τότε ὑπέφερον τοὺς μῆνας. 'Ο δὲ θεὸς ἐπεσήμαινεν αὐτῷ, ὅσιον εἶναι μὴ δεχομένῳ σπονδὰς ἀδίκως ἐπιφερομένας. 'Εκεῖθεν δ' εὐθὺς πορευθεὶς εἰς Δελφοὺς, ἐπήρετο αὐτὸν Ἀπόλλων, εἰ κακείνῳ δοκοίη περὶ τῶν σπονδῶν, καθάπερ τῷ πατρὶ. 'Ο δ' ἀπεκρίνατο, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ ταῦτά.

I have given in the text what I believe to be the meaning of the words ὑποφέρειν τοὺς μῆνας,—upon which Schneider has a long and not very instructive note, adopting an untenable hypothesis of Dodwell, that the Argeians on this occasion appealed to the sanctity of the Isthmian truce; which is not countenanced by anything in Xenophon, and which it belonged to the Corinthians to announce, not to the Argeians. The plural τοὺς μῆνας indicates (as Weiske and Manso understand it) that the Argeians sometimes put forward the name of one festival, sometimes of another. We may be pretty sure that the Karneian festival was one of them; but what the others were, we cannot tell. It is very probable that there were several festivals of common obligation either among all the Dorians, or between Sparta and Argos—πατρώους τινὰς σπονδὰς ἐκ παλαιῶν καθεστῶσας τοῖς Δωριεῦσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους,—to use the language of Pausanias (iii, 5, 6). The language of Xenophon implies that the demand made by the Argeians, for observance of the Holy Truce, was in itself rightful, or rather, that it would have been rightful at a different season; but that they put themselves in the wrong by making it at an improper season and for a fraudulent political purpose.

For some remarks on other fraudulent manœuvres of the Argeians, respecting the season of the Karneian truce, see Vol. VII. of this History Ch. lvi, p. 66. The compound verb ὑποφέρειν τοὺς μῆνας seems to imply the underhand purpose with which the Argeians preferred their demand of the truce. What were the previous occasions on which they had preferred a similar demand, we are not informed. Two years before, Agesilaus had invaded and laid waste Argos; perhaps they may have tried, but without success, to arrest his march by a similar pious fraud.

was accepted by Agesipolis as a satisfactory affirmative. Nevertheless, to make assurance doubly sure, he went directly forward to Delphi, to put the same question to Apollo. As it would have been truly embarrassing, however, if the two holy replies had turned out such as to contradict each other, he availed himself of the *præjudicium* which he had already received at Olympia, and submitted the question to Apollo at Delphi in this form: "Is thine opinion on the question of the holy truce, the same as that of thy father (Zeus)?" "Most decidedly the same," replied the god. Such double warranty, though the appeal was so drawn up as scarcely to leave to Apollo freedom of speech,<sup>1</sup> enabled Agesipolis to return with full confidence to Phlius, where his army was already mustered; and to march immediately into the Argeian territory by the road of Nemea. Being met on the frontier by two heralds with wreaths and in solemn attire, who warned him that it was a season of holy truce, he informed them that the gods authorized his disobedience to their summons, and marched on into the Argeian plain.

It happened that on the first evening after he had crossed the border, the supper and the consequent libation having been just concluded, an earthquake occurred; or, to translate the Greek phrase, "the god (Poseidon) shook." To all Greeks, and to Lacedæmonians especially, this was a solemn event, and the personal companions of Agesipolis immediately began to sing the pæan in honor of Poseidon; the general impression among the soldiers being, that he would give orders for quitting the territory immediately, as Agis had acted in the invasion of Elis a few years be-

It is to this proceeding, perhaps, that Andokides alludes (Or. iii, De Pace, p. 27), where he says that the Argeians, though strenuous in insisting that Athens should help them to carry on the war for the possession of Corinth against the Lacedæmonians, had nevertheless made a separate peace with the latter, covering their own Argeian territory from invasion—αὐτοὶ δ' ἰδίῃ εἰρήνην ποιησάμενοι τὴν χώραν οὐ παρέχουσιν ἐμπολεμεῖν. Of this obscure passage I can give no better explanation.

<sup>1</sup> Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii, 23. Ἡγήσιππος ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐπηρώτα τὸν θεὸν, κεχρημένος πρότερον Ὀλυμπιάσιν, εἰ αὐτῷ ταῦτά δοκεῖ, ἅπερ τῷ πατρὶ, ὡς αἰσχροὺν δὲ τὰ πάντα εἰπεῖν.

A similar story about the manner of putting the question to Apollo at Delphi, after it had already been put to Zeus at Dôdôna, is told about Agesilaus on another occasion (Plutarch, Apophth. Lacon. p. 208 F.).



fore. Perhaps Agesipolis would have done the same here, construing the earthquake as a warning that he had done wrong, in neglecting the summons of the heralds, — had he not been fortified by the recent oracles. He now replied, that if the earthquake had occurred before he crossed the frontier, he should have considered it as a prohibition; but as it came after his crossing, he looked upon it as an encouragement to go forward.

So fully had the Argeians counted on the success of their warning transmitted by the heralds, that they had made little preparation for defence. Their dismay and confusion were very great; their property was still outlying, not yet removed into secure places, so that Agesipolis found much both to destroy and to appropriate. He carried his ravages even to the gates of the city, piquing himself on advancing a little farther than Agesilaus had gone in his invasion two years before. He was at last driven to retreat by the terror of a flash of lightning in his camp, which killed several persons. And a project which he had formed, of erecting a permanent fort on the Argeian frontier, was abandoned in consequence of unfavorable sacrifices.<sup>1</sup>

Besides these transactions in and near the isthmus of Corinth, the war between Sparta and her enemies was prosecuted during the same years both in the islands and on the coast of Asia Minor; though our information is so imperfect that we can scarcely trace the thread of events. The defeat near Knidus (394 B. C.), — the triumphant maritime force of Pharnabazus and Konon at the Isthmus of Corinth in the ensuing year (393 B. C.), — the restoration of the Athenian Long Walls and fortified port, — and the activity of Konon with the fleet among the islands,<sup>2</sup> — so alarmed the

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 7; Pausan. iii, 5, 6.

It rather seems, by the language of these two writers, that they look upon the menacing signs, by which Agesipolis was induced to depart, as marks of some displeasure of the gods against his expedition.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 12. Compare Isokrates, Or. vii, (Areopag.) s. 13. ἀπάσης γὰρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑπὸ τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν ὑποπεσοῦσης καὶ μετὰ τὴν Κόρινθον ναυμαχίαν καὶ μετὰ τὴν Τιμοθέου στρατηγίαν, etc. This oration, however, was composed a long while after the events (about B. C. 353 — see Mr. Clinton's Fast. H., in that year); and Isokrates exaggerates; mistaking the break-up of the Lacedæmonian empire for a resumption of the Athenian. Demosthenes also (cont. Leptin. c. 16, p. 477) confounds the same two ideas and even the Athenian vote of thanks to Konon, perpetuated on a *commemorative*

Spartans with the idea of a second Athenian maritime empire, that they made every effort to detach the Persian force from the side of their enemies.

The Spartan Antalkidas, a dexterous, winning and artful man,<sup>1</sup> not unlike Lysander, was sent as envoy to Tiribazus (392 B. C.); whom we now find as satrap of Ionia in the room of Tithraustes, after having been satrap of Armenia during the retreat of the Ten Thousand. As Tiribazus was newly arrived in Asia Minor, he had not acquired that personal enmity against the Spartans, which the active hostilities of Derkyllidas and Agesilaus had inspired to Pharnabazus and other Persians. Moreover, jealousy between neighboring satraps was an ordinary feeling, which Antalkidas now hoped to turn to the advantage of Sparta. To counteract his projects, envoys were also sent to Tiribazus, by the confederate enemies of Sparta, Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and Argos; and Konon, as the envoy of Athens, was incautiously despatched among the number. On the part of Sparta, Antalkidas offered, first, to abandon to the king of Persia all the Greeks on the continent of Asia; next, as to all the other Greeks, insular as well as continental, he required nothing more than absolute autonomy for each separate city, great and small.<sup>2</sup> The Persian king (he said) could neither desire anything more for himself, nor have any motive for continuing the war against Sparta, when he should once be placed in possession of all the towns on the Asiatic coast, and when he should find both Sparta and Athens rendered incapable of annoying him, through the autonomy and disunion of the Hellenic world. But to neither of the two propositions of Antalkidas would Athens, Thebes, or Argos, accede. As to the first, they repudiated the disgrace of thus formally abandoning the Asiatic Greeks;<sup>3</sup>

commemorative column, countenanced the same impression, — *ἀπὸ τοῦ Κωνόνος ἡ τελευτήσας τοῖς Ἀθηναίων συμμάχοις, etc.*

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 12–14.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiv, 110. He affirms that these cities strongly objected to this concession, five years afterwards, when the peace of Antalkidas was actually concluded; but that they were forced to give up their scruples and accept the peace including the concession, because they had not force to resist Persia and Sparta acting in hearty alliance.

Hence we may infer with certainty, that they also objected to it during the earlier discussions, when it was first broached by Antalkidas; and that their objections to it were in part the cause why the discussions reported in the text broke off without result.



as to the second proposition, guaranteeing autonomy to every distinct city of Greece, they would admit it only under special reserves, which it did not suit the purpose of Antalkidas to grant. In truth the proposition went to break up (and was framed with that view) both the Boeotian confederacy under the presidency of Thebes, and the union between Argos and Corinth; while it also deprived Athens of the chance of recovering Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros,<sup>1</sup> — islands which had been possessed and recognized by her since the first commencement of the confederacy of Delos; indeed the two former, even from the time of Miltiades the conqueror of Marathon.

Here commences a new era in the policy of Sparta. That she should abnegate all pretension to maritime empire, is noway difficult to understand — seeing that it had already been irrevocably overthrown by the defeat of Knidus. Nor can we wonder that she should abandon the Greeks on the Asiatic continent to Persian sway; since this was nothing more than she had already consented to do in her conventions with Tissaphernes and Cyrus during the latter years of the Peloponnesian war,<sup>2</sup> — and consented, let us add, not under any of that stringent necessity which at the same time pressed upon Athens, but simply with a view to the maximum of victory over an enemy already enfeebled. The events which followed the close of that war (recounted in a former chapter) had indeed induced her to alter her determination, and again to espouse their

It is true that Athens, during her desperate struggles in the last years of the Peloponnesian war, had consented to this concession, and even to greater, without doing herself any good (Thucyd. viii, 56). But she was not now placed in circumstances so imperious as to force her to be equally yielding.

Plato, in the *Menexenus* (c. 17, p. 245), asserts that all the allies of Athens — Boeotians, Corinthians, Argeians, etc., were willing to surrender the Asiatic Greeks at the requisition of Artaxerxes; but that the Athenians alone resolutely stood out, and were in consequence left without any allies. The latter part of this assertion, as to the isolation of Athens from her allies, is certainly not true; nor do I believe that the allies took essentially different views from Athens on the point. The *Menexenus*, eloquent and complimentary to Athens, must be followed cautiously as to matters of fact. Plato goes the length of denying that the Athenians subscribed the convention of Antalkidas. Aristides (*Panathen.* p. 172) says that they were forced to subscribe it, because all their allies abandoned them.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. *Hellen.* iv, 8, 15.

<sup>2</sup> See a striking passage in the *Or.* xii, (*Panathen.*) of Isokrates, s. 110.

cause. But the real novelty now first exhibited in her policy, is, the full development of what had before existed in manifest tendency, — hostility against all the partial land-confederacies of Greece, disguised under the plausible demand of universal autonomy for every town, great or small. How this autonomy was construed and carried into act, we shall see hereafter; at present, we have only to note the first proclamation of it by Antalkidas in the name of Sparta.

On this occasion, indeed, his mission came to nothing, from the peremptory opposition of Athens and the others. But he was fortunate enough to gain the approbation and confidence of Tiribazus; who saw so clearly how much both propositions tended to promote the interests and power of Persia, that he resolved to go up in person to court, and prevail on Artaxerxes to act in concert with Sparta. Though not daring to support Antalkidas openly, Tiribazus secretly gave him money to reinforce the Spartan fleet. He at the same time rendered to Sparta the more signal service of arresting and detaining Konon, pretending that the latter was acting contrary to the interests of the king.<sup>1</sup> This arrest was a gross act of perfidy, since Konon not only commanded respect in his character of envoy, — but had been acting with the full confidence, and almost under the orders, of Pharnabazus. But the removal of an officer of so much ability, — the only man who possessed the confidence of Pharnabazus, — was the most fatal of all impediments to the naval renovation of Athens. It was fortunate that Konon had had time to rebuild the Long Walls, before his means of action were thus abruptly intercepted. Respecting his subsequent fate, there exist contradictory stories. According to one, he was put to death by the Persians in prison; according to another, he found means to escape and again took refuge with Evagoras in Cyprus, in which island he afterwards died of sickness.<sup>2</sup> The latter story appears undoubtedly to be the true one. But it is certain that he never afterwards had the means of performing any public service, and that his career was cut short by this treacherous detention, just at the moment when its promise was the most splendid for his country.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. *Hellen.* iv, 8, 16; Diodor. xiv, 85.

<sup>2</sup> Lysias, *Or.* xix, (*De Bon. Aristoph.*) s. 41, 42, 44; Cornelius Nepos, *Konon*, c. 5; Isokrates, *Or.* iv (*Panegy.*) s. 180.



Tiribazus, on going up to the Persian court, seems to have been detained there for the purpose of concerting measures against Evagoras, prince of Salamis in Cyprus, whose revolt from Persia was now on the point of breaking out. But the Persian court could not yet be prevailed upon to show any countenance to the propositions of Sparta or of Antalkidas. On the contrary, Struthas, who was sent down to Ionia as temporary substitute for Tiribazus, full of anxiety to avenge the ravages of Agesilaus, acted with vigorous hostility against the Lacedæmonians, and manifested friendly dispositions towards Athens.

Thimbron (of whom we have before heard as first taking the command of the Cyreian army in Asia Minor, after their return from Thrace) received orders again to act as head of the Lacedæmonian forces in Asia against Struthas. The new commander, with an army estimated by Diodorus at eight thousand men,<sup>1</sup> marched from Ephesus into the interior, and began his devastation of the territory dependent on Persia. But his previous command, though he was personally amiable,<sup>2</sup> had been irregular and disorderly, and it was soon observed that the same defects were now yet more prominent, aggravated by too liberal indulgence in convivial pleasures. Aware of his rash, contemptuous, and improvident mode of attack, Struthas laid a snare for him by sending a detachment of cavalry to menace the camp, just when Thimbron had concluded his morning meal in company with the flute-player Thersander,—the latter not merely an excellent musician, but possessed of a full measure of Spartan courage. Starting from his tent at the news, Thimbron, with Thersander, waited only to collect the few troops immediately at hand, without even leaving any orders for the remainder, and hastened to repel the assailants; who gave way easily, and seduced him into a pursuit. Presently Struthas himself, appearing with a numerous and well-arrayed body of cavalry, charged with vigor the disorderly detachment of Thimbron. Both that general and Thersander, bravely fighting, fell among the first; while the army, deprived of their commander

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 99.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 22. Ἦν δὲ οὗτος ἀνὴρ (Diphridas) εὐχαρις τῷ οὐχ ἥττον τοῦ Θίμβρωνος, μᾶλλον τε συνεταγμένος, καὶ ἐγχειρητικώτερος, στρατηγός. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκράτουν αὐτοῦ αἱ τοῦ σώματος ἡδοναὶ. ἀλλὰ καὶ, πρὸς τὴν εὐρίαν, ταῦτα ἐπραττεν.

as well as ill-prepared for a battle, made but an ineffective resistance. They were broken, warmly pursued, and the greater number slain. A few who contrived to escape the active Persian cavalry, found shelter in the neighboring cities.<sup>1</sup>

This victory of Struthas, gained by the Persian cavalry, displays a degree of vigor and ability which, fortunately for the Greeks, was rarely seen in Persian operations. Our scanty information does not enable us to trace its consequences. We find Diphridas sent out soon after by the Lacedæmonians, along with the admiral Ekdikus, as successor of Thimbron to bring together the remnant of the defeated army, and to protect those cities which had contributed to form it. Diphridas,—a man with all the popular qualities of his predecessor, but a better and more careful officer,—is said to have succeeded to some extent in this difficult mission. Being fortunate enough to take captive the son-in-law of Struthas, with his wife, (as Xenophon had captured Asidatês,) he obtained a sufficiently large ransom to enable him to pay his troops for some time.<sup>2</sup> But it is evident that his achievements were not considerable, and that the Ionian Greeks on the continent are now left to make good their position, as they can, against the satrap at Sardis.

The forces of Sparta were much required at Rhodes; which island (as has been mentioned already) had revolted from Sparta about five years before (a few months anterior to the battle of Knidus), dispossessed the Lysandrian oligarchy, and established a democratical government. But since that period, an opposition-party in the island had gradually risen up, acquired strength, and come into correspondence with the oligarchical exiles; who on their side warmly solicited aid from Sparta, representing that Rhodes would otherwise become thoroughly dependent on Athens. Accordingly, the Lacedæmonians sent eight triremes across the Ægean under the command of Ekdikus; the first of their ships of war which had crossed since the defeat of Knidus.<sup>3</sup> Though the Perso-Athenian naval force in the Ægean had been either dismissed or paralyzed since the seizure of Konon, yet the Rhodian government possessed a fleet of about twenty triremes, besides considerable force of other kinds; so that Ekdikus could not even land on the

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 18, 19.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 21.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 21.

island, but was compelled to halt at Knidus. Fortunately, Teleutias the Lacedæmonian was now in the Corinthian Gulf with a fleet of twelve triremes, which were no longer required there; since Agesilaus and he had captured Lechæum a few months before, and destroyed the maritime force of the Corinthians in those waters. He was now directed to sail with his squadron out of the Corinthian Gulf across to Asia, to supersede Ekdikus, and take the command of the whole fleet for operations off Rhodes. On passing by Samos, he persuaded the inhabitants to embrace the cause of Sparta, and to furnish him with a few ships; after which he went onward to Knidus, where, superseding Ekdikus, he found himself at the head of twenty-seven triremes.<sup>1</sup> In his way from Knidus to Rhodes, he accidentally fell in with the Athenian admiral Philokrates, conducting ten triremes to Cyprus to the aid of Evagoras in his struggle against the Persians. He was fortunate enough to carry them all as prisoners into Knidus, where he sold the whole booty, and then proceeded with his fleet, thus augmented to thirty-seven sail, to Rhodes. Here he established a fortified post, enabling the oligarchical party to carry on an active civil war. But he was defeated in a battle, — his enemies being decidedly the stronger force in the island, and masters of all the cities.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 23.

Diodorus (xiv, 97) agrees in this number of twenty-seven triremes, and in the fact of aid having been obtained from Samos, which island was persuaded to detach itself from Athens. But he recounts the circumstances in a very different manner. He represents the oligarchical party in Rhodes as having risen in insurrection, and become masters of the island; he does not name Teleutias, but Eudokimus (Ekdikus?), Diphilus (Diphridas?), and Philodikus, as commanders.

The statement of Xenophon deserves the greater credence, in my judgment. His means of information, as well as his interest, about Teleutias (the brother of Agesilaus) were considerable.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 24–26.

Although the three ancient Rhodian cities (Lindus, Ialysus, and Kamiros) had coalesced (see Diodor. xiii, 75) a few years before into the great city of Rhodes, afterwards so powerful and celebrated, — yet they still continued to exist, and apparently as fortified places. For Xenophon speaks of the democrats in Rhodes as τὰς τε πόλεις ἔχοντας, etc.

Whether the Philokrates here named as *Philokrates son of Ephialtes*, is the same person as the Philokrates accused in the Thirtieth oration of Ly-

The alliance with Evagoras of Cyprus, in his contention against Artaxerxes, was at this moment an unfortunate and perplexing circumstance for Athens, since she was relying upon Persian aid against Sparta, and since Sparta was bidding against her for it. But the alliance was one which she could not lightly throw off. For Evagoras had not only harbored Konon with the remnant of the Athenian fleet after the disaster of Ægospotami, but had earned a grant of citizenship and the honor of a statue at Athens, as a strenuous auxiliary in procuring that Persian aid which gained the battle of Knidus, and as a personal combatant in that battle, before the commencement of his dissension with Artaxerxes.<sup>1</sup> It would have been every way advantageous to Athens at this moment to decline assisting Evagoras, since (not to mention the probability of offending the Persian court) she had more than enough to employ all her maritime force nearer home and for purposes more essential to herself. Yet in spite of these very serious considerations of prudence, the paramount feelings of prior obligation and gratitude, enforced by influential citizens who had formed connections in Cyprus, determined the Athenians to identify themselves with his gallant struggles<sup>2</sup> (of which I shall speak more fully presently). So little was fickleness, or instability, or the easy oblivion of past feelings, a part of their real nature, — though historians have commonly denounced it as among their prominent qualities.

The capture of their squadron under Philokrates, however, and the consequent increase of the Lacedæmonian naval force at Rhodes, compelled the Athenians to postpone further aid to Evagoras, and to arm forty triremes under Thrasybulus for the Asiatic coast; no inconsiderable effort, when we recollect that four years before there was scarcely a single trireme in Peiræus, and not even a wall of defence around the place. Though sent immediately for the assistance of Rhodes, Thrasybulus judged it expedient to go

sias — cannot be certainly made out. It is possible enough that there might be two contemporary Athenians bearing this name, which would explain the circumstance that Xenophon here names the father Ephialtes — a practice occasional with him, but not common.

<sup>1</sup> Isokrates, Or. ix (Evagoras) s. 67, 68, 82; Epistola Philippi ap. Demosthen. Orot. p. 161, c. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Lysias, Orat. xix, (De Bonis Aristoph.) s. 27–44.



first to the Hellespont; probably from extreme want of money to pay his men. Derkyllidas was still in occupation of Abydos, yet there was no Lacedæmonian fleet in the strait; so that Thrasybulus was enabled to extend the alliances of Athens both on the European and the Asiatic side, — the latter being under the friendly satrap, Pharnabazus. Reconciling the two Thracian princes, Seuthes and Amadokus, whom he found at war, he brought both of them into amicable relations with Athens, and then moved forward to Byzantium. That city was already in alliance with Athens; but on the arrival of Thrasybulus, the alliance was still further cemented by the change of its government into a democracy. Having established friendship with the opposite city of Chalkedon, and being thus master of the Bosphorus, he sold the tithe of the commercial ships sailing out of the Euxine; <sup>1</sup> leaving doubtless an adequate force to exact it. This was a striking evidence of revived Athenian maritime power, which seems also to have been now extended more or less to Samothrace, Thasus, and the coast of Thrace.<sup>2</sup>

From Byzantium, Thrasybulus sailed to Mitylênê, which was already in friendship with Athens, — though Methymna and the other cities in the island were still maintained by a force under the Lacedæmonian harmost, Therimachus. With the aid of the Mitylenæans, and of the exiles from other Lesbian cities, Thrasybulus marched to the borders of Methymna, where he was met by Therimachus; who had also brought together his utmost force, but was now completely defeated and slain. The Athenians thus became masters of Antissa and Eresus, where they were enabled to levy a valuable contribution, as well as to plunder the refractory territory of Methymna. Nevertheless, Thrasybulus, in spite of farther help from Chios and Mitylênê, still thought himself not in a situation to go to Rhodes with advantage. Perhaps he was not sure of pay in advance, and the presence of unpaid troops in an

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 25–27.

Polybius (iv, 38–47) gives instructive remarks and information about the importance of Byzantium and its very peculiar position, in the ancient world, — as well as about the dues charged on the merchant vessels going into, or coming out of, the Euxine, — and the manner in which these dues pressed upon general trade.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 7.

exhausted island might be a doubtful benefit. Accordingly, he sailed from Lesbos along the western and southern coast of Asia Minor, levying contributions at Halikarnassus <sup>1</sup> and other places, until he came to Aspendus in Pamphylia; where he also obtained money and was about to depart with it, when some misdeeds committed by his soldiers so exasperated the inhabitants, that they attacked him by night unprepared in his tent, and slew him.<sup>2</sup>

Thus perished the citizen to whom, more than to any one else, Athens owed not only her renovated democracy, but its wise, generous, and harmonious working, after renovation. Even the philo-Laconian and oligarchical Xenophon bestows upon him a marked and unaffected eulogy.<sup>3</sup> His devoted patriotism in commencing and prosecuting the struggle against the Thirty, at a time when they not only were at the height of their power, but had plausible ground for calculating on the full auxiliary strength of Sparta, deserves high admiration. But the feature which stands yet more eminent in his character, — a feature infinitely rare in the Grecian character, generally, — is, that the energy of a successful leader was combined with complete absence both of vindictive antipathies for the past, and of overbearing ambition for himself. Content to live himself as a simple citizen under the restored democracy, he taught his countrymen to forgive an oligarchical party from whom they had suffered atrocious wrongs, and set the example himself of acquiescing, in the loss of his own large property. The generosity of such a proceeding ought not to count for less, because it was at the same time dictated by the highest political prudence. We find in an oration of Lysias against Ergokles (a citizen who served in the Athenian fleet on this last expedition), in which the latter is accused of gross peculation, — insinuations against Thrasybulus, of having countenanced the delinquency, though coupled with praise of his general character. Even the words as they now stand are so vague as to carry little evidence; but when we re-

<sup>1</sup> Lysias, Or. xxviii, cont. Erg. s. 1–20.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 28–30; Diodor. xiv, 94.

The latter states that Thrasybulus lost twenty-three triremes by a storm near Lesbos, — which Xenophon does not notice, and which seems improbable.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 31. Καὶ Θρασύβουλος μὲν δὴ, μάλα δοκῶν ἀνὴρ ἐξαθῶς εἶναι, οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν.



reflect that the oration was spoken after the death of Thrasybulus, they are entitled to no weight at all.<sup>1</sup>

The Athenians sent Agyrrhius to succeed Thrasybulus. After the death of the latter, we may conclude that the fleet went to Rhodes, its original destination, — though Xenophon does not expressly say so, — the rather, as neither Teleutias nor any subsequent Lacedæmonian commander appears to have become master of the island, in spite of the considerable force which they had there assembled.<sup>2</sup> The Lacedæmonians, however, on their side, being also much in want of money, Teleutias was obliged (in the same manner as the Athenians), to move from island to island, levying contributions as he could.<sup>3</sup>

When the news of the successful proceedings of Thrasybulus at Byzantium and the Hellespont, again establishing a toll for the profit of Athens, reached Sparta, it excited so much anxiety, that Anaxibius, having great influence with the ephors of the time, prevailed on them to send him out as harmost to Abydos, in the room of Derkyllidas, who had now been in that post for several years. Having been the officer originally employed to procure the

<sup>1</sup> Lysias, cont. Ergo. Or. xxviii, s. 9.

Ergokles is charged in this oration with gross abuse of power, oppression towards allies and citizens of Athens, and peculation for his own profit, during the course of the expedition of Thrasybulus; who is indirectly accused of conniving at such misconduct. It appears that the Athenians, as soon as they were informed that Thrasybulus had established the toll in the Bosphorus, passed a decree that an account should be sent home of all moneys exacted from the various cities, and that the colleagues of Thrasybulus should come home to go through the audit (s. 5); implying (so far as we can understand what is thus briefly noticed) that Thrasybulus himself should not be obliged to come home, but might stay on his Hellespontine or Asiatic command. Ergokles, however, probably one of these colleagues, resented this decree as an insult, and advised Thrasybulus to seize Byzantium, to retain the fleet, and to marry the daughter of the Thracian prince Seuthês. It is also affirmed in the oration that the fleet had come home in very bad condition (s. 2-4), and that the money, levied with so much criminal abuse, had been either squandered or fraudulently appropriated.

We learn from another oration that Ergokles was condemned to death. His property was confiscated, and was said to amount to thirty talents, though he had been poor before the expedition; but nothing like that amount was discovered after the sentence of confiscation (Lysias, Or. xxx, cont. Philokrat. s. 3).

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8 31.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 2.

revolt of the place from Athens (in 411 B. C.),<sup>1</sup> Derkyllidas had since rendered service not less essential in preserving it to Sparta, during the extensive desertion which followed the battle of Knidus. But it was supposed that he ought to have checked the aggressive plans of Thrasybulus; moreover, Anaxibius promised, if a small force were entrusted to him, to put down effectually the newly-revived Athenian influence. He was supposed to know well, those regions in which he had once already been admiral, at the moment when Xenophon and the Cyreian army first returned; the harshness, treachery, and corruption, which he displayed in his dealing with that gallant body of men, have been already recounted in a former chapter.<sup>2</sup> With three triremes, and funds for the pay of a thousand mercenary troops, Anaxibius accordingly went to Abydos. He began his operations with considerable vigor, both against Athens and Pharnabazus. While he armed a land-force, which he employed in making incursions on the neighboring cities in the territory of that satrap, — he at the same time reinforced his little squadron by three triremes out of the harbor of Abydos, so that he became strong enough to seize the merchant vessels passing along the Hellespont to Athens or to her allies.<sup>3</sup> The force which Thrasybulus had left at Byzantium to secure the strait revenues, was thus inadequate to its object without farther addition.

Fortunately, Iphikrates was at this moment disengaged at Athens, having recently returned from Corinth with his body of peltasts, for whom doubtless employment was wanted. He was accordingly sent with twelve hundred peltasts and eight triremes, to combat Anaxibius in the Hellespont; which now became again the scene of conflict, as it had been in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war; the Athenians from the European side, the Lacedæmonians from the Asiatic. At first the warfare consisted of desultory privateering, and money-levying excursions, on both sides.<sup>4</sup> But at length, the watchful genius of Iphikrates discov-

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. viii, 61; compare Xenoph. Anab. v, 6, 24.

<sup>2</sup> See above, Chapter lxxi, p. 156 of the present volume.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 32, 83.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 35, 36. τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ληστὰς διαπέμποντες ἐπολέ-  
μουν ἄλλήλοις. . . . . Ὅπως δοκοῖη, ὥσπερ εἰώθει, ἐπ' ἀργυρολογίαν ἐπε-  
βαπεπλευνέσθαι.



red opportunity for a successful stratagem. Anaxibius, having just drawn the town of Antandrus into his alliance, had marched thither for the purpose of leaving a garrison in it, with his Lacedæmonian and mercenary forces, as well as two hundred hoplites from Abydos itself. His way lay across the mountainous region of Ida, southward to the coast of the gulf of Adramyttium. Accordingly, Iphikrates, foreseeing that he would speedily return, crossed over in the night from the Chersonese, and planted himself in ambush on the line of return march; at a point where it traversed the desert and mountainous extremities of the Abydene territory, near the gold mines of Kremastê. The triremes which carried him across were ordered to sail up the strait on the next day, in order that Anaxibius must be apprised of it, and might suppose Iphikrates to be employed on his ordinary money-levying excursion.

The stratagem was completely successful. Anaxibius returned on the next day, without the least suspicion of any enemy at hand, marching in careless order and with long-stretched files, as well from the narrowness of the mountain path as from the circumstance that he was in the friendly territory of Abydos. Not expecting to fight, he had unfortunately either omitted the morning sacrifice, or taken no pains to ascertain that the victims were favorable; so Xenophon informs us,<sup>1</sup> with that constant regard to the divine judgments and divine warnings which pervades both the Hellenica and the Anabasis. Iphikrates having suffered the Abydenes who were in the van to pass, suddenly sprang from his ambush, to assault Anaxibius with the Lacedæmonians and the mercenaries, as they descended the mountain-pass into the plain of Kremastê. His appearance struck terror and confusion into the whole army; unprepared in its disorderly array for steadfast resistance,—even if the minds of the soldiers had been ever so well strung,—against well-trained peltasts, who were sure to prevail over hoplites not in steady rank. To Anaxibius himself, the truth stood plain at once. Defeat was inevitable, and there remained no other resource for him except to die like a brave man.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 36. 'Ο Ἀναξίβιος ἀπεπορεύετο, ὡς μὲν ἐλεγετο, οὐδὲ τῶν ἱερῶν γεγεννημένων αὐτῷ ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ἀλλὰ καταφρονήσας, ὅτι διὰ φιλίας τε ἐπιπρεύετο καὶ ἐς πόλιν φιλίαν, καὶ ὅτι ἦκουε τῶν ἀπαντῶντων, τὸν Ἰφικράτην ἀναπεπλευκέναι τὴν ἐπὶ Προικοννήσου, ἀμελέσσειν ἐπορεύετο.

Accordingly, desiring his shield-bearer to hand to him his shield, he said to those around him, — "Friends, my honor commands me to die here; but do you hasten away, and save yourselves, before the enemy close with us." Such order was hardly required to determine his panic-stricken troops, who fled with one accord towards Abydos; while Anaxibius himself awaited firmly the approach of the enemy, and fell gallantly fighting on the spot. No less than twelve Spartan harmosts, those who had been expelled from their various governments by the defeat of Knidus, and who had remained ever since under Derkyllidas at Abydos, stood with the like courage and shared his fate. Such disdain of life hardly surprises us in conspicuous Spartan citizens, to whom preservation by flight was "no true preservation" (in the language of Xenophon),<sup>1</sup> but simply prolongation of life under intolerable disgrace at home. But what deserves greater remark is, that the youth to whom Anaxibius was tenderly attached and who was his constant companion, could not endure to leave him, stayed fighting by his side, and perished by the same honorable death.<sup>2</sup> So strong was the mutual devotion which this relation between persons of the male sex inspired in the ancient Greek mind. With these exceptions, no one else made any attempt to stand. All fled, and were pursued by Iphikrates as far as the gates of Abydos, with the slaughter of fifty out of the two hundred Abydene hoplites, and two hundred of the remaining troops.

This well-planned and successful exploit, while it added to the reputation of Iphikrates, rendered the Athenians again masters of the Bosphorus and the Hellespont, ensuring both the levy of the dues and the transit of their trading vessels. But while the Athenians were thus carrying on naval war at Rhodes and the Hellespont, they began to experience annoyance nearer home, from Ægina.

That island (within sight as the eyesore of Peiræus, as Perikles was wont to call it) had been occupied fifty years before by a population eminently hostile to Athens, afterwards conquered and

<sup>1</sup> See the remarks a few pages back, upon the defeat and destruction of the Lacedæmonian mora by Iphikrates, near Lechæum, page 350.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 39. Καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ μέντοι αὐτῷ παρέμεινε, καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ τῶν συνεληλυθότων ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἀρμολήρων ὡς δώδεκα μαχομένοι συναπέθανον· οἱ δ' ἄλλοι φεύγοντες ἐπίπτον.



expelled by her, — at last again captured in the new abode which they had obtained in Laconia, — and put to death by her order. During the Peloponnesian war, Ægina had been tenanted by Athenian citizens as outsettlers or kleruchs; all of whom had been driven in after the battle of Ægospotami. The island was then restored by Lysander to the remnant of the former population, — as many of them at least as he could find.

These new Æginetans, though doubtless animated by associations highly unfavorable to Athens, had nevertheless remained not only at peace, but also in reciprocal commerce, with her, until a considerable time after the battle of Knidus and the rebuilding of her Long Walls. And so they would have continued, of their own accord, — since they could gain but little, and were likely to lose all the security of their traffic, by her hostility, — had they not been forced to commence the war by Eteonikus, the Lacedæmonian harmost in the island;<sup>1</sup> one amidst many examples of the manner in which the smaller Grecian states were dragged into war, without any motive of their own, by the ambition of the greater, — by Sparta as well as by Athens.<sup>2</sup> With the concurrence of the ephors, Eteonikus authorized and encouraged all Æginetans to fit out privateers for depredation on Attica; which aggression the

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 1. ὧν δὲ πάλιν ὁ Ἐτεόνικος ἐν τῇ Αἰγίνῃ, καὶ ἐπιμίστρια χρωμένων τὸν πρόσθεν χρόνον τῶν Αἰγινητῶν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἐπεὶ φανερώς κατὰ θάλατταν ἐπολεμεῖτο ὁ πόλεμος, ξυνδόξαν καὶ τοῖς ἐφόροις, ἵκησι ληΐζεσθαι τὸν βουλόμενον ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς.

The meaning of the word πάλιν here is not easy to determine, since (as Schneider remarks) not a word had been said before about the presence of Eteonikus at Ægina. Perhaps we may explain it by supposing that Eteonikus found the Æginetans reluctant to engage in the war, and that he did not like to involve them in it without first going to Sparta to consult the ephors. It was on coming back to Ægina (πάλιν) from Sparta, after having obtained the consent of the ephors (ξυνδόξαν καὶ τοῖς ἐφόροις), that he issued the letters of marque.

Schneider's note explains τὸν πρόσθεν χρόνον incorrectly, in my judgment.

Compare Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 8; Thucyd. iii, 13. The old Æginetan antipathy against Athens, when thus again instigated, continued for a considerable time. A year or two afterwards, when the philosopher Plato was taken to Ægina to be sold as a slave, it was death to any Athenian to land in the island (Aristides, Or. xlv, p. 384, p. 306 Dindorf, Diogenes Laert. ii, 19 Plutarch. Dion. c. 5).

Athenians resented, after suffering considerable inconvenience by sending a force of ten triremes to block up Ægina from the sea, with a body of hoplites under Pamphilus to construct and occupy a permanent fort in the island. This squadron, however, was soon driven off (though Pamphilus still continued to occupy the fort) by Teleutias, who came to Ægina on hearing of the blockade; having been engaged, with the fleet which he commanded at Rhodes, in an expedition among the Cyclades, for the purpose of levying contributions. He seems to have been now at the term of his year of command, and while he was at Ægina, his successor, Hierax, arrived from Sparta, on his way to Rhodes, to supersede him. The fleet was, accordingly, handed over to Hierax at Ægina, while Teleutias went directly home to Sparta. So remarkable was his popularity among the seamen, that numbers of them accompanied him down to the water-edge, testifying their regret and attachment by crowning him with wreaths, or pressing his hand. Some, who came down too late, when he was already under weigh, cast their wreaths on the sea, uttering prayers for his health and happiness.<sup>1</sup>

Hierax, while carrying back to Rhodes the remaining fleet which Teleutias had brought from that island, left his subordinate Gorgôpas as harmost at Ægina with twelve triremes; a force which protected the island completely, and caused the fortified post occu-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 3. Ὁ δὲ Τελευτίας, μακαριώτατα δὲ ἀπέπλευσεν οἰκάδε, etc.

This description of the scene at the departure of Teleutias (for whom, as well as for his brother Agesilaus, Xenophon always manifests a marked sympathy) is extremely interesting. The reflection, too, with which Xenophon follows it up, deserves notice, — "I know well that in these incidents I am not recounting any outlay of money, or danger incurred, or memorable stratagem. But by Zeus, it does seem to me worth a man's while to reflect, by what sort of conduct Teleutias created such dispositions in his soldiers. This is a true man's achievement, more precious than any outlay or any danger."

What Xenophon here glances at in the case of Teleutias, is the scheme worked out in detail in the romance of the Cyropædia (τὸ ἐθελοντῶν ἄρχειν — the exercising command in such manner as to have willing and obedient subjects) — and touched upon indirectly in various of his other compositions, — the Hiero, the Œconomicus, and portions of the Memorabilia. The idéal of government, as it presented itself to Xenophon, was the paternal despotism, or something like it.



pied by the Athenians under Pamphilus to be itself blocked up, insomuch that after an interval of four months, a special decree was passed at Athens to send a numerous squadron and fetch away the garrison. As the Æginetan privateers, aided by the squadron of Gorgôpas, now recommenced their annoyances against Attica, thirteen Athenian triremes were put in equipment under Eunomus as a guard-squadron against Ægina. But Gorgôpas and his squadron were now for the time withdrawn, to escort Antalkidas, the new Lacedæmonian admiral sent to Asia chiefly for the purpose of again negotiating with Tiribazus. On returning back, after landing Antalkidas at Ephesus, Gorgôpas fell in with Eunomus, whose pursuit, however, he escaped, landing at Ægina just before sunset. The Athenian admiral, after watching for a short time until he saw the Lacedæmonian seamen out of their vessels and ashore, departed as it grew dark to Attica, carrying a light to prevent his ships from parting company. But Gorgôpas, causing his men to take a hasty meal, immediately reëmbarked and pursued; keeping on the track by means of the light, and taking care not to betray himself either by the noise of oars or by the chant of the Keleustês. Eunomus had no suspicion of the accompanying enemy. Just after he had touched land near cape Zostêr in Attica, when his men were in the act of disembarking, Gorgôpas gave signal by trumpet to attack. After a short action by moonlight, four of the Athenian squadrons were captured, and carried off to Ægina; with the remainder, Eunomus escaped to Peiræus.<sup>1</sup>

This victory, rendering both Gorgôpas and the Æginetans confident, laid them open to a stratagem skilfully planned by the Athenian Chabrias. That officer, who seems to have been dismissed from Corinth as Iphikrates had been before him, was now about to conduct a force of ten triremes and eight hundred peltasts to the aid of Evagoras; to whom the Athenians were thus paying their debt of gratitude, though they could ill-spare any of their forces from home. Chabrias, passing over from Peiræus at night, landed without being perceived in a desert place of the coast of Ægina, and planted himself in ambush with his peltasts at some little distance inland of the Herakleion or temple of Herakles, amidst hollow ground suitable for concealment. He had before

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 6-10.

made agreement with another squadron and a body of hoplites under Demænetus; who arrived at daybreak and landed at Ægina at a point called Tripyrgia, about two miles distant from the Herakleion, but farther removed from the city. As soon as their arrival became known, Gorgôpas hastened out of the city to repel them, with all the troops he could collect, Æginetans as well as marines out of the ships of war, — and eight Spartans who happened to be his companions in the island. In their march from the city to attack the new comers, they had to pass near the Herakleion, and therefore near the troops in ambush; who, as soon as Gorgôpas and those about him had gone by, rose up suddenly and attacked them in the rear. The stratagem succeeded not less completely than that of Iphikrates at Abydos against Anaxibius. Gorgôpas and the Spartans near him were slain, the rest were defeated, and compelled to flee with considerable loss back to the city.<sup>1</sup>

After this brilliant success, Chabrias pursued his voyage to Cyprus, and matters appeared so secure on the side of Ægina, that Demænetus also was sent to the Hellespont to reinforce Iphikrates. For some time indeed, the Lacedæmonian ships at Ægina did nothing. Eteonikus, who was sent as successor to Gorgôpas,<sup>2</sup> could neither persuade nor constrain the seamen to go aboard, since he had no funds, while their pay was in arrears; so that Athens with her coast and her trading-vessels remained altogether unmolested. At length the Lacedæmonians were obliged to send again to Ægina Teleutias, the most popular and best-beloved of all their commanders, whom the seamen welcomed with the utmost delight. Addressing them under the influence of this first impression, immediately after he had offered sacrifice, he told them plainly that he had brought with him no money, but that he had come to put them in the way of procuring it; that he should himself touch nothing until they were amply provided, and should require of them to bear no more hardship or fatigue than he went through himself; that the power and prosperity of Sparta had all been purchased by willingly braving danger, as well as toil, in the cause of duty; that it became valiant men to seek their pay, not by

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 12, 13.

<sup>2</sup> So we may conclude from Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 13; Demænetus is found at the Hellespont v, 1, 26.



cringing to any one, but by their own swords at the cost of enemies. And he engaged to find them the means of doing this, provided they would now again manifest the excellent qualities which he knew them by experience to possess.<sup>1</sup>

This address completely won over the seamen, who received it with shouts of applause; desiring Teleutias to give his orders forthwith, and promising ready obedience. "Well, (said he), now go and get your suppers, as you were intending to do; and then come immediately on shipboard, bringing with you provisions for one day. Advance me thus much out of your own means, that we may, by the will of the gods, make an opportune voyage."<sup>2</sup>

In spite of the eminent popularity of Teleutias, the men would probably have refused to go on board, had he told them beforehand his intention of sailing with his twelve triremes straight into the harbor of Peiræus. At first sight, the enterprise seemed insane, for there were triremes in it more than sufficient to overwhelm him. But he calculated on finding them all unprepared, with seamen as well as officers in their lodgings ashore, so that he could not only strike terror and do damage, but even realize half an hour's plunder before preparations could be made to resist him. Such was the security which now reigned there, especially since the death of Gorgôpas, that no one dreamt of an attack. The harbor was open, as it had been forty years before, when Brasidas (in the third year of the Peloponnesian war) attempted the like enterprise from the port of Megara.<sup>3</sup> Even then, at the maximum of the Athenian naval power, it was an enterprise possible, simply because every one considered it to be impossible; and it only failed because the assailants became terrified, and flinched in the execution.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 14-17.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 18. "Ἀγετε, ὦ ἄνδρες, δειπνήσατε μὲν, ἅπερ καὶ ὡς ἐμέλλετε· προπαράσχετε δέ μοι μιᾷς ἡμέρας σιτον· ἔπειτα δὲ ἔχετε ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς αὐτίκα μύλα, ὅπως πλεύσωμεν, ἐνθα θεὸς ἐθέλει, ἐν καιρῷ ἀφιζόμενοι."

Schneider doubts whether the words *προπαράσχετε δέ μοι* are correct. But they seem to me to bear a very pertinent meaning. Teleutias had no money; yet it was necessary for his purpose that the seamen should come furnished with one day's provision beforehand. Accordingly he is obliged to ask them to get provision for themselves, or to lend it, as it were, to him; though they were already so dissatisfied from not having received their pay.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. ii, 94.

A little after dark, Teleutias quitted the harbor of Ægina, without telling any one whither he was going. Rowing leisurely, and allowing his men alternate repose on their oars, he found himself before morning within half a mile of Peiræus, where he waited until day was just dawning, and then led his squadron straight into the harbor. Everything turned out as he expected; there was not the least idea of being attacked, nor the least preparation for defence. Not a single trireme was manned or in fighting condition, but several were moored without their crews, together with merchant-vessels, loaded as well as empty. Teleutias directed the captains of his squadron to drive against the triremes, and disable them; but by no means to damage the beaks of their own ships by trying to disable the merchant-ships. Even at that early hour, many Athenians were abroad, and the arrival of the unexpected assailants struck every one with surprise and consternation. Loud and vague cries transmitted the news through all Peiræus, and from Peiræus up to Athens, where it was believed that their harbor was actually taken. Every man having run home for his arms, the whole force of the city rushed impetuously down thither, with one accord, — hoplites as well as horsemen. But before such succors could arrive, Teleutias had full time to do considerable mischief. His seamen boarded the larger merchant-ships, seizing both the men and the portable goods which they found aboard. Some even jumped ashore on the quay (called the Deigma), laid hands on the tradesmen, ship-masters, and pilots, whom they saw near, and carried them away captive. Various smaller vessels with their entire cargoes were also towed away; and even three or four triremes. With all these Teleutias sailed safely out of Peiræus, sending some of his squadron to escort the prizes to Ægina, while he himself with the remainder sailed southward along the coast. As he was seen to come out of Peiræus, his triremes were mistaken for Athenian, and excited no alarm; so that he thus captured several fishing-boats, and passage-boats coming with passengers from the islands to Athens, — together with some merchantmen carrying corn and other goods, at Sunium. All were carried safely into Ægina.<sup>1</sup>

The enterprise of Teleutias, thus admirably concerted and

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 18-22.



executed without the loss of a man, procured for him a plentiful booty, of which, probably not the least valuable portion consisted in the men seized as captives. When sold at Ægina, it yielded so large a return that he was enabled to pay down at once a month's pay to his seamen; who became more attached to him than ever, and kept the triremes in animated and active service under his orders.<sup>1</sup> Admonished by painful experience, indeed, the Athenians were now, doubtless, careful both in guarding and in closing Peiræus; as they had become forty years before after the unsuccessful attack of Brasidas. But in spite of the utmost vigilance, they suffered an extent of damage from the indefatigable Teleutias, and from the Æginetan privateers, quite sufficient to make them weary of the war.<sup>2</sup>

We cannot doubt, indeed, that the prosecution of the war must have been a heavy financial burthen upon the Athenians, from 395 B. C. downward to 387 B. C. How they made good the cost, without any contributory allies, or any foreign support, except what Konon obtained during one year from Pharnabazus, — we are not informed. On the revival of the democracy in 403 B. C., the poverty of the city, both public and private, had been very great, owing to the long previous war, ending with the loss of all Athenian property abroad. At a period about three years afterwards it seems that the Athenians were in arrears, not merely for the tribute-money which they then owed to Sparta as her subject allies, but also for debts due to the Bœotians on account of damage done; that they were too poor to perform in full the religious sacrifices prescribed for the year, and were obliged to omit some even of the more ancient; that the docks as well as the walls were in sad want of repair.<sup>3</sup> Even the pay to those citizens who attended the pub-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 24.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 29.

Even ten years after this, however, when the Lacedæmonian harmost Sphodrias marched from Thespiæ by night to surprise Peiræus, it was without cut gates on the landside — ἀπὸ λωτοῦς — or at least without any such gates as would resist an assault (Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 20).

<sup>3</sup> Lysias, Orat. xxx, cont. Nikomachum, s. 21–30.

I trust this Oration so far as the matter of fact, that in the preceding year, some ancient sacrifices had been omitted from state-poverty; but the manner in which the speaker makes this fact tell against Nikomachus, may or may not be just.

lic assemblies and sat as dikasts in the dikasteries, — pay essential to the working of the democracy, — was restored only by degrees; beginning first at one obolus, and not restored to three oboli, at which it had stood before the capture, until after an interval of some years.<sup>1</sup> It was at this time too that the Theoric Board, or Paymasters for the general expenses of public worship and sacrifice, was first established; and when we read how much the Athenians were embarrassed for the means of celebrating the prescribed sacrifices, there was, probably, great necessity for the formation of some such office. The disbursements connected with this object had been effected, before 403 B. C., not by any special Board, but by the Hellenotamiæ, or treasurers of the tribute collected from the allies, who were not renewed after 403 B. C. as the Athenian empire had ceased to exist.<sup>2</sup> A portion of the money disbursed by the Theoric Board for the religious festivals, was employed in the distribution of two oboli per head, called the diobely, to all present citizens, and actually received by all, — not merely by the poor, but by persons in easy circumstances also.<sup>3</sup> This distribution was made at several festivals, having originally begun at the Dionysia, for the purpose of enabling the citizens to obtain places at the theatrical representations in honor of Dionysus; but we do not know either the number of the festivals, or the amount of the total sum. It was, in principle, a natural corollary of the religious idea connected with the festival; not simply because the comfort and recreation of each citizen, individually taken, was promoted by his being enabled to attend the festival, — but because the collective effect of the ceremony, in honoring and propitiating the god, was believed to depend in part upon a multitudinous attendance and lively manifestations.<sup>4</sup> Gradually, however, this distribution of

<sup>1</sup> Aristophan. Ecclesias. 300–310.

<sup>2</sup> See the Inscription No. 147, in Boeckh's Corpus Inscriptt. Græcor. — Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, ii, 7, p. 179, 180, Eng. transl. — and Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Publ. Græc. s. 77, p. 320.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenes, Philippic. iv, p. 141, s. 43; Demosth. Orat. xlv, cont. Leocharem, p. 1091, s. 48.

<sup>4</sup> It is common to represent the festivals at Athens as if they were so many stratagems for feeding poor citizens at the public expense. But the primitive idea and sentiment of the Grecian religious festival — the satisfaction to the god dependent upon multitudinous spectators sympathizing and enjoying themselves together (ἄμμιγα πάντας) — is much anterior to



Theôric or festival-money came to be pushed to an abusive and mischievous excess, which is brought before our notice forty years afterwards, during the political career of Demosthenes. Until that time, we have no materials for speaking of it; and what I here notice is simply the first creation of the Theôric Board.

The means of Athens for prosecuting the war, and for paying her troops sent as well to Bœotia as to Corinth, must have been derived mainly from direct assessments on property, called eis-phoræ. And some such assessments we find alluded to generally as having taken place during these years; though we know no details either as to frequency or amount.<sup>1</sup> But the restitution of

the development of democracy at Athens. See the old oracles in Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 531, s. 66; Homer, Hymn. Apollin. 147; K. F. Hermann, Gottesdienstlich. Alterthümer der Griechen, s. 8.

<sup>1</sup> See such direct assessments on property alluded to in various speeches of Lysias, Orat. xix. De Bonis Aristoph. s. 31, 45, 63; Orat. xxvii. cont. Epikratem, s. 11, Orat. xxix. cont. Philokrat. s. 14.

Boeckh (in his Public Econ. of Athens, iv, 4, p. 493, Engl. transl., which passage stands unaltered in the second edition of the German original recently published, p. 642) affirms that a proposition for the assessment of a direct property-tax of one-fortieth, or two and a half per cent., was made about this time by a citizen named Euripides, who announced it as intended to produce five hundred talents; that the proposition was at first enthusiastically welcomed by the Athenians, and procured for its author unbounded popularity; but that he was presently cried down and disgraced, because on farther examination the measure proved unsatisfactory and empty talk.

Sievers also (Geschichte von Griech. bis zur Schlacht von Mantinea, pp. 100, 101) adopts the same view as Boeckh, that this was a real proposition of a property tax of two and a half per cent., made by Euripides. After having alleged that the Athenians in these times supplied their treasury by the most unscrupulous injustice in confiscating the property of rich citizens, — referring as proof to passages in the orators, none of which establishes his conclusion, — Sievers goes on to say, — “But that these violences did not suffice, is shown by the fact that the people caught with greedy impatience at other measures. Thus a new scheme of finance, which however was presently discovered to be insufficient or inapplicable, excited at first the most extravagant joy.” He adds in a note: “The scheme proceeded from Euripides; it was a property tax of two and a half per cent. See Aristoph. Ecclesiaz. 823; Boeckh, Staatshaush. ii, p. 27.

In my judgment, the assertion here made by Boeckh and Sievers rests upon no sufficient ground. The passage of Aristophanes does not warrant us in concluding anything at all about a proposition for a property-tax. It is as follows: —

the Long Walls and of the fortifications of Peiræus by Konon, was an assistance not less valuable to the finances of Athens than

Τὸ δ' ἐναγχος οὐχ ἅπαντες ἡμεῖς ὠμνῶμεν  
Τάλαντ' ἐσεσθαι πεντεκόσια τῇ πόλει  
Τῆς τεσσαρακοστῆς, ἣν ἐπόρισ' Εὐριπίδης;  
Κεῦθ' οὖν κατεχρύσου πᾶς ἀνὴρ Εὐριπίδην  
Ὅτε δὴ δ' ἀνασκοπούμενοις ἐφαίνετο  
Ὁ Διδς Κόρινθος, καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμ' οὐκ ἤρκεσεν,  
Πάλιν κατεπίττον πᾶς ἀνὴρ Εὐριπίδην.

What this “new financial scheme” (so Sievers properly calls it) was, which the poet here alludes to, — we have no means of determining. But I venture to express my decided conviction that it cannot have been a property-tax. The terms in which it is described forbid that supposition. It was a scheme which seemed at first sight exceedingly promising and gainful to the city, and procured for its author very great popularity; but which, on farther examination, proved to be mere empty boasting (ὁ Διδς Κόρινθος). How can this be said about any motion for a property-tax? That any financier should ever have gained extraordinary popularity by proposing a property-tax, is altogether inconceivable. And a proposition to raise the immense sum of five hundred talents (which Schömann estimates as the probable aggregate charge of the whole peace-establishment of Athens, Antiq. Jur. Public. Græc. s. 73, p. 313) at one blow by an assessment upon property! It would be as much as any financier could do to bear up against the tremendous unpopularity of such a proposition; and to induce the assembly even to listen to him, were the necessity ever so pressing. How odious are propositions for direct taxation, we may know without recurring to the specific evidence respecting Athens; but if any man requires such specific evidence, he may find it abundantly in the Philippics and Olynthiacs of Demosthenes. On one occasion (De Symmoriis, Or. xiv. s. 33, p. 185) that orator alludes to a proposition for raising five hundred talents by direct property-tax as something extravagant, which the Athenians would not endure to hear mentioned.

Moreover, — unpopularity apart, — the motion for a property-tax could scarcely procure credit for a financier, because it is of all ideas the most simple and obvious. Any man can suggest such a scheme. But to pass for an acceptable financier, you must propose some measure which promises gain to the state without such undisguised pressure upon individuals.

Lastly, there is nothing *delusive* in a property-tax, — nothing which looks gainful at first sight, and then turns out on farther examination (ἀνασκοπούμενοις) to be false or uncertain. It may, indeed, be more or less evaded; but this can only be known after it has been assessed, and when payment is actually called for.

Upon these grounds I maintain that the τεσσαρακοστὴ proposed by Euripides was not a property-tax. What it was I do not pretend to say; but τεσσαρακοστὴ may have many other meanings; it might mean a duty of two



to her political power. That excellent harbor, commodious as a mercantile centre, and now again safe for the residence of metics

and a half per cent. upon imports or exports, or upon the produce of the mines of Laureion; or it might mean a cheap coinage or base money, something in the nature of the Chian *τεσσαρακοσται* (Thucyd. viii, 100). All that the passage really teaches us is, that some financial proposition was made by Euripides which at first seemed likely to be lucrative, but would not stand an attentive examination. It is not even certain that Euripides promised a receipt of five hundred talents; this sum is only given to us as a comic exaggeration of that which foolish men at first fancied. Boeckh in more than one place reasons (erroneously, in my judgment) as if this five hundred talents was a real and trustworthy estimate, and equal to two and a half per cent. upon the taxable property of the Athenians. He says (iv, 8, p. 520, Engl. transl.) that "Euripides assumed as the basis of his proposal for levying a property-tax, a taxable capital of twenty thousand talents," — and that "his proposition of one-fortieth was calculated to produce five hundred talents." No such conclusion can be fairly drawn from Aristophanes.

Again, Boeckh infers from another passage in the same play of the same author, that a small direct property-tax of one five-hundredth part had been recently imposed. After a speech from one of the old women, calling upon a young man to follow her, he replies (v. 1006): —

Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη μοῦσιν, εἰ μὴ τῶν ἐμῶν  
τὴν πεντακοσίστην κατέδηκας τῇ πόλει.

Boeckh himself admits (iv, 8, p. 520) that this passage is very obscure, and so I think every one will find it. Tyrwhitt was so perplexed by it that he altered *ἐμῶν* into *ἐτῶν*. Without presuming to assign the meaning of the passage, I merely contend that it cannot be held to justify the affirmation, as a matter of historical fact, that a property tax of one-five-hundredth had been levied at Athens, shortly before the representation of *Ekklesiazusæ*.

I cannot refrain here from noticing another inference drawn by Sievers from a third passage in this same play, — the *Ekklesiazusæ* (Geschichte Griechenlands vom Ende der Pelop. Kriegs bis zur Schlacht von Mantinea, p. 101.) He says, — "How melancholy is the picture of Athenian popular life, which is presented to us by the *Ekklesiazusæ* and the second *Plutus*, ten or twelve years after the restoration of the democracy! What an *impressive seriousness* (welch ein erschütternder Ernst) is expressed in the speech of Praxagora!" (v. 174 seqq.).

I confess that I find neither seriousness, nor genuine and trustworthy coloring, in this speech of Praxagora. It was a comic case made out for the purpose of showing that the women were more fit to govern Athens than the men, and setting forth the alleged follies of the men in terms of broad and general disparagement. The whole play is, throughout, thorough farce and full of Aristophanic humor. And it is surely preposterous to treat what is put into the mouth of Praxagora, the leading feminine character, as if it were historical evidence as to the actual condition or management of Ath-

and the importations of merchants, became speedily a scene of animated commerce, as we have seen it when surprised by Teleutias. The number of metics, or free resident non-citizens, became also again large, as it had been before the time of her reverses, and including a number of miscellaneous non-Hellenic persons, from Lydia, Phrygia, and Syria.<sup>1</sup> Both the port-duties, and the value of fixed property at Athens, was thus augmented so as in part to countervail the costs of war. Nevertheless these costs, continued from year to year, and combined with the damage done by Æginetan privateers, were seriously felt, and contributed to dispose the Athenians to peace.

In the Hellespont also, their prospects were not only on the decline, but had become seriously menacing. After going from Ægina to Ephesus in the preceding year, and sending back Gorgôpus with the Æginetan squadron, Antalkidas had placed the remainder of his fleet under his secretary, Nikolochus, with orders to proceed to the Hellespont for the relief of Abydos. He himself landed, and repaired to Tiribazus, by whom he was conducted up to the court of Susa. Here he renewed the propositions for the pacification of Greece, — on principles of universal autonomy, abandoning all the Asiatic Greeks as subject absolutely to the Persian king, — which he had tried in vain to carry through two years before. Though the Spartans generally were odious to Artaxerxes, Antalkidas behaved with so much dexterity<sup>2</sup> as to gain the royal favor personally, while all the influence of Tiribazus was employed to second his political views. At length they succeeded in prevailing upon the king formally to adopt the peace, and to proclaim war against any Greeks who should refuse to accede to it, empowering the Spartans to enforce it everywhere as his allies and under his sanction. In order to remove one who would have

ens. Let any one follow the speech of Praxagora into the proposition of reform which she is made to submit, and he will then see the absurdity of citing her discourse as if it were an harangue in Thucydides. History is indeed strangely transformed by thus turning comic wit into serious matter of evidence; and no history has suffered so much from the proceeding as that of Athens.

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. v. 1, 19-24; compare vii, 1, 3, 4; Xenoph. De Vectigalibus, chapters i, ii, iii, etc.; Xenoph. De Repub. Athen. l. 17

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.



proved a great impediment to this measure, the king was farther induced to invite the satrap Pharnabazus up to court, and to honor him with his daughter in marriage; leaving the satrapy of Daskylium under the temporary administration of Ariobarzanes, a personal friend and guest of Antalkidas.<sup>1</sup> Thus armed against all contingencies, Antalkidas and Tiribazus returned from Susa to the coast of Asia Minor in the spring of 387 B. C., not only bearing the formal diploma ratified by the king's seal, but commanding ample means to carry it into effect; since, in addition to the full forces of Persia, twenty additional triremes were on their way from Syracuse and the Greco-Italian towns, sent by the despot Dionysius to the aid of the Lacedæmonians.<sup>2</sup>

On reaching the coast, Antalkidas found Nikolochus with his fleet of twenty-five sail blocked up in Abydos by the Athenians under Iphikrates; who with thirty-two sail were occupying the European side of the Hellespont. He immediately repaired to Abydos by land, and took an early opportunity of stealing out by night with his fleet up the strait towards the Propontis; spreading the rumor that he was about to attack Chalkêdon, in concert with a party in the town. But he stopped at Perkôtê, and lay hid in that harbor until he saw the Athenian fleet (which had gone in pursuit of him upon the false scent laid out) pass by towards Prokonnêsus. The strait being now clear, Antalkidas sailed down it again to meet the Syracusan and Italian ships, whom he safely joined. Such junction, with a view to which his recent manœuvre had been devised, rendered him more than a match for his enemies. He had further the good fortune to capture a detached Athenian squadron of eight triremes, which Thrasybulus (a second Athenian citizen of that name) was conducting from Thrace to join the main Athenian fleet in the Hellespont. Lastly, additional reinforcements also reached Antalkidas from the zealous aid of Tiribazus and Ariobarzanes, insomuch that he found himself at the head of no less than eighty triremes, besides a still greater number which were under preparation in the various ports of Ionia.<sup>3</sup>

Such a fleet, the greatest which had been seen in the Hellespont

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 28.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 25-27.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xv, 2. These triremes were employed in the ensuing year for the prosecution of the war against Evagoras.

since the battle of Ægospotami, was so much superior to anything which could be brought to meet it, and indicated so strongly the full force of Persia operating in the interests of Sparta,—that the Athenians began to fear a repetition of the same calamitous suffering which they had already undergone from Lysander. A portion of such hardship they at once began to taste. Not a single merchant-ship reached them from the Euxine, all being seized and detained by Antalkidas; so that their main supply of imported corn was thus cut off. Moreover, in the present encouraging state of affairs, the Æginetan privateers became doubly active in harassing the coasting trade of Attica; and this combination, of actual hardship with prospective alarm, created a paramount anxiety at Athens to terminate the war. Without Athens, the other allies would have no chance of success through their own forces; while the Argeians also, hitherto the most obstinate, had become on their own account desirous of peace, being afraid of repeated Lacedæmonian invasions of their territory. That Sparta should press for a peace, when the terms of it were suggested by herself, is not wonderful. Even to her, triumphant as her position now seemed, the war was a heavy burden.<sup>1</sup>

Such was the general state of feeling in the Grecian world, when Tiribazus summoned the contending parties into his presence, probably at Sardis, to hear the terms of the convention which had just come down from Susa. He produced the original edict, and having first publicly exhibited the royal seal, read aloud as follows:—

“King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia, and the islands of Klazomenæ and Cyprus, shall belong to him. He thinks it just also, to leave all the other Hellenic cities autonomous, both small and great,—except Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, which are to belong to Athens, as they did originally. Should any parties refuse to accept this peace, I will make war upon them, along with those who are of the same mind, by land as well as by sea, with ships and with money.”<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 28, 29.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 31.

In this document there is the same introduction of the first person immediately following the third, as in the correspondence between Pausanias and Xerxes (Thucyd. i, 128, 129).



Instructions were given to all the deputies to report the terms of this edict to their respective cities, and to meet again at Sparta for acceptance or rejection. When the time of meeting arrived,<sup>1</sup> all the cities, in spite of their repugnance to the abandonment of the Asiatic Greeks, and partly also to the second condition, nevertheless felt themselves overruled by superior force, and gave a reluctant consent. On taking the oaths, however, the Thebans tried indirectly to make good an exception in their own case, by claiming to take the oath not only on behalf of themselves, but on behalf of the Boeotian cities generally; a demand which Agesilaus in the name of Sparta repudiated, as virtually cancelling that item in the pacification whereby the small cities were pronounced to be autonomous as well as the great. When the Theban deputy replied that he could not relinquish his claim without fresh instructions from home, Agesilaus desired him to go at once and consult his countrymen. "You may tell them (said he) that if they do not comply, they will be shut out from the treaty."

It was with much delight that Agesilaus pronounced this peremptory sentence, which placed Thebes in so humiliating a dilemma. Antipathy towards the Thebans was one of his strongest sentiments, and he exulted in the hope that they would persist in their refusal so that he would thus be enabled to bring an overwhelming force to crush their isolated city. So eagerly did he thirst for the expected triumph, that immediately on the departure of the Theban deputies, and before their answer could possibly have been obtained, he procured the consent of the ephors, offered the border-sacrifice, and led the Spartan force out as far as Tegea. From that city he not only despatched messengers in all directions to hasten the arrival of the Perioeci, but also sent forth the officers called *xenagi* to the cities of the Peloponnesian allies, to muster and bring together the respective contingents. But in spite of all injunctions to despatch, his wishes were disappointed. Before he started from Tegea, the Theban deputies returned with the intimation that they were prepared to take the oath for Thebes alone, recognizing the other Boeotian cities as autonomous. Agesilaus and the Spartans were thus obliged to be satisfied with the minor triumph, in itself very serious and considerable, of having degraded

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 110

Thebes from her federal headship, and isolated her from the Boeotian cities.<sup>1</sup>

The unmeasured and impatient miso-Theban bitterness of Agesilaus, attested here by his friend and panegyrist, deserves especial notice; for it will be found to explain much of the misconduct of Sparta and her officers during the ensuing years.

There yet remained one compliance for Agesilaus to exact. The Argeian auxiliaries were not yet withdrawn from Corinth; and the Corinthian government might probably think that the terms of the peace, leaving their city autonomous, permitted them to retain or dismiss these auxiliaries at their own discretion. But it was not so that Agesilaus construed the peace; and his construction, right or wrong, was backed by the power of enforcement. He sent to inform both Argeians and Corinthians, that if the auxiliaries were not withdrawn, he would march his army forthwith into both territories. No resistance could be offered to his peremptory mandate. The Argeians retired from Corinth; and the vehement philo-Argeian Corinthians, — especially those who had been concerned in the massacre at the festival of the Eukleia, — retired at the same time into voluntary exile, thinking themselves no longer safe in the town. They found a home partly at Argos, partly at Athens,<sup>2</sup> where they were most hospitably received. Those Corinthians who had before been in exile, and who, in concert with the Lacedæmonian garrison at Lechæum and Sikyon, had been engaged in bitter hostility against their countrymen in Corinth, — were immediately readmitted into the city. According to Xenophon, their readmission was pronounced by the spontaneous voice of the Corinthian citizens.<sup>3</sup> But we shall be more correct in affirming, that it was procured by the same intimidating summons from Agesilaus which had extorted the dismissal of the Argeians.<sup>4</sup> The restoration of the exiles from Lechæum on the

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 32, 33.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 34; Demosthen. adv. Leptin. c. 13, p. 473.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 34. *Οἱ δ' ἄλλοι πολῖται ἕκαστος κατέδεχοντο τοὺς πρόσθεν φεύγοντας.*

<sup>4</sup> Such is in fact the version of the story in Xenophon's Encomium upon Agesilaus (ii, 21), where it is made a matter of honor to the latter, that he would not consent to peace, except with a compulsory clause (*πράγασαι*) that the Corinthian and Theban exiles should be restored. The Corinthian

present occasion was no more voluntary than that of the Athenian exiles had been eighteen years before, at the Peloponnesian war,—or than that of the Phliasian exiles was, two or three years afterwards.<sup>1</sup>

exiles had been actively coöperating with Agesilaus against Corinth. Of Theban exiles we have heard nothing; but it is very probable that there were several serving with Agesilaus,—and also pretty certain that he would insist upon their restoration.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 8.



















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
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
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PREFACE TO VOL. X.

THE present Volume is already extended to an unusual number of pages; yet I have been compelled to close it at an inconvenient moment, midway in the reign of the Syracusan despot Dionysius. To carry that reign to its close, one more chapter will be required, which must be reserved for the succeeding volume.

The history of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, forming as it does a stream essentially distinct from that of the Peloponnesians, Athenians, etc., is peculiarly interesting during the interval between 409 B. C. (the date of the second Carthaginian invasion) and the death of Timoleon in 336 B. C. It is, moreover, reported to us by authors (Diodorus and Plutarch), who, though not themselves very judicious as selectors, had before them good contemporary witnesses. And it includes some of the most prominent and impressive characters of the Hellenic world,—Dionysius I, Dion with Plato as instructor, and Timoleon.

I thought it indispensable to give adequate development to this important period of Grecian history, even at the cost of that inconvenient break which terminates my tenth volume. At one time I had hoped to comprise in that volume not only the full history of Dionysius I., but also that of Dionysius II. and Dion—and that of Timoleon besides. Three new chapters, including all this additional matter, are already composed and ready. But the bulk of the present volume compels me to reserve them for the commencement of my next, which will carry Grecian history down to the battle of Chaeroneia and the death of Philip of Macedon—and which will, I trust, appear without any long interval of time.

G. G.

LONDON, FEB. 15, 1852.

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census. — The Solonian census retained in the main, though with modifications, at the restoration under the archonship of Eukleides in 403 B.C. — Archonship of Nausinikus in 378 B.C. — New census and schedule then introduced, of all citizens worth twenty minæ and upwards, distributed into classes, and entered for a fraction of their total property; each class for a different fraction. — All metics, worth more than twenty-five minæ, were registered in the schedule; all in one class, each man for one-sixth of his property. Aggregate schedule. The Symmories — containing the twelve hundred wealthiest citizens — the three hundred wealthiest leaders of the Symmories. — Citizens not wealthy enough to be included in the Symmories, yet still entered in the schedule, and liable to property-tax. Purpose of the Symmories — extension of the principle to the trierarchy. — Enthusiasm at Thebes in defence of the new government and against Sparta. Military training — the Sacred Band. — Epaminondas. — His previous character and training — musical and intellectual, as well as gymnastic. Conversation with philosophers, Sokratic as well as Pythagorean. — His eloquence — his unambitious disposition — gentleness of his political resentments. — Conduct of Epaminondas at the Theban revolution of 379 B.C. — he acquires influence, through Pelopidas, in the military organization of the city. — Agesilaus marches to attack Thebes with the full force of the Spartan confederacy — good system of defence adopted by Thebes — aid from Athens under Chabrias. Increase of the Theban strength in Bœotia, against the philo-Spartan oligarchies in the Bœotian cities. — Second expedition of Agesilaus into Bœotia — he gains no decisive advantage. The Thebans acquire greater and greater strength. Agesilaus retires — he is disabled by a hurt in the leg. — Kleombrotus conducts the Spartan force to invade Bœotia. — He retires without reaching Bœotia. — Resolution of Sparta to equip a large fleet, under the admiral Pollis. The Athenians send out a fleet under Chabrias — Victory of Chabrias at sea near Naxos. Recollections of the battle of Arginusæ. — Extension of the Athenian maritime confederacy, in consequence of the victory at Naxos. — Circumnavigation of Peloponnesus by Timotheus with an Athenian fleet — his victory over the Lacedæmonian fleet — his success in extending the Athenian confederacy — his just dealing. — Financial difficulties of Athens. — She becomes jealous of the growing strength of Thebes — steady and victorious progress of Thebes in Bœotia. — Victory of Pelopidas at Tegyra over the Lacedæmonians. — The Thebans expel the Lacedæmonians out of all Bœotia, except Orchomenus — they reorganize the Bœotian federation. — They invade Phokis — Kleombrotus is sent thither with an army for defence — Athens makes a separate peace with the Lacedæmonians. — Jason of Pheræ — his energetic character and formidable power. — His prudent dealing with Polydamas. — The Lacedæmonians find themselves unable to spare any aid for Thessaly — they dismiss Polydamas with a refusal. He comes to terms with Jason, who becomes Tagus of Thessaly. — Peace between Athens and Sparta — broken off almost immediately. The Lacedæmonians declare war again, and resume their plans upon Zakynthos and Korkyra. — Lacedæmonian armament under Mnasippus, collected from all the confederates, invades Korkyra. — Mnasippus besieges the city — high cultivation of the adjoining lands. — The Korkyræans blocked up in the city — supplies intercepted — want begins — no hope of safety except in aid from Athens. Reinforcement arrives from Athens — large Athenian fleet preparing under Timotheus. Mnasippus is defeated and slain — the city supplied with provisions. — Approach of the Athenian reinforcement — Hypermenês, successor of Mnasippus, conveys away the armament, leaving his sick and much property behind. — Tardy arrival of the Athenian fleet — it is commanded

not by Timotheus, but by Iphikrates — causes of the delay — preliminary voyage of Timotheus, very long protracted. — Discontent at Athens, in consequence of the absence of Timotheus — distress of the armament assembled at Kalauria — Iphikrates and Kallistratus accuse Timotheus. Iphikrates named admiral in his place. — Return of Timotheus — an accusation is entered against him, but trial is postponed until the return of Iphikrates from Korkyra. — Rapid and energetic movements of Iphikrates towards Korkyra — his excellent management of the voyage. On reaching Kephallenia, he learns the flight of the Lacedæmonians from Korkyra. — He goes on to Korkyra, and captures by surprise the ten Syracusan triremes sent by Dionysius to the aid of Sparta. — Iphikrates in want of money — he sends home Kallistratus to Athens — he finds work for his seamen at Korkyra — he obtains funds by service in Akarnia. — Favorable tone of public opinion at Athens, in consequence of the success at Korkyra — the trial of Timotheus went off easily — Jason and Alketas come to support him — his quaester is condemned to death. — Timotheus had been guilty of delay, not justifiable under the circumstances — though acquitted, his reputation suffered — he accepts command under Persia. — Discouragement of Sparta in consequence of her defeat at Korkyra, and of the triumphant position of Iphikrates. — Helikê and Bura are destroyed by an earthquake. — The Spartans again send Antalkidas to Persia, to sue for a fresh intervention — the Persian satraps send down an order that the Grecian belligerents shall make up their differences. — Athens disposed towards peace. — Athens had ceased to be afraid of Sparta, and had become again jealous of Thebes. — Equivocal position of the restored Plataea, now that the Lacedæmonians had been expelled from Bœotia. — The Thebans forestall a negotiation by seizing Plataea, and expelling the inhabitants, who again take refuge at Athens. — Strong feeling excited in Athens against the Thebans, on account of their dealings with Plataea and Thespiæ. The Plataic discourse of Isokrates. — Increased tendency of the Athenians towards peace with Sparta — Athens and the Athenian confederacy give notice to Thebes General congress for peace at Sparta. — Speeches of the Athenian envoys Kallias, Autokles, Kallistratus. — Kallistratus and his policy. — He proposes that Sparta and Athens shall divide between them the headship of Greece — Sparta on land, Athens at sea — recognizing general autonomy. — Peace is concluded. Autonomy of each city to be recognized: Sparta to withdraw her harmosts and garrisons. — Oaths exchanged. Sparta takes the oath for herself and her allies. Athens takes it for herself: her allies take it after her, successively. — The oath proposed to the Thebans Epaminondas, the Theban envoy, insists upon taking the oath in the name of the Bœotian federation. Agesilaus and the Spartans require that he shall take it for Thebes alone. — Daring and emphatic speeches delivered by Epaminondas in the congress — protesting against the overweening pretensions of Sparta. He claims recognition of the ancient institutions of Bœotia, with Thebes as president of the federation. — Indignation of the Spartans, and especially of Agesilaus — brief questions exchanged — Thebes is excluded from the treaty. — General peace sworn, including Athens, Sparta, and the rest — Thebes alone is excluded — Terms of peace — compulsory and indefeasible confederacies are renounced — voluntary alliances alone maintained. — Real point in debate between Agesilaus and Epaminondas..... 72-174



## CHAPTER LXXVIII

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## CHAPTER LXXXI

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## CHAPTER LXXXII.

### SICILY DURING THE DESPOTISM OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS AT SYRACUSE.

Imilkon with the Carthaginian army marches from Agrigentum to attack Gela. — Brave defence of the Geloans — Dionysius arrives with an army to relieve them. — Plan of Dionysius for a general attack on the Carthaginian army. — He is defeated and obliged to retreat. — He evacuates Gela and Kamarina — flight of the population of both places, which are taken and sacked by the Carthaginians. — Indignation and charges of treachery against Dionysius. — Mutiny of the Syracusan horsemen — they ride off to Syracuse, and declare against Dionysius. — Their imprudence Dionysius master of Syracuse. — Propositions of peace come from Imilkon. Terms of peace. — Collusion of Dionysius with the Carthaginians, who confirm his dominion over Syracuse. Pestilence in the Carthaginian army. — Near coincidence, in time, of this peace, with the victory of Lysander at Ægospotami — sympathy of Sparta with Dionysius. — Depressed condition of the towns of Southern Sicily, from Cape Pachynus to Lilybæum. — Strong position of Dionysius. — Strong fortifications and other buildings erected by Dionysius, in and about Ortygia. — He assigns houses in Ortygia to his soldiers and partisans — he distributes the lands of Syracuse anew. — Exorbitant exactions of Dionysius — discontent at Syracuse. — Dionysius marches out of Syracuse against the Sikels — mutiny of the Syracusan soldiers at Herbesa — Dorikus the commander is slain. — The Syracusan insurgents, with assistance from Rhegium and Messênê, besiege Dionysius in Ortygia. — Despair of Dionysius — he applies to a body of Campanians in the Carthaginian service, for aid. — He amuses the assailants with feigned submission — arrival of the Campanians — victory of Dionysius. — Dionysius strengthens his despotism more than before — assistance lent to him by the Spartan Aristus — Nikoteles the Corinthian is put to death. — He disarms the Syracusan citizens — strengthens the fortifications of Ortygia — augments his mercenary force. — Dionysius conquers Naxos, Katana, and Leontini. — Great power of Dionysius. Foundation of Alæsa by Archonides. — Resolution of Dionysius to make war upon Carthage. — Locality of Syracuse — danger to which the town had been exposed, in the Athenian siege. — Additional fortifications made by Dionysius along the northern ridge of the cliffs of Epipolæ, up the Euryalus. — Popularity of the work — efforts made by all the Syracusans as well as by Dionysius himself. — Preparations of Dionysius for aggressive war against the Carthaginians. — Improvement in the behavior of Dionysius towards the Syracusans. — His conciliatory offers to other Grecian cities in Sicily. Hostile sentiment of



the Rhegines towards him. Their application to Messênê. — He makes peace with Messênê and Rhegium. — He desires to marry a Rhegine wife. His proposition is declined by the city. He is greatly incensed. — He makes a proposition to marry a wife from Lokri — his wish is granted — he marries a Lokrian maiden named Doris. — Immense warlike equipment of Dionysius at Syracuse — arms, engines, etc. — Naval preparations in the harbor of Syracuse. Enlargement of the bulk of ships of war — quadriremes and quinqueremes. — General sympathy of the Syracusans in his projects against Carthage. — He hires soldiers from all quarters. — He celebrates his nuptials with two wives on the same day — Doris and Aristomachê. Temporary good feeling at Syracuse towards him. — He convokes the Syracusan assembly, and exhorts them to war against Carthage. — He desires to arrest the emigration of those who were less afraid of the Carthaginian dominion than of his. — He grants permission to plunder the Carthaginian residents and ships at Syracuse. Alarm at Carthage — suffering in Africa from the pestilence. — Dionysius marches out from Syracuse with a prodigious army against the Carthaginians in Sicily. — Insurrection against Carthage, among the Sicilian Greeks subject to her. Terrible tortures inflicted on the Carthaginians. — Dionysius besieges the Carthaginian seaport Motyê. — Situation of Motyê — operations of the siege — vigorous defence. — Dionysius overruns the neighboring dependencies of Carthage — doubtful result of the siege of Motyê — appearance of Imilkon with a Carthaginian fleet — he is obliged to return. — Desperate defence of Motyê. It is at length taken by a nocturnal attack. — Plunder of Motyê — the inhabitants either slaughtered or sold for slaves. — Farther operations of Dionysius. — Arrival of Imilkon with a Carthaginian armament — his successful operations — he retakes Motyê. — Dionysius retires to Syracuse. — Imilkon captures Messênê. — Revolt of the Sikels from Dionysius. Commencement of Tauromenium. — Provisions of Dionysius for the defence of Syracuse — he strengthens Leontini — he advances to Katana with his land-army as well as his fleet. — Naval battle off Katana — great victory of the Carthaginian fleet under Magon. — Arrival of Imilkon to join the fleet of Magon near Katana — fruitless invitation to the Campanians of Ætna. — Dionysius retreats to Syracuse — discontent of his army. — Imilkon marches close up to Syracuse — the Carthaginian fleet come up to occupy the Great Harbor — their imposing entry. Fortified position of Imilkon near the Harbor. — Imilkon plunders the suburb of Achradina — blockades Syracuse by sea. — Naval victory gained by the Syracusan fleet during the absence of Dionysius. — Effect of this victory in exalting the spirits of the Syracusans. — Public meeting convened by Dionysius — mutinous spirit against him — vehement speech by Theodorus. — Sympathy excited by the speech in the Syracusan assembly. — The Spartan Pharakidas upholds Dionysius — who finally dismisses the assembly, and silences the adverse movement. — Alliance of Sparta with Dionysius — suitable to her general policy at the time. The emancipation of Syracuse depended upon Pharakidas. — Dionysius tries to gain popularity. — Terrific pestilence among the Carthaginian army before Syracuse. — Dionysius attacks the Carthaginian camp. He deliberately sacrifices a detachment of his mercenaries. — Success of Dionysius, both by sea and by land, against the Syracusan position. — Conflagration of the Carthaginian camp — exultation at Syracuse. — Imilkon concludes a secret treaty with Dionysius, to be allowed to escape with the Carthaginians, on condition of abandoning his remaining army. Destruction of the remaining Carthaginian army, except Sikels and Iberians. — Distress at Carthage — miserable end of Imilkon. — Danger of Carthage — anger and revolt of her African subjects — at length put down.....446-519

## HISTORY OF GREECE.

### PART II.

#### CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

#### CHAPTER LXXVI.

##### FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS DOWN TO THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY SPARTA.

THE peace or convention<sup>1</sup> which bears the name of Antalkidas, was an incident of serious and mournful import in Grecian history. Its true character cannot be better described than in a brief remark and reply which we find cited in Plutarch. "Alas for Hellas (observed some one to Agesilaus) when we see our Laconians *medising*!" — "Nay (replied the Spartan king), say rather the Medes (Persians) *laconising*."<sup>2</sup>

These two propositions do not exclude each other. Both were perfectly true. The convention emanated from a separate partnership between Spartan and Persian interests. It was solicited by the Spartan Antalkidas, and propounded by him to Tiribazus

<sup>1</sup> It goes by both names; Xenophon more commonly speaks of *ἡ εἰρήνη* — Isokrates, of *αἱ συνθήκαι*.

Though we say, the peace of Antalkidas, the Greek authors say *ἡ ἐπ' Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνη*; I do not observe that they ever phrase it with the genitive case *Ἀνταλκίδου* simply, without a preposition.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 22 (compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 23; and his Apophtheg. Lacon. p. 213 B). 'Ο μὲν γὰρ Ἀγησίλαος, πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα — Φεῦ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ὅπου μηδίζουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ Λάκωνες!.. Μᾶλλον, εἶπεν, οἱ Μῆδοι λακωνίζουσι



on the express ground, that it was exactly calculated to meet the Persian king's purposes and wishes, — as we learn even from the philo-Laconian Xenophon.<sup>1</sup> While Sparta and Persia were both great gainers, no other Grecian state gained anything, as the convention was originally framed. But after the first rejection, Antalkidas saw the necessity of conciliating Athens by the addition of a special article providing that Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros should be restored to her.<sup>2</sup> This addition seems to have been first made in the abortive negotiations which form the subject of the discourse already mentioned, pronounced by Andokides. It was continued afterwards and inserted in the final decree which Antalkidas and Tiribazus brought down in the king's name from Susa; and it doubtless somewhat contributed to facilitate the adherence of Athens, though the united forces of Sparta and Persia had become so overwhelming, that she could hardly have had the means of standing out, even if the supplementary article had been omitted. Nevertheless, this condition undoubtedly did secure to Athens a certain share in the gain, conjointly with the far larger shares both of Sparta and Persia. It is, however, not less true, that Athens, as well as Thebes,<sup>3</sup> assented to the peace only under fear and compulsion. As to the other states of Greece, they were interested merely in the melancholy capacity of partners in the general loss and degradation.

That degradation stood evidently marked in the form, origin, and transmission, of the convention, even apart from its substance. It was a fiat issued from the court of Susa; as such it was ostentatiously proclaimed and "sent down" from thence to Greece. Its authority was derived from the king's seal, and its sanction from his concluding threat, that he would make war against all recusants. It was brought down by the satrap Tiribazus (along

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 14.

<sup>2</sup> The restoration of these three islands forms the basis of historical truth in the assertion of Isokrates, that the Lacedæmonians were so subdued by the defeat of Knidus, as to come and tender maritime empire to Athens — (ἐλθεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν δώσοντας) Orat. vii, (Areopagit.) s. 74; Or. ix, (Evagor.) s. 83. But the assertion is true respecting a later time; for the Lacedæmonians really did make this proposition to Athens after they had been enfeebled and humiliated by the battle of Leuktra; but not before (Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 3).

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiv 111

with Antalkidas), read by him aloud, and heard with submission by the assembled Grecian envoys, after he had called their special attention to the regal seal.<sup>1</sup> Such was the convention which Sparta, the ancient president of the Grecian world had been the first to solicit at the hands of the Persian king, and which she now not only set the example of sanctioning by her own spontaneous obedience, but even avouched as guarantee and champion against all opponents; preparing to enforce it at the point of the sword against any recusant state, whether party to it or not. Such was the convention which was now inscribed on stone, and placed as a permanent record in the temples of the Grecian cities;<sup>2</sup> nay, even in the common sanctuaries, — the Olympic, Pythian, and others, — the great *foci* and rallying points of Pan-hellenic sentiment. Though called by the name of a convention, it was on the very face of it a peremptory mandate proceeding from the ancient enemy of Greece, an acceptance of which was nothing less than an act of obedience. While to him it was a glorious trophy, to all

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 30, 31. 'Ὡς τ' ἐπεὶ παρήγγειλεν ὁ Τιρίβαζος παρῆναι τοὺς βουλομένους ὑπακοῦσαι, ἦν βασιλεὺς εἰρήνην κατὰπεμποί, τάχως πάντες παρεγένοντο. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ξυνῆλθον, ἐπιδείξας ὁ Τιρίβαζος τὰ βασιλέως σημεία, ἀνεγίνωσκε τὰ γεγραμμένα, εἶχε δὲ ὧδε·

Ἄρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς νομίζει δίκαιον, τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, καὶ τῶν νήσων Κλαζομένας καὶ Κύπρον· τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας, αὐτονόμους εἶναι, πλὴν Λήμνον, καὶ Ἰμβρόν καὶ Σκύρον, ταύτας δὲ, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον, εἶναι Ἀθηναίων. Ὅπότεροι δὲ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ δέχονται, τοῦτοίς ἐγὼ πολέμησω, μετὰ τῶν ταῦτ' ἀβουλομένων, καὶ πέζῃ καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν, καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ χρήμασιν.

<sup>2</sup> Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyric) s. 211. Καὶ ταύτας ἡμᾶς ἠνάγκασεν (the Persian king) ἐν στήλαις λιθίναις ἀναγράψαντας ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς τῶν ἱερῶν ἀναθεῖναι, πολλὸν κάλλιον τροπαῖον τῶν ἐν ταῖς μάχαις γιγνομένων.

The Oratio Panegyrica of Isokrates (published about 380 B. C., seven years afterwards) from which I here copy, is the best evidence of the feelings with which an intelligent and patriotic Greek looked upon this treaty at the time; when it was yet recent, but when there had been full time to see how the Lacedæmonians carried it out. His other orations, though valuable and instructive, were published later, and represent the feelings of after-time.

Another contemporary, Plato in his Menexenus (c. 17, p. 245 D), stigmatizes severely "the base and unholy act (*αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀνόσιον ἔργον*) of surrendering Greeks to the foreigner," and asserts that the Athenians resolutely refused to sanction it. This is a sufficient mark of his opinion respecting the peace of Antalkidas.



Pan-hellenic patriots it was the deepest disgrace and insult.<sup>1</sup> Effacing altogether the idea of an independent Hellenic world, bound together and regulated by the self-acting forces and common sympathies of its own members, — even the words of the convention proclaimed it as an act of intrusive foreign power, and erected the barbarian king into a dictatorial settler of Grecian differences; a guardian<sup>2</sup> who cared for the peace of Greece more than the Greeks themselves. And thus, looking to the form alone, it was tantamount to that symbol of submission — the cession of earth and water — which had been demanded a century before by the ancestor of Artaxerxes from the ancestors of the Spartans and Athenians; a demand, which both Sparta and Athens then not only repudiated, but resented so cruelly, as to put to death the heralds by whom it was brought, — stigmatizing the Æginetans and others as traitors to Hellas for complying with it.<sup>3</sup> Yet nothing more would have been implied in such cession than what stood embodied in the inscription on that "colonna infame," which

<sup>1</sup> Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyrr.) s. 207. 'Α χρὴν ἀναιρεῖν, καὶ μηδεμίαν ἐπ' ἡμέραν, νομίζοντες, προστάγματα καὶ οὐ συνθήκας εἶναι, etc. (s. 213). Δίσχρον ἡμῶς ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑβρίζουσένης, μηδεμίαν ποιήσασθαι κοινὴν τιμωρίαν, etc.

The word *προστάγματα* exactly corresponds with an expression of Xenophon (put in the mouth of Autokles the Athenian envoy at Sparta), respecting the dictation of the peace of Antalkidas by Artaxerxes — *Καὶ ὅτε μὲν Βασιλεὺς προσέταττεν αὐτονόμους τὰς πόλεις εἶναι*, etc. (Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 9).

<sup>2</sup> Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyrr.) s. 205. Καίτοι πῶς οὐ χρὴ διαλύειν ταῦτα τὰς ὁμολογίας, ἐξ ὧν τοιαύτην δόξα γέγονεν, ὥστε ὁ μὲν Βάρβαρος κήδεταί τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ φύλαξ τῆς εἰρήνης ἐστίν, ἡμῶν δὲ τινὲς εἰσιν οἱ λυμαίνοντες καὶ κακῶς ποιοῦντες αὐτήν;

The word employed by Photius in his abstract of Theopompus (whether it be the expression of Theopompus himself, we cannot be certain — see *Fragm.* 111, ed. Didot), to designate the position taken by Artaxerxes in reference to this peace, is — *τὴν εἰρήνην ἦν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐβράβευσεν* — which implies the peremptory decision of an official judge, analogous to another passage (139) of the Panegyrr. Orat. of Isokrates — *Νῦν δ' ἐκεῖνός (Artaxerxes) ἐστίν, ὁ διοικῶν τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ μόνον οὐκ ἐπιστάθμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καθιστάς*. Πλὴν γὰρ τοῦτον τι τῶν ἄλλων ὑπόλοιπόν ἐστιν; Οὐ καὶ τοῦ πολέμου κύριος ἐγένετο, καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπρυτάνευσεν, καὶ τῶν παρόντων πραγμάτων ἐπιστάτης καθέστηκεν;

<sup>3</sup> Herodot. vi, 49. κατηγορεῖον Ἀλγινήτων τὰ πεποιήκοιεν, προδόντες τὴν Ἑλλάδα.

placed the peace of Antalkidas side by side with the Pan-hellenic glories and ornaments at Olympia.<sup>1</sup>

Great must have been the change wrought by the intermediate events, when Sparta, the ostensible president of Greece, — in her own estimation even more than in that of others,<sup>2</sup> — had so lost all Pan-hellenic conscience and dignity, as to descend into an obsequious minister, procuring and enforcing a Persian mandate for political objects of her own. How insane would such an anticipation have appeared to Æschylus, or the audience who heard the Persæ! to Herodotus or Thucydides! to Perikles and Archidamus! nay, even to Kallikratidas or Lysander! It was the last consummation of a series of previous political sins, invoking more and more the intervention of Persia to aid her against her Grecian enemies.

Her first application to the Great King for this purpose dates from

<sup>1</sup> Isokrates, Orat. xii, (Panathen.) s. 112-114.

Plutarch (Agesil. c. 23; Artaxerxes, c. 21, 22) expresses himself in terms of bitter and well-merited indignation of this peace, — "if indeed (says he) we are to call this ignominy and betrayal of Greece by the name of *peace*, which brought with it as much infamy as the most disastrous war." Sparta (he says) lost her headship by her defeat at Leuktra, but her honor had been lost before, by the convention of Antalkidas.

It is in vain, however, that Plutarch tries to exonerate Agesilaus from any share in the peace. From the narrative (in Xenophon's Hellenica, v. i, 33) of his conduct at the taking of the oaths, we see that he espoused it most warmly. Xenophon (in the Encomium of Agesilaus, vii, 7) takes credit to Agesilaus for being *μισοπέρης*, which was true, from the year B.C. 396 to B.C. 394. But in B.C. 387, at the time of the peace of Antalkidas, he had become *μισοθηβαῖος*; his hatred of Persia had given place to hatred of Thebes.

See also a vigorous passage of Justin (viii, 4), denouncing the disgraceful position of the Greek cities at a later time in calling in Philip of Macedon as arbiter; a passage not less applicable to the peace of Antalkidas; and perhaps borrowed from Theopompus.

<sup>2</sup> Compare the language in which the Ionians, on their revolt from Darius king of Persia about 500 B.C., had implored the aid of Sparta (Herodot. v, 49). *Τὰ κατήκοντα γὰρ ἐστί ταῦτα· Ἰώνων παῖδας δούλους εἶναι ἂντ' ἐλευθέρων — δνείδος καὶ ἄλγος μέγιστον μὲν αὐτοῖσι ἡμῖν, ἐτι δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑμῖν, ὅσῳ προεστέατε τῆς Ἑλλάδος*.

How striking is the contrast between these words and the peace of Antalkidas! and what would have been the feelings of Herodotus himself if he could have heard of the latter event!



the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, and is prefaced by an apology, little less than humiliating, from king Archidamus who, not unconscious of the sort of treason which he was meditating, pleads that Sparta, when the Athenians are conspiring against her, ought not to be blamed for asking from foreigners as well as from Greeks aid for her own preservation.<sup>1</sup> From the earliest commencement to the seventh year of the war, many separate and successive envoys were despatched by the Spartans to Susa; two of whom were seized in Thrace, brought to Athens, and there put to death. The rest reached their destination, but talked in so confused a way, and contradicted each other so much, that the Persian court, unable to understand what they meant,<sup>2</sup> sent Artaphernes with letters to Sparta (in the seventh year of the war) complaining of such stupidity, and asking for clearer information. Artaphernes fell into the hands of an Athenian squadron at Eion on the Strymon, and was conveyed to Athens; where he was treated with great politeness, and sent back (after the letters which he carried had been examined) to Ephesus. What is more important to note is, that Athenian envoys were sent along with him, with a view of bringing Athens into friendly communication with the Great King; which was only prevented by the fact that Artaxerxes Longimanus just then died. Here we see the fatal practice, generated by intestine war, of invoking Persian aid; begun by Sparta as an importunate solicitor, — and partially imitated by Athens, though we do not know what her envoys were instructed to say, had they been able to reach Susa.

Nothing more is heard about Persian intervention until the year of the great Athenian disasters before Syracuse. Elate with the hopes arising out of that event, the Persians required no solicitation, but were quite as eager to tender interference for their own purposes, as Sparta was to invite them for hers. How ready Sparta was to purchase their aid by the surrender of the Asiatic

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i, 82. *Κάν τούτω καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν ἐξαρτίεσθαι ξυμμάχων τε προσαγωγῇ καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων, εἰ ποθέν τινα ἢ ναυτικῶν ἢ χρημάτων δύναμιν προσληφόμεθα, (ἀνεπίφθονον δὲ, δοκοῦν καὶ ἡμεῖς ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων ἐπιβουλευόμεθα, μὴ Ἑλλήνας μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ βαρβάρους προσλαβόντας διασωθῆναι), etc. Compare also Plato, Menexenus, c. 14, p. 243 B.*

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii, 7, 67; iv, 50.

Greeks, and that too without any stipulations in their favor, — has been recounted in my last volume.<sup>1</sup> She had not now the excuse, — for it stands only as an excuse and not as a justification — of self-defence against aggression from Athens, which Archidamus had produced at the beginning of the war. Even then it was only a colorable excuse, not borne out by the reality of the case; but now, the avowed as well as the real object was something quite different, — not to repel, but to crush, Athens. Yet to accomplish that object, not even of pretended safety, but of pure ambition, Sparta sacrificed unconditionally the liberty of her Asiatic kinsmen; a price which Archidamus at the beginning of the war would certainly never have endured the thoughts of paying, notwithstanding the then formidable power of Athens. Here, too, we find Athens following the example; and consenting, in hopes of procuring Persian aid, to the like sacrifice, though the bargain was never consummated. It is true that she was then contending for her existence. Nevertheless, the facts afford melancholy proof how much the sentiment of Pan-hellenic independence became enfeebled in both the leaders, amidst the fierce intestine conflict terminated by the battle of Ægospotami.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Vol. IX, Ch. LXXV, p. 360.

Compare the expressions of Demosthenes (cont. Aristokrat. c. 33, p. 666) attesting the prevalent indignation among the Athenians of his time, about this surrender of the Asiatic Greeks by Sparta, — and his oration De Rhodior. Libertate, c. 13, p. 199, where he sets the peace of Kallias, made by Athens with Persia in 449 B. C., in contrast with the peace of Antalkidas, contracted under the auspices of Sparta.

<sup>2</sup> This is strikingly set forth by Isokrates, Or. xii, (Panathen.) s. 167-173. In this passage, however, he distributes his blame too equally between Sparta and Athens, whereas the blame belongs of right to the former, in far greater proportion. Sparta not only began the practice of invoking the Great King, and invoking his aid by disgraceful concessions, — but she also carried it, at the peace of Antalkidas, to a more extreme point of selfishness and subservience. Athens is guilty of following the bad example of her rival, but to a less extent, and under greater excuse on the plea of necessity.

Isokrates says in another place of this discourse, respecting the various acts of wrong-doing towards the general interest of Hellas — *ἐπιεικτέον τοὺς μὲν ἡμετέρους ὀψιμαθεῖς αὐτῶν γεγενημένους, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ τὰ μὲν πρώτους, τὰ δὲ μόνους, ἐξαμαρτόντας* (Panath. s. 103). Which is much nearer the truth than the passage before referred to.



After that battle, the bargain between Sparta and Persia would doubtless have been fulfilled, and the Asiatic Greeks would have passed at once under the dominion of the latter, — had not an entirely new train of circumstances arisen out of the very peculiar position and designs of Cyrus. That young prince did all in his power to gain the affections of the Greeks, as auxiliaries for his ambitious speculations; in which speculations both Sparta and the Asiatic Greeks took part, compromising themselves irrevocably against Artaxerxes, and still more against Tissaphernes. Sparta thus became unintentionally the enemy of Persia, and found herself compelled to protect the Asiatic Greeks against his hostility, with which they were threatened; a protection easy for her to confer, not merely from the unbounded empire which she then enjoyed over the Grecian world, but from the presence of the renowned Cyreian Ten Thousand, and the contempt for Persian military strength which they brought home from their retreat. She thus finds herself in the exercise of a Pan-hellenic protectorate or presidency, first through the ministry of Derkyllidas, next of Agesilaus, who even sacrifices at Aulis, takes up the sceptre of Agamemnon, and contemplates large schemes of aggression against the Great King. Here, however, the Persians play against her the same game which she had invoked them to assist in playing against Athens. Their fleet, which fifteen years before she had invited for her own purposes, is now brought in against herself, and with far more effect, since her empire was more odious as well as more oppressive than the Athenian. It is now Athens and her allies who call in Persian aid; without any direct engagement, indeed, to surrender the Asiatic Greeks, for we are told that after the battle of Knidus, Konon incurred the displeasure of the Persians by his supposed plans for reuniting them with Athens,<sup>1</sup> and Athenian aid was still continued to Evagoras, — yet, nevertheless, indirectly paving the way for that consummation. If Athens and her allies here render themselves culpable of an abnegation of Pan-hellenic sentiment, we may remark, as before, that they act under the pressure of stronger necessities than could ever be pleaded by Sparta; and that they might employ on their own behalf, with much greater truth, the excuse of self-preservation preferred by king Archidamus.

<sup>1</sup> Cornelius Nepos. Conon. c. 5

But never on any occasion did that excuse find less real place than in regard to the mission of Antalkidas. Sparta was at that time so powerful, even after the loss of her maritime empire, that the allies at the Isthmus of Corinth, jealous of each other and held together only by common terror, could hardly stand on the defensive against her, and would probably have been disunited by reasonable offers on her part; nor would she have needed even to recall Agesilaus from Asia. Nevertheless, the mission was probably dictated in great measure by a groundless panic, arising from the sight of the revived Long Walls and re-fortified Piræus, and springing at once to the fancy, that a new Athenian empire, such as had existed forty years before, was about to start into life; a fancy little likely to be realized, since the very peculiar circumstances which had created the first Athenian empire were now totally reversed. Debarred from maritime empire herself, the first object with Sparta was, to shut out Athens from the like; the next, to put down all partial federations or political combinations, and to enforce universal autonomy, or the maximum of political isolation; in order that there might nowhere exist a power capable of resisting herself, the strongest of all individual states. As a means to this end, which was no less in the interest of Persia than in hers, she outbid all prior subserviencies to the Great King, betrayed to him not only one entire division of her Hellenic kinsmen, but also the general honor of the Hellenic name in the most flagrant manner, — and volunteered to *medise* in order that the Persians might repay her by *laconising*.<sup>1</sup> To ensure fully the obedience of all the satraps, who had more than once manifested dissentient views of their own, Antalkidas procured and brought down a formal order signed and sealed at Susa; and Sparta undertook, without shame or scruple, to enforce the same order, — “the convention sent down by the king,” — upon all her countrymen; thus converting them into the subjects, and herself into a sort of viceroy or satrap, of Artaxerxes. Such an act of treason to the Pan-hellenic cause was far more flagrant and destructive than that alleged confederacy with the Persian king, for which the Theban Ismenias was afterwards put to death, and that, too, by

<sup>1</sup> Isok. Or. iv, (Panegyric) s. 145. Καὶ τῷ βασιλεὶ τῆς Ἀσίας κρατοῦντι συμπράττουσι (the Lacedæmonians) δπως ὡς μεγίστην ἀρχὴν ἔξουσιν



the Spartans themselves.<sup>1</sup> Unhappily it formed a precedent for the future, and was closely copied afterwards by Thebes;<sup>2</sup> foreboding but too clearly the short career which Grecian political independence had to run.

That large patriotic sentiment, which dictated the magnanimous answer sent by the Athenians<sup>3</sup> to the offers of Mardonius in 479 B. C., refusing in the midst of ruin present and prospective, all temptation to betray the sanctity of Pan-hellenic fellowship, — that sentiment which had been during the two following generations the predominant inspiration of Athens, and had also been powerful, though always less powerful, at Sparta, — was now, in the former, overlaid by more pressing apprehensions, and in the latter completely extinguished. Now it was to the leading states that Greece had to look, for holding up the great banner of Pan-hellenic independence; from the smaller states nothing more could be required than that they should adhere to and defend it, when upheld.<sup>4</sup> But so soon as Sparta was seen to solicit and enforce, and Athens to accept (even under constraint), the proclamation under the king's hand and seal brought down by Antalkidas, — that banner was no longer a part of the public emblems of Gre-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 35.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33-39.

<sup>3</sup> Herodot. viii, 143.

The explanation which the Athenians give to the Spartan envoys, of the reasons and feelings which dictated their answer of refusal to Alexander (viii, 144), are not less impressive than the answer itself.

But whoever would duly feel and appreciate the treason of the Spartans in soliciting the convention of Antalkidas, should read in contrast with it that speech which their envoys address to the Athenians, in order to induce the latter to stand out against the temptations of Mardonius (viii, 142).

<sup>4</sup> The sixth oration (called Archidamus) of Isokrates sets forth emphatically the magnanimous sentiments, and comprehensive principles, on which it becomes Sparta to model her public conduct, — as altogether different from the simple considerations of prudence and security which are suitable to humbler states like Corinth, Epidauros, or Phlius (Archidamus, s. 105, 106, 110).

Contrast these lofty pretensions with the dishonorable realities of the convention of Antalkidas, — not thrust upon Sparta by superior force, but both originally sued out, and finally enforced by her, for her own political ends.

Compare also Isokrates, Or. xii, (Panathen.) s. 169-172, about the dissension of the leading Grecian states, and its baneful effects.

gian political life. The grand idea represented by it, — of eclectic self-determining Hellenism, — was left to dwell in the bosoms of individual patriots.

If we look at the convention of Antalkidas apart from its form and warranty, and with reference to its substance, we shall find that though its first article was unequivocally disgraceful, its last was at least popular as a promise to the ear. Universal autonomy, to each city, small or great, was dear to Grecian political instinct. I have already remarked more than once that the exaggerated force of this desire was the chief cause of the short duration of Grecian freedom. Absorbing all the powers of life to the separate parts, it left no vital force or integrity to the whole; especially, it robbed both each and all of the power of self-defence against foreign assailants. Though indispensable up to a certain point and under certain modifications, yet beyond these modifications, which Grecian political instinct was far from recognizing, it produced a great preponderance of mischief. Although, therefore, this item of the convention was in its promise acceptable and popular, — and although we shall find it hereafter invoked as a protection in various individual cases of injustice, — we must inquire how it was carried into execution, before we can pronounce whether it was good or evil, the present of a friend or of an enemy.

The succeeding pages will furnish an answer to this inquiry. The Lacedæmonians, as "presidents (guarantees or executors) of the peace, sent down by the king,"<sup>1</sup> undertook the duty of execution; and we shall see that from the beginning they meant nothing sincerely. They did not even attempt any sincere and steady compliance with the honest, though undistinguishing, political instinct of the Greek mind; much less did they seek to grant as much as was really good, and to withhold the remainder. They defined autonomy in such manner, and meted it out in such portions, as suited their own political interests and purposes. The

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 36.

<sup>2</sup> Ἐν δὲ τῷ πολέμῳ μᾶλλον ἀντιβρόπως τοῖς ἐναντίοις πράττοντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, πολλὸν ἐπικυδέστεροι ἐγένοντο ἐκ τῆς ἐπ' Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνης καλουμένης προστάτα. γὰρ, γενόμενοι τῆς ὑπὸ βασιλέως καταπεμφθείσης εἰρήνης καὶ τὴν αὐτονομίαν ταῖς πόλεσι πράττοντες, etc



promise made by the convention, except in so far as it enabled them to increase their own power by dismemberment or party intervention, proved altogether false and hollow. For if we look back to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when they sent to Athens to require general autonomy throughout Greece, we shall find that the word had then a distinct and serious import; demanding that the cities held in dependence by Athens should be left free, which freedom Sparta might have ensured for them herself at the close of the war, had she not preferred to convert it into a far harsher empire. But in 387 (the date of the peace of Antalkidas) there were no large body of subjects to be emancipated, except the allies of Sparta herself, to whom it was by no means intended to apply. So that in fact, what was promised, as well as what was realized, even by the most specious item of this disgraceful convention, was — "that cities should enjoy autonomy, not for their own comfort and in their own way, but for Lacedæmonian convenience;" a significant phrase (employed by Perikles,<sup>1</sup> in the debates preceding the Peloponnesian war) which forms a sort of running text for Grecian history during the sixteen years between the peace of Antalkidas and the battle of Leuktra.

I have already mentioned that the first two applications of the newly-proclaimed autonomy, made by the Lacedæmonians, were to extort from the Corinthian government the dismissal of its Argeian auxiliaries, and to compel Thebes to renounce her ancient presidency of the Bœotian federation. The latter especially was an object which they had long had at heart;<sup>2</sup> and by both, their ascendancy in Greece was much increased. Athens, too, terrified by the new development of Persian force as well as partially bribed by the restoration of her three islands, into an acceptance of the peace, — was thus robbed of her Theban and Corinthian allies, and disabled from opposing the Spartan projects. But before we enter upon these projects, it will be convenient to turn for a short time to the proceedings of the Persians.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i, 144. *Νῦν δὲ τοῦτοις (to the Lacedæmonian envoys) ἀποκρινόμενοι ἀποπέμψωμεν . . . τὰς δὲ πόλεις ὅτι αὐτονόμους ἀφήσομεν, αἱ καὶ αὐτονόμους ἔχοντες ἐσπευσάμεθα, καὶ ὅταν κάκεῖνοι ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀποδῶσι πόλεις μὴ σφίσι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐπιτηδείως αὐτονομεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ αὐτοῖς ἐκάστοις, ὥς βούλονται*

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 36. *οὐπὲρ πάλαι ἐπεθύμουν.*

Even before the death of Darius Nothus (father of Artaxerxes and Cyrus) Egypt had revolted from the Persians, under a native prince named Amyrtæus. To the Grecian leaders who accompanied Cyrus in his expedition against his brother, this revolt was well known to have much incensed the Persians; so that Klearchus, in the conversation which took place after the death of Cyrus about accommodation with Artaxerxes, intimated that the Ten Thousand could lend him effectual aid in reconquering Egypt.<sup>1</sup> It was not merely these Greeks who were exposed to danger by the death of Cyrus, but also the various Persians and other subjects who had lent assistance to him; all of whom made submission and tried to conciliate Artaxerxes, except Tamos, who had commanded the fleet of Cyrus on the coasts both of Ionia and Kilikia. Such was the alarm of Tamos when Tissaphernes came down in full power to the coast, that he fled with his fleet and treasures to Egypt, to seek protection from king Psammetichus, to whom he had rendered valuable service. This traitor, however, having so valuable a deposit brought to him, forgot every thing else in his avidity to make it sure, and put to death Tamos with all his children.<sup>2</sup> About 395 B. C., we find Nephereus king of Egypt lending aid to the Lacedæmonian fleet against Artaxerxes.<sup>3</sup> Two years afterwards (392–390 B. C.), during the years immediately succeeding the victory of Knidus, and the voyage of Pharnabazus across the Ægean to Peloponnesus, — we hear of that satrap as employed with Abrokomas and Tithraustes in strenuous but unavailing efforts to reconquer Egypt.<sup>4</sup> Having thus

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 13.

It would appear that the revolt of Egypt from Persia must date between 414–411 B. C.; but this point is obscure. See Boeckh, *Manetho und die Handstern-Periode*, pp. 358, 363, Berlin 1845; and Ley, *Fata et Conditio Egypti sub Imperio Persarum*, p. 55.

M. Rehdantz, *Vitæ Iphicratis, Timothei, et Chabriæ*, p. 240, places the revolt rather earlier, about 414 B. C.; and Mr. Fynes Clinton (*Fasti Hellenici*, Appendix, ch. 18, p. 317) countenances the same date.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 35.

This Psammetichus is presumed by Ley (in his *Dissertation* above cited, p. 20) to be the same person as Amyrtæus the Saite in the list of Manetho, under a different name. It is also possible, however, that he may have been king over a part of Egypt, contemporaneous with Amyrtæus.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiv, 79.

<sup>4</sup> This is the chronology laid down by M. Rehdantz (*Vitæ Iphicratis*,



repulsed the Persians, the Egyptian king Akoras is found between 390–380 B. C.,<sup>1</sup> sending aid to Evagoras in Cyprus against the same enemy. And in spite of farther efforts made afterwards by Artaxerxes to reconquer Egypt, the native kings in that country maintained their independence for about sixty years in all, until the reign of his successor Ochus.

But it was a Grecian enemy, — of means inferior, yet of qualities much superior, to any of these Egyptians, — who occupied the chief attention of the Persians immediately after the peace of Antalkidas; Evagoras, despot of Salamis in Cyprus. Respecting that prince we possess a discourse of the most glowing and superabundant eulogy, composed after his death for the satisfaction (and probably paid for with the money) of his son and successor Nikoklês, by the contemporary Isokrates. Allowing as we must do for exaggeration and partiality, even the trustworthy features of the picture are sufficiently interesting.

Evagoras belonged to a Salaminian stock of Gens called the Teukridæ, which numbered among its ancestors the splendid legendary names of Teukrus, Telamon, and Æakus; taking its departure, through them, from the divine name of Zeus. It was believed that the archer Teukrus, after returning from the siege of Troy to (the Athenian) Salamis, had emigrated under a harsh order from his father Telamon, and given commencement to the city of that name on the eastern coast of Cyprus.<sup>2</sup> As in Sicily, so in Cyprus, the Greek and Phœnician elements were found in near contact, though in very different proportions. Of the nine or ten separate city communities, which divided among them the whole sea-coast, the inferior towns being all dependent upon one

Chabriæ. et Timothei, Epimetr. ii, pp. 241, 242) on very probable grounds, principally from Isokrates, Orat. iv, (Panegy.) s. 161, 162.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 2, 3.

<sup>2</sup> Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokl.) s. 50; Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 21; Pausanias, ii, 29, 4; Diodor. xiv, 98.

The historian Theopompus, when entering upon the history of Evagoras, seems to have related many legendary tales respecting the Greek Gentes in Cyprus, and to have represented Agamemnon himself as ultimately migrating to it (Theopompus, Frag. 111, ed. Wichers; and ed. Didot. ap. Photium)

The tomb of the archer Teukrus was shown at Salamis in Cyprus. See the Epigram of Aristotle, Antholog. i, 8, 112.

or other of them, — seven pass for Hellenic, the two most considerable being Salamis and Soli; three for Phœnician, — Paphos, Amathus, and Kitium. Probably, however, there was in each a mixture of Greek and Phœnician population, in different proportions.<sup>1</sup> Each was ruled by its own separate prince or despot, Greek or Phœnician. The Greek immigrations (though their exact date cannot be assigned) appear to have been later in date than the Phœnician. At the time of the Ionic revolt (B. C. 496), the preponderance was on the side of Hellenism; yet with considerable intermixture of Oriental custom. Hellenism was, however, greatly crushed by the Persian reconquest of the revolters, accomplished through the aid of the Phœnicians<sup>2</sup> on the opposite continent. And though doubtless the victories of Kimon and the Athenians (470–450 B. C.) partially revived it, yet Perikles, in his pacification with the Persians, had prudently relinquished Cyprus as well as Egypt;<sup>3</sup> so that the Grecian element in the former,

<sup>1</sup> Mövers, in his very learned investigations respecting the Phœnicians (vol. iii, ch. 5, p. 203–221 *seq.*), attempts to establish the existence of an ancient population in Cyprus, called Kitians; once extended over the island, and of which the town called Kitium was the remnant. He supposes them to have been a portion of the Canaanitish population, anterior to the Jewish occupation of Palestine. The Phœnician colonies in Cyprus he reckons as of later date, superadded to, and depressing these natives. He supposes the Kilikian population to have been in early times Canaanitish also. Engel (Kypros, vol. i, p. 166) inclines to admit the same hypothesis as highly probable.

The sixth century B. C. (from 600 downwards) appears to have been very unfavorable to the Phœnicians, bringing upon Tyre severe pressure from the Chaldeans, as it brought captivity upon the Jews. During the same period, the Grecian commerce with Egypt was greatly extended, especially by the reign of the Phil-hellenic Amasis, who acquired possession of Cyprus. Much of the Grecian immigration into Cyprus probably took place at this time; we know of one body of settlers invited by Philokyprus to Soli, under the assistance of the Athenian Solon (Mövers, p. 244 *seq.*).

<sup>2</sup> Herodot. v, 109.

Compare the description given by Herodotus of the costume and arms of the Cypriots in the armament of Xerxes, — half Oriental (vii, 90). The Salaminians used chariots of war in battle (v, 113); as the Carthaginians did, before they learnt the art of training elephants (Diodor. xvi, 80; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27).

<sup>3</sup> See Vol. V. of this History, Ch. xlv, p. 335.



receiving little extraneous encouragement, became more and more subordinate to the Phœnician.

It was somewhere about this time that the reigning princes of Salamis, who at the time of the Ionic revolt had been Greeks of the Teukrid Gens,<sup>1</sup> were supplanted and dethroned by a Phœnician exile who gained their confidence and made himself despot in their place.<sup>2</sup> To insure his own sceptre, this usurper did everything in his power to multiply and strengthen the Phœnician population, as well as to discourage and degrade the Hellenic. The same policy was not only continued by his successor at Salamis, but seems also to have been imitated in several of the other towns; insomuch that during most part of the Peloponnesian war, Cyprus became sensibly dis-hellenized. The Greeks in the island were harshly oppressed; new Greek visitors and merchants were kept off by the most repulsive treatment, as well as by threats of those cruel mutilations of the body which were habitually employed as penalties by the Orientals; while Grecian arts, education, music, poetry, and intelligence, were rapidly on the decline.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> One of these princes, however, is mentioned as bearing the Phœnician name of Siromus (Herod. v, 104).

<sup>2</sup> We may gather this by putting together Herodot. iv, 162; v, 104-114, with Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 22.

<sup>3</sup> Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 23, 55, 58.

Παραλαβὼν γὰρ (Evagoras) τὴν πόλιν ἐκβεβαρβαρωμένην, καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν Φοινίκων ἀρχὴν οὐτε τοὺς Ἕλληνας προσδεχομένην, οὐτε τέχνας ἐπισταμένην, οὐτ' ἐμπορίῳ χρωμένην, οὐτε λίμενα κεκτημένην, etc.

Πρὶν μὲν γὰρ λαβεῖν Εὐαγόραν τὴν ἀρχὴν, οὕτως ἀπροσίοιστως καὶ χαλεπῶς εἶχον, ὥστε καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων τοὺς ἐνόμιζον εἶναι βελτίστους οἱ τινες ὁμότατα πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας διακείμενοι τυγχάνοιεν, etc.

This last passage receives remarkable illustration from the oration of Lysias against Andokides, in which he alludes to the visit of the latter to Cyprus — μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐπλευσεν ὡς τὸν Κιτιέων βασιλέα, καὶ προδιδοῦς λεηστὴς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐδέθη, καὶ οὐ μόνον τὸν θάνατον ἐφοβεῖτο ἀλλὰ τὰ καθ' ἡμέραν αἰκίσματα, οἵοντος τὰ ἀκρωτήρια ζῶντος ἀποτμηθῆσθαι (s. 26).

Engel (Kypros, vol. i, §. 286) impugns the general correctness of this narrative of Isokrates. He produces no adequate reasons, nor do I myself see any, for this contradiction.

Not only Konon, but also his friend Nikophemus, had a wife and family at Cyprus, besides another family in Athens (Lysias, De Bonis Aristophanis, Or. xix, s. 38).

Notwithstanding such untoward circumstances, in which the youth of the Teukrid Evagoras at Salamis was passed, he manifested at an early age so much energy both of mind and body, and so much power of winning popularity, that he became at once a marked man both among Greeks and Phœnicians. It was about this time that the Phœnician despot was slain, through a conspiracy formed by a Kitian or Tyrian named Abdémon, who got possession of his sceptre.<sup>1</sup> The usurper, mistrustful of his position, and anxious to lay hands upon all conspicuous persons who might be capable of doing him mischief, tried to seize Evagoras; but the latter escaped and passed over to Soli and Kilikia. Though thus to all appearance a helpless exile, he found means to strike a decisive blow, while the new usurpation, stained by its first violences and rapacity, was surrounded by enemies, doubters, or neutrals, without having yet established any firm footing. He crossed over from Soli in Kilikia, with a small but determined band of about fifty followers, — obtained secret admission by a postern gate of Salamis, — and assaulted Abdémon by night in his palace. In spite of a vastly superior number of guards, this enterprise was conducted with such extraordinary daring and judgment, that Abdémon perished, and Evagoras became despot in his place.<sup>2</sup>

The splendor of this exploit was quite sufficient to seat Evagoras unopposed on the throne, amidst a population always accustomed to princely government; while among the Salaminian Greeks he was still farther endeared by his Teukrid descent.<sup>3</sup> His conduct fully justified the expectations entertained. Not merely did he refrain from bloodshed, or spoliation, or violence for

<sup>1</sup> Theopompus (Fr. 111) calls Abdémon a Kitian; Diodorus (xiv, 98) calls him a Tyrian. Mövers (p. 206) thinks that both are correct, and that he was a Kitian living at Tyre, who had migrated from Salamis during the Athenian preponderance there. There were Kitians, not natives of the town of Kition, but belonging to the ancient population of the island, living in the various towns of Cyprus; and there were also Kitians mentioned as resident at Sidon (Diogen. Laert. Vit. Zenon. s. 6).

<sup>2</sup> Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 29-35; also Or. iii, (Nikokl.) s. 33; Theopomp. Fragm. 111, ed. Wichers and ed. Didot. Diodor. xiv, 98.

The two latter mention the name, Audymon or Abdémon, which Isokrates does not specify.

<sup>3</sup> Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokles) s. 33.



the gratification of personal appetite; abstinences remarkable enough in any Grecian despot to stamp his reign with letters of gold, and the more remarkable in Evagoras, since he had the susceptible temperament of a Greek, though his great mental force always kept it under due control.<sup>1</sup> But he was also careful in inquiring into, and strict in punishing crime, yet without those demonstrations of cruel infliction by which an Oriental prince displayed his energy.<sup>2</sup> His government was at the same time highly popular and conciliating, as well towards the multitude as towards individuals. Indefatigable in his own personal supervision, he examined everything for himself, shaped out his own line of policy, and kept watch over its execution.<sup>3</sup> He was foremost in all effort and in all danger. Maintaining undisturbed security, he gradually doubled the wealth, commerce, industry, and military force, of the city, while his own popularity and renown went on increasing.

Above all, it was his first wish to renovate, both in Salamis and in Cyprus, that Hellenism which the Phœnician despots of the last fifty years had done so much to extinguish or corrupt. For aid in this scheme, he seems to have turned his thoughts to Athens, with which city he was connected as a Teukrid, by gentile and legendary sympathies, — and which was then only just ceasing to be the great naval power of the Ægean. For though we cannot exactly make out the date at which Evagoras began to reign, we

<sup>1</sup> Isokrat. Or. ix, s. 53. ἡγούμενος τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀγόμενος ὑπ' αὐτῶν, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Isokr. Or. ix, 51. οὐδένα μὲν ἀδικῶν, τοὺς δὲ χρηστοὺς τιμῶν, καὶ σφόδρ' αὖν ἀπάντων ἀρχῶν, νομίμως δὲ τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας κολύζων (s. 58) — ὅς οὐ μόνον τὴν αὐτοῦ πόλιν πλείονος ἀξίαν ἐποίησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν τόπον ὅλον, τὸν περιέχοντα τὴν νῆσον, ἐπὶ πρᾶσι καὶ μετρί-  
ότητα προήγαγεν, etc.; compare s. 81.

These epithets, *lawful punishment, mild dealing*, etc., cannot be fully understood except in contrast with the mutilations alluded to by Lysias, in the passage cited in a note on page 16, above; also with exactly similar mutilations, mentioned by Xenophon as systematically inflicted upon offenders by Cyrus the younger (Xenoph. Anab. i, 9, 13). Οὐδέεις γὰρ ἡμῶν (says Isokrates about the Persians) οὕτως ἀκίχεται τοὺς οἰκέτας, ὥς ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους κολύζουσιν — Or. iv, (Paneg.) 142.

<sup>3</sup> Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 50–56.

The language of the encomiast, though exaggerated, must doubtless be founded in truth, as the result shows.

may conclude it to have been about 411 or 410 B. C. It seems to have been shortly after that period that he was visited by Andokides the Athenian;<sup>1</sup> moreover, he must have been a prince not merely established, but powerful, when he ventured to harbor Konon in 405 B. C., after the battle of Ægospotami. He invited to Salamis fresh immigrants from Attica and other parts of Greece, as the prince Philokyprus of Soli had done under the auspices of Solon,<sup>2</sup> a century and a half before. He took especial pains to revive and improve Grecian letters, arts, teaching, music, and intellectual tendencies. Such encouragement was so successfully administered, that in a few years, without constraint or violence, the face of Salamis was changed. The gentleness and sociability, the fashions and pursuits, of Hellenism, became again predominant; with great influence of example over all the other towns of the island.

Had the rise of Evagoras taken place a few years earlier, Athens might perhaps have availed herself of the opening to turn her ambition eastward, in preference to that disastrous impulse which led her westward to Sicily. But coming as he did only at that later moment when she was hard pressed to keep up even a defensive war, he profited rather by her weakness than by her strength. During those closing years of the war, when the Athenian empire was partially broken up, and when the Ægean, instead of the tranquillity which it had enjoyed for fifty years under Athens, became a scene of contest between two rival money-levying fleets, — many out-settlers from Athens, who had acquired property in the islands, the Chersonesus, or elsewhere, under her guarantee, found themselves insecure in every way, and were tempted to change their abodes. Finally, by the defeat of Ægospotami (B. C. 405), all such out-settlers as then remained were expelled, and forced to seek shelter either at Athens (at that moment the least attractive place in Greece), or in some other locality. To such persons, not less than to the Athenian admiral Konon with his small remnant of Athenian triremes saved out of the great defeat, the proclaimed invitations of Evagoras would present a harbor of refuge nowhere else to be found. Accordingly, we learn that numerous settlers of the best character, from

<sup>1</sup> Lysias cont. Andokid. s. 28.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Solon, c. 26.



different parts of Greece, crowded to Salamis.<sup>1</sup> Many Athenian women, during the years of destitution and suffering which preceded as well as followed the battle of Ægospotami, were well pleased to emigrate and find husbands in that city;<sup>2</sup> while throughout the wide range of the Lacedæmonian empire, the numerous victims exiled by the harmosts and dekarchies had no other retreat on the whole so safe and tempting. The extensive plain of Salamis afforded lands for many colonists. On what conditions, indeed, they were admitted, we do not know; but the conduct of Evagoras as a ruler, gave universal satisfaction.

During the first years of his reign, Evagoras doubtless paid his tribute regularly, and took no steps calculated to offend the Persian king. But as his power increased, his ambition increased also. We find him towards the year 390 B. C., engaged in a struggle not merely with the Persian king, but with Amathus and Kitium in his own island, and with the great Phœnician cities on the mainland. By what steps, or at what precise period, this war began, we cannot determine. At the time of the battle of Knidus (394 B. C.) Evagoras had not only paid his tribute, but was mainly instrumental in getting the Persian fleet placed under Konon to

<sup>1</sup> Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 59-61; compare Lysias, Or. xix, (De Aristoph. Bon.) s. 38-46; and Diodor. xiv, 98.

<sup>2</sup> Isokrates, *l. c.* παιδοποιεῖσθαι δὲ τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶν γυναῖκας λαμβάνοντες παρ' ἡμῶν, etc.

For the extreme distress of Athenian women during these trying times consult the statement in Xenophon, Memorab. ii, 7, 2-4.

The Athenian Andokides is accused of having carried out a young woman of citizen family,—his own cousin, and daughter of an Athenian named Aristides,—to Cyprus, and there to have sold her to the despot of Kitium for a cargo of wheat. But being threatened with prosecution for this act before the Athenian Dikastery, he stole her away again and brought her back to Athens; in which act, however, he was detected by the prince, and punished with imprisonment from which he had the good fortune to escape. (Plutarch, Vit. X, Orat. p. 834; Photius, Cod. 261; Tzetzes, Chiliad. vi, 367).

How much there may be of truth in this accusation, we have no means of determining. But it illustrates the way in which the Athenian maidens, who had no dowry at home, were provided for by their relatives elsewhere. Probably Andokides took this young woman out, under the engagement to find a Grecian husband for her in Cyprus. Instead of doing this, he sold her for his own profit to the harem of the prince; or at least, is accused of having so sold her.

act against the Lacedæmonians, himself serving aboard.<sup>1</sup> It was in fact (if we may believe Isokrates) to the extraordinary energy, ability, and power, displayed by him on that occasion in the service of Artaxerxes himself, that the jealousy and alarm of the latter against him are to be ascribed. Without any provocation, and at the very moment when he was profiting by the zealous services of Evagoras, the Great King treacherously began to manoeuvre against him, and forced him into the war in self-defence.<sup>2</sup> Evagoras accepted the challenge, in spite of the disparity of strength, with such courage and efficiency, that he at first gained marked successes. Seconded by his son Pnytagoras, he not only worsted and humbled Amathus, Kitium, and Soli, which cities, under the prince Agyris, adhered to Artaxerxes,—but also equipped a large fleet, attacked the Phœnicians on the mainland with so much vigor as even to take the great city of Tyre; prevailing, moreover, upon some of the Kilikian towns to declare against the Persians.<sup>3</sup> He received powerful aid from Akoria, the native and independent king in Egypt, as well as from Chabrias and the force sent out by the Athenians.<sup>4</sup> Beginning apparently about 390 B. C., the war against Evagoras lasted something more than ten years, costing the Persians great efforts and an immense expenditure of money. Twice did Athens send a squadron to his assistance, from gratitude for his long protection to Konon and his energetic efforts before and in the battle of Knidus,—though she thereby ran every risk of making the Persians her enemies.

The satrap Tiribazus saw that so long as he had on his hands

<sup>1</sup> This much appears even from the meagre abstract of Ktesias, given by Photius (Ktesias Persica, c. 63, p. 80, ed. Bähr).

Both Ktesias and Theopompus (Fr. iii, ed. Wichers, and ed. Didot) recounted the causes which brought about the war between the Persian king and Evagoras.

<sup>2</sup> Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 71, 73, 74. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτον (Evagoras) οὕτως ἐκ πολλοῦ περιδεῶς ἔσχε (Artaxerxes), ὥστε μεταξὺ πάσων ἐδύπολεμειν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπεχείρησε, δίκαια μὲν οὐ ποιών, etc.—ἐπειδὴ ἦνα γ' ἐάσθ' ἡ πολεμεῖν (*i. e.* Evagoras).

<sup>3</sup> Isokr. Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 75, 76; Diodor. xiv, 98; Ephorus, Frag. 134, ed. Didot.

<sup>4</sup> Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c. 2; Demosthenes adv. Leptinem, p. 479 s. 84.



a war in Greece, it was impossible for him to concentrate his force against the prince of Salamis and the Egyptians. Hence, in part, the extraordinary effort made by the Persians to dictate, in conjunction with Sparta, the peace of Antalkidas, and to get together such a fleet in Ionia as should overawe Athens and Thebes into submission. It was one of the conditions of that peace that Evagoras should be abandoned;<sup>1</sup> the whole island of Cyprus being acknowledged as belonging to the Persian king. Though thus cut off from Athens, and reduced to no other Grecian aid than such mercenaries as he could pay, Evagoras was still assisted by Akoris of Egypt, and even by Hekatomnus prince of Karia with a secret present of money.<sup>2</sup> But the peace of Antalkidas being now executed in Asia, the Persian satraps were completely masters of the Grecian cities on the Asiatic seaboard, and were enabled to convey round to Kilikia and Cyprus not only their whole fleet from Ionia, but also additional contingents from these very Grecian cities. A large portion of the Persian force acting against Cyprus was thus Greek, yet seemingly acting by constraint, neither well paid nor well used,<sup>3</sup> and therefore not very efficient.

The satraps Tiribazus and Orontes commanded the land force, a large portion of which was transported across to Cyprus; the admiral Gaos was at the head of the fleet, which held its station at Kitium in the south of the island. It was here that Evagoras having previously gained a battle on land, attacked them. By extraordinary efforts he had got together a fleet of two hundred triremes, nearly equal in number to theirs; but after a hard-fought

<sup>1</sup> Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegy.) s. 162. *Εὐαγόραν — ὅς ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις ἐκδοτός ἐστίν*, etc.

We must observe, however, that Cyprus had been secured to the king of Persia, even under the former peace, so glorious to Athens, concluded by Perikles about 449 B. C., and called the peace of Kallias. It was, therefore, neither a new demand on the part of Artaxerxes, nor a new concession on the part of the Greeks, at the peace of Antalkidas.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv, 2.

It appears that Artaxerxes had counted much upon the aid of Hekatomnus for conquering Evagoras (Diodor. xiv, 98).

About 380 B. C., Isokrates reckons Hekatomnus as being merely dependent in name on Persia; and ready to revolt openly on the first opportunity (Isokrates, Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 189).

<sup>3</sup> Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegy.) s. 153, 154, 179.

contest, in which he at first seemed likely to be victorious, he underwent a complete naval defeat, which disqualified him from keeping the sea, and enabled the Persians to block up Salamis as well by sea as by land.<sup>1</sup> Though thus reduced to his own single city, however, Evagoras defended himself with unshaken resolution, still sustained by aid from Akoris in Egypt; while Tyre and several towns in Kilikia also continued in revolt against Artaxerxes; so that the efforts of the Persians were distracted, and the war was not concluded until ten years after its commencement.<sup>2</sup> It cost them on the whole (if we may believe Isokrates)<sup>3</sup> fifteen thousand talents in money, and such severe losses in men, that Tiribazus acceded to the propositions of Evagoras for peace, consenting to leave him in full possession of Salamis, under payment of a stipulated tribute, "like a slave to his master." These last words were required by the satrap to be literally inserted in the convention; but Evagoras peremptorily refused his consent, demanding that the tribute should be recognized as paid by "one

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 4.

<sup>2</sup> Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegy.) s. 187, 188 — with Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 77.

The war was not concluded, — and Tyre as well as much of Kilikia was still in revolt, — when Isokrates published the Panegyric Oration. At that time, Evagoras had maintained the contest six years, counting either from the peace of Antalkidas (387 B. C.) or from his naval defeat about a year or two afterwards; for Isokrates does not make it quite clear from what point of commencement he reckons the six years.

We know that the war between the king of Persia and Evagoras has begun as early as 390 B. C., in which year an Athenian fleet was sent to assist the latter (Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 24). Both Isokrates and Diodorus state that it lasted ten years; and I therefore place the conclusion of it in 380 or 379 B. C., soon after the date of the Panegyric Oration of Isokrates. I dissent on this point from Mr. Clinton (see *Fasti Hellenici*, ad annos 387–376 B. C., and his Appendix, No. 12 — where the point is discussed). He supposes the war to have begun after the peace of Antalkidas, and to have ended in 376 B. C. I agree with him in making light of Diodorus, but he appears to me on this occasion to contradict the authority of Xenophon, — or at least only to evade the necessity of contradicting him by resorting to an inconvenient hypothesis, and by representing the two Athenian expeditions sent to assist Evagoras in Cyprus, first in 390 B. C., next in 388 B. C., as relating to "hostile measures before the war began" (p. 280). To me it appears more natural and reasonable to include these as a part of the war.

Isokrates, Or. ix, s. 73–76.



king to another." Rather than concede this point of honor, he even broke off the negotiation, and resolved again to defend himself to the uttermost. He was rescued, after the siege had been yet farther prolonged, by a dispute which broke out between the two commanders of the Persian army. Orontes, accusing Tiribazus of projected treason and rebellion against the king, in conjunction with Sparta, caused him to be sent for as prisoner to Susa, and thus became sole commander. But as the besieging army was already wearied out by the obstinate resistance of Salamis, he consented to grant the capitulation, stipulating only for the tribute, and exchanging the offensive phrase enforced by Tiribazus, for the amendment of the other side.<sup>1</sup>

It was thus that Evagoras was relieved from his besieging enemies, and continued for the remainder of his life as tributary prince of Salamis under the Persians. He was no farther engaged in war, nor was his general popularity among the Salaminians diminished by the hardships which they had gone through along with him.<sup>2</sup> His prudence calmed the rankling antipathy of the Great King, who would gladly have found a pretext for breaking the treaty. His children were numerous, and lived in harmony as well with him as with each other. Isokrates specially notices this fact, standing as it did in marked contrast with the family-relations of most of the Grecian despots, usually stained with jealousies, antipathies, and conflict, often with actual bloodshed.<sup>3</sup> But he omits to notice the incident whereby Evagoras perished; an incident not in keeping with that superhuman good fortune and favor from the gods, of which the Panegyric Oration boasts as having been vouchsafed to the hero throughout his life.<sup>4</sup> It was seemingly not very long after the peace, that a Sa-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 8, 9.

This remarkable anecdote, of susceptible Grecian honor on the part of Evagoras, is noway improbable, and seems safe to admit on the authority of Diodorus. Nevertheless, it forms so choice a morsel for a panegyric discourse such as that of Isokrates, that one cannot but think he would have inserted it had it come to his knowledge. His silence causes great surprise — not without some suspicion as to the truth of the story.

<sup>2</sup> Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokles) s. 40, — a passage which must be more true of Evagoras than of Nikokles.

<sup>3</sup> Isokrat. Or. ix, s. 88. Compare his Orat. viii, (De Pace) s. 130.

<sup>4</sup> Isokrates, ib. s. 85. *εὐτυχέστερον καὶ θεοφιλέστερον*, etc.

laminian named Nikokreon formed a conspiracy against his life and dominion, but was detected, by a singular accident, before the moment of execution, and forced to seek safety in flight. He left behind him a youthful daughter in his harem, under the care of an eunuch (a Greek, born in Elis) named Thrasydæus; who, full of vindictive sympathy in his master's cause, made known the beauty of the young lady both to Evagoras himself and to Pnytagoras, the most distinguished of his sons, partner in the gallant defence of Salamis against the Persians. Both of them were tempted, each unknown to the other, to make a secret assignation for being conducted to her chamber by the eunuch; both of them were there assassinated by his hand.<sup>1</sup>

Thus perished a Greek of preeminent vigor and intelligence, remarkably free from the vices usual in Grecian despots, and form-

<sup>1</sup> I give this incident, in the main, as it is recounted in the fragment of Theopompus, preserved as a portion of the abstract of that author by Photius (Theopom. Fr. 111, ed. Wickers and ed. Didot).

Both Aristotle (Polit. v, 8, 10) and Diodorus (xv, 47) allude to the assassination of Evagoras by the eunuch; but both these authors conceive the story differently from Theopompus. Thus Diodorus says — Nikoklēs, the eunuch, assassinated Evagoras, and became "despot of Salamis." This appears to be a confusion of Nikoklēs with Nikokreon. Nikoklēs was the son of Evagoras, and the manner in which Isokrates addresses him affords the surest proof that he had no hand in the death of his father.

The words of Aristotle are — *ἡ (ἐπίθεσις) τοῦ εὐνοῦχου Εὐαγόρα τῷ Κυπρίῳ* διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν γυναῖκα παρελθεῖν τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἀπέκτεινεν ὡς ὑβρισμὲνος. So perplexing is the passage in its literal sense, that M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, in the note to his translation, conceives *ὁ εὐνοῦχος* to be a surname or sobriquet given to the conspirator, whose real name was Nikoklēs. But this supposition is, in my judgment, contradicted by the fact, that Theopompus marks the same fact, of the assassin being an eunuch, by another word — *Θρασυδαῖον τοῦ ἡμιάρβενος*, ὅς ἦν Ἑλλείος τὸ γένος, etc.

It is evident that Aristotle had heard the story differently from Theopompus, and we have to choose between the two. I prefer the version of the latter; which is more marked as well as more intelligible, and which furnishes the explanation why Pnytagoras, — who seems to have been the most advanced of the sons, being left in command of the besieged Salamis when Evagoras quitted it to solicit aid in Egypt, — did not succeed his father, but left the succession to Nikoklēs, who was evidently (from the representation even of an eulogist like Isokrates) not a man of much energy. The position of this eunuch in the family of Nikokreon seems to mark the partial prevalence of Oriental habits.



ing a strong contrast in this respect with his contemporary Dionysius, whose military energy is so deeply stained by crime and violence. Nikoklēs, the son of Evagoras, reigned at Salamis after him, and showed much regard, accompanied by munificent presents, to the Athenian Isokrates; who compliments him as a pacific and well-disposed prince, attached to Greek pursuits and arts, conversant by personal study with Greek philosophy, and above all, copying his father in that just dealing and absence of wrong towards person or property, which had so much promoted the comfort as well as the prosperity of the city.<sup>1</sup>

We now revert from the episode respecting Evagoras, — interesting not less from the eminent qualities of that prince than from the glimpse of Hellenism struggling with the Phœnician element in Cyprus, — to the general consequences of the peace of Antalkidas in Central Greece. For the first time since the battle of Mykalē in 479 B. C., the Persians were now really masters of all the Greeks on the Asiatic coast. The satraps lost no time in confirming their dominion. In all the cities which they suspected, they built citadels and planted permanent garrisons. In some cases, their mistrust or displeasure was carried so far as to raze the town altogether.<sup>2</sup> And thus these cities, having already once changed their position greatly for the worse, by passing from easy subjection under Athens to the harsh rule of Lacedæmonian harlots and native decemvirs, — were now transferred to masters yet more oppressive and more completely without the pale of Hellenic sympathy. Both in public extortion, and in wrong doing towards individuals, the commandant and his mercenaries, whom the satrap maintained, were probably more rapacious, and certainly more unrestrained, than even the harlots of Sparta. Moreover, the Persian grandees required beautiful boys as eunuchs for their service, and beautiful women as inmates of their harems.<sup>3</sup> What was taken for their convenience admitted neither

<sup>1</sup> Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikoklēs) s. 38–48; Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 100; Or. xv, (Permut.) s. 43. Diodorus (xv. 47) places the assassination of Evagoras in 374 B. C.

<sup>2</sup> Isokrates, Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 142, 156, 190. *Τὰς τε πόλεις τὰς Ἑλληνίδας οὕτω κυρίως παρείληφεν, ὥστε τὰς μὲν κατασκάπτειν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀκροπόλεις ἐντειχίζειν.*

<sup>3</sup> See Herodot. vi, 9; ix, 76.

of recovery nor redress; and Grecian women, if not more beautiful than many of the native Asiatics, were at least more intelligent, lively, and seductive, — as we may read in the history of that Phœnæan lady, the companion of Cyrus, who was taken captive at Kunaxa. Moreover, these Asiatic Greeks, when passing into the hands of Oriental masters, came under the maxims and sentiment of Orientals, respecting the infliction of pain or torture, — maxims not only more cruel than those of the Greeks, but also making little distinction between freemen and slaves.<sup>1</sup> The difference between the Greeks and Phœnicians in Cyprus, on this point, has been just noticed; and doubtless the difference between Greeks and Persians was still more marked. While the Asiatic Greeks were thus made over by Sparta and the Perso-Spartan convention of Antalkidas, to a condition in every respect worse, they were at the same time thrown in, as reluctant auxiliaries, to strengthen the hands of the Great King against other Greeks, — against Evagoras in Cyprus, — and above all, against the islands adjoining the coast of Asia, — Chios, Samos, Rhodes, etc.<sup>2</sup> These islands were now exposed to the same hazard, from their overwhelming Persian neighbors, as that from which they had been rescued nearly a century before by the Confederacy of Delos, and by the Athenian empire into which that Confederacy was transformed. All the tutelary combination that the genius, the energy, and the Pan-hellenic ardor, of Athens had first organized, and so long kept up, — was now broken up; while Sparta, to whom its

<sup>1</sup> Isocrat. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 142.

*Οἷς (to the Asiatic Greeks after the peace of Antalkidas) οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ δασυλογεῖσθαι καὶ τὰς ἀκροπόλεις ὄραν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν κατεχομένας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ταῖς κοιναῖς συμφοραῖς δεινότερα πάσχουσιν. τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ἀργυρωνήτων οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν οὕτως αἰκίζεται τοὺς οἰκέτας, ὥς ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους κολλάουσιν.*

<sup>2</sup> Isokrat. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 143, 154, 189, 190.

How immediately the inland kings, who had acquired possession of the continental Grecian cities, aimed at acquiring the islands also, is seen in Herodot. i, 27. Chios and Samos indeed, surrendered without resisting, to the first Cyrus, when he was master of the continental towns, though he had no naval force (Herod. i, 143–169). Even after the victory of Mykalē, the Spartans deemed it impossible to protect these islanders against the Persian masters of the continent (Herod. ix, 106). Nothing except the energy and organization of the Athenians proved that it was possible to do so



extinction was owing, in surrendering the Asiatic Greeks, had destroyed the security even of the islanders.

It soon appeared, however, how much Sparta herself had gained by this surrender in respect to dominion nearer home. The government of Corinth, — wrested from the party friendly to Argos, deprived of Argeian auxiliaries, and now in the hands of the restored Corinthian exiles who were the most devoted partisans of Sparta, — looked to her for support, and made her mistress of the Isthmus, either for offence or for defence. She thus gained the means of free action against Thebes, the enemy upon whom her attention was first directed. Thebes was now the object of Spartan antipathy, not less than Athens had formerly been; especially on the part of King Agesilaus, who had to avenge the insult offered to himself at the sacrifice near Aulis, as well as the strenuous resistance on the field of Koroneia. He was at the zenith of his political influence; so that his intense miso-Theban sentiment made Sparta, now becoming aggressive on all sides, doubly aggressive against Thebes. More prudent Spartans, like Antalkidas, warned him<sup>1</sup> that his persevering hostility would ultimately kindle in the Thebans a fatal energy of military resistance and organization. But the warning was despised until it was too fully realized in the development of the great military genius of Epaminondas, and in the defeat of Leuktra.

I have already mentioned that in the solemnity of exchanging oaths to the peace of Antalkidas, the Thebans had hesitated at first to recognize the autonomy of the other Bœotian cities; upon which Agesilaus had manifested a fierce impatience to exclude them from the treaty, and attack them single-handed.<sup>2</sup> Their timely accession balked him in this impulse; but it enabled him to enter upon a series of measures highly humiliating to the dignity as well as to the power of Thebes. All the Bœotian cities were now proclaimed autonomous under the convention. As solicitor, guarantee, and interpreter, of that convention, Sparta either had, or professed to have, the right of guarding their autonomy against dangers, actual or contingent, from their previous Vorort or presiding city. For this purpose she availed herself of this

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 26; Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 13

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 33.

moment of change to organize in each of them a local oligarchy, composed of partisans adverse to Thebes as well as devoted to herself, and upheld in case of need by a Spartan harmost and garrison.<sup>1</sup> Such an internal revolution grew almost naturally out of the situation; since the previous leaders, and the predominant sentiment in most of the towns, seem to have been favorable to Bœotian unity, and to the continued presidency of Thebes. These leaders would therefore find themselves hampered, intimidated, and disqualified, under the new system, while those who had before been an opposition minority would come forward with a bold and decided policy, like Kritias and Theramenes at Athens after the surrender of the city to Lysander. The new leaders doubtless would rather invite than repel the establishment of a Spartan harmost in their town, as a security to themselves against resistance from their own citizens as well as against attacks from

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46. 'Εν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσι δυναστεῖαι καθιεστήκεσαν, ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις. Respecting the Bœotian city of Tanagra, he says — ἐτι γὰρ τότε καὶ τὴν Τανάγραν οἱ περὶ Ὑπατοδώρον, φίλοι οὐτε τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, εἶχον (v, 4, 49).

Schneider, in his note on the former of these two passages, explains the word *δυναστεῖαι* as follows — "Sunt factiones optimatum qui Lacedæmoniis favebant, cum præsidio et harmostâ Laconico." This is perfectly just; but the words *ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις* seem also to require an explanation. These words allude to the "factio optimatum" at Thebes, of whom Leontiades was the chief; who betrayed the Kadmeia (the citadel of Thebes) to the Lacedæmonian troops under Phæbidas in 382 B. C.; and who remained masters of Thebes, subservient to Sparta and upheld by a standing Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia, until they were overthrown by the memorable conspiracy of Pelopidas and Mellon in 379 B. C. It is to this oligarchy under Leontiades at Thebes, devoted to Spartan interests and resting on Spartan support, — that Xenophon compares the governments planted by Sparta, after the peace of Antalkidas, in each of the Bœotian cities. What he says, of the government of Leontiades and his colleagues at Thebes, is — "that they deliberately introduced the Lacedæmonians into the acropolis, and enslaved Thebes to them, in order that they might themselves exercise a despotism" — τοὺς τε τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσαγαγόντας εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ βουλευθέντας Λακεδαιμονίους τὴν πόλιν δουλεύειν, ὥστε αὐτοὶ τυραννεῖν (v, 4, 1: compare v, 2, 36). This character — conveying a strong censure in the mouth of the philo-Laconian Xenophon — belongs to all the governments planted by Sparta in the Bœotian cities after the peace of Antalkidas, and, indeed, to the Dekarchies generally which she established throughout her empire.



Thebes, and as a means of placing them under the assured conditions of a Lysandrian dekharchy. Though most of the Bœotian cities were thus, on the whole, favorable to Thebes, — and though Sparta thrust upon them the boon, which she called autonomy, from motives of her own, and not from their solicitation, — yet, Orchomenus and Thespiæ, over whom the presidency of Thebes appears to have been harshly exercised, were adverse to her, and favorable to the Spartan alliance.<sup>1</sup> These two cities were strongly garrisoned by Sparta, and formed her main stations in Bœotia.<sup>2</sup>

The presence of such garrisons, one on each side of Thebes, — the discontinuance of the Bœotarchs, with the breaking up of all symbols and proceedings of the Bœotian federation, — and the establishment of oligarchies devoted to Sparta in the other cities, — was doubtless a deep wound to the pride of the Thebans. But there was another wound still deeper, and this the Lacedæmonians forthwith proceeded to inflict, — the restoration of Plataea.

A melancholy interest attaches both to the locality of this town, as one of the brightest scenes of Grecian glory, — and to its brave and faithful population, victims of an exposed position combined with numerical feebleness. Especially, we follow with a sort of repugnance the capricious turns of policy which dictated the Spartan behavior towards them. One hundred and twenty years before, the Plataeans had thrown themselves upon Sparta, to entreat her protection against Thebes. The Spartan king Kleomenes had then declined the obligation as too distant, and had recommended them to ally themselves with Athens.<sup>3</sup> This recommendation, though dictated chiefly by a wish to raise contention between Athens and Thebes, was complied with; and the alliance, severing Plataea altogether from the Bœotian confederacy, turned out both advantageous and honorable to her until the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. At that time, it suited the policy of the Spartans to uphold and strengthen in every way the supremacy of Thebes over the Bœotian cities; it was altogether by Spartan intervention, indeed, that the power of Thebes was rees-

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Memorab. iii, 5, 2; Thucyd. iv, 133; Diodor. xv, 79.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 15-20; Diodor. xv, 32-37; Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 14, 15.

<sup>3</sup> Herodot. vi, 108.

tablished, after the great prostration as well as disgrace which she had undergone, as traitor to Hellas and zealous in the service of Mardonius.<sup>1</sup> Athens, on the other hand, was at that time doing her best to break up the Bœotian federation, and to enrol its various cities as her allies; in which project, though doubtless suggested by and conducive to her own ambition, she was at that time (460-445 B. C.) perfectly justifiable on Pan-hellenic grounds; seeing that Thebes as their former chief had so recently enlisted them all in the service of Xerxes, and might be expected to do the same again if a second Persian invasion should be attempted. Though for a time successful, Athens was expelled from Bœotia by the defeat of Kôroncia; and at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the whole Bœotian federation (except Plataea), was united under Thebes, in bitter hostility against her. The first blow of the war, even prior to any declaration, was struck by Thebes in her abortive nocturnal attempt to surprise Plataea. In the third year of the war, king Archidamus, at the head of the full Lacedæmonian force, laid siege to the latter town; which, after an heroic defence and a long blockade, at length surrendered under the extreme pressure of famine; yet not before one half its brave defenders had forced their way out over the blockading wall, and escaped to Athens, where all the Plataean old men, women, and children, had been safely lodged before the siege. By a cruel act which stands among the capital iniquities of Grecian warfare, the Lacedæmonians had put to death all the Plataean captives, two hundred in number, who fell into their hands; the town of Plataea had been razed, and its whole territory, joined to Thebes, had remained ever since cultivated on Theban account.<sup>2</sup> The surviving Plataeans had been dealt with kindly and hospitably by the Athenians. A qualified right of citizenship was conceded to them at Athens, and when Skionê was recaptured in 420 B. C., that town (vacant by the slaughter of its captive citizens) was handed over to the Plataeans as a residence.<sup>3</sup> Compelled to evacuate Skionê, they were obliged at the close of the Peloponnesian war,<sup>4</sup> to return to

<sup>1</sup> See Vol. V. Ch. xlv, p. 327 of this History.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iii, 68.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. v, 32; Isokrates, Or. iv (Panegy.) s. 126; Or. xii, (Panathen.) s. 101.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch Lysand. c. 14.



Athens, where the remainder of them were residing at the time of the peace of Antalkidas; little dreaming that those who had destroyed their town and their fathers forty years before, would now turn round and restore it.<sup>1</sup>

Such restoration, whatever might be the ostensible grounds on which the Spartans pretended to rest it, was not really undertaken either to carry out the convention of Antalkidas, which guaranteed only the autonomy of *existing* towns, — or to repair previous injustice, since the prior destruction had been the deliberate act of themselves, and of King Archidamus the father of Agesilaus, — but simply as a step conducive to the present political views of Sparta. And towards this object it was skilfully devised. It weakened the Thebans, not only by wresting from them what had been, for about forty years, a part of their territory and property; but also by establishing upon it a permanent stronghold in the occupation of their bitter enemies, assisted by a Spartan garrison. It furnished an additional station for such a garrison in Bœotia, with the full consent of the newly-established inhabitants. And more than all, it introduced a subject of contention between Athens and Thebes, calculated to prevent the two from hearty cooperation afterwards against Sparta. As the sympathy of the Plataeans with Athens was no less ancient and cordial than their antipathy against Thebes, we may probably conclude that the restoration of the town was an act acceptable to the Athenians; at least, at first, until they saw the use made of it, and the position which Sparta came to occupy in reference to Greece generally. Many of the Plataeans, during their residence at Athens, had intermarried with Athenian women,<sup>2</sup> who now, probably, accompanied their husbands to the restored little town on the north of Kithæron, near the southern bank of the river Asôpus.

Had the Plataeans been restored to a real and honorable autonomy, such as they enjoyed in alliance with Athens before the Peloponnesian war, we should have cordially sympathized with the event. But the sequel will prove — and their own subsequent statement emphatically sets forth — that they were a mere dependency of Sparta, and an outpost of Spartan operations against

<sup>1</sup> Pausanias, ix, 1, 3.

<sup>2</sup> Isokrates. Or. xiv (Plataic.) s. 54

Thebes.<sup>1</sup> They were a part of the great revolution which the Spartans now brought about in Bœotia; whereby Thebes was degraded from the president of a federation into an isolated autonomous city, while the other Bœotian cities, who had been before members of the federation, were elevated each for itself into the like autonomy; or rather (to substitute the real truth<sup>2</sup> in place of Spartan professions) they became enrolled and sworn in as dependent allies of Sparta, under oligarchical factions devoted to her purposes and resting upon her for support. That the Thebans should submit to such a revolution, and, above all, to the sight of Plataea as an independent neighbor with a territory abstracted from themselves, — proves how much they felt their own weakness, and how irresistible at this moment was the ascendancy of their great enemy, in perverting to her own ambition the popular lure of universal autonomy held out by the peace of Antalkidas. Though compelled to acquiesce, the Thebans waited in hopes of some turn of fortune which would enable them to reorganize the Bœotian federation; while their hostile sentiment towards Sparta was not the less bitter for being suppressed. Sparta on her part kept constant watch to prevent the reunion of Bœotia;<sup>3</sup> an object in which she was for a time completely successful, and was even

<sup>1</sup> See the Orat. xiv, (called Plataicus) of Isokrates; which is a pleading probably delivered in the Athenian assembly by the Plataeans (after the second destruction of their city), and, doubtless, founded upon their own statements. The painful dependence and compulsion under which they were held by Sparta, is proclaimed in the most unequivocal terms (s. 31, 33, 48); together with the presence of a Spartan harmost and garrison in their town (s. 14).

<sup>2</sup> Xenophon says, truly enough, that Sparta made the Bœotian cities *αὐτονόμους ἀπὸ τῶν Θηβαίων* (v. 1, 36), which she had long desired to do. Autonomy, in the sense of disconnection from Thebes, was insured to them, — but in no other sense.

<sup>3</sup> To illustrate the relations of Thebes, the other Bœotian cities, and Sparta, between the peace of Antalkidas and the seizure of the Kadmeia by Sparta (387–382 B. C.) — compare the speech of the Akanthian envoys, and that of the Theban Leontiades, at Sparta (Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 16–34). *Τῶν* (the Spartans) *τῆς μὲν Βοιωτίας ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως μὴ καθ' ἑν εἴη, etc. Καὶ ὑμεῖς γε τότε μὲν αἰεὶ προσείχετε τὸν νοῦν, τότε ἀκούσεσθε βιάζομενους αὐτοὺς* (the Thebans) *τὴν Βοιωτίαν ὑφ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι· νῦν δὲ, ἐπεὶ τάδε πέπρακται, οὐδὲν ὑμᾶς δεῖ Θηβαίους φοβεῖσθαι, etc.* Compare Diodor. xv, 20



enabled, beyond her hopes, to become possessed of Thebes itself,<sup>1</sup> through a party of traitors within, — as will presently appear.

In these measures regarding Bœotia, we recognize the vigorous hand, and the miso-Theban spirit, of Agesilaus. He was at this time the great director of Spartan foreign policy, though opposed by his more just and moderate colleague king Agesipolis,<sup>2</sup> as well as by a section of the leading Spartans, who reproached Agesilaus with his project of ruling Greece by means of subservient local despots or oligarchies in the various cities,<sup>3</sup> and who contended that the autonomy promised by the peace of Antalkidas ought to be left to develop itself freely, without any coercive intervention on the part of Sparta.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In the Orat. (14) Plataic. of Isokrates, s. 30 — we find it stated among the accusations against the Thebans, that during this period (*i. e.* between the peace of Antalkidas and the seizure of the Kadmeia) they became sworn in as members of the Spartan alliance and as ready to act with Sparta conjointly against Athens. If we could admit this as true, we might also admit the story of Epaminondas and Pelopidas serving in the Spartan army at Mantinea (Plutarch, Pelop. c. 3). But I do not see how it can be even partially true. If it had been true, I think Xenophon could not have failed to mention it: all that he does say, tends to contradict it.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv. 29.

<sup>3</sup> How currently this reproach was advanced against Agesilaus, may be seen in more than one passage of the Hellenica of Xenophon; whose narrative is both so partial, and so ill-constructed, that the most instructive information is dropped only in the way of unintentional side-wind, where we should not naturally look for it. Xen. Hellen. v. 3, 16. πολλῶν δὲ λεγόντων Λακεδαιμονίων ὡς ὀλίγων ἕνεκεν ἀνθρώπων πόλει (Phlius) ἀπεχθάνοιτο (Agesilaus) πλεόν πεντακισχιλίων ἀνδρῶν. Again, v. 4, 13. ('Αγησίλαος) ἐν εἰδῶς, ὅτι, εἰ στρατηγὸς, λείξειαν οἱ πολῖται, ὡς 'Αγησίλαος, ὅπως βοηθήσειε τοῖς τυράννοις, πράγματα τῇ πόλει παρέχει, etc. Compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24-26.

<sup>4</sup> Diodorus indeed affirms, that this was really done, for a short time; that the cities which had before been dependent allies of Sparta were now emancipated and left to themselves; that a reaction immediately ensued against those dekharchies or oligarchies which had hitherto managed the cities in the interests of Sparta; that this reaction was so furious, as every where to kill, banish, or impoverish, the principal partisans of Spartan supremacy; and that the accumulated complaints and sufferings of these exiles drove the Spartans, after having "endured the peace like a heavy burthen" (ὥσπερ βαρὺ φόρτιον — xv, 5) for a few months, to shake it off, and to reestablish by force their own supremacy as well as the government of their friends in all the various cities. In this statement there is nothing

Far from any wish thus to realize the terms of peace which they had themselves imposed, the Lacedæmonians took advantage of an early moment after becoming free from their enemies in Bœotia and Corinth, to strain their authority over their allies beyond its previous limits. Passing in review<sup>1</sup> the conduct of each during the war, they resolved to make an example of the city of Mantinea. Some acts, not of positive hostility, but of equivocal fidelity, were imputed to the Mantineans. They were accused of having been slack in performance of their military obligations, sometimes even to the length of withholding their contingent altogether, under pretence of a season of religious truce; of furnishing corn in time of war to the hostile Argeians; and of plainly manifesting their disaffected feeling towards Sparta, — chagrin at every success which she obtained, — satisfaction, when she chanced to experience a reverse.<sup>2</sup> The Spartan ephors now sent an envoy to Mantinea, denouncing all such past behavior, and peremptorily requiring that the walls of the city should be demolished, as the only security for future penitence and amendment. As compliance was refused, they despatched an army, summoning the allied contingents generally for the purpose of enforcing the sentence.

intrinsically improbable. After what we have heard of the dekharchies under Sparta, no extent of violence in the reaction against them is incredible, nor can we doubt that such reaction would carry with it some new injustice, along with much well-merited retribution. Hardly any but Athenian citizens were capable of the forbearance displayed by Athens both after the Four Hundred and after the Thirty. Nevertheless, I believe that Diodorus is here mistaken, and that he has assigned to the period immediately succeeding the peace of Antalkidas, those reactionary violences which took place in many cities about sixteen years subsequently, after the battle of Leuktra. For Xenophon, in recounting what happened after the peace of Antalkidas, mentions nothing about any real autonomy granted by Sparta to her various subject-allies, and subsequently revoked; which he would never have omitted to tell us, had the fact been so, because it would have supplied a plausible apology for the high-handed injustice of the Spartans, and would have thus lent aid to the current of partiality which manifests itself in his history.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v. 2, 1-8. Αἰσθόμενοι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐπισκοποῦντας τοὺς συμμάχους, ὅποιοι τινες ἕκαστοι ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ αὐτοῖς ἐγεγένηντο, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v. 2, 2. He had before stated, that the Mantineans had really shown themselves pleased, when the Lacedæmonian Mœra was destroyed near Corinth by Iphikrates (iv, 5, 18).



They intrusted the command to king Agesipolis, since Agesilaus excused himself from the duty, on the ground that the Mantineans had rendered material service to his father Archidamus in the dangerous Messenian war which had beset Sparta during the early part of his reign.<sup>1</sup>

Having first attempted to intimidate the Mantineans by ravaging their lands, Agesipolis commenced the work of blockade by digging a ditch around the town; half of his soldiers being kept on guard, while the rest worked with the spade. The ditch being completed, he prepared to erect a wall of circumvallation. But being apprised that the preceding harvest had been so good, as to leave a large stock of provision in the town, and to render the process of starving it out tedious both for Sparta and for her allies, — he tried a more rapid method of accomplishing his object. As the river Ophis, of considerable breadth for a Grecian stream, passed through the middle of the town, he dammed up its efflux on the lower side;<sup>2</sup> thus causing it to inundate the interior of the

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v. 2, 3.

<sup>2</sup> In 1627, during the Thirty years' War, the German town of Wolfenbüttel was constrained to surrender in the same manner, by damming up the river Ocker which flowed through it; a contrivance of General Count Papenheim, the Austrian besieging commander. See Colonel Mitchell's *Life of Wallenstein*, p. 107.

The description given by Xenophon of Mantinea as it stood in 385 B. C., with the river Ophis, a considerable stream, passing through the middle of it, is perfectly clear. When the city, after having been now broken up, was rebuilt in 370 B. C., the site was so far changed that the river no longer ran through it. But the present course of the river Ophis, as given by excellent modern topographical examiners, Colonel Leake and Kiepert, is at a very considerable distance from the Mantinea rebuilt in 370 B. C.; the situation of which is accurately known, since the circuit of its walls still remains distinctly marked. The Mantinea of 370 B. C., therefore, as compared with the Mantinea in 385 B. C., must have been removed to a considerable distance — or else the river Ophis must have altered its course. Colonel Leake supposes that the Ophis had been artificially diverted from its course, in order that it might be brought through the town of Mantinea; a supposition, which he founds on the words of Xenophon, — *σοφωτέρων γενομένων ταύτῃ γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὸ μὴ διὰ τειχῶν ποταμὸν ποιεῖσθαι* (Hellen. v. 2, 7). But it is very difficult to agree with him on this point, when we look at his own map (annexed to the *Peloponnesiaca*) of the Mantinea and Tegeatis, and observe the great distance between the river Ophis and Mantinea; nor do the words of Xenophon seem necessarily to imply any artificial

city and threaten the stability of the walls; which seem to have been of no great height, and built of sun-burnt bricks. Disappointed in their application to Athens for aid,<sup>1</sup> and unable to provide extraneous support for their tottering towers, the Mantineans were compelled to solicit a capitulation. But Agesipolis now refused to grant the request, except on condition that not only the fortifications of their city, but the city itself, should be in great part demolished; and that the inhabitants should be re-distributed into those five villages, which had been brought together, many years before, to form the aggregate city of Mantinea. To this also the Mantineans were obliged to submit, and the capitulation was ratified.

Though nothing was said in the terms of it about the chiefs of the Mantinean democratical government, yet these latter, conscious that they were detested both by their own oligarchical opposition and by the Lacedæmonians, accounted themselves certain of being put to death. And such would assuredly have been their fate, had not Pausanias (the late king of Sparta, now in exile at Tegea), whose good opinion they had always enjoyed, obtained as a personal favor from his son Agesipolis the lives of the most obnoxious, sixty in number, on condition that they should depart into exile. Agesipolis had much difficulty in accomplishing the wishes of his father. His Lacedæmonian soldiers were ranged in arms on both sides of the gate by which the obnoxious men went out; and Xenophon notices it as a signal mark of Lacedæmonian discipline, that they could keep their spears unemployed when disarmed enemies were thus within their reach; especially as the oligarchical Mantineans manifested the most murderous propensities, and were exceedingly difficult to control.<sup>2</sup> As at Peiræus before, so

diversion of the river. It appears easier to believe that the river has changed its course. See Leake, *Travels in Morea*, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 71; and *Peloponnesiaca*, p. 380; and Ernst Curtius, *Peloponnesos*, p. 239 — who still, however, leaves the point obscure.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 5.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v. 2, 6. *Οἰομένων δὲ ἀποθανεῖσθαι τῶν ἀργολιζόντων, καὶ τῶν τοῦ δήμου προστατῶν, διεπράξατο ὁ πατήρ* (see before, v. 2, 3) *παρὰ τοῦ Ἀγησιπόλειδος, ἀσφάλειαν αὐτοῖς εἶσεσθαι, ἀπαλλαττομένοις ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἐξήκοντα οὖσι. Καὶ ἀμφοτέρωθεν μὲν τῆς ὁδοῦ, ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τῶν πυλῶν ἔχοντες τὰ δόρατα οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐστήσαν, θεώμενοι τοὺς ἐξιόντας· καὶ κλισοῦντες αὐτοὺς ὁμῶς ἀπείχοντο αὐτῶν ῥᾶον, ἢ οἱ βέ'*



here at Mantinea again, — the liberal, but unfortunate, king Pausanias is found interfering in the character of mediator to soften the ferocity of political antipathies.

The city of Mantinea was now broken up, and the inhabitants were distributed again into the five constituent villages. Out of four-fifths of the population, each man pulled down his house in the city, and rebuilt it in the village near to which his property lay. The remaining fifth continued to occupy Mantinea as a village. Each village was placed under oligarchical government, and left unfortified. Though at first (says Xenophon) the change proved troublesome and odious, yet presently, when men found themselves resident upon their landed properties, — and still more, when they felt themselves delivered from the vexatious demagogues, — the new situation became more popular than the old. The Lacedæmonians were still better satisfied. Instead of one city of Mantinea, five distinct Arcadian villages now stood enrolled in their catalogue of allies. They assigned to each a separate *xenâgus* (Spartan officer destined to the command of each allied contingent), and the military service of all was henceforward performed with the utmost regularity.<sup>1</sup>

Such was the dissection or cutting into parts of the ancient city Mantinea; one of the most odious acts of high-handed Spartan despotism. Its true character is veiled by the partiality of the historian, who recounts it with a confident assurance, that after the trouble of moving was over, the population felt themselves deci-

τιστοι τῶν Μαντινέων· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν εἰρήσθω μέγα τεκμήριον πειθαρχίας.

I have remarked more than once, and the reader will here observe a new example, how completely the word *βέλτιστοι* — which is applied to the wealthy or aristocratical party in politics, as its equivalent is in other languages, by writers who sympathize with them — is divested of all genuine ethical import as to character.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 7.

He says of this breaking up of the city of Mantinea, *διωκίσθη ἡ Μαντινεία τετραχῇ, καθάπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ὤκουν*. Ephorus (Fr. 138, ed. Didot) states that it was distributed into the *five* original villages; and Strabo affirms that there were five original constituent villages (viii, p. 337). Hence it is probable that Mantinea the city was still left, after this *διοίκισις*, to subsist as one of the five unfortified villages; so that Ephorus, Strabo, and Xenophon may be thus made to agree, in substance.

dedly bettered by the change. Such an assurance is only to be credited, on the ground that, being captives under the Grecian laws of war, they may have been thankful to escape the more terrible liabilities of death or personal slavery, at the price of forfeiting their civic community. That their feelings towards the change were those of genuine aversion, is shown by their subsequent conduct after the battle of Leuktra. As soon as the fear of Sparta was removed, they flocked together, with unanimous impulse, to re-constitute and re-fortify their dismantled city.<sup>1</sup> It would have been strange indeed had the fact been otherwise; for attachment to a civic community was the strongest political instinct of the Greek mind. The citizen of a town was averse — often most unhappily averse — to compromise the separate and autonomous working of his community by joining in any larger political combination, however equitably framed, and however it might promise on the whole an increase of Hellenic dignity. But still more vehemently did he shrink from the idea of breaking up his town into separate villages, and exchanging the character of a citizen for that of a villager, which was nothing less than great

<sup>1</sup> This is mentioned by Xenophon himself (Hellen. vi, 5, 3). The Lacedæmonians, though they remonstrated against it, were at that time too much humiliated to interfere by force and prevent it. The reason why they did not interfere by force (according to Xenophon) was that a general peace had just then been sworn, guaranteeing autonomy to every distinct town, so that the Mantineans under this peace had a right to do what they did — *στρατεύειν γε μέντοι ἐπ' αὐτοὺς οὐ δυνατόν ἐδόκει εἶναι, ἐπ' αὐτονομίᾳ τῆς εἰρήνης γεγενημένης* (vi, 5, 5). Of this second peace, Athens was the originator and the voucher; but the autonomy which it guaranteed was only the same as had been professedly guaranteed by the peace of Antalkidas, of which Sparta had been the voucher.

General autonomy, as interpreted by Athens, was a different thing from general autonomy as it had been when interpreted by Sparta. The Spartans, when they had in their own hands both the power of interpretation and the power of enforcement, did not scruple to falsify autonomy so completely as to lay siege to Mantinea and break up the city by force; while, when interpretation and enforcement had passed to Athens, they at once recognized that the treaty precluded them from a much less violent measure of interference.

We may see by this, how thoroughly partial and Laconian is the account given by Xenophon of the *διοίκισις* of Mantinea; how completely he keeps out of view the odious side of that proceeding.



social degradation, in the eyes of Greeks generally, Spartans not excepted.<sup>1</sup>

In truth the sentence executed by the Spartans against Mantinea was in point of dishonor, as well as of privation, one of the severest which could be inflicted on free Greeks. All the distinctive glory and superiority of Hellenism, — all the intellectual and artistic manifestations, — all that there was of literature and philosophy, or of refined and rational sociality, — depended upon the city-life of the people. And the influence of Sparta, during the period of her empire, was peculiarly mischievous and retrograde, as tending not only to decompose the federations such as Bœotia into isolated towns, but even to decompose suspected towns such as Mantinea into villages; all for the purpose of rendering each of them exclusively dependent upon herself. Athens, during her period of empire, had exercised no such disuniting influence; still less Thebes, whom we shall hereafter find coming forward actively to found the new and great cities of Megalopolis and Messênê. The imperial tendencies of Sparta are worse than those of either Athens or Thebes; including less of improving or Pan-hellenic sympathies, and leaning the most systematically upon subservient factions in each subordinate city. In the very treatment of Mantinea just recounted, it is clear that the attack of Sparta was welcomed at least, if not originally invited, by the oligarchical party of the place, who sought to grasp the power into their own hands and to massacre their political opponents. In the first object they completely succeeded, and their government probably was more assured in the five villages than it would have been in the entire town. In the second, nothing prevented them from succeeding except the accidental intervention of the exile Pausanias; an accident, which alone rescued the Spartan name from the additional disgrace of a political massacre, over and above the lasting odium incurred by the act itself; by breaking up an ancient autonomous city, which had shown no act of overt enmity, and which was so moderate in its democratical manifestations as to receive the fa-

<sup>1</sup> See the remarkable sentence of the Spartans, in which they reject the claim of the Pisatans to preside over and administer the Olympic festival (which had been their ancient privilege) because they were *χωρίται* and not fit for the task (Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31): compare *χωρικῶς* (Xen. Cyrop. iv 5, 54).

vorable criticism of judges rather disinclined towards democracy generally.<sup>1</sup> Thirty years before, when Mantinea had conquered certain neighboring Arcadian districts, and had been at actual war with Sparta to preserve them, the victorious Spartans exacted nothing more than the reduction of the city to its original district;<sup>2</sup> now they are satisfied with nothing less than the partition of the city into unfortified villages, though there had been no actual war preceding. So much had Spartan power, as well as Spartan despotic propensity, progressed during this interval.

The general language of Isokrates, Xenophon, and Diodorus,<sup>3</sup> indicates that this severity towards Mantinea was only the most stringent among a series of severities, extended by the Lacedæmonians through their whole confederacy, and operating upon all such of its members as gave them ground for dissatisfaction or mistrust. During the ten years after the surrender of Athens, they had been lords of the Grecian world both by land and sea, with a power never before possessed by any Grecian state; until the battle of Knidus, and the combination of Athens, Thebes, Argos, and Corinth, seconded by Persia, had broken up their empire at sea, and much endangered it on land. At length the peace of Antalkidas, enlisting Persia on their side (at the price of the liberty of the Asiatic Greeks), had enabled them to dissolve the hostile combination against them. The general autonomy, of which they were the authorized interpreters, meant nothing more than a separation of the Bœotian cities from Thebes,<sup>4</sup> and of Corinth from Argos, — being noway intended to apply to the relation between Sparta and her allies. Having thus their hands free, the Lacedæmonians applied themselves to raise their ascendancy on land to the point where it had stood before the battle of Knidus, and even to regain as much as possible of their empire at sea. To bring back a dominion such as that of the Lysandrian harmosts and dekarchies, and to reconstitute a local oligarchy of their most devoted partisans, in each of those cities where the government had been somewhat liberalized during the recent period of war, — was their systematic policy.

<sup>1</sup> Aristot. Polit. vi, 2, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. v, 81.

<sup>3</sup> Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegy.) s. 133, 134, 146, 206; Or. viii, (De Pace) s. 123; Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 1-8; Diodor. xv, 5, 9-19.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 35.



Those exiles who had incurred the condemnation of their fellow-citizens for subservience to Sparta, now found the season convenient for soliciting Spartan intervention to procure their return. It was in this manner that a body of exiled political leaders from Phlius, — whose great merit it was that the city when under their government had been zealous in service to Sparta, but had now become lukewarm or even disaffected in the hands of their opponents, — obtained from the ephors a message, polite in form but authoritative in substance, addressed to the Phliasians, requiring that the exiles should be restored, as friends of Sparta banished without just cause.<sup>1</sup>

While the Spartan power, for the few years succeeding the peace of Antalkidas, was thus decidedly in ascending movement on land, efforts were also made to reestablish it at sea. Several of the Cyclades and other smaller islands were again rendered tributary. In this latter sphere, however, Athens became her competitor. Since the peace, and the restoration of Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, combined with the re fortified Peiræus and its Long Walls, — Athenian commerce and naval power had been reviving, though by slow and humble steps. Like the naval force of England compared with France, the warlike marine of Athens rested upon a considerable commercial marine, which latter hardly existed at all in Laconia. Sparta had no seamen except constrained Helots or paid foreigners;<sup>2</sup> while the commerce of Peiræus had both required and maintained a numerous population of this character. The harbor of Peiræus was convenient in respect of accommodation, and well-stocked with artisans, — while Laconia had few artisans, and was notoriously destitute of harbors.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, in this maritime competition, Athens, though but the shadow of her former self, started at an advantage as compared with Sparta, and in spite of the superiority of the latter on land, was enabled to compete with her in acquiring tributary dependencies among the smaller islands of the Ægean. To these latter, who had no marine of their own, and who (like Athens herself) required habitual supplies of imported corn, it was important to

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 8-10.

The consequences of this forced return are difficult to foresee; they will appear in a subsequent page.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 3-12.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hell. iv, 8, 7.

obtain both access to Peiræus and protection from the Athenian triremes against that swarm of pirates, who showed themselves after the peace of Antalkidas, when there was no predominant maritime state; besides which, the market of Peiræus was often supplied with foreign corn from the Crimea, through the preference shown by the princes of Bosphorus to Athens, at a time when vessels from other places could obtain no cargo.<sup>1</sup> A moderate tribute paid to Athens would secure to the tributary island greater advantages than if paid to Sparta, — with at least equal protection. Probably, the influence of Athens over these islanders was farther aided by the fact, that she administered the festivals, and lent out the funds, of the holy temple at Delos. We know by inscriptions remaining, that large sums were borrowed at interest from the temple-treasure, not merely by individual islanders, but also by the island-cities collectively, — Naxos, Andros, Tenos, Siphnos, Seriphos. The Amphiktyonic council who dispensed these loans (or at least the presiding members) were Athenians named annually at Athens.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, these islanders rendered religious homage and attendance at the Delian festivals, and were thus brought within the range of a central Athenian influence, capable, under favorable circumstances, of being strengthened and rendered even politically important.

By such helps, Athens was slowly acquiring to herself a second maritime confederacy, which we shall presently find to be of considerable moment, though never approaching the grandeur of her former empire; so that in the year 380 B. C., when Isokrates published his Panegyric Discourse (seven years after the peace of Antalkidas), though her general power was still slender compared with the overruling might of Sparta,<sup>3</sup> yet her navy had already

<sup>1</sup> Isokrates, Orat. xvii, (Trapezit.) s. 71.

<sup>2</sup> See the valuable inscription called the Marmor Sandvicense, which contains the accounts rendered by the annual Amphiktyons at Delos, from 377-373 B. C.

Boeckh, Staatshaushaltung der Athener, vol. ii, p. 214, ed. 1; vol. ii, p. 78 seq., ed. 2nd.

The list of cities and individuals who borrowed money from the temple is given in these accounts, together with the amount of interest either paid by them, or remaining in arrear.

<sup>3</sup> This is the description which Isokrates himself gives (Orat. xv, (Permutat.) s. 61) of the state of the Grecian world when he published his Pan-



made such progress, that he claims for her the right of taking the command by sea, in that crusade which he strenuously enforces, of Athens and Sparta in harmonious unity at the head of all Greece, against the Asiatic barbarians.<sup>1</sup>

It would seem that a few years after the peace of Antalkidas, Sparta became somewhat ashamed of having surrendered the Asiatic Greeks to Persia; and that king Agesipolis and other leading Spartans encouraged the scheme of a fresh Grecian expedition against Asia, in compliance with propositions from some disaffected subjects of Artaxerxes.<sup>2</sup> Upon some such project, currently discussed though never realized, Isokrates probably built his Panegyric Oration, composed in a lofty strain of patriotic eloquence (380 B. C.) to stimulate both Sparta and Athens in the cause, and calling on both, as joint chiefs of Greece, to suspend dissensions at home for a great Pan-hellenic manifestation against the common enemy abroad. But whatever ideas of this kind the Spartan leaders may have entertained, their attention was taken off, about 382 B. C. by movements in a more remote region of the Grecian world, which led to important consequences.

Since the year 414 B. C. (when the Athenians were engaged in

gyrical Discourse — *ὅτε Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν ἤρχον τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταπεινῶς ἐπράττομεν*, etc.

<sup>1</sup> The Panegyric Discourse of Isokrates, the date of it being pretty exactly known, is of great value for enabling us to understand the period immediately succeeding the peace of Antalkidas.

He particularly notices the multiplication of pirates, and the competition between Athens and Sparta about tribute from the islands in the *Ægean* (s. 133) *Τίς γὰρ ἂν τοιαύτης καταστάσεως ἐπιθυμῇσειεν, ἐν ᾗ καταποντισταὶ μὲν τὴν θάλασσαν κατέχουσι, πελτασταὶ δὲ τὰς πόλεις καταλαμβάνουσι, etc.*

... Καίτοι χρὴ τοὺς φύσει καὶ μὴ διὰ τύχην μέγα φρονούντας τοιοῦτοις ἔργοις ἐπιχειρεῖν, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς νησιώτας δασμολογεῖν, οὓς ἀξιὸν ἔστιν ἐλέειν, ὁρῶντας τούτους μὲν διὰ σπανιότητα τῆς γῆς ὄρη γεωργεῖν ἀναγκαζομένους, τοὺς δ' ἡπειρώτας δι' ἀφθονίαν τῆς χώρας τὴν μὲν πλείστην αὐτῆς ἀργὸν περιορῶντας, etc. (s. 151).

... Ὡς ἡμεῖς (Athenians and Spartans) οὐδεμίαν ποιοῦμεθα πρόνοιαν, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῶν Κυκλάδων νήσων ἀμφισβητοῦμεν, τοσαύτας δὲ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τηλικαύτας τὸ μέγεθος δυνάμεις οὕτως εἰκὴ ὥς βαρβάρῳ παραδεδώκαμεν.

Compare Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 1, 12 — *μὴ εἰς νησὶν ἐπαρβλέποντας*, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv, 3, 13.

the siege of Syracuse), we have heard nothing either of the king of Macedonia, or of the Chalkidic Grecian cities in the peninsula of Thrace adjoining Macedonia. Down to that year, Athens still retained a portion of her maritime empire in those regions. The Plataeans were still in possession of Skiōnē (on the isthmus of Pal lēnē) which she had assigned to them; while the Athenian admiral Euetion, seconded by many hired Thracians, and even by Perdikkas king of Macedonia, undertook a fruitless siege to reconquer Amphipolis on the Strymon.<sup>1</sup> But the fatal disaster at Syracuse having disabled Athens from maintaining such distant interests, they were lost to her along with her remaining empire, — perhaps earlier; though we do not know how. At the same time, during the last years of the Peloponnesian war, the kingdom of Macedonia greatly increased in power; partly, we may conceive, from the helpless condition of Athens, — but still more from the abilities and energy of Archelaus, son and successor of Perdikkas.

The course of succession among the Macedonian princes seems not to have been settled, so that disputes and bloodshed took place at the death of several of them. Moreover, there were distinct tribes of Macedonians, who, though forming part, really or nominally, of the dominion of the Temenid princes, nevertheless were immediately subject to separate but subordinate princes of their own. The reign of Perdikkas had been troubled in this manner. In the first instance, he had stripped his own brother Alketas of the crown,<sup>2</sup> who appears (so far as we can make out) to have had

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. vii, 9.

<sup>2</sup> This is attested by Plato, Gorgias, c. 26. p. 471 A.

... Ὃς γε (Archelaus son of Perdikkas) πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον αὐτὸν τὸν δεσπότην καὶ θεῖον (Alketas) μεταπεμφάμενος, ὥς ἀποδώσων τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣν Περδίκκας αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο, etc.

This statement of Plato, that Perdikkas expelled his brother Alketas from the throne, appears not to be adverted to by the commentators. Perhaps it may help to explain the chronological embarrassments connected with the reign of Perdikkas, the years of which are assigned by different authors, as 23, 28, 35, 40, 41. See Mr. Clinton, Fasti Hellen. ch. iv, p. 222—where he discusses the chronology of the Macedonian kings: also Krebs, Lection. Diogenes, p. 159.

There are no means of determining when the reign of Perdikkas began—nor exactly, when it ended. We know from Thucydides that he was king in 432, and in 414 B. C. But the fact of his acquiring the crown by the ex-



the better right to it; next he had also expelled his younger brother Philippus from his subordinate principality. To restore Amyntas the son of Philippus, was one of the purposes of the Thracian prince Sitalkês, in the expedition undertaken conjointly with Athens, during the second year of the Peloponnesian war.<sup>1</sup> On the death of Perdikkas (about 413 B. C.), his eldest or only legitimate son was a child of seven years old; but his natural son<sup>2</sup> Archelaus was of mature age and unscrupulous ambition. The dethroned Alketas was yet alive, and had now considerable chance of reestablishing himself on the throne; Archelaus, inviting him and his son under pretence that he would himself bring about their reestablishment, slew them both amidst the intoxication of a banquet. He next despatched the boy, his legitimate brother, by suffocating him in a well; and through these crimes made himself king. His government, however, was so energetic and able, that Macedonia reached a degree of military power such as none of his predecessors had ever possessed. His troops, military equipments, and fortified places, were much increased in numbers; while he also cut straight roads of communication between the various portions of his territory,—a novelty seemingly everywhere, at that time.<sup>3</sup> Besides such improved organization (which unfortunately we are not permitted to know in detail), Archelaus founded a splendid periodical Olympic festival, in honor of the Olympian Zeus and the Muses,<sup>4</sup> and maintained correspondence with the poets and philosophers of Athens. He prevailed upon the tragic poets Euripides and Agathon, as well as the epic poet Chœrilus, to visit him in Macedonia, where Euripides especially was treated with distinguished favor and munificence,<sup>5</sup> remaining

pulsion of an elder brother, renders it less wonderful that the beginning of his reign should be differently stated by different authors; though these authors seem mostly to conceive Perdikkas as the immediate successor of Alexander, without any notice of Alketas.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i, 57; ii, 97-100.

<sup>2</sup> The mother of Archelaus was a female slave belonging to Alketas; it is for this reason that Plato calls Alketas *δεσπότην καὶ θεῖον* of Archelaus (Plato, Gorgias, c. 26. p. 471 A.)

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. ii, 100. *ὁδοὺς εὐθείας ἔτεμε*, etc. See the note in Ch. lxi, p. 17 of Vol. ix.

<sup>4</sup> Arrian, i, 11; Diodor. xvii, 16.

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch, De Vitioso Pudore, c. 7, p. 531 E.

here until his death in 406 or 405 B. C. Archelaus also invited Sokrates, who declined the invitation,—and appears to have shown some favor to Plato.<sup>1</sup> He perished in the same year as Sokrates (399 B. C.), by a violent death; two Thessalian youths, Krateuas and Hellanokrates, together with a Macedonian named Dekamnichus, being his assassins during a hunting-party. The first two were youths to whom he was strongly attached, but whose dignity he had wounded by insulting treatment and non-performance of promises; the third was a Macedonian, who, for having made an offensive remark upon the bad breath of Euripides, had been given up by the order of Archelaus to the poet, in order that he might be flogged for it. Euripides actually caused the sentence to be inflicted; but it was not till six years after his death that Dekamnichus, who had neither forgotten nor forgiven the affront, found the opportunity of taking revenge by instigating and aiding the assassins of Archelaus.<sup>2</sup>

These incidents, recounted on the authority of Aristotle, and relating as well to the Macedonian king Archelaus as to the Athenian citizen and poet Euripides, illustrate the political contrast between Macedonia and Athens. The government of the former is one wholly personal,—dependent on the passions, tastes, appetites, and capacities, of the king. The ambition of Archelaus leads both to his crimes for acquiring the throne, and to his improved organization of the military force of the state afterwards; his admiration for the poets and philosophers of Athens makes

<sup>1</sup> Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii, 24; Seneca, de Beneficiis, v. 6; Ælian, V. H. xiv, 17.

<sup>2</sup> See the statements, unfortunately very brief, of Aristotle (Politic. v, 8, 10-13). Plato (Alkibiad. ii, c. 5, p. 141 D), while mentioning the assassination of Archelaus by his *παῖδικα* represents the motive of the latter differently from Aristotle, as having been an ambitious desire to possess himself of the throne. Diodorus (xiv, 37) represents Krateuas as having killed Archelaus unintentionally in a hunting-party.

*Καὶ τῆς Ἀρχελαίου δ' ἐπιθέσεως Δεκάμνιχος ἡγεμὼν ἐγένετο, παρεξόντων τοὺς ἐπιθεμένους πρῶτος· αἴτιον δὲ τῆς ὀργῆς, ὅτι αὐτὸν ἐξέδωκε μαστιγῶσα. Εὐριπίδῃ γὰρ ποιητῇ· ὁ δὲ Εὐριπίδης ἐχαλέπαινε ἐπόντας τι αὐτοῦ εἰς διώδειαν τοῦ στόματος (Arist. Pol. l. c.).*

Dekamnichus is cited by Aristotle as one among the *εἰκασμοὶ* of persons actually scourged; which proves that Euripides availed himself of the privilege accorded by Archelaus.



him sympathize warmly with Euripides, and ensure to the latter personal satisfaction for an offensive remark; his appetites, mingling license with insult, end by drawing upon him personal enemies of a formidable character. *L'Etat, c'est moi* — stands marked in the whole series of proceedings; the personality of the monarch is the determining element. Now at Athens, no such element exists. There is, on the one hand, no easy way of bringing to bear the ascendancy of an energetic chief to improve the military organization, — as Athens found to her cost, when she was afterwards assailed by Philip, the successor after some interval, and in many respects the parallel, of Archelaus. But on the other hand, neither the personal tastes nor the appetites, of any individual Athenian, count as active causes in the march of public affairs, which is determined by the established law and by the pronounced sentiments of the body of citizens. However gross an insult might have been offered to Euripides at Athens, the *dikasts* would never have sentenced that the offender should be handed over to him to be flogged. They would have inflicted such measure of punishment as the nature of the wrong, and the preëxisting law appeared to them to require. Political measures, or judicial sentences, at Athens, might be well or ill-judged; but at any rate, they were always dictated by regard to a known law and to the public conceptions entertained of state-interests, state-dignity, and state-obligations, without the avowed intrusion of any man's personality. To Euripides, — who had throughout his whole life been the butt of Aristophanes and other comic writers, and who had been compelled to hear, in the crowded theatre, taunts far more galling than what is ascribed to Dekamnichus, — the contrast must have been indeed striking, to have the offender made over to him, and the whip placed at his disposal, by order of his new patron. And it is little to his honor, that he should have availed himself of the privilege, by causing the punishment to be really administered; a punishment which he could never have seen inflicted, during the fifty years of his past life, upon any free Athenian citizen.

Krateuas did not survive the deed more than three or four days, after which Orestes, son of Archelaus, a child, was placed on the throne, under the guardianship of Æropus. The latter, however, after about four years, made away with his ward, and reigned in

his stead for two years. He then died of sickness, and was succeeded by his son Pausanias; who, after a reign of only one year, was assassinated and succeeded by Amyntas.<sup>1</sup> This Amyntas (chiefly celebrated as the father of Philip and the grandfather of Alexander the Great), though akin to the royal family, had been nothing more than an attendant of Æropus,<sup>2</sup> until he made himself king by putting to death Pausanias.<sup>3</sup> He reigned, though with interruptions, twenty-four years (393–369 B. C.); years, for the most part, of trouble and humiliation for Macedonia, and of occasional exile for himself. The vigorous military organization introduced by Archelaus appears to have declined; while the frequent dethronements and assassinations of kings, beginning even with Perdikkas the father of Archelaus, and continued down to Amyntas, unhinged the central authority and disunited the various portions of the Macedonian name; which naturally tended to separation, and could only be held together by a firm hand.

The interior regions of Macedonia were bordered, to the north, north-east, and north-west, by warlike barbarian tribes, Thracian and Illyrian, whose invasions were not unfrequent and often formidable. Tempted, probably, by the unsettled position of the government, the Illyrians poured in upon Amyntas during the first year of his reign; perhaps they may have been invited by other princes of the interior,<sup>4</sup> and at all events their coming would operate as a signal for malcontents to declare themselves. Amyntas, — having only acquired the sceptre a few months before by assassinating his predecessor, and having little hold on the people, — was not only unable to repel them, but found himself obliged to evacuate Pella, and even to retire from Macedonia altogether. Despairing of his position, he made over to the Olynthians a large

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv. 84–89.

<sup>2</sup> Ælian, V. H. xii. 43; Dexippus ap. Syncell. p. 263; Justin, vii. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiv. 89. 'Ἐτελεύτησε δὲ καὶ Πανσανίας ὁ τῶν Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς, ἀναιρεθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἀμύντου δόλῳ, ἀρξὰς ἐνιαυτὸν τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν κάτεσχεν Ἀμύντας, etc.

<sup>4</sup> See in Thucyd. iv. 112 — the relations of Arrhibæus, prince of the Macedonians called Lynkestæ in the interior country, with the Illyrian invaders — B. C. 423.

Archelaus had been engaged at a more recent period in war with a prince of the interior named Arrhibæus, — perhaps the same person (Aristot. Polit. v. 8, 11).



portion of the neighboring territory, — Lower Macedonia or the coast and cities round the Thermaic Gulf.<sup>1</sup> As this cession is represented to have been made at the moment of his distress and expatriation, we may fairly suspect that it was made for some reciprocal benefit or valuable equivalent; of which Amyntas might well stand in need, at a moment of so much exigency.

It is upon this occasion that we begin to hear again of the Chalkidians of Olynthus, and the confederacy which they gradually aggregated around their city as a centre. The confederacy seems to have taken its start from this cession of Amyntas, — or rather, to speak more properly, from his abdication; for the cession of what he could not keep was of comparatively little moment, and we shall see that he tried to resume it as soon as he acquired strength. The effect of his flight was, to break up the government of Lower or maritime Macedonia, and to leave the cities therein situated defenceless against the Illyrians or other invaders from the interior. To these cities, the only chance of security, was to throw themselves upon the Greek cities on the coast, and to organize in conjunction with the latter a confederacy for mutual support. Among all the Greeks on that coast, the most strenuous and persevering (so they had proved themselves in their former contentions against Athens when at the summit of her power) as well as the nearest, were the Chalkidians of Olynthus. These Olynthians now put themselves forward, — took into their alliance and under their protection the smaller towns of maritime Macedonia immediately near them, — and soon extended their confederacy so as to comprehend all the larger towns in this region, — including even Pella, the most considerable city of the country.<sup>2</sup> As they began

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 92; xv, 19. 'Απογνῶς δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν, Ὀλυνθίοις μὲν τὴν συνεγγὺς χώραν ἐδωρήσατο, etc. Τῷ δὲ μὲν τῶν Ὀλυνθίων δωρησαμένου πολλὴν τῆς ὁμόρου χώρας, διὰ τὴν ἀπόγνωσιν τῆς αὐτοῦ δυναστείας, etc.

The flight of Amyntas, after a year's reign, is confirmed by Dexippus ap. Syncell. p. 263.

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 12. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκης μεγίστη πόλις Ὀλυνθος, σχεδὸν πάντες ἐπίστασθε. Οὗτοι τῶν πόλεων προσηγάγοντο ἔστιν ἄς, ἐφ' ὧτε τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι νόμοις καὶ συμπολιτεύειν. ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν μειζόνων προσέλαβόν τινας. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἐπεχείρησαν καὶ τὰς τῆς Μακεδονίας πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν ἀπὸ Ἀμύντου, τοῦ βασιλέως Μακεδόνων. Ἐπεὶ δὲ εἰσέκονσαν αἱ ἐγγύτατα αὐτῶν, ταχὺ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς πόλιν καὶ μείζους ἐπορεύοντο· καὶ κατελείποντο ἡμεῖς ἔχοντας ἤδη ἄλλας τε πολλὰς, καὶ Πέλλαν, ἥτις

this enterprise at a time when the Illyrians were masters of the country so as to drive Amyntas to despair and flight, we may be sure that it must have cost them serious efforts, not without great danger if they failed. We may also be sure that the cities themselves must have been willing, not to say eager, coadjutors; just as the islanders and Asiatic Greeks clung to Athens at the first formation of the confederacy of Delos. The Olynthians could have had no means of conquering even the less considerable Macedonian cities, much less Pella, by force and against the will of the inhabitants.

How the Illyrians were compelled to retire, and by what steps the confederacy was got together, we are not permitted to know. Our information (unhappily very brief) comes from the Akanthian envoy Kleigenēs, speaking at Sparta about ten years afterwards (B. C. 383), and describing in a few words the confederacy as it then stood. But there is one circumstance which this witness, — himself hostile to Olynthus and coming to solicit Spartan aid against her, — attests emphatically; the equal, generous, and brotherly principles, upon which the Olynthians framed their scheme from the beginning. They did not present themselves as an imperial city enrolling a body of dependent allies, but invited each separate city to adopt common laws and reciprocal citizenship with Olynthus, with full liberty of intermarriage, commercial dealing, and landed proprietorship. That the Macedonian cities near the sea should welcome so liberal a proposition as this, coming from the most powerful of their Grecian neighbors, cannot at all surprise us; especially at a time when they were exposed to the Illyrian invaders, and when Amyntas had fled the country. They had hitherto always been subjects;<sup>1</sup> their cities had not

μεγίστη τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ πόλεων. Καὶ Ἀμύνταν δὲ αἰσθανόμεθα ἀποχωροῦντά τε ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἐκπεπωκότα ἤδη ἐκ πάσης Μακεδονίας.

We know from Diodorus that Amyntas fled the country in despair, and ceded a large proportion at least of Lower Macedonia to the Olynthians. Accordingly, the struggle between the latter and Amyntas (here alluded to), must have taken place when he came back and tried to resume his dominion.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 12 — τὰς τῆς Μακεδονίας πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν ἀπὸ Ἀμύντου, etc.; compare v, 2, 38.



(like the Greek cities) enjoyed each its own separate autonomy within its own walls; the offer, now made to them by the Olynthians, was one of freedom in exchange for their past subjection under the Macedonian kings, combined with a force adequate to protect them against Illyrian and other invaders. Perhaps also these various cities, — Anthemus, Therma, Chalastra, Pella, Alôrus, Pydna, etc., — may have contained, among the indigenous population, a certain proportion of domiciliated Grecian inhabitants, to whom the proposition of the Olynthians would be especially acceptable.

We may thus understand why the offer of Olynthus was gladly welcomed by the Macedonian maritime cities. They were the first who fraternized as voluntary partners in the confederacy; which the Olynthians, having established this basis, proceeded to enlarge farther, by making the like liberal propositions to the Greek cities in their neighborhood. Several of these latter joined voluntarily; others were afraid to refuse; insomuch that the confederacy came to include a considerable number of Greeks, — especially, Potidæa, situated on the Isthmus of Pallênê, and commanding the road of communication between the cities within Pallênê and the continent. The Olynthians carried out with scrupulous sincerity their professed principles of equal and intimate partnership, avoiding all encroachment or offensive preeminence in favor of their own city. But in spite of this liberal procedure, they found among their Grecian neighbors obstructions which they had not experienced from the Macedonian. Each of the Grecian cities had been accustomed to its own town-autonomy and separate citizenship, with its peculiar laws and customs. All of them were attached to this kind of distinct political life, by one of the most tenacious and universal instincts of the Greek mind; all of them would renounce it with reluctance, even on consenting to enter the Olynthian confederacy, with its generous promise, its enlarged security, and its manifest advantages; and there were even some who, disdaining every prospective consideration, refused to change their condition at all except at the point of the sword.

Among these last were Akanthus and Apollonia, the largest cities (next to Olynthus) in the Chalkidic peninsula, and, therefore, the least unable to stand alone. To these the Olynthians

did not make application, until they had already attracted within their confederacy a considerable number of other Grecian as well as Macedonian cities. They then invited Akanthus and Apollonia to come in, upon the same terms of equal union and fellow-citizenship. The proposition being declined, they sent a second message intimating that, unless it were accepted within a certain time, they would enforce it by compulsory measures. So powerful already was the military force of the Olynthian confederacy, that Akanthus and Apollonia, incompetent to resist without foreign aid, despatched envoys to Sparta to set forth the position of affairs in the Chalkidic peninsula, and to solicit intervention against Olynthus.

Their embassy reached Sparta about B. C. 383, when the Spartans, having broken up the city of Mantinea into villages, and coerced Phlius, were in the full swing of power over Peloponnesus, — and when they had also dissolved the Bœotian federation, placing harmosts in Plataea and Thespiae as checks upon any movement of Thebes. The Akanthian Kleigenês, addressing himself to the Assembly of Spartans and their allies, drew an alarming picture of the recent growth and prospective tendencies of Olynthus, invoking the interference of Sparta against that city. The Olynthian confederacy (he said) already comprised many cities, small and great, Greek as well as Macedonian, — Amyntas having lost his kingdom. Its military power, even at present great, was growing every day.<sup>1</sup> The territory, comprising a large breadth of fertile corn-land, could sustain a numerous population. Wood for ship-building was close at hand, while the numerous

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v. 2, 14.

The number of Olynthian troops is given in Xenophon as eight hundred hoplites — a far greater number of peltasts — and one thousand horsemen, assuming that Akanthus and Apollonia joined the confederacy. It has been remarked by Mr. Mitford and others, that these numbers, as they here stand, must be decidedly smaller than the reality. But we have no means of correction open to us. Mr. Mitford's suggestion of eight thousand hoplites in place of eight hundred, rests upon no authority.

Demosthenes states that Olynthus by herself, and before she had brought all the Chalkidians into confederacy (*οὕτω Χαλκιδέων πάντων εἰς ἐν συνφασμένον* — De Fals. Leg. c. 75, p. 425) possessed four hundred horsemen, and a citizen population of 5000; no more than this (he says) at the time when the Lacedæmonians attacked them. The historical statements of the great orator, for a time which nearly coincides with his own birth, are to be received with caution.



harbors of the confederate cities ensured a thriving trade as well as a steady revenue from custom-duties. The neighboring Thracian tribes would be easily kept in willing dependence, and would thus augment the military force of Olynthus; even the gold mines of Mount Pangæus would speedily come within her assured reach. "All that I now tell you (such was the substance of his speech) is matter of public talk among the Olynthian people, who are full of hope and confidence. How can you Spartans, who are taking anxious pains to prevent the union of the Bœotian cities,<sup>1</sup> permit the aggregation of so much more formidable a power, both by land and by sea, as this of Olynthus? Envoys have already been sent thither from Athens and Thebes, — and the Olynthians have decreed to send an embassy in return for contracting alliance with those cities; hence, your enemies will derive a large additional force. We of Akanthus and Apollonia, having declined the proposition to join the confederacy voluntarily, have received notice that, if we persist, they will constrain us. Now we are anxious to retain our paternal laws and customs, continuing as a city by ourselves.<sup>2</sup> But if we cannot obtain aid from you, we shall be under the necessity of joining them, — as several other cities have already done, from not daring to refuse; cities, who would have sent envoys along with us, had they not been afraid of offending the Olynthians. These cities, if you interfere forthwith, and with a powerful force, will now revolt from the new confederacy. But if you postpone your interference, and allow time for the confederacy to work, their sentiments will soon alter. They will come to be knit together in attached unity, by the co-burgership, the intermarriage, and the reciprocity of landed possessions, which have already been enacted prospectively. All of them will become convinced that they have a common interest both in belonging to, and in strengthening the confederacy, — just as the Arcadians, when they follow you, Spartans, as allies, are not only enabled to

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 16. Ἐννοήσατε δὲ καὶ τόδε, πῶς εἰκός, ὑμᾶς τῆς μὲν Βοιωτίας ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως μὴ καθ' ἑν εἴη, πολλὰ δὲ μείζωνος ἀθροισμένης ὑνάμεως ἀμελῆσαι, etc.

I translate here the substance of the speech, not the exact words.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 14. Ἡμεῖς δὲ, ὡς ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι, βουλόμεθα μὲν τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι, καὶ αὐτοπολίται εἶναι· εἰ μὲντοι μὴ βοηθήσει τις, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἡμῖν μετ' ἐκείνων γίγνεσθαι.

preserve their own property, but also to plunder others. If, by your delay, the attractive tendencies of the confederacy should come into real operation, you will presently find it not so much within your power to dissolve.<sup>1</sup>"

This speech of the Akanthian envoy is remarkable in more than one respect. Coming from the lips of an enemy, it is the best of all testimonies to the liberal and comprehensive spirit in which the Olynthians were acting. They are accused, — not of injustice, nor of selfish ambition, nor of degrading those around them, — but literally, of organizing a new partnership on principles too generous and too seductive; of gently superseding, instead of violently breaking down, the barriers between the various cities, by reciprocal ties of property and family among the citizens of each; of uniting them all into a new political aggregate, in which not only all would enjoy equal rights, but all without exception would be gainers. The advantage, both in security and in power, accruing prospectively to all, is not only admitted by the orator, but stands in the front of his argument. "Make haste and break up the confederacy (he impresses upon Sparta) before its fruit is ripe, so that the confederates may never taste it nor find out how good it is; for if they do, you will not prevail on them to forego it." By implication, he also admits, — and he says nothing tending even to raise a doubt, — that the cities which he represents, Akanthus and Apollonia, would share along with the rest in this same benefit. But the Grecian political instinct was never theless predominant, — "We wish to preserve our paternal laws, and to be a city by ourselves." Thus nakedly is the objection stated; when the question was, not whether Akanthus should lose its freedom and become subject to an imperial city like Athens, — but whether it should become a free and equal member of a larger political aggregate, cemented by every tie which could make union

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 18. Δεῖ γε μὴν ὑμᾶς καὶ τόδε εἰδέναι, ὥς, ἣν εἰρήκαμεν δύναμιν μεγάλην οὖσαν, οὕτω δυσπάλαιστός τις ἐστίν· αἱ γὰρ ἀκουσαι τῶν πόλεων τῆς πολιτείας κοινωνοῦσαι, αὗται, ἂν τι ἴδωσιν ἀντίπαλον, ταχὺ ἀποστήσονται· εἰ μὲντοι συγκλεισθήσονται ταῖς τε ἐπιγαμίαις καὶ ἐγκτήσεσι παρ' ἀλλήλαις, ὥς ἐψηφισμένοι εἰσι — καὶ γινώσκονται, ὅτι μετὰ τῶν κρατούντων ἐπεσθαι κερδαλέον ἐστίν, ὥσπερ Ἀρκάδες, ὅταν μεθ' ὑμῶν ἴωσι, τὰ τε αὐτῶν σώζουσι καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἀρπάζουσιν — ἴσως οὐ κεθ' ὁμοίως εὐλυστα ἐσται.



secure, profitable, and dignified. It is curious to observe how perfectly the orator is conscious that this repugnance, though at the moment preponderant, was nevertheless essentially transitory, and would give place to attachment when the union came to be felt as a reality; and how eagerly he appeals to Sparta to lose no time in clenching the repugnance, while it lasted. He appeals to her, not for any beneficial or Pan-hellenic objects, but in the interests of her own dominion, which required that the Grecian world should be as it were pulverized into minute, self-acting, atoms without cohesion, — so that each city, or each village, while protected against subjection to any other, should farther be prevented from equal political union or fusion with any other; being thus more completely helpless and dependent in reference to Sparta.

It was not merely from Akanthus and Apollonia, but also from the dispossessed Macedonian king Amyntas, that envoys reached Sparta to ask for aid against Olynthus. It seems that Amyntas, after having abandoned the kingdom and made his cession to the Olynthians, had obtained some aid from Thessaly and tried to re-instate himself by force. In this scheme he had failed, being defeated by the Olynthians. Indeed we find another person named Argæus, mentioned as competitor for the Macedonian sceptre, and possessing it for two years.<sup>1</sup>

After hearing these petitioners, the Lacedæmonians first declared their own readiness to comply with the prayer, and to put down Olynthus; next, they submitted the same point to the vote of the assembled allies.<sup>2</sup> Among these latter, there was no genuine antipathy against the Olynthians, such as that which had prevailed against Athens before the Peloponnesian war, in the synod then held at Sparta. But the power of Sparta over her allies was now far greater than it had been then. Most of their cities were under oligarchies, dependent upon her support for authority over their fellow-citizens; moreover, the recent events in Bœotia and at

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 92; xv, 19.

Demosthenes speaks of Amyntas as having been expelled from his kingdom by the Thessalians (cont. Aristokrat. c. 29, p. 657). If this be historically correct, it must be referred to some subsequent war in which he was engaged with the Thessalians, perhaps to the time when Jason of Phœria acquired dominion over Macedonia (Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 1, 11).

<sup>2</sup> See above in this History, Vol. VI. Ch. xlviii, p. 79.

Mantineia had operated as a serious intimidation. Anxiety to keep the favor of Sparta was accordingly paramount, so that most of the speakers as well as most of the votes, declared for war,<sup>1</sup> and a combined army of ten thousand men was voted to be raised. To make up such total, a proportional contingent was assessed upon each confederate; combined with the proviso now added for the first time, that each might furnish money instead of men, at the rate of three Æginæan oboli (half an Æginæan drachma) for each hoplite. A cavalry-soldier, to those cities which furnished such, was reckoned as equivalent to four hoplites; a hoplite, as equivalent to two peltasts; or pecuniary contribution on the same scale. All cities in default were made liable to a forfeit of one stater (four drachmæ) per day, for every soldier not sent; the forfeit to be enforced by Sparta.<sup>2</sup> Such licensed substitution of pecuniary payment for personal service, is the same as I have already described to have taken place nearly a century before in the confederacy of Delos under the presidency of Athens.<sup>3</sup> It was a system not likely to be extensively acted upon among the Spartan allies, who were at once poorer and more warlike than those of Athens. But in both cases it was favorable to the ambition of the leading state; and the tendency becomes here manifest, to sanction, by the formality of a public resolution, that increased Lacedæmonian ascendancy which had already grown up in practice.

The Akanthian envoys, while expressing their satisfaction with the vote just passed, intimated that the muster of these numerous contingents would occupy some time, and again insisted on the necessity of instant intervention, even with a small force; before the Olynthians could find time to get their plans actually in work or appreciated by the surrounding cities. A moderate Lacedæmonian force (they said), if despatched forthwith, would not only

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 20. Ἐκ τούτου μέντοι, πολλοὶ μὲν ξυνηγόρευον στρατὸν ποιεῖν, μάλιστα δὲ οἱ βουλόμενοι Λακεδαιμονίοις χαρίζεσθαι, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 21, 22.

Diodorus (xv, 31) mentions the fact that an hoplite was reckoned equivalent to two peltasts, in reference to a Lacedæmonian muster-roll of a few years afterwards; but it must have been equally necessary to fix the proportion on the present occasion.

<sup>3</sup> See Vol. V. Ch. xlv, p. 302 of this History.



keep those who had refused to join Olynthus, steady to their refusal, but also induce others, who had joined reluctantly, to revolt. Accordingly the ephors appointed Eudamidas at once, assigning to him two thousand hoplites, — Neodamodes (or enfranchised Helots), Perieki, and Skiritæ or Arcadian borderers. Such was the anxiety of the Akanthians for haste, that they would not let him delay even to get together the whole of this moderate force. He was put in march immediately, with such as were ready; while his brother Phœbidas was left behind to collect the remainder and follow him. And it seems that the Akanthians judged correctly. For Eudamidas, arriving in Thrace after a rapid march, though he was unable to contend against the Olynthians in the field, yet induced Potidæa to revolt from them, and was able to defend those cities, such as Akanthus and Apollonia, which resolutely stood aloof.<sup>1</sup> Amyntas brought a force to coöperate with him.

The delay in the march of Phœbidas was productive of consequences no less momentous than unexpected. The direct line from Peloponnesus to Olynthus lay through the Theban territory; a passage which the Thebans, whatever might have been their wishes, were not powerful enough to refuse, though they had contracted an alliance with Olynthus,<sup>2</sup> and though proclamation was made that no Theban citizens should join the Lacedæmonian force. Eudamidas, having departed at a moment's notice, passed through Bœotia without a halt, in his way to Thrace. But it was known that his brother Phœbidas was presently to follow; and upon this fact the philo-Laconian party in Thebes organized a conspiracy.

They obtained from the ephors, and from the miso-Theban feelings of Agesilaus, secret orders to Phœbidas, that he should coöperate with them in any party movement which they might find opportunity of executing;<sup>3</sup> and when he halted with his

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 24; Diodor. xv, 21.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 27-34.

<sup>3</sup> This is the statement of Diodorus (xv, 20), and substantially that of Plutarch (Agesil. c. 24), who intimates that it was the general belief of the time. And it appears to me much more probable than the representation of Xenophon — that the first idea arose when Phœbidas was under the walls of Thebes, and that the Spartan leader was persuaded by Leontiades to act on his own responsibility. The behavior of Agesilaus and of the ephors after the fact

detachment near the gymnasium a little way without the walls, they concerted matters as well with him as among themselves. Leontiades, Hypatês, and Archias, were the chiefs of the party in Thebes favorable to Sparta; a party decidedly in minority, yet still powerful, and at this moment so strengthened by the unbounded ascendancy of the Spartan name, that Leontiades himself was one of the polemarchs of the city. Of the anti-Spartan, or predominant sentiment in Thebes, — which included most of the wealthy and active citizens, those who came successively into office as hipparchs or generals of the cavalry,<sup>1</sup> — the leaders were Ismenias and Androkleides. The former, especially, the foremost as well as ablest conductor of the late war against Sparta, was now in office as Polemarch, conjointly with his rival Leontiades.

While Ismenias, detesting the Spartans, kept aloof from Phœbidas, Leontiades assiduously courted him and gained his confidence. On the day of the Thesmophoria,<sup>2</sup> a religious festival

is like that of persons who had previously contemplated the possibility of it. But the original suggestion must have come from the Theban faction themselves.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch (De Genio Socratis, c. 5, p. 578 B.) states that most of these generals of cavalry (τῶν ἱππαρχηκότων νομίμως) were afterwards in exile with Pelopidas at Athens.

We have little or no information respecting the government of Thebes. It would seem to have been at this moment a liberalized oligarchy. There was a Senate, and two Polemarchs (perhaps the Polemarchs may have been more than two in all, though the words of Xenophon rather lead us to suppose only two) — and there seems also to have been a civil magistrate, chosen by lot (δυναμιστὸς ἄρχων) and renewed annually, whose office was marked by his constantly having in his possession the sacred spear of state (τὸ ἐπὶ δόρυ) and the city-seal (Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 31, p. 597 — B. — C.).

At this moment, it must be recollected, there were no such officers as Bœotarchs; since the Lacedæmonians, enforcing the peace of Antalkidas, had put an end to the Bœotian federation.

<sup>2</sup> The rhetor Aristides (Or. xix, Eleusin. p. 452 Cant.; p. 419 Dind.) states that the Kadmeia was seized during the Pythian festival. This festival would take place, July or August 382 B. C.; near the beginning of the third year of the (99th) Olympiad. See above in this History, Vol. VI. Ch. liv, p. 455, note. Respecting the year and month in which the Pythian festival was held, there is a difference of opinion among commentators. I agree with those who assign it to the first quarter of the third Olympic year. And the date of the march of Phœbidas would perfectly harmonize with this supposition.



celebrated by the women apart from the men, during which the acropolis or Kadmeia was consecrated to their exclusive use,—Phœbidas, affecting to have concluded his halt, put himself in march to proceed as if towards Thrace; seemingly rounding the walls of Thebes, but not going into it. The Senate was actually assembled in the portico of the agora, and the heat of a summer's noon had driven every one out of the streets, when Leontiades, stealing away from the Senate, hastened on horseback to overtake Phœbidas, caused him to face about, and conducted the Lacedæmonians straight up to the Kadmeia; the gates of which, as well as those of the town, were opened by his order as polemarch. There were not only no citizens in the streets, but none even in the Kadmeia; no male person being permitted to be present at the feminine Thesmophoria; so that Phœbidas and his army became possessed of the Kadmeia without the smallest opposition. At the same time they became possessed of an acquisition of hardly less importance,—the persons of all the assembled Theban women; who served as hostages for the quiet submission, however reluctant, of the citizens in the town below. Leontiades handed to Phœbidas the key of the gates, and then descended into the town, giving orders that no man should go up without his order.<sup>1</sup>

The assembled Senate heard with consternation the occupation of the acropolis by Phœbidas. Before any deliberation could be taken among the senators, Leontiades came down to resume his seat. The lochages and armed citizens of his party, to whom he had previously given orders, stood close at hand. "Senators (said he), be not intimidated by the news that the Spartans are in the Kadmeia; for they assure us that they have no hostile purpose against any one who does not court war against them. But I, as polemarch, am empowered by law to seize any one whose behavior is manifestly and capitally criminal. Accordingly, I seize this man Ismenias, as the great inflamer of war. Come forward, captains and soldiers, lay hold of him, and carry him off where your orders direct." Ismenias was accordingly seized and hurried off

Xenophon mentions nothing about the Pythian festival as being in course of celebration when Phœbidas was encamped near Thebes: for it had no particular reference to Thebes.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v. 2, 28, 29.

as a prisoner to the Kadmeia; while the senators, thunderstruck and overawed, offered no resistance. Such of them as were partisans of the arrested polemarch, and many even of the more neutral members, left the Senate and went home, thankful to escape with their lives. Three hundred of them, including Androkleidas, Pelopidas, Mellon, and others, sought safety by voluntary exile to Athens; after which, the remainder of the Senate, now composed of few or none except philo-Spartan partisans, passed a vote formally dismissing Ismenias, and appointing a new polemarch in his place.<sup>1</sup>

This blow of high-handed violence against Ismenias forms a worthy counterpart to the seizure of Theramenes by Kritias,<sup>2</sup> twenty-two years before, in the Senate of Athens under the Thirty. Terror-striking in itself, it was probably accompanied by similar deeds of force against others of the same party. The sudden explosion and complete success of the conspiracy, plotted by the Executive Chief himself, the most irresistible of all conspirators,—the presence of Phœbidas in the Kadmeia, and of a compliant Senate in the town,—the seizure or flight of Ismenias and all his leading partisans,—were more than sufficient to crush all spirit of resistance on the part of the citizens; whose first anxiety probably was, to extricate their wives and daughters from the custody of the Lacedæmonians in the Kadmeia. Having such a price to offer, Leontiades would extort submission the more easily, and would probably procure a vote of the people ratifying the new régime, the Spartan alliance, and the continued occupation of the acropolis. Having accomplished the first settlement of his authority, he proceeded without delay to Sparta, to make known the fact that "order reigned" at Thebes.

The news of the seizure of the Kadmeia and of the revolution at Thebes had been received at Sparta with the greatest surprise, as well as with a mixed feeling of shame and satisfaction. Everywhere throughout Greece, probably, it excited a greater sensation than any event since the battle of Ægospotami. Tried by the recognized public law of Greece, it was a flagitious iniquity, for which Sparta had not the shadow of a pretence. It was even

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v. 2, 30, 31.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. ii. 3. See above in this History, Vol. VIII. Ch. lxxv p. 252.



worse than the surprise of Plataea by the Thebans before the Peloponnesian war, which admitted of the partial excuse that war was at any rate impending; whereas in this case, the Thebans had neither done nor threatened anything to violate the peace of Antalkidas. It stood condemned by the indignant sentiment of all Greece, unwillingly testified even by the philo-Laconian Xenophon<sup>1</sup> himself. But it was at the same time an immense accession to Spartan power. It had been achieved with preeminent skill and success; and Phœbidas might well claim to have struck for Sparta the most important blow since Ægospotami, relieving her from one of her two really formidable enemies.<sup>2</sup>

Nevertheless, far from receiving thanks at Sparta, he became the object of wrath and condemnation, both with the ephors and the citizens generally. Every one was glad to throw upon him the odium of the proceeding, and to denounce him as having acted without orders. Even the ephors, who had secretly authorized him beforehand to coöperate generally with the faction at Thebes, having doubtless never given any specific instructions, now indignantly disavowed him. Agesilaus alone stood forward in his defence, contending that the only question was, whether his proceeding at Thebes had been injurious or beneficial to Sparta. If the former, he merited punishment; if the latter, it was always lawful to render service, even *impromptu* and without previous orders.

Tried by this standard, the verdict was not doubtful. For every man at Sparta felt how advantageous the act was in itself; and felt it still more, when Leontiades reached the city, humble in solicitation as well as profuse in promise. In his speech addressed

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 1.

<sup>2</sup> It is curious that Xenophon, treating Phœbidas as a man more warm-hearted than wise, speaks of him as if he had rendered no real service to Sparta by the capture of the Kadmeia (v, 2, 28). The explanation of this is, that Xenophon wrote his history at a later period, after the defeat at Leuktra and the downfall of Sparta; which downfall was brought about by the reaction against her overweening and oppressive dominion, especially after the capture of the Kadmeia, — or (in the pious creed of Xenophon) by the displeasure of the gods, which such iniquity drew down upon her (v, 4, 1). In this way, therefore, it is made out that Phœbidas had not acted with true wisdom, and that he had done his country more harm than good a criticism, which we may be sure that no man advanced, at the time of the capture itself, or during the three years after it.

to the assembled ephors and Senate, he first reminded them how hostile Thebes had hitherto been to them, under Ismenias and the party just put down, — and how constantly they had been in jealous alarm, lest Thebes should reconstitute by force the Bœotian federation. "Now (added he) your fears may be at an end; only take as good care to uphold our government, as we shall take to obey your orders. For the future, you will have nothing to do but to send us a short despatch, to get every service which you require." It was resolved by the Lacedæmonians, at the instance of Agesilaus, to retain their garrison now in the Kadmeia, to uphold Leontiades with his colleagues in the government of Thebes, and to put Ismenias upon his trial. Yet they at the same time, as a sort of atonement to the opinion of Greece, passed a vote of censure on Phœbidas, dismissed him from his command, and even condemned him to a fine. The fine, however, most probably was never exacted; for we shall see by the conduct of Sphodrias afterwards that the displeasure against Phœbidas, if at first genuine, was certainly of no long continuance.

That the Lacedæmonians should at the same time condemn Phœbidas and retain the Kadmeia — has been noted as a gross contradiction. Nevertheless, we ought not to forget, that had they evacuated the Kadmeia, the party of Leontiades at Thebes, which had compromised itself for Sparta as well as for its own aggrandizement, would have been irretrievably sacrificed. The like excuse, if excuse it be, cannot be urged in respect to their treatment of Ismenias; whom they put upon his trial at Thebes, before a court consisting of three Lacedæmonian commissioners, and one from each allied city. He was accused, probably by Leontiades and his other enemies, of having entered into friendship and con-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 34.

Καὶ ὑμεῖς γε (says Leontiades to the Lacedæmonian ephors) τότε μὲν ἀεὶ προσείχετε τὸν νοῦν, πότε ἀκούσεσθε βιαζομένους αὐτοὺς τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἐφ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι· νῦν δ', ἐπεὶ τάδε πέπρακται, οὐδὲν ὑμᾶς δεῖ Θηβαίους φοβεῖσθαι· ἀλλ' ἀρκέσει ὑμῖν μικρὰ σκυτάλη, ὥστε ἐκείθεν πάντα πράττεσθαι, ὅσων ἂν θέησθε — ἐάν, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς ὑμῶν, οὕτω καὶ ὑμεῖς ἡμῶν, ἐπιμέλησθε.

Xenophon mentions the *displeasure* of the ephors and the Spartans generally against Phœbidas (χαλεπῶς ἔχοντας τῷ Φοιβίδῃ) but not the fine, which is certified by Diodorus (xv, 20), by Plutarch (Pelopidas, c. 6, and De Genio Socratis, p. 576 A), and Cornelius Nepos (Pelopid. c. 1)



spiracy with the Persian king to the detriment of Greece,<sup>1</sup> — of having partaken in the Persian funds brought into Greece by Timokrates the Rhodian, — and of being the real author of that war which had disturbed Greece from 395 B. C. down to the peace of Antalkidas. After an unavailing defence, he was condemned and executed. Had this doom been inflicted upon him by his political antagonists as a consequence of their intestine victory, it would have been too much in the analogy of Grecian party-warfare to call for any special remark. But there is something peculiarly revolting in the prostitution of judicial solemnity and Panhellenic pretence, which the Lacedæmonians here committed. They could have no possible right to try Ismenias as a criminal at all; still less to try him as a criminal on the charge of confederacy with the Persian king, — when they had themselves, only five years before, acted not merely as allies, but even as instruments, of that monarch, in enforcing the peace of Antalkidas. If Ismenias had received money from one Persian satrap, the Spartan Antalkidas had profited in like manner by another, — and for the like purpose too of carrying on Grecian war. The real motive of the Spartans was doubtless to revenge themselves upon this distinguished Theban for having raised against them the war which began in 395 B. C. But the mockery of justice by which that revenge was masked, and the impudence of punishing in him as treason that same foreign alliance with which they had ostentatiously identified themselves, lends a deeper enormity to the whole proceeding.

Leontiades and his partisans were now established as rulers in Thebes, with a Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia to sustain them and execute their orders. The once-haughty Thebes was enrolled as a member of Lacedæmonian confederacy. Sparta was now enabled to prosecute her Olynthian expedition with redoubled vigor. Eudamidas and Amyntas, though they repressed the growth of the Olynthian confederacy, had not been strong enough to put it down; so that a larger force was necessary, and the aggregate of ten thousand men, which had been previously decreed, was put into instant requisition, to be commanded by

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 35; Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, p. 576 A. Plutarch in another place (Pelopid. c. 5) represents Ismenias as having been conveyed to Sparta and tried there.

Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus. The new general, a man of very popular manners, was soon on his march at the head of this large army, which comprised many Theban hoplites as well as horsemen, furnished by the new rulers in their unqualified devotion to Sparta. He sent forward envoys to Amyntas in Macedonia, urging upon him the most strenuous efforts for the purpose of recovering the Macedonian cities which had joined the Olynthians, — and also to Derdas, prince of the district of Upper Macedonia called Elimeia, inviting his coöperation against that insolent city, which would speedily extend her dominion (he contended) from the maritime region to the interior, unless she were put down.<sup>1</sup>

Though the Lacedæmonians were masters everywhere and had their hands free, — though Teleutias was a competent officer with powerful forces, — and though Derdas joined with four hundred excellent Macedonian horse, — yet the conquest of Olynthus was found no easy enterprise.<sup>2</sup> The Olynthian cavalry, in particular, was numerous and efficient. Unable as they were to make head against Teleutias in the field or repress his advance, nevertheless in a desultory engagement which took place near the city gates, they defeated the Lacedæmonian and Theban cavalry, threw even the infantry into confusion, and were on the point of gaining a complete victory, had not Derdas with his cavalry on the other wing, made a diversion which forced them to come back for the protection of the city. Teleutias, remaining master of the field, continued to ravage the Olynthian territory during the summer, for which, however, the Olynthians retaliated by frequent marauding expeditions against the cities in alliance with him.<sup>3</sup>

In the ensuing spring, the Olynthians sustained various partial defeats, especially one near Apollonia, from Derdas. They were more and more confined to their walls; insomuch that Teleutias became confident and began to despise them. Under these dispo-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 38.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes (De Fals. Leg. c. 75, p. 425) speaks with proper commendation of the brave resistance made by the Olynthians against the great force of Sparta. But his expressions are altogether misleading as to the tenor and result of the war. If we had no other information than his, we should be led to imagine that the Olynthians had been victorious, and the Lacedæmonians baffled.

<sup>3</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. v 2, 40-43.



sitions on his part, a body of Olynthian cavalry showed themselves one morning, passed the river near their city, and advanced in calm array towards the Lacedæmonian camp. Indignant at such an appearance of daring, Teleutias directed Tlemonidas with the peltasts to disperse them; upon which the Olynthians slowly retreated, while the peltasts rushed impatiently to pursue them, even when they recrossed the river. No sooner did the Olynthians see that half the peltasts had crossed it, than they suddenly turned, charged them vigorously, and put them to flight with the loss of their commander Tlemonidas and a hundred others. All this passed in sight of Teleutias, who completely lost his temper. Seizing his arms, he hurried forward to cover the fugitives with the hoplites around him, sending orders to all his troops, hoplites, peltasts, and horsemen, to advance also. But the Olynthians, again retreating, drew him on towards the city, with such inconsiderate forwardness, that many of his soldiers ascending the eminence on which the city was situated, rushed close up to the walls.<sup>1</sup> Here, however, they were received by a shower of missiles which forced them to recede in disorder; upon which the Olynthians again sallied forth, probably, from more than one gate at once, and charged them first with cavalry and peltasts, next with hoplites. The Lacedæmonians and their allies, disturbed and distressed by the first, were unable to stand against the compact charge of the last; Teleutias himself, fighting in the foremost ranks, was slain, and his death was a signal for the flight of all around. The whole besieging force dispersed and fled in different directions, — to Akanthus, to Spartólus, to Potidæa, to Apollonia. So vigorous and effective was the pursuit of the Olynthians, that the loss of the fugitives was immense. The whole army was in fact ruined;<sup>2</sup> for probably many of the allies who escaped became discouraged and went home.

At another time, probably, a victory so decisive might have deterred the Lacedæmonians from farther proceedings, and saved Olynthus. But now, they were so completely masters everywhere else, that they thought only of repairing the dishonor by a still

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i, 63 — with the Scholiast.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 4-6. *παμπλήθεις ἀπέκτειναν ἀνθρώπους καὶ οὗτοι περὶ πολὺν ἦν τούτου τοῦ στρατεύματος.*

Diodorus (xv, 21) states the loss at twelve hundred men.

more imposing demonstration. Their king Agesipolis was placed at the head of an expedition on the largest scale; and his name called forth eager cooperation, both in men and money, from the allies. He marched with thirty Spartan counsellors, as Agesilaus had gone to Asia; besides a select body of energetic youth as volunteers, from the Periæki, from the illegitimate sons of Spartans, and from strangers or citizens who had lost their franchise through poverty, introduced as friends of richer Spartan citizens to go through the arduous Lykurgæan training.<sup>1</sup> Amyntas and Derdas also were instigated to greater exertions than before, so that Agesipolis was enabled, after receiving their reinforcements in his march through Macedonia, to present himself before Olynthus with an overwhelming force, and to confine the citizens within their walls. He then completed the ravage of their territory, which had been begun by Teleutias; and even took Torônê by storm. But the extreme heat of the summer weather presently brought upon him a fever, which proved fatal in a week's time; although he had caused himself to be carried for repose to the shady grove, and clear waters, near the temple of Dionysus at Aphytis. His body was immersed in honey and transported to Sparta, where it was buried with the customary solemnities.<sup>2</sup>

Polybiades, who succeeded Agesipolis in the command, prosecuted the war with undiminished vigor; and the Olynthians, debarred from their home produce as well as from importation, were

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 9. *Πολλοὶ δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν περιοίκων ἐθέλονται καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἡκολούθουν, καὶ ξένοι τῶν τροφίμων καλουμένων, καὶ νόθοι τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, μάλα εὐειδεῖς τε καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καλῶν οὐκ ἄπειροι.*

The phrase — *ξένοι τῶν τροφίμων* — is illustrated by a passage from Phylarchus in Athenæus, vi, p. 271 (referred to by Schneider in his note here). I have already stated that the political franchise of a Spartan citizen depended upon his being able to furnish constantly his quota to the public mess-table. Many of the poor families became unable to do this, and thus lost their qualification and their training; but rich citizens sometimes paid their quota for them, and enabled them by such aid to continue their training as *ἐντροφοί*, *τροφίμοι*, *μόθακες*, etc. as companions of their own sons. The two sons of Xenophon were educated at Sparta (Diog. Laert. ii, 54), and would thus be *ξένοι τῶν τροφίμων καλουμένων*. If either of them was now old enough, he might probably have been one among the volunteers to accompany Agesipolis.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 18; Pausan. iii, 5, 9.



speedily reduced to such straits as to be compelled to solicit peace. They were obliged to break up their own federation, and to enrol themselves as sworn members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, with its obligations of service to Sparta.<sup>1</sup> The Olynthian union being dissolved, the component Grecian cities were enrolled severally as allies of Sparta, while the maritime cities of Macedonia were deprived of their neighboring Grecian protector, and passed again under the dominion of Amyntas.

Both the dissolution of this growing confederacy, and the reconstitution of maritime Macedonia, were signal misfortunes to the Grecian world. Never were the arms of Sparta more mischievously or more unwarrantably employed. That a powerful Grecian confederacy should be formed in the Chalkidic peninsula, in the border region where Hellas joined the non-Hellenic tribes, — was an incident of signal benefit to the Hellenic world generally. It would have served as a bulwark to Greece against the neighboring Macedonians and Thracians, at whose expense its conquests, if it made any, would have been achieved. That Olynthus did not oppress her Grecian neighbors — that the principles of her confederacy were of the most equal, generous, and seducing character, — that she employed no greater compulsion than was requisite to surmount an unreflecting instinct of town-autonomy, — and that the very towns who obeyed this instinct would have become sensible themselves, in a very short time, of the benefits conferred by the confederacy on each and every one, — these are facts certified by the urgency of the reluctant Akanthians, when they entreat Sparta to leave no interval for the confederacy to make its workings felt. Nothing but the intervention of Sparta could have crushed this liberal and beneficent promise; nothing but the accident, that during the three years from 382 to 379 B. C., she was at the maximum of her power and had her hands quite free, with Thebes and its Kadmeia under her garrison. Such prosperity did not long continue unabated. Only a few months after the submission of Olynthus, the Kadmeia was retaken by the Theban exiles, who raised so vigorous a war against Sparta, that she would have been disabled from meddling with Olynthus, — as we shall find illustrated by the fact (hereafter to be recounted), that she declined interfering in Thessaly to pro-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 3 26; Diodor. xv, 22, 23.

rect the Thessalian cities against Jason of Pheræ. Had the Olynthian confederacy been left to its natural working, it might well have united all the Hellenic cities around it in harmonious action, so as to keep the sea coast in possession of a confederacy of free and self-determining communities, confining the Macedonian princes to the interior. But Sparta threw in her extraneous force, alike irresistible and inauspicious, to defeat these tendencies; and to frustrate that salutary change, — from fractional autonomy and isolated action into integral and equal autonomy with collective action, — which Olynthus was laboring to bring about. She gave the victory to Amyntas, and prepared the indispensable basis upon which his son Philip afterwards rose, to reduce not only Olynthus, but Akanthus, Apollonia, and the major part of the Grecian world, to one common level of subjection. Many of those Akanthians, who spurned the boon of equal partnership and free communion with Greeks and neighbors, lived to discover how impotent were their own separate walls as a bulwark against Macedonian neighbors; and to see themselves confounded in that common servitude which the imprudence of their fathers had entailed upon them. By the peace of Antalkidas, Sparta had surrendered the Asiatic Greeks to Persia; by crushing the Olynthian confederacy, she virtually surrendered the Thracian Greeks to the Macedonian princes. Never again did the opportunity occur of placing Hellenism on a firm, consolidated, and self-supporting basis, round the coast of the Thermaic Gulf.

While the Olynthian expedition was going on, the Lacedæmonians were carrying on, under Agesilaus, another intervention within Peloponnesus, against the city of Phlius. It has already been mentioned that certain exiles of this city had recently been recalled, at the express command of Sparta. The ruling party in Phlius had at the same time passed a vote to restore the confiscated property of these exiles; reimbursing out of the public treasury, to those who had purchased it, the price which they had paid, — and reserving all disputed points for judicial decision.<sup>1</sup> The returned exiles now again came to Sparta, to prefer complaint that they could obtain no just restitution of their property; that the tribunals of the city were in the hands of their opponents,

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 10.



many of them directly interested as purchasers, who refused them the right of appealing to any extraneous and impartial authority; and that there were even in the city itself many who thought them wronged. Such allegations were, probably, more or less founded in truth. At the same time, the appeal to Sparta, abrogating the independence of Phlius, so incensed the ruling Phliasians that they passed a sentence of fine against all the appellants. The latter insisted on this sentence as a fresh count for strengthening their complaints at Sparta; and as a farther proof of anti-Spartan feeling, as well as of high-handed injustice, in the Phliasian rulers.<sup>1</sup> Their cause was warmly espoused by Agesilaus, who had personal relations of hospitality with some of the exiles; while it appears that his colleague, King Agesipolis, was on good terms with the ruling party at Phlius, — had received from them zealous aid, both in men and money, for his Olynthian expedition, — and had publicly thanked them for their devotion to Sparta.<sup>2</sup> The Phliasian government, emboldened by the proclaimed testimonial of Agesipolis, certifying their fidelity, had fancied that they stood upon firm ground, and that no Spartan coercion would be enforced against them. But the marked favor of Agesipolis, now absent in Thrace, told rather against them in the mind of Agesilaus; pursuant to that jealousy which usually prevailed between the two Spartan kings. In spite of much remonstrance at Sparta, from many who deprecated hostilities against a city of five thousand citizens, for the profit of a handful of exiles, — he not only seconded the proclamation of war against Phlius by the ephors, but also took the command of the army.<sup>3</sup>

The army being mustered, and the border sacrifices favorable, Agesilaus marched with his usual rapidity towards Phlius; dismissing those Phliasian envoys, who met him on the road and bribed or entreated him to desist, with the harsh reply that the government had already deceived Sparta once, and that he would be satisfied with nothing less than the surrender of the acropolis. This being refused, he marched to the city, and blocked it up by a wall of circumvallation. The besieged defended themselves

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 10, 11.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 10. ἡ Φλιασίων πόλις, ἐπαινεθείσα μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀγησιπόλεως, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ ταχέως αὐτῷ χρήματα ἐς τὴν στρατιάν ἐδωκεν, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 12, 13; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24; Diodor. xv, 21.

with resolute bravery and endurance, under a citizen named Delphion; who, with a select troop of three hundred, maintained constant guard at every point, and even annoyed the besiegers by frequent sallies. By public decree, every citizen was put upon half-allowance of bread, so that the siege was prolonged to double the time which Agesilaus, from the information of the exiles as to the existing stock of provisions, had supposed to be possible. Gradually, however, famine made itself felt; desertions from within increased, among those who were favorable, or not decidedly averse, to the exiles; desertions, which Agesilaus took care to encourage by an ample supply of food, and by enrolment as Phliasian emigrants on the Spartan side. At length, after about a year's blockade,<sup>1</sup> the provisions within were exhausted, so that the besieged were forced to entreat permission from Agesilaus to despatch envoys to Sparta and beg for terms. Agesilaus granted their request. But being at the same time indignant that they submitted to Sparta rather than to him, he sent to ask the ephors that the terms might be referred to his dictation. Meanwhile he redoubled his watch over the city; in spite of which, Delphion, with one of his most active subordinates, contrived to escape at this last hour. Phlius was now compelled to surrender at discretion to Agesilaus, who named a Council of One Hundred (half from the exiles, half from those within the city) vested with absolute powers of life and death over all the citizens, and authorized to frame a constitution for the future government of the city. Until this should be done, he left a garrison in the acropolis, with assured pay for six months.<sup>2</sup>

Had Agesipolis been alive, perhaps the Phliasians might have obtained better terms. How the omnipotent Hekatontarchy named by the partisan feelings of Agesilaus,<sup>3</sup> conducted themselves, we

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 25.

Καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ Φλίουντα οὕτως αὐ ἐπετετέλεστο ἐν ὅκτῳ μηνὶ καὶ ἐνιαυτῷ.

This general expression "the matters relative to Phlius," comprises not merely the blockade, but the preliminary treatment and complaints of the Phliasian exiles. One year, therefore, will be as much as we can allow for the blockade, — perhaps more than we ought to allow.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 17-26.

<sup>3</sup> The panegyrist of Agesilaus finds little to commend in these Phliasian proceedings, except the φιλευταιρία or partisan-attachment of his hero (Xenoph. Agesil. ii, 21).



do not know. But the presumptions are all unfavorable, seeing that their situation as well as their power was analogous to that of the Thirty at Athens and the Lysandrian Dekarchies elsewhere.

The surrender of Olynthus to Polybiades, and of Phlius to Agesilaus, seem to have taken place nearly at the same time.

## CHAPTER LXXVII.

FROM THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY THE LACEDÆMONIANS DOWN TO THE CONGRESS AT SPARTA, AND PARTIAL PEACE, IN 371 B. C.

At the beginning of 379 B. C., the empire of the Lacedæmonians on land had reached a pitch never before paralleled. On the sea, their fleet was but moderately powerful, and they seem to have held divided empire with Athens over the smaller islands; while the larger islands (so far as we can make out) were independent of both. But the whole of inland Greece, both within and without Peloponnesus, — except Argos, Attica, and perhaps the more powerful Thessalian cities, — was now enrolled in the confederacy dependent on Sparta. Her occupation of Thebes, by a Spartan garrison and an oligarchy of local partisans, appeared to place her empire beyond all chance of successful attack; while the victorious close of the war against Olynthus carried everywhere an intimidating sense of her far-reaching power. Her allies, too, — governed as they were in many cases by Spartan harpists, and by oligarchies whose power rested on Sparta, — were much more dependent upon her than they had been during the time of the Peloponnesian war.

Such a position of affairs rendered Sparta an object of the same mingled fear and hatred (the first preponderant) as had been felt towards imperial Athens fifty years before, when she was designated as the "despot city."<sup>1</sup> And this sentiment was farther

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i, 124. πόλιν τύραννον.

aggravated by the recent peace of Antalkidas, in every sense the work of Sparta; which she had first procured, and afterwards carried into execution. That peace was disgraceful enough, as being dictated by the king of Persia, enforced in his name, and surrendering to him all the Asiatic Greeks. But it became yet more disgraceful when the universal autonomy which it promised was seen to be so executed, as to mean nothing better than subjection to Sparta. Of all the acts yet committed by Sparta, not only in perversion of the autonomy promised to every city, but in violation of all the acknowledged canons of right dealing between city and city, — the most flagrant was, her recent seizure and occupation of the Kadmeia at Thebes. Her subversion (in alliance with, and partly for the benefit of, Amyntas king of Macedonia) of the free Olynthian confederacy was hardly less offensive to every Greek of large or Pan-hellenic patriotisms. She appeared as the confederate of the Persian king on one side, of Amyntas the Macedonian, on another, of the Syracusan despot Dionysius on a third, — as betraying the independence of Greece to the foreigner, and seeking to put down, everywhere within it, that free spirit which stood in the way of her own harpists and partisan oligarchies.

Unpopular as Sparta was, however, she stood out incontestably as the head of Greece. No man dared to call into question her headship, or to provoke resistance against it. The tone of patriotic and free-spoken Greeks at this moment is manifested in two eminent residents at Athens, — Lysias and Isokrates. Of these two rhetors, the former composed an oration which he publicly read at Olympia during the celebration of the 99th Olympiad, B. C. 384, three years after the peace of Antalkidas. In this oration (of which unhappily only a fragment remains, preserved by Dionysius of Halikarnassus), Lysias raises the cry of danger to Greece, partly from the Persian king, partly from the despot Dionysius of Syracuse.<sup>1</sup> He calls upon all Greeks to lay aside hos-

<sup>1</sup> Lysias, Frag. Orat. xxxiii, (Olympic.) ed. Bekker ap. Dionys. Hal. *Ja. dic. de Lysia*, p. 520-525, Reisk.

... 'Ορῶν οὕτως αἰσχροῦς διακειμένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν αὐτῆς ὄντι ὑπὸ τῷ βαρβάρῳ, πολλὰς δὲ πόλεις ὑπὸ τυράννων ἀναστάτους γενεῖν μένας.

... 'Ορῶμεν γὰρ τοὺς κινδύνους καὶ μεγάλους καὶ τ' ἀντάχοντες περισσύνε-



tility and jealousies one with the other, and to unite in making head against these two really formidable enemies, as their ancestors had previously done, with equal zeal for putting down despots and for repelling the foreigner. He notes the number of Greeks (in Asia) handed over to the Persian king, whose great wealth would enable him to hire an indefinite number of Grecian soldiers, and whose naval force was superior to anything which the Greeks could muster; while the strongest naval force in Greece was that of the Syracusan Dionysius. Recognizing the Lacedæmonians as chiefs of Greece, Lysias expresses his astonishment that they should quietly permit the fire to extend itself from one city to another. They ought to look upon the misfortunes of those cities which had been destroyed, both by the Persians and by Dionysius, as coming home to themselves; not to wait patiently, until the two hostile powers had united their forces to attack the centre of Greece, which yet remained independent.

τας. Ἐπίστασθε δὲ, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῶν κρατούντων τῆς θαλάσσης, τῶν δὲ χρημάτων βασιλεὺς ταμίης· τὰ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων σώματα, τῶν δὲ πανᾶσθαι δυναμένων· ναὺς δὲ πολλὰς αὐτὸς κέκτηται, πολλὰς δ' ὁ τύραννος τῆς Σικελίας. ....

... Ὡστε ἄξιον — τοὺς προγόνους μιμεῖσθαι, οἱ τοὺς μὲν βαρβάρους ἐποίησαν, τῆς ἀλλοτρίας ἐπιθυμοῦντας, τῆς σφετέρας αὐτῶν ἐστερηθῆναι· τοὺς δὲ τυράννους ἐξελάσαντες, κοινὴν ἅπασιν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν κατέστησαν. Θανμάζω δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους πάντων μάλιστα, τίνι ποτε γνώμῃ χρώμενοι, κακομένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιόρῳσιν, ἡγεμόνες ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, etc.

... Οὐ τοίνυν ὁ ἐπιὼν καιρὸς τοῦ παρόντος βελτίων· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλοτρίως δεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀπολωλότων συμφορὰς νομίζειν, ἀλλ' οἰκείας· οὐδ' ἀναμείναι, ἕως ἂν ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς αἱ δυνάμεις ἀμφοτέρων (of Artaxerxes and Dionysius) ἐλθῶσιν, ἀλλ' ἕως ἔτι ἐξεστί, τὴν τούτων ὕβριν κωλύσαι.

Ephorus appears to have affirmed that there was a plan concerted between the Persian king and Dionysius, for attacking Greece in concert and dividing it between them (see Ephori Fragm. 141, ed. Didot). The assertion is made by the rhetor Aristides, and the allusion to Ephorus is here preserved by the Scholiast on Aristides (who, however, is mistaken, in referring it to Dionysius the younger). Aristides ascribes the frustration of this attack to the valor of two Athenian generals, Iphikrates, and Timotheus; the former of whom captured the fleet of Dionysius, while the latter defeated the Lacedæmonian fleet at Leukas. But these events happened in 373-372 B.C., when the power of Dionysius was not so formidable or aggressive as it had been between 387-382 B.C.; moreover, the ships of Dionysius taken by Iphikrates were only ten in number, a small squadron Aristides appears to me to have misconceived the date to which the assertion of Ephorus really referred.

Of the two common enemies, — Artaxerxes and Dionysius, — whom Lysias thus denounces, the latter had sent to this very Olympic festival a splendid Theôry, or legation to offer solemn sacrifice in his name; together with several chariots to contend in the race, and some excellent rhapsodes to recite poems composed by himself. The Syracusan legation, headed by Thearides, brother of Dionysius, were clothed with rich vestments, and lodged in a tent of extraordinary magnificence, decorated with gold and purple; such, probably, as had not been seen since the ostentatious display made by Alkibiades<sup>1</sup> in the ninetieth Olympiad (B.C. 420). While instigating the spectators present to exert themselves as Greeks for the liberation of their fellow-Greeks enslaved by Dionysius, Lysias exhorted them to begin forthwith their hostile demonstration against the latter, by plundering the splendid tent before them, which insulted the sacred plain of Olympia with the spectacle of wealth extorted from Grecian sufferers. It appears that this exhortation was partially, but only partially, acted upon.<sup>2</sup> Some persons assailed the tents, but were, probably, re-

<sup>1</sup> See Pseudo-Andokides cont. Alkibiad. s. 30; and Vol. VII. of this History, Ch. IV, p. 53.

<sup>2</sup> Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 519; Diodor. xiv, 109. ὥστε τινες τοὺς μῆσαι διαρπάξαι τὰς σκηνάς.

Dionysius does not specify the date of this oration of Lysias; but Diodorus places it at Olympiad 98 — B.C. 388 — the year before the peace of Antalkidas. On this point I venture to depart from him, and assign it to Olympiad 99, or 384 B.C., three years after the peace; the rather as his Olympic chronology appears not clear, as may be seen by comparing xv, 7 with xiv, 109.

1. The year 388 B.C. was a year of war, in which Sparta with her allies on one side, — and Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos on the other, — were carrying on strenuous hostilities. The war would hinder the four last-mentioned states from sending any public legation to sacrifice at the Olympic festival. Lysias, as an Athenian metie, could hardly have gone there at all; but he certainly could not have gone there to make a public and bold oratorical demonstration.

2. The language of Lysias implies that the speech was delivered after the cession of the Asiatic Greeks to Persia, — ὁρῶν πολλὰ μὲν αὐτῆς (Ἑλλάδος) ὄντα ὑπὸ τῷ Βαρβάρῳ, etc. This is quite pertinent after the peace of Antalkidas; but not at all admissible before that peace. The same may be said about the phrase, — οὐ γὰρ ἀλλοτρίως δεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀπολωλότων συμφορὰς νομίζειν, ἀλλ' οἰκείας; which must be referred to the recent subjection



strained by the Eleian superintendents without difficulty. Yet the incident, taken in conjunction with the speech of Lysias, helps us to understand the apprehensions and sympathies which agitated the Olympic crowd in B. C. 384. This was the first Olympic festival after the peace of Antalkidas; a festival memorable, not only because it again brought thither Athenians, Boeotians, Corinthians, and Argeians, who must have been prevented by the preceding war from coming either in B. C. 388 or in B. C. 392, — but also as it exhibited the visitors and Theories from the Asiatic Greeks, for the first time since they had been handed over by Sparta to the Persians, — and the like also from those numerous Italians and Sicilian Greeks whom Dionysius had enslaved. All these sufferers, especially the Asiatics, would doubtless be full of complaints respecting the hardships of their new lot, and against Sparta as having betrayed them; complaints, which would call forth genuine sympathy in the Athenians, Thebans, and all others who had submitted reluctantly to the peace of Antalkidas. There was thus a large body of sentiment prepared to respond to the declamations of Lysias. And many a Grecian patriot, who would be ashamed to lay hands on the Syracusan tents or envoys, would yet yield a mournful assent to the orator's remark, that the free Grecian world was on fire<sup>1</sup> at both sides; that Asiatics, Italians, and Sicilians, had already passed into the hands of Artaxerxes and Dionysius; and that, if these two formidable enemies should coalesce, the liberties even of central Greece would be in great danger.

It is easy to see how much such feeling of grief and shame would

of the Asiatic Greeks by Persia, and of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks by Dionysius.

3. In 388 B. C. — when Athens and so large a portion of the greater cities of Greece were at war with Sparta, and therefore contesting her headship, — Lysias would hardly have publicly talked of the Spartans as *ηγέμονες τῶν Ἑλλήνων*, οὐκ ἀδίκως, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐμφύτου ἀρετὴν καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιστήμην. This remark is made also by Sievers (*Geschich. Griech. bis zur Schlacht von Mantinea*, p. 138). Nor would he have de-claimed so ardently against the Persian king, at a time when Athens was still not despairing of Persian aid against Sparta.

On these grounds (as well as on others which I shall state when I recount the history of Dionysius), it appears to me that this oration of Lysias is unsuitable to B. C. 388 — but perfectly suitable to 384 B. C.

<sup>1</sup> Lysias, Orat. Olymp. Frag. *καίτοι μὲν τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιρῶσιν*, etc.

tend to raise antipathy against Sparta. Lysias, in that portion of his speech which we possess, disguises his censure against her under the forms of surprise. But Isokrates, who composed an analogous discourse four years afterwards (which may perhaps have been read at the next Olympic festival of B. C. 380), speaks out more plainly. He denounces the Lacedæmonians as traitors to the general security and freedom of Greece, and as seconding foreign kings as well as Grecian despots to aggrandize themselves at the cost of autonomous Grecian cities, — all in the interest of their own selfish ambition. No wonder (he says) that the free and self-acting Hellenic world was every day becoming contracted into a narrower space, when the presiding city Sparta assisted Artaxerxes, Amyntas, and Dionysius to absorb it, — and herself undertook unjust aggressions against Thebes, Olynthus, Phlius, and Mantinea.<sup>1</sup>

The preceding citations, from Lysias and Isokrates, would be sufficient to show the measure which intelligent contemporaries took, both of the state of Greece and of the conduct of Sparta, during the eight years succeeding the peace of Antalkidas (387–379 B. C.). But the philo-Laconian Xenophon is still more emphatic in his condemnation of Sparta. Having described her triumphant and seemingly unassailable position after the subjugation of Olynthus and Phlius, he proceeds to say,<sup>2</sup> — “I could produce numerous oth-

<sup>1</sup> Isokrates, Or. iv. (Panegy.) s. 145, 146: compare his Orat. viii. (De Pace) s. 122; and Diodor. xv, 23.

Dionysius of Syracuse had sent twenty triremes to join the Lacedæmonians at the Hellespont, a few months before the peace of Antalkidas (Xenophon, Hellen. v, 1, 26).

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 1. Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ἂν τις ἔχοι καὶ ἄλλα λέγειν, καὶ Ἑλληνικὰ καὶ βαρβαρικὰ, ὡς θεοὶ οὔτε τῶν ἀσεβοῦντων οὔτε τῶν ἀνόσια ποιούντων ἀμελοῦσι· νῦν γε μὴν λέξω τὰ προκείμενα. Λακεδαιμόνιοι τε γὰρ, οἱ δμῶσαντες αὐτονόμους ἔασι τὰς πόλεις, τὴν ἐν Θήβαις ἀκρόπολιν κατασχόντες, ὑπ' αὐτῶν μόνον τῶν ἀδικηθέντων ἐκολάσθησαν, πρῶτον οὐδ' ὑφ' ἐνὸς τῶν πώποτε ἀνθρώπων κρατηθέντες. Τοὺς τε τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσαγάγοντας εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ βουληθέντας Λακεδαιμονίους τὴν πόλιν δουλεύειν, ὥστε αὐτοὶ τυραννεῖν. . . . τὴν τούτων ἀρχὴν ἐπὶ μόνον τῶν φυγόντων ἤρκεσαν καταλῦσαι.

This passage is properly characterized by Dr. Peter (in his *Commentatio Critica in Xenophontis Hellenica*, Hall. 1837, p. 82) as the turning-point in the history: —

“Hoc igitur in loco quasi editiore operis sui Xenophon subsistit, atque uno in conspectu Spartanos, et ad suæ felicitatis fastigium ascendere videt



er incidents, both in and out of Greece, to prove that the gods take careful note of impious men and of evil-doers; but the events which I am now about to relate are quite sufficient. The Lacedæmonians, who had sworn to leave each city autonomous, having violated their oaths by seizing the citadel of Thebes, were punished by the very men whom they had wronged, — though no one on earth had ever before triumphed over them. And the Theban faction who had introduced them into the citadel, with the deliberate purpose that their city should be enslaved to Sparta in order that they might rule despotically themselves, — were put down by no more than seven assailants, among the exiles whom they had banished."

What must have been the hatred, and sense of abused ascendancy, entertained towards Sparta by neutral or unfriendly Greeks, when Xenophon, alike conspicuous for his partiality to her and for his dislike of Thebes, could employ these decisive words in ushering in the coming phase of Spartan humiliation, representing it as a well-merited judgment from the gods? The sentence which I have just translated marks, in the commonplace manner of the Xenophontic Hellenica, the same moment of pointed contrast and transition, — past glory suddenly and unexpectedly darkened by supervening misfortune, — which is foreshadowed in the narrative of Thucydides by the dialogue between the Athenian envoys and the Melian<sup>1</sup> council; or in the *Œdipus* and *Antigonê* of Sophokles,<sup>2</sup> by the warnings of the prophet Teiresias.

The government of Thebes had now been for three years (since the blow struck by Phœbidas) in the hands of Leontiades and his oligarchical partisans, upheld by the Spartan garrison in the Kadmeia. Respecting the details of its proceedings we have scarce any information. We can only (as above remarked) judge of it by the analogy of the Thirty tyrants at Athens, and of the Lysandrian Dekarchies, to which it was exactly similar in origin, position, and interests. That the general spirit of it must have been cruel, oppressive, and rapacious, — we cannot doubt; though in what degree we have no means of knowing. The appetites

et rursus ab eo delabi: tantâ autem divinæ justitiæ conscientia tangitur in hac Spartanorum fortunâ conspicuæ, ut vix suum iudicium, quanquam id solet facere, suppresserit."

<sup>1</sup> See Vol. VII. of this History, — the close of Chapter lvi.

<sup>2</sup> Soph. *Œdip. Tyr.* 450; *Antigon.* 1066

of uncontrolled rulers, as well as those of a large foreign garrison, would ensure such a result; besides which, those rulers must have been in constant fear of risings or conspiracies amidst a body of high-spirited citizens who saw their city degraded, from being the chief of the Bœotian federation, into nothing better than a captive dependency of Sparta. Such fear was aggravated by the vicinity of a numerous body of Theban exiles, belonging to the opposite or anti-Spartan party; three or four hundred of whom had fled to Athens at the first seizure of their leader Ismenias, and had been doubtless joined subsequently by others. So strongly did the Theban rulers apprehend mischief from these exiles, that they hired assassins to take them off by private murder at Athens; and actually succeeded in thus killing Androkleidas, chief of the band and chief successor of the deceased Ismenias, — though they missed their blows at the rest.<sup>1</sup> And we may be sure that they made the prison in Thebes subservient to multiplied enormities and executions, when we read not only that one hundred and fifty prisoners were found in it when the government was put down,<sup>2</sup> but also that in the fervor of that revolutionary movement, the slain gaoler was an object of such fierce antipathy, that his corpse was trodden and spit upon by a crowd of Theban women.<sup>3</sup> In Thebes, as in other Grecian cities, the women not only took no part in political disputes, but rarely even showed themselves in public;<sup>4</sup> so that this furious demonstration of vin-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 6: compare Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 29, p. 596 B.

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 14.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 33, p. 598 B, C. *ὃ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν ἐπενέβησαν καὶ προσέπτυσαν οὐκ ὀλίγαι γυναῖκες.*

Among the prisoners was a distinguished Theban of the democratic party, named Amphitheus. He was about to be shortly executed, and the conspirators, personally attached to him, seem to have accelerated the hour of their plot partly to preserve his life (Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. p. 577 D p. 586 F.).

<sup>4</sup> The language of Plutarch (De Gen. Socrat. c. 33, p. 598 C.) is illustrated by the description given in the harangue of Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. (c. xi, s. 40) — of the universal alarm prevalent in Athens after the battle of Chæroneia, such that even the women could not stay in their houses — *ἀναξίως αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς πόλεως ὀρωμέναις*, etc. Compare also the words of Makaria, in the Herakleidae of Euripides, 475; and Diodor. xiii, 55, in his description of the capture of Selinus in Sicily.



ductive sentiment must have been generated by the loss or maltreatment of sons, husbands, and brothers.

The Theban exiles found at Athens not only secure shelter, but genuine sympathy with their complaints against Lacedæmonian injustice. The generous countenance which had been shown by the Thebans, twenty-four years before, to Thrasybulus and the other Athenian refugees, during the omnipotence of the Thirty, was now gratefully requited under this reversal of fortune to both cities;<sup>1</sup> and requited too in defiance of the menaces of Sparta, who demanded that the exiles should be expelled, — as she had in the earlier occasion demanded that the Athenian refugees should be dismissed from Thebes. To protect these Theban exiles, however, was all that Athens could do. Their restoration was a task beyond her power, — and seemingly yet more beyond their own. For the existing government of Thebes was firmly seated, and had the citizens completely under control. Administered by a small faction, Archias, Philippus, Hypatês, and Leontiades (among whom the first two were at this moment polemarchs, though the last was the most energetic and resolute — it was at the same time sustained by the large garrison of fifteen hundred Lacedæmonians and allies,<sup>2</sup> under Lysanoridas and two other harlots, in the Kadmeia, — as well as by the Lacedæmonian posts in the other Bœotian cities around, — Orchomenus, Thespis, Plataea, Tanagra, etc. Though the general body of Theban senti-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 6.

See this sentiment of gratitude on the part of Athenian democrats, towards those Thebans who had sheltered them at Thebes during the exile along with Thrasybulus, — strikingly brought out in an oration of Lysias, of which unfortunately only a fragment remains (Lysias, Frag. 46, 47, Bekk.; Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Isæo, p. 594). The speaker of this oration had been received at Thebes by Kephisodotus the father of Pherenikus; the latter was now in exile at Athens; and the speaker had not only welcomed him (Pherenikus) to his house with brotherly affection, but also delivered this oration on his behalf before the Dikastery; Pherenikus having rightful claims on the property left behind by the assassinated Androkleidas.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv, 25; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 12; Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 17, p. 586 E.

In another passage of this treatise (the last sentence but one) he sets down the numbers in the Kadmeia at five thousand; but the smaller number is most likely to be true.

ment in the city was decidedly adverse to the government, and though the young men while exercising in the palæstra (gymnastic exercises being more strenuously prosecuted at Thebes than anywhere else except at Sparta) kept up by private communication the ardor of an earnest, but compressed, patriotism, — yet all manifestation or assemblage was forcibly kept down, and the commanding posts of the lower town, as well as the citadel, were held in vigilant occupation by the ruling minority.<sup>1</sup>

For a certain time the Theban exiles at Athens waited in hopes of some rising at home, or some positive aid from the Athenians. At length, in the third winter after their flight, they began to despair of encouragement from either quarter, and resolved to take the initiative upon themselves. Among them were numbered several men of the richest and highest families at Thebes, proprietors of chariots, jockeys, and training establishments, for contending at the various festivals: Pelopidas, Mellon, Damokleidas, Theopompus, Pherenikus, and others.<sup>2</sup>

Of these the most forward in originating aggressive measures, though almost the youngest, was Pelopidas; whose daring and self-devotion, in an enterprise which seemed utterly desperate, soon communicated itself to a handful of his comrades. The exiles, keeping up constant private correspondence with their friends in Thebes, felt assured of the sympathy of the citizens generally, if they could once strike a blow. Yet nothing less would be sufficient than the destruction of the four rulers, Leontiades and his colleagues, — nor would any one within the city devote himself to so hopeless a danger. It was this conspiracy which Pelopidas, Mellon, and five or ten other exiles (the entire band is differently numbered, by some as seven, by others, twelve<sup>3</sup>) un-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 4, p. 577 B; c. 17, p. 587 B; c. 25, p. 594 C; c. 27, p. 595 A.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 7, 8.

Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 17, p. 587 D. Τῶν Μέλλωνος ἀματηλατῶν ἐπιστάτης. . . . Ἀρ' οὐ Χλιδῶνα λέγει. τὸν κέλπει τὰ Ἑραία νικῶντα πένησι;

<sup>3</sup> Xenophon says seven (Hellen. v, 4, 1, 2); Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos say twelve (Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 2, p. 576 C; Plutarch, Pelopidas c. 8-13; Cornel. Nepos, Pelopidas, c. 2).

It is remarkable that Xenophon never mentions the name of Pelopidas in this conspiracy; nor indeed (with one exception) throughout his Hellenica  
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dertook to execute. Many of their friends in Thebes came in as auxiliaries to them, who would not have embarked in the design as primary actors. Of all auxiliaries, the most effective and indispensable was Phyllidas, the secretary of the polemarchs; next to him, Charon, an eminent and earnest patriot. Phyllidas, having been despatched to Athens on official business, entered into a secret conference with the conspirators, concerted with them the day for their coming to Thebes, and even engaged to provide for them access to the persons of the polemarchs. Charon not only promised them concealment in his house, from their first coming within the gates until the moment of striking their blow should have arrived, — but also entered his name to share in the armed attack. Nevertheless, in spite of such partial encouragements, the plan still appeared desperate to many who wished heartily for its success. Epaminondas, for example, — who now for the first time comes before us, — resident at Thebes, and not merely sympathizing with the political views of Pelopidas, but also bound to him by intimate friendship, — dissuaded others from the attempt, and declined participating in it. He announced distinctly that he would not become an accomplice in civil bloodshed. It appears that there were men among the exiles whose violence made him fear that they would not, like Pelopidas, draw the sword exclusively against Leontiades and his colleagues, but would avail themselves of success to perpetrate unmeasured violence against other political enemies.<sup>1</sup>

The day for the enterprise was determined by Phyllidas the secretary, who had prepared an evening banquet for Archias and Philippus, in celebration of the period when they were going out of office as polemarchs, — and who had promised on that occasion to bring into their company some women remarkable for beauty, as well as of the best families in Thebes.<sup>2</sup> In concert with the general body of Theban exiles at Athens, who held themselves ready on the borders of Attica, together with some Athenian sympathizers, to march to Thebes the instant that they should receive

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 3, p. 576 E.; p. 577 A.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 4. τὰς σεμνοτάτας καὶ καλλίστας τῶν ἐν Θήβαις. Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 4, p. 577 C.; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 9.

The Theban women were distinguished for majestic figure and beauty (Dikæarchus, Vit. Græc. p. 144, ed Fuhr.).

intimation, — and in concert also with two out of the ten Strategoi of Athens, who took on themselves privately to countenance the enterprise, without any public vote, — Pelopidas and Mellon, and their five companions,<sup>1</sup> crossed Kithæron from Athens to Thebes. It was wet weather, about December B. C. 379; they were disguised as rustics or hunters, with no other arms than a concealed dagger; and they got within the gates of Thebes one by one at nightfall, just when the latest farming men were coming home from their fields. All of them arrived safe at the house of Charon, the appointed rendezvous.

It was, however, by mere accident that they had not been turned back, and the whole scheme frustrated. For a Theban named Hipposthenidas, friendly to the conspiracy, but faint-hearted, who had been let into the secret against the will of Phyllidas, — became so frightened as the moment of execution approached, that he took upon himself, without the knowledge of the rest, to despatch Chlidon, a faithful slave of Mellon, ordering him to go forth on horseback from Thebes, to meet his master on the road, and to desire that he and his comrades would go back to Attica, since circumstances had happened to render the project for the moment impracticable. Chlidon, going home to fetch his bridle, but not finding it in its usual place, asked his wife where it was. The woman, at first pretending to look for it, at last confessed that she had lent it to a neighbor. Chlidon became so irritated with this delay, that he got into a loud altercation with his wife, who on her part wished him ill luck with his journey. He at last beat her, until neighbors ran in to interpose. His departure was thus accidentally frustrated, so that the intended message of countermand never reached the conspirators on their way.<sup>2</sup>

In the house of Charon they remained concealed all the ensuing day, on the evening of which the banquet of Archias and Philippus was to take place. Phyllidas had laid his plan for introducing them at that banquet, at the moment when the two polemarchs had become full of wine, in female attire, as being the

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, (Pelopid. c. 25; De Gen. Socr. c. 26, p. 594 D.) mentions Menekleidēs, Damokleidās, and Theopompus among them. Compare Cornel. Nepos. Pelopid. c. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 8; Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. c. 17, p. 586 B.; c. 18, p. 587 D-E.

women whose visit was expected. The hour had nearly arrived, and they were preparing to play their parts, when an unexpected messenger knocked at the door, summoning Charon instantly into the presence of the polemarchs. All within were thunderstruck with the summons, which seemed to imply that the plot had been divulged, perhaps by the timid Hipposthenidas. It was agreed among them that Charon must obey at once. Nevertheless, he himself, even in the perilous uncertainty which beset him, was most of all apprehensive lest the friends whom he had sheltered should suspect him of treachery towards themselves and their cause. Before departing, therefore, he sent for his only son, a youth of fifteen, and of conspicuous promise in every way. This youth he placed in the hands of Pelopidas, as a hostage for his own fidelity. But Pelopidas and the rest, vehemently disclaiming all suspicion, entreated Charon to put his son away, out of the reach of that danger in which all were now involved. Charon, however, could not be prevailed on to comply, and left his son among them to share the fate of the rest. He went into the presence of Archias and Philippus; whom he found already half-intoxicated, but informed, by intelligence from Athens, that some plot, they knew not by whom, was afloat. They had sent for him to question him, as a known friend of the exiles; but he had little difficulty, aided by the collusion of Phyllidas, in blinding the vague suspicions of drunken men, anxious only to resume their conviviality.<sup>1</sup> He was allowed to retire and rejoin his friends. Nevertheless, soon after his departure, — so many were the favorable chances which befel these improvident men, — a fresh message was delivered to Archias the polemarch, from his namesake Archias the Athenian Hierophant, giving an exact account of the names and scheme of the conspirators, which had become known

<sup>1</sup> Xenophon does not mention this separate summons and visit of Charon to the polemarchs, — nor anything about the scene with his son. He only notices Charon as having harbored the conspirators in his house, and seems even to speak of him as a person of little consequence — *παρὰ Χαρὸν τιμὴν*, etc. (v, 4, 3).

The anecdote is mentioned in both the compositions of Plutarch (De Gen. Socr. c. 28, p. 595; and Pelopidas, c. 9), and is too interesting to be omitted, being perfectly consistent with what we read in Xenophon; though it has perhaps somewhat of a theatrical air.

to the philo-Laconian party at Athens. The messenger who bore this despatch delivered it to Archias with an intimation, that it related to very serious matters. "Serious matters for to-morrow," said the polemarch, as he put the despatch, unopened and unread, under the pillow of the couch on which he was reclining.<sup>1</sup>

Returning to their carousal, Archias and Philippus impatiently called upon Phyllidas to introduce the women according to his promise. Upon this the secretary retired, and brought the conspirators, clothed in female attire, into an adjoining chamber; then going back to the polemarchs, he informed them that the women would not come in unless all the domestics were first dismissed. An order was forthwith given that these latter should depart, while Phyllidas took care that they should be well provided with wine at the lodging of one among their number. The polemarchs were thus left only with one or two friends at table, half-intoxicated as well as themselves; among them Kabeirichus, the archon of the year, who always throughout his term kept the consecrated spear of office in actual possession, and had it at that moment close to his person. Phyllidas now conducted the pretended women into the banqueting-room; three of them attired as ladies of distinction, the four others following as female attendants. Their long veils, and ample folds of clothing, were quite sufficient as disguise, — even had the guests at table been sober, — until they sat down by the side of the polemarchs; and the instant of lifting their veils was the signal for using their daggers. Archias and Philippus were slain at once and with little resistance; but Kabeirichus with his spear tried to defend himself, and thus perished with the others, though the conspirators had not originally intended to take his life.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 10; Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 30, p. 596 F. *Εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ σπονδαία*.

This occurrence also finds no place in the narrative of Xenophon. Cornelius Nepos, Pelopidas, c. 3. Æneas (Poliorectic. c. 31) makes a general reference to the omission of immediate opening of letters arrived, as having caused the capture of the Kadmeia; which was, however, only its remote consequence.

<sup>2</sup> The description given by Xenophon, of this assassination of the polemarchs at Thebes, differs materially from that of Plutarch. I follow Xenophon in the main; introducing, however, several of the details found in Plutarch, which are interesting, and which have the air of being authentic



Having been thus far successful, Phyllidas conducted three of the conspirators, — Pelopidas, Kephisodôrus, and Damokleidas, — to the house of Leontiades, into which he obtained admittance by announcing himself as the bearer of an order from the polemarchs. Leontiades was reclining after supper, with his wife sitting spinning wool by his side, when they entered his chamber. Being a brave and powerful man, he started up, seized his sword, and mortally wounded Kephisodôrus in the throat; a desperate struggle then ensued between him and Pelopidas in the narrow doorway, where there was no room for a third to approach. At length, however, Pelopidas overthrew and killed him, after which they retired, enjoining the wife with threats to remain silent, and closing the door after them with peremptory commands that it should not be again opened. They then went to the house of Hypatês, whom they slew while he attempted to escape over the roof.<sup>1</sup>

Xenophon himself intimates (Hellen. v, 4, 7), that besides the story given in the text, there was also another story told by some, — that Mellon and his companions had got access to the polemarchs in the guise of drunken revellers. It is this latter story which Plutarch has adopted, and which carries him into many details quite inconsistent with the narrative of Xenophon. I think the story, of the conspirators having been introduced in female attire, the more probable of the two. It is borne out by the exact analogy of what Herodotus tells us respecting Alexander son of Amyntas, prince of Macedonia (Herod. v, 20).

Compare Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 10, 11; Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. c. 31. p. 597. Polyænus (ii, 4, 3) gives a story with many different circumstances, yet agreeing in the fact that Pelopidas in female attire killed the Spartan general. The story alluded to by Aristotle (Polit. v, 5, 10), though he names both Thebes and Archias, can hardly refer to this event.

It is Plutarch, however, who mentions the presence of Kabeirichus the archon at the banquet, and the curious Theban custom that the archon during his year of office never left out of his hand the consecrated spear. As a Bœotian born, Plutarch was doubtless familiar with these old customs.

From what other authors Plutarch copied the abundant details of this revolution at Thebes, which he interweaves in the life of Pelopidas and in the treatise called De Genio Socratis—we do not know. Some critics suppose him to have borrowed from Dionysodôrus and Anaxis—Bœotian historians whose work comprised this period, but of whom not a single fragment is preserved (see Fragm. Histor. Græc. ed. Didot, vol. ii, p. 84).

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hell. v, 4, 9; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 11, 12; and De Gen. Socr. p. 597 D-F. Here again Xenophon and Plutarch differ; the latter represents that Pelopidas got into the house of Leontiades *without* Phyllidas, — which

The four great rulers of the philo-Laconian party in Thebes having been now put to death, Phyllidas proceeded with the conspirators to the prison. Here the gaoler, a confidential agent in the oppressions of the deceased governors, hesitated to admit him; but was slain by a sudden thrust with his spear, so as to ensure free admission to all. To liberate the prisoners, probably, for the most part men of kindred politics with the conspirators, — to furnish them with arms taken from the battle-spoils hanging up in the neighboring porticos, — and to range them in battle order near the temple of Amphion, — were the next proceedings; after which they began to feel some assurance of safety and triumph.<sup>1</sup> Epaminondas and Gorgidas, apprised of what had occurred, were the first who appeared in arms with a few friends to sustain the cause; while proclamation was everywhere made aloud, through heralds, that the despots were slain, — that Thebes was free, — and that all Thebans who valued freedom should muster in arms in the market-place. There were at that moment in Thebes many trumpeters who had come to contend for the prize at the approaching festival of the Herakleia. Hipposthenidas engaged these men to blow their trumpets in different parts of the city, and thus everywhere to excite the citizens to arms.<sup>2</sup>

Although during the darkness surprise was the prevalent feeling, and no one knew what to do, — yet so soon as day dawned, and the truth became known, there was but one feeling of joy and patriotic enthusiasm among the majority of the citizens.<sup>3</sup> Both

appears to me altogether improbable. On the other hand, Xenophon mentions nothing about the defence of Leontiades and his personal conflict with Pelopidas, which I copy from Plutarch. So brave a man as Leontiades, awake and sober, would not let himself be slain without a defence dangerous to assailants. Plutarch, in another place, singles out the death of Leontiades as the marking circumstance of the whole glorious enterprise, and the most impressive to Pelopidas (Plutarch—Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum — p. 1099 A-E.).

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hell. v, 4, 8; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 12; De Gen. Socr. p. 598 B.

<sup>2</sup> This is a curious piece of detail, which we learn from Plutarch (De Gen. Socr. c. 34. p. 598 D.).

The Orchomenian Inscriptions in Boeckh's Collection record the prizes given to these *Σαλπικταὶ* or trumpeters (see Boeckh, Corp. Inscr. No. 1584, 1585, etc.).

<sup>3</sup> The unanimous joy with which the consummation of the revolution was

horses and hoplites hastened in arms to the agora. Here for the first time since the seizure of the Kadmeia by Phœbidas, a formal assembly of the Theban people was convened, before which Pelopidas and his fellow-conspirators presented themselves. The priests of the city crowned them with wreaths, and thanked them in the name of the local gods; while the assembly hailed them with acclamations of delight and gratitude, nominating with one voice Pelopidas, Mellon, and Charon, as the first renewed Boetarchs.<sup>1</sup> The revival of this title, which had been dropped since the peace of Antalkidas, was in itself an event of no mean significance; implying not merely that Thebes had waked up again into freedom, but that the Boeotian confederacy also had been, or would be, restored.

Messengers had been forthwith despatched by the conspirators to Attica to communicate their success; upon which all the remaining exiles, with the two Athenian generals privy to the plot, and a body of Athenian volunteers, or *corps francs*, all of whom were ready on the borders awaiting the summons, — flocked to Thebes to complete the work. The Spartan generals, on their side also, sent to Platæ and Thespiæ for aid. During the whole night, they had been distracted and alarmed by the disturbance in the city; lights showing themselves here and there, with trumpets sounding and shouts for the recent success.<sup>2</sup> Apprised speedily of the slaughter of the polemarchs, from whom they had been accustomed to receive orders, they knew not whom to trust or to consult, while they were doubtless beset by affrighted fugitives of the now defeated party, who would hurry up the Kadmeia for safety. They reckoned at first on a diversion in their favor from the forces at Platæ and Thespiæ. But these forces were not permitted even to approach the city gate; being vigorously charged, as soon as they came in sight, by the newly-mustered Theban cavalry, and forced to retreat with loss. The Lacedæmonians in the citadel were thus not only left without support, but saw their enemies in

welcomed in Thebes, — and the ardor with which the citizens turned out to support it by armed force, — is attested by Xenophon, no very willing witness, — Hellen. v, 4, 9. *ἐπεὶ δ' ἡμέρα ἦν καὶ φανερόν ἦν τὸ γεγενημένον, ταχὺ δὲ καὶ οἱ ὀπλῖται καὶ οἱ ἵππεις σὺν τοῖς ὀπλοῖς ἐξεβόηθον*

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Pelop. c. 12.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 598 E.; Pelop. c. 12.

the city reinforced by the other exiles, and by the auxiliary volunteers.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile, Pelopidas and the other new Boetarchs found themselves at the head of a body of armed citizens, full of devoted patriotism and unanimous in hailing the recent revolution. They availed themselves of this first burst of fervor to prepare for storming the Kadmeia without delay, knowing the importance of forestalling all aid from Sparta. And the citizens were already rushing up to the assault, — proclamation being made of large rewards to those who should first force their way in, — when the Lacedæmonian commander sent proposals for a capitulation.<sup>2</sup> Undisturbed egress from Thebes, with the honors of war, being readily guaranteed to him by oath, the Kadmeia was then surrendered. As the Spartans were marching out of the gates, many Thebans of the defeated party came forth also. But against these latter the exasperation of the victors was so ungovernable, that several of the most odious were seized as they passed, and put to death; in some cases, even their children along with them. And more of them would have been thus despatched, had not the Athenian auxiliaries, with generous anxiety, exerted every effort to get them out of sight and put them into safety.<sup>3</sup> We are not told, — nor is it certain, — that these Thebans were protected under the capitulation. Even had they been so, however, the wrathful impulse might still have prevailed against them. Of the three harmosts who thus evacuated the Kadmeia without a blow, two were put to death, the third was heavily fined and banished, by the authorities at Sparta.<sup>4</sup> We do not know what the fortifi-

<sup>1</sup> Xenophon expressly mentions that the Athenians who were invited to come, and who actually did come, to Thebes, were the two generals and the volunteers; all of whom were before privy to the plot, and were in readiness on the borders of Attica — *τοὺς πρὸς τοῖς ὁρίοις Ἀθηναίων καὶ τοὺς δύο τῶν στρατηγῶν — οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρίων ἤδη παρήσαν* (Hellen. v, 4, 9, 10).

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 10, 11. *προσέβαλον πρὸς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν — τὴν προθυμίαν τῶν προσιόντων ἀπάντων ἑώρων*, etc.

Diodorus, xv, 25. *ἐπεὶ τα τοὺς πολίτας ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν παρακαλέσαντες* (the successful Theban conspirators, Pelopidas, etc.) *συνέργους ἔσχον δπαντας τοὺς Θεβαίους*.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 12.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 13; Diodor. xv, 21.



cations of the Kadmeia were, nor how far it was provisioned. But we can hardly wonder that these officers were considered to have dishonored the Lacedæmonian arms, by making no attempt to defend it; when we recollect that hardly more than four or five days would be required to procure adequate relief from home, — and that forty-three years afterwards, the Macedonian garrison in the same place maintained itself against the Thebans in the city for more than fourteen days, until the return of Alexander from Illyria.<sup>1</sup> The first messenger who brought news to Sparta of the conspiracy and revolution at Thebes, appears to have communicated at the same time that the garrison had evacuated the Kadmeia and was in full retreat, with a train of Theban exiles from the defeated party.<sup>2</sup>

Plutarch (Pelopid. c. 13) augments the theatrical effect by saying that the Lacedæmonian garrison on its retreat, actually met at Megra the reinforcements under king Kleombrotus, which had advanced thus far, on their march to relieve the Kadmeia. But this is highly improbable. The account of Xenophon intimates clearly that the Kadmeia was surrounded on the next morning after the nocturnal movement. The commanders capitulated in the first moment of distraction and despair, without even standing an assault.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 6.

<sup>2</sup> In recounting this revolution at Thebes, and the proceedings of the Athenians in regard to it, I have followed Xenophon almost entirely.

Diodorus (xv, 25, 26) concurs with Xenophon in stating that the Theban exiles got back from Attica to Thebes by night, partly through the concurrence of the Athenians (*συνεπιλαβομένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων*) — slew the rulers — called the citizens to freedom next morning, finding all hearty in the cause — and then proceeded to besiege the fifteen hundred Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesians in the Kadmeia.

But after thus much of agreement, Diodorus states what followed, in a manner quite inconsistent with Xenophon; thus (he tells us) —

The Lacedæmonian commander sent instant intelligence to Sparta of what had happened, with request for a reinforcement. The Thebans at once attempted to storm the Kadmeia, but were repulsed with great loss, both of killed and wounded. Fearing that they might not be able to take the fort before reinforcement should come from Sparta, they sent envoys to Athens to ask for aid, reminding the Athenians that they (the Thebans) had helped to emancipate Athens from the Thirty, and to restore the democracy (*ἐπομνήσκοντες μὲν ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ συγκτήγαγον τὸν δῆμον τῶν Ἀθηναίων καθ' ὃν καιρὸν ὑπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα κατεδονλώθησαν*). The Athenians, partly from desire to requite this favor, partly from a wish to secure the Thebans as allies against Sparta, passed a public vote to assist

This revolution at Thebes came like an electric shock upon the Grecian world. With a modern reader, the assassination of the

them forthwith. Demophon the general got together five thousand hoplites and five hundred horsemen, with whom he hastened to Thebes on the next day; and all the remaining population were prepared to follow, if necessary (*πανόημει*). All the other cities in Bœotia also sent aid to Thebes too, — so that there was assembled there a large force of twelve thousand hoplites and two thousand horsemen. This united force, the Athenians being among them, assaulted the Kadmeia day and night, relieving each other; but were repelled with great loss of killed and wounded. At length the garrison found themselves without provisions; the Spartans were tardy in sending reinforcement; and sedition broke out among the Peloponnesian allies who formed the far larger part of the garrison. These Peloponnesians, refusing to fight longer, insisted upon capitulating; which the Lacedæmonian governor was obliged perforce to do, though both he and the Spartans along with him desired to hold out to the death. The Kadmeia was accordingly surrendered, and the garrison went back to Peloponnesus. The Lacedæmonian reinforcement from Sparta arrived only a little too late.

All these circumstances stated by Diodorus are not only completely different from Xenophon, but irreconcilable with his conception of the event. We must reject either the one or the other.

Now Xenophon is not merely the better witness of the two, but is in this case sustained by all the collateral probabilities of the case.

1. Diodorus represents the Athenians as having despatched by public vote, assistance to Thebes, in order to requite the assistance which the Thebans had before sent to restore the Athenian democracy against the Thirty. Now this is incorrect in point of fact. The Thebans had never sent any assistance, positive or ostensible, to Thrasybulus and the Athenian democrats against the Thirty. They had assisted Thrasybulus underhand, and without any public government-act; and they had refused to serve along with the Spartans against him. But they never sent any force to help him against the Thirty. Consequently, the Athenians could not now have sent any public force to Thebes, in requital for a similar favor done before by the Thebans to them.

2. Had the Athenians passed a formal vote, sent a large public army, and taken vigorous part in several bloody assaults on the Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia, — this would have been the most flagrant and unequivocal commencement of hostilities against Sparta. No Spartan envoys could, after that, have gone to Athens, and stayed safely in the house of the Proxenus, — as we know from Xenophon that they did. Besides, — the story of Sphodrias (presently to be recounted) proves distinctly that Athens was at peace with Sparta, and had committed no act of hostility against her, for three or four months at least after the revolution at Thebes. It therefore refutes the narrative of Diodorus about the public vote of the Athenians, and the public Athenian force under Demophon, aiding in the



four leaders, in their houses and at the banquet, raises a sentiment of repugnance which withdraws his attention from the other fea-

attack of the Kadmeia. Strange to say, — Diodorus himself, three chapters afterwards (xv, 29), relates this story about Sphodrias, just in the same manner (with little difference) as Xenophon; ushering in the story with a declaration, that *the Athenians were still at peace with Sparta*, and forgetting that he had himself recounted a distinct rupture of that peace on the part of the Athenians.

3. The news of the revolution at Thebes must necessarily have taken the Athenian public completely by surprise (though some few Athenians were privy to the scheme), because it was a scheme which had no chance of succeeding except by profound secrecy. Now, that the Athenian public, hearing the news for the first time, — having no positive act to complain of on the part of Sparta, and much reason to fear her power, — having had no previous circumstances to work them up, or prepare them for any dangerous resolve, — should identify themselves at once with Thebes, and provoke war with Sparta in the impetuous manner stated by Diodorus, — this is, in my judgment, eminently improbable, requiring good evidence to induce us to believe it.

4. Assume the statement of Diodorus to be true, — what reasonable explanation can be given of the erroneous version which we read in Xenophon? The facts as he recounts them conflict most pointedly with his philo-Laonian partialities; first, the overthrow of the Lacedæmonian power at Thebes, by a handful of exiles; still more, the whole story of Sphodrias and his acquittal.

But assume the statement of Xenophon to be true, — and we can give a very plausible explanation how the erroneous version in Diodorus arose. A few months later, after the acquittal of Sphodrias at Sparta, the Athenians did enter heartily into the alliance of Thebes, and sent a large public force (indeed five thousand hoplites, the same number as those of Demophon, according to Diodorus, c. 32) to assist her in repelling Agesilaus with the Spartan army. It is by no means unnatural that their public vote and expedition undertaken about July 378 B. C., — should have been erroneously thrown back to December 379 B. C. The Athenian orators were fond of boasting that Athens had saved the Thebans from Sparta; and this might be said with some truth, in reference to the aid which she really rendered afterwards. Isokrates (Or. Plataic. s. 31) makes this boast in general terms; but Deinarchus (cont. Demosthen. s. 40) is more distinct, and gives in a few words a version the same as that which we find in Diodorus; so also does Aristides, in two very brief allusions (Panathen. p. 172, and Or. xxxviii, Socialis, p. 486-498). Possibly Aristides as well as Diodorus may have copied from Ephorus; but however this may be, it is easy to understand the mistake out of which their version grew.

5. Lastly, Plutarch mentions nothing about the public vote of the Athenians and the regular division of troops under Demophon which Diodorus

tures of this memorable deed. Now an ancient Greek not only had no such repugnance, but sympathized with the complete revenge for the seizure of the Kadmeia and the death of Ismenias; while he admired, besides, the extraordinary personal daring of Pelopidas and Mellon, — the skilful forecast of the plot, — and the sudden overthrow, by a force so contemptibly small, of a government which the day before seemed unassailable.<sup>1</sup> It deserves note that we here see the richest men in Thebes undertaking a risk, single-handed and with their own persons, which must have appeared on a reasonable estimate little less than desperate. From the Homeric Odysseus and Achilles down to the end of free Hellenism, the rich Greek strips in the Palæstra,<sup>2</sup> and exposes his person in the ranks as a soldier like the poorest citizens; being generally superior to them in strength and bodily efficiency.

As the revolution in Thebes acted forcibly on the Grecian mind from the manner in which it was accomplished, so by its positive effects it altered forthwith the balance of power in Greece. The empire of Sparta, far from being undisputed and nearly universal

asserts to have aided in the storming of the Kadmeia. See Plutarch (De Gen. Socrat. ad fin. Agesil. c. 23; Pelopid. 12, 13). He intimates only, as Xenophon does, that there were some Athenian volunteers who assisted the exiles.

M. Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabrias, etc. p. 38-43) discusses this discrepancy at considerable length, and cites the opinion of various German authors in respect to it, with none of whom I altogether concur.

In my judgment, the proper solution is, to reject altogether (as belonging to a later time) the statement of Diodorus, respecting the public vote at Athens, and the army said to have been sent to Thebes under Demophon; and to accept the more credible narrative of Xenophon; which ascribes to Athens a reasonable prudence, and great fear of Sparta, — qualities such as Athenian orators would not be disposed to boast of. According to that narrative, the question about sending Athenians to aid in storming the Kadmeia could hardly have been submitted for public discussion, since that citadel was surrendered at once by the intimidated garrison.

<sup>1</sup> The daring *coup de main* of Pelopidas and Mellon, against the government of Thebes, bears a remarkable analogy to that by which Evagoras got into Salamis and overthrew the previous despot (Isokrates, Or. ix, Evagor. s. 34).

<sup>2</sup> See, in illustration of Greek sentiment on this point, Xenophon, *Hellen.* iii, 4, 19; and Xenophon, *Enc.* Ages. i, 28



over Greece, is from henceforward only maintained by more or less effort, until at length it is completely overthrown.<sup>1</sup>

The exiles from Thebes, arriving from Sparta, inflamed both the ephors, and the miso-Theban Agesilaus, to the highest pitch. Though it was then the depth of winter,<sup>2</sup> an expedition was decreed forthwith against Thebes, and the allied contingents were summoned. Agesilaus declined to take the command of it, on the ground that he was above sixty years of age, and therefore no longer liable to compulsory foreign service. But this (says Xenophon<sup>3</sup>) was not his real reason. He was afraid that his enemies at Sparta would say,—“Here is Agesilaus again putting us to expense, in order that he may uphold despots in other cities,”—as he had just done, and had been reproached with doing, at Phlius; a second proof that the reproaches against Sparta (which I have cited a few pages above from Lysias and Isokrates) of allying herself with Greek despots as well as with foreigners to put down Grecian freedom, found an echo even in Sparta herself. Accordingly Kleombrotus, the other king of Sparta, took the command. He had recently succeeded his brother Agesipolis, and had never commanded before.

<sup>1</sup> If, indeed, we could believe Isokrates, speaking through the mouth of a Plataean, it would seem that the Thebans, immediately after their revolution, sent an humble embassy to Sparta deprecating hostility, entreating to be admitted as allies, and promising service, even against their benefactors the Athenians, just as devoted as the deposed government had rendered; an embassy which the Spartans haughtily answered by desiring them to receive back their exiles, and to cast out the assassins Pelopidas and his comrades. It is possible that the Thebans may have sent to try the possibility of escaping Spartan enmity; but it is highly improbable that they made any such promises as those here mentioned; and it is certain that they speedily began to prepare vigorously for that hostility which they saw to be approaching.

See Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 31.

This oration is put into the mouth of a Plataean, and seems to be an assemblage of nearly all the topics which could possibly be enforced, truly or falsely, against Thebes.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 14. μάλα χειμῶνος ὄντος.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 13. εὐ εἰδὼς ὅτι, εἰ στρατηγόη, λείξειαν οἱ πολλοί, ὁ Ἀγησίλαος, ὅπως βοηθήσει τοῖς τυράννοις, πρᾶγματα τῇ πόλει παρ' αὐτοῖς. Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24.

Kleombrotus conducted his army along the Isthmus of Corinth through Megara to Plataea, cutting to pieces an outpost of Thebans, composed chiefly of the prisoners set free by the recent revolution, who had been placed for the defence of the intervening mountain-pass. From Plataea he went forward to Thespiæ, and from thence to Kynoskephalæ in the Theban territory, where he lay encamped for sixteen days; after which he retreated to Thespiæ. It appears that he did nothing, and that his inaction was the subject of much wonder in his army, who are said to have even doubted whether he was really and earnestly hostile to Thebes. Perhaps the exiles, with customary exaggeration, may have led him to hope that they could provoke a rising in Thebes, if he would only come near. At any rate the bad weather must have been a serious impediment to action; since in his march back to Peloponnesus through Kreusis and Ægosthenæ the wind blew a hurricane, so that his soldiers could not proceed without leaving their shields and coming back afterwards to fetch them. Kleombrotus did not quit Bœotia, however, without leaving Sphodrias as harmost at Thespiæ, with one third of the entire army, and with a considerable sum of money to employ in hiring mercenaries and acting vigorously against the Thebans.<sup>1</sup>

The army of Kleombrotus, in its march from Megara to Plataea, had passed by the skirts of Attica; causing so much alarm to the Athenians, that they placed Chabrias with a body of peltasts, to guard their frontier and the neighboring road through Eleuthera into Bœotia. This was the first time that a Lacedæmonian army had touched Attica (now no longer guarded by the lines of Corinth, as in the war between 394 and 388 B. C.) since the retirement of king Pausanias in 404 B. C.; furnishing a proof of the exposure of the country, such as to revive in the Athenian mind all the terrible recollections of Dekeleia and the Peloponnesian war. It was during the first prevalence of this alarm,—and seemingly while Kleombrotus was still with his army at Thespiæ or Kynoskephalæ, close on the Athenian frontier,—that three Lacedæmonian envoys, Etymoklês and two others, arrived at Athens to demand satisfaction for the part taken by the two Athenian generals and the Athenian volunteers, in concerting and aid

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 15-18.



ing the enterprise of Pelopidas and his comrades. So overpowering was the anxiety in the public mind to avoid giving offence to Sparta, that these two generals were both of them accused before the dikastery. The first of them was condemned and executed; the second, profiting by this warning (since, pursuant to the psephism of Kannônes,<sup>1</sup> the two would be put on trial separately), escaped, and a sentence of banishment was passed against him.<sup>2</sup> These two generals had been unquestionably guilty of a grave abuse of their official functions. They had brought the state into public hazard, not merely without consulting the senate or assembly, but even without taking the sense of their own board of Ten. Nevertheless the severity of the sentence pronounced indicates the alarm, as well as the displeasure, of the general body of Athenians; while it served as a disclaimer in fact, if not in form, of all political connection with Thebes.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Vol. VIII. of this History, Ch. lxiv, p. 196 — about the psephism of Kannônes.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 19; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 14.

Xenophon mentions the Lacedæmonian envoys at Athens, but does not expressly say that they were sent to demand reparation for the conduct of these two generals or of the volunteers. I cannot doubt, however, that the fact was so; for in those times, there were no resident envoys, — none but envoys sent on special missions.

<sup>3</sup> The trial and condemnation of these two generals has served as the groundwork for harsh reproach against the Athenian democracy. Wachsmuth (Hellen. Alterth. i, p. 654) denounces it as "a judicial horror, or abomination — ein Greul-gericht." Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphieratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 44, 45) says, — "Quid? quia invasionem Lacedæmoniorum viderant in Bœotiam factam esse, non puduit eos, damnare imperatores quorum facta suis decretis comprobaverant?" . . . . "Igitur hanc illius facinoris excusationem habebimus: Rebus quæ a Thebanis agebantur (i. e. by the propositions of the Thebans seeking peace from Sparta, and trying to get enrolled as her allies, — alleged by Isokrates, which I have noticed above as being, in my judgment, very inaccurately recorded) cognitæ, Athenienses, quo enitius subvenerant, eo majore pœnitentiâ percussi sunt. . . . . Sed tantum abfuit ut sibimet irascerentur, ut, e more Atheniensium, punirentur qui perfecrant id quod tum populus exoptaverat."

The censures of Wachsmuth, Rehdantz, etc. assume as matter of fact, — 1. That the Athenians had passed a formal vote in the public assembly to send assistance to Thebes, under two generals, who accordingly went out in command of the army and performed their instructions. 2. That the Athenians, becoming afterwards repentant or terrified, tried and condemned these two generals for having executed the commission entrusted to them.

Even before the Lacedæmonian envoys had quitted Athens, however, an incident, alike sudden and memorable, completely

I have already shown grounds (in a previous note) for believing that the first of these affirmations is incorrect; the second, as dependent on it, will therefore be incorrect also.

These authors here appear to me to single out a portion of each of the two inconsistent narratives of Xenophon and Diodorus, and blend them together in a way which contradicts both.

Thus, they take from Diodorus the allegation, that the Athenians sent to Thebes by public vote a large army, which fought along with the Thebans against the Kadmeia, — an allegation which, not only is not to be found in Xenophon, but which his narrative plainly, though indirectly, excludes.

Next, they take from Xenophon the allegation, that the Athenians tried and condemned the two generals who were accomplices in the conspiracy of Mellon against the Theban rulers, — τῷ δὲ στρατηγῷ, οἱ συνηπιστάσθην τὴν τοῦ Μέλλωνος ἐπὶ τοῖς περὶ Λεοντιάδην ἐπανάστασιν (v, 4, 19). Now the mention of these two generals follows naturally and consistently in Xenophon. He had before told us that there were two out of the Athenian generals, who both assisted underhand in organizing the plot, and afterwards went with the volunteers to Thebes. But it cannot be fitted on to the narrative of Diodorus, who never says a word about this condemnation by the Athenians — nor even mentions any two Athenian generals, at all. He tells us that the Athenian army which went to Thebes was commanded by Demophon; he notices no colleague whatever. He says in general words, that the conspiracy was organized "with the assistance of the Athenians" (συνεπιλαβομένων Ἀθηναίων); not saying a word about any two generals as especially active.

Wachsmuth and Rehdantz take it for granted, most gratuitously, that these two condemned generals (mentioned by Xenophon and not by Diodorus) are identical with Demophon and another colleague, commanders of an army which went out by public vote (mentioned by Diodorus and not by Xenophon).

The narratives of Xenophon and Diodorus (as I have before observed, are distinct and inconsistent with each other. We have to make our option between them. I adhere to that of Xenophon, for reasons previously given. But if any one prefers that of Diodorus, he ought then to reject altogether the story of the condemnation of the two Athenian generals (who nowhere appear in Diodorus), and to suppose that Xenophon was misinformed upon that point, as upon the other facts of the case.

That the two Athenian generals (assuming the Xenophontic narrative as true) should be tried and punished, when the consequences of their unauthorized proceeding were threatening to come with severity upon Athens, — appears to me neither improbable nor unreasonable. Those who are shocked by the very severity of the sentence, will do well to read the re-



altered the Athenian temper. The Lacedæmonian harmost Sphodrias (whom Kleombrotus had left at Thespiæ to prosecute the war against Thebes), being informed that Peiræus on its land side was without gates or night watch, — since there was no suspicion of attack, — conceived the idea of surprising it by a night-march from Thespiæ, and thus of mastering at one stroke the commerce, the wealth, and the naval resources of Athens. Putting his troops under march one evening after an early supper, he calculated on reaching the Peiræus the next morning before daylight. But his reckoning proved erroneous. Morning overtook him when he had advanced no farther than the Thriasian plain near Eleusis; from whence, as it was useless to proceed farther, he turned back and retreated to Thespiæ; not, however, without committing various acts of plunder against the neighboring Athenian residents.

This plan against Peiræus appears to have been not ill conceived. Had Sphodrias been a man competent to organize and execute movements as rapid as those of Brasidas, there is no reason why it might not have succeeded; in which case the whole face of the war would have been changed, since the Lacedæmonians, if once masters of Peiræus, both could and would have maintained the place. But it was one of those injustices, which no one ever commends until it has been successfully consummated, — “*consilium quod non potest laudari nisi peractum.*”<sup>1</sup> As it

marks which the Lacedæmonian envoys make (Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 23) of the conduct of Sphodrias.

To turn from one severe sentence to another, — whoever believes the narrative of Diodorus in preference to that of Xenophon, ought to regard the execution of those two Lacedæmonian commanders who surrendered the Kadmeia as exceedingly cruel. According to Diodorus, these officers had done everything which brave men could do; they had resisted a long time, repelled many attacks, and were only prevented from farther holding out by a mutiny among their garrison.

Here again, we see the superiority of the narrative of Xenophon over that of Diodorus. According to the former, these Lacedæmonian commanders surrendered the Kadmeia without any resistance at all. Their condemnation, like that of the Athenian two generals becomes a matter easy to understand and explain.

<sup>1</sup> Tacit. Histor. i, 38.

Compare (in Plutarch, Anton. c. 32) the remark of Sextus Pompey to his

failed, it has been considered, by critics as well as by contemporaries, not merely as a crime but as a fault, and its author Sphodrias as a brave man, but singularly weak and hot-headed.<sup>1</sup> Without admitting the full extent of this censure, we may see that his present aggression grew out of an untoward emulation of the glory which Phœbidas, in spite of the simulated or transient displeasure of his countrymen, had acquired by seizing the Kadmeia. That Sphodrias received private instructions from Kleombrotus (as Diodorus states) is not sufficiently proved; while the suspicion, intimated by Xenophon as being abroad, that he was wrought upon by secret emissaries and bribes from his enemies the Thebans, for the purpose of plunging Athens into war with Sparta, is altogether improbable;<sup>2</sup> and seems merely an hypothesis suggested by the consequences of the act, — which were such, that if his enemies had bribed him, he could not have served them better.

captain Menas, when the latter asked his permission to cut the cables of the ship, while Octavius and Antony were dining on board, and to seize their persons, — “I cannot permit any such thing; but you ought to have done it without asking my permission.” A reply familiar to the readers of Shakspeare’s Antony and Cleopatra.

<sup>1</sup> Kallisthenes, Frag. 2, ed. Didot, apud. Harpokration, v, Σφοδρίας; Diodor. xv, 29, Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 14; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24. The miscalculation of Sphodrias as to the time necessary for his march to Peiræus is not worse than other mistakes which Polybius (in a very instructive discourse, ix, 12, 20, seemingly extracted from his lost commentaries on Tactics) recounts as having been committed by various other able commanders.

<sup>2</sup> Πείθουσι τὸν ἐν ταῖς Θεσπιαῖς ἀρμυστὴν Σφοδρίαν, χρήματα δόντες, ὡς ὑπαπτεύετο — Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 20; Diodor. xv, 29; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 14; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24, 25.

Diodorus affirms private orders from Kleombrotus to Sphodrias.

In rejecting the suspicion mentioned by Xenophon, — that it was the Theban leaders who instigated and bribed Sphodrias, — we may remark — 1. That the plan might very possibly have succeeded; and its success would have been ruinous to the Thebans. Had they been the instigators, they would not have failed to give notice of it at Athens at the same time; which they certainly did not do. 2. That if the Lacedæmonians had punished Sphodrias, no war would have ensued. Now every man would have predicted, that assuming the scheme to fail, they certainly would punish him. 3. The strong interest taken by Agesilaus afterwards in the fate of Sphodrias, and the high encomium which he passed on the general character of the latter, — are quite consistent with a belief on his part that Sphodrias

The presence of Sphodrias and his army in the Thriasian plain was communicated shortly after day-break at Athens, where it excited no less terror than surprise. Every man instantly put himself under arms for defence; but news soon arrived that the invader had retired. When thus reassured, the Athenians passed from fear to indignation. The Lacedæmonian envoys, who were lodging at the house of Kallias the proxenus of Sparta, were immediately put under arrest and interrogated. But all three affirmed that they were not less astonished, and not less exasperated, by the march of Sphodrias, than the Athenians themselves; adding, by way of confirmation, that had they been really privy to any design of seizing the Peiræus, they would have taken care not to let themselves be found in the city, and in their ordinary lodging at the house of the proxenus, where of course their persons would be at once seized. They concluded by assuring the Athenians, that Sphodrias would not only be indignantly disavowed, but punished capitally, at Sparta. And their reply was deemed so satisfactory, that they were allowed to depart; while an Athenian embassy was sent to Sparta, to demand the punishment of the offending general.<sup>1</sup>

The Ephors immediately summoned Sphodrias home to Sparta, to take his trial on a capital charge. So much did he himself despair of his case, that he durst not make his appearance; while the general impression was, both at Sparta and elsewhere, that he would certainly be condemned. Nevertheless, though thus absent and undefended, he was acquitted, purely through private favor and esteem for his general character. He was of the party of Kleombrotus, so that all the friends of that prince espoused his cause, as a matter of course. But as he was of the party opposed to Agesilaus, his friends dreaded that the latter would declare

(like Phœbidas) may have done wrong towards a foreign city from over-ambition in the service of his country. But if Agesilaus (who detested the Thebans beyond measure) had believed that Sphodrias was acting under the influence of bribes from them, he would not merely have been disposed to let justice take its course, but would have approved and promoted the condemnation.

On a previous occasion (Hellen. iii, 5, 3) Xenophon had imputed to the Thebans a similar refinement of stratagem; seemingly with just as little cause.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v. 4, 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24.

against him, and bring about his condemnation. Nothing saved Sphodrias except the peculiar intimacy between his son Kleonymus and Archidamus son of Agesilaus. The mournful importunity of Archidamus induced Agesilaus, when this important cause was brought before the Senate of Sparta, to put aside his judicial conviction, and give his vote in the following manner: "To be sure, Sphodrias is guilty; upon that there cannot be two opinions. Nevertheless, we cannot put to death a man like him, who, as boy, youth, and man, has stood unblemished in all Spartan honor. Sparta cannot part with soldiers like Sphodrias."<sup>1</sup> The friends of Agesilaus, following this opinion and coinciding with those of Kleombrotus, ensured a favorable verdict. And it is remarkable, that Etymoklês himself, who as envoy at Athens had announced as a certainty that Sphodrias would be put to death, — as senator and friend of Agesilaus voted for his acquittal.<sup>2</sup>

This remarkable incident (which comes to us from a witness not merely philo-Laconian, but also personally intimate with Agesilaus) shows how powerfully the course of justice at Sparta was overruled by private sympathy and interests, — especially, those of the two kings. It especially illustrates what has been stated in a former chapter respecting the oppressions exercised by the Spartan harmosts and the dekadarchies, for which no redress was attainable at Sparta. Here was a case where not only the guilt of Sphodrias stood confessed, but in which also his acquittal was sure to be followed by a war with Athens. If, under such circumstances, the Athenian demand for redress was overruled by the favor of the two kings, what chance was there of any justice to the complaint of a dependent city, or an injured individual,

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v. 4, 32. Ἐκεῖνος γὰρ (Ἀγησίλαος) πρὸς πάντας ὅσους διεῖλεται, τὰ ταῦτα λέγει· Μὴ ἀδικεῖν μὲν Σφοδρίαν ἀδύνατον εἶναι· ὅστις μὲντοι, παῖς τε ὢν καὶ παιδίσκος καὶ ἡβῶν, πάντα τὰ καλὰ ποιῶν διετέλεσε, χαλεπὸν εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἀποκτείνεσθαι· τὴν γὰρ Σπάρτην τοιούτων δεῖσθαι στρατιωτῶν.

Xenophon explains at some length (v. 4, 25-33) and in a very interesting manner, both the relations between Kleonymus and Archidamus, and the appeal of Archidamus to his father. The statement has all the air of being derived from personal knowledge, and nothing but the fear of prolixity hinders me from giving it in full.

Compare Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 25; Diodor. xv, 29.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v. 4, 22-32.



against the harmost? The contrast between Spartan and Athenian proceeding is also instructive. Only a few days before, the Athenians condemned, at the instance of Sparta, their two generals who had without authority lent aid to the Theban exiles. In so doing, the Athenian dikastery enforced the law against clear official misconduct, — and that, too, in a case where their sympathies went along with the act, though their fear of a war with Sparta was stronger. But the most important circumstance to note is, that at Athens there is neither private influence, nor kingly influence, capable of overruling the sincere judicial conscience of a numerous and independent dikastery.

The result of the acquittal of Sphodrias must have been well known beforehand to all parties at Sparta. Even by the general voice of Greece, the sentence was denounced as iniquitous.<sup>1</sup> But the Athenians, who had so recently given strenuous effect to the remonstrances of Sparta against their own generals, were stung by it to the quick; and only the more stung, in consequence of the extraordinary compliments to Sphodrias on which the acquittal was made to turn. They immediately contracted hearty alliance with Thebes, and made vigorous preparations for war against Sparta both by land and sea. After completing the fortifications of Peiræus, so as to place it beyond the reach of any future attempt, they applied themselves to the building of new ships of war, and to the extension of their naval ascendancy, at the expense of Sparta.<sup>2</sup>

From this moment, a new combination began in Grecian politics. The Athenians thought the moment favorable to attempt the construction of a new confederacy, analogous to the Confederacy of Delos, formed a century before; the basis on which had been reared the formidable Athenian empire, lost at the close of the Peloponnesian war. Towards such construction there was so far a tendency, that Athens had already a small body of maritime allies; while rhetors like Isokrates (in his Panegyric Discourse, published two years before) had been familiarizing the public mind with larger ideas. But the enterprise was now pressed with the determination and vehemence of men smarting under recent insult. The Athenians had good ground to build upon; since,

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 24.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 34-63.

while the discontent against the ascendancy of Sparta was widely spread, the late revolution in Thebes had done much to lessen that sentiment of fear upon which such ascendancy chiefly rested. To Thebes, the junction with Athens was preëminently welcome, and her leaders gladly enrolled their city as a constituent member of the new confederacy.<sup>1</sup> They cheerfully acknowledged the presidency of Athens, — reserving, however, tacitly or expressly, their own rights as presidents of the Bœotian federation, as soon as that could be reconstituted; which reconstitution was at this moment desirable even for Athens, seeing that the Bœotian towns were now dependent allies of Sparta under harmosts and oligarchies.

The Athenians next sent envoys round to the principal islands and maritime cities in the Ægean, inviting all of them to an alliance on equal and honorable terms. The principles were in the main the same as those upon which the confederacy of Delos had been formed against the Persians, almost a century before. It was proposed that a congress of deputies should meet at Athens, one from each city, small as well as great, each with one vote; that Athens should be president, yet each individual city autonomous; that a common fund should be raised, with a common naval force, through assessment imposed by this congress upon each, and applied as the same authority might prescribe; the general purpose being defined to be, maintenance of freedom and security from foreign aggression, to each confederate, by the common force of all. Care was taken to banish as much as possible those associations of tribute and subjection which rendered the recollection of the former Athenian empire unpopular.<sup>2</sup> And as there were many Athenian citizens, who, during those times of supremacy, had been planted out as kleruchs or outsettlers in various dependencies, but had been deprived of their properties at the close of the war, — it was thought necessary to pass a formal decree,<sup>3</sup> re-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 34; Xen. de Vectigal. v, 7; Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 20, 23, 37; Diodor xv, 29.

<sup>2</sup> The contribution was now called *σύνταξις*, not *φόρος*; see Isokrates, De Pace, s. 37-46; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7; Harpokration, v. *Σύνταξις*.

Plutarch, De Fortunâ Athen. p. 351. *ἰσόψηφον αὐτοῖς τὴν Ἑλλάδα κατέστησαν*.

<sup>3</sup> Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 47. *Καὶ τῶν μὲν κτημάτων τῶν ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν ἀπέστητε, βουλόμενοι τὴν συμμαχίαν ὡς μεγίστην ταῖς αἰῶσι, etc.*



nouncing and barring all revival of these suspended rights. It was farther decreed that henceforward no Athenian should on any

Diodor. xv, 28, 29. Ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ καὶ τὰς γενομένας κληρουχίας ἀποκαταστήσαι τοῖς πρότερον κυρίοις γεγονόσι, καὶ νόμον ἔθεντο μηδὲνα τῶν Ἀθηναίων γεωργεῖν ἐκτὸς τῆς Ἀττικῆς. Διὰ δὲ ταύτης τῆς φιλανθρωπίας ἀνακτησάμενοι τὴν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εὐνοίαν, ἰσχυροτέρῳ ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ἰδίαν ἡγεμονίαν.

Isokrates and Diodorus speak loosely of this vote, in language which might make us imagine that it was one of distinct restitution, giving back property actually enjoyed. But the Athenians had never actually regained the outlying private property lost at the close of the war, though they had much desired it, and had cherished hopes that a favorable turn of circumstances might enable them to effect the recovery. As the recovery, if effected, would be at the cost of those whom they were now soliciting as allies, the public and formal renunciation of such rights was a measure of much policy, and contributed greatly to appease uneasiness in the islands though in point of fact nothing was given up except rights to property not really enjoyed.

An Inscription has recently been discovered at Athens, recording the original Athenian decree, of which the main provisions are mentioned in my text. It bears date in the archonship of Nausinikus. It stands, with the restorations of M. Boeckh (fortunately a portion of it has been found in tolerably good preservation), in the Appendix to the new edition of his work, — "Über die Staats-haushaltung der Athener — Verbesserungen und Nachträge zu den drei Banden der Staats-haushaltung der Athener," p. xx.

Ἀπὸ δὲ Νανυσινίκου ἀρχοντος μὴ ἐξεῖναι μήτε ἰδίᾳ μήτε δημοσίᾳ Ἀθηναίων μηδὲν ἐγκτήσασθαι ἐν ταῖς τῶν συμμάχων χώραις μήτε οἰκίαν μήτε χώραν, μήτε πριαμένῳ, μήτε ὑποθεμένῳ, μήτε ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ μηδενί. Ἐὰν δὲ τις ὤνηται ἢ κτῆται ἢ τίθεται τρόπῳ ὁτιοῦν, ἐξεῖναι τῷ βουλομένῳ τῶν συμμάχων φῆναι πρὸς τοὺς συνέδρους τῶν συμμάχων. Οἱ δὲ σύνεδροι ἀπο-μενοὶ ἀποδόντων [τὸ μὲν ἡ]μισυ τῷ φήναντι, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο κοινῶν ἔστω τῶν συμμάχων. Ἐὰν δὲ τις [ἢ] ἐπὶ πολέμῳ ἐπὶ τοῖς ποιησαμένοις τὴν συμμαχίαν, ἢ κατὰ γῆν ἢ κατὰ θάλασσαν, βοηθεῖν Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους τοῦτοις καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. Ἐὰν δὲ τις εἴπῃ ἢ ἐπιψηφίσῃ, ἢ ἄρχων ἢ ἰδιώτης, παρὰ τὸδε τὸ ψήφισμα, ὥς λυεῖν τι δεῖ τῶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ψηφίσματι εἰρημένων, ὑπαρχέτω μὲν αὐτῷ ἀτίμῳ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ χρήματα αὐτοῦ δημοσία ἔστω καὶ τῆς θεοῦ τὸ ἐπιδέκατον· καὶ κρινέσθω ἐν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις ὥς διαλύων τὴν συμμαχίαν. Ζημιούντων δὲ αὐτοὺς θανάτῳ ἢ φυγῇ ὅπου Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι κρατοῦσι. Ἐὰν δὲ θανάτῳ τιμῇ, μὴ ταφῇ ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ μηδὲ ἐν τῇ τῶν συμμάχων.

Then follows a direction, that the Secretary of the Senate of Five Hundred shall inscribe the decree on a column of stone, and place it by the side of the statue of Zeus Eleutherius; with orders to the Treasurers of the goddess to disburse sixty drachmas for the cost of so doing.

It appears that there is annexed to this Inscription a list of such cities as

pretence hold property, either in house or land, in the territory of any one of the confederates; neither by purchase, nor as security for money lent, nor by any other mode of acquisition. Any Athenian infringing this law, was rendered liable to be informed against before the synod; who, on proof of the fact, were to deprive him of the property, — half of it going to the informer, half to the general purposes of the confederacy.

Such were the liberal principles of confederacy now proposed by Athens, — who, as a candidate for power, was straightforward and just, like the Herodotean Deioikês,<sup>1</sup> — and formally ratified, as well by the Athenians as by the general voice of the confederate deputies assembled within their walls. The formal decree and compact of alliance was inscribed on a stone column and placed by the side of the statue of Zeus Eleutherius or the Liberator; a symbol, of enfranchisement from Sparta accomplished, as well as of freedom to be maintained against Persia and other enemies.<sup>2</sup> Periodical meetings of the confederate deputies were provided to be held (how often, we do not know) at Athens, and the synod was recognized as competent judge of all persons, even Athenian citizens, charged with treason against the confederacy. To give fuller security to the confederates generally, it was provided in the original compact, that if any Athenian citizen should either speak, or put any question to the vote, in the Athenian assembly, contrary to the tenor of that document, — he should be

had already joined the confederacy, together with certain other names added afterwards, of cities which joined subsequently. The Inscription itself directs such list to be recorded, — εἰς δὲ τὴν στήλην ταύτην ἀναγράφειν τῶν τε οὐσῶν πόλεων συμμαχίδων τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ ἡτίς ἂν ἄλλη σύμμαχος γίγνηται.

Unfortunately M. Boeckh has not annexed this list, which, moreover, he states to have been preserved only in a very partial and fragmentary condition. He notices only, as contained in it, the towns of Poiessa and Korêssus in the island of Keos, — and Antissa and Eresus in Lesbos; all four as autonomous communities.

<sup>1</sup> Herodot. i, 96. Ὁ δὲ, οἷα δὴ μνεώμενος ἀρχὴν, ἰθύς τε καὶ δίκαιος ἦν.

<sup>2</sup> This is the sentiment connected with Ζεὺς Ἐλευθέριος, — Pausanias the victor of Plataea, offers to Zeus Eleutherius a solemn sacrifice and thanks giving immediately after the battle, in the agora of the town (Thucyd. ii 71). So the Syracusans immediately after the expulsion of the Geloniat dynasty (Diodor. xi, 72) — and Mæandrius at Samos (Herodot. iii, 142)



tried before the synod for treason; and that, if found guilty, he might be condemned by them to the severest punishment.

Three Athenian leaders stood prominent as commissioners in the first organization of the confederacy, and in the dealings with those numerous cities whose junction was to be won by amicable inducement, — Chabrias, Timotheus son of Konon, and Kallistratus.<sup>1</sup>

The first of the three is already known to the reader. He and Iphikrates were the most distinguished warriors whom Athens numbered among her citizens. But not having been engaged in any war, since the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B. C., she had had no need of their services; hence both of them had been absent from the city during much of the last nine years, and Iphikrates seems still to have been absent. At the time when that peace was concluded, Iphikrates was serving in the Hellespont and Thrace, Chabrias with Evagoras in Cyprus; each having been sent thither by Athens at the head of a body of mercenary peltasts. Instead of dismissing their troops, and returning to Athens as peaceful citizens, it was not less agreeable to the military tastes of these generals, than conducive to their importance and their profit, to keep together their bands, and to take foreign service. Accordingly, Chabrias had continued in service first in Cyprus, next with the native Egyptian king Akoris. The Persians, against whom he served, found his hostility so inconvenient, that Pharnabazus demanded of the Athenians to recall him, on pain of the Great King's displeasure; and requested at the same time that Iphikrates might be sent to aid the Persian satraps in organizing a great expedition against Egypt. The Athenians, to whom the goodwill of Persia was now of peculiar importance, complied on both points; recalled Chabrias, who thus became disposable for the Athenian service,<sup>2</sup> and despatched Iphikrates to take command along with the Persians.

Iphikrates, since the peace of Antalkidas, had employed his peltasts in the service of the kings of Thrace: first of Seuthes, near the shores of the Propontis, whom he aided in the recovery of certain lost dominions, — next of Kotys, whose favor he acquired, and whose daughter he presently married.<sup>3</sup> Not only did he enjoy great scope for warlike operations and plunder, among the "butter

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 29.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv, 29.

<sup>3</sup> Cornel. Nepos, Iphicrates, c. 2; Chabrias, c. 2, 3.

eating Thracians,"<sup>1</sup> — but he also acquired, as dowry, a large stock of such produce as Thracian princes had at their disposal, together with a boon even more important, — a seaport village not far from the mouth of the Hebrus, called Drys, where he established a fortified post, and got together a Grecian colony dependent on himself.<sup>2</sup> Miltiades, Alkibiades, and other eminent Athenians had done the same thing before him; though Xenophon had refused a similar proposition when made to him by the earlier Seuthes.<sup>3</sup> Iphikrates thus became a great man in Thrace, yet by no means abandoning his connection with Athens, but making his position in each subservient to his importance in the other. While he was in a situation to favor the projects of Athenian citizens for mercantile and territorial acquisitions in the Chersonese and other parts

<sup>1</sup> See an interesting Fragment (preserved by Athenæus, iv, p. 131) of the comedy called *Protesilaus* — by the Athenian poet Anaxandrides (Meineke, Comic. Græc. Frag. iii, p. 182). It contains a curious description of the wedding of Iphikrates with the daughter of Kotys in Thrace; enlivened by an abundant banquet and copious draughts of wine given to crowds of Thracians in the market-place: —

δειπνεῖν δ' ἄνδρας βουτυροφάγας  
ἀρχιμηροκόμας μυριοπληθεῖς, etc.,

brazen vessels as large as wine vats, full of broth, — Kotys himself girt round, and serving the broth in a golden basin, then going about to taste all the bowls of wine and water ready mixed, until he was himself the first man intoxicated. Iphikrates brought from Athens several of the best players on the harp and flute.

The distinction between the *butter* eaten, or rubbed on the skin, by the Thracians, and the *olive-oil* habitually consumed in Greece, deserves notice. The word *ἀρχιμηροκόμας* seems to indicate the absence of those scented unguents which, at the banquet of Greeks, would have been applied to the hair of the guests, giving to it a shining gloss and moisture. It appears that the Lacedæmonian women, however, sometimes anointed themselves with butter, and not with oil; see Plutarch, adv. Koloten, p. 1109 B.

The number of warlike stratagems in Thrace, ascribed to Iphikrates by Polyænus and other Tactic writers, indicates that his exploits there were renowned as well as long-continued.

<sup>2</sup> Theopomp. Fragm. 175, ed. Didot; Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664.

<sup>3</sup> Xenoph. Anab. vii, 2, 38; vii, 5, 8; vii, 6, 43. Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 17. Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 36.

See also a striking passage (in Lysias Orat. xxviii, cont. Ergokl. s. 5) about the advice given to Thrasybulus by a discontented fellow-citizen, to seize Byzantium, marry the daughter of Seuthes, and defy Athens.



of Thrace, — he could also lend the aid of Athenian naval and military art, not merely to princes in Thrace, but to others even beyond those limits, — since we learn that Amyntas king of Macedonia became so attached or indebted to him as to adopt him for his son.<sup>1</sup> When sent by the Athenians to Persia, at the request of Pharnabazus (about 378 B. C. apparently), Iphikrates had fair ground for anticipating that a career yet more lucrative was opening before him.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 13. p. 249.

At what time this adoption took place, we cannot distinctly make out; Amyntas died in 370 B. C., while from 378–371 B. C., Iphikrates seems to have been partly on service with the Persian satraps, partly in command of the Athenian fleet in the Ionian Sea (see Rehdantz, *Vitæ Iphicratis*, etc. ch. 4). Therefore, the adoption took place at some time between 387–378 B. C.; perhaps after the restoration of Amyntas to his maritime dominions by the Lacedæmonian expedition against Olynthus — 382–380 B. C. Amyntas was so weak and insecure, from the Thessalians, and other land-neighbors (see Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 657. s. 112), that it was much to his advantage to cultivate the favor of a warlike Athenian established on the Thracian coast, like Iphikrates.

<sup>2</sup> From these absences of men like Iphikrates and Chabrias, a conclusion has been drawn severely condemning the Athenian people. They were so envious and ill-tempered (it has been said), that none of their generals could live with comfort at Athens; all lived abroad as they could. Cornelius Nepos (Chabrias, c. 3) makes the remark, borrowed originally from Theopompus (Fr. 117, ed. Didot), and transcribed by many modern commentators as if it were exact and literal truth — “Hoc Chabrias nuntio (i. e. on being recalled from Egypt, in consequence of the remonstrance of Pharnabazus) Athenas rediit neque ibi diutius est moratus quam fuit necesse. Non enim libenter erat ante oculos civium suorum, quod et vivebat laute, et indulgebat sibi liberalius, quam ut invidiam vulgi posset effugere. Est enim hoc commune vitium in magnis liberisque civitatibus, ut invidia gloriæ comes sit, et libenter de his detrahant, quos eminere videant altius; neque animo æquo pauperes alienam opulentiam intuentur fortunam. Itaque Chabrias, quoad ei licebat, plurimum aberat. Neque vero solus ille aberat Athenis libenter, sed omnes fere principes fecerunt idem, quod tantum se ab invidiâ putabant abfuturos, quantum a conspectu suorum recessissent. Itaque Conon plurimum Cypri vixit, Iphicrates in Thraciâ, Timotheus Lesbi, Chares in Sigæo.”

That the people of Athens, among other human frailties, had their fair share of envy and jealousy, is not to be denied; but that these attributes belonged to them in a marked or peculiar manner, cannot (in my judgment) be shown by any evidence extant, — and most assuredly is not shown by the evidence here alluded to.

Iphikrates being thus abroad, the Athenians joined with Chabrias, in the mission and measures for organizing their new confed-

“Chabrias was fond of a life of enjoyment and luxurious indulgence.” If instead of being an Athenian, he had been a Spartan, he would undoubtedly have been compelled to expatriate in order to gratify this taste; for it was the express drift and purpose of the Spartan discipline, not to equalize property, but to equalize the habits, enjoyments, and personal toils, of the rich and poor. This is a point which the admirers of Lykurgus, — Xenophon and Plutarch, — attest not less clearly than Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, and others. If then it were considered a proof of envy and ill-temper, to debar rich men from spending their money in procuring enjoyments, we might fairly consider the reproach as made out against Lykurgus and Sparta. Not so against Athens. There was no city in Greece where the means of luxurious and comfortable living were more abundantly exhibited for sale, nor where a rich man was more perfectly at liberty to purchase them. Of this the proofs are everywhere to be found. Even the son of this very Chabrias, Ktesippus, who inherited the appetite for enjoyment, without the greater qualities of his father, — found the means of gratifying his appetite so unfortunately easy at Athens, that he wasted his whole substance in such expenses (Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7; Athenæus, iv, p. 165). And Chares was even better liked at Athens in consequence of his love of enjoyment and license, — if we are to believe another Fragment (238) of the same Theopompus.

The allegation of Theopompus and Nepos, therefore, is neither true as matter of fact, nor sufficient, if it had been true, to sustain the hypothesis of a malignant Athenian public, with which they connect it. Iphikrates and Chabrias did not stay away from Athens because they loved enjoyments or feared the envy of their countrymen; but because both of them were large gainers by doing so, in importance, in profit, and in tastes. Both of them were men *πολεμικοὶ καὶ φιλοπόλεμοι ἐσχάτως* (to use an expression of Xenophon respecting the Lacedæmonian Klearchus — *Anab.* ii, 6, 1); both of them loved war and had great abilities for war, — qualities quite compatible with strong appetite for enjoyment; while neither of them had either taste or talent for the civil routine and debate of Athens when at peace. Besides, each of them was commander of a body of peltasts, through whose means he could obtain lucrative service as well as foreign distinction; so that we can assign a sufficient reason why both of them preferred to be absent from Athens during most part of the nine years that the peace of Antalkidas continued. Afterwards, Iphikrates was abroad three or four years, in service with the Persian satraps, by order of the Athenians; Chabrias also went a long time afterwards, again on foreign service, to Egypt, at the same time when the Spartan king Agesilaus was there (yet without staying long away, since we find him going out on command from Athens to the Chersonese in 359–358 B. C. — Demosth. cont. Aristokr. p. 677, s. 204); but neither he, nor Agesilaus, went there to escape the mischief of envious



eracy, two other colleagues, of whom we now hear for the first time — Timotheus son of Konon, and Kallistratus the most celebrated orator of his time.<sup>1</sup> The abilities of Kallistratus were not military at all; while Timotheus and Chabrias were men of distinguished military merit. But in acquiring new allies and attracting deputies to her proposed congress, Athens stood in need of persuasive appeal, conciliatory dealing, and substantial fairness in all her propositions, not less than of generalship. We are told that Timotheus, doubtless as son of the liberator Konon, from the recollections of the battle of Knidus — was especially successful in procuring new adhesions; and probably Kallistratus,<sup>2</sup> going round with him to the different islands, contributed by his eloquence not a little to the same result. On their invitation, many cities entered as con-

countrymen. Demosthenes does not talk of Iphikrates as being uncomfortable in Athens, or anxious to get out of it; see *Orat. cont. Meidiam*, p. 535, s. 83.

Again, as to the case of Konon and his residence in Cyprus; it is truly surprising to see this fact cited as an illustration of Athenian jealousy or ill-temper. Konon went to Cyprus immediately after the disaster of Ægospotami, and remained there, or remained away from Athens, for eleven years (405–393 B.C.) until the year after his victory at Knidus. It will be recollected that he was one of the six Athenian generals who commanded the fleet at Ægospotami. That disaster, while it brought irretrievable ruin upon Athens, was at the same time such as to brand with well-merited infamy the generals commanding. Konon was so far less guilty than his colleagues, as he was in a condition to escape with eight ships when the rest were captured. But he could not expect, and plainly did not expect, to be able to show his face again in Athens, unless he could redeem the disgrace by some signal fresh service. He nobly paid this debt to his country, by the victory of Knidus in 394 B.C.; and then came back the year afterwards, to a grateful and honorable welcome at Athens. About a year or more after this, he went out again as envoy to Persia in the service of his country. He was there seized and imprisoned by the satrap Tiribazus, but contrived to make his escape, and died at Cyprus, as it would appear, about 390 B.C. Nothing therefore can be more unfounded than the allegation of Theopompus, "that Konon lived abroad at Cyprus, because he was afraid of undeserved ill-temper from the public at Athens." For what time Timotheus may have lived at Lesbos, we have no means of saying. But from the year 370 B.C. down to his death, we hear of him so frequently elsewhere, in the service of his country, that his residence cannot have been long.

<sup>1</sup> Æschines, *Fals. Leg.* c. 40, p. 283.

<sup>2</sup> The employment of the new word *συντάξεις*, instead of the unpopular term *φόρους*, is expressly ascribed to Kallistratus, — Harpokration in *Voce*

federates.<sup>1</sup> At this time (as in the earlier confederacy of Delos) all who joined must have been unconstrained members. And we may understand the motives of their junction, when we read the picture drawn by Isokrates (in 380 B.C.) of the tyranny of the Persians on the Asiatic mainland, threatening, to absorb the neighboring islands. Not only was there now a new basis of imposing force, presented by Athens and Thebes in union — but there was also a wide-spread hatred of imperial Sparta, aggravated since her perversion of the pretended boon of autonomy, promised by the peace of Antalkidas; and the conjunction of these sentiments caused the Athenian mission of invitation to be extremely successful. All the cities in Eubœa (except Histiaea, at the north of the island) — as well as Chios, Mitylênê, Byzantium, and Rhodes — the three former of whom had continued favorably inclined to Athens ever since the peace of Antalkidas,<sup>2</sup> — all entered into the confederacy. An Athenian fleet under Chabrias, sailing among the Cyclades and the other islands of the Ægean, aided in the expulsion of the Lacedæmonian harmosts,<sup>3</sup> together with their devoted local oligarchies, wherever they still subsisted; and all the cities thus liberated became equal members of the newly-constituted congress at Athens. After a certain interval, there came to be not less than

<sup>1</sup> Isokrates gives the number twenty-four cities (*Or. xv*, *Permut.* s. 120). So also Deinarchus *cont. Demosthen.* s. 15; *cont. Philokl.* s. 17. The statement of Æschines, that Timotheus brought seventy-five cities into the confederacy, appears large, and must probably include all that that general either acquired or captured (*Æsch. Fals. Leg.* c. 24, p. 263). Though I think the number twenty-four probable enough, yet it is difficult to identify what towns they were. For Isokrates, so far as he particularizes, includes Samos, Sestos, and Krithôtê, which were not acquired until many years afterwards, — in 366–365 B.C.

Neither of these orators distinguish between those cities which Timotheus brought or persuaded to come into the confederacy, when it was first formed (among which we may reckon Eubœa, or most part of it — *Plutarch, De Glor. Athen.* p. 351 A.) — from those others which he afterwards took by siege, like Samos.

<sup>2</sup> Isokrates, *Or. xiv*, *Plataic.* s. 30.

<sup>3</sup> Isokrates, *Or. xiv*, (*Plat.*) s. 20. *Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑφ' ἑμῶν κατὰ κράτος ἀλόντες εὐθὺς μὲν ἀρμοστοῦ καὶ δουλείας ἀπηλλάγησαν, νῦν δὲ τοῦ συνεδρίου καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας μετέχουσιν, etc.*

The adverb of time here used indicates about 372 B.C., about a year before the battle of Leuktra.



seventy cities, many of them separately powerful, which sent deputies to it;<sup>1</sup> an aggregate sufficient to intimidate Sparta, and even to flatter Athens with the hope of restoration to something like her former lustre.

The first votes both of Athens herself, and of the newly-assembled congress, threatened war upon the largest scale. A resolution was passed to equip twenty thousand hoplites, five hundred horsemen, and two hundred triremes.<sup>2</sup> Probably the insular and Ionic deputies promised each a certain contribution of money, but nothing beyond. We do not, however, know how much, — nor how far the engagements, large or small, were realized, — nor whether Athens was authorized to enforce execution against defaulters, — or was in circumstances to act upon such authority, if granted to her by the congress. It was in this way (as the reader will recollect from my fifth volume) that Athens had first rendered herself unpopular in the confederacy of Delos, — by enforcing the resolutions of the confederate synod against evasive or seceding members. It was in this way that what was at first a voluntary association had ultimately slid into an empire by constraint. Under the new circumstances of 378 B. C., we may presume that the confederates, though ardent and full of promises on first assembling at Athens, were even at the outset not exact, and became afterwards still less exact, in performance; yet that Athens was forced to be reserved in claiming, or in exercising, the right of enforcement. To obtain a vote of contribution by the majority of deputies present, was only the first step in the process; to obtain punctual payment, when the Athenian fleet was sent round for the purpose of collecting, — yet without incurring dangerous unpopularity, — was the second step, but by far the most doubtful and difficult.

It must, however, be borne in mind that at this moment, when the confederacy was first formed, both Athens and the other cities

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 30.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv, 29.

Polybius (ii, 62) states that the Athenians sent out (not merely, voted to send out) ten thousand hoplites, and manned one hundred triremes.

Both these authors treat the resolution as if it were taken by the Athenians alone; but we must regard it in conjunction with the newly-assembled synod of allies.

came together from a spontaneous impulse of hearty mutuality and coöperation. A few years afterwards, we shall find this changed; Athens selfish, and the confederates reluctant.<sup>1</sup> Inflamed as well by their position of renovated headship, as by fresh animosity against Sparta, the Athenians made important efforts of their own, both financial and military. Equipping a fleet, which for the time was superior in the Ægean, they ravaged the hostile territory of Histiea in Eubœa, and annexed to their confederacy the islands of Peparêthus and Skiathus. They imposed upon themselves also a direct property-tax; to what amount, however, we do not know.

It was on the occasion of this tax that they introduced a great change in the financial arrangements and constitution of the city; a change conferring note upon the archonship of Nausinikus, (B. C. 378–377). The great body of substantial Athenian citizens as well as metics were now classified anew for purposes of taxation. It will be remembered that even from the time of Solon<sup>2</sup> the citizens of Athens had been distributed into four classes, — Pentakosiomedimni, Hippeis, Zeugitæ, Thêtes, — distinguished from each other by the amount of their respective properties. Of these Solonian classes, the fourth, or poorest, paid no direct taxes; while the three former were taxed according to assessments representing a certain proportion of their actual property. The taxable property of the richest (or Pentakosiomedimni, including all at or above the minimum income of five hundred medimni of corn per annum) was entered in the tax-book at a sum equal to twelve times their income; that of the Hippeis (comprising all who possessed between three hundred and five hundred medimni of annual income) at ten times their income; that of the Zeugitæ (or possessors of an annual income between two hundred and three

<sup>1</sup> Xen. De Vectigal. v, 6. οὐκ οὐν καὶ τότε, ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἀπεσχόμεθα, πάλιν ὑπὸ τῶν νησιωτῶν ἐκόντων προστάται τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἐγενόμεθα;

In the early years of this confederacy, votive offerings of wreaths or crowns, in token of gratitude to Athens, were decreed by the Eubœans, as well as by the general body of allies. These crowns were still to be seen thirty years afterwards at Athens, with commemorative inscriptions (Demosthen. cont. Androtion. c. 21, p. 616; cont. Timokrat. c. 41, p. 756).

<sup>2</sup> For the description of the Solonian census, see Vol. III, Ch. xi, p. 117 of this History.



hundred medimni) at five times their income. A medimnus of corn was counted as equivalent to a drachma; which permitted the application of this same class-system to movable property as well as to land. So that, when an actual property-tax (or *eisphora*) was imposed, it operated as an equal or proportional tax, so far as regarded all the members of the same class; but as a graduated or progressive tax, upon all the members of the richer class as compared with those of the poorer.

The three Solonian property-classes above named appear to have lasted, though probably not without modifications, down to the close of the Peloponnesian war; and to have been in great part preserved, after the renovation of the democracy in B. C. 403, during the archonship of Eukleides.<sup>1</sup> Though eligibility to the great offices of state had before that time ceased to be dependent on pecuniary qualification, it was still necessary to possess some means of distinguishing the wealthier citizens, not merely in case of direct taxation being imposed, but also because the liability to serve in liturgies or burdensome offices was consequent on a man's enrolment as possessor of more than a given minimum of property. It seems, therefore, that the Solonian census, in its main principles of classification and graduation, was retained. Each man's property being valued, he was ranged in one of three or more classes according to its amount. For each of the classes, a fixed proportion of taxable capital to each man's property was assumed, and each was entered in the schedule, not for his whole property, but for the sum of taxable capital corresponding to his property, according to the proportion assumed. In the first or richest class, the taxable capital bore a greater ratio to the actual property than in the less rich; in the second, a greater ratio than in the third. The sum of all these items of taxable capital, in all the different classes, set opposite to each man's name in the schedule, constituted the aggregate census of Attica; upon which all direct property-tax was imposed, in equal proportion upon every man.

Respecting the previous modifications in the register of taxable property, or the particulars of its distribution into classes, which

<sup>1</sup> This is M. Boeckh's opinion, seemingly correct, as far as can be made out on a subject very imperfectly known (Public Economy of Athens, B. V. ch. 1).

had been introduced in 403 B. C. at the archonship of Eukleides, we have no information. Nor can we make out how large or how numerous were the assessments of direct property-tax, imposed at Athens between that archonship and the archonship of Nausinikus in 378 B. C. But at this latter epoch the register was again considerably modified, at the moment when Athens was bracing herself up for increased exertions. A new valuation was made of the property of every man possessing property to the amount of twenty-five minæ (or twenty-five hundred drachmæ) and upwards. Proceeding upon this valuation, every one was entered in the schedule for a sum of taxable capital equal to a given fraction of what he possessed. But this fraction was different in each of the different classes. How many classes there were, we do not certainly know; nor can we tell, except in reference to the lowest class taxed, what sum was taken as the minimum for any one of them. There could hardly have been less, however, than three classes, and there may probably have been four. But respecting the first or richest class, we know that each man was entered in the schedule for a taxable capital equal to one-fifth of his estimated property; and that possessors of fifteen talents were included in it. The father of Demosthenes died in this year, and the boy Demosthenes was returned by his guardians to the first class, as possessor of fifteen talents; upon which his name was entered on the schedule with a taxable capital of three talents set against him; being one-fifth of his actual property. The taxable capital of the second class was entered at a fraction less than one-fifth of their actual property (probably enough, one-sixth, the same as all the registered metics); that of the third, at a fraction still smaller; of the fourth (if there was a fourth), even smaller than the third. This last class descended down to the minimum of twenty-five minæ, or twenty-five hundred drachmæ; below which no account was taken.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. cont. Aphob. i. p. 815, 816; cont. Aphob. ii. p. 836; cont. Aphob. de Perjur. p. 862. Compare Boeckh, Publ. Econ. Ath. iv. 7.

In the exposition which M. Boeckh gives of the new property-schedule introduced under the archonship of Nausinikus, he inclines to the hypothesis of four distinct classes, thus distributed (p. 671 of the new edition of his *Staats-haushaltung der Athener*):—

1. The first class included all persons who possessed property to the value



Besides the taxable capitals of the citizens, thus graduated, the schedule also included those of the metics or resident aliens; who were each enrolled (without any difference of greater or smaller property, above twenty-five minæ) at a taxable capital equal to one-sixth of his actual property;<sup>1</sup> being a proportion less than the richest class of citizens, and probably equal to the second class in order of wealth. All these items summed up amounted to five thousand seven hundred and fifty or six thousand talents,<sup>2</sup> forming the aggregate schedule of taxable property; that is, something near about six thousand talents. A property-tax was no part of the regular ways and means of the state. It was imposed only on special occasions; and whenever it was imposed, it was assessed upon this schedule, — every man, rich or poor, being rated equally according to his taxable capital as there entered. A property-tax of one per cent. would thus produce sixty talents; two per cent., one hundred and twenty talents, etc. It is highly probable that the exertions of Athens during the archonship of Nausinikus, when this new schedule was first prepared, may have caused a property-tax to be then imposed, but we do not know to what amount.<sup>3</sup>

of twelve talents and upwards. They were entered on the schedule, each for one-fifth, or twenty per cent. of his property.

2. The second class comprised all who possessed property to the amount of six talents, but below twelve talents. Each was enrolled in the schedule, for the amount of sixteen per cent. upon his property.

3. The third class included all whose possessions amounted to the value of two talents, but did not reach six talents. Each was entered in the schedule at the figure of twelve per cent. upon his property.

4. The fourth class comprised all, from the minimum of twenty-five minæ, but below the maximum of two talents. Each was entered in the schedule for the amount of eight per cent. upon his property.

This detail rests upon no positive proof; but it serves to illustrate the principle of distribution, and of graduation, then adopted.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. cont. Androtion. p. 612, c. 17. τὸ ἐκτὸν μέρος εἰσφέρειν μετὰ τῶν μετοίκων.

<sup>2</sup> Polybius states the former sum (ii, 62), Demosthenes the latter (De Symmoriis, p. 183, c. 6). Boeckh however has shown, that Polybius did not correctly conceive what the sum which he stated really meant.

<sup>3</sup> I am obliged again, upon this point, to dissent from M. Boeckh, who sets it down as positive matter of fact that a property-tax of five per cent., amounting to three hundred talents, was imposed and levied in the archonship of Nausinikus (Publ. Econ. Ath. iv, 7, 8. p. 517-521, Eng. Transl.). The evidence upon which this is asserted, is, a passage of Demosthenes cont. An-

Along with this new schedule of taxable capital, a new distribution of the citizens now took place into certain bodies called Symmories. As far as we can make out, on a very obscure subject, it seems that these Symmories were twenty in number, two to each tribe; that each contained sixty citizens, thus making one thousand two hundred in all; that these one thousand two hundred were the wealthiest citizens of the schedule, — containing, perhaps, the two first out of the four classes enrolled. Among these one thousand two hundred, however, the three hundred wealthiest stood out as a separate body; thirty from each tribe. These three hundred were the wealthiest men in the city, and were called "the leaders or chiefs of the Symmories." The three hundred and the twelve hundred corresponded, speaking roughly, to the old Solonian classes of Pentakosiomedimni and Hippeis; of which

Androtion. (p. 606. c. 14). Ὑμῖν παρὰ τὰς εἰσφορὰς τὰς ἀπὸ Νάυσινίκου, παρ' ἰσως τάλαντα τριακόσια ἢ μικρῷ πλείω, ἔλλειμμα τέτταρα καὶ δέκα ἐστὶ τάλαντα· ὧν ἑπτὰ οὗτος (Androtion) εἰσέπραξεν. Now these words imply, — not that a property-tax of about three hundred talents had been levied or called for during the archonship of Nausinikus, but — that a total sum of three hundred talents, or thereabouts, had been levied (or called for) by all the various property-taxes imposed from the archonship of Nausinikus down to the date of the speech. The oration was spoken about 355 B. C.; the archonship of Nausinikus was in 378 B. C. What the speaker affirms, therefore, is, that a sum of three hundred talents had been levied or called for by all the various property-taxes imposed between these two dates; and that the aggregate sum of arrears due upon all of them, at the time when Androtion entered upon his office, was fourteen talents.

Taylor, indeed, in his note, thinking that the sum of three hundred talents is very small, as the aggregate of all property-taxes imposed for twenty-three years, suggests that it might be proper to read ἐπὶ Νάυσινίκου instead of ἀπὸ Νάυσινίκου; and I presume that M. Boeckh adopts that reading. But it would be unsafe to found an historical assertion upon such a change of text, even if the existing text were more indefensible than it actually is. And surely the plural number τὰς εἰσφορὰς proves that the orator has in view, not the single property-tax imposed in the archonship of Nausinikus, but two or more property-taxes, imposed at different times. Besides, Androtion devoted himself to the collection of outstanding arrears generally, in whatever year they might have accrued. He would have no motive to single out those which had accrued in the year 378 B. C.; moreover, those arrears would probably have become confounded with others, long before 355 B. C. Demosthenes selects the year of Nausinikus as his initial period, because it was then that the new schedule and a new reckoning, began.



latter class there had also been twelve hundred, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.<sup>1</sup> The liturgies, or burdensome and costly offices, were discharged principally by the Three Hundred, but partly also by the Twelve Hundred. It would seem that the former was a body essentially fluctuating, and that after a man had been in it for some time, discharging the burdens belonging to it, the Stratêgi or Generals suffered him to be mingled with the Twelve Hundred, and promoted one of the latter body to take his place in the Three Hundred. As between man and man, too, the Attic law always admitted the process called Antidosis, or Exchange of Property. Any citizen who believed himself to have been overcharged with costly liturgies, and that another citizen, as rich or richer than himself, had not borne his fair share,—might, if saddled with a new liturgy, require the other to undertake it in his place; and in case of refusal, might tender to him an exchange of properties, under an engagement that he would undertake the new charge, if the property of the other were made over to him.

It is to be observed, that besides the twelve hundred wealthiest citizens who composed the Symmories, there were a more considerable number of less wealthy citizens not included in them, yet still liable to the property-tax; persons who possessed property from the minimum of twenty-five minæ, up to some maximum that we do not know, at which point the Symmories began,—and who corresponded, speaking loosely, to the third class or Zeugitæ of the Solonian census. The two Symmories of each tribe (comprising its one hundred and twenty richest members) superintended the property-register of each tribe, and collected the contributions due from its less wealthy registered members. Occasionally, when the state required immediate payment, the thirty richest men in each tribe (making up altogether the three hundred) advanced the whole sum of tax chargeable upon the tribe, having their legal remedy of enforcement against the other members for the recovery of the sum chargeable upon each. The richest citizens were thus both armed with rights and charged with duties,

<sup>1</sup> Respecting the Symmories, compare Boeckh, *Staats-haushaltung der Athener*, iv, 9, 10; Schömann, *Antiq. Jur. Publ. Græcor.* s. 78; Parreidt, *De Symmoriis*, p. 18 *seq.*

such as had not belonged to them before the archonship of Nausinikus. By their intervention (it was supposed) the schedule would be kept nearer to the truth as respects the assessment on each individual, while the sums actually imposed would be more immediately forthcoming, than if the state directly interfered by officers of its own. Soon after, the system of the Symmories was extended to the trierarchy; a change which had not at first been contemplated. Each Symmory had its chiefs, its curators, its assessors, acting under the general presidency of the Stratêgi. Twenty-five years afterwards, we also find Demosthenes (then about thirty years of age) recommending a still more comprehensive application of the same principle, so that men, money, ships, and all the means and forces of the state, might thus be parcelled into distinct fractions, and consigned to distinct Symmories, each with known duties of limited extent for the component persons to perform, and each exposed not merely to legal process, but also to loss of esteem, in the event of non-performance. It will rather appear, however, that, in practice, the system of Symmories came to be greatly abused, and to produce pernicious effects never anticipated.

At present, however, I only notice this new financial and political classification introduced in 378 B.C., as one evidence of the ardour with which Athens embarked in her projected war against Sparta. The feeling among her allies, the Thebans, was no less determined. The government of Leontiades and the Spartan garrison had left behind it so strong an antipathy, that the large majority of citizens, embarking heartily in the revolution against them, lent themselves to all the orders of Pelopidas and his colleagues; who, on their part, had no other thought but to repel the common enemy. The Theban government now became probably democratical in form; and still more democratical in spirit, from the unanimous ardor pervading the whole mass. Its military force was put under the best training; the most fertile portion of the plain north of Thebes, from which the chief subsistence of the city came, was surrounded by a ditch and a palisade,<sup>1</sup> to repel the expected Spartan invasion; and the memorable Sacred Band was now for the first time organized. This was a brigade of three

<sup>1</sup> *Ven. Hellen.* v, 4, 38



hundred hoplites, called the *Lochus*, or regiment of the city, as being consecrated to the defence of the *Kadmeia*, or acropolis.<sup>1</sup> It was put under constant arms and training, at the public expense, like the Thousand at Argos, of whom mention was made in my seventh volume.<sup>2</sup> It consisted of youthful citizens from the best families, distinguished for their strength and courage amidst the severe trials of the *palæstra* in Thebes, and was marshalled in such manner, that each pair of neighboring soldiers were at the same time intimate friends; so that the whole band were thus kept together by ties which no dangers could sever. At first its destination, under Gorgidas its commander (as we see by the select Three Hundred who fought in 424 B.C. at the battle of Delium),<sup>3</sup> was to serve as front rank men, for the general body of hoplites to follow. But from a circumstance to be mentioned presently, it came to be employed by Pelopidas and Epaminondas as a regiment by itself, and in a charge was then found irresistible.<sup>4</sup>

We must remark that the Thebans had always been good soldiers, both as hoplites and as cavalry. The existing enthusiasm, therefore, with the more sustained training, only raised good soldiers into much better. But Thebes was now blessed with another good fortune, such as had never yet befallen her. She found among her citizens a leader of the rarest excellence. It is now for the first time that Epaminondas, the son of Polymnis, begins to stand out in the public life of Greece. His family, poor rather than rich, was among the most ancient in Thebes, belonging to

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch. Pelopid. c. 18, 19.

<sup>2</sup> Hist. of Greece, Vol. VII, ch. iv, p. 11.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xii, 70.

These pairs of neighbors who fought side by side at Delium, were called *Heniochi* and *Parabatæ*, — Charioteers and Side Companions; a name borrowed from the analogy of chariot-fighting, as described in the *Iliad* and probably in many of the lost epic poems; the charioteer being himself an excellent warrior, though occupied for the moment with other duties, — Diomedes and Sthenelus, Pandarus and Æneas, Patroklos and Automedon, etc.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 18, 19.

<sup>5</sup> *Ὁ συνταχθεὶς ἐπὶ Ἐπαιμινώνδου ἱερὸς λόχος* (Hieronymus apud Athenæum, xiii, p. 602 A.). There was a Carthaginian military division which bore the same title, composed of chosen and wealthy citizens, two thousand five hundred in number (Diodor. xvi, 80).

those Gentes called Sparti, whose heroic progenitors were said to have sprung from the dragon's teeth sown by Kadmus.<sup>1</sup> He seems to have been now of middle age; Pelopidas was younger, and of a very rich family; yet the relations between the two were those of equal and intimate friendship, tested in a day of battle, wherein the two were ranged side by side as hoplites, and where Epaminondas had saved the life of his wounded friend, at the cost of several wounds, and the greatest possible danger, to himself.<sup>2</sup>

Epaminondas had discharged, with punctuality, those military and gymnastic duties which were incumbent on every Theban citizen. But we are told that in the gymnasia he studied to acquire the maximum of activity rather than of strength; the nimble movements of a runner and wrestler, — not the heavy muscularity, purchased in part by excessive nutriment, of the Bœotian pugilist.<sup>3</sup> He also learned music, vocal and instrumental, and

<sup>1</sup> Pausan. viii, 11, 5.

Dikæarchus, only one generation afterwards, complained that he could not find out the name of the mother of Epaminondas (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19).

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Pelop. c. 4; Pausan. ix, 13, 1. According to Plutarch, Epaminondas had attained the age of forty years, before he became publicly known (De Occult. Vivendo, p. 1129 C.).

Plutarch affirms that the battle (in which Pelopidas was desperately wounded, and saved by Epaminondas) took place at Mantinea, when they were fighting on the side of the Lacedæmonians, under king Agesipolis, against the Arcadians; the Thebans being at that time friends of Sparta, and having sent a contingent to her aid.

I do not understand what battle Plutarch can here mean. The Thebans were never so united with Sparta as to send any contingent to her aid, after the capture of Athens (in 404 B.C.). Most critics think that the war referred to by Plutarch, is, the expedition conducted by Agesipolis against Mantinea, whereby the city was broken up into villages — in 385 B.C.; see Mr. Clinton's *Fasti Hellenici* ad 385 B.C. But, in the first place, there cannot have been any Theban contingent then assisting Agesipolis; for Thebes was on terms unfriendly with Sparta, — and certainly was not her ally. In the next place, there does not seem to have been any battle, according to Xenophon's account.

I therefore am disposed to question Plutarch's account, as to this alleged battle of Mantinea; though I think it probable that Epaminondas may have saved the life of Pelopidas at some earlier conflict, before the peace of Antalkidas.

<sup>3</sup> Cornel Nepos, Epamin. c. 2; Plutarch, Apophth. Reg. p. 192 D.; Aristophan. Acharn. 872



dancing; by which, in those days, was meant, not simply the power of striking the lyre or blowing the flute, but all that belonged to the graceful, expressive, and emphatic management, either of the voice or of the body; rhythmical pronunciation, exercised by repetition of the poets,—and disciplined movements, for taking part in a choric festival with becoming consonance amidst a crowd of citizen performers. Of such gymnastic and musical training, the combination of which constituted an accomplished Grecian citizen, the former predominated at Thebes, the latter at Athens. Moreover, at Thebes the musical training was based more upon the flute (for the construction of which, excellent reeds grew near the Lake Kopaïs); at Athens more upon the lyre, which admitted of vocal accompaniment by the player. The Athenian Alkibiades<sup>1</sup> was heard to remark, when he threw away his flute in disgust, that flute-playing was a fit occupation for the Thebans, since they did not know how to speak; and in regard to the countrymen of Pindar<sup>2</sup> generally, the remark was hardly less true than contemptuous. On this capital point, Epaminondas formed a splendid exception. Not only had he learnt the lyre<sup>3</sup> as well as the flute from the best masters, but also, dissenting from his brother Kapheisias and his friend Pelopidas, he manifested from his earliest years an ardent intellectual impulse, which would have been remarkable even in an Athenian. He sought with eagerness the conversation of the philosophers within his reach, among whom were the Theban Simmias and the Tarentine Spintharus, both of them once companions of Sokrates; so that the stirring influence of the Sokratic method would thus find its way, partially and at second-hand, to the bosom of Epaminondas. As the relations between Thebes and Athens, ever since the close of the Peloponnesian war, had become more and more

Compare the citations in Athenæus, x, p. 417. The perfection of form required in the runner was also different from that required in the wrestler (Xenoph. Memor. iii, 8, 4; iii, 10, 6).

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Alkib. c. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Pindar, Olymp. vi, 90.

*ἀρχαίων δυνεὶδος* — *Βοιωτίων ὄν*, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Aristoxenus mentions the flute, Cicero and Cornelius Nepos the lyre (Aristoxen. Fr. 60, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæ. iv, p. 184; Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i, 2, 4; Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 2).

friendly, growing at length into alliance and joint war against the Spartans,—we may reasonably presume that he profited by teachers at the latter city as well as at the former. But the person to whom he particularly devoted himself, and whom he not only heard as a pupil, but tended almost as a son, during the close of an aged life,—was a Tarentine exile, named Lysis; a member of the Pythagorean brotherhood, who, from causes which we cannot make out, had sought shelter at Thebes, and dwelt there until his death.<sup>1</sup> With him, as well as with other philosophers, Epaminondas discussed all the subjects of study and inquiry then afloat. By perseverance in this course for some years, he not only acquired considerable positive instruction, but also became practised in new and enlarged intellectual combinations; and was, like Perikles,<sup>2</sup> emancipated from that timorous interpretation of nature, which rendered so many Grecian commanders the slaves of signs and omens. His patience as a listener, and his indifference to showy talk on his own account, were so remarkable, that Spintharus (the father of Aristoxenus), after numerous conversations with him, affirmed that he had never met with any one who understood more, or talked less.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Aristoxenus, Frag. 11, ed. Didot; Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 583, Cicero, De Offic. i, 44, 155; Pausan. ix, 13, 1; Ælian, V. H. iii, 17.

The statement (said to have been given by Aristoxenus, and copied by Plutarch as well as by Jamblichus) that Lysis, who taught Epaminondas, had been one of the persons actually present in the synod of Pythagoreans at Kroton when Kylon burnt down the house, and that he with another had been the only persons who escaped—cannot be reconciled with chronology.

<sup>2</sup> Compare Diodor. xv, 52 with Plutarch, Perikles, c. 6, and Plutarch, Demosthenes, c. 20.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, De Gen. Sokrat. p. 576 D. *μετέλθε παιδείας διάφορον καὶ περὶ τῆς* — (p. 585 D.) *τὴν ἀρίστην τροφὴν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ* — (p. 592 F.) *Σπίνθαρος ὁ Ταραντίνος οὐκ ὀλίγον αὐτῷ (Epaminondas) συνδιατρίψας ἐν ταῦθα χρόνον, ἀεὶ δὴ πονεῖ λέγει, μηδὲν πονεῖ τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀνθρώπων ἐν τετευχέναι, μήτε πλεῖονα γινώσκοντι μήτε ἐλάττωνα φθεγγόμενον.* Compare Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 3 — and Plutarch, De Audiend. c. 3, p. 39 F.

We may fairly presume that this judgment of Spintharus was communicated by him to his son Aristoxenus, from whom Plutarch copied it; and we know that Aristoxenus in his writings mentioned other particulars respecting Epaminondas (Athenæus, iv, p. 184). We see thus that Plutarch had access to good sources of information respecting the latter. And as he had composed a life of Epaminondas (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 28), though unfortunately it has not reached us, we may be confident that he had taken



Nor did such reserve proceed from any want of ready powers of expression. On the contrary, the eloquence of Epaminondas, when he entered upon his public career, was shown to be not merely preëminent among Thebans, but effective even against the best Athenian opponents.<sup>1</sup> But his disposition was essentially modest and unambitious, combined with a strong intellectual curiosity and a great capacity; a rare combination amidst a race usually erring on the side of forwardness and self-esteem. Little moved by personal ambition, and never cultivating popularity by unworthy means, Epaminondas was still more indifferent on the score of money. He remained in contented poverty to the end of his life, not leaving enough to pay his funeral expenses, yet repudiating not merely the corrupting propositions of foreigners, but also the solicitous tenders of personal friends;<sup>2</sup> though we are told that, when once serving the costly office of choregus, he permitted his friend Pelopidas to bear a portion of the expense.<sup>3</sup> As he thus stood exempt from two of the besetting infirmities which most frequently misguided eminent Greek statesmen, so there was a third characteristic not less estimable in his moral character; the gentleness of his political antipathies,—his repugnance to harsh treatment of conquered enemies,—and his refusal to mingle in intestine bloodshed. If ever there were men whose conduct seemed to justify unmeasured retaliation, it was Leontiades and his fellow-traitors. They had opened the doors of the Kadmeia to the Spartan Phœbidas, and had put to death the Theban leader Ismenias. Yet Epaminondas disapproved of the scheme of Pelopidas and the other exiles to assassinate them, and declined to take part in it; partly on prudential grounds, but partly, also,

some pains to collect materials for the purpose, which materials would naturally be employed in his dramatic dialogue, "De Genio Socratis." This strengthens our confidence in the interesting statements which that dialogue furnishes respecting the character of Epaminondas; as well as in the incidental allusions interspersed among Plutarch's other writings.

<sup>1</sup> Cornel. Nepos, Epaminond. c. 5; Plutarch, Præcept. Reip. Gerend. p. 819 C. Cicero notices him as the only man with any pretensions to oratorical talents, whom Thebes, Corinth, or Argos had ever produced (Brutus, c. 13, 50).

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch (De Gen. Socr. p. 583, 584; Pelopid. c. 3; Fab. Max. c. 27 Compar. Alcibiad. and Coriol. c. 4). Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 1; Justin, vi. 8.

on conscientious scruples.<sup>1</sup> None of his virtues was found so difficult to imitate by his subsequent admirers, as this mastery over the resentful and vindictive passions.<sup>2</sup>

Before Epaminondas could have full credit for these virtues, however, it was necessary that he should give proof of the extraordinary capacities for action with which they were combined, and that he should achieve something to earn that exclamation of praise which we shall find his enemy Agesilaus afterwards pronouncing, on seeing him at the head of the invading Theban army near Sparta,—“Oh! thou man of great deeds!”<sup>3</sup> In the year B. C. 379, when the Kadmeia was emancipated, he was as yet undistinguished in public life, and known only to Pelopidas with his other friends; among whom, too, his unambitious and inquisitive disposition was a subject of complaint as keeping him unduly in the background.<sup>4</sup> But the unparalleled phenomena of that year supplied a spur which overruled all backwardness, and smothered all rival inclinations. The Thebans, having just recovered their city by an incredible turn of fortune, found themselves exposed single-handed to the full

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 576 F. Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ, μὴ πείθων ὥς οἴεται θέλτιον εἶναι ταῦτα μὴ πράσσειν· εἰκότως ἀντιτείνει πρὸς ἃ μὴ πέφυκε, μηδὲ δοκιμάζει, παρακαλοῦμενος.

... Ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ πείθει τοὺς πολλοὺς, ἀλλὰ ταύτην ὥρμήκαμεν τὴν ὁδὸν, ἔαν αὐτὸν κελεύει φόνου καθαρὸν ὄντα καὶ ἀνάτιον ἐφρεσθῆναι τοῖς καιροῖς, μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου τῷ συμφέροντι προσισόμενον.

Compare the same dialogue, p. 594 B.; and Cornelius Nepos, Pelopidas c. 4.

Isokrates makes a remark upon Evagoras of Salamis, which may be well applied to Epaminondas; that the objectionable means, without which the former could not have got possession of the sceptre, were performed by others and not by him; while all the meritorious and admirable functions of command were reserved for Evagoras (Isokrates, Or. ix. (Evag.) s. 28).

<sup>2</sup> See the striking statements of Plutarch and Pausanias about Philopœmen, — καίπερ Ἐπαμεινώνδου βουλόμενος εἶναι μάλιστα ζηλωτῆς, τὸ δραστήριον καὶ συνετὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ χρημάτων ἀπαθὲς ἰσχυρῶς ἐμμεῖτο, τῷ δὲ πρᾶφ καὶ βαθεῖ καὶ φιλανθρώπῳ παρὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς διαφορὰς ἐμμένειν οὐ θυνάμενος, δι' ὀργὴν καὶ φιλονεικίαν, μᾶλλον ἐδόκει στρατιωτικῆς ἢ πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς οἰκείος εἶναι. To the like purpose, Pausanias, viii. 49, 2; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 25; Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 3 — “patiens admirandum in modum.”

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 32. Ὡ τοῦ μεγαλοπράγμονος ἀνθρώπου!

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 576 E. Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ, Βοιωτῶν ἀπάντω, ὃ πεπαιδευθῆναι πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀξίων διαφέρειν, ἀμβλὺς ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπροθυμῶς.



attack of Sparta and her extensive confederacy. Not even Athens had yet declared in their favor, nor had they a single other ally. Under such circumstances, Thebes could only be saved by the energy of all her citizens, — the unambitious and philosophical as well as the rest. As the necessities of the case required such simultaneous devotion, so the electric shock of the recent revolution was sufficient to awaken enthusiasm in minds much less patriotic than that of Epaminondas. He was among the first to join the victorious exiles in arms, after the contest had been transferred from the houses of Archias and Leontiades to the open market-place; and he would probably have been among the first to mount the walls of the Kadmeia, had the Spartan harmost awaited an assault. Pelopidas being named Bœotarch, his friend Epaminondas was naturally placed among the earliest and most forward organizers of the necessary military resistance against the common enemy, in which employment his capacities speedily became manifest. Though at this moment almost an unknown man, he had acquired, in B. C. 371, seven years afterwards, so much reputation both as speaker and as general, that he was chosen as the expositor of Theban policy at Sparta, and trusted with the conduct of the battle of Leuktra, upon which the fate of Thebes hinged. Hence we may fairly conclude, that the well-planned and successful system of defence, together with the steady advance of Thebes against Sparta, during the intermediate years, was felt to have been in the main his work.<sup>1</sup>

The turn of politics at Athens which followed the acquittal of Sphodrias was an unspeakable benefit to the Thebans, in second-

<sup>1</sup> Bauch, in his instructive biography of Epaminondas (*Epaminondas, und Thebens Kampf um die Hegemonie*: Breslau, 1834, p. 26), seems to conceive that Epaminondas was never employed in any public official post by his countrymen, until the period immediately preceding the battle of Leuktra. I cannot concur in this opinion. It appears to me that he must have been previously employed in such posts as enabled him to show his military worth. For all the proceedings of 371 B. C. prove that in that year he actually possessed a great and established reputation, which must have been acquired by previous acts in a conspicuous position; and as he had no great family position to start from, his reputation was probably acquired only by slow degrees.

The silence of Xenophon proves nothing in contradiction of this supposition: for he does not mention Epaminondas even at Leuktra.

ing as well as encouraging their defence; and the Spartans, not unmoved at the new enemies raised up by their treatment of Sphodrias, thought it necessary to make some efforts on their side. They organized on a more systematic scale the military force of their confederacy, and even took some conciliatory steps with the view of effacing the odium of their past misrule.<sup>1</sup> The full force of their confederacy, — including, as a striking mark of present Spartan power, even the distant Olynthians,<sup>2</sup> — was placed in motion against Thebes in the course of the summer under Agesilaus; who contrived, by putting in sudden requisition a body of mercenaries acting in the service of the Arcadian town Kleitor against its neighbor the Arcadian Orchomenus, to make himself master of the passes of Kithæron, before the Thebans and Athenians could have notice of his passing the Lacedæmonian border.<sup>3</sup> Then crossing Kithæron into Bœotia, he established his head-quarters at Thespiæ, a post already under Spartan occupation. From thence he commenced his attacks upon the Theban territory, which he found defended partly by a considerable length of ditch and palisade — partly by the main force of Thebes, assisted by a division of mixed Athenians and mercenaries, sent from Athens under Chabrias. Keeping on their own side of the palisade, the Thebans suddenly sent out their cavalry, and attacked Agesilaus by surprise, occasioning some loss. Such sallies were frequently repeated, until, by a rapid march at break of day, he forced his way through an opening in the breastwork into their inner country, which he laid waste nearly to the city walls.<sup>4</sup> The Thebans and Athenians, though not offering him battle on equal terms, nevertheless kept the field against him, taking care to hold positions advantageous for defence. Agesilaus on his side did not feel confident enough to attack them against such odds. Yet on one occasion he had made up his mind to do so; and was marching up to the charge, when he was daunted by the firm attitude and excellent array of the troops of Chabrias. They had received orders to await his approach, on a high and advantageous ground, without moving until signal should be given; with their shields resting on the

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 31.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 54; Diodor. xv, 31.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 36-38.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 44.



knee, and their spears protended. So imposing was their appearance, that Agesilaus called off his troops without daring to complete the charge.<sup>1</sup> After a month or more of devastations on the lands of Thebes, and a string of desultory skirmishes in which he seems to have lost rather than gained, Agesilaus withdrew to Thespiæ; the fortifications of which he strengthened, leaving Phœbidas with a considerable force in occupation, and then leading back his army to Peloponnesus.

Phœbidas, — the former captor of the Kadmeia, — thus stationed at Thespiæ, carried on vigorous warfare against Thebes; partly with his own Spartan division, partly with the Thespian hoplites, who promised him unshrinking support. His incursions soon brought on reprisals from the Thebans; who invaded Thespiæ, but were repulsed by Phœbidas with the loss of all their plunder. In the pursuit, however, hurrying incautiously forward, he was slain by a sudden turn of the Theban cavalry;<sup>2</sup> upon which all his troops fled, chased by the Thebans to the very gates of Thespiæ. Though the Spartans, in consequence of this misfortune, despatched by sea another general and division to replace Phœbidas, the cause of the Thebans was greatly strengthened by their recent victory. They pushed their success not only against Thespiæ, but against the other Bœotian cities, still held by local oligarchies in dependence on Sparta. At the same time, these oligarchies were threatened by the growing strength of their own popular or philo-Theban citizens, who crowded in considerable numbers as exiles to Thebes.<sup>3</sup>

A second expedition against Thebes, undertaken by Agesilaus in the ensuing summer with the main army of the confederacy, was neither more decisive nor more profitable than the preceding. Though he contrived, by a well-planned stratagem, to surprize the

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 32; Polyæn. ii, 1, 2; Cornel. Nepos, Chabrias, c. 1, — "obnixo genu sento," — Demosthen. cont. Leptinem, p. 479.

The Athenian public having afterwards voted a statue to the honor of Chabrias, he made choice of this attitude for the design (Diodor. xv, 33).

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 42-45; Diodor. xv, 33.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου πάλιν αὐτὰ τῶν Θηβαίων ἀνεζωπυρεῖτο, καὶ ἐστρατεύοντο εἰς Θεσπιάς, καὶ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περικύκιδας πόλεις. Ὁ μὲντοι δῆμος ἐξ αὐτῶν εἰς τὰς Θήβας ἀπεχώρει· ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσι δυναστεῖαι καθειστήκεσαν, ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις· ὥστε καὶ οἱ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς πόλεσι φίλοι τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων βοηθείας ἐδέοντο.

Theban palisade, and lay waste the plain, he gained no serious victory; and even showed, more clearly than before, his reluctance to engage except upon perfectly equal terms.<sup>1</sup> It became evident that the Thebans were not only strengthening their position in Bœotia, but also acquiring practice in warfare and confidence against the Spartans; insomuch that Antalkidas and some other companions remonstrated with Agesilaus, against carrying on the war so as only to give improving lessons to his enemies in military practice, — and called upon him to strike some decisive blow. He quitted Bœotia, however, after the summer's campaign, without any such step.<sup>2</sup> In his way he appeased an intestine conflict which was about to break out in Thespiæ. Afterwards, on passing to Megara, he experienced a strain or hurt, which grievously injured his sound leg, (it has been mentioned already that he was lame of one leg,) and induced his surgeon to open a vein in the limb for reducing the inflammation. When this was done, however, the blood could not be stopped until he swooned. Having been conveyed home to Sparta in great suffering, he was confined to his couch for several months; and he remained during a much longer time unfit for active command.<sup>3</sup>

The functions of general now devolved upon the other king Kleombrotus, who in the next spring conducted the army of the confederacy to invade Bœotia anew. But on this occasion, the Athenians and Thebans had occupied the passes of Kithæron, so that he was unable even to enter the country, and was obliged to dismiss his troops without achieving anything.<sup>4</sup>

His inglorious retreat excited such murmurs among the allies when they met at Sparta, that they resolved to fit out a large naval force, sufficient both to intercept the supplies of imported corn to Athens, and to forward an invading army by sea against Thebes, to the Bœotian port of Kreusis in the Krissæan Gulf. The former object was attempted first. Towards midsummer, a fleet of sixty triremes, fitted out under the Spartan admiral Pollis,

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 47, 51.

The anecdotes in Polyænus (ii, 1, 18-20), mentioning faint-heartedness and alarm among the allies of Agesilaus, are likely to apply (certainly in part) to this campaign.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv, 33, 34; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 26.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 58

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 59.



was cruising in the Ægean ; especially round the coast of Attica, near Ægina, Keos, and Andros. The Athenians, who, since their recently renewed confederacy, had been undisturbed by any enemies at sea, found themselves thus threatened, not merely with loss of power, but also with loss of trade and even famine ; since their corn-ships from the Euxine, though safely reaching Geræstus (the southern extremity of Eubœa), were prevented from doubling Cape Sunium. Feeling severely this interruption, they fitted out at Peiræus a fleet of eighty triremes,<sup>1</sup> with crews mainly composed of citizens ; who, under the admiral Chabrias, in a sharply contested action near Naxos, completely defeated the fleet of Pollis, and regained for Athens the mastery of the sea. Forty nine Lacedæmonian triremes were disabled or captured, eight with their entire crews.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, Chabrias might have destroyed all or most of the rest, had he not suspended his attack, having eighteen of his own ships disabled, to pick up both the living men and the dead bodies on board, as well as all Athenians who were swimming for their lives. He did this (we are told<sup>3</sup>), from distinct

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 61. *ἐνέβησαν αὐτοὶ εἰς τὰς ναῦς*, etc. Boeckh (followed by Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. ch. 38, vol. v, p. 58) connects with this maritime expedition an Inscription (Corp. Insc. No. 84, p. 124) recording a vote of gratitude, passed by the Athenian assembly in favor of Phanokritus, a native of Parium in the Propontis. But I think that the vote can hardly belong to the present expedition. The Athenians could not need to be informed by a native of Parium about the movements of a hostile fleet near Ægina and Keos. The information given by Phanokritus must have related more probably, I think, to some occasion of the transit of hostile ships along the Hellespont, which a native of Parium would be the likely person first to discover and communicate.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv, 35 ; Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 17, p. 480.

I give the number of prize-ships taken in this action, as stated by Demosthenes ; in preference to Diodorus, who mentions a smaller number. The orator, in enumerating the exploits of Chabrias in this oration, not only speaks from a written memorandum in his hand, which he afterwards causes to be read by the clerk, — but also seems exact and special as to numbers, so as to inspire greater confidence than usual.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xv, 35. Chabrias ἀπέσχετο παντελῶς τοῦ διωγμοῦ, ἀναμνησθεὶς τῆς ἐν Ἀργινοῦσαις ναυμαχίας, ἐν ᾗ τοὺς νικήσαντας στρατηγοὺς ὁ δῆμος ἀντὶ μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας θανάτῳ περιέβαλεν, αἰτιασάμενος ὅτι τοὺς τετελευτηκότας κατὰ τὴν ναυμαχίαν οὐκ ἔθαψαν· εὐλαβήθη οὖν (see Wesseling and Stephens's note) μή ποτε τῆς περιστάσεως ὁμοίας γενομένης κινδυνεύῃ παθεῖν παραπλήσια. Διόπερ ἀποστὰς τοῦ δι



ALEXANDER THE GREAT IN THE TEMPLE OF JUPITER  
*Greece, vol. ten.*



recollection of the fierce displeasure of the people against the victorious generals after the battle of Arginusæ. And we may thus see, that though the proceedings on that memorable occasion were stained both by illegality and by violence, they produced a salutary effect upon the public conduct of subsequent commanders. Many a brave Athenian (the crews consisting principally of citizens) owed his life, after the battle of Naxos, to the terrible lesson administered by the people to their generals in 406 B. C., thirty years before.

This was the first great victory (in September, 376 B. C.<sup>1</sup>) which the Athenians had gained at sea since the Peloponnesian war; and while it thus filled them with joy and confidence, it led to a material enlargement of their maritime confederacy. The fleet of Chabrias, — of which a squadron was detached under the orders of Phokion, a young Athenian now distinguishing himself for the first time and often hereafter to be mentioned, — sailed victorious round the Ægean, made prize of twenty other triremes in single ships, brought in three thousand prisoners with one hundred and ten talents in money, and annexed seventeen new cities to the confederacy, as sending deputies to the synod and furnishing contributions. The discreet and conciliatory behavior of Phokion, especially obtained much favor among the islanders, and determined several new adhesions to Athens.<sup>2</sup> To the inhabitants

ώκειν, ἀνέλεγτο τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς διανηχομένους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐτι ζῶντας διέσωσε, τοὺς δὲ τετελευτηκότας ἐθαψεν. Εἰ δὲ μὴ περὶ ταύτην ἐγένετο τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, ῥαδίως ἂν ἅπαντα τὸν πολεμίων στόλον διέφθειρε.

This passage illustrates what I remarked in my preceding volume (Vol. VIII, Ch. lxiv, p. 175), respecting the battle of Arginusæ and the proceedings at Athens afterwards. I noticed that Diodorus incorrectly represented the excitement at Athens against the generals as arising from their having neglected to pick up the bodies of the slain warriors for burial, — and that he omitted the more important fact, that they left many living and wounded warriors to perish.

It is curious, that in the first of the two sentences above cited, Diodorus repeats his erroneous affirmation about the battle of Arginusæ; while in the second sentence he corrects the error, telling us that Chabrias, profiting by the warning, took care to pick up the living men on the wrecks and in the water, as well as the dead bodies.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 6; Plutarch, Camillus, c. 19.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. cont. Leptin. p. 480; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7.

of Abdëra in Thrace, Chabrias rendered an inestimable service, by aiding them to repulse a barbarous horde of Triballi, who quitting their abode from famine, had poured upon the sea-coast, defeating the Abderites and plundering their territory. The citizens, grateful for a force left to defend their town, willingly allied themselves with Athens, whose confederacy thus extended itself to the coast of Thrace.<sup>1</sup>

Having prosperously enlarged their confederacy to the east of Peloponnesus, the Athenians began to aim at the acquisition of new allies in the west. The fleet of sixty triremes, which had recently served under Chabrias, was sent, under the command of Timotheus, the son of Konon, to circumnavigate Peloponnesus and alarm the coast of Laconia; partly at the instance of the Thebans, who were eager to keep the naval force of Sparta occupied, so as to prevent her from conveying troops across the Krissæan Gulf from Corinth to the Bœotian port of Kreusis.<sup>2</sup> This Periplus of Peloponnesus, — the first which the fleet of Athens had attempted since her humiliation at Ægospotami, — coupled with the ensuing successes, was long remembered by the countrymen of Timotheus. His large force, just dealing, and conciliatory professions, won new and valuable allies. Not only Kephallenia, but the still more important island of Korkyra, voluntarily accepted his propositions; and as he took care to avoid all violence or interference with the political constitution, his popularity all around augmented every day. Alketas, prince of the Molossi, — the Chaonians with other Epirotic tribes, — and the Akarnanians on the coast, — all embraced his alliance.<sup>3</sup> While near Alyzia and Leukas on this coast, he was assailed by the Peloponnesian ships under Nikolochus, rather inferior in number to his fleet. He defeated them, and being shortly afterwards reinforced by other triremes from Korkyra, he became so superior in those waters, that the hostile fleet did not dare to show itself. Having received only thirteen talents on quitting Athens, we are told that he had great difficulty in paying his fleet; that he procured an advance of money, from each of the sixty trierarchs in his fleet, of seven minæ towards the pay of their respective ships;

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 36. He states by mistake, that Chabrias was afterwards assassinated at Abdëra.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 32.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 64; Diodor. xv, 36.

and that he also sent home requests for large remittances from the public treasury; <sup>1</sup> measures which go to bear out that honorable repugnance to the plunder of friends or neutrals, and care to avoid even the suspicion of plunder, which his panegyrist Isokrates ascribes to him.<sup>2</sup> This was a feature unhappily rare among the Grecian generals on both sides, and tending to become still rarer, from the increased employment of mercenary bands.

The demands of Timotheus on the treasury of Athens were not favorably received. Though her naval position was now more brilliant and commanding than it had been since the battle of Ægospotami, — though no Lacedæmonian fleet showed itself to disturb her in the Ægean,<sup>3</sup> — yet the cost of the war began to be seriously felt. Privateers from the neighboring island of Ægina annoyed her commerce, requiring a perpetual coast-guard; while the contributions from the deputies to the confederate synod were not sufficient to dispense with the necessity of a heavy direct property tax at home.<sup>4</sup>

In this synod the Thebans, as members of the confederacy, were represented.<sup>5</sup> Application was made to them to contribute towards the cost of the naval war; the rather, as it was partly at their instance that the fleet had been sent round to the Ionian Sea. But the Thebans declined compliance,<sup>6</sup> nor were they

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 66; Isokrates, De Permutat. s. 116; Cornelius Nepos, Timotheus, c. 2.

The advance of seven minæ respectively, obtained by Timotheus from the sixty trierarchs under his command, is mentioned by Demosthenes cont. Timotheum (c. 3, p. 1187). I agree with M. Boeckh (Public Economy of Athens, ii, 24, p. 294) in referring this advance to his expedition to Korkyra and other places in the Ionian Sea in 375–374 B. C., not to his subsequent expedition of 373 B. C., to which Rehdantz, Lachmann, Schlosser, and others would refer it (Vitæ Iphicratis, etc. p. 89). In the second expedition, it does not appear that he ever had really sixty triremes, or sixty trierarchs, under him. Xenophon (Hellen. v, 4, 63) tells us that the fleet sent with Timotheus to Korkyra consisted of sixty ships; which is the exact number of trierarchs named by Demosthenes.

<sup>2</sup> Isokrates, Orat. De Permutat. s. 128, 131, 135.

<sup>3</sup> Isokrates, De Permutat. s. 117; Cornel. Nepos, Timoth. c. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1.

<sup>5</sup> See Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 21, 23, 37.

<sup>6</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1. Οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀξαναμένοντες μὲν ὁρῶντες διὰ φῶς τοὺς Θηβαίους, χρήματα δ' οὐ συμβαλλόμενους εἰς τὸ ναυτικόν; αὐτοὶ δ'



probably in any condition to furnish pecuniary aid. Their refusal occasioned much displeasure at Athens, embittered by jealousy at the strides which they had been making during the two last years, partly through the indirect effect of the naval successes of Athens. At the end of the year 377 B. C., after the two successive invasions of Agesilaus, the ruin of two home crops had so straitened the Thebans, that they were forced to import corn from Pagasæ in Thessaly; in which enterprise their ships and seamen were at first captured by the Lacedæmonian harmost at Oreus in Eubœa, Alketas. His negligence, however, soon led not only to an outbreak of their seamen who had been taken prisoners, but also to the revolt of the town from Sparta, so that the communication of Thebes with Pagasæ became quite unimpeded. For the two succeeding years, there had been no Spartan invasion of Bœotia; since, in 376 B. C., Kleombrotus could not surmount the heights of Kithæron, — while in 375 B. C., the attention of Sparta had been occupied by the naval operations of Timotheus in the Ionian Sea. During these two years, the Thebans had exerted themselves vigorously against the neighboring cities of Bœotia, in most of which a strong party, if not the majority of the population, was favorable to them, though the government was in the hands of the philo-Spartan oligarchy, seconded by Spartan harmosts and garrison.<sup>1</sup> We hear of one victory gained by the Theban cavalry near Plataea, under Charon, and of another near Tanagra, in which Panthoides, the Lacedæmonian harmost in that town, was slain.<sup>2</sup>

But the most important of all their successes was that of Pelopidas near Tegyra. That commander, hearing that the Spartan harmost, with his two (*moræ* or) divisions in garrison at Orchomenus, had gone away on an excursion into the Lokrian territory, made a dash from Thebes with the Sacred Band and a few cavalry, to surprise the place. It was the season in which the waters of the Lake Kopais were at the fullest, so that he was obliged to take a wide circuit to the north-west, and to pass by Tegyra, on the road between Orchomenus and the Opuntian Lokris. On arriving

ἀποκναιόμενοι καὶ χρημάτων εἰσφοραῖς καὶ ληστείαις ἐξ Αἰγίνης, καὶ φυλακαῖς τῆς χώρας, ἐπεθύμησαν παύσασθαι τοῦ πολέμου.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46-55.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 15-25.

near Orchomenus, he ascertained that there were still some Lacedæmonians in the town, and that no surprise could be effected; upon which he retraced his steps. But on reaching Tegyra, he fell in with the Lacedæmonian commanders, Gorgoleon and Theopompus, returning with their troops from the Lokrian excursion. As his numbers were inferior to theirs by half, they rejoiced in the encounter; while the troops of Pelopidas were at first dismayed, and required all his encouragement to work them up. But in the fight that ensued, closely and obstinately contested in a narrow pass, the strength, valor, and compact charge of the Sacred Band proved irresistible. The two Lacedæmonian commanders were both slain; their troops opened, to allow the Thebans an undisturbed retreat; but Pelopidas, disdaining this opportunity, persisted in the combat until all his enemies dispersed and fled. The neighborhood of Orchomenus forbade any long pursuit, so that Pelopidas could only erect his trophy, and strip the dead, before returning to Thebes.<sup>1</sup>

This combat, in which the Lacedæmonians were for the first time beaten in fair field by numbers inferior to their own, produced a strong sensation in the minds of both the contending parties. The confidence of the Thebans, as well as their exertion, was redoubled; so that by the year 374 B. C., they had cleared Bœotia of the Lacedæmonians, as well as of the local oligarchies which sustained them; persuading or constraining the cities again to come into union with Thebes, and reviving the Bœotian confederacy. Haliartus, Korôneia, Lebadeia, Tanagra, Thespiæ, Plataea, and the rest, thus became again Bœotian;<sup>2</sup> leaving out Orchomenus alone, (with its dependency Chæroneia,) which was on the borders of Phokis, and still continued under Lacedæmonian occupation. In most of these cities, the party friendly to Thebes was

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 17; Diodor. xv, 37.

Xenophon does not mention the combat at Tegyra. Diodorus mentions, what is evidently this battle, near Orchomenus; but he does not name Tegyra.

Kallisthenes seems to have described the battle of Tegyra, and to have given various particulars respecting the religious legends connected with that spot (Kallisthenes, Fragm. 3, ed. Didot, ap. Stephan. Byz. v, Τεγύρα).

<sup>2</sup> That the Thebans thus became again presidents of all Bœotia, and revived the Bœotian confederacy, — is clearly stated by Xenophon, Hellen. v, 4, 63; vi, 1, 1.



numerous, and the change, on the whole, popular though in some the prevailing sentiment was such, that adherence was only obtained by intimidation. The change here made by Thebes, was not to absorb these cities into herself, but to bring them back to the old federative system of Bœotia; a policy which she had publicly proclaimed on surprising Plataea in 431 B. C.<sup>1</sup> While resuming her own ancient rights and privileges as head of the Bœotian federation, she at the same time guaranteed to the other cities, — by convention, probably express, but certainly implied, — their ancient rights, their security, and their qualified autonomy, as members; the system which had existed down to the peace of Antalkidas.

The position of the Thebans was materially improved by this reconquest or reconfederation of Bœotia. Becoming masters of Kreusis, the port of Thespiæ,<sup>2</sup> they fortified it, and built some triremes to repel any invasion from Peloponnesus by sea across the Krissæan Gulf. Feeling thus secure against invasion, they began to retaliate upon their neighbors and enemies the Phokians, allies of Sparta, and auxiliaries in the recent attacks on Thebes, — yet also, from ancient times, on friendly terms with Athens.<sup>3</sup> So hard pressed were the Phokians, — especially as Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly was at the same time their bitter enemy,<sup>4</sup> — that unless assisted, they would have been compelled to submit to the Thebans, and along with them Orchomenus, including the Lacedæmonian garrison then occupying it; while the treasures of the Delphian Temple would also have been laid open, in case the Thebans should think fit to seize them. Intimation being sent by

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii, 2. Ἀνεῖπεν ὁ κήρυξ (the Theban herald after the Theban troops had penetrated by night into the middle of Plataea) εἰ τις βούλεται κατὰ τὰ πατρία τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν ξυμμαχεῖν, τίθεσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ τὰ ὅπλα, νομίζοντες σφίσι ῥαδίως τοῦτω τῷ τρόπῳ προσχωρήσειν τῇ πόλει.

Compare the language of the Thebans about τὰ πατρία τῶν Βοιωτῶν (iii, 61, 65, 66). The description which the Thebans give of their own professions and views, when they attacked Plataea in 431 B. C., may be taken as fair analogy to judge of their professions and views towards the recovered Bœotian towns in 376–375 B. C.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3; Compare Diodor. xv, 53.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xv, 31; Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 1; iii, 5, 21.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 21–27.

the Phokians to Sparta, King Kleombrotus was sent to their aid, by sea across the Gulf, with four Lacedæmonian divisions of troops, and an auxiliary body of allies.<sup>1</sup> This reinforcement, compelling the Thebans to retire, placed both Phokis and Orchomenus in safety. While Sparta thus sustained them, even Athens looked upon the Phokian cause with sympathy. When she saw that the Thebans had passed from the defensive to the offensive, — partly by her help, yet nevertheless refusing to contribute to the cost of her navy, — her ancient jealousy of them became again so powerful, that she sent envoys to Sparta, to propose terms of peace. What these terms were, we are not told; nor does it appear that the Thebans even received notice of the proceeding. But the peace was accepted at Sparta, and two of the Athenian envoys were despatched at once from thence, without even going home, to Korkyra, for the purpose of notifying the peace to Timotheus, and ordering him forthwith to conduct his fleet back to Athens.<sup>2</sup>

This proposition of the Athenians, made seemingly in a moment of impetuous dissatisfaction, was made to the advantage of Sparta,

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 1; vi, 21.

This expedition of Kleombrotus to Phokis is placed by Mr. Fynes Clinton in 375 B. C. (Fast. Hel. ad 375 B. C.). To me it seems to belong rather to 374 B. C. It was not undertaken until the Thebans had reconquered all the Bœotian cities (Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 1); and this operation seems to have occupied them all the two years, — 376 and 375 B. C. See v, 4, 63, where the words οὐτ' ἐν ᾧ Τιμόθεος περιέπλευσε must be understood to include, not simply the time which Timotheus took in actually circumnavigating Peloponnesus, but the year which he spent afterwards in the Ionian Sea, and the time which he occupied in performing his exploits near Korkyra, Leukas, and the neighborhood generally. The "Periplus" for which Timotheus was afterwards honored at Athens (see Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. c. 90, p. 458) meant the exploits performed by him during the year and with the fleet of the "Periplus."

It is worth notice that the Pythian games were celebrated in this year 374 B. C., — ἐπὶ Σωκράτιδου ἀρχοντος; that is, in the first quarter of that archon, or the third Olympic year; about the beginning of August, Chabrias won a prize at these games with a chariot and four; in celebration of which, he afterwards gave a splendid banquet at the point of sea-shore called Kólías, near Athens (Demosthen. cont. Neæram. c. 11, p. 1356).

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1, 2.

Kallias seems to have been one of the Athenian envoys (Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 4).



and served somewhat to countervail a mortifying revelation which had reached the Spartans a little before from a different quarter.

Polydamas, an eminent citizen of Pharsalus in Thessaly, came to Sparta to ask for aid. He had long been on terms of hospitality with the Lacedæmonians; while Pharsalus had not merely been in alliance with them, but was for some time occupied by one of their garrisons.<sup>1</sup> In the usual state of Thessaly, the great cities Larissa, Pheræ, Pharsalus, and others, each holding some smaller cities in a state of dependent alliance, were in disagreement with each other, — often even in actual war. It was rare that they could be brought to concur in a common vote for the election of a supreme chief or *Tagus*. At his own city of Pharsalus, Polydamas was now in the ascendant, enjoying the confidence of all the great family factions who usually contended for predominance; to such a degree, indeed, that he was entrusted with the custody of the citadel and the entire management of the revenues, receipts as well as disbursements. Being a wealthy man, "hospitable and ostentatious in the Thessalian fashion," he advanced money from his own purse to the treasury whenever it was low, and repaid himself when public funds came in.<sup>2</sup>

But a greater man than Polydamas had now arisen in Thessaly, — Jason, despot of Pheræ; whose formidable power, threatening the independence of Pharsalus, he now came to Sparta to denounce. Though the force of Jason can hardly have been very considerable when the Spartans passed through Thessaly, six years before, in their repeated expeditions against Olynthus, he was now not only despot of Pheræ, but master of nearly all the Thessalian cities (as Lykophron of Pheræ had partially succeeded in becoming thirty years before),<sup>3</sup> as well as of a large area of

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 82.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 3. Καὶ ὅποτε μὲν ἐνδεὴς εἶη, παρ' ἑαυτοῦ προσετιθεὶς ὅποτε δὲ περιγένοιτο τῆς προσόδου, ἀπελάμβανεν· ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως φιλόξενός τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τὸν Θετταλικὸν τρόπον.

Such loose dealing of the Thessalians with their public revenues helps us to understand how Philip of Macedon afterwards got into his hands the management of their harbors and customs-duties (Demosthen. Olynth. i, p. 15; ii, p. 20). It forms a striking contrast with the exactness of the Athenian people about their public receipts and disbursements, as testified in the inscriptions yet remaining.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 4.

tributary circumjacent territory. The great instrument of his dominion was, a standing and well-appointed force of six thousand mercenary troops, from all parts of Greece. He possessed all the personal qualities requisite for conducting soldiers with the greatest effect. His bodily strength was great; his activity indefatigable; his self-command, both as to hardship and as to temptation, alike conspicuous. Always personally sharing both in the drill and in the gymnastics of the soldiers, and encouraging military merits with the utmost munificence, he had not only disciplined them, but inspired them with extreme warlike ardor and devotion to his person. Several of the neighboring tribes, together with Alketas, prince of the Molossi in Epirus, had been reduced to the footing of his dependent allies. Moreover, he had already defeated the Pharsalians, and stripped them of many of the towns which had once been connected with them, so that it only remained for him now to carry his arms against their city. But Jason was prudent, as well as daring. Though certain of success, he wished to avoid the odium of employing force, and the danger of having malcontents for subjects. He therefore proposed to Polydamas, in a private interview, that he (Polydamas) should bring Pharsalus under Jason's dominion, accepting for himself the second place in Thessaly, under Jason installed as *Tagus* or president. The whole force of Thessaly thus united, with its array of tributary nations around, would be decidedly the first power in Greece, superior on land either to Sparta or Thebes, and at sea to Athens. And as to the Persian king, with his multitudes of unwarlike slaves, Jason regarded him as an enemy yet easier to overthrow; considering what had been achieved first by the Cyreians, and afterwards by Agesilaus.

Such were the propositions, and such the ambitious hopes, which the energetic despot of Pheræ had laid before Polydamas; who replied, that he himself had long been allied with Sparta, and that he could take no resolution hostile to her interests. "Go to

The story (told in Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. p. 583 F) of Jason sending a large sum of money to Thebes, at some period anterior to the recapture of the Kadmeia, for the purpose of corrupting Epaminondas, — appears not entitled to credit. Before that time, Epaminondas was too little known to be worth corrupting; moreover, Jason did not become *tagus* of Thessaly until long after the recapture of the Kadmeia (Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 18, 19).

Sparta, then (rejoined Jason), and give notice there, that I intend to attack Pharsalus, and that it is for them to afford you protection. If they cannot comply with the demand, you will be unfaithful to the interests of your city if you do not embrace my offers." It was on this mission that Polydamas was now come to Sparta, to announce that unless aid could be sent to him, he should be compelled unwillingly to sever himself from her. "Recollect (he concluded) that the enemy against whom you will have to contend is formidable in every way, both from personal qualities and from power; so that nothing short of a first-rate force and commander will suffice. Consider, and tell me what you can do."

The Spartans, having deliberated on the point, returned a reply in the negative. Already a large force had been sent under Kleombrotus as essential to the defence of Phokis; moreover, the Athenians were now the stronger power at sea. Lastly, Jason had hitherto lent no active assistance to Thebes and Athens — which he would assuredly be provoked to do, if a Spartan army interfered against him in Thessaly. Accordingly the ephors told Polydamas plainly, that they were unable to satisfy his demands, recommending him to make the best terms that he could, both for Pharsalus and for himself. Returning to Thessaly, he resumed his negotiation with Jason, and promised substantial compliance with what was required. But he entreated to be spared the dishonor of admitting a foreign garrison into the citadel which had been confidentially entrusted to his care; engaging at the same time to bring his fellow-citizens into voluntary union with Jason, and tendering his two sons as hostages for faithful performance. All this was actually brought to pass. The politics of the Pharsalians were gently brought round, so that Jason, by their votes as well as the rest, was unanimously elected Tagus of Thessaly.<sup>1</sup>

The dismissal of Polydamas implied a mortifying confession of weakness on the part of Sparta. It marks, too, an important stage in the real decline of her power. Eight years before, at the instance of the Akanthian envoys, backed by the Macedonian Amyntas, she had sent three powerful armies in succession to

<sup>1</sup> See the interesting account of this mission, and the speech of Polydamas, which I have been compelled greatly to abridge (in *Xen. Hellen.* vi. 1 4-18).



crush the liberal and promising confederacy of Olynthus, and to re-transfer the Grecian cities on the sea-coast to the Macedonian crown. The region to which her armies had been sent, was the extreme verge of Hellas. The parties in whose favor she acted, had scarcely the shadow of a claim, as friends or allies; while those *against* whom she acted, had neither done nor threatened any wrong to her: moreover, the main ground on which her interference was invoked, was to hinder the free and equal confederation of Grecian cities. *Now*, a claim, and a strong claim, is made upon her by Polydamas of Pharsalus, an old friend and ally. It comes from a region much less distant; lastly, her political interest would naturally bid her arrest the menacing increase of an aggressive power already so formidable as that of Jason. Yet so seriously has the position of Sparta altered in the last eight years (382-374 B.C.), that she is now compelled to decline a demand which justice, sympathy, and political policy alike prompted her to grant. So unfortunate was it for the Olynthian confederacy, that their honorable and well-combined aspirations fell exactly during those few years in which Sparta was at her maximum of power! So unfortunate was such coincidence of time, not only for Olynthus, but for Greece generally: — since nothing but Spartan interference restored the Macedonian kings to the sea-coast, while the Olynthian confederacy, had it been allowed to expand, might probably have confined them to the interior, and averted the death-blow which came upon Grecian freedom in the next generation from their hands.

The Lacedaemonians found some compensation for their reluctant abandonment of Polydamas, in the pacific propositions from Athens which liberated them from one of their chief enemies. But the peace thus concluded was scarcely even brought to execution. Timotheus, being ordered home from Korkyra, obeyed and set sail with his fleet. He had serving along with him some exiles from Zakynthus; and as he passed by that island in his homeward voyage, he disembarked these exiles upon it, aiding them in establishing a fortified post. Against this proceeding the Zakynthian government laid complaints at Sparta, where it was so deeply resented, that redress having been in vain demanded at Athens, the peace was at once broken off, and war again declared. A Lacedaemonian squadron of twenty-five sail was despatched to

assist the Zakynthians,<sup>1</sup> while plans were formed for the acquisition of the more important island of Korkyra. The fleet of Timotheus having now been removed home, a malcontent Korkyraean party formed a conspiracy to introduce the Lacedaemonians as friends, and betray the island to them. A Lacedaemonian fleet of twenty-two triremes accordingly sailed thither, under color of a voyage to Sicily. But the Korkyraean government, having detected the plot, refused to receive them, took precautions for defence, and sent envoys to Athens to entreat assistance.

The Lacedaemonians now resolved to attack Korkyra openly, with the full naval force of their confederacy. By the joint efforts of Sparta, Corinth, Leukas, Ambrakia, Elis, Zakynthus, Achaia, Epidaurus, Træzen, Hermione, and Halicis, — strengthened by

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 3; Diodor. xv, 45.

The statements of Diodorus are not clear in themselves; besides that on some points, though not in the main, they contradict Xenophon. Diodorus states that those exiles whom Timotheus brought back to Zakynthus, were the philo-Spartan leaders, who had been recently expelled for their misrule under the empire of Sparta. This statement must doubtless be incorrect. The exiles whom Timotheus restored must have belonged to the anti-Spartan party in the island.

But Diodorus appears to me to have got into confusion by representing that universal and turbulent reaction against the philo-Spartan oligarchies, which really did not take place until after the battle of Leuktra — as if it had taken place some three years earlier. The events recounted in Diodor. xv, 40, seem to me to belong to a period *after* the battle of Leuktra.

Diodorus also seems to have made a mistake in saying that the Athenians sent *Ktesiklēs* as auxiliary commander to *Zakynthos* (xv, 46); whereas this very commander is announced by himself in the next chapter (as well as by Xenophon, who calls him *Stesiklēs*) as sent to *Korkyra* (Hellen. v, 2, 10).

I conceive Diodorus to have inadvertently mentioned this Athenian expedition under *Stesiklēs* or *Ktesiklēs*, twice over; once as sent to Zakynthus — then again as sent to *Korkyra*. The latter is the truth. No Athenian expedition at all appears on this occasion to have gone to Zakynthus; for Xenophon enumerates the Zakynthians among those who helped to fit out the fleet of Mnasippus (v, 2, 3).

On the other hand, I see no reason for calling in question the reality of the two Lacedaemonian expeditions, in the last half of 374 B.C. — one under Aristokrates to Zakynthus, the other under Alkidas to Korkyra — which Diodorus mentions (Diod. xv, 45, 46). It is true that Xenophon does not notice either of them; but they are noway inconsistent with the facts which he does state.

pecuniary payments from other confederates, who preferred commuting their obligation to serve beyond sea, — a fleet of sixty triremes and a body of one thousand five hundred mercenary hoplites were assembled; besides some Lacedaemonians, probably Helots or Neodamodes.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, application was sent to Dionysius the Syracusan despot, for his coöperation against Korkyra, on the ground that the connection of that island with Athens had proved once, and might prove again, dangerous to his city.

It was in the spring of 373 B.C. that this force proceeded against Korkyra, under the command of the Lacedaemonian Mnasippus; who, having driven in the Korkyraean fleet with the loss of four triremes, landed on the island, gained a victory, and confined the inhabitants within the walls of the city. He next carried his ravages round the adjacent lands, which were found in the highest state of cultivation, and full of the richest produce; fields admirably tilled, — vineyards in surpassing condition, — with splendid farm-buildings, well-appointed wine-cellars, and abundance of cattle as well as laboring-slaves. The invading soldiers, while enriching themselves by depredations on cattle and slaves, became so pampered with the plentiful stock around, that they refused to drink any wine that was not of the first quality.<sup>2</sup> Such is the picture given by Xenophon, an unfriendly witness, of the democratical Korkyra, in respect of its lauded economy, at the time when it was invaded by Mnasippus; a picture not less memorable than that presented by Thucydides (in the speech of Archidamus), of the flourishing agriculture surrounding democratical Athens, at

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 3, 5, 16; compare v, 2, 21 — about the commutation of personal service for money.

Diodorus (xv, 47) agrees with Xenophon in the main about the expedition of Mnasippus, though differing on several other contemporary points.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 6. 'Επειδὴ δὲ ἀπέβη (when Mnasippus landed), ἐκράτει τε τῆς γῆς καὶ ἐδίου ἐξεργασμένην μὲν παγκαλῶς καὶ πεφυτευμένην τὴν χώραν, μεγαλοπρεπεῖς δὲ οἰκῆσεις καὶ οἰνῶνας κατεσκευασμένους ἔχουσιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν. ὥστ' ἔφασαν τοὺς στρατιώτας εἰς τοῦτο τρυφῆς ἐλθεῖν, ὥστ' οὐκ ἐθέλειν πίνειν, εἰ μὴ ἀνθοσμίας εἴη. Καὶ ἀνδράποδα δὲ καὶ βοσκήματα πάμπολλα ἡλίσκετο ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν.

Οἶνον, implied in the antecedent word οἰνῶνας, is understood after εἴη.



the moment when the hand of the Peloponnesian devastator was first felt there in 421 B.C.<sup>1</sup>

With such plentiful quarters for his soldiers, Mnasippus encamped on a hill near the city walls, cutting off those within from supplies out of the country, while he at the same time blocked up the harbor with his fleet. The Korkyraeans soon began to be in want. Yet they seemed to have no chance of safety except through aid from the Athenians; to whom they had sent envoys with pressing entreaties,<sup>2</sup> and who had now reason to regret their hasty consent (in the preceding year) to summon home the fleet of Timotheus from the island. However, Timotheus was again appointed admiral of a new fleet to be sent thither; while a division of six hundred peltasts, under Stesiklēs, was directed to be despatched by the quickest route, to meet the immediate necessities of the Korkyraeans, during the delays unavoidable in the preparation of the main fleet and its circumnavigation of Peloponnesus. These peltasts were conveyed by land across Thessaly and Epirus, to the coast opposite Korkyra; upon which island they were enabled to land through the intervention of Alketas solicited by the Athenians. They were fortunate enough to get into the town; where they not only brought the news that a large Athenian fleet might be speedily expected, but also contributed much to the defence. Without such encouragement and aid, the Korkyraeans would hardly have held out; for the famine within the walls increased daily; and at length became so severe, that

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i. 82. (Speech of Archidamus) μή γὰρ ἄλλο τι νομισθε τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν (of the Athenians) ἢ ἄρῃαν εἶναι, καὶ οὐχ ἔσσαν ὅσα ἄρῃαν ἐξείργασται.

Compare the earlier portion of the same speech (c. 80), and the second speech of the same Archidamus (ii. 11).

To the same purpose Thucydides speaks, respecting the properties of the wealthy men established throughout the area of Attica. — οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ καλὰ κτήματα κατὰ τὴν χώραν οἰκούμεναις τε καὶ πολυτέλειαι κατασκευαῖς ἀπολωλέκότες (i. e. by the invasion) — Thucyd. ii. 65.

<sup>2</sup> The envoys from Korkyra to Athens (mentioned by Xenophon, v. 2. 9) would probably cross Epirus and Thessaly, through the aid of Alketas. This would be a much quicker way for them than the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus; and it would suggest the same way for the detachment of Stesiklēs presently to be mentioned.

many of the citizens deserted, and numbers of slaves were thrust out. Mnasippus refused to receive them, making public proclamation that every one who deserted should be sold into slavery; and since deserters nevertheless continued to come, he caused them to be scourged back to the city-gates. As for the unfortunate slaves, being neither received by him, nor re-admitted within, many perished outside of the gates from sheer hunger.<sup>1</sup>

Such spectacles of misery portended so visibly the approaching hour of surrender, that the besieging army became careless, and the general insolent. Though his military chest was well-filled, through the numerous pecuniary payments which he had received from allies in commutation of personal service, — yet he had dismissed several of his mercenaries without pay, and had kept all of them unpaid for the last two months. His present temper made him not only more harsh towards his own soldiers,<sup>2</sup> but also less vigilant in the conduct of the siege. Accordingly the besieged, detecting from their watch-towers the negligence of the guards, chose a favorable opportunity and made a vigorous sally. Mnasippus, on seeing his outposts driven in, armed himself and hastened forward with the Lacedæmonians around him to sustain them; giving orders to the officers of the mercenaries to bring their men forward also. But these officers replied, that they could not answer for the obedience of soldiers without pay; upon which Mnasippus was so incensed, that he struck them with his stick and with the shaft of his spear. Such an insult inflamed still farther the existing discontent. Both officers and soldiers came to the combat discouraged and heartless, while the Athenian peltasts and the Korkyraean hoplites, rushing out of several gates at once, pressed their attack with desperate energy. Mnasippus, after displaying great personal valor, was at length slain, and all his troops, being completely routed, fled back to the fortified camp in which their stores were preserved. Even this too might have been taken, and the whole armament destroyed, had the besieged attacked it

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi. 2, 15.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi. 2, 16.

Ὁ δ' αὖ Μνάσιππος ὄρων ταῦτα, ἐνύμζε τε ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη εἶχεν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ περὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους, ἐκαινοβργει, καὶ τοὺς μὲν τινὰς αὐτῶν ἀπομίσθους ἐπεποιήκει, τοῖς δ' οὐαὶ καὶ δυοῖν ἤδη μηνῶν ὤφειλε τὸν μισθὸν, οὐκ ἀπορῶν ὡς ἐλάττωτο, χρημάτων, etc.



at once. But they were astonished at their own success. Mistaking the numerous camp-followers for soldiers in reserve, they retired back to the city.

Their victory was however so complete, as to reopen easy communication with the country, to procure sufficient temporary supplies, and to afford a certainty of holding out until reinforcement from Athens should arrive. Such reinforcement, indeed, was already on its way, and had been announced as approaching to Hyperimenês (second under the deceased Mnasippus), who had now succeeded to the command. Terrified at the news, he hastened to sail round from his station, — which he had occupied with the fleet to block up the harbor, — to the fortified camp. Here he first put the slaves, as well as the property, aboard of his transports, and sent them away; remaining himself to defend the camp with the soldiers and marines, — but remaining only a short time, and then taking these latter also aboard the triremes. He thus completely evacuated the island, making off for Leukas. But such had been the hurry, — and so great the terror lest the Athenian fleet should arrive, — that much corn and wine, many slaves, and even many sick and wounded soldiers, were left behind. To the victorious Korkyræans, these acquisitions were not needed to enhance the value of a triumph which rescued them from capture, slavery, or starvation.<sup>1</sup>

The Athenian fleet had not only been tardy in arriving, so as to incur much risk of finding the island already taken, — but when it did come, it was commanded by Iphikrates, Chabrias, and the orator Kallistrates,<sup>2</sup> — not by Timotheus, whom the original vote of the people had nominated. It appears that Timotheus, — who (in April 373 B. C.), when the Athenians first learned that the formidable Lacedæmonian fleet had begun to attack Korkyra, had been directed to proceed thither forthwith with a fleet of sixty triremes, — found a difficulty in manning his ships at Athens, and therefore undertook a preliminary cruise to procure both seamen and contributory funds, from the maritime allies. His first act was to transport the six hundred peltasts under Stesiklês to Thessaly, where he entered into relations with Jason of Phœræ. He persuaded the latter to become the ally of Athens, and to further

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 18–26; Diodor. xv, 47.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 39

the march of Stesiklês with his division by land across Thessaly over the passes of Pindus, to Epirus; where Alketas, who was at once the ally of Athens, and the dependent of Jason, conveyed them by night across the strait from Epirus to Korkyra. Having thus opened important connection with the powerful Thessalian despot, and obtained from him a very seasonable service, together (perhaps) with some seamen from Pagasæ to man his fleet, — Timotheus proceeded onward to the ports of Macedonia, where he also entered into relations with Amyntas, receiving from him signal marks of private favor, — and then to Thrace as well as the neighboring islands. His voyage procured for him valuable subsidies in money and supplies of seamen, besides some new adhesions and deputies to the Athenian confederacy.

This preliminary cruise of Timotheus, undertaken with the general purpose of collecting means for the expedition to Korkyra, began in the month of April or commencement of May 373 B. C.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The manner in which I have described the preliminary cruise of Timotheus, will be found (I think) the only way of uniting into one consistent narrative the scattered fragments of information which we possess respecting his proceedings in this year.

The date of his setting out from Athens is exactly determined by Demosthenes, adv. Timoth. p. 1186 — the month Munychion, in the archonship of Sokratidês — April 373 B. C. Diodorus says that he proceeded to Thrace, and that he acquired several new members for the confederacy (xv, 47); Xenophon states that he sailed towards the islands (Hellen. vi, 2, 12); two statements not directly the same, yet not incompatible with each other. In his way to Thrace, he would naturally pass up the Eubœan strait and along the coast of Thessaly.

We know that Stesiklês and his peltasts must have got to Korkyra, not by sea circumnavigating Peloponnesus, but by land across Thessaly and Epirus; a much quicker way. Xenophon tells us that the Athenians "asked Alketas to help them to cross over from the mainland of Epirus to the opposite island of Korkyra: and that they were in consequence carried across by night." — Ἀλκίτου δὲ ἐδεήθησαν συνδιαβιβάσαι τούτους· καὶ οὗτοι μὲν νυκτὸς διακομισθέντες πρὸς τῆς χώρας, ἐσῆλθον εἰς τὴν πόλιν.

Now these troops could not have got to Epirus without crossing Thessaly; nor could they have crossed Thessaly without the permission and escort of Jason. Moreover, Alketas himself was the dependent of Jason, whose goodwill was therefore doubly necessary (Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 7).

We farther know that in the year preceding (374 B. C.), Jason was not yet in alliance with Athens, nor even inclined to become so, though the



On departing, it appears, he had given orders to such of the allies as were intended to form part of the expedition, to assemble at Kalauria (an island off Træzen, consecrated to Poseidon) where he would himself come and take them up to proceed onward. Pursuant to such order, several contingents mustered at this island, — among them the Boeotians, who sent several triremes, though in the preceding year it had been alleged against them that they contributed nothing to sustain the naval exertions of Athens. But Timotheus stayed out a long time. Reliance was placed upon him, and upon the money which he was to bring home, for the pay of the fleet; and the unpaid triremes accordingly fell into distress and disorganization at Kalauria, awaiting his return.<sup>1</sup> In the

Athenians were very anxious for it (Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 10). But in November 373 B.C., Jason (as well as Alketas) appears as the established ally of Athens; not as then becoming her ally for the first time, but as so completely an established ally, that he comes to Athens for the express purpose of being present at the trial of Timotheus and of deposing in his favor — Ἀφικόμενον γὰρ Ἀλκίου καὶ Ἰάσονος ὡς τοῦτον (Timotheus) ἐν τῷ Μαίμακ-τηριῶνι μηνὶ τῷ ἐπ' Ἀστέϊον ἄρχοντος, ἐπὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τὸν τοῦτον, βοηθησόντων αὐτῷ καὶ καταγομένων εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν τὴν ἐν Περαιεῖ, etc. (Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 5, p. 1190). Again, — Ἀπὸν δὲ τοῦτον (Timotheus) ἐξαιτουμένον μὲν τῶν ἐπιτηδίων καὶ οἰκίων αὐτῷ ἀπάρτων, ἐπὶ δὲ καὶ Ἀλκίου καὶ Ἰάσονος, συμμάχων ὄντων ἑμῶν, μᾶλλον οὐκ ἐπίσθητε ἀρεῖν. (Demosthen. ib. c. 3, p. 1187.) We see from hence, therefore, that the first alliance between Jason and Athens had been contracted in the early part of 373 B.C.; we see farther that it had been contracted by Timotheus in his preliminary cruise, which is the only reasonable way of explaining the strong interest felt by Jason as well as by Alketas in the fate of Timotheus, inducing them to take the remarkable step of coming to Athens to promote his acquittal. It was Timotheus who had first made the alliance of Athens with Alketas (Diodor. xv, 36; Cornel. Nepos, Timoth. c. 2), a year or two before.

Combining all the circumstances here stated, I infer with confidence, that Timotheus, in his preliminary cruise, visited Jason, contracted alliance between him and Athens, and prevailed upon him to forward the division of Stesikles across Thessaly to Epirus and Korkyra.

In this oration of Demosthenes, there are three or four exact dates mentioned, which are a great aid to the understanding of the historical events of the time. That oration is spoken by Apollodorus, claiming from Timotheus the repayment of money lent to him by Pasion the banker, father of Apollodorus; and the dates specified are copied from entries made by Pasion at the time in his commercial books (c. 1. p. 1186; c. 9. p. 1197).

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 3. p. 1188. ἄμισθον μὲν τὸ στράτευμα κα-

mean time fresh news reached Athens that Korkyra was much pressed; so that great indignation was felt against the absent admiral, for employing in his present cruise a precious interval essential to enable him to reach the island in time. Iphikratēs (who had recently come back from serving with Pharnabazus, in an unavailing attempt to reconquer Egypt for the Persian king) and the orator Kallistratus, were especially loud in their accusations against him. And as the very salvation of Korkyra required pressing haste, the Athenians cancelled the appointment of Timotheus even during his absence, — naming Iphikrates, Kallistratus, and Chabrias, to equip a fleet and go round to Korkyra without delay.<sup>1</sup>

Before they could get ready, Timotheus returned; bringing several new adhesions to the confederacy, with a flourishing account of general success.<sup>2</sup> He went down to Kalauria to supply the deficiencies of funds, and make up for the embarrassments which his absence had occasioned. But he could not pay the Boeotian trierarchs without borrowing money for the purpose on his own credit; for though the sum brought home from his voyage was considerable, it would appear that the demands upon him had been greater still. At first an accusation, called for in consequence of the pronounced displeasure of the public, was entered against him by Iphikrates and Kallistratus. But as these two had been named joint admirals for the expedition to Korkyra, which admitted of no delay, — his trial was postponed until the autumn, a postponement advantageous to the accused, and doubtless seconded by his friends.<sup>3</sup>

ταξίσασθαι ἐν Καλαυρίᾳ, etc. — *ibid.* c. 10, p. 1199. προσήκει γὰρ τῷ μὲν Βοιωτῷ ἄρχοντι παρὰ τοῦτον (Timotheus) τὴν τροφὴν τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ παραλ-αμβάνειν. ἐκ γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν συντάξεων ἡ μισθοφορία ἦν τῷ στρατεύματι· τὰ δὲ χρήματα σὺ (Timotheus) ἅπαντα ἐξέ-λεξας ἐκ τῶν συμμάχων· καὶ σὺ ἴδου αὐτὸν λόγον ἀποδαναι.

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 2, 12, 13, 39; Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 3. p. 1188.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv, 47.

<sup>3</sup> I collect what is here stated from Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 3. p. 1188; c. 10. p. 1199. It is there said that Timotheus was about to sail home from Kalauria to take his trial; yet it is certain that his trial did not take place until the month Mæmakterion or November. Accordingly, the trial must have been postponed, in consequence of the necessity for Iphikrates and Kallistratus going away at once to preserve Korkyra.



Meanwhile Iphikrates adopted the most strenuous measures for accelerating the equipment of his fleet. In the present temper of the public, and in the known danger of Korkyra, he was allowed (though perhaps Timotheus, a few weeks earlier, would not have been allowed) not only to impress seamen in the port, but even to coerce the trierarchs with severity,<sup>1</sup> and to employ all the triremes reserved for the coast-guard of Attica, as well as the two sacred triremes called *Paralus* and *Salaminia*. He thus completed a fleet of seventy sail, promising to send back a large portion of it directly, if matters took a favorable turn at Korkyra. Expecting to find on the watch for him a Lacedæmonian fleet fully equal to his own, he arranged his voyage so as to combine the maximum of speed with training to his seamen, and with preparation for naval combat. The larger sails of an ancient trireme were habitually taken out of the ship previous to a battle, as being inconvenient aboard: Iphikrates left such sails at Athens, — employed even the smaller sails sparingly, — and kept his seamen constantly at the oar; which greatly accelerated his progress, at the same time that it kept the men in excellent training. Every day he had to stop, for meals and rest, on an enemy's shore; and these halts were conducted with such extreme dexterity as well as precision, that the least possible time was consumed, not enough for any local hostile force to get together. On reaching Sphacteria, Iphikrates learnt for the first time the defeat and death of Mnasippus. Yet not fully trusting the correctness of his information, he still persevered both in his celerity and his precautions, until he reached Kephallenia, where he first fully satisfied himself that the danger of Korkyra was past. The excellent management of Iphikrates throughout this expedition is spoken of in terms of admiration by Xenophon.<sup>2</sup>

Having no longer any fear of the Lacedæmonian fleet, the Athenian commander probably now sent back the home-squadron of Attica which he had been allowed to take, but which could ill be spared from the defence of the coast.<sup>3</sup> After making himself master of some of the Kephallenian cities, he then proceeded

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 14. "Ο δὲ (Iphikrates) ἐπεὶ κατέστη στρατηγός, μάλιστά τινι τῶν ναυῶν ἐπληροῦτο, καὶ τοὺς τοιηράρχους ἠνάγκαζε.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 27, 32.

Compare vi, 2, 14 — with vi, 2, 39.

onward to Korkyra; where the squadron of ten triremes from Syracuse was now on the point of arriving; sent by Dionysius to aid the Lacedæmonians, but as yet uninformed of their flight. Iphikrates, posting scouts on the hills to give notice of their approach, set apart twenty triremes to be ready for moving at the first signal. So excellent was his discipline, (says Xenophon,) that "the moment the signal was made, the ardor of all the crews was a fine thing to see; there was not a man who did not hasten at a run to take his place aboard."<sup>1</sup> The ten Syracusan triremes, after their voyage across from the Iapygian cape, had halted to rest their men on one of the northern points of Korkyra; where they were found by Iphikrates and captured, with all their crews and the admiral Anippus; one alone escaping, through the strenuous efforts of her captain, the Rhodian Melanôpus. Iphikrates returned in triumph, towing his nine prizes into the harbor of Korkyra. The crews, being sold or ransomed, yielded to him a sum of sixty talents; the admiral Anippus was retained in expectation of a higher ransom, but slew himself shortly afterwards from mortification.<sup>2</sup>

Though the sum thus realized enabled Iphikrates for the time to pay his men, yet the suicide of Anippus was a pecuniary disappointment to him, and he soon began to need money. This consideration induced him to consent to the return of his colleague Kallistratus; who, — an orator by profession, and not on friendly terms with Iphikrates, — had come out against his own consent. Iphikrates had himself singled out both Kallistratus and Chabrias as his colleagues. He was not indifferent to the value of their advice, nor did he fear the criticisms, even of rivals, on what they

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 34.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 35, 38; Diodor. xv, 47.

We find a story recounted by Diodorus (xvi, 57), that the Athenians under Iphikrates captured, off Korkyra, some triremes of Dionysius, carrying sacred ornaments to Delphi and Olympia. They detained and appropriated the valuable cargo, of which Dionysius afterwards loudly complained.

This story (if there be any truth in it) can hardly allude to any other triremes than those under Anippus. Yet Xenophon would probably have mentioned the story, if he had heard it; since it presents the enemies of Sparta as committing sacrilege. And whether the triremes were carrying sacred ornaments or not, it is certain that they were coming to take part in the war, and were therefore legitimate prizes.



really saw in his proceedings. But he had accepted the command under hazardous circumstances; not only from the insulting displacement of Timotheus, and the provocation consequently given to a powerful party attached to the son of Konon, — but also in great doubts whether he could succeed in relieving Korkyra, in spite of the rigorous coercion which he applied to man his fleet. Had the island been taken and had Iphikrates failed, he would have found himself exposed to severe crimination, and multiplied enemies, at Athens. Perhaps Kallistratus and Chabrias, if left at home, might in that case have been among his assailants, — so that it was important to him to identify both of them with his good or ill success, and to profit by the military ability of the latter, as well as by the oratorical talent of the former.<sup>1</sup> As the result of the expedition, however, was altogether favorable, all such anxieties were removed. Iphikrates could well afford to part with both his colleagues; and Kallistratus engaged, that if permitted to go home, he would employ all his efforts to keep the fleet well paid from the public treasury; or if this were impracticable, that he would labor to procure peace.<sup>2</sup> So terrible are the difficulties which the Grecian generals now experience in procuring money from Athens, (or from other cities in whose service they are acting,) for payment of their troops! Iphikrates suffered the same embarrassment which Timotheus had experienced the year before, — and which will be found yet more painfully felt as we advance forward in the history. For the present, he subsisted his seamen by find-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 39. The meaning of Xenophon here is not very clear, nor is even the text perfect.

Ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ ταύτην τὴν στρατηγίαν τῶν Ἰφικράτους οὐκ ἡκιστα ἐπαυῶ. ἔπειτα καὶ τὸ προσελέγειν αὐτὸν κελευσάτω (this shows that Iphikrates himself singled them out) Καλλιστρατὸν τε τὸν δημῳγόν, οὐ μάλ᾽ ἐπιτήδειον ὄντα, καὶ Χαβρίαν, μάλ᾽ στρατηγικὸν νομιζόμενον. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ κορυνητοὺς αὐτοῖς ἡγομένους εἶναι, συμβούλους λαβεῖν ἐβούλετο, σφόδρ' ἐμὴ δοκεῖ διαπράξασθαι εἴτε ἀντιπαλοὺς νομίζων, οἷα ὅστις (some words in the text seem to be wanting). . . . . μήτε καταβύθιον μήτε καταμελῶν φαίνεσθαι μηδὲν, μετ' αὐτοῖς ἐφ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ μοι δοκεῖ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι.

I follow Dr. Thirlwall's translation of οὐ μάλ᾽ ἐπιτήδειον, which appears to me decidedly preferable. The word ἡφίει (vi, 3, 3) shows that Kallistratus was an unwilling colleague.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3. ὑποσχόμενος γὰρ Ἰφικράτει (Kallistratus) εἰ αὖ τὸν ἡφίει, ἢ χρήματα πέμψειν τῷ ναυτικῷ, ἢ εἰσὶν ποιήσειν, etc.

ing work for them on the farms of the Korkyraans, where there must doubtless have been ample necessity for repairs after the devastations of Mnasippus, while he crossed over to Akarnania with his peltasts and hoplites, and there obtained service with the townships friendly to Athens against such others as were friendly to Sparta; especially against the warlike inhabitants of the strong town called Thyrieis.<sup>1</sup>

The happy result of the Korkyraean expedition, imparting universal satisfaction at Athens, was not less beneficial to Timotheus than to Iphikrates. It was in November, 373 B. C., that the former, as well as his quaestor or military treasurer Antimachus, underwent each his trial. Kallistratus, having returned home, pleaded against the quaestor, perhaps against Timotheus also, as one of the accusers;<sup>2</sup> though probably in a spirit of greater gentleness and moderation, in consequence of his recent joint success and of the general good temper prevalent in the city. And while the edge of the accusation against Timotheus was thus blunted, the defence was strengthened not merely by numerous citizen friends speaking in his favor with increased confidence, but also by the unusual phenomenon of two powerful foreign supporters. At the request of Timotheus, both Alketas of Epirus, and Jason of Pheræ, came to Athens a little before the trial, to appear as witnesses in his favor. They were received and lodged by him in his house in the Hippodamian Agora, the principal square of the Peiræus. And as he was then in some embarrassment for want of money, he found it necessary to borrow various articles of finery in order to do them honor, — clothes, bedding, and two silver drinking bowls, — from Pasion, a wealthy banker near at hand. These two important witnesses would depose to the zealous service and estimable qualities of Timotheus; who had inspired them with warm interest, and had been the means of bringing them into alliance with Athens; an alliance, which they had sealed at once by conveying Stesikles and his division across Thessaly and Epirus to Korkyra. The minds of the dikastery would be powerfully affected by seeing before them such a man as Jason of Pheræ, at that moment the most powerful individual in Greece; and we are

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2. 37, 38.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. cont. Timoth. c. 9, p. 1197, 1198.



not surprised to learn that Timotheus was acquitted. His treasurer Antimachus, not tried by the same dikastery, and doubtless not so powerfully befriended, was less fortunate. He was condemned to death, and his property confiscated; the dikastery doubtless believing (on what evidence we do not know) that he had been guilty of fraud in dealing with the public money, which had caused serious injury at a most important crisis. Under the circumstances of the case, he was held responsible as treasurer, for the pecuniary department of the money-levying command confided to Timotheus by the people.

As to the military conduct, for which Timotheus himself would be personally accountable, we can only remark that having been invested with the command for the special purpose of relieving the besieged Korkyra, he appears to have devoted an unreasonable length of time to his own self-originated cruise elsewhere; though such cruise was in itself beneficial to Athens; insomuch that if Korkyra had really been taken, the people would have had good reason for imputing the misfortune to his delay.<sup>1</sup> And although

<sup>1</sup> The narrative here given of the events of 373 B. C., so far as they concern Timotheus and Iphikrates, appears to me the only way of satisfying the exigencies of the case, and following the statements of Xenophon and Demosthenes.

Schneider in his note, indeed, implies, and Rehdantz (*Vitæ Iphicratis*, etc. p. 86) contends, that Iphikrates did not take command of the fleet, nor depart from Athens, until *after* the trial of Timotheus. There are some expressions in the oration of Demosthenes, which might seem to countenance this supposition; but it will be found hardly admissible, if we attentively study the series of facts.

1. Mnasippus arrived with his armament at Korkyra, and began the siege, either before April, or at the first opening of April, 373 B. C. For his arrival there, and the good condition of his fleet, was known at Athens *before* Timotheus received his appointment as admiral of the fleet for the relief of the island (*Xen. Hellen. vi. 2, 10, 11, 12*).

2. Timotheus sailed from Peiræus on this appointed voyage, in April 373 B. C.

3. Timotheus was tried at Athens in November 373 B. C.; Alketas and Jason being then present, as allies of Athens and witnesses in his favor.

Now, if the truth were, that Iphikrates did not depart from Athens with his fleet until after the trial of Timotheus in November, we must suppose that the siege of Korkyra by Mnasippus lasted seven months, and the cruise of Timotheus nearly five months. Both the one and the other are altogether improbable. The Athenians would never have permitted Korkyra

he was now acquitted, his reputation suffered so much by the whole affair, that in the ensuing spring he was glad to accept an

to incur so terrible a chance of capture, simply in order to wait for the trial of Timotheus. Xenophon does not expressly say how long the siege of Korkyra lasted, but from his expressions about the mercenaries of Mnasippus (that already pay was owing to them for *as much as two months*, — καὶ δύοιν ἡ δὲ ἡ μηνοῖν — vi, 2, 16), we should infer that it could hardly have lasted more than three months in all. Let us say, that it lasted four months; the siege would then be over in August, and we know that the fleet of Iphikrates arrived just after the siege was concluded.

Besides, is it credible, that Timotheus — named as admiral for the express purpose of relieving Korkyra, and knowing that Mnasippus was already besieging the place with a formidable fleet — would have spent so long a time as *five months* in his preliminary cruise?

I presume Timotheus to have stayed out in this cruise about *two months*; and even this length of time would be quite sufficient to raise strong displeasure against him at Athens, when the danger and privations of Korkyra were made known as hourly increasing. At the time when Timotheus came back to Athens, he found all this displeasure actually afloat against him, excited in part by the strong censures of Iphikrates and Kallistratus (*Dem. cont. Timoth. p. 1187. c. 3*). The adverse orations in the public assembly, besides inflaming the wrath of the Athenians against him, caused a vote to be passed deposing him from his command to Korkyra, and nominating in his place Iphikrates, with Chabrias and Kallistratus. Probably those who proposed this vote would at the same time give notice that they intended to prefer a judicial accusation against Timotheus for breach or neglect of duty. But it would be the interest of all parties to postpone *actual trial* until the fate of Korkyra should be determined, for which purpose the saving of time would be precious. Already too much time had been lost, and Iphikrates was well aware that his whole chance of success depended on celerity; while Timotheus and his friends would look upon postponement as an additional chance of softening the public displeasure, besides enabling them to obtain the attendance of Jason and Alketas. Still, though trial was postponed, Timotheus was from this moment under impeachment. The oration composed by Demosthenes therefore (delivered by Apollodorus as plaintiff, several years afterwards), — though speaking loosely, and not distinguishing the angry speeches against Timotheus in the public assembly (in June 373 B. C., or thereabouts, whereby his deposition was obtained), from the accusing speeches against him at his actual trial in November 373 B. C., *before the dikastery* — is nevertheless not incorrect in saying, — ἐπειδὴ δ' ἀπεχειροτονήθη μὲν ὑφ' ὑμῶν στρατηγὸς διὰ τὸ μὴ περιπελεῦσαι Πελοπόννησον, ἐπὶ κρίσει δὲ παρεδόδοτο εἰς τὸν δῆμον, αἰτίας τῆς μεγίστης οὐχῶν (c. 3, p. 1187) — and again respecting his coming from Kalauria to Athens — μέλλων τοῖνυν καταπλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν κρίσιν, ἐν Κα-



invitation of the Persian satraps, who offered him the command of the Grecian mercenaries in their service for the Egyptian war:

*λαυρία δαερίζεται*, etc. (p. 1188, 1189.) That Timotheus had been handed over to the people for trial — that he was sailing back from Kalauria *for his trial* — might well be asserted respecting his position in the month of June, though his trial did not actually take place until November. I think it cannot be doubted that the triremes at Kalauria would form a part of that fleet which actually went to Korkyra under Iphikrates; not waiting to go thither until after the trial of Timotheus in November, but departing as soon as Iphikrates could get ready, probably about July 373 B. C.

Rehdantz argues that if Iphikrates departed with the fleet in July, he must have returned to Athens in November to the trial of Timotheus, which is contrary to Xenophon's affirmation that he remained in the Ionian sea until 371 B. C. But if we look attentively at the oration of Demosthenes, we shall see that there is no certain ground for affirming Iphikrates to have been present in Athens in November, during the actual trial of Timotheus. The phrases in p. 1187 — *ἐφειστήκει δ' αὐτῷ Καλλίστρατος καὶ Ἰφικράτης* . . . . . *οὕτω δὲ διέθεσαν ἡμᾶς κατηγοροῦντες τούτου αὐτοὶ τε καὶ οἱ συναγορεύοντες, αὐτοῖς*, etc., may be well explained, so far as Iphikrates is concerned, by supposing them to allude to those pronounced censures in the public assembly whereby the vote of deposition against Timotheus was obtained, and whereby the general indignation against him was first excited. I therefore see no reason for affirming that Iphikrates was actually present at the trial of Timotheus in November. But Kallistratus was really present at the trial (see c. 9. p. 1197, 1198); which consists well enough with the statement of Xenophon, that this orator obtained permission from Iphikrates to leave him at Korkyra and come back to Athens (vi, 3, 3). Kallistratus directed his accusation mainly against Antimachus, the treasurer of Timotheus. And it appears to me that under the circumstances of the case, Iphikrates, having carried his point of superseding Timotheus in the command and gaining an important success at Korkyra — might be well-pleased to be dispensed from the obligation of formally accusing him before the dikastery, in opposition to Jason and Alketas, as well as to a powerful body of Athenian friends.

Diodorus (xv, 47) makes a statement quite different from Xenophon. He says that Timotheus was at first deposed from his command, but afterwards forgiven and re-appointed by the people (jointly with Iphikrates) in consequence of the great accession of force which he had procured in his preliminary cruise. Accordingly the fleet, one hundred and thirty triremes in number, was despatched to Korkyra under the joint command of Iphikrates and Timotheus. Diodorus makes no mention of the trial of Timotheus. This account is evidently quite distinct from that of Xenophon; which latter is on all grounds to be preferred, especially as its main points are in conformity with the Demosthenic oration.

the same command from which Iphikrates had retired a little time before.<sup>1</sup>

That admiral, whose naval force had been reinforced by a large number of Korkyræan triremes, was committing without opposition incursions against Akarnania, and the western coast of Peloponnesus; insomuch that the expelled Messenians, in their distant exile at Hesperides in Libya, began to conceive hopes of being restored by Athens to Naupaktus, which they had occupied under her protection during the Peloponnesian war.<sup>2</sup> And while the Athenians were thus masters at sea both east and west of Peloponnesus,<sup>3</sup> Sparta and her confederates, discouraged by the ruinous failure of their expedition against Korkyra in the preceding year, appear to have remained inactive. With such mental predispositions, they were powerfully affected by religious alarm arising from certain frightful earthquakes and inundations with which Peloponnesus was visited during this year, and which were regarded as marks of the wrath of the god Poseidon. More of these formidable visitations occurred this year in Peloponnesus than had ever before been known; especially one, the worst of all, whereby the two towns of Helikê and Bura in Achaia were destroyed, together with a large portion of their population. Ten Lacedæmonian triremes, which happened to be moored on this shore on the night when the calamity occurred, were destroyed by the rush of the waters.<sup>4</sup>

Under these depressing circumstances, the Lacedæmonians had recourse to the same manœuvre which had so well served their purpose fifteen years before, in 388–387 B. C. They sent Antal-

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. cont. Timoth. c. 6. p. 1191; c. 8. p. 1194.

We see from another passage of the same oration, that the creditors of Timotheus reckoned upon his making a large sum of money in the Persian service (c. 1 p. 1185). This farther illustrates what I have said in a previous note, about the motives of the distinguished Athenian officers to take service in foreign parts away from Athens.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 38; Pausanias, iv, 26, 3.

<sup>3</sup> See a curious testimony to this fact in Demosthen. cont. Neæram, c. 12 p. 1357.

<sup>4</sup> Diodor. xi, 48, 49; Pausan. vii, 25; Ælian. Hist. Animal. xi, 19.

Kallisthenes seems to have described at large, with appropriate religious comments, numerous physical portents which occurred about this time (see Kallisthen. Fragm. 8, ed. Didot).



kidas again as envoy to Persia, to entreat both pecuniary aid,<sup>1</sup> and a fresh Persian intervention enforcing anew the peace which bore his name; which peace had now been infringed (according to Lacedæmonian construction) by the reconstitution of the Bœotian confederacy under Thebes as president. And it appears that in the course of the autumn or winter, Persian envoys actually did come to Greece, requiring that the belligerents should all desist from war, and wind up their dissensions on the principles of the peace of Antalkidas.<sup>2</sup> The Persian satraps, at this time renewing their efforts against Egypt, were anxious for the cessation of hostilities in Greece, as a means of enlarging their numbers of Grecian mercenaries; of which troops Timotheus had left Athens a few months before to take the command.

Apart, however, from this prospect of Persian intervention, which doubtless was not without effect,—Athens herself was becoming more and more disposed towards peace. That common fear and hatred of the Lacedæmonians, which had brought her into alliance with Thebes in 378 B. C., was now no longer predominant. She was actually at the head of a considerable maritime confederacy; and this she could hardly hope to increase by continuing the war, since the Lacedæmonian naval power had already been humbled. Moreover, she found the expense of warlike operations very burdensome, nowise defrayed either by the contributions of her allies or by the results of victory. The orator Kallistratus,—who had promised either to procure remittances from Athens to

<sup>1</sup> This second mission of Antalkidas is sufficiently verified by an indirect allusion of Xenophon (vi, 3, 12). His known philo-Laonian sentiments sufficiently explain why he avoids directly mentioning it.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv, 50.

Diodorus had stated (a few chapters before, xv, 38) that Persian envoys had also come into Greece a little before the peace of 374 B. C., and had been the originators of that previous peace. But this appears to me one of the cases (not a few altogether in his history) in which he repeats himself, or gives the same event twice over under analogous circumstances. The intervention of the Persian envoys bears much more suitably on the period immediately preceding the peace of 371 B. C., than upon that which preceded the peace of 374 B. C., when, in point of fact, no peace was ever fully executed.

Dionysius of Halikarnassus also (Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 479) represents the king of Persia as a party to the peace sworn by Athens and Sparta in 371 B. C.

Iphikrates, or to recommend the conclusion of peace,—was obliged to confine himself to the latter alternative, and contributed much to promote the pacific dispositions of his countrymen.<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, the Athenians had become more and more alienated from Thebes. The ancient antipathy between these two neighbors had for a time been overlaid by common fear of Sparta. But as soon as Thebes had reestablished her authority in Bœotia, the jealousies of Athens again began to arise. In 374 B. C., she had concluded a peace with the Spartans, without the concurrence of Thebes; which peace was broken almost as soon as made, by the Spartans themselves, in consequence of the proceedings of Timotheus at Zakynthos. The Phokians,—against whom, as having been active allies of Sparta in her invasions of Bœotia, Thebes was now making war,—had also been ancient friends of Athens, who sympathized with their sufferings.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the Thebans on their side probably resented the unpaid and destitute condition in which their seamen had been left by Timotheus at Kalauria, during the expedition for the relief of Korkyra in the preceding year;<sup>3</sup> an expedition of which Athens alone reaped both the glory and the advantage. Though they remained members of the confederacy, sending deputies to the congress at Athens, the unfriendly spirit on both sides continued on the increase, and was farther exasperated by their violent proceeding against Plataea in the first half of 372 B. C.

During the last three or four years, Plataea, like the other towns of Bœotia, had been again brought into the confederacy under Thebes. Reestablished by Sparta after the peace of Antalkidas as a so-called autonomous town, it had been garrisoned by her as a post against Thebes, and was no longer able to maintain a real autonomy after the Spartans had been excluded from Bœotia in 376 B. C. While other Bœotian cities were glad to find themselves emancipated from their philo-Laonian oligarchies and rejoined to the federation under Thebes, Plataea,—as well as Thespiæ,—submitted to the union only by constraint; awaiting any favorable opportunity for breaking off, either by means of Sparta or of Athens. Aware probably of the growing coldness

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. cont. Timoth. p. 1188, s. 17.

Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 1.



between the Athenians and Thebans, the Plataeans were secretly trying to persuade Athens to accept and occupy their town, annexing Plataea to Attica;<sup>1</sup> a project hazardous both to Thebes and Athens, since it would place them at open war with each other, while neither was yet at peace with Sparta.

This intrigue, coming to the knowledge of the Thebans, determined them to strike a decisive blow. Their presidency, over more than one of the minor Boeotian cities, had always been ungentle, suitable to the roughness of their dispositions. Towards Plataea, especially, they not only bore an ancient antipathy, but regarded the reestablished town as little better than a Lacedaemonian encroachment, abstracting from themselves a portion of territory which had become Theban, by prescriptive enjoyment lasting for forty years from the surrender of Plataea in 427 B. C. As it would have been to them a loss as well as embarrassment, if Athens should resolve to close with the tender of Plataea, — they forestalled the contingency by seizing the town for themselves. Since the reconquest of Boeotia by Thebes, the Plataeans had come again, though reluctantly, under the ancient constitution of Boeotia; they were living at peace with Thebes, acknowledging her rights as president of the federation, and having their own rights as members guaranteed in return by her, probably under positive engagement, — that is, their security, their territory, and their qualified autonomy, subject to the federal restrictions and obligations. But though thus at peace with Thebes,<sup>2</sup> the Plataeans knew

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 46. I do not know from whom Diodorus copied this statement; but it seems extremely reasonable.

<sup>2</sup> This seems to me what is meant by the Plataean speaker in Isokrates, when he complains more than once that Plataea had been taken by the Thebans in time of peace, — *εἰρήνης οὐσίας*. The speaker, in protesting against the injustice of the Thebans, appeals to two guarantees which they have violated; for the purpose of his argument, however, the two are not clearly distinguished, but run together into one. The first guarantee was, the peace of Antalkidas, under which Plataea had been restored, and to which Thebes, Sparta, and Athens, were all parties. The second guarantee, was that given by Thebes when she conquered the Boeotian cities in 377-376 B. C., and reconstituted the federation, whereby she ensured to the Plataeans existence as a city, with so much of autonomy as was consistent with the obligations of a member of the Boeotian federation. When the Plataean speaker accuses the Thebans of having violated "the oaths and

well what was her real sentiment towards them, and their own towards her. If we are to believe, what seems very probable, that they were secretly negotiating with Athens to help them in breaking off from the federation, — the consciousness of such an intrigue tended still farther to keep them in anxiety and suspicion. Accordingly, being apprehensive of some aggression from Thebes, they kept themselves habitually on their guard. But their vigilance was somewhat relaxed and most of them went out of the city to their farms in the country, on the days, well known beforehand, when the public assemblies in Thebes were held. Of this relaxation the Boeotarch Neokles took advantage.<sup>1</sup> He conducted a Theban armed force, immediately from the assembly, by a circuitous route through Hysiae to Plataea; which town he found deserted by most of its male adults, and unable to make resistance. The Plataeans, — dispersed in the fields, finding their walls, their wives, and their families, all in possession of the victor, — were under the necessity of accepting the terms proposed to them. They were allowed to depart in safety, and to carry away all their mov-

the agreement" (*ὅρκους καὶ συνθήκας*), he means the terms of the peace of Antalkidas, subject to the limits afterwards imposed by the submission of Plataea to the federal system of Boeotia. He calls for the tutelary interference of Athens, as a party to the peace of Antalkidas.

Dr. Thirlwall thinks (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. 38, p. 70-72) that the Thebans were parties to the peace of 374 B. C. between Sparta and Athens; that they accepted it, intending deliberately to break it; and that under that peace, the Lacedaemonian harmosts and garrisons were withdrawn from Thespieæ and other places in Boeotia. I am unable to acquiesce in this view; which appears to me negatived by Xenophon, and neither affirmed nor implied in the Plataic discourse of Isokrates. In my opinion, there were no Lacedaemonian harmosts in Boeotia (except at Orchomenus in the north) in 374 B. C. Xenophon tells (Hellen. v, 4, 63; vi, 1, 1) that the Thebans "were recovering the Boeotian cities — had subdued the Boeotian cities" — in or before 375 B. C., so that they were able to march out of Boeotia and invade Phokis; which implies the expulsion or retirement of all the Lacedaemonian forces from the southern part of Boeotia.

The reasoning in the Plataic discourse of Isokrates is not very clear or discriminating; nor have we any right to expect that it should be, in the pleading of a suffering and passionate man. But the expression *εἰρήνης οὐσίας* and *εἰρήνη* may always (in my judgment) be explained, without referring it, as Dr. Thirlwall does, to the peace of 374 B. C., or supposing Thebes to have been a party to that peace.

<sup>1</sup> Pausanias, ix, 1, 3.



able property; but their town was destroyed, and its territory again annexed to Thebes. The unhappy fugitives were constrained for the second time to seek refuge at Athens, where they were again kindly received, and restored to the same qualified right of citizenship as they had enjoyed prior to the peace of Antalkidas.<sup>1</sup>

It was not merely with Plataea, but also with Thespiae, that Thebes was now meddling. Mistrusting the dispositions of the Thespians, she constrained them to demolish the fortifications of their town;<sup>2</sup> as she had caused to be done fifty-two years before, after the victory of Delium,<sup>3</sup> on suspicion of leanings favorable to Athens.

Such proceedings on the part of the Thebans in Bœotia excited strong emotion at Athens; where the Plataeans not only appeared

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 47.

Pausanias (ix, 1, 3) places this capture of Plataea in the third year (counting the years from midsummer to midsummer) before the battle of Leuktra; or in the year of the archon Asteius at Athens; which seems to me the true date, though Mr Clinton supposes it (without ground, I think) to be contradicted by Xenophon. The year of the archon Asteius reaches from midsummer 373 to 372 B. C. It is in the latter half of the year that I suppose Plataea to have been taken.

<sup>2</sup> I infer this from Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 21-38; compare also sect 10. The Plataean speaker accuses the Thebans of having destroyed the walls of some Bœotian cities (over and above what they had done to Plataea,) and I venture to apply this to Thespiae. Xenophon indeed states that the Thespians were at this very period treated exactly like the Plataeans; that is, driven out of Bœotia, and their town destroyed; except that they had not the same claim on Athens (Hellen. vi, 3, 1 — ἀπόλειδας γενομένους: compare also vi, 3, 5). Diodorus also (xv, 46) speaks of the Thebans as having destroyed Thespiae. But against this, I gather, from the Plataic Oration of Isokrates, that the Thespians were not in the same plight with the Plataeans when that oration was delivered; that is, they were not expelled collectively out of Bœotia. Moreover, Pausanias also expressly says that the Thespians were present in Bœotia at the time of the battle of Leuktra, and that they were expelled shortly afterwards. Pausanias at the same time gives a distinct story, about the conduct of the Thespians, which it would not be reasonable to reject (ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1). I believe therefore that Xenophon has spoken inaccurately in saying that the Thespians were ἀπόλειδες before the battle of Leuktra. It is quite possible that they might have sent supplications to Athens (ἰκετεύοντες — Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 1) in consequence of the severe mandate to demolish their walls.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. iv, 133.

as suppliants, with the tokens of misery conspicuously displayed, but also laid their case pathetically before the assembly, and invoked aid to regain their town, of which they had been just bereft. On a question at once so touching and so full of political consequences, many speeches were doubtless composed and delivered, one of which has fortunately reached us; composed by Isokrates, and perhaps actually delivered by a Plataean speaker before the public assembly. The hard fate of this interesting little community is here impressively set forth; including the bitterest reproaches, stated with not a little of rhetorical exaggeration, against the multiplied wrongs done by Thebes, as well towards Athens as towards Plataea. Much of his invective is more vehement than conclusive. Thus when the orator repeatedly claims for Plataea her title to autonomous existence, under the guarantee of universal autonomy sworn at the peace of Antalkidas,<sup>1</sup> — the Thebans would doubtless reply, that at the time of that peace, Plataea was no longer in existence; but had been extinct for forty years, and was only renovated afterwards by the Lacedæmonians for their own political purposes. And the orator intimates plainly, that the Thebans were noway ashamed of their proceeding, but came to Athens to justify it, openly and avowedly; moreover, several of the most distinguished Athenian speakers espoused the same side.<sup>2</sup> That the Plataeans had cooperated with Sparta in her recent operations in Bœotia against both Athens and Thebes, was an undeniable fact; which the orator himself can only extenuate by saying that they acted under constraint from a present Spartan force, — but which was cited on the opposite side as a proof of their philo-Spartan dispositions, and of their readiness again to join the common enemy as soon as he presented himself.<sup>3</sup> The Thebans would accuse Plataea of subsequent treason to the

<sup>1</sup> Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 11, 13, 18, 42, 46, 47, 68.

<sup>2</sup> Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 3. Εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ Θεβαίωνες ἐπαρώμεν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου παρεσκευασμένους πείθειν ὑμᾶς ὥς οὐδὲν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐξημαρτήκασι, διὰ βραχέων ἂν ἐποιήσαμεθα τοὺς λόγους· ἐπειδὴ δ' εἰς τοῦτ' ἀτυχίας ἤλθομεν, ὥστε μὴ μόνον ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀγῶνα πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ῥητόρων τοὺς δυνατάτατους, οὓς ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων αὐτοῖς οὕτοι παρεσκευάσαντο συνηγόνους, etc.

Compare sect. 36.

<sup>3</sup> Isokr. Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 12, 13, 14, 16, 28, 33, 43.



confederacy; and they even seem to have contended, that they had rendered a positive service to the general Athenian confederacy of which they were members,<sup>1</sup> by expelling the inhabitants of Plataea and dismantling Thespiae; both towns being not merely devoted to Sparta, but also adjoining Kithæron, the frontier line whereby a Spartan army would invade Bœotia. Both in the public assembly of Athens, and in the general congress of the confederates at that city, animated discussions were raised upon the whole subject;<sup>2</sup> discussions, wherein, as it appears, Epaminondas, as the orator and representative of Thebes, was found a competent advocate against Kallistratus, the most distinguished speaker in Athens; sustaining the Theban cause with an ability which greatly enhanced his growing reputation.<sup>3</sup>

But though the Thebans and their Athenian supporters, having all the prudential arguments on their side, carried the point so that no step was taken to restore the Plataeans, nor any hostile declaration made against those to whom they owed their expulsion, — yet the general result of the debates, animated by keen sympathy with the Plataean sufferers, tended decidedly to poison the good feeling, and loosen the ties, between Athens and Thebes. This change showed itself by an increased gravitation towards peace with Sparta; strongly advocated by the orator Kallistratus, and now promoted not merely by the announced Persian inter-

<sup>1</sup> Isokrat. Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 23–27. λέγουσιν ὡς ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν συμμάχων ταῦτ' ἐπραξαν — φασὶ τὸ Θηβαίους ἔχειν τὴν ἡμετέραν, τοῦτο σύμφερον εἶναι τοῖς συμμάχοις, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Isokrat. Or. 14, (Plat.) s. 23, 24.

<sup>3</sup> Diodorus, (xv, 38) mentions the parliamentary conflict between Epaminondas and Kallistratus, assigning it to the period immediately antecedent to the abortive peace concluded between Athens and Sparta three years before. I agree with Wesseling (see his note *ad loc.*) in thinking that these debates more properly belong to the time immediately preceding the peace of 371 B. C. Diodorus has made great confusion between the two; sometimes repeating twice over the same antecedent phenomena, as if they belonged to both, — sometimes assigning to one what properly belongs to the other.

The altercation between Epaminondas and Kallistratus (ἐν τῷ κοινῷ συνεδρίῳ) seems to me more properly appertaining to debates in the assembly of the confederacy at Athens, — rather than to debates at Sparta, in the preliminary discussions for peace, where the altercations between Epaminondas and Agesilaus occurred.

vention, but by the heavy cost of war, and the absence of all prospective gain from its continuance. The resolution was at length taken, — first by Athens, and next, probably, by the majority of the confederates assembled at Athens, — to make propositions of peace to Sparta, where it was well known that similar dispositions prevailed towards peace. Notice of this intention was given to the Thebans, who were invited to send envoys thither also, if they chose to become parties. In the spring of 371 B. C., at the time when the members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy were assembled at Sparta, both the Athenian and Theban envoys, and those from the various members of the Athenian confederacy, arrived there. Among the Athenian envoys, two at least, — Kallias (the hereditary daduch or torchbearer of the Eleusinian ceremonies) and Autoklēs, — were men of great family at Athens; and they were accompanied by Kallistratus the orator.<sup>1</sup> From the Thebans, the only man of note was Epaminondas, then one of the Bœotarchs.

Of the debates which took place at this important congress, we have very imperfect knowledge; and of the more private diplomatic conversations, not less important than the debates, we have no knowledge at all. Xenophon gives us a speech from each of the three Athenians, and from no one else. That of Kallias, who announces himself as hereditary proxenus of Sparta at Athens, is boastful and empty, but eminently philo-Laconian in spirit;<sup>2</sup> that of Autoklēs is in the opposite tone, full of severe censure on the past conduct of Sparta; that of Kallistratus, delivered after the other two, — while the enemies of Sparta were elate, her friends humiliated, and both parties silent from the fresh effect of the reproaches of Autoklēs,<sup>3</sup> — is framed in a spirit of conciliation; admitting faults on both sides, but deprecating the continuance of war, as injurious to both, and showing how much the joint interests of both pointed towards peace.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3.

It seems doubtful, from the language of Xenophon, whether Kallistratus was one of the envoys appointed, or only a companion.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 4–6.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 7–10. Ταῦτ' εἰπὼν, σιωπῇ μὲν παρὰ πάντων ἐποίησεν (Autoklēs), ἡδομένους δὲ τοὺς ἀχθόμενους τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐποίησε.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 10–17.



This orator, representing the Athenian diplomacy of the time, recognizes distinctly the peace of Antalkidas as the basis upon which Athens was prepared to treat,—autonomy to each city, small as well as great; and in this way, coinciding with the views of the Persian king, he dismisses with indifference the menace that Antalkidas was on his way back from Persia with money to aid the Lacedæmonians in the war. It was not from fear of the Persian treasures (he urged),—as the enemies of peace asserted,—that Athens sought peace.<sup>1</sup> Her affairs were now so prosperous, both by sea and land, as to prove that she only did so on consideration of the general evils of prolonged war, and on a prudent abnegation of that rash confidence which was always ready to contend for extreme stakes,<sup>2</sup> like a gamester playing double or quits. The time had come for both Sparta and Athens now to desist from hostilities. The former had the strength on land, the latter was predominant at sea; so that each could guard the other; while the reconciliation of the two would produce peace throughout the Hellenic world, since in each separate city, one of the two opposing local parties rested on Athens, the other on Sparta.<sup>3</sup> But it was indispensably necessary that Sparta should renounce that system of aggression (already pointedly denounced by the Athenian, Autoklês) on which she had acted since the peace of Antalkidas; a system, from which she had at last reaped bitter fruits, since her unjust seizure of the Kadmeia had ended by throwing into the arms of the Thebans all those Bœotian cities, whose separate autonomy she had bent her whole policy to ensure.<sup>4</sup>

Two points stand out in this remarkable speech, which takes a judicious measure of the actual position of affairs;—first, autonomy to every city; and autonomy in the genuine sense, not construed and enforced by the separate interests of Sparta. as it

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 12, 13.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 16.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 14. Καὶ γὰρ δὴ κατὰ γῆν μὲν τις ἀνὴρ, ἡμῶν φίλων ὄντων, ἱκανὸς γένοιτο ἡμᾶς λυπῆσαι; κατὰ θαλάτταν γε μὴν τις ἀνὴρ ἡμᾶς βλάψαι τι, ἡμῶν ἡμῖν ἐπιτηδείων ὄντων;

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 11. Καὶ ὑμῖν δὲ ἔγωγε ὁρῶ διὰ τὰ ἀγνωμόνως πράχθοντα ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ πολλὰ ἀντίτυπα γιγνόμενα· ὧν ἦν καὶ ἡ καταληφθεῖσα ἐν Θήβαις Κάδμεια· νῦν γοῦν, ὥς (?) ἐσπουδάσατε αὐτονόμους τὰς πόλεις γίγνεσθαι, πάσαι παλιν, ἐπεὶ ἡδίκηθησαν οἱ Θηβαῖοι, ἐπ' ἐκείνοις γεγεννηνται.

had been at the peace of Antalkidas; next, the distribution of such preëminence or headship, as was consistent with this universal autonomy, between Sparta and Athens; the former on land, the latter at sea,—as the means of ensuring tranquillity in Greece. That "autonomy perverted to Lacedæmonian purposes,"—which Perikles had denounced before the Peloponnesian war as the condition of Peloponnesus, and which had been made the political canon of Greece by the peace of Antalkidas,—was now at an end. On the other hand, Athens and Sparta were to become mutual partners and guarantees; dividing the headship of Greece by an ascertained line of demarcation, yet neither of them interfering with the principle of universal autonomy. Thebes, and her claim to the presidency of Bœotia, were thus to be set aside by mutual consent.

It was upon this basis that the peace was concluded. The armaments on both sides were to be disbanded; the harmosts and garrisons everywhere withdrawn, in order that each city might enjoy full autonomy. If any city should fail in observance of these conditions, and continue in a career of force against any other, all were at liberty to take arms for the support of the injured party; but no one who did not feel disposed, was bound so to take arms. This last stipulation exonerated the Lacedæmonian allies from one of their most vexatious chains.

To the conditions here mentioned, all parties agreed; and on the ensuing day the oaths were exchanged. Sparta took the oath for herself and her allies; Athens took the oath for herself only; her allies afterwards took it severally, each city for itself. Why such difference was made, we are not told; for it would seem that the principle of severance applied to both confederacies alike.

Next came the turn of the Thebans to swear; and here the fatal hitch was disclosed. Epaminondas, the Theban envoy, insisted on taking the oath, not for Thebes separately, but for Thebes as president of the Bœotian federation, including all the Bœotian cities. The Spartan authorities on the other hand, and Agesilaus as the foremost of all, strenuously opposed him. They required that he should swear for Thebes alone, leaving the Bœotian cities to take the oath each for itself.

Already in the course of the preliminary debates, Epaminondas had spoken out boldly against the ascendancy of Sparta



While most of the deputies stood overawed by her dignity, represented by the energetic Agesilaus as spokesman,—he, like the Athenian Autoklês, and with strong sympathy from many of the deputies present, had proclaimed that nothing kept alive the war except her unjust pretensions, and that no peace could be durable unless such pretensions were put aside.<sup>1</sup> Accepting the conditions of peace as finally determined, he presented himself to swear to them in the name of the Bœotian federation. But Agesilaus, requiring that each of the Bœotian cities should take the oath for itself, appealed to those same principles of liberty which Epaminondas himself had just invoked, and asked him whether each of the Bœotian cities had not as good a title to autonomy as Thebes. Epaminondas might have replied by asking, why Sparta had just been permitted to take the oath for her allies as well as for herself. But he took a higher ground. He contended that the presidency of Bœotia was held by Thebes on as good a title as the sovereignty of Laconia by Sparta.<sup>2</sup> He would remind the assembly that when Bœotia was first conquered and settled by its present inhabitants, the other towns had all been planted out from Thebes as their chief and mother-city; that the federal union of all, administered by Bœotarchs chosen by and from all, with Thebes as president, was coeval with the first settlement of the country; that the separate autonomy of each was qualified by an established institution, devolving on the Bœotarchs and councils sitting at Thebes the management of the foreign relations of all jointly. All this had been already pleaded by the Theban orator fifty-six years earlier, before the five Spartan commissioners, assembled to determine the fate of the captives after the surrender of Platæa; when he required the condemnation of the Platæans as guilty of treason to the ancestral institutions of Bœotia;<sup>3</sup> and the Spartan commis-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 27.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 28.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. iii, 61. ἡμῶν (the Thebans) κτισάντων Πλάταιαν ὕστερον τῆς ἄλλης Βοιωτίας καὶ ἄλλα χωρία μετ' αὐτῆς, ἃ ξυμμηκτοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐξελάσαντες ἐσχομεν, οὐκ ἤξιον οὗτοι (the Platæans), ὥσπερ ἐτάχθη τὸ πρῶτον, ἡγεμονεύεσθαι ὑφ' ἡμῶν, ἐξω δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Βοιωτῶν παραβαίνοντες τὰ πάτρια, ἐπειδὴ προσηναγκάζοντο, προσεχώρησαν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, etc.

Again (c. 65) he says respecting the oligarchical Platæans who admitted the Theban detachment when it came by night to surprise Platæa, — οἱ δὲ

doners had recognized the legitimacy of these institutions by a sweeping sentence of death against the transgressors. Moreover at a time when the ascendancy of Thebes over the Bœotian cities had been greatly impaired by her anti-Hellenic cooperation with the invading Persians, the Spartans themselves had assisted her with all their power to reestablish it, as a countervailing force against Athens.<sup>1</sup> Epaminondas could show, that the presidency of Thebes over the Bœotian cities was the keystone of the federation; a right not only of immemorial antiquity, but pointedly recognized and strenuously vindicated by the Spartans themselves. He could show farther that it was as old, and as good, as their own right to govern the Laconian townships; which latter was acquired and held (as one of the best among their own warriors had boastfully proclaimed)<sup>2</sup> by nothing but Spartan valor and the sharpness of the Spartan sword.

An emphatic speech of this tenor, delivered amidst the deputies assembled at Sparta, and arraigning the Spartans not merely in their supremacy over Greece, but even in their dominion at home, — was as it were the shadow cast before, by coming events. It opened a question such as no Greek had ever ventured to raise. It was a novelty startling to all, — extravagant probably in the eyes of Kallistratus and the Athenians, — but to the Spartans themselves, intolerably poignant and insulting.<sup>3</sup> They had already a long

ἀνδρες ὑμῶν οἱ πρότεροι καὶ χρήμασι καὶ γένει, βουλόμενοι τῆς μὲν ἐξω ξυμμαχίας ὑμᾶς παῦσαι, ἐς δὲ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν πατρίαν καταστήσαι, ἐπεκαλέσαντο ἔκοντες, etc.

Again (c. 66), κατὰ τὰ πάντων βοιωτῶν πάτρια, etc. Compare ii, 2.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xi, 81.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iv, 126.

Brasidas, addressing his soldiers when serving in Macedonia, on the approach of the Illyrians: —

Ἀγαθοὶς γὰρ εἶναι προσήκει ὑμῖν τὰ πολέμια, οὐ διὰ ξυμμάχων παρουσίας ἐκαστοτε, ἀλλὰ δι' οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν, καὶ μηδὲν πλεῖον φοβήσθαι ἐτέρων· οἱ γέ μὴδ' ἀπὸ πολιτειῶν τοιούτων ἦκετε, ἐν αἷς οὐ πολλοὶ ὀλίγων ἀρχοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ πλειονῶν μᾶλλον ἐλάσσονος οὐκ ἄλλω τινὶ κτησάμενοι τὴν δύνασταιαν ἢ τῷ μαχόμενοι κρατεῖν.

<sup>3</sup> One may judge of the revolting effect produced by such a proposition, before the battle of Leuktra, — by reading the language which Isokrates puts into the mouth of the Spartan prince Archidamus, five or six years after that battle, protesting that all Spartan patriots ought to perish rather



account of antipathy to clear off with Thebes; their own wrong doing in seizing the Kadmeia, — their subsequent humiliation in losing it and being unable to recover it, — their recent shortcomings and failures, in the last seven years of war against Athens and Thebes jointly. To aggravate this deep-seated train of hostile associations, their pride was now wounded in an unforeseen point, the tenderest of all. Agesilaus, full to overflowing of the national sentiment, which in the mind of a Spartan passed for the first of virtues, was stung to the quick. Had he been an Athenian orator like Kallistratus, his wrath would have found vent in an animated harangue. But a king of Sparta was anxious only to close these offensive discussions with scornful abruptness, thus leaving to the presumptuous Theban no middle ground between humble retraction and acknowledged hostility. Indignantly starting from his seat, he said to Epaminondas, — "Speak plainly, — will you, or will you not, leave to each of the Bœotian cities its separate autonomy?" To which the other replied — "Will you leave each of the Laconian towns autonomous?" Without saying another word, Agesilaus immediately caused the name of the Thebans to be struck out of the roll, and proclaimed them excluded from the treaty.<sup>1</sup>

than consent to the relinquishment of Messenia, — *περὶ μὲν ἄλλων τινῶν ἀμφισβητήσεις, ἐγίνοντο, περὶ δὲ Μεσσηνίας, οὔτε βασιλεὺς, οὔθ' ἡ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλις, οὔδ' ἰσώποθ' ἡμῖν ἐνεκαλεσεν ὡς ἀδίκως κεκτημένη οὕτην* (Isok. Arch. s. 32). In the spring of 371 B. C., what had once been Messenia, was only a portion of Laconia, which no one thought of distinguishing from the other portions (see Thucyd. iv. 3, 11).

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 28, Pausanias, ix. 13, 1, compare Diodor. xv. 51. Pausanias erroneously assigns the debate to the congress preceding the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B. C., at which time Epaminondas was an unknown man.

Plutarch gives this interchange of brief questions, between Agesilaus and Epaminondas, which is in substance the same as that given by Pausanias, and has every appearance of being the truth. But he introduces it in a very bold and abrupt way, such as cannot be conformable to the reality. To raise a question about the right of Sparta to govern Laconia, was a most daring novelty. A courageous and patriotic Theban might venture upon it as a retort against those Spartans who questioned the right of Thebes to her presidency of Bœotia; but he would never do so without assigning his reasons to justify an assertion so startling to a large portion of his hearers. The reasons which I here ascribe to Epaminondas are such as we have seen

Such was the close of this memorable congress at Sparta in June, 371 B. C. Between the Spartans and Athenians, and their respective allies, peace was sworn. But the Thebans were excluded, and their deputies returned home (if we may believe Xenophon<sup>1</sup>) discouraged and mournful. Yet such a man as Epaminondas must have been well aware that neither his claims nor his arguments would be admitted by Sparta. If therefore he was disappointed with the result, this must be because he had counted upon, but did not obtain, support from the Athenians or others.

The leaning of the Athenian deputies had been adverse rather than favorable to Thebes throughout the congress. They were disinclined, from their sympathies with the Plataeans, to advocate the presidential claims of Thebes, though on the whole it was the political interest of Athens that the Bœotian federation should be

have formed the Theban creed, in reference to the Bœotian cities; such as were actually urged by the Theban orator in 427 B. C., when the fate of the Plataean captives was under discussion. After Epaminondas had once laid out the reasons in support of his assertion, he might then, if the same brief question were angrily put to him a second time, meet it with another equally brief counter-question or retort. It is this final interchange of thrusts which Plutarch has given, omitting the arguments previously stated by Epaminondas, and necessary to warrant the seeming paradox which he advances. We must recollect that Epaminondas does not contend that Thebes was entitled to as much power in Bœotia as Sparta in Laconia. He only contends that Bœotia, under the presidency of Thebes, was as much an integral political aggregate, as Laconia under Sparta, — in reference to the Grecian world.

Xenophon differs from Plutarch in his account of the conduct of the Theban envoys. He does not mention Epaminondas at all, nor any envoy by name; but he says that "the Thebans, having entered their name among the cities which had taken the oaths, came on the next day and requested, that the entry might be altered, and that 'the Bœotians' might be substituted in place of the Thebans, as having taken the oath. Agesilaus told them that he could make no change, but he would strike their names out if they chose, and he accordingly did strike them out" (vi. 3, 19). It seems to me that this account is far less probable than that of Plutarch, and bears every mark of being incorrect. Why should such a man as Epaminondas (who doubtless was the envoy) consent at first to waive the presidential pretensions of Thebes, and to swear for her alone? If he did consent, why should he retract the next day? Xenophon is anxious to make out Agesilaus to be as much in the right as may be; since the fatal consequences of his proceedings manifested themselves but too soon.

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 3. 20.



maintained, as a bulwark to herself against Sparta. Yet the relations of Athens with Thebes, after the congress as before it, were still those of friendship, nominal rather than sincere. It was only with Sparta, and her allies, that Thebes was at war, without a single ally attached to her. On the whole, Kallistratus and his colleagues had managed the interests of Athens in this congress with great prudence and success. They had disengaged her from the alliance with Thebes, which had been dictated seven years before by common fear and dislike of Sparta, but which had no longer any adequate motive to countervail the cost of continuing the war; at the same time, the disengagement had been accomplished without bad faith. The gains of Athens, during the last seven years of war, had been considerable. She had acquired a great naval power, and a body of maritime confederates; while her enemies the Spartans had lost their naval power in the like proportion. Athens was now the ascendent leader of maritime and insular Greece, — while Sparta still continued to be the leading power on land, but only on land; and a tacit partnership was now established between the two, each recognizing the other in their respective halves of the Hellenic hegemony.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, Athens had the prudence to draw her stake, and quit the game, when at the maximum of her acquisitions, without taking the risk of future contingencies.

On both sides, the system of compulsory and indefeasible confederacies was renounced; a renunciation which had already been once sworn to, sixteen years before, at the peace of Antalkidas, but treacherously perverted by Sparta in the execution. Under this new engagement, the allies of Sparta or Athens ceased to constitute an organized permanent body, voting by its majority, passing resolutions permanently binding upon dissentients, arming the chief state with more or less power of enforcement against all, and forbidding voluntary secessions of individual members. They became a mere uncemented aggregate of individuals, each acting for himself; taking counsel together as long as they chose, and co-operating so far as all were in harmony; but no one being bound by any decision of the others, nor recognizing any right in the others to compel him even to performance of what he had specially

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 38-82

promised, if it became irksome. By such change, therefore, both Athens and Sparta were losers in power; yet the latter to a much greater extent than the former, inasmuch as her reach of power over her allies had been more comprehensive and stringent.

We here see the exact point upon which the requisition addressed by Sparta to Thebes, and the controversy between Epaminondas and Agesilaus, really turned. Agesilaus contended that the relation between Thebes and the other Bœotian cities was the same as what subsisted between Sparta and her allies; that accordingly, when Sparta renounced the indefeasible and compulsory character of her confederacy, and agreed to deal with each of its members as a self-acting and independent unit, she was entitled to demand that Thebes should do the same in reference to the Bœotian towns. Epaminondas, on the contrary, denied the justice of this parallel. He maintained that the proper subject of comparison to be taken, was the relation of Sparta, not to her extra-Laconian allies, but to the Laconian townships; that the federal union of the Bœotian towns under Thebes was coeval with the Bœotian settlement, and among the most ancient phenomena of Greece; that in reference to other states, Bœotia, like Laconia or Attica, was the compound and organized whole, of which each separate city was only a fraction; that other Greeks had no more right to meddle with the internal constitution of these fractions, and convert each of them into an integer, — than to insist on separate independence for each of the townships of Laconia. Epaminondas did not mean to contend that the power of Thebes over the Bœotian cities was as complete and absolute in degree, as that of Sparta over the Laconian townships; but merely that her presidential power, and the federal system of which it formed a part, were established, indefeasible, and beyond the interference of any Hellenic convention, — quite as much as the internal government of Sparta in Laconia.

Once already this question had been disputed between Sparta and Thebes at the peace of Antalkidas; and already decided once by the superior power of the former, extorting submission from the latter. The last sixteen years had reversed the previous decision, and enabled the Thebans to reconquer those presidential rights of which the former peace had deprived them. Again, therefore, the question stood for decision, with keener antipathy



on both sides, — with diminished power in Sparta, — but with increased force, increased confidence, and a new leader whose inestimable worth was even yet but half-known, — in Thebes. The Athenians, — friendly with both, yet allies of neither, — suffered the dispute to be fought out without interfering. How it was settled will appear in the next chapter.

### CHAPTER LXXVIII.

#### BATTLE OF LEUKTRA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

IMMEDIATELY after the congress at Sparta in June 371 B. C., the Athenians and Lacedæmonians both took steps to perform the covenants sworn respectively to each other as well as to the allies generally. The Athenians despatched orders to Iphikrates, who was still at Korkyra or in the Ionian Sea, engaged in incursions against the Lacedæmonian or Peloponnesian coasts, — that he should forthwith conduct his fleet home, and that if he had made any captures subsequent to the exchange of oaths at Sparta, they should all be restored;<sup>1</sup> so as to prevent the misunderstanding which had occurred fifty-two years before with Brasidas,<sup>2</sup> in the peninsula of Pallênê. The Lacedæmonians on their side sent to withdraw their harmosts and their garrisons from every city still under occupation. Since they had already made such promise once before, at the peace of Antalkidas, but had never performed it, — commissioners,<sup>3</sup> not Spartans, were now named from the general congress, to enforce the execution of the agreement.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 1.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iv.

<sup>3</sup> Diodorus, xv, 38. ἐξαγωγεῖς. Xen. Hellen. l. c.

Diodorus refers the statements in this chapter to the peace between Athens and Sparta in 374 B. C. I have already remarked that they belong properly to the peace of 371 B. C.; as Wesseling suspects in his note.

No great haste, however, was probably shown in executing this part of the conditions; for the whole soul and sentiment of the Spartans were absorbed by their quarrel with Thebes. The miso-Theban impulse now drove them on with a fury which overcame all other thoughts; and which, though doubtless Agesilaus and others considered it at the time as legitimate patriotic resentment for the recent insult, appeared to the philo-Laconian Xenophon, when he looked back upon it from the subsequent season of Spartan humiliation, to be a misguiding inspiration sent by the gods,<sup>1</sup> — like that of the Homeric Atê. Now that Thebes stood isolated from Athens and all other allies out of Bœotia, Agesilaus had full confidence of being able to subdue her thoroughly. The same impression of the superiority of Spartan force was also entertained both by the Athenians and by other Greeks; to a great degree even by the Thebans themselves. It was anticipated that the Spartans would break up the city of Thebes into villages (as they had done at Mantinea) or perhaps retaliate upon her the fate which she had inflicted upon Plataea — or even decimate her citizens and her property to the profit of the Delphian god, pursuant to the vow that had been taken more than a century before, in consequence of the assistance lent by the Thebans to Xerxes.<sup>2</sup> Few persons out of Bœotia doubted of the success of Sparta.

To attack Thebes, however, an army was wanted; and as Sparta, by the peace just sworn, had renounced everything like imperial ascendancy over her allies, leaving each of them free to send or withhold assistance as they chose, — to raise an army was no easy task; for the allies, generally speaking, being not at all inflamed with the Spartan antipathy against Thebes, desired only to be left to enjoy their newly-acquired liberty. But it so happened, that at the moment when peace was sworn, the Spartan king Kleombrotus was actually at the head of an army, of Lacedæmonians and allies, in Phokis, on the north-western frontier of Bœotia. Immediately on hearing of the peace, Kleombrotus sent home to ask for instructions as to his future proceedings. By the unanimous voice of the Spartan authorities and assembly, with Agesilaus as

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3. ἥδη γὰρ, ὥς εἶκε, τὸ δαιμόνιον ἤγεν, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 20; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 20; Diodor xv, 51.



the most vehement of all,<sup>1</sup> he was directed to march against the Thebans, unless they should flinch at the last moment (as they had done at the peace of Antalkidas), and relinquish their presidency over the other Bœotian cities. One citizen alone, named Prothous, interrupted this unanimity. He protested against the order, first, as a violation of their oaths, which required them to disband the army and reconstitute it on the voluntary principle, — next, as imprudent in regard to the allies, who now looked upon such liberty as their right, and would never serve with cordiality unless it were granted to them. But Prothous was treated with disdain as a silly alarmist,<sup>2</sup> and the peremptory order was despatched to Kleombrotus; accompanied, probably, by a reinforcement of Spartans and Lacedæmonians, the number of whom, in the ensuing battle, seems to have been greater than can reasonably be imagined to have been before serving in Phokis.

Meanwhile no symptoms of concession were manifested at Thebes.<sup>3</sup> Epaminondas, on his return, had found cordial sympathy with the resolute tone which he had adopted both in defence of the Bœotian federation and against Sparta. Though every one felt the magnitude of the danger, it was still hoped that the enemy might be prevented from penetrating out of Phokis into Bœotia. Epaminondas accordingly occupied with a strong force the narrow pass near Koroneia, lying between a spur of Mount Helikon on one side and the Lake Kopais on the other; the same position as had been taken by the Bœotians, and forced by the army returning from Asia under Agesilaus, twenty-three years before. Orchomenus lay northward (that is, on the Phokian side) of this position; and its citizens, as well as its Lacedæmonian garrison, now doubtless formed part of the invading army of Kleombrotus. That prince, with a degree of military skill rare in the Spartan commanders, baffled all the Theban calculations. Instead of march-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch. Agesilaus, c. 28.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 2, 3. *ἔκεινον μὲν φλυαρεῖν ἡγήσατο, etc.*

<sup>3</sup> It is stated that either the Lacedæmonians from Sparta, or Kleombrotus from Phokis, sent a new formal requisition to Thebes, that the Bœotian cities should be left autonomous; and the requisition was repudiated (Diodor. xv, 51; Aristides, Or. (Leuktr.) ii, xxxiv, p. 644, ed. Dindorf. But such mission seems very doubtful.

ing by the regular road from Phokis into Bœotia, he turned southward by a mountain-road scarcely deemed practicable, defeated the Theban division under Chæreas which guarded it, and crossed the ridge of Helikon to the Bœotian port of Kreusis on the Crissæan Gulf. Coming upon this place by surprise, he stormed it, capturing twelve Theban triremes which lay in the harbor. He then left a garrison to occupy the port, and marched without delay over the mountainous ground into the territory of Thespiæ on the eastern declivity of Helikon; where he encamped on the high ground, at a place of ever-memorable name, called Leuktra.<sup>1</sup>

Here was an important success, skilfully gained; not only placing Kleombrotus within an easy march of Thebes, but also opening a sure communication by sea with Sparta, through the port of Kreusis, and thus eluding the difficulties of Mount Kithæron. Both the king and the Lacedæmonians around him were full of joy and confidence; while the Thebans on their side were struck with dismay as well as surprise. It required all the ability of Epaminondas, and all the daring of Pelopidas, to uphold the resolution of their countrymen, and to explain away or neutralize the terrific signs and portents, which a dispirited Greek was sure to see in every accident of the road. At length, however, they succeeded in this, and the Thebans with their allied Bœotians were marched out from Thebes to Leuktra, where they were posted on a declivity opposite to the Spartan camp. They were commanded by the seven Bœotarchs, of whom Epaminondas was one. But such was the prevalent apprehension of joining battle with the Spartans on equal terms, that even when actually on the ground, three of these Bœotarchs refused to concur in the order for fighting, and proposed to shut themselves up in Thebes for a siege, sending their wives and families away to Athens. Epaminondas was vainly combating their determination, when the seventh Bœotarch, Branchylides, arrived from the passes of Kithæron, where he had been on guard, and was prevailed upon to vote in favor of the bolder course. Though a majority was thus secured for fighting, yet the feeling throughout the Theban camp was more that of brave despair than of cheering hope; a conviction that it was better to perish in the field, than to live in exile with the Lacedæmonians.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3, 4; Diodor. xv, 53; Pausan. ix, 13, 2.



masters of the Kadmeia. Some encouraging omens, however, were transmitted to the camp, from the temples in Thebes as well as from that of Trophonius at Lebadeia:<sup>1</sup> and a Spartan exile named Leandrias, serving in the Theban ranks, ventured to assure them that they were now on the very spot foredoomed for the overthrow of the Lacedæmonian empire. Here stood the tomb of two females (daughters of a Leuktrian named Skedasus) who had been violated by two Lacedæmonians and had afterwards slain themselves. Skedasus, after having in vain attempted to obtain justice from the Spartans for this outrage, came back, imprecating curses on them, and slew himself also. The vengeance of these departed sufferers would now be sure to pour itself out on Sparta, when her army was in their own district and near their own tomb. And the Theban leaders, to whom the tale was full of opportune encouragement, crowned the tomb with wreaths, invoking the aid of its inmates against the common enemy now present.<sup>2</sup>

While others were thus comforted by the hope of superhuman aid, Epaminondas, to whom the order of the coming battle had been confided, took care that no human precautions should be wanting. His task was arduous; for not only were his troops dispirited, while those of the enemy were confident,—but their numbers were inferior, and some of the Bœotians present were hardly ever

<sup>1</sup> Kallisthenes, apud Cic. de Divinatione, i, 34, Fragm. 9, ed. Didot.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 7; Diodor. xv, 54; Pausan. ix, 13, 3; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 20, 21; Polyænus, ii, 3, 8.

The latter relates that Pelopidas in a dream saw Skedasus, who directed him to offer on this tomb "an auburn virgin" to the deceased females. Pelopidas and his friends were greatly perplexed about the fulfilment of this command; many urged that it was necessary for some maiden to devote herself, or to be devoted by her parents, as a victim for the safety of the country, like Menœkeus and Makaria in the ancient legends; others denounced the idea as cruel and inadmissible. In the midst of the debate, a mare, with a chestnut filly, galloped up, and stopped not far off; upon which the prophet Theokritus exclaimed,—“Here comes the victim required, sent by the special providence of the gods.” The chestnut filly was caught and offered as a sacrifice on the tomb; every one being in high spirits from a conviction that the mandate of the gods had been executed.

The prophet Theokritus figures in the treatise of Plutarch De Genio Socratis (c. 3, p. 576 D.) as one of the companions of Pelopidas in the conspiracy whereby the Theban oligarchy was put down and the Lacedæmonians expelled from the Kadmeia.

trustworthy. What the exact numbers were on either side, we are not permitted to know. Diodorus assigns about six thousand men to the Thebans; Plutarch states the numbers of Kleombrotus at eleven thousand.<sup>1</sup> Without placing faith in these figures, we see good reason for believing that the Theban total was decidedly inferior. For such inferiority Epaminondas strove to make up by skilful tactics, and by a combination at that time novel as well as ingenious. In all former Grecian battles, the opposite armies had been drawn up in line, and had fought along the whole line; or at least such had been the intention of the generals,—and if it was not realized, the cause was to be sought in accidents of the ground, or backwardness or disorder on the part of some division of the soldiers. Departing from this habit, Epaminondas now arrayed his troops so as to bring his own left to bear with irresistible force upon the Spartan right, and to keep back the rest of his army comparatively out of action. Knowing that Kleombrotus, with the Spartans and all the official persons, would be on the right of their own line, he calculated that, if successful on this point against the best troops, he should find little resistance from the remainder. Accordingly he placed on his own left wing chosen Theban hoplites, to the prodigious depth of fifty shields, with Pelopidas and the Sacred Band in front. His order of advance was disposed obliquely or in echelon, so that the deep column on the left should join battle first, while the centre and right kept comparatively back and held themselves more in a defensive attitude.

In 371 B. C., such a combination was absolutely new, and betokened high military genius. It is therefore no disgrace to Kleombrotus that he was not prepared for it, and that he adhered to the ordinary Grecian tactics of joining battle at once along the whole line. But so unbounded was the confidence reigning among the Spartans, that there never was any occasion on which peculiar precautions were less thought of. When, from their entrenched camp on the Leuktrian eminence, they saw the Thebans encamped on an opposite eminence, separated from them by a small breadth of low ground and moderate declivities,—their only impatience was to hurry on the decisive moment, so as to prevent the enemy from escaping. Both the partisans and the opponents of Kleom-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 52-56; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 20.



protus united in provoking the order for battle, each in their own language. The former urged him, since he had never yet done anything against the Thebans, to strike a blow, and clear himself from the disparaging comparisons which rumor instituted between him and Agesilaus; the latter gave it to be understood, that if Kleombrotus were now backward, their suspicions would be confirmed that he leaned in his heart towards the Thebans.<sup>1</sup> Probably the king was himself sufficiently eager to fight, and so would any other Spartan general have been, under the same circumstances, before the battle of Leuktra. But even had he been otherwise, the impatience, prevalent among the Lacedæmonian portion of his army, left him no option. Accordingly, the decided resolution to fight was taken. The last council was held, and the final orders issued by Kleombrotus, after his morning meal, where copious libations of wine both attested and increased the confident temper of every man. The army was marched out of the camp, and arrayed on the lower portion of the declivity; Kleombrotus with the Spartans and most of the Lacedæmonians being on the right, in an order of twelve deep. Some Lacedæmonians were also on the left, but respecting the order of the other parts of the line, we have no information. The cavalry was chiefly posted along the front.

Meanwhile, Epaminondas also marched down his declivity, in his own chosen order of battle: his left wing being both forward, and strengthened into very deep order, for desperate attack. His cavalry too were posted in front of his line. But before he commenced his march, he sent away his baggage and attendants home to Thebes; while at the same time he made proclamation that any of his Bæotian hoplites, who were not hearty in the cause, might also retire, if they chose. Of such permission the Thespians immediately availed themselves;<sup>2</sup> so many were there, in the Theban camp, who estimated the chances to be all in favor of Lacedæmonian victory. But when these men, a large portion of them unarmed, were seen retiring, a considerable detachment from the army of Kleombrotus, either with or without orders, ran after to prevent their escape, and forced them to return for safety to the

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 5.

<sup>2</sup> Polyæn. ii, 2, 2, Pausanias, ix, 13, 3, ix, 14, 1.

main Theban army. The most zealous among the allies of Sparta present, — the Phokians, the Phliasians, and the Herakleots, together with a body of mercenaries, — executed this movement; which seems to have weakened the Lacedæmonians in the main battle, without doing any mischief to the Thebans.

The cavalry first engaged, in front of both lines; and here the superiority of the Thebans soon became manifest. The Lacedæmonian cavalry, — at no time very good, but at this moment unusually bad, composed of raw and feeble novices, mounted on horses provided by the rich, — was soon broken and driven back upon the infantry, whose ranks were disturbed by the fugitives. To reestablish the battle, Kleombrotus gave the word for the infantry to advance, himself personally leading the right. The victorious Theban cavalry probably hung upon the Lacedæmonian infantry of the centre and left, and prevented them from making much forward movement; while Epaminondas and Pelopidas with their left, advanced according to their intention to bear down Kleombrotus and his right wing. The shock here was terrible; on both sides victory was resolutely and desperately disputed, in a close hand-combat, with pushing of opposite shields and opposite masses. But such was the overwhelming force of the Theban charge, — with the sacred band or chosen warriors in front, composed of men highly trained in the palæstra,<sup>1</sup> and the deep column of fifty shields propelling behind, — that even the Spartans, with all their courage, obstinacy, and discipline, were unable to stand up against it. Kleombrotus, himself either in or near the front, was mortally wounded, apparently early in the battle; and it was only by heroic and unexampled efforts, on the part of his comrades around, that he was carried off yet alive, so as to preserve him from falling into the hands of the enemy. Around him also fell the most eminent members of the Spartan official staff; Deinon the polemarch, Sphodrias, with his son Kleonymus, and several others. After an obstinate resistance and a fearful slaughter, the right wing of the Spartans was completely beaten, and driven back to their camp on the higher ground.

It was upon this Spartan right wing, where the Theban left was irresistibly strong, that all the stress of the battle fell, —

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Symposiac. ii, 5, p. 639 F



Epaminondas had intended that it should. In no other part of the line does there appear to have been any serious fighting; partly through his deliberate scheme of not pushing forward either his centre or his right, — partly through the preliminary victory of the Theban cavalry, which probably checked a part of the forward march of the enemy's line, — and partly also through the lukewarm adherence, or even suppressed hostility, of the allies marshalled under the command of Kleombrotus.<sup>1</sup> The Phokians and Herakleots, — zealous in the cause from hatred of Thebes, — had quitted the line to strike a blow at the retiring baggage and attendants; while the remaining allies, after mere nominal fighting and little or no loss, retired to the camp as soon as they saw the Spartan right defeated and driven back to it. Moreover, even some Lacedæmonians on the left wing, probably astounded by the lukewarmness of those around them, and by the unexpected calamity on their own right, fell back in the same manner. The whole Lacedæmonian force, with the dying king, was thus again assembled and formed behind the entrenchment on the higher ground, where the victorious Thebans did not attempt to molest them.<sup>2</sup>

But very different were their feelings as they now stood arrayed in the camp, from that exulting boastfulness with which they had quitted it an hour or two before; and fearful was the loss when it came to be verified. Of seven hundred Spartans who had marched forth from the camp, only three hundred returned to it.<sup>3</sup> One thousand Lacedæmonians, besides, had been left on the field, even by the admission of Xenophon; probably the real number was

<sup>1</sup> Pausanias (ix, 13, 4; compare viii, 6, 1) lays great stress upon this indifference or even treachery of the allies. Xenophon says quite enough to authenticate the reality of the fact (Hellen vi, 4, 15-24); see also Cicero *De Offic.* ii, 7, 26.

Polyænus has more than one anecdote respecting the dexterity of Agesilaus in dealing with fainthearted conduct or desertion on the part of the allies of Sparta (Polyæn. ii, 1, 18-20).

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 13, 14.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. l. c. Plutarch (Agesil. c. 28) states a thousand Lacedæmonians to have been slain; Pausanias (ix, 13, 4) gives the number as more than a thousand; Diodorus mentions four thousand (xv, 56), which is doubtless above the truth, though the number given by Xenophon may be fairly presumed as somewhat below it. Dionysius of Halikarnassus (*Antiq. Roman* ii, 17) states that seventeen hundred Spartans perished.

even larger. Apart from this, the death of Kleombrotus was of itself an event impressive to every one, the like of which had never occurred since the fatal day of Thermopylæ. But this was not all. The allies who stood alongside of them in arms were now altered men. All were sick of their cause, and averse to farther exertion; some scarcely concealed a positive satisfaction at the defeat. And when the surviving polemarchs, now commanders, took counsel with the principal officers as to the steps proper in the emergency, there were a few, but very few, Spartans who pressed for renewal of the battle, and for recovering by force their slain brethren in the field, or perishing in the attempt. All the rest felt like beaten men; so that the polemarchs, giving effect to the general sentiment, sent a herald to solicit the regular truce for burial of their dead. This the Thebans granted, after erecting their own trophy.<sup>1</sup> But Epaminondas, aware that the Spartans would practise every stratagem to conceal the magnitude of their losses, coupled the grant with a condition that the allies should bury their dead first. It was found that the allies had scarce any dead to pick up, and that nearly every slain warrior on the field was a Lacedæmonian.<sup>2</sup> And thus the Theban general, while he placed the loss beyond possibility of concealment, proclaimed at the same time such public evidence of Spartan courage, as to rescue the misfortune of Leuktra from all aggravation on the score of dishonor. What the Theban loss was, Xenophon does not tell us. Pausanias states it at forty-seven men,<sup>3</sup> Diodorus at three hundred. The former number is preposterously small, and even the latter is doubtless under the truth; for a victory in close fight, over soldiers like the Spartans, must have been dearly purchased. Though the bodies of the Spartans were given up to burial, their arms were retained; and the shields of the principal officers were seen by the traveller Pausanias at Thebes five hundred years afterwards.<sup>4</sup>

Twenty days only had elapsed, from the time when Epaminondas quitted Sparta after Thebes had been excluded from the general peace, to the day when he stood victorious on the field of

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 15.

<sup>2</sup> Pausan. ix, 13, 4; Plutarch, *Apotheg. Reg.* p. 193 B.; Cicero, *de officiis*, ii, 7.

<sup>3</sup> Pausan. ix, 13, 4; Diodor. xv, 55.

<sup>4</sup> Pausan. ix, 16, 9.



Leuktra.<sup>1</sup> The event came like a thunderclap upon every one in Greece, upon victors as well as vanquished, — upon allies and neutrals, near and distant, alike. The general expectation had been that Thebes would be speedily overthrown and dismantled; instead of which, not only she had escaped, but had inflicted a crushing blow on the military majesty of Sparta. It is in vain that Xenophon, — whose account of the battle is obscure, partial, and imprinted with that chagrin which the event occasioned to him,<sup>2</sup> — ascribes the defeat to untoward accidents,<sup>3</sup> or to the rashness and convivial carelessness of Kleombrotus; upon whose generalship Agesilaus and his party at Sparta did not scruple to cast ungenerous reproach,<sup>4</sup> while others faintly exculpated him by saying that he had fought contrary to his better judgment, under

<sup>1</sup> This is an important date, preserved by Plutarch (Agesil. c. 28). The congress was broken up at Sparta on the fourteenth of the Attic month Skirophorion (June), the last month of the year of the Athenian archon Alkisthenes; the battle was fought on the fifth of the Attic month of Hekatombæon, the first month of the next Attic year, of the archon Phrasikleidēs, about the beginning of July.

<sup>2</sup> Diodorus differs from Xenophon on one important matter connected with the battle; affirming that Archidamus son of Agesilaus was present and fought, together with various other circumstances, which I shall discuss presently, in a future note. I follow Xenophon.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 8. Εἰς δ' οὖν τὴν μάχην τοῖς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίοις πάντα τὰνάντια ἐγένετο, τοῖς δὲ (to the Thebans) πάντα καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης κατωφύοντο.

<sup>4</sup> Isokrates, in the Oration vi, called *Archidamus* (composed about five years after the battle, as if to be spoken by Archidamus son of Agesilaus), puts this statement distinctly into the mouth of Archidamus — μέχρ' ἔτι μὲν ταυτησὶ τῆς ἡμέρας διδυστυχηκέναι δοκοῦμεν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τῇ πρὸς Θηβαίους, καὶ τοῖς μὲν σώμασι κρατηθῆναι διὰ τὸν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἡγησάμενον, etc. (s. 9).

I take his statement as good evidence of the real opinion entertained both by Agesilaus and by Archidamus; an opinion the more natural, since the two contemporary kings of Sparta were almost always at variance, and at the head of opposing parties; especially true about Agesilaus and Kleombrotus, during the life of the latter.

Cicero (probably copying Kallisthenes or Ephorus) says, de Officiis, i, 24, 84 — "Illa plaga (Lacedæmoniis) pestifera, quâ, quum Cleombrotus invidiam timens temere cum Epaminondâ conflixisset, Lacedæmoniorum opes eorumnerunt." Polybius remarks (ix, 23, we know not from whom he borrowed) that all the proceedings of Kleombrotus during the empire of Sparta, were marked with a generous regard for the interests and feelings of the allies; while the proceedings of Agesilaus were of the opposite character.

fear of unpopularity. Such criticisms, coming from men wise after the fact, and consoling themselves for the public calamity by censuring the unfortunate commander, will not stand examination. Kleombrotus represented on this occasion the feeling universal among his countrymen. He was ordered to march against Thebes with the full belief, entertained by Agesilaus and all the Spartan leaders, that her unassisted force could not resist him. To fight the Thebans on open ground was exactly what he and every other Spartan desired. While his manner of forcing the entrance of Bœotia, and his capture of Kreusis, was a creditable manœuvre, he seems to have arranged his order of battle in the manner usual with Grecian generals at the time. There appears no reason to censure his generalship, except in so far as he was unable to divine, — what no one else divined, — the superior combinations of his adversary, then for the first time applied to practice. To the discredit of Xenophon, Epaminondas is never named in his narrative of the battle, though he recognizes in substance that the battle was decided by the irresistible Theban force brought to bear upon one point of the enemy's phalanx; a fact which both Plutarch and Diodorus<sup>1</sup> expressly refer to the genius of the general. All the calculations of Epaminondas turned out successful. The bravery of the Thebans, cavalry as well as infantry, seconded by the training which they had received during the last few years, was found sufficient to carry his plans into full execution. To this circumstance, principally, was owing the great revolution of opinion throughout Greece which followed the battle. Every one felt that a new military power had arisen, and that the Theban training, under the generalship of Epaminondas, had proved itself more than a match on a fair field, with shield and spear, and with numbers on the whole inferior, — for the ancient Lykurgian discipline; which last had hitherto stood without a parallel as turning out artists and craftsmen in war, against mere citizens in the opposite ranks, armed but without the like training.<sup>2</sup> Essentially stationary and old-fashioned, the Lykurgian discipline was now

Diodor. xv, 55. Epaminondas, ἰδίᾳ τινι καὶ περιττῇ τάξει χρησάμενος, διὰ τῆς ἰδίας στρατηγίας πεοιεποιήσατο τὴν περιβόητον νίκην.....διὰ καὶ λοξῇ ποιήσας τὴν φάλαγγα, τῷ τοῦ ἐπιλέκτους ἐχθροῦ κέρατι ἐγὼν κρινεῖν τὴν μάχην, etc. Compare Plutarch, Pelop. c. 23.

<sup>2</sup> See Aristotel. Politic. viii, 3, 3, 5.



overborne by the progressive military improvement of other states, handled by a preëminent tactician; a misfortune predicted by the Corinthians<sup>1</sup> at Sparta sixty years before, and now realized, to the conviction of all Greece, on the field of Leuktra.

But if the Spartan system was thus invaded and overpassed in its privilege of training soldiers, there was another species of teaching wherein it neither was nor could be overpassed, — the hard lesson of enduring pain and suppressing emotion. Memorable indeed was the manner in which the news of this fatal catastrophe was received at Sparta. To prepare the reader by an appropriate contrast, we may turn to the manifestation at Athens twenty-seven years before, when the trireme called *Paralus* arrived from *Ægyptus*, bearing tidings of the capture of the entire Athenian fleet. "The moan of distress (says the historian)<sup>2</sup> reached all up the Long Walls from *Peiræus* to Athens, as each man communicated the news to his neighbor: on that night, not a man slept, from bewailing for his lost fellow-citizens and for his own impending ruin." Not such was the scene at Sparta, when the messenger arrived from the field of Leuktra, although there was everything calculated to render the shock violent. For not only was the defeat calamitous and humiliating beyond all former parallel, but it came at a moment when every man reckoned on victory. As soon as *Kleombrotus*, having forced his way into *Bœotia*, saw the unassisted Thebans on plain ground before him, no Spartan entertained any doubt of the result. Under this state of feeling, a messenger arrived with the astounding revelation, that the army was totally defeated, with the loss of the king, of four hundred Spartans, and more than a thousand Lacedæmonians; and that defeat stood confessed by having solicited the truce for interment of the slain. At the moment when he arrived, the festival called the *Gymnopædia*

Compare Xenophon, *De Repub. Laced.* xiii, 5 τὸς μὲν ἄλλους αὐτοσχέδιαστας εἶναι τῶν στρατιωτικῶν, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ μόνους τῷ ὄντι τεχνίτας τῶν πολεμικῶν — and Xenoph. *Memorab.* iii, 5, 13, 14.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i, 71 ἀρχαιοτροπα ὑμῶν (of you Spartans) τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἴσθι. Ἀνάγκη δ' ὥσπερ τέχνης ἀεὶ τὰ ἐπιτεχνούμενα κατατείνεσθαι καὶ ἡσυχάζουσθαι μὲν πόλει τὰ ἀκίνητα νόμιμα ἀρίστα, πρὸς πόλιν δὲ ἀναγκαζομένους ἵεναι, πολλὰς καὶ τῆς ἐπιτεχνήσεως δεῖ, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. *Hellen.* ii, 2, 3

was actually being celebrated, on its last day; and the chorus of grown men was going through its usual solemnity in the theatre. In spite of all the poignancy of the intelligence, the ephors would not permit the solemnity to be either interrupted or abridged. "Of necessity, I suppose, they were grieved, — but they went through the whole as if nothing had happened, only communicating the names of the slain to their relations, and issuing a general order to the women, to make no noise or wailing, but to bear the misfortune in silence." That such an order should be issued, is sufficiently remarkable; that it should be issued and obeyed, is what could not be expected; that it should not only be issued and obeyed, but overpassed, is what no man could believe, if it were not expressly attested by the contemporary historian. "On the morrow (says he) you might see those whose relations had been slain, walking about in public with bright and cheerful countenances; but of those whose relatives survived, scarce one showed himself; and the few who were abroad, looked mournful and humbled."<sup>1</sup>

In comparing this extraordinary self-constraint and obedience to orders, at Sparta, under the most trying circumstances, — with the sensitive and demonstrative temper, and spontaneous outburst of feeling at Athens, so much more nearly approaching to the Homeric type of Greeks, — we must at the same time remark, that in reference to active and heroic efforts for the purpose of repairing past calamities and making head against preponderant odds, the Athenians were decidedly the better of the two. I have al-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. *Hellen.* vi, 4, 16. Γενομένων δὲ τούτων, ὁ μὲν εἰς τὴν Λακεδαιμονίαν ἀγγελῶν τὸ πάθος ἀφικνεῖται, Γυμνοπαιδῶν τε οὐσῶν τῆς τελευταίας, καὶ τοῦ ἀνδρικοῦ χοροῦ ἐνδον ὄντος. Οἱ δὲ ἐφοροὶ, ἐπεὶ ἤκουσαν τὸ πάθος, ἐλυποῦντο μὲν, ὥσπερ οἶμαι, ἀνάγκη· τὸν μὲντοι χορὸν οὐκ ἐξήγαγον, ἀλλὰ διαγωνίσασθαι εἶπον. Καὶ τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους ἐκάστου τῶν τεθνηκότων ἀπέδοσαν· προεῖπον δὲ ταῖς γυναῖξιν, μὴ ποιεῖν κραυγὴν, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ τὸ πάθος φέρειν. Τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ ἦν ὄρα, ὡς μὲν ἐπέθνασαν οἱ προσήκοντες, λιπαροὺς καὶ φαῖδροὺς ἐν τῷ φαναρῷ ἀναστρεφόμενους· ὡς δὲ ζῶντες ἤγγελλένοι ἦσαν, ὀλιγοὺς ἂν εἶδες, τοὺτους δὲ σκυθρωποὺς καὶ ταπεινοὺς περιιόντας — and Plutarch, *Agasil.* c. 29.

See a similar statement of Xenophon, after he has recounted the cutting in pieces of the Lacedæmonian mora near Lechæum, about the satisfaction and even triumph of those of the Lacedæmonians who had lost relations in the battle, while every one else was mournful (*Xen. Hellen.* iv, 5, 10). Compare also Justin, xxviii, 4 — the behavior after the defeat of Sellasia



ready recounted the prodigious and unexpected energy displayed by Athens, after the ruinous loss of her two armaments before Syracuse, when no one expected that she could have held out for six months: I am now about to recount the proceedings of Sparta, after the calamity at Leuktra, — a calamity great and serious indeed, yet in positive amount inferior to what had befallen the Athenians at Syracuse. The reader will find that, looking to the intensity of active effort in both cases, the comparison is all to the advantage of Athens; excusing at least, if not justifying, the boast of Perikles<sup>1</sup> in his memorable funeral harangue, — that his countrymen, without the rigorous drill of Spartans, were yet found no way inferior to Spartans in daring exertion, when the hour of actual trial arrived.

It was the first obligation of the ephors to provide for the safety of their defeated army in Bœotia; for which purpose they put in march nearly the whole remaining force of Sparta. Of the Lacedæmonian moræ, or military divisions (seemingly six in the aggregate), two or three had been sent with Kleombrotus; all the remainder were now despatched, even including elderly citizens up to near sixty years of age, and all who had been left behind in consequence of other public offices. Archidamus took the command (Agesilaus still continuing to be disabled), and employed himself in getting together the aid promised from Tegea, — from the villages representing the disintegrated Mantinea, — from Corinth, Sikyon, Phlius, and Achaia; all these places being still under the same oligarchies which had held them under Lacedæmonian patronage, and still adhering to Sparta. Triremes were equipped at Corinth, as a means of transporting the new army across to Kreusis, and thus joining the defeated troops at Leuktra, the port of Kreusis, the recent acquisition of Kleombrotus, being now found inestimable, as the only means of access into Bœotia.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile the defeated army still continued in its entrenched camp at Leuktra, where the Thebans were at first in no hurry to disturb it. Besides that this was a very arduous enterprise, even after the recent victory, — we must recollect the actual feeling of the Thebans themselves, upon whom their own victory had come by surprise, at a moment when they were animated more by de-

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii, 39.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 17-19.

spair than by hope. They were doubtless absorbed in the intoxicating triumph and exultation of the moment, with the embraces and felicitations of their families in Thebes, rescued from impending destruction by their valor. Like the Syracusans after their last great victory<sup>1</sup> over the Athenian fleet in the Great Harbor, they probably required an interval to give loose to their feelings of ecstasy, before they would resume action. Epaminondas and the other leaders, aware how much the value of Theban alliance was now enhanced, endeavored to obtain reinforcement from without, before they proceeded to follow up the blow. To Athens they sent a herald, crowned with wreaths of triumph, proclaiming their recent victory. They invited the Athenians to employ the present opportunity for taking full revenge on Sparta, by joining their hands with those of Thebes. But the sympathies of the Athenians were now rather hostile than friendly to Thebes, besides that they had sworn peace with Sparta, not a month before. The Senate, who were assembled in the acropolis when the herald arrived, heard his news with evident chagrin, and dismissed him without even a word of courtesy; while the unfortunate Plataeans, who were doubtless waiting in the city in expectation of the victory of Kleombrotus, and of their own speedy reestablishment, found themselves again struck down and doomed to indefinite exile.

To Jason of Phæræ in Thessaly, another Theban herald was sent for the same purpose, and very differently received. The despot sent back word that he would come forthwith by sea, and ordered triremes to be equipped for the purpose. But this was a mere deception; for at the same time, he collected the mercenaries and cavalry immediately near to him, and began his march by land. So rapid were his movements, that he forestalled all opposition, — though he had to traverse the territory of the Herakleots and Phokians, who were his bitter enemies, — and joined the Thebans safely in Bœotia.<sup>2</sup> But when the Theban leaders proposed that he should attack the Lacedæmonian camp in flank, from the high ground, while they would march straight up the hill and

<sup>1</sup> See Thucyd. vii, 73.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 20, 21.

However, since the Phokians formed part of the beaten army at Leuktra, it must be confessed that Jason had less to fear from them at this moment, than at any other.



attack it in front, — Jason strongly dissuaded the enterprise as too perilous; recommending that they should permit the enemy's departure under capitulation. "Be content (said he) with the great victory which you have already gained. Do not compromise it by attempting something yet more hazardous, against Lacedæmonians driven to despair in their camp. Recollect that a few days ago, *you* yourselves were in despair, and that your recent victory is the fruit of that very feeling. Remember that the gods take pleasure in bringing about these sudden changes of fortune." Having by such representations convinced the Thebans, he addressed a friendly message to the Lacedæmonians, reminding them of their dangerous position, as well as of the little trust to be reposed in their allies, — and offering himself as mediator to negotiate for their safe retreat. Their acquiescence was readily given; and at his instance, a truce was agreed to by both parties, assuring to the Lacedæmonians the liberty of quitting Bœotia. In spite of the agreement, however, the Lacedæmonian commander placed little faith either in the Thebans or in Jason, apprehending a fraud for the purpose of inducing him to quit the camp and of attacking him on the march. Accordingly, he issued public orders in the camp for every man to be ready for departure after the evening meal, and to march in the night to Kithæron, with a view of passing that mountain on the next morning. Having put the enemy on this false scent, he directed his real night-march by a different and not very easy way, first to Kreusis, next to Ægosthena in the Megarian territory.<sup>2</sup> The Thebans offered no opposition; nor is

<sup>1</sup> Pausanias states that immediately after the battle, Epaminondas gave permission to the allies of Sparta to depart and go home, by which permission they profited, so that the Spartans now stood alone in the camp (Paus. ix, 14, 1). This however is inconsistent with the account of Xenophon (vi, 4, 26), and I think improbable.

Sievers (Geschichte, etc. p. 247) thinks that Jason preserved the Spartans by outwitting and deluding Epaminondas. But it appears to me that the storming of the Spartan camp was an arduous enterprise, wherein more Thebans than Spartans would have been slain: moreover, the Spartans were masters of the port of Kreusis, so that there was little chance of starving out the camp before reinforcements arrived. The capitulation granted by Epaminondas seems to have been really the wisest proceeding.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 22-25.

The road from Kreusis to Leuktra, however, must have been that by which Kleombrotus arrived.

it at all probable that they intended any fraud, considering that Jason was here the guarantee, and that he had at least no motive to break his word.

It was at Ægosthena that the retreating Lacedæmonians met Archidamus, who had advanced to that point with the Laconian forces, and was awaiting the junction of his Peloponnesian allies. The purpose of his march being now completed, he advanced no farther. The armament was disbanded, and Lacedæmonians as well as allies returned home.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This is the most convenient place for noticing the discrepancy, as to the battle of Leuktra, between Diodorus and Xenophon. I have followed Xenophon.

Diodorus (xv, 54) states both the arrival of Jason in Bœotia, and the out-march of Archidamus from Sparta, to have taken place, *not after* the battle of Leuktra, but *before* it. Jason (he says) came with a considerable force to the aid of the Thebans. He prevailed upon Kleombrotus, who doubted the sufficiency of his own numbers, to agree to a truce and to evacuate Bœotia. But as Kleombrotus was marching homeward, he met Archidamus with a second Lacedæmonian army, on his way to Bœotia, by order of the ephors, for the purpose of reinforcing him. Accordingly Kleombrotus, finding himself thus unexpectedly strengthened, openly broke the truce just concluded, and marched back with Archidamus to Leuktra. Here they fought the battle, Kleombrotus commanding the right wing, and Archidamus the left. They sustained a complete defeat, in which Kleombrotus was slain; the result being the same on both statements.

We must here make our election between the narrative of Xenophon and that of Diodorus. That the authority of the former is greater, speaking generally, I need hardly remark; nevertheless his philo-Laconian partialities become so glaring and preponderant, during these latter books of the Hellenica (where he is discharging the mournful duty of recounting the humiliation of Sparta), as to afford some color for the suspicions of Palmerius, Mommsen, and Schneider, who think that Xenophon has concealed the direct violation of truce on the part of the Spartans, and that the facts really occurred as Diodorus has described them. See Schneider ad Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 5, 6.

It will be found, however, on examining the facts, that such suspicion ought not to be admitted, and that there are grounds for preferring the narrative of Xenophon.

1. He explains to us how it happened that the remains of the Spartan army, after the defeat of Leuktra, escaped out of Bœotia. Jason arrives after the battle, and prevails upon the Thebans to allow them to retreat under a truce; Archidamus also arrives after the battle to take them up. If the defeat had taken place under the circumstances mentioned by Diodorus, — Archidamus and the survivors would have found it scarcely possible to escape out of Bœotia.



In all communities, the return of so many defeated soldiers, liberated under a capitulation by the enemy, would have been a scene of mourning. But in Sparta it was pregnant with grave and dangerous consequences. So terrible was the scorn and ignominy heaped upon the Spartan citizen who survived a defeat, that life became utterly intolerable to him. The mere fact sufficed for his condemnation, without any inquiry into justifying or extenuating circumstances. No citizen at home would speak to him, or be seen consorting with him in tent, game, or chorus; no other family would intermarry with his; if he was seen walking about with an air of cheerfulness, he was struck and ill-used by the passers-by, until he assumed that visible humility which was supposed to become his degraded position. Such rigorous treatment (which we learn from the panegyrist Xenophon)<sup>1</sup> helps to explain the satisfaction of the Spartan father and mother, when they learned that their son was among the slain and not among the survivors. Defeat of Spartan troops had hitherto been rare. But in the case of the prisoners at Sphakteria, when released from captivity and brought back to a degraded existence at Sparta, some uneasiness had been felt, and some precautions deemed necessary to prevent them from becoming dangerous malcontents.<sup>2</sup> Here was another

2. If Diodorus relates correctly, there must have been a violation of truce on the part of Kleombrotus and the Lacedæmonians, as glaring as any that occurs in Grecian history. But such violation is never afterwards alluded to by any one, among the misdeeds of the Lacedæmonians.

3. A part, and an essential part, of the story of Diodorus, is, that Archidamus was present and fought at Leuktra. But we have independent evidence rendering it almost certain that he was not there. Whoever reads the Discourse of Isocrates called *Archidamus* (Or. vi. sect. 9, 10, 129), will see that such observations could not have been put into the mouth of Archidamus, if he had been present there, and (of course) in joint command with Kleombrotus.

4. If Diodorus be correct, Sparta must have levied a new army from her allies, just after having sworn the peace, which peace exonerated her allies from everything like obligation to follow her headship; and a new army not for the purpose of extricating defeated comrades in Boeotia, but for pure aggression against Thebes. This, to say the least, is eminently improbable.

On these grounds, I adhere to Xenophon and depart from Diodorus.

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Rep. Lac. c. ix; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. v. 34.

case yet more formidable. The vanquished returning from Leuktra were numerous, while the severe loss sustained in the battle amply attested their bravery. Aware of the danger of enforcing against them the established custom, the ephors referred the case to Agesilaus; who proposed that for that time and case the customary penalties should be allowed to sleep; but should be revived afterwards and come into force as before. Such was the step accordingly taken;<sup>1</sup> so that the survivors from this fatal battle-field were enabled to mingle with the remaining citizens without dishonor or degradation. The step was indeed doubly necessary, considering the small aggregate number of fully qualified citizens; which number always tended to decline, — from the nature of the Spartan political franchise combined with the exigencies of Spartan training,<sup>2</sup> — and could not bear even so great a diminution as that of the four hundred slain at Leuktra. "Sparta (says Aristotle) could not stand up against a single defeat, but was ruined through the small number of her citizens."<sup>3</sup>

The cause here adverted to by Aristotle, as explaining the utter loss of ascendancy abroad, and the capital diminution both of power and of inviolability at home, which will now be found to come thick upon Sparta, was undoubtedly real and important. But a fact still more important was, the alteration of opinion produced everywhere in Greece with regard to Sparta, by the sudden shock of the battle of Leuktra. All the prestige and old associations connected with her long-established power vanished; while the hostility and fears, inspired both by herself and by her partisans, but hitherto reluctantly held back in silence, — now burst forth into open manifestation.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30, Plutarch, Apophtheg. Lacon. p. 214 B; Apophtheg. Reg. p. 191 C; Polyænus, ii. 1, 13.

A similar suspension of penalties, for the special occasion, was enacted after the great defeat of Agis and the Lacedæmonians by Antipater, B.C. 330. Akrotatus, son of King Kleomenes, was the only person at Sparta who opposed the suspension (Diodor. xix, 70). He incurred the strongest unpopularity for such opposition. Compare also Justin, xxviii, 4 — describing the public feeling at Sparta after the defeat at Sellasia.

<sup>2</sup> The explanation of Spartan citizenship will be found in an earlier part of this History, Vol. II, Ch. vi.

<sup>3</sup> Aristotel. Polit. ii, 6, 12. *Μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν οὐχ ὑπένεγκεν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἐπώλετο διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν*



The ascendancy, exercised down to this time by Sparta north of the Corinthian Gulf, in Phokis and elsewhere, passed away from her, and became divided between the victorious Thebans and Jason of Pheræ. The Thebans, and the Boeotian confederates who were now in cordial sympathy with them, excited to enthusiasm by their recent success, were eager for fresh glories, and readily submitted to the full exigencies of military training; while under a leader like Epaminondas, their ardor was turned to such good account, that they became better soldiers every month.<sup>1</sup> The Phokians, unable to defend themselves single-handed, were glad to come under the protection of the Thebans, as less bitterly hostile to them than the Thessalian Jason, — and concluded with them obligations of mutual defence and alliance.<sup>2</sup> The cities of Eubœa, together with the Lokrians (both Epiknemidian and Opuntian,) the Malians and the town of Heraklea, followed the example. The latter town was now defenceless; for Jason, in returning from Boeotia to Thessaly, had assailed it and destroyed its fortifications; since by its important site near the pass of Thermopylae, it might easily be held as a position to bar his entrance into Southern Greece.<sup>3</sup> The Boeotian town of Orchomenus, which had held with the Lacedæmonians even until the late battle, was now quite defenceless; and the Thebans, highly exasperated against its inhabitants, were disposed to destroy the city, reducing the inhabitants to slavery. Severe as this proposition was, it would not have exceeded the customary rigors of war, nor even what might have befallen Thebes herself, had Kleombrotus been victorious at Leuktra. But the strenuous remonstrance of Epaminondas prevented it from being carried into execution. Alike distinguished for mild temper and for long-sighted views, he reminded his countrymen that in their present aspiring hopes towards ascendancy in Greece, it was essential to establish a character for moderation of dealing<sup>4</sup> not inferior to their military courage, as attested by the recent victory. Accordingly, the Orchomenians were par-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 24. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν Βοιωτοῖς πάντες ἐγχεύοντο περὶ τὰ ὅπλα, ἀγαλλόμενοι τῇ ἐν Λευκτροῖς νικῇ, etc.

These are remarkable words from the unwilling pen of Xenophon: compare vii. 5, 12.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 23; vii, 5, 4; Diodor. xv, 57.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 27; vi, 5, 23.

<sup>4</sup> Diodor. xv, 57.

doned upon submission, and re-admitted as members of the Boeotian confederacy. To the Thespians, however, the same lenity was not extended. They were expelled from Boeotia, and their territory annexed to Thebes. It will be recollected, that immediately before the battle of Leuktra, when Epaminondas caused proclamation to be made that such of the Boeotians as were disaffected to the Theban cause might march away, the Thespians had availed themselves of the permission and departed.<sup>1</sup> The fugitive Thespians found shelter, like the Plataeans, at Athens.<sup>2</sup>

While Thebes was commemorating her recent victory by the erection of a treasury chamber,<sup>3</sup> and the dedication of pious offerings at Delphi, — while the military organization of Boeotia was receiving such marked improvement, and the cluster of dependent states attached to Thebes was thus becoming larger, under the able management of Epaminondas, — Jason in Thessaly was also growing more powerful every day. He was tagus of all Thessaly; with its tributary neighbors under complete obedience, — with Macedonia partly dependent on him, — and with a mercenary force, well paid and trained, greater than had ever been assembled in Greece. By dismantling Heraklea, in his return home from Boeotia, he had laid open the strait of Thermopylae, so as to be sure of access into southern Greece whenever he chose. His personal ability and ambition, combined with his great power, inspired universal alarm; for no man knew whither he would direct his arms; whether to Asia, against the Persian king, as he was fond of boasting,<sup>4</sup> — or northward against the cities in Chalkidikê — or southward against Greece.

The last-mentioned plan seemed the most probable, at the beginning of 370 B. C., half a year after the battle of Leuktra: for Jason proclaimed distinctly his intention of being present at the Pythian festival (the season for which was about August 1, 370 B. C., near Delphi), not only with splendid presents and sacrifices to Apollo, but also at the head of a numerous army. Orders had

<sup>1</sup> Pausan. ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 1.

I have already given my reasons (in a note on the preceding chapter) for believing that the Thespians were not ἀπόλιδες before the battle of Leuktra.

<sup>3</sup> Pausanias, x, 11, 4.

<sup>4</sup> Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.) s. 141.

been given that his troops should hold themselves ready for military service,<sup>1</sup> — about the time when the festival was to be celebrated; and requisitions had been sent round, demanding from all his tributaries victims for the Pythian sacrifice, to a total of not less than one thousand bulls, and ten thousand sheep, goats, and swine; besides a prize-bull to take the lead in the procession, for which a wreath of gold was to be given. Never before had such honor been done to the god; for those who came to offer sacrifice were usually content with one or more beasts bred on the neighboring plain of Kirrha.<sup>2</sup> We must recollect, however, that this Pythian festival of 370 B. C. occurred under peculiar circumstances; for the two previous festivals in 374 B. C. and 378 B. C. must have been comparatively unfrequented; in consequence of the war between Sparta and her allies on one side, and Athens and Thebes on the other, — and also of the occupation of Phokis by Kleombrotus. Hence the festival of 370 B. C., following immediately after the peace, appeared to justify an extraordinary burst of pious magnificence, to make up for the niggardly tributes to the god during the two former; while the hostile dispositions of the Phokians would be alleged as an excuse for the military force intended to accompany Jason.

But there were other intentions, generally believed though not formally announced, which no Greek could imagine without uneasiness. It was affirmed that Jason was about to arrogate to himself the presidency and celebration of the festival, which belonged

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 30. *παρήγγιλλε δὲ καὶ ὡς στρατηγούμενος εἰς τὴν περὶ τὰ Πύθια χρῆσιν Ὀετταλοῖς παρασκευάζεσθαι.*

I agree with Dr. Arnold's construction of this passage (see his Appendix ad. Thucyd. v, 1, at the end of the second volume of his edition of Thucydides) as opposed to that of Mr. Fynes Clinton. At the same time, I do not think that the passage proves much either in favor of his view, or against the view of Mr. Clinton, about the month of the Pythian festival; which I incline to conceive as celebrated about August 1, a little later than Dr. Arnold, a little earlier than Mr. Clinton, supposes. Looking to the lunar months of the Greeks, we must recollect that the festival would not always coincide with the same month or week of our year.

I cannot concur with Dr. Arnold in setting aside the statement of Plutarch respecting the coincidence of the Pythian festival with the battle of Koroneia.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 29, 30. *βοῶν ἡγεμόνα, etc.*

of right to the Amphiktyonic assembly. It was feared, moreover, that he would lay hands on the rich treasures of the Delphian temple; a scheme said to have been conceived by the Syracusan despot Dionysius fifteen years before, in conjunction with the epirot Alketas, who was now dependent upon Jason.<sup>1</sup> As there were no visible means of warding off this blow, the Delphians consulted the god to know what they were to do if Jason approached the treasury; upon which the god replied, that he would himself take care of it, — and he kept his word. This enterprising despot, in the flower of his age and at the summit of his power, perished most unexpectedly before the day of the festival arrived.<sup>2</sup> He had been reviewing his cavalry near Pheræ, and was sitting to receive and answer petitioners, when seven young men approached, apparently in hot dispute with each other, and appealing to him for a settlement. As soon as they got near, they set upon him and slew him.<sup>3</sup> One was killed on the spot by the guards, and another also as he was mounting on horseback; but the remaining five contrived to reach horses ready prepared for them and to gallop away out of the reach of pursuit. In most of the Grecian cities which these fugitives visited, they were received with distinguished honor, as having relieved the Grecian world from one who inspired universal alarm,<sup>4</sup> now that Sparta was unable to resist him, while no other power had as yet taken her place.

Jason was succeeded in his dignity, but neither in his power,

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 13.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 30. *ἀποκρίνασθαι τὸν θεόν, ὅτι αὐτῷ μελήσει. 'Ὁ δ' οὖν ἀνὴρ, τηλικούτος ὢν, καὶ τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα διακρούμενος, etc.*

Xenophon evidently considers the sudden removal of Jason as a consequence of the previous intention expressed by the god to take care of his own treasure.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 31, 32.

The cause which provoked these young men is differently stated: compare Diodor. xv, 60; Valer. Maxim. ix, 10, 2.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 32.

The death of Jason in the spring or early summer of 370 B. C., refutes the compliment which Cornelius Nepos (Timoth. c. 4) pays to Timotheus; who can never have made war upon Jason after 373 B. C., when he received the latter at Athens in his house.



nor ability, by two brothers, — Polyphron and Polydorus. Had he lived longer, he would have influenced most seriously the subsequent destinies of Greece. What else he would have done, we cannot say; but he would have interfered materially with the development of Theban power. Thebes was a great gainer by his death, though perfectly innocent of it, and though in alliance with him to the last; inasmuch that his widow went to reside there for security.<sup>1</sup> Epaminondas was relieved from a most formidable rival, while the body of Theban allies north of Bœotia became much more dependent than they would have remained, if there had been a competing power like that of Jason in Thessaly. The treasures of the god were preserved a few years longer, to be rifled by another hand.

While these proceedings were going on in Northern Greece, during the months immediately succeeding the battle of Leuktra, events not less serious and stirring had occurred in Peloponnesus. The treaty sworn at Sparta twenty days before that battle, bound the Lacedæmonians to disband their forces, remove all their harmosts and garrisons, and leave every subordinate city to its own liberty of action. As they did not scruple to violate the treaty by the orders sent to Kleombrotus, so they probably were not zealous in executing the remaining conditions; though officers were named, for the express purpose of going round to see that the evacuation of the cities was really carried into effect.<sup>2</sup> But it probably was not accomplished in twenty days; nor would it perhaps have been ever more than nominally accomplished, if Kleombrotus had been successful in Bœotia. But after these twenty days came the portentous intelligence of the fate of that prince and his army. The invincible arm of Sparta was broken; she had not a man to spare for the maintenance of foreign ascendancy. Her harmosts disappeared at once, (as they had disappeared from the Asiatic and insular cities twenty-three years before, immediately after the battle of Knidus;<sup>3</sup>) and returned home. Nor was this all. The Lacedæmonian ascendancy had been maintained everywhere by local oligarchies or dekarchies, which had been for the most part violent and oppressive. Against these governments, now deprived

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 37.

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 1-5.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xv, 38. *ἀστυνορίας*

of their foreign support, the long-accumulated flood of internal discontent burst with irresistible force, stimulated probably by returning exiles. Their past mis-government was avenged by severe sentences and proscription, to the length of great reactionary injustice; and the parties banished by this anti-Spartan revolution became so numerous, as to harass and alarm seriously the newly-established governments. Such were the commotions which, during the latter half of 371 B. C., disturbed many of the Peloponnesian towns, — Phigaleia, Phlius, Corinth, Sikyon, Megara, etc., though with great local difference, both of detail and of result.<sup>1</sup>

But the city where intestine commotion took place in its most violent form was Argos. We do not know how this fact was con-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 39, 40.

Diodorus mentions these commotions as if they had taken place after the peace concluded in 374 B. C., and not after the peace of 371 B. C. But it is impossible that they can have taken place after the former, which in point of fact, was broken off almost as soon as sworn, — was never carried into effect, — and comprised no one but Athens and Sparta. I have before remarked that Diodorus seems to have confounded, both in his mind and in his history, these two treaties of peace together, and has predicated of the former what really belongs to the latter. The commotions which he mentions come in, most naturally and properly, immediately after the battle of Leuktra.

He affirms the like reaction against Lacedæmonian supremacy and its local representatives in the various cities, to have taken place even after the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B. C. (xv, 5). But if such reaction began at that time, it must have been promptly repressed by Sparta, then in undiminished and even advancing power.

Another occurrence, alleged to have happened after the battle of Leuktra, may be properly noticed here. Polybius (ii, 39), and Strabo seemingly copying him (viii, p. 384), assert that both Sparta and Thebes agreed to leave their disputed questions of power to the arbitration of the Achæans, and to abide by their decision. Though I greatly respect the authority of Polybius, I am unable here to reconcile his assertion either with the facts which unquestionably occurred, or with general probability. If any such arbitration was ever consented to, it must have come to nothing; for the war went on without interruption. But I cannot bring myself to believe that it was even consented to, either by Thebes or by Sparta. The exuberant confidence of the former, the sense of dignity on the part of the latter, must have indisposed both to such a proceeding; especially to the acknowledgment of umpires like the Achæan cities, who enjoyed little estimation in 370 B. C., though they acquired a good deal a century and a half afterwards.



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<sup>3</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 1-5.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv, 38. ἐξαρῶντες

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Diodorus mentions these commotions as if they had taken place after the peace concluded in 374 B. C., and not after the peace of 371 B. C. But it is impossible that they can have taken place after the former, which in point of fact, was broken off almost as soon as sworn, — was never carried into effect, — and comprised no one but Athens and Sparta. I have before remarked that Diodorus seems to have confounded, both in his mind and in his history, these two treaties of peace together, and has predicated of the former what really belongs to the latter. The commotions which he mentions come in, most naturally and properly, immediately after the battle of Leuktra.

He affirms the like reaction against Lacedæmonian supremacy and its local representatives in the various cities, to have taken place even after the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B. C. (xv, 5). But if such reaction began at that time, it must have been promptly repressed by Sparta, then in undiminished and even advancing power.

Another occurrence, alleged to have happened after the battle of Leuktra, may be properly noticed here. Polybius (ii, 39), and Strabo seemingly copying him (viii, p. 384), assert that both Sparta and Thebes agreed to leave their disputed questions of power to the arbitration of the Achæans, and to abide by their decision. Though I greatly respect the authority of Polybius, I am unable here to reconcile his assertion either with the facts which unquestionably occurred, or with general probability. If any such arbitration was ever consented to, it must have come to nothing; for the war went on without interruption. But I cannot bring myself to believe that it was even consented to, either by Thebes or by Sparta. The exuberant confidence of the former, the sense of dignity on the part of the latter, must have indisposed both to such a proceeding; especially to the acknowledgment of umpires like the Achæan cities, who enjoyed little estimation in 370 B. C., though they acquired a good deal a century and a half afterwards.



nected with the general state of Grecian politics at the time; for Argos had not been in any way subject to Sparta, nor a member of the Spartan confederacy, nor (so far as we know) concerned in the recent war, since the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B. C. The Argeian government was a democracy, and the popular leaders were vehement in their denunciations against the oligarchical opposition party — who were men of wealth and great family position. These last, thus denounced, formed a conspiracy for the forcible overthrow of the government. But the conspiracy was discovered prior to execution, and some of the suspected conspirators were interrogated under the torture, to make them reveal their accomplices; under which interrogation one of them deposed against thirty conspicuous citizens. The people, after a hasty trial, put these thirty men to death, and confiscated their property, while others slew themselves to escape the same fate. So furious did the fear and wrath of the people become, exasperated by the popular leaders, that they continued their executions until they had put to death twelve hundred (or, as some say, fifteen hundred) of the principal citizens. At length the popular leaders became themselves tired and afraid of what they had done; upon which the people were animated to fury against them, and put them to death also.<sup>1</sup>

This gloomy series of events was termed the Skytalism, or Cudgelling, from the instrument (as we are told) by which these multiplied executions were consummated; though the name seems more to indicate an impetuous popular insurrection than deliberate executions. We know the facts too imperfectly to be able to infer anything more than the brutal working of angry political passion amidst a population like that of Argos or Kotkyra, where there was not (as at Athens) either a taste for speech, or the habit of being guided by speech, and of hearing both sides of every question fully discussed. Cicero remarks that he had never heard of an Argeian orator. The acrimony of Demosthenes and Æschines was discharged by mutual eloquence of vituperation, while the assembly or the dikastery afterwards decided between them. We are told that the assembled Athenian people, when they heard the news of the Skytalism at Argos, were so shocked at it, that they

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 57, 58.

caused the solemnity of purification to be performed round the assembly.<sup>1</sup>

Though Sparta thus saw her confidential partisans deposed, expelled, or maltreated, throughout so many of the Peloponnesian cities, — and though as yet there was no Theban interference within the isthmus, either actual or prospective, — yet she was profoundly discouraged, and incapable of any effort either to afford protection or to uphold ascendancy. One single defeat had driven her to the necessity of contending for home and family;<sup>2</sup> probably too the dispositions of her own Perioeci and Helots in Laconia, were such as to require all her force as well as all her watchfulness. At any rate, her empire and her influence over the sentiments of Greeks out of Laconia, became suddenly extinct, to a degree which astonishes us, when we recollect that it had become a sort of tradition in the Greek mind, and that, only nine years before, it had reached as far as Olynthus. How completely her ascendancy had passed away, is shown in a remarkable step taken by Athens, seemingly towards the close of 371 B. C., about four months after the battle of Leuktra. Many of the Peloponnesian cities, though they had lost both their fear and their reverence for Sparta, were still anxious to continue members of a voluntary alliance under the presidency of some considerable city. Of this feeling the Athenians took advantage, to send envoys and invite them to enter into a common league at Athens, on the basis of the peace of Antalkidas, and of the peace recently sworn at Sparta.<sup>3</sup> Many

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. p. 814 B; Isokrates, Or. v, (Philip) i. 58; compare Dionys. Halic. Antiq. Rom. vii, 66.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 10.

The discouragement of the Spartans is revealed by the unwilling, though indirect, intimations of Xenophon, — not less than by their actual conduct — Hellen. vi, 5, 21; vii, 1, 30–32; compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 1–3.

<sup>4</sup> Εὐθυμηθέντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὅτι οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐτι οἰοῦνται, χρῆναι ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ οὕτω διακέσιντο οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὥσπερ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους διέθεσαν — μεταπέμπονται τὰς πόλεις, ὅσοι βούλονται τῆς εἰρήνης μετέχειν, ἢ βασιλεὺς κατέπεμψεν.

In this passage, Morus and some other critics maintain that we ought to read οὕτω (which seems not to be supported by any MSS.), in place of οὕτω. Zeune and Schneider have admitted the new reading into the text; yet they doubt the propriety of the change, and I confess that I share their doubts. The word οὕτω will construe, and gives a clear sense; a very dif-



of them, obeying the summons, entered into an engagement to the following effect: "I will adhere to the peace sent down by the Persian king, and to the resolutions of the Athenians and the allies generally. If any of the cities who have sworn this oath shall be attacked, I will assist her with all my might." What cities, or how many, swore to this engagement, we are not told; we make out indirectly that Corinth was one;<sup>1</sup> but the Eleians refused it, on the ground that their right of sovereignty over the Marganeis, the Triphylians, and the Skilluntians, was not recognized. The formation of the league itself, however, with Athens as president, is a striking fact, as evidence of the sudden dethronement of Sparta, and as a warning that she would henceforward have to move in her own separate orbit, like Athens after the Peloponnesian war. Athens stepped into the place of Sparta, as president of the Peloponnesian confederacy, and guarantee of the sworn peace; though the cities which entered into this new compact were not for that reason understood to break with their ancient president.<sup>2</sup>

Another incident too, apparently occurring about the present time, though we cannot mark its exact date, — serves to mark the altered position of Sparta. The Thebans preferred in the assembly of Amphiktyons an accusation against her, for the unlawful capture of their citadel the Kadmeia by Phœbidas, while under a sworn peace; and for the sanction conferred by the Spartan authorities on this act, in detaining and occupying the place. The Amphiktyonic assembly found the Spartans guilty, and condemned them to a fine of five hundred talents. As the fine was not paid, the assembly, after a certain interval, doubled it; but the second sentence remained unexecuted as well as the first, since there were no means of enforcement.<sup>3</sup> Probably neither those who

ferent sense from *ὀβριμω*, indeed, — yet more likely to have been intended by Xenophon.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 37.

<sup>2</sup> Thus the Corinthians still continued allies of Sparta (Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 8).

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi, 23-29; Justin, viii, 1.

We may fairly suppose that both of them borrow from Theopompus, who treated at large of the memorable Sacred War against the Phokians, which began in 355 B.C., and in which the conduct of Sparta was partly determined by this previous sentence of the Amphiktyons. See Theopompi Fragm. 182-184, ed. Didot.

preferred the charge, nor those who passed the vote, expected that the Lacedæmonians would really submit to pay the fine. The utmost which could be done, by way of punishment for such contumacy, would be to exclude them from the Pythian games, which were celebrated under the presidency of the Amphiktyons; and we may perhaps presume that they really were thus excluded.

The incident however deserves peculiar notice, in more than one point of view. First, as indicating the lessened dignity of Sparta. Since the victory of Leuktra and the death of Jason, Thebes had become preponderant, especially in Northern Greece, where the majority of the nations or races voting in the Amphiktyonic assembly were situated. It is plainly through the ascendancy of Thebes, that this condemnatory vote was passed. Next, as indicating the incipient tendency, which we shall hereafter observe still farther developed, to extend the functions of the Amphiktyonic assembly beyond its special sphere of religious solemnities, and to make it the instrument of political coercion or revenge in the hands of the predominant state. In the previous course of this history, an entire century has passed without giving occasion to mention the Amphiktyonic assembly as taking part in political affairs. Neither Thucydides nor Xenophon, though their united histories cover seventy years, chiefly of Hellenic conflict, ever speak of that assembly. The latter, indeed, does not even notice this fine imposed upon the Lacedæmonians, although it falls within the period of his history. We know the fact only from Diodorus and Justin; and unfortunately merely as a naked fact, without any collateral or preliminary details. During the sixty or seventy years preceding the battle of Leuktra, Sparta had always had her regular political confederacy and synod of allies convened by herself: her political ascendancy was exercised over them, *eo nomine*, by a method more direct and easy than that of perverting the religious authority of the Amphiktyonic assembly, even if such a proceeding were open to her.<sup>1</sup> But when Thebes, after the battle of Leuktra, became the more powerful state individually, she had no such established confederacy and synod of allies, to sanction her propositions, and to share or abet her antipathies. The Amphiktyonic assembly,

<sup>1</sup> See Tittmann, Ueber den Bund der Amphiktyomen, pp. 192-197 (Berlin, 1812).



meeting alternately at Delphi and at Thermopylæ, and composed of twelve ancient races, principally belonging to Northern Greece, as well as most of them inconsiderable in power, — presented itself as a convenient instrument for her purposes. There was a certain show of reason for considering the seizure of the Kadmeia by Phœbidas as a religious offence; since it was not only executed during the Pythian festival, but was in itself a glaring violation of the public law and interpolitical obligations recognized between Grecian cities; which, like other obligations, were believed to be under the sanction of the gods; though probably, if the Athenians and Plataeans had preferred a similar complaint to the Amphiktyons against Thebes for her equally unjust attempt to surprise Plataea under full peace in the spring of 431 B. C., — both Spartans and Thebans would have resisted it. In the present case, however, the Thebans had a case against Sparta sufficiently plausible, when combined with their overruling ascendancy, to carry a majority in the Amphiktyonic assembly, and to procure the imposition of this enormous fine. In itself the sentence produced no direct effect, — which will explain the silence of Xenophon. But it is the first of a series of proceedings, connected with the Amphiktyons, which will be found hereafter pregnant with serious results for Grecian stability and independence.

Among all the inhabitants of Peloponnesus, none were more powerfully affected, by the recent Spartan overthrow at Leuktra, than the Arcadians. Tegea, their most important city, situated on the border of Laconia, was governed by an oligarchy wholly in the interest of Sparta: Orchomenus was of like sentiment; and Mantinea had been broken up into separate villages (about fifteen years before) by the Lacedæmonians themselves — an act of high-handed injustice committed at the zenith of their power after the peace of Antalkidas. The remaining Arcadian population were in great proportion villagers; rude men, but excellent soldiers, and always ready to follow the Lacedæmonian banners, as well from old habit and military deference, as from the love of plunder.<sup>1</sup>

The defeat of Leuktra effaced this ancient sentiment. The Arcadians not only ceased to count upon victory and plunder in the service of Sparta, but began to fancy that their own military prow-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 19

ess was not inferior to that of the Spartans; while the disappearance of the harmosts left them free to follow their own inclinations. It was by the Mantineans that the movement was first commenced. Divested of Grecian city-life, and condemned to live in separate villages, each under its own philo-Spartan oligarchy, they had nourished a profound animosity, which manifested itself on the first opportunity of deposing these oligarchies and coming again together. The resolution was unanimously adopted, to re-establish Mantinea with its walls, and resume their political consolidation; while the leaders banished by the Spartans at their former intervention, now doubtless returned to become foremost in the work.<sup>1</sup> As the breaking up of Mantinea had been one of the most obnoxious acts of Spartan omnipotence, so there was now a strong sympathy in favor of its re-establishment. Many Arcadians from other quarters came to lend auxiliary labor, while the Eleians sent three talents as a contribution towards the cost. Deeply mortified by this proceeding, yet too weak to prevent it by force, the Spartans sent Agesilaus with a friendly remonstrance. Having been connected with the city by paternal ties of hospitality, he had declined the command of the army of coercion previously employed against it; nevertheless, on this occasion, the Mantinean leaders refused to convene their public assembly to hear his communication, desiring that he would make known his purpose to them. Accordingly, he intimated that he had come with no view of hindering the re-establishment of the city, but simply to request that they would defer it until the consent of Sparta could be formally given; which (he promised) should soon be forthcoming, together with a handsome subscription to lighten the cost. But the Mantinean leaders answered, that compliance was impossible, since a public resolution had already been taken to prosecute the work forthwith. Enraged at such a rebuff, yet without power to resent it, Agesilaus was compelled to return home.<sup>2</sup> The Mantineans persevered and com-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 6; vi, 5, 3.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 4, 5.

Pausanias (viii, 8, 6; ix, 14, 2) states that the Thebans reestablished the city of Mantinea. The act emanated from the spontaneous impulse of the Mantineans and other Arcadians, before the Thebans had yet begun to interfere actively in Peloponnesus, which we shall presently find them doing. But it was doubtless done in reliance upon Theban support, and was in all



pleted the rebuilding of their city, on a level site, and in an elliptical form, surrounded with elaborate walls and towers.

The affront here offered, probably studiously offered, by Mantinean leaders who had either been exiles themselves, or sympathized with the exiles, — was only the prelude to a series of others (presently to be recounted) yet more galling and intolerable. But it was doubtless felt to the quick both by the ephors and by Agesilaus, as a public symptom of that prostration into which they had so suddenly fallen. To appreciate fully such painful sentiment, we must recollect that an exaggerated pride and sense of dignity, individual as well as collective, founded upon military excellence and earned by incredible rigor of training, — was the chief mental result imbibed by every pupil of Lykurgus, and

probability made known to, and encouraged by, Epaminondas. It formed the first step to that series of anti-Spartan measures in Arcadia, which I shall presently relate.

Either the city of Mantinea now built was not exactly in the same situation as the one dismantled in 385 B. C., since the river Ophis did not run through it, as it had run through the former, — or else the course of the Ophis has altered. If the former, there would be three successive sites, the oldest of them being on the hill called Ptolis, somewhat north of Gurzuli. Ptolis was perhaps the larger of the primary constituent villages. Ernst Curtius (*Peloponnesos*, p. 242) makes the hill Gurzuli to be the same as the hill called Ptolis; Colonel Leake distinguishes the two, and places Ptolis on his map northward of Gurzuli (*Peloponnesiaca*, p. 378-381). The summit of Gurzuli is about one mile distant from the centre of Mantinea (Leake, *Peloponnesos*, p. 383).

The walls of Mantinea, as rebuilt in 370 B. C., form an ellipse of about eighteen stadia, or a little more than two miles in circumference. The greater axis of the ellipse points north and south. It was surrounded with a wet ditch, whose waters join into one course at the west of the town, and form a brook which Sir William Gell calls the Ophis (*Itinerary of the Morea*, p. 142). The face of the wall is composed of regularly cut square stones; it is about ten feet thick in all, — four feet for an outer wall, two feet for an inner wall, and an intermediate space of four feet filled up with rubbish. There were eight principal double gates, each with a narrow winding approach, defended by a round tower on each side. There were quadrangular towers, eighty feet apart, all around the circumference of the walls (Ernst Curtius, *Peloponnesos*, p. 236, 237).

These are instructive remains, indicating the ideas of the Greeks respecting fortification in the time of Epaminondas. It appears that Mantinea was not so large as Tegea, to which last Curtius assigns a circumference of more than three miles (p. 253).

hitherto ratified as legitimate by the general testimony of Greece. This was his principal recompense for the severe fatigue, the intense self-suppression, the narrow, monotonous, and unlettered routine, wherein he was born and died. As an individual, the Spartan citizen was pointed out by the finger of admiration at the Olympic and other festivals;<sup>1</sup> while he saw his city supplicated from the most distant regions of Greece, and obeyed almost everywhere near her own border, as Pan-hellenic president. On a sudden, with scarce any preparatory series of events, he now felt this proud prerogative sentiment not only robbed of its former tribute, but stung in the most mortifying manner. Agesilaus, especially, was the more open to such humiliation, since he was not only a Spartan to the core, but loaded with the consciousness of having exercised more influence than any other king before him, — of having succeeded to the throne at a moment when Sparta was at the maximum of her power, — and of having now in his old age accompanied her, in part brought her by his misjudgments, into her present degradation.

Agesilaus had, moreover, incurred unpopularity among the Spartans themselves, whose chagrin took the form of religious scruple and uneasiness. It has been already stated that he was, and had been from childhood, lame; which deformity had been vehemently insisted on by his opponents (during the dispute between him and Leotychides in 398 B. C. for the vacant throne) as disqualifying him for the regal dignity, and as being the precise calamity against which an ancient oracle — "Beware of a lame reign" — had given warning. Ingenious interpretation by Lysander, combined with superior personal merit in Agesilaus, and suspicions about the legitimacy of Leotychides, had caused the objection to be then overruled. But there had always been a party, even during the palmy days of Agesilaus, who thought that he had obtained the crown under no good auspices. And when the humiliation of Sparta arrived, every man's religion suggested to him readily the cause of it,<sup>2</sup> — "See what comes of having set at nought the gracious warning of the gods, and put upon ourselves a lame reign!" In spite of such untoward impression, however, the real energy and bravery of Agesilaus, which had not deserted

<sup>1</sup> Isokrates, *Or.* vi, (Archidamus) s. 111.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, *Agesil.* c. 30, 31, 34.



even an infirm body and an age of seventy years, was more than ever indispensable to his country. He was still the chief leader of her affairs, condemned to the sad necessity of submitting to this Mantinean affront, and much worse that followed it, without the least power of hindrance.

The reestablishment of Mantinea was probably completed during the autumn and winter of B. C. 371-370. Such coalescence of villages into a town, coupled with the predominance of feelings hostile to Sparta, appears to have suggested the idea of a larger political union among all who bore the Arcadian name. As yet, no such union had ever existed; the fractions of the Arcadian name had nothing in common, apart from other Greeks, except many legendary and religious sympathies, with a belief in the same heroic lineage and indigenous antiquity.<sup>1</sup> But now the idea and aspiration, espoused with peculiar ardor by a leading Mantinean named Lykomedes, spread itself rapidly over the country, to form a "commune Arcadum," or central Arcadian authority, composed in certain proportions out of all the sections now autonomous, — and invested with peremptory power of determining by the vote of its majority. Such central power, however, was not intended to absorb or set aside the separate governments, but only to be exercised for certain definite purposes; in maintaining unanimity at home, together with concurrent, independent action, as to foreign states.<sup>2</sup> This plan of Pan-Arcadian federation was warmly promoted by the Mantineans, who looked to it as a proteo-

<sup>1</sup> It seems, however, doubtful whether there were not some common Arcadian coins struck, even before the battle of Leuktra.

Some such are extant; but they are referred by K. O. Müller, as well as by M. Boeckh (*Metrologisch. Untersuchungen*, p. 92) to a later date subsequent to the foundation of Megalopolis.

On the other hand, Ernst Curtius (*Beyträge zur Aeltern Münzkunde*, p. 85-90, Berlin, 1851) contends that there is a great difference in the style and execution of these coins, and that several in all probability belong to a date earlier than the battle of Leuktra. He supposes that these older coins were struck in connection with the Pan-Arcadian sanctuary and temple of Zeus Lykæus, and probably out of a common treasury at the temple of that god for religious purposes; perhaps also in connection with the temple of Artemis Hymnia (*Pausan. viii, 5, 11*) between Mantinea and Orchomenus.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 6. *συνήγον ἐπὶ τὸ συνιέναι πᾶν τὸ Ἀρκαδίαν, καὶ ὅτι νικῶν ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι καὶ τῶν πόλεων, etc.*

Compare *Diodor. xv, 59-62*.

tion to themselves in case the Spartan power should revive; as well as by the Thebans and Argeians, from whom aid was expected in case of need. It found great favor in most parts of Arcadia, especially in the small districts bordering on Laconia, which stood most in need of union to protect themselves against the Spartans, — the Mænarians, Parrhasians, Eutresians, Ægytes,<sup>1</sup> etc. But the jealousies among the more considerable cities made some of them adverse to any scheme emanating from Mantinea. Among these unfriendly opponents were Heræa, on the west of Arcadia bordering on Elis, — Orchomenus,<sup>2</sup> conterminous with Mantinea to the north — and Tegea, conterminous to the south. The hold of the Spartans on Arcadia had been always maintained chiefly through Orchomenus and Tegea. The former was the place where they deposited their hostages taken from other suspected towns; the latter was ruled by Stasippus and an oligarchy devoted to their interests.<sup>3</sup>

Among the population of Tegea, however, a large proportion were ardent partisans of the new Pan-Arcadian movement, and desirous of breaking off their connection with Sparta. At the head of this party were Proxenus and Kallibius; while Stasippus and his friends, supported by a senate composed chiefly of their partisans, vehemently opposed any alteration of the existing system. Proxenus and his partisans resolved to appeal to the assembled people, whom accordingly they convoked in arms; pacific popular assemblies, with free discussion, forming seemingly no part of the constitution of the city. Stasippus and his friends appeared in armed numbers also; and a conflict ensued, in which each party charged the other with bad faith and with striking the first blow.<sup>4</sup> At first Stasippus had the advantage. Proxenus with a few of the

<sup>1</sup> See *Pausanias, viii, 27, 2, 3*.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 11.

<sup>3</sup> For the relations of these Arcadian cities, with Sparta and with each other, see *Thucyd. iv, 134, v, 61, 64, 77*.

<sup>4</sup> Xenophon in his account represents Stasippus and his friends as being quite in the right, and as having behaved not only with justice but with clemency. But we learn from an indirect admission, in another place, that there was also another story, totally different, which represented Stasippus as having begun unjust violence. Compare *Hellenic. vi, 5, 7, 8* with *vi, 5, 36*.

The manifest partiality of Xenophon, in these latter books, greatly diminishes the value of his own belief on such a matter.



opposite party were slain, while Kallibius with the remainder maintained himself near the town-wall, and in possession of the gate on the side towards Mantinea. To that city he had before despatched an express, entreating aid, while he opened a parley with the opponents. Presently the Mantinean force arrived, and was admitted within the gates; upon which Stasippus, seeing that he could no longer maintain himself, escaped by another gate towards Pallantium. He took sanctuary with a few friends in a neighboring temple of Artemis, whither he was pursued by his adversaries, who removed the roof, and began to cast the tiles down upon them. The unfortunate men were obliged to surrender. Fettered and placed on a cart, they were carried back to Tegea, and put on their trial before the united Tegeans and Mantineans, who condemned them and put them to death. Eight hundred Tegeans, of the defeated party, fled as exiles to Sparta.<sup>1</sup>

Such was the important revolution which now took place at Tegea; a struggle of force on both sides, and not of discussion, — as was in the nature of the Greek oligarchical governments, where scarce any serious change of policy in the state could be brought about without violence. It decided the success of the Pan-Arcadian movement, which now proceeded with redoubled enthusiasm. Both Mantinea and Tegea were cordially united in its favor; though Orchomenus, still strenuous in opposing it, hired for that purpose, as well as for her own defence, a body of mercenaries from Corinth under Polytropus. A full assembly of the Arcadian name was convoked at a small town called Asea, in the mountainous district west of Tegea. It appears to have been numerous; attended; for we hear of one place, Eutæa (in the district of Mount Mænalus,<sup>2</sup> and near the borders of Laconia), from whence every single male adult went to the assembly. It was here that the consummation of the Pan-Arcadian confederacy was finally determined; though Orchomenus and Heræa still stood aloof.<sup>3</sup>

There could hardly be a more fatal blow to Sparta than this loss to herself, and transfer to her enemies, of Tegea, the most powerful of her remaining allies.<sup>4</sup> To assist the exiles and avenge Stasip-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 8, 9, 10.

<sup>2</sup> Pausanias, viii, 27, 3.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 2.

<sup>4</sup> See the prodigious anxiety manifested by the Lacedæmonians respecting the sure adhesion of Tegea (Thucyd. v, 64).

pus, as well as to arrest the Arcadian movement, she resolved on a march into the country, in spite of her present dispirited condition; while Heræa and Lepreum, but no other places, sent contingents to her aid. From Elis and Argos, on the other hand, reinforcements came to Mantinea and Tegea. Proclaiming that the Mantineans had violated the recent peace by their entry into Tegea, Agesilaus marched across the border against them. The first Arcadian town which he reached was Eutæa,<sup>1</sup> where he found that all the male adults had gone to the great Arcadian assembly. Though the feeble population, remaining behind, were completely in his power, he took scrupulous care to respect both person and property, and even lent aid to rebuild a decayed portion of the wall. At Eutæa he halted a day or two, thinking it prudent to wait for the junction of the mercenary force and the Boeotian exiles under Polytropus, now at Orchomenus. Against the latter place, however, the Mantineans had marched under Lykomêdes, while Polytropus, coming forth from the walls to meet them, had been defeated with loss, and slain.<sup>2</sup> Hence Agesilaus was compelled to advance onward with his own unassisted forces, through the territory of Tegea up to the neighborhood of Mantinea. His onward march left the way from Asea to Tegea free, upon which the Arcadians assembled at Asea broke up, and marched by night to Tegea; from whence, on the next day, they proceeded to Mantinea, along the mountain range eastward of the Tegeatic plain; so that the whole Arcadian force thus became united. Agesilaus on his

<sup>1</sup> I cannot but think that Eutæa stands marked upon the maps of Kiepert at a point too far from the frontier of Laconia, and so situated in reference to Asea, that Agesilaus must have passed very near Asea in order to get to it; which is difficult to suppose, seeing that the Arcadian convocation was assembled at Asea. Xenophon calls Eutæa πόλιν δημορον with reference to Laconia (Hellen. vi, 5, 12), this will hardly suit with the position marked by Kiepert.

The district called Mænalía must have reached farther southward than Kiepert indicates on his map. It included Oresteion, which was on the straight road from Sparta to Tegea (Thucyd. v, 64; Herodot. ix, 11). Kiepert has placed Oresteion in his map agreeably to what seems the meaning of Pausanias, viii, 44, 3. But it rather appears that the place mentioned by Pausanias must have been *Oresthasion*, and that *Oresteion* must have been a different place, though Pausanias considers them the same. See the geographical Appendix to K. O. Müller's Dorians, vol. ii, p. 442 — Germ. edit.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 13, 14; Diodor. xv, 62.



side, having ravaged the fields and encamped within little more than two miles from the walls of Mantinea, was agreeably surprised by the junction of his allies from Orchomenus, who had eluded by a night-march the vigilance of the enemy. Both on one side and on the other, the forces were thus concentrated. Agesilaus found himself on the first night, without intending it, embosomed in a recess of the mountains near Mantinea, where the Mantineans gathered on the high ground around, in order to attack him from above, the next morning. By a well-managed retreat, he extricated himself from this inconvenient position, and regained the plain; where he remained three days, prepared to give battle if the enemy came forth, in order that he might "not seem (says Xenophon) to hasten his departure through fear."<sup>1</sup> As the enemy kept within their walls, he marched homeward, on the fourth day, to his former camp in the Tegean territory. The enemy did not pursue, and he then pushed on his march, though it was late in the evening, to Eutæa; "wishing (says Xenophon) to get his troops off before even the enemies' fires could be seen, in order that no one might say that his return was a flight. He thought that he had raised the spirit of Sparta out of the previous discouragement, by invading Arcadia and ravaging the country without any enemy coming forth to fight him."<sup>2</sup> The army was then brought back to Sparta and disbanded.

It had now become a matter of boast for Agesilaus (according to his own friendly historian) to keep the field for three or four days, without showing fear of Arcadians and Eleians! So fatally had Spartan pride broken down, since the day (less than eighteen months before) when the peremptory order had been sent to Kleombrotus, to march out of Phokis straight against Thebes!

Nevertheless it was not from fear of Agesilaus, but from a wise discretion, that the Arcadians and Eleians had kept within the

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 20. ὅπως μὴ δοκοῖη φοβούμενος σπεύδειν τὴν ἐφοδόν.

See Leake's Travels in the Morea, vol. iii, c. xxiv, p. 74, 75. The exact spot designated by the words τὸν ὀπίσθεν κόλπον τῆς Μαντινικῆς, seems hardly to be identified.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 21. βουλόμενος ἀπαγαγεῖν τοὺς ἐπλίτας, πρὶν καὶ τὰ πύρα τῶν πολεμίων ἰδεῖν, ἵνα μὴ τις εἴπῃ, ὡς φεύγων ἀπαγάγοι. Ἐκ γὰρ τῆς πρόσθεν ἀθυμίας ἰδοῦναι τε ἀνείληφέναι τὴν πόλιν, ὅτι καὶ ἐμβεβλήκει εἰς τὴν Ἀρκადίαν, καὶ δοῦναι τὴν χώραν οὐδεὶς ἠθέληκει μάχεσθαι: compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30.

walls of Mantinea. Epaminondas with the Theban army was approaching to their aid, and daily expected; a sum of ten talents having been lent by the Eleians to defray the cost.<sup>1</sup> He had been invited by them and by others of the smaller Peloponnesian states, who felt the necessity of some external protector against Sparta, — and who even before they applied to Thebes for aid, had solicited the like interference from Athens (probably under the general presidency accepted by Athens, and the oaths interchanged by her with various inferior cities, since the battle of Leuktra), but had experienced a refusal.<sup>2</sup>

Epaminondas had been preparing for this contingency ever since the battle of Leuktra. The first use made of his victory had been to establish or confirm the ascendancy of Thebes both over the recusant Boeotian cities and over the neighboring Phokians and Lokrians, etc. After this had been accomplished, he must have been occupied (during the early part of 370 B. C.) in anxiously watching the movements of Jason of Pheræ, — who had already announced his design of marching with an imposing force to Delphi for the celebration of the Pythian games (about August 1.) Though this despot was the ally of Thebes, yet as both his power, and his aspirations towards the headship of Greece,<sup>3</sup> were well known, no Theban general, even of prudence inferior to Epaminondas, could venture in the face of such liabilities to conduct away the Theban force into Peloponnesus, leaving Boeotia uncovered. The assassination of Jason relieved Thebes from such apprehensions, and a few weeks sufficed to show that his successors were far less formidable in power as well as in ability. Accordingly, in the autumn of 370 B. C. Epaminondas had his attention free to turn to Peloponnesus, for the purpose both of maintaining the anti-Spartan revolution which had taken place in Tegea, and of seconding the pronounced impulse among the Arcadians towards federative coalition.

But the purposes of this distinguished man went farther still embracing long-sighted and permanent arrangements, such as should forever disable Sparta from recovering her prominent sta-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 19.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv, 62.

Compare Demosthenes, Orat. pro Megalopolit. pp. 205-207, s. 13-23.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xv, 60.



tion in the Grecian world. While with one hand he organized Arcadia, with the other he took measures for replacing the exiled Messenians on their ancient territory. To achieve this, it was necessary to dispossess the Spartans of the region once known as independent Messenia, under its own line of kings, but now, for near three centuries, the best portion of Laconia, tilled by Helots for the profit of proprietors at Sparta. While converting these Helots into free Messenians, as their forefathers had once been, Epaminondas proposed to invite back all the wanderers of the same race who were dispersed in various portions of Greece; so as at once to impoverish Sparta by loss of territory, and to plant upon her flank a neighbor bitterly hostile. It has been already mentioned, that during the Peloponnesian war, the exiled Messenians had been among the most active allies of Athens and Sparta, — at Naupaktus, at Sphacteria, at Pylus, in Kephallenia, and elsewhere. Expelled at the close of that war by the triumphant Spartans,<sup>1</sup> not only from Peloponnesus, but also from Naupaktus and Kephallenia, these exiles had since been dispersed among various Hellenic colonies; at Rhegium in Italy, at Messênê in Sicily, at Hesperides in Libya. From 404 B. C. (the close of the war) to 373 B. C., they had remained thus without a home. At length, about the latter year (when the Athenian confederate navy again became equal or superior to the Lacedæmonian on the west coast of Peloponnesus), they began to indulge the hope of being restored to Naupaktus.<sup>2</sup> Probably their request may have been preferred and discussed in the synod of Athenian allies, where the Thebans sat as members. Nothing however had been done towards it by the Athenians, — who soon became fatigued with the war, and at length made peace with Sparta, — when the momentous battle of Leuktra altered, both completely and suddenly, the balance of power in Greece. A chance of protection was now opened to the Messenians from Thebes, far more promising than they had ever had from Athens. Epaminondas, well aware of the loss as well as humiliation that he should inflict upon Sparta by restoring them to their ancient territory, entered into communication with them, and caused them to be invited to Peloponnesus from all their distant places of emigration.<sup>3</sup> By the

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 34.

<sup>2</sup> Pausanias, iv, 26, 3.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xv, 66; Pausanias, iv, 26, 3, 4.

time of his march into Arcadia, in the late autumn of 370 B. C., many of them had already joined him, burning with all their ancient hatred of Sparta, and contributing to aggravate the same sentiment among Thebans and allies.

With the scheme of restoring the Messenians, was combined in the mind of Epaminondas another, for the political consolidation of the Arcadians; both being intended as parts of one strong and self-supporting organization against Sparta on her own border. Of course he could have accomplished nothing of the kind, if there had not been a powerful spontaneous movement towards consolidation among the Arcadians themselves. But without his guidance and protection, the movement would have proved abortive, through the force of local jealousies within the country, fomented and seconded by Spartan aid from without. Though the general vote for federative coalition had been passed with enthusiasm, yet to carry out such a vote to the satisfaction of all, without quarrelling on points of detail, would have required far more of public-minded sentiment, as well as of intelligence, than what could be reckoned upon among the Arcadians. It was necessary to establish a new city; since the standing jealousy between Mantinea and Tegea, now for the first time embarked in one common cause, would never have permitted that either should be preferred as the centre of the new consolidation.<sup>1</sup> Besides fixing upon the new site required, it was indispensable also to choose between conflicting exigencies, and to break up ancient habits, in a way such as could hardly have been enforced by any majority purely Arcadian. The authority here deficient was precisely supplied by Epaminondas; who brought with him a victorious army and a splendid personal name, combined with impartiality as to the local politics of Arcadia, and single-minded hostility to Sparta.

It was with a view to these two great foundations, as well as to expel Agesilaus, that Epaminondas now marched the Theban army into Arcadia; the command being voluntarily intrusted to him by Pelopidas and the other Bœotarchs present. He arrived shortly after the retirement of Agesilaus, while the Arcadi-

<sup>1</sup> To illustrate small things by great, — At the first formation of the Federal Constitution of the United States of America, the rival pretensions of New York and Philadelphia were among the principal motives for creating the new federal city of Washington.



ans and Eleians were ravaging the lands of the recusant town of Heræa. As they speedily came back to greet his arrival, the aggregate confederate body, — Argeians, Arcadians, and Eleians, united with the Thebans and their accompanying allies, — is said to have amounted to forty thousand, or according to some, even to seventy thousand men.<sup>1</sup> Not merely had Epaminondas brought with him a choice body of auxiliaries, — Phokians, Lokrians, Eubœans, Akarnanians, Herakleots, Malians, and Thessalian cavalry and peltasts, — but the Bœotian bands themselves were so brilliant and imposing, as to excite universal admiration. The victory of Leuktra had awakened among them an enthusiastic military ardor, turned to account by the genius of Epaminondas, and made to produce a finished discipline which even the unwilling Xenophon cannot refuse to acknowledge.<sup>2</sup> Conscious of the might of their assembled force, within a day's march of Laconia, the Arcadians, Argeians, and Eleians pressed Epaminondas to invade that country, now that no allies could approach the frontier to its aid. At first he was unwilling to comply. He had not come prepared for the enterprise; being well aware, from his own journey to Sparta (when the peace-congress was held there prior to the battle of Leuktra), of the impracticable nature of the intervening country, so easy to be defended, especially during the winter-season, by troops like the Lacedæmonians, whom he believed to be in occupation of all the passes. Nor was his reluctance overcome until the instances of his allies were backed by assurances from the Arcadians on the frontier, that the passes were not all guarded; as well as by invitations from some of the discontented Perieki, in Laconia. These Perieki engaged to revolt openly, if he would only show himself in the country. They told him that there was a general slackness throughout Laconia in obeying the military requisitions from Sparta; and tendered their lives as atonement if they should be found to speak falsely. By such encouragements, as well as by the general impatience of all around him to

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 31; and compare Agesil. and Pomp c. 4; Diodor. xv. 62. Compare Xenophon, Agesilaus, 2, 24.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 23. Οἱ δὲ Ἀρκάδες καὶ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Ἠλαιοὶ ἐπειθοῦς αὐτοῦς ἡγεῖσθαι ὡς τάχιστα εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν, ἐπιδείκνυντες μὲν τὸ ἐαυτῶν πλῆθος, ὑπερεπαινοῦντες δὲ τὸ τῶν Θηβαίων στράτευμα. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν Βοιωτοὶ ἐγυμνάζοντο πάντες περὶ τὰ ὅπλα, ἀγαλλόμενοι τῇ ἐν Δεύκτροις νίκῃ etc.

revenge upon Sparta her long career of pride and abused ascendancy, Epaminondas was at length induced to give the order of invasion.<sup>1</sup>

That he should have hesitated in taking this responsibility, will not surprise us, if we recollect, that over and above the real difficulties of the country, invasion of Laconia by land was an unparalleled phenomenon, — that the force of Sparta was most imperfectly known, — that no such thought had been entertained when he left Thebes, — that the legal duration of command, for himself and his colleagues, would not permit it, — and that though his Peloponnesian allies were forward in the scheme, the rest of his troops and his countrymen might well censure him, if the unknown force of resistance turned out as formidable as their associations from old time led them to apprehend.

The invading army was distributed into four portions, all penetrating by different passes. The Eleians had the westernmost and easiest road, the Argeians the easternmost;<sup>2</sup> while the Thebans themselves and the Arcadians formed the two central divisions. The latter alone experienced any serious resistance. More daring even than the Thebans, they encountered Ischolaus the Spartan at Ium or Oeum in the district called Skiritis, attacked him in the village, and overpowered him by vehemence of assault, by superior numbers, and seemingly also by some favor or collusion<sup>3</sup> on the part of the inhabitants. After a desperate resistance, this brave Spartan with nearly all his division perished. At Karyæ, the Thebans also found and surmounted some resistance; but the victory of the Arcadians over Ischolaus operated as an encouragement to all, so that the four divisions reached Sellasia<sup>4</sup> and were again

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 24, 25.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv, 64.

See Colonel Leake's Travels in the Morea, vol. iii, ch. 23, p. 29.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 26. When we read that the Arcadians got on the roofs of the houses to attack Ischolaus, this fact seems to imply that they were admitted into the houses by the villagers.

<sup>4</sup> Respecting the site of Sellasia, Colonel Leake thinks, and advances various grounds for supposing, that Sellasia was on the road from Sparta to the north-east, towards the Thyreatis; and that Karyæ was on the road from Sparta northward, towards Tegea. The French investigators of the Morea, as well as Professor Ross and Kiepert, hold a different opinion, and place Sellasia on the road from Sparta northward towards Tegea (Leake.



united in safety. Undefended and deserted (seemingly) by the Spartans, Sellasia was now burnt and destroyed by the invaders, who, continuing their march along the plain or valley towards the Eurotas, encamped in the sacred grove of Apollo. On the next day they reached the Eurotas, at the foot of the bridge which crossed that river and led to the city of Sparta.

Epaminondas found the bridge too well-guarded to attempt forcing it; a strong body of Spartan hoplites being also discernible on the other side, in the sacred ground of Athênê Alea. He therefore marched down the left bank of the river, burning and plundering the houses in his way, as far as Amyklæ, between two and three miles below Sparta. Here he found a ford, though the river was full, from the winter season; and accomplished the passage, defeating, after a severe contest, a body of Spartans who tried to oppose it. He was now on the same side of the river as Sparta, to which city he slowly and cautiously made his approach; taking care to keep his Theban troops always in the best battle order, and protecting them, when encamped, by felled trees; while the Arcadians and other Peloponnesian allies dispersed around to plunder the neighboring houses and property.<sup>1</sup>

Great was the consternation which reigned in the city; destitute of fortifications, yet hitherto inviolate in fact and unassailable even in idea. Besides their own native force, the Spartans had no auxiliaries except those mercenaries from Orchomenus who had come back with Agesilaus; nor was it certain beforehand that even these troops would remain with them, if the invasion became formidable.<sup>2</sup> On the first assemblage of the irresistible army on their frontier, they had despatched one of their commanders of foreign contingents (called Xenâgi) to press the instant coming of such Peloponnesian allies as remained faithful to them; and also envoys to Athens, entreating assistance from that city. Auxiliaries were obtained, and rapidly put under march, from Pellênê,

<sup>1</sup> Peloponnesiaca, p. 342-352; Ross, Seisen im Peloponnes. p. 187; Berlin (1841).

Upon such a point, the authority of Colonel Leake is very high; yet the opposite opinion respecting the site of Sellasia seems to me preferable.

Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 30; Diodor. xv, 65.

<sup>2</sup> This I apprehend to be the meaning of the phrase — *ἐπεὶ μὲντοι ἔμενον οἱ ἐν Ὀρχομένῳ μισθοφόροι*, etc.

Sikyon, Phlius, Corinth, Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis.<sup>1</sup> But the ordinary line of march into Laconia was now impracticable to them; the whole frontier being barred by Argæians and Arcadians. Accordingly they were obliged to proceed first to the Argolic peninsula, and from thence to cross by sea (embarking probably at Halieis on the south-western coast of the peninsula) to Prasîæ on the eastern coast of Laconia; from whence they made their way over the Laconian mountains to Sparta. Being poorly provided with vessels, they were forced to cross in separate detachments, and to draw lots for priority.<sup>2</sup> By this chance the Phliasian contingent did not come over until the last; while the xenagus, eager to reach Sparta, left them behind, and conducted the rest thither, arriving only just before the confederate enemies debouched from Sellasia. The Phliasians, on crossing to Prasîæ, found neither their comrades nor the xenagus, but were obliged to hire a guide to Sparta. Fortunately they arrived there both safely and in time, eluding the vigilance of the enemy, who were then near Amyklæ.

These reinforcements were no less seasonable to Sparta, than creditable to the fidelity of the allies. For the bad feeling which habitually reigned in Laconia, between the Spartan citizens on one side, and the Periœki and Helots on the other, produced in this hour of danger its natural fruits of desertion, alarm, and weakness. Not only were the Periœki and Helots in standing discontent, but even among the Spartan citizens themselves, a privileged fraction called Peers had come to monopolize political honors; while the remainder, — poorer men, yet ambitious and active, and known under the ordinary name of the Inferiors, — were subject to a degrading exclusion, and rendered bitterly hostile. The account given in a previous chapter of the conspiracy of Kinadon, will have disclosed the fearful insecurity of the Spartan citizen, surrounded by so many disaffected companions; Periœki and Helots

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 29; vii, 2, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 2. *Καὶ διαβαίνειν τελευταῖοι λαχόντες (the Phliasians) εἰς Πρασιᾶς τῶν συμβοηθῶντων. . . . οὐ γὰρ πρότε ἀφίστασαν, ἀλλ' οὐδ', ἐπεὶ ὁ ξεναγὸς τοὺς προδιαβεβῶτας λαβὼν ἀπολιπὼν αὐτοὺς ὤχετο, οὐδ' ὥς ἀπεστράφησαν, ἀλλ' ἡγεμόνα μισθωσάμενοι εἰς Πρασιῶν, ὄντων τῶν πολεμίων περὶ Ἀμύκλας, ὅπως ἐδύναντο διαβύντες εἰς Σπάρτην ἀφίκοντο.*



in Laconia, inferior citizens at Sparta. On the appearance of the invading enemy, indeed, a certain feeling of common interest arose, since even the disaffected might reasonably imagine that a plundering soldiery, if not repelled at the point of the sword, would make their condition worse instead of better. And accordingly, when the ephors made public proclamation, that any Helot who would take heavy armor and serve in the ranks as an hoplite, should be manumitted,—not less than six thousand Helots gave in their names to serve. But a body thus numerous, when seen in arms, became itself the object of mistrust to the Spartans; so that the arrival of their new allies from Prasizæ was welcomed as a security, not less against the armed Helots within the city, than against the Thebans without.<sup>1</sup> Open enmity, however, was not wanting. A considerable number both of Pericæki and Helots actually took arms on behalf of the Thebans; others remained inactive, disregarding the urgent summons from the ephors, which could not now be enforced.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 28, 29. ὥστε φόβον αὐτοῖσι παρεῖχον συνεταγμένοι καὶ λίαν ἐδόκουν πολλοὶ εἶναι, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 25; vi, 5, 32; vii, 2, 2.

It is evident from the last of these three passages, that the number of Pericæki and Helots who actually revolted, was very considerable; and that the contrast between the second and third passages evinces the different feelings with which the two seem to have been composed by Xenophon.

In the second, he is recounting the invasion of Epaminondas, with a wish to soften the magnitude of the Spartan disgrace and calamity as much as he can. Accordingly, he tells us no more than this,—“there were some among the Pericæki, who even took active service in the attack of Gythium, and fought along with the Thebans,”—*ἦσαν δὲ τινες τῶν Περιεκαίων, οἳ καὶ ἐπέθεντο καὶ συνεστρατεύοντο τοῖς μετὰ Θηβαίων*

But in the third passage (vii, 2, 2: compare his biography called Agesilaus. ii, 24) Xenophon is extolling the fidelity of the Phliasians to Sparta under adverse circumstances of the latter. Hence it then suits his argument, to magnify these adverse circumstances, in order to enhance the merit of the Phliasians; and he therefore tells us,—“Many of the Pericæki, all the Helots, and all the allies except a few, had revolted from Sparta,”—*σφαλέντων δ' αὐτῶν τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις μάχῃ, καὶ ἀποστάντων μὲν πολλῶν Περιεκαίων, ἀποστάντων δὲ πάντων τῶν Εἰλωτῶν, ἐτι δὲ τῶν συμμάχων πλεονεξίας, ἐπιστρατεύοντων δ' αὐτοῖς, ὡς εἰπεῖν, πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πιστοὶ δέμειναν (the Phliasians).*

I apprehend that both statements depart from the reality, though in opposite directions. I have adopted in the text something between the two

Under such wide-spread feelings of disaffection the defence even of Sparta itself against the assailing enemy was a task requiring all the energy of Agesilaus. After having vainly tried to hinder the Thebans from crossing the Eurotas, he was forced to abandon Amyklæ and to throw himself back upon the city of Sparta, towards which they immediately advanced. More than one conspiracy was on the point of breaking out, had not his vigilance forestalled the projects. Two hundred young soldiers of doubtful fidelity were marching, without orders, to occupy a strong post (sacred to Artemis) called the Issorium. Those around him were about to attack them, but Agesilaus, repressing their zeal, went up alone to the band, addressed them in language betokening no suspicion, yet warning them that they had mistaken his orders: their services were needed, not at the Issorium, but in another part of the city. They obeyed his orders, and moved to the spot indicated; upon which he immediately occupied the Issorium with troops whom he could trust. In the ensuing night, he seized and put to death fifteen of the leaders of the two hundred. Another conspiracy, said to have been on the point of breaking out, was repressed by seizing the conspirators in the house where they were assembled, and putting them to death untried; the first occasion (observes Plutarch) on which any Spartan was ever put to death untried,<sup>1</sup>—a statement which I hesitate to believe without knowing from whom he borrowed it, but which, if true, proves that the Spartan kings and ephors did not apply to Spartan citizens the same measure as to Pericæki and Helots.

By such severe proceedings, disaffection was kept under; while the strong posts of the city were effectively occupied, and the wider approaches barricaded by heaps of stones and earth.<sup>2</sup> Though destitute of walls, Sparta was extremely defensible by position. Epaminondas marched slowly up to it from Amyklæ; the Arcadians and others in his army spreading themselves to burn and plunder the neighborhood. On the third or fourth day his cavalry occupied the Hippodrome (probably a space of level ground near the river, under the hilly site of the town), where the Spartan cavalry, though inferior both in number and in goodness, gained

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 32; Polyænus, ii, 1, 14; Ælian, V H. xiv, 27.

<sup>2</sup> Æneas. Poliorceticus, c. 2, p. 15.



an advantage over them, through the help of three hundred chosen hoplites whom Agesilaus had planted in ambush hard by, in a precinct sacred to the Dioskuri. Though this action was probably of little consequence, yet Epaminondas did not dare to attempt the city by storm. Satisfied with having defied the Spartans and manifested his mastery of the field even to their own doors, he marched away southward down to Eurotas. To them, in their present depression, it was matter of consolation and even of boasting,<sup>1</sup> that he had not dared to assail them in their last stronghold. The agony of their feelings, — grief, resentment, and wounded honor, — was intolerable. Many wished to go out and fight, at all hazard; but Agesilaus resisted them with the same firmness as Perikles had shown at Athens, when the Peloponnesians first invaded Attica at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Especially the Spartan women, who had never before beheld an enemy, are said to have manifested emotions so furious and distressing, as to increase much the difficulty of defence.<sup>2</sup> We are even told that Antalkidas, at that time one of the ephors, sent his children for safety away from Sparta to the island of Kythêra. Epaminondas knew well how desperate the resistance of the Spartans would be if their city were attacked; while to himself, in the midst of a hostile and impracticable country, repulse would be absolute ruin.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 32. Καὶ τὸ μὲν μὴ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν προσβαλεῖν αὐτὸς, ἥδη τι ἐδόκει θαρραλεώτερον, εἶναι.

This passage is not very clear, nor are the commentators unanimous either as to the words or as to the meaning. Some omit μὴ, construe ἐδόκει as if it were ἐδόκει τοῖς Θηβαίοις, and translate θαρραλεώτερον "excessively rash."

I agree with Schneider in dissenting from this alteration and construction. I have given in the text what I believe to be the meaning.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 28; Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 8; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 32, 33; Plutarch, comp. Agesil. and Pomp. c. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Aristotle (in his Politic, iv, 10, 5), discussing the opinion of those political philosophers who maintained that a city ought to have no walls, but to be defended only by the bravery of its inhabitants, — gives various reasons against such opinion, and adds "that these are old-fashioned thinkers; that the cities which made such ostentatious display of personal courage, have been proved to be wrong by actual results, — λίαν ἀρχαίως ὑπολαμβάνονσι, καὶ ταυτ' ὁρῶντες ἐλεγχόμενας ἐργῶ τὰς ἐκείνως καλλωπισσάμενας.

The commentators say (see the note of M. Barth. St. Hilaire) that Aristotle has in his view Sparta at the moment of this Theban invasion. I do

On leaving Sparta, Epaminondas carried his march as far as Helos and Gythium on the sea-coast; burning and plundering the country, and trying for three days to capture Gythium, which contained the Lacedæmonian arsenal and ships. Many of the Lacedæmonian Perioeci joined and took service in his army; nevertheless his attempt on Gythium did not succeed; upon which he turned back and retraced his steps to the Arcadian frontier. It was the more necessary for him to think of quitting Laconia, since his Peloponnesian allies, the Arcadians and others, were daily stealing home with the rich plunder which they had acquired, while his supplies were also becoming deficient.<sup>1</sup>

Epaminondas had thus accomplished far more than he had projected when quitting Thebes; for the effect of the expedition on Grecian opinion was immense. The reputation of his army, as well as his own, was prodigiously exalted; and even the narrative of Xenophon, unfriendly as well as obscure, bears involuntary testimony both to the excellence of his generalship and to the good discipline of his troops. He made his Thebans keep in rank and hold front against the enemy, even while their Arcadian allies were dispersing around for plunder. Moreover, the insult and humiliation to Sparta were still greater than that inflicted by the battle of Leuktra; which had indeed shown that she was no longer invincible in the field, but had still left her with the admitted supposition of an inviolable territory and an unapproachable city.

The resistance of the Spartans indeed (except in so far as regards their city) had been far less than either friends or enemies expected;

not see what else he can mean; yet at the same time, if such be his meaning, the remark is surely difficult to admit. Epaminondas came close up to Sparta, but did not dare to attempt to carry it by assault. If the city had had walls like those of Babylon, they could not have procured for her any greater protection. To me the fact appears rather to show (contrary to the assertion of Aristotle) that Sparta was so strong by position, combined with the military character of her citizens, that she could dispense with walls.

Polyænus (ii, 2, 5) has an anecdote, I know not from whom borrowed, to the effect that Epaminondas might have taken Sparta, but designedly refrained from doing so, on the ground that the Arcadians and others would then no longer stand in need of Thebes. Neither the alleged matter of fact, nor the reason, appear to me worthy of any credit. Ælian (V H. iv. 8) has the same story, but with a different reason assigned.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 50; Diodor. xv, 67.



the belief in their power was thus proportionally abridged. It now remained for Epaminondas to complete their humiliation by executing those two enterprises which had formed the special purpose of his expedition: the reestablishment of Messênê, and the consolidation of the Arcadians.

The recent invasion of Laconia, victorious as well as lucrative, had inspired the Arcadians with increased confidence and antipathy against Sparta, and increased disposition to listen to Epaminondas. When that eminent man proclaimed the necessity of establishing a strong frontier against Sparta on the side of Arcadia, and when he announced his intention of farther weakening Sparta by the restoration of the exiled Messenians, — the general feeling of the small Arcadian communities, already tending in the direction of coalescence, became strong enough to overbear all such impediments of detail as the breaking up of ancient abode and habit involves. Respecting early Athenian history, we are told by Thucydides,<sup>1</sup> that the legendary Theseus, "having become powerful, in addition to his great capacity," had effected the discontinuance of those numerous independent governments which once divided Attica, and had consolidated them all into one common government at Athens. Just such was the revolution now operated by Epaminondas, through the like combination of intelligence and power. A Board of *Ækists* or Founders was named to carry out the resolution taken by the Arcadian assemblies at Asea and Tegea, for the establishment of a Pan-Arcadian city and centre. Of this Board, two were from Tegea, two from Mantinea, two from Kleitor, two from the district of Menalus, two from that of the Parrhasians. A convenient site being chosen upon the river Helisson (which flowed through and divided the town in two), about twenty miles west of Tegea, well-fitted to block up the marches of Sparta in a north-westerly direction, — the foundation of the new Great City (Megalopolis) was laid by the *Ækists* jointly with Epaminondas. Forty distinct Arcadian townships,<sup>2</sup> from all sides of this centre, were persuaded to join the new community. Ten were from the Mænalii, eight from the Parrhasii, six from the Eutresii;

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii, 15. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ Θησεὺς ἔβασ' ἔειπεν, γένόμενος μετὰ τοῦ ξυνοῦ τοῦ καὶ δυνατὸς, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv, 72.

three great sections of the Arcadian name, each an aggregate of villages. Four little townships, occupying a portion of the area intended for the new territory, yet being averse to the scheme, were constrained to join; but in one of them, Trapezus, the aversion was so strong, that most of the inhabitants preferred to emigrate, and went to join the Trapezuntines in the Euxine Sea (Trebizond), who received them kindly. Some of the leading Trapezuntines were even slain by the violent temper of the Arcadian majority. The walls of the new city enclosed an area of fifty stadia in circumference (more than five miles and a half); while an ample rural territory was also gathered around it, extending northward as much as twenty-four miles from the city, and conterminous on the east with Tegea, Mantinea, Orchomenus, and Kaphyæ, — on the west with Messênê,<sup>1</sup> Phigalia, and Heræa.

The other new city, — Messênê, — was founded under the joint auspices of the Thebans and their allies, Argeians and others; Epitelês being especially chosen by the Argeians for that purpose.<sup>2</sup> The Messenian exiles, though eager and joyful at the thought of regaining their name and nationality, were averse to fix their new city either at *Cechalia* or *Andania*, which had been the scenes of their calamities in the early wars with Sparta. Moreover the site of Mount *Ithômê* is said to have been pointed out by the hero *Kaukon*, in a dream, to the Argeian general *Epitelês*. The local circumstances of this mountain (on which the last gallant resistance of the revolted Messenians against Sparta had been carried on, between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars) were such, that the indications of dreams, prophets, and religious signs coincided fully with the deliberate choice of a judge like Epaminondas. In after days, this hill *Ithômê* (then bearing the town and citadel of *Messênê*), together with the *Akrocorinthus*, were marked out by *Do-*

<sup>1</sup> Pausan. viii, 27; viii, 35, 5. Diodor. xv, 63.

See Mr. Fynes Clinton, *Fasti Hellenici*, Appendix, p. 418, where the facts respecting Megalopolis are brought together and discussed.

It is remarkable that though Xenophon (*Hellen.* v, 2, 7) observes that the capture of Mantinea by Agesipolis had made the Mantineans see the folly of having a river run through their town, — yet in choosing the site of Megalopolis, this same feature was deliberately reproduced: and in this choice the Mantineans were parties concerned.

<sup>2</sup> Pausan. iv, 26, 6.



metrius of Pharus as the two horns of Peloponnesus: whoever held these two horns, was master of the bull.<sup>1</sup> Ithômê was near two thousand five hundred feet above the level of the sea, having upon its summit an abundant spring of water, called Klepsydra. Upon this summit the citadel or acropolis of the new town of Messênê was built; while the town itself was situated lower down on the slope, though connected by a continuous wall with its acropolis. First, solemn sacrifices were offered, by Epaminondas, who was recognized as Œkist or Founder,<sup>2</sup> to Dionysus and Apollo Ismenius, — by the Argeians, to the Argeian Hêrê and Zeus Nemeius, — by the Messenians, to Zeus Ithomatês and the Dioskuri. Next, prayer was made to the ancient Heroes and Heroines of the Messenian nation, especially to the invincible warrior Aristomenes, that they would now come back and again take up their residence as inmates in enfranchised Messênê. After this, the ground was marked out and the building was begun, under the sound of Argeian and Bœotian flutes, playing the strains of Pronomus and Sakadas. The best masons and architects were invited from all Greece, to lay out the streets with regularity, as well as to ensure a proper distribution and construction of the sacred edifices.<sup>3</sup> In respect of the fortifications, too, Epaminondas was studiously provident. Such was their excellence and solidity, that they exhibited matter for admiration even in the after-days of the traveller Pausanias.<sup>4</sup>

From their newly-established city on the hill of Ithômê, the Messenians enjoyed a territory extending fifteen miles southward down to the Messenian Gulf, across a plain, then as well as now, the richest and most fertile in Peloponnesus; while to the eastward, their territory was conterminous with that of Arcadia and the contemporary establishment of Megalopolis. All the newly-appropriated space was land cut off from the Spartan dominion. How much was cut off in the direction south-east of Ithômê (along the north-eastern coast of the Messenian Gulf), we cannot exactly say. But it would appear that the Perioeki of Thuria, situated in that neighborhood, were converted into an independent community

<sup>1</sup> Strabo, viii, p. 361; Polybius, vii, 11.


<sup>2</sup> Pausan. ix, 14, 2 compare the inscription on the statue of Epaminondas (ix, 15, 4).

Pausan. iv, 27, 3.

<sup>4</sup> Pausan. ii, 31, 5

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Greece, vol. I, p. 100.





and protected by the vicinity of Messênê.<sup>1</sup> What is of more importance to notice, however, is,—that all the extensive district westward and south-westward of Ithômê,—all the south-western corner of Peloponnesus, from the river Neda southward to Cape Akritas,—was now also subtracted from Sparta. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the Spartan Brasidas had been in garrison near Methônê<sup>2</sup> (not far from Cape Akritas); Pylus,—where the Athenian Demosthenes erected his hostile fort, near which the important capture at Sphacteria was effected,—had been a maritime point belonging to Sparta, about forty-six miles from the city;<sup>3</sup> Aulon (rather farther north, near the river Neda) had been at the time of the conspiracy of Kinadon a township of Spartan Perioeki, of very doubtful fidelity.<sup>4</sup> Now all this wide area, from the north-eastern corner of the Messenian Gulf westward, the best half of the Spartan territory, was severed from Sparta to become the property of Perioeki and Helots, converted into freemen; not only sending no rent or tribute to Sparta, as before, but bitterly hostile to her from the very nature of their tenure. It was in the ensuing year that the Arcadian army cut to pieces the Lacedæmonian garrison at Asinê,<sup>5</sup> killing the Spartan polemarch Geronor; and probably about the same time the other Lacedæmonian garrisons in the south-western peninsula must have been expelled. Thus liberated, the Perioeki of the region welcomed the new Messênê as the guarantee of their independence. Epaminondas, besides confirming the independence of Methônê and Asinê, re-constituted some other towns,<sup>6</sup> which under Lacedæmonian dominion had probably been kept unfortified and had dwindled away.

<sup>1</sup> Pausan. iv, 31, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iv, 3.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 25.

<sup>4</sup> Pausan. iv, 27, 4. ἀνέγκιστον δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πολισμοῦ, etc. Pausanias, following the line of coast from the mouth of the river Pamisus in the Messenian Gulf, round Cape Akritas to the mouth of the Neda in the Western Sea,—enumerates the following towns and places,—Kōronê, Kolônides, Asinê, the Cape Akritas, the Harbor Phœnikus, Methônê, or Mothônê, Pylus, Aulon (Pausan. iv, 34, 35, 36). The account given by Skylax (Periplus, c. 46, 47) of the coast of these regions, appears to me confused and unintelligible. He reckons Asinê and Mothônê as cities of Laconia; but he seems to have conceived these cities as being in the central southern projection of Peloponnesus (whereof Cape Tænarus forms the extremity); and

<sup>5</sup> Thucyd. ii, 25.

<sup>6</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 8.

In the spring of 425 B. C., when Demosthenes landed at Pylus, Thucydides considers it a valuable acquisition for Athens, and a serious injury to Sparta, to have lodged a small garrison of Messenians in that insignificant post, as plunderers of Spartan territory and instigators of Helots to desertion,<sup>1</sup> — especially as their dialect could not be distinguished from that of the Spartans themselves. How prodigious must have been the impression throughout Greece, when Epaminondas, by planting the Messenian exiles and others on the strong frontier city and position of Ithômê, deprived Sparta in a short time of all the wide space between that mountain and the western sea, enfranchising the Perioeki and Helots contained in it! We must recollect that the name Messênê had been from old times applied generally to this region, and that it was never bestowed upon any city before the time of Epaminondas. When therefore the Spartans complained of "the liberation of Messênê," — "the loss of Messênê," — they included in the word, not simply the city on Mount Ithômê, but all this territory besides; though it was not all comprised in the domain of the new city.

They complained yet more indignantly, that along with the genuine Messenians, now brought back from exile, — a rabble of their own emancipated Perioeki and Helots had been domiciled on their border.<sup>2</sup> Herein were included, not only such of these two classes

not to have conceived at all the south-western projection, whereof Cape Akritas forms the extremity. He recognizes Messene, but he pursues the Parapulus of the Messenian coast from the mouth of the river Neda to the coast of the Messenian Gulf south of Ithômê without interruption. Then after that, he mentions Asinê, Mothônê, Achilleios Limên, and Psamathus, with Cape Tænarus between them. Besides, he introduces in Messenia two different cities, — one called Messênê, the other called Ithômê; whereas there was only one Messênê situated on Mount Ithome.

I cannot agree with Niebuhr, who, resting mainly upon this account of Skylax, considers that the south-western corner of Peloponnesus remained a portion of Laconia and belonging to Sparta, long after the establishment of the city of Messênê. See the Dissertation of Niebuhr on the age of Skylax of Karyanda, — in his *Kleine Schriften*, p. 119.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv, 3, 42.

<sup>2</sup> The Oration (vi.) called Archidamus, by Isokrates, exhibits powerfully the Spartan feeling of the time, respecting this abstraction of territory, and emancipation of serfs, for the purpose of restoring Messênê, s. 30. Καὶ αὐτὸν τοῦτον ὡς ἀληθῶς Μεσσηνίους κατήγον (the Thebans), ἡδίκουν μὲν αὐτοὺς διὰ τὸ εὐλογητέως αὐτοὺς εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐξημέρτανον· νῦν δὲ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἀμάρτανον

as, having before dwelt in servitude throughout the territory westward of Ithômê, now remained there in a state of freedom — but also doubtless a number of others who deserted from other parts of Laconia. For as we know that such desertions had been not inconsiderable, even when there was no better shelter than the outlying posts of Pylus and Kythêra — so we may be sure that they became much more numerous, when the neighboring city of Messênê was founded under adequate protection, and when there was a chance of obtaining, westward of the Messenian Gulf, free lands with a new home. Moreover, such Perioeki and Helots as had actually joined the invading army of Epaminondas in Laconia, would be forced from simple insecurity to quit the country when he retired, and would be supplied with fresh residences in the newly-enfranchised territory. All these men would pass at once, out of a state of peculiarly harsh servitude, into the dignity of free and equal Hellenes,<sup>1</sup> sending again a solemn Messenian legation or Theôry to the Olympic festival, after an interval of more than three centuries,<sup>2</sup> — outdoing their former masters in the magnitude of

ἡμῖν παρακατοικίζουσιν, ὥστε μὴ τοῦτ' εἶναι χαλεπώτατον, εἰ τῆς χώρας στερησόμεθα παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' εἰ τοὺς δούλους ἡμετέρους ἐποπόμεθα κυριεύουσιν αὐτῆς ὄντας.

Again — s. 101. ἦν γὰρ παρακατοικισόμεθα τοὺς Ἕλληνας, καὶ τὴν πόλιν ταύτην περιδόμεν ἀξήθεισαν, τίς οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι πάντα τὸν βίον ἐν ταραχαῖς καὶ κινδύνοις διατελούμεν ὄντες; compare also sections 8 and 102.

<sup>1</sup> Isokrates, Orat. vi, (Archidam.) s. 111. Ἄξιον δὲ καὶ τὴν Ὀλυμπιάδα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσχυνθῆναι πανηγύρεις, ἐν αἷς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν (Spartans) ζῆλον τότερος ἦν καὶ θαυμαστότερος τῶν ἀθλητῶν τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι τὰς νίκας ἀναρριπόμενον. Εἰς αἷς τίς ἂν ἐλθεῖν τολμήσειεν, ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι καταφρονησόμενος — ἐτι δὲ πρὸς τοῦτοις ὀψόμενος μὲν τοὺς οἰκέτας ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας ἧς οἱ πατέρες ἡμῖν κατέλιπον ἀπαρχὰς καὶ θυσίας μεγάλους ἡμῶν ποιούμενους, ἀκουσόμενος δ' αὐτῶ τοιαυταῖς βλασφημίαις χρωμένων, οἷαις περ εἰκόδες τοὺς χαλεπώτερον τῶν ἄλλων δεδουλευσότας, ἐξ ἰσού δὲ νῦν τὰς συνθήκας τοῖς δεσπότηαις πεποιημένους.

This oration, composed only five or six years after the battle of Leuktra, is exceedingly valuable as a testimony of the Spartan feeling under such severe humiliations.

<sup>2</sup> The freedom of the Messenians had been put down by the first Messenian war, after which they became subjects of Sparta. The second Messenian war arose from their revolt.

No free Messenian legation could therefore have visited Olympia since the termination of the first war; which is placed by Pausanias (iv, 13, 4) in 723 B. C., though the date is not to be trusted. Pausanias (iv, 27, 3) gives



their offerings from the same soil,—and requiring them for previous ill-usage by words of defiance and insult, instead of that universal deference and admiration which a Spartan had hitherto been accustomed to look upon as his due.

The enfranchisement and reorganization of all Western Laconia, the renovation of the Messenian name, the foundation of the two new cities (Messênê and Megalopolis) in immediate neighborhood and sympathy,—while they completed the degradation of Sparta, constituted in all respects the most interesting political phenomena that Greece had witnessed for many years. To the profound mortification of the historian,—he is able to recount nothing more than the bare facts, with such inferences as these facts themselves warrant. Xenophon, under whose eyes all must have passed, designedly omits to notice them;<sup>1</sup> Pausanias, whom we

two hundred and eighty-seven years between the end of the second Messenian war and the foundation of Messênê by Epaminondas. See the note of Siebelis on this passage. Exact dates of these early wars cannot be made out.

<sup>1</sup> The partiality towards Sparta, visible even from the beginning of Xenophon's history, becomes more and more exaggerated throughout the two latter books wherein he recounts her misfortunes; it is moreover intensified by spite against the Thebans and Epaminondas as her conquerors. But there is hardly any instance of this feeling, so glaring or so discreditable, as the case now before us. In describing the expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus in the winter of 370–369 B. C., he totally omits the foundation both of Messênê and Megalopolis, though in the after part of his history, he alludes (briefly) both to one and to the other as facts accomplished. He represents the Thebans to have come into Arcadia with their magnificent army, for the simple purpose of repelling Agesilaus and the Spartans, and to have been desirous of returning to Boeotia, as soon as it was ascertained that the latter had already returned to Sparta (vi, 5, 23). Nor does he once mention the name of Epaminondas as general of the Thebans in the expedition, any more than he mentions him at Leuktra.

Considering the momentous and striking character of these facts, and the eminence of the Theban general by whom they were achieved, such silence on the part of an historian, who professes to recount the events of the time, is an inexcusable dereliction of his duty to state the *whole truth*. It is plain that Messênê and Megalopolis wounded to the quick the philo-Spartan sentiment of Xenophon. They stood as permanent evidences of the degradation of Sparta, even after the hostile armies had withdrawn from Laconia. He prefers to ignore them altogether. Yet he can find space to recount, with disproportionate prolixity, the two applications of

have to thank for most of what we know, is prompted by his religious imagination to relate many divine signs and warnings, but little matter of actual occurrence. Details are altogether withheld from us. We know neither how long a time was occupied in the building of the two cities, nor who furnished the cost; though both the one and the other must have been considerable. Of the thousand new arrangements, incident to the winding up of many small townships, and the commencement of two large cities, we are unable to render any account. Yet there is no point of time wherein social phenomena are either so interesting or so instructive. In describing societies already established and ancient, we find the force of traditional routine almost omnipotent in its influence both on men's actions and on their feelings; bad as well as good is preserved in one concrete, since the dead weight of the past stifles all constructive intelligence, and leaves little room even for improving aspirations. But the forty small communities which coalesced into Megalopolis, and the Messenians and other settlers who came for the first time together on the hill of Ithômê, were in a state in which new exigencies of every kind pressed for immediate satisfaction. There was no file to afford a precedent, nor any resource left except to submit all the problems to discussion by those whose character and judgment was most esteemed. Whether the problems were well- or ill-solved, there must have been now a genuine and earnest attempt to strike out as good a solution as the lights of the time and place permitted, with a certain latitude for conflicting views. Arrangements must have been made for the apportionment of houses and lands among the citizens, by purchase, or grant, or both together; for the political and judicial constitution; for religious and recreative ceremonies, for military defence, for markets, for the security and transmission of property, etc. All these and many other social wants of a nascent community must now have been provided for, and it would have been highly interesting to know how. Unhappily the means are denied to us. We can record little more than the bare fact that these two youngest members of the Hellenic brotherhood of cities were born at the same time, and under the auspices of the same presiding genius, Epami-

the Spartans to Athens for aid, with the favorable reception which they obtained,—also the exploits of the Phliasiens in their devoted attachment to Sparta.



nondas; destined to sustain each other in neighborly sympathy and in repelling all common danger from the attacks of Sparta; a purpose, which, even two centuries afterwards, remained engraven on the mind of a Megalopolitan patriot like Polybius.<sup>1</sup>

Megalopolis was intended not merely as a great city in itself, but as the centre of the new confederacy; which appears to have comprised all Arcadia, except Orchomenus and Heræa. It was enacted that a synod or assembly, from all the separate members of the Arcadian name, and in which probably every Arcadian citizen from the constituent communities had the right of attending, should be periodically convoked there. This assembly was called the Ten Thousand, or the Great Number. A body of Arcadian troops, called the Epariti, destined to uphold the federation, and receiving pay when on service, was also provided. Assessments were levied upon each city for their support, and a Pan-Arcadian general (probably also other officers) was named. The Ten Thousand, on behalf of all Arcadia, received foreign envoys, — concluded war, or peace, or alliance, — and tried all officers or other Arcadians brought before them on accusations of public misconduct.<sup>2</sup> The great Athenian orators, Kallistratus, Demosthenes, Æschines, on various occasions pleaded before it.<sup>3</sup> What were its times of meeting, we are unable to say. It contributed seriously, for a certain time, to sustain a Pan-Arcadian communion of action and sentiment which had never before existed;<sup>4</sup> and to prevent, or soften, those dissensions which had always a tendency to break out among the separate Arcadian cities. The patriotic enthusiasm, however, out of which Megalopolis had first arisen, gradually became enfeebled. The city never attained that preeminence or power which its founders contemplated, and which had caused the city to be laid out on a scale too large for the population actually inhabiting it.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See a striking passage in Polybius, iv, 32. Compare also Pausan. 7, 29, 3; and viii, 27, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 38; vii, 4, 2, 33, 34; vii, 3, 1.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Legat. p. 344, s. 11, p. 403, s. 220, Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 296, c. 49; Cornel. Nepos. Epamin. c. 6.

<sup>4</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 38; vii, 4, 33; Diodor. xv, 59; Aristotie — *Ἀπὸ τῶν Πολιτειῶν* — ap. Harpokration, v, *Μύριοι*, p. 106, ed. Neumann.

<sup>5</sup> Polybius, ii, 55.

Not only was the portion of Laconia west of the Messenian Gulf now rendered independent of Sparta, but also much of the territory which lies north of Sparta, between that city and Arcadia. Thus the Skiritæ (hardy mountaineers of Arcadian race, heretofore dependent upon Sparta, and constituting a valuable contingent to her armies),<sup>1</sup> with their territory forming the northern frontier of Laconia towards Arcadia, became from this time independent of and hostile to Sparta.<sup>2</sup> The same is the case even with a place much nearer to Sparta, — Sellasia; though this latter was retaken by the Lacedæmonians four or five years afterwards.<sup>3</sup>

Epaminondas remained about four months beyond the legal duration of his command in Arcadia and Laconia.<sup>4</sup> The sufferings of a severe mid-winter were greatly mitigated to his soldiers by the Arcadians, who, full of devoted friendship, pressed upon them an excess of hospitality which he could not permit consistently with his military duties.<sup>5</sup> He stayed long enough to settle all the preliminary debates and difficulties, and to put in train of serious execution the establishment of Messênê and Megalopolis. For the completion of a work thus comprehensive, which changed the face and character of Peloponnesus, much time was of course necessary. Accordingly, a Theban division under Pamenes was left to repel all obstruction from Sparta;<sup>6</sup> while Tegea also, from this time for-

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v, 66.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 21.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 12; Diodor. xv, 64.

<sup>4</sup> The exact number of eighty-five days, given by Diodorus (xv, 67), seems to show that he had copied literally from Ephorus or some other older author.

Plutarch, in one place (Agesil. c. 32), mentions "three entire months," which differs little from eighty-five days. He expresses himself as if Epaminondas spent all this time in ravaging Laconia. Yet again, in the Apophth. Reg. p. 194 B. (compare Ælian, V H. xiii, 42), and in the life of Pelopidas (c. 25), Plutarch states, that Epaminondas and his colleagues held the command four whole months over and above the legal time, being engaged in their operations in Laconia and Messenia. This seems to me the more probable interpretation of the case, for the operations seem too large to have been accomplished in either three or four months.

<sup>5</sup> See a remarkable passage in Plutarch — *An Seni sit gerenda Respublica* (c. 8, p. 788 A.).

<sup>6</sup> Pausan. viii, 27, 2. Pamenes is said to have been an earnest friend of Epaminondas, but of older political standing, to whom Epaminondas partly owed his rise (Plutarch. Reip. Ger. Præcep. p. 805 F.).



ward, for some years, was occupied as a post by a Theban *harmost* and garrison.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile the Athenians were profoundly affected by these proceedings of Epaminondas in Peloponnesus. The accumulation of force against Sparta was so powerful, that under a chief like him, it seemed sufficient to crush her; and though the Athenians were now neutral in the contest, such a prospect was not at all agreeable to them,<sup>2</sup> involving the aggrandizement of Thebes to a point inconsistent with their security. It was in the midst of the successes of Epaminondas that envoys came to Athens from Sparta, Corinth, and Phlius, to entreat her aid. The message was one not merely humiliating to the Lacedæmonians, who had never previously sent the like request to any Grecian city, — but also difficult to handle in reference to Athens. History showed abundant acts of jealousy and hostility, little either of good feeling or consentient interest, on the part of the Lacedæmonians towards her. What little was to be found, the envoys dexterously brought forward; going back to the dethronement of the Peisistratids from Athens by Spartan help, the glorious expulsion of Xerxes from Greece by the joint efforts of both cities, — and the auxiliaries sent by Athens into Laconia in 465 B. C., to assist the Spartans against the revolted Messenians

Pausanias places the foundation of Megalopolis in the same Olympic year as the battle of Leuktra, and a few months after that battle, during the archonship of Phrasikleides at Athens; that is, between Midsummer 371 and Midsummer 370 B. C. (Pausan. viii, 27, 6). He places the foundation of Messênê in the next Olympic year, under the archonship of Dyskinêtos at Athens; that is, between Midsummer 370 and Midsummer 369 B. C. (iv, 27, 5).

The foundation of Megalopolis would probably be understood to date from the initial determination taken by the assembled Arcadians, soon after the revolution at Tegea, to found a Pan-Arcadian city and federative league. This was probably taken before Midsummer 370 B. C., and the date of Pausanias would thus be correct.

The foundation of Messênê would doubtless take its æra from the expedition of Epaminondas, — between November and March 370–369 B. C. which would be during the archonship of Dyskinêtos at Athens, as Pausanias affirms.

What length of time was required to complete the erection and establishment of either city, we are not informed.

Diodorus places the foundation of Megalopolis in 368 B. C. (xv 72)

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 36

<sup>2</sup> Isokrates (Archidamus), Or. vi, s. 129

on Mount Ithômê. In these times (he reminded the Athenian assembly) Thebes had betrayed the Hellenic cause by joining Xerxes, and had been an object of common hatred to both. Moreover the maritime forces of Greece had been arrayed under Athens in the Confederacy of Delos, with full sanction and recommendation from Sparta; while the headship of the latter by land had in like manner been accepted by the Athenians. He called on the assembly, in the name of these former glories, to concur with Sparta in forgetting all the deplorable hostilities which had since intervened, and to afford to her a generous relief against the old common enemy. The Thebans might even now be decimated (according to the vow said to have been taken after the repulse of Xerxes), in spite of their present menacing ascendancy, — if Athens and Sparta could be brought heartily to cooperate; and might be dealt with as Thebes herself had wished to deal with Athens after the Peloponnesian war, when Sparta refused to concur in pronouncing the sentence of utter ruin.<sup>1</sup>

This appeal from Sparta was earnestly seconded by the envoys from Corinth and Phlius. The Corinthian speaker contended, that Epaminondas and his army, passing through the territory of Corinth and inflicting damage upon it in their passage into Peloponnesus, had committed a glaring violation of the general peace, sworn in 371 B. C., first at Sparta and afterwards at Athens, guaranteeing universal autonomy to every Grecian city. The envoy from Phlius, — while complimenting Athens on the proud position which she now held, having the fate of Sparta in her hands, — dwelt on the meed of honor which she would earn in Greece, if she now generously interfered to rescue her ancient rival, forgetting past injuries and remembering only past benefits. In adopting such policy, too, she would act in accordance with her own true interests; since, should Sparta be crushed, the Thebans would become undisputed heads of Greece, and more formidable still to Athens.<sup>2</sup>

It was not among the least marks of the prostration of Sparta, that she should be compelled to send such an embassy to Athens, and to entreat an amnesty for so many untoward realities during the past. The contrast is indeed striking, when we set her present language against that which she had held respecting Athens, before and through the Peloponnesian war.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi. 5. 34, 35.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi. 5. 38–48.



At first, her envoys were heard with doubtful favor; the sentiment of the assembly being apparently rather against than for them. "Such language from the Spartans (murmured the assembled citizens) is intelligible enough during their present distress; but so long as they were in good circumstances, we received nothing but ill-usage from them."<sup>1</sup> Nor was the complaint of the Spartans, that the invasion of Laconia was contrary to the sworn peace guaranteeing universal autonomy, admitted without opposition. Some said that the Lacedæmonians had drawn the invasion upon themselves, by their previous interference with Tegea and in Arcadia; and that the intervention of the Mantineans at Tegea had been justifiable, since Stasippus and the philo-Laconian party in that city had been the first to begin unjust violence. On the other hand, the appeal made by the envoys to the congress of Peloponnesian allies held in 404 B. C., after the surrender of Athens, — when the Theban deputy had proposed that Athens should be totally destroyed, while the Spartans had strenuously protested against so cruel a sentence — made a powerful impression on the assembly, and contributed more than anything else to determine them in favor of the proposition.<sup>2</sup> "As Athens was then, so Sparta is now, on the brink of ruin, from the fiat of the same enemy: Athens was then rescued by Sparta, and shall she now leave the rescue unrequited?" Such was the broad and simple issue which told upon the feelings of the assembled Athenians, disposing them to listen with increasing favor both to the envoys from Corinth and Phlius, and to their own speakers on the same side.

To rescue Sparta, indeed, was prudent as well as generous. A counterpoise would thus be maintained against the excessive aggrandizement of Thebes, which at this moment doubtless caused serious alarm and jealousy to the Athenians. And thus, after the first ebullition of resentment against Sparta, naturally suggested by the history of the past, the philo-Spartan view of the situation gradually became more and more predominant in the assembly. Kallistratus<sup>3</sup> the orator spoke eloquently in support of the Lacedæ-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 35. Οἱ μὲντοι Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ πᾶν ἐδέξαντο, ἀλλὰ θροῦς τις τοιοῦτος διήλθεν, ὥς νῦν μὲν τὰτα λέγουσιν· ὅτι δὲ ἐν ἑπάρτῳ, ἐπέκειντο ἡμῖν.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 35. Μέγιστον δὲ τῶν λεχθέντων παρὰ Λακιδαιμονίους ἰδόμεναι εἶναι, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenes cont. Næær p. 1353.

dæmonians; while the adverse speakers were badly listened to, as pleading in favor of Thebes, whom no one wished to aggrandize farther. A vote, decisive and enthusiastic, was passed for assisting the Spartans with the full force of Athens; under the command of Iphikrates, then residing as a private citizen<sup>1</sup> at Athens, since the peace of the preceding year, which had caused him to be recalled from Korkyra.

As soon as the sacrifices, offered in contemplation of this enterprise were announced to be favorable, Iphikrates made proclamation that the citizens destined for service should equip themselves and muster in arms in the grove of Akadêmus (outside the gates), there to take their evening meal, and to march the next morning at daybreak. Such was the general ardor, that many citizens went forth from the gates even in advance of Iphikrates himself; and the total force which followed him is said to have been twelve thousand men, — not named under conscription by the general, but volunteers.<sup>2</sup> He first marched to Corinth, where he halted some days; much to the discontent of his soldiers, who were impatient to accomplish their project of carrying rescue to Sparta. But Iphikrates was well aware that all beyond Corinth was hostile ground, and that he had formidable enemies to deal with. After having established his position at Corinth, and obtained information regarding the enemy, he marched into Arcadia, and there made war without any important result. Epaminondas and his army had quitted Laconia, while many of the Arcadians and Eleians had gone home with the plunder acquired; so that Sparta was, for the time, out of danger. Impelled in part by the recent manifestation of Athens,<sup>3</sup> the Theban general himself soon commenced his march of return into Bœotia, in which it was necessary for him to pass the line of Mount Oneium between Corinth and Kenchreæ. This line was composed of difficult ground, and afforded good means of resistance to the passage of an army; nevertheless Iphikrates, though he occupied its two extremities, did not attempt directly to

Xenokleides, a poet, spoke in opposition to the vote for supporting Sparta (ib.).

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 49; Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 479.

<sup>2</sup> This number is stated by Diodorus (xv, 63).

<sup>3</sup> To this extent we may believe what is said by Cornelius Nepos (Iphikrates, c. 2).



bar the passage of the Thebans. He contented himself with sending out from Corinth all his cavalry, both Athenian and Corinthian to harass them in their march. But Epaminondas beat them back with some loss, and pursued them to the gates of Corinth. Excited by this spectacle, the Athenian main body within the town were eager to march out and engage in general battle. Their ardor was however repressed by Iphikrates; who, refusing to go forth, suffered the Thebans to continue their retreat unmolested.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The account here given in the text coincides as to the matter of fact with Xenophon, as well as with Plutarch; and also (in my belief) with Pausanias (Xen. Hell. vi, 5, 51; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 24; Pausan. ix, 14, 3).

But though I accept the facts of Xenophon, I cannot accept either his suppositions as to the purpose, or his criticisms on the conduct, of Iphikrates. Other modern critics appear to me not to have sufficiently distinguished Xenophon's *facts* from his *suppositions*.

Iphikrates (says Xenophon), while attempting to guard the line of Mount Oneium, in order that the Thebans might not be able to reach Bœotia, — left the excellent road adjoining to Kenchreæ unguarded. Then, — wishing to inform himself, whether the Thebans had as yet passed the Mount Oneium, he sent out as scouts all the Athenian and all the Corinthian cavalry. Now (observes Xenophon) a few scouts can see and report as well as a great number; while the great number find it more difficult to get back in safety. By this foolish conduct of Iphikrates, in sending out so large a body, several horsemen were lost in the retreat; which would not have happened if he had only sent out a few.

The criticism here made by Xenophon appears unfounded. It is plain, from the facts which he himself states, that Iphikrates never intended to bar the passage of the Thebans; and that he sent out his whole body of cavalry, not simply as scouts, but to harass the enemy on ground which he thought advantageous for the purpose. That so able a commander as Iphikrates should have been guilty of the gross blunders with which Xenophon here reproaches him, is in a high degree improbable; it seems to me more probable that Xenophon has misconceived his real purpose. Why indeed should Iphikrates wish to expose the whole Athenian army in a murderous conflict for the purpose of preventing the homeward march of the Thebans? His mission was, to rescue Sparta; but Sparta was now no longer in danger; and it was for the advantage of Athens that the Thebans should go back to Bœotia, rather than remain in Peloponnesus. That he should content himself with harassing the Thebans, instead of barring their retreat directly, is a policy which we should expect from him.

There is another circumstance in this retreat which has excited discussion among the commentators, and on which I dissent from their views. It is connected with the statement of Pausanias, who says, — Ὡς προῖδν τῷ στρατῷ (Epaminondas) κατὰ Λέχαιον ἐγίνετο, καὶ διεξίεναι τῆς ὁδοῦ τὰ στένα καὶ

On returning to Thebes, Epaminondas with Pelopidas and the other Bœotarchs, resigned the command. They had already

δύσβατα ἐμελλεν, Ἰφικράτης ὁ Τιμοθέου πελάστας καὶ ἄλλην Ἀθηναίων ἐχὼν δύναμιν, ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς Θεβαίοις. Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ τοὺς ἐπιθεμένους τρέπεται, καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀφικόμενος Ἀθηναίων τὸ ἄστυ, ὡς ἐπεξίεναι μαχουμένους τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐκώλυεν Ἰφικράτης, ὁ δὲ αὐθις ἐς τὰς Θήβας ἀπήλυνε.

In this statement there are some inaccuracies, as that of calling Iphikrates "son of Timotheus," and speaking of Lechæum, where Pausanias ought to have named Kenchreæ. For Epaminondas could not have passed Corinth on the side of Lechæum, since the Long Walls, reaching from one to the other, would prevent him; moreover, the "rugged ground" was between Corinth and Kenchreæ, not between Corinth and Lechæum.

But the words which occasion most perplexity are those which follow "Epaminondas repulses the assailants, and having come to the city itself of the Athenians, when Iphikrates forbade the Athenians to come out and fight, he (Epaminondas) again marched away to Thebes."

What are we to understand by the city of the Athenians? The natural sense of the word is certainly Athens; and so most of the commentators relate. But when the battle was fought between Corinth and Kenchreæ, can we reasonably believe that Epaminondas pursued the fugitives to Athens — through the city of Megara, which lay in the way, and which seems then (Diodor. xv, 68) to have been allied with Athens? The station of Iphikrates was Corinth; from thence he had marched out, — and thither his cavalry, when repulsed, would go back, as the nearest shelter.

Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Greece, vol. v, ch. 39, p. 141) understands Pausanias to mean, that Iphikrates retired with his defeated cavalry to Corinth, — that Epaminondas then marched straight on to Athens, — and that Iphikrates followed him. "Possibly (he says) the only mistake in this statement is, that it represents the presence of Iphikrates, instead of his absence, as the cause which prevented the Athenians from fighting. According to Xenophon, Iphikrates must have been in the rear of Epaminondas."

I cannot think that we obtain this from the words of Xenophon. Neither he nor Plutarch countenance the idea that Epaminondas marched to the walls of Athens, which supposition is derived solely from the words of Pausanias. Xenophon and Plutarch intimate only that Iphikrates interposed some opposition, and not very effective opposition, near Corinth, to the retreating march of Epaminondas, from Peloponnesus into Bœotia.

That Epaminondas should have marched to Athens at all, under the circumstances of the case, when he was returning to Bœotia, appears to me in itself improbable, and to be rendered still more improbable by the silence of Xenophon. Nor is it indispensable to put this construction even upon Pausanias; who may surely have meant by the words — πρὸς αὐτὸ Ἀθηναίων τὸ ἄστυ, — not Athens, but the city then occupied by the Athenians engaged, — that is, Corinth. The city of the Athenians, in reference to this battle, was



retained it for four months longer than the legal expiration of their term. Although, by the constitutional law of Thebes, any general who retained his functions longer than the period fixed by law was pronounced worthy of death, yet Epaminondas, while employed in his great projects for humiliating Sparta and founding the two hostile cities on her border, had taken upon himself to brave this illegality, persuading all his colleagues to concur with him. On resigning the command, all of them had to undergo that trial of accountability which awaited every retiring magistrate, as a matter of course, — but which, in the present case, was required on special ground, since all had committed an act notoriously punishable as well as of dangerous precedent. Epaminondas undertook the duty of defending his colleagues as well as himself. That he as well as Pelopidas had political enemies, likely to avail themselves of any fair pretext for accusing him, — is not to be doubted. But we may well doubt, whether on the present occasion any of these enemies actually came forward to propose that the penalty legally incurred should be inflicted; not merely because this proposition, in the face of a victorious army, returning elate with their achievements and proud of their commanders, was full of danger to the mover himself, — but also for another reason, — because Epaminondas would hardly be imprudent enough to wait for the case to be stated by his enemies. Knowing that the illegality committed was flagrant and of hazardous example, — having also the reputation of his colleagues as well as his own to protect, — he would forestall accusation by coming forward himself to explain and justify the proceeding. He set forth the glorious results of the expedition just finished; the

Corinth; it was the city out of which the troops of Iphikrates had just marched, and to which, on being defeated, they naturally retired for safety, pursued by Epaminondas to the gates. The statement of Pausanias, — that Iphikrates would not let the Athenians in the town (Corinth) go out to fight, — then follows naturally. Epaminondas, finding that they would not come out, drew back his troops, and resumed his march to Thebes.

The stratagem of Iphikrates noticed by Polyænus (iii, 9, 29), can hardly be the same incident as this mentioned by Pausanias. It purports to be a nocturnal surprise planned by the Thebans against Athens; which certainly must be quite different (if it be in itself a reality) from this march of Epaminondas. And the stratagem ascribed by Polyænus to Iphikrates is of a strange and highly improbable character.

invasion and devastation of Laconia, hitherto unvisited by any enemy, — the confinement of the Spartans within their walls, — the liberation of all Western Laconia, and the establishment of Messênê as a city, — the constitution of a strong new Arcadian city, forming, with Tegea on one flank and Messênê on the other, a line of defence on the Spartan frontier, so as to ensure the permanent depression of the great enemy of Thebes, — the emancipation of Greece generally, from Spartan ascendancy, now consummated.

Such justification, — whether delivered in reply to a substantive accuser, or (which is more probable) tendered spontaneously by Epaminondas himself, — was not merely satisfactory, but triumphant. He and the other generals were acquitted by acclamation; without even going through the formality of collecting the votes.<sup>1</sup> And it appears that both Epaminondas and Pelopidas were immediately reappointed among the Bœotarchs of the year.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 25; Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 194 B.; Pausanias, ix, 14, 4; Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 7, 8; Ælian, V. H. xiii, 42.

Pausanias states the fact plainly and clearly; the others, especially Nepos and Ælian, though agreeing in the main fact, surround it with colors exaggerated and false. They represent Epaminondas as in danger of being put to death by ungrateful and malignant fellow-citizens; Cornelius Nepos puts into his mouth a justificatory speech of extreme insolence (compare Arist. Or. xlv, *περὶ τοῦ παραφθέγγματος* — p. 385 Jebb.; p. 520 Dindorf.); which, had it been really made, would have tended more than anything else to set the public against him, — and which is moreover quite foreign to the character of Epaminondas. To carry the exaggeration still farther, Plutarch (De Vitioso Pudore, p. 540 E.) describes Pelopidas as trembling and begging for his life.

Epaminondas had committed a grave illegality, which could not be passed over without notice in his trial of accountability. But he had a good justification. It was necessary that he should put in the justification; when put in, it passed triumphantly. What more could be required? The facts, when fairly stated, will not serve as an illustration of the alleged ingratitude of the people towards great men.

<sup>2</sup> Diodorus (xv, 81) states that Pelopidas was Bœotarch without interruption, annually reappointed, from the revolution of Thebes down to his decease. Plutarch also (Pelopid. c. 34) affirms that when Pelopidas died, he was in the thirteenth year of his appointment; which may be understood as the same assertion in other words. Whether Epaminondas was rechosen does not appear.

Sievers denies the reappointment as well of Pelopidas as of Epaminondas. But I do not see upon what grounds; for, in my judgment, Epaminondas appears again as commander in Peloponnesus during this same year



## CHAPTER LXXIX.

FROM THE FOUNDATION OF MESSENE AND MEGALOPOLIS TO  
THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS.

PRODIGIOUS was the change operated throughout the Grecian world during the eighteen months between June 371 B. C. (when the general peace, including all except Thebes, was sworn at Sparta, twenty days before the battle of Leuktra), and the spring of 369 B. C., when the Thebans, after a victorious expedition into Peloponnesus, were reconducted home by Epaminondas.

How that change worked in Peloponnesus, amounting to a partial reconstitution of the peninsula, has been sketched in the preceding chapter. Among most of the cities and districts hitherto dependent allies of Sparta, the local oligarchies, whereby Spartan influence had been maintained, were overthrown, not without harsh and violent reaction. Laconia had been invaded and laid waste, while the Spartans were obliged to content themselves with guarding their central hearth and their families from assault. The western and best half of Laconia had been wrested from them; Messênê had been constituted as a free city on their frontier; a large proportion of their Perioeci and Helots had been converted into independent Greeks bitterly hostile to them; moreover the Arcadian population had been emancipated from their dependence, and organized into self-acting jealous neighbors in the new city of Megalopolis, as well as in Tegea and Mantinea. The once philo-Laconian Tegea was now among the chief enemies of Sparta; and the Skiritæ, so long numbered as the bravest of the auxiliary troops of the latter, were now identified in sentiment with Arcadians and Thebans against her.

Out of Peloponnesus, the change wrought had also been considerable; partly, in the circumstances of Thessaly and Macedonia, partly in the position and policy of Athens.

(369 B. C.) Sievers holds Epaminondas to have commanded without being Boeotarch; but no reason is produced for this (Sievers, *Geschicht. Griech. bis zur Schlacht von Mantinea*, p. 277).

At the moment of the battle of Leuktra (July, 371 B. C.) Jason was tagus of Thessaly, and Amyntas king of Macedonia. Amyntas was dependent on, if not tributary to, Jason, whose dominion, military force, and revenue, combined with extraordinary personal energy and ability, rendered him decidedly the first potentate in Greece, and whose aspirations were known to be unbounded; so that he inspired more or less alarm everywhere, especially to weaker neighbors like the Macedonian prince. Throughout a reign of twenty-three years, full of trouble and peril, Amyntas had cultivated the friendship both of Sparta and of Athens,<sup>1</sup> especially the former. It was by Spartan aid only that he had been enabled to prevail over the Olynthian confederacy, which would otherwise have proved an overmatch for him. At the time when Sparta aided him to crush that promising and liberal confederacy, she was at the maximum of her power (382-379 B. C.), holding even Thebes under garrison among her subject allies. But the revolution of Thebes, and the war against Thebes and Athens (from 378 B. C. downward) had sensibly diminished her power on land; while the newly-organized naval force and maritime confederacy of the Athenians, had overthrown her empire at sea. Moreover, the great power of Jason in Thessaly had so grown up (combined with the resistance of the Thebans) as to cut off the communication of Sparta with Macedonia, and even to forbid her (in 374 B. C.) from assisting her faithful ally, the Pharsalian Polydamas, against him.<sup>2</sup> To Amyntas, accordingly, the friendship of Athens, now again the greatest maritime potentate in Greece, had become more important than that of Sparta. We know that he tried to conciliate the powerful Athenian generals, Iphikrates and Timotheus. He adopted the former as his son;<sup>3</sup> at what exact period, cannot be discovered; but I have

<sup>1</sup> Æschines, *De Fals. Leg.* c. 13, p. 249; Isokrates, *Or. v.* (Philipp.) s. 124. 'Ο γὰρ πατήρ σου (Isokrates to Philip) πρὸς τὰς πόλεις ταύτας (Sparta, Athens, Argos, and Thebes), αἷς σοι παραινῶ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, πρὸς ἀπάσας οἰκείως εἶχε.

The connection of Amyntas with Thebes could hardly have been considerable; that with Argos, was based upon a strong legendary and ancestral sentiment rather than on common political grounds; with Athens, it was both political and serious; with Sparta, it was attested by the most essential military aid and coöperation.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. *Hellen.* vi, 1, 17.

<sup>3</sup> Æschines, *De Fals. Leg.* c. 13, p. 249.



already stated that Iphikrates had married the daughter of Kotys king of Thrace, and had acquired a maritime settlement called Drys, on the Thracian coast. In the years 378-372 B. C., we find Timotheus also in great favor with Amyntas, testified by a valuable present sent to him at Athens; a cargo of timber, the best produce of Macedonia.<sup>1</sup> Amyntas was at this period on the best footing with Athens, sent his deputies as a confederate to the regular synod there assembled, and was treated with considerable favor.<sup>2</sup>

The battle of Leuktra (July 371 B. C.) tended to knit more closely the connection between Amyntas and the Athenians, who were now the auxiliaries most likely to sustain him against the ascendancy of Jason. It produced at the same time the more important effect of stimulating the ambition of Athens in every direction. Not only her ancient rival, Sparta, beaten in the field and driven from one humiliation to another, was disabled from opposing her, and even compelled to solicit her aid, — but new rivals, the Thebans, were suddenly lifted into an ascendancy inspiring her with mingled jealousy and apprehension. Hence fresh hopes as well as fresh jealousies conspired to push Athens in a career of aspiration such as had never appeared open to her since the disasters of 404 B. C. Such enlargement of her views was manifested conspicuously by the step taken two or three months after the battle of Leuktra (mentioned in my preceding chapter), — of causing the peace, which had already been sworn at Sparta in the preceding month of June, to be resworn under the presidency and guarantee of Athens, by cities binding themselves mutually to each other as defensive allies of Athens; thus silently disenthroning Sparta and taking her place.

On land, however, Athens had never held, and could hardly expect to hold, anything above the second rank, serving as a bulwark against Theban aggrandizement. At sea she already occupied the first place, at the head of an extensive confederacy; and it was to

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. cont. Timotheum, c. 8, p. 1194; Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 1, 11.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 13, p. 248. τὴν πατρικὴν εὐνοίαν, καὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας ἃς ὑμεῖς ὑπῆρξατε Ἀμύντα, τῷ Φιλίππου πατρὶ, etc.

Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. c. 30, p. 660. τὴν πατρικὴν φιλίαν ἀνευσεύσθαι (Philip to the Athenians): compare *ibid.* c. 29, p. 657.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 2.

farther maritime aggrandizement that her present chances, as well as her past traditions, pointed. Such is the new path upon which we now find her entering. At the first formation of her new confederacy, in 378 B. C., she had distinctly renounced all idea of resuming the large amount of possessions, public and private, which had been snatched from her along with her empire at the close of the Peloponnesian war; and had formally proclaimed that no Athenian citizen should for the future possess or cultivate land out of Attica — a guarantee against renovation of the previous kleruchies or out-possession. This prudent self-restraint, which had contributed so much during the last seven years to raise her again into naval preëminence, is now gradually thrown aside, under the tempting circumstances of the moment. Henceforward, the Athenian maritime force becomes employed for the recovery of lost possessions as well as for protection or enlargement of the confederacy. The prohibition against kleruchies out of Attica will soon appear to be forgotten. Offence is given to the prominent members of the maritime confederacy; so that the force of Athens, misemployed and broken into fragments, is found twelve or thirteen years afterwards unable to repel a new aggressor, who starts up, alike able and unexpected, in the Macedonian prince Philip, son of Amyntas.

Very different was the position of Amyntas himself towards Athens, in 371 B. C. He was an unpretending ally, looking for help in case of need against Jason, and sending his envoy to the meeting at Athens about September or October 371 B. C., when the general peace was resworn under Athenian auspices. It was at this meeting that Athens seems to have first put forth her new maritime pretensions. While guaranteeing to every Grecian city, great and small, the enjoyment of autonomy, she made exception of some cities which she claimed as belonging to herself. Among these was certainly Amphipolis; probably also the towns in the Thracian Chersonesus and Potidæa; all which we find, a few years afterwards, occupied by Athenians.<sup>1</sup> How much of their lost possessions the Athenians thought it prudent now to reclaim, we cannot distinctly make out. But we know that their aspirations grasped

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. (Philippic. ii, c. 4, p. 71; De Halonneso. c. 3, p. 79; De Rebas Chersones. c. 2, p. 91): also Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosthen. c. 6 p. 163.



much more than Amphipolis;<sup>1</sup> and the moment was probably thought propitious for making other demands besides. Amyntas through his envoy, together with the rest of the assembled envoys, recognized without opposition the right of the Athenians to Amphipolis.<sup>2</sup>

Such recognition was not indeed in itself either any loss to Amyntas, or any gain to Athens; for Amphipolis, though bordering on his kingdom, had never belonged to him, nor had he any power of transferring it. Originally an Athenian colony,<sup>3</sup> next taken from

<sup>1</sup> Compare the aspirations of Athens, as stated in 391 B. C., when the propositions of peace recommended by Andokides were under consideration, aspirations, which were then regarded as beyond all hope of attainment, and imprudent even to talk about (Andokides, *De Pace*, s. 15). *φέρει, ἄλλα Χερρόνησον καὶ τὰς ἀποικίας καὶ τὰ ἐγκτήματα καὶ τὰ χρεῖα ἵνα ἀπολάβωμεν; Ἄλλ' οὔτε βασιλεὺς, οὔτε οἱ σύμμαχοι, συγχωροῦσιν ἡμῖν, μεθ' ὧν αὐτὰ δεῖ πολεμοῦντας κτήσασθαι.*

<sup>2</sup> *Æschines*, *De Fals. Leg.* c. 14, p. 250.

*Συμμαχίας γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων συνέλευσιν, εἰς ἣν τούτων Ἀμύντας ὁ Φιλίππου πατὴρ, καὶ πέμπων σύνοδον, καὶ τῆς καθ' ἑαυτὸν ψήφου κύριος ὢν, ἐψηφίσατο Ἀμφίπολιν τὴν Ἀθηναίων συνέξαι μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων Ἀθηναίοις. Καὶ τοῦτο τὸ κοινὸν δόγμα τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ τοὺς ψηφισαμένους, ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων γραμμάτων μάρτυρας παρεσχόμεν.*

The remarkable event to which *Æschines* here makes allusion, must have taken place either in the congress held at Sparta, in the month preceding the battle of Leuktra, where the general peace was sworn, with universal autonomy guaranteed, — leaving out only Thebes, or else, at the subsequent congress held three or four months afterwards at Athens, where a peace, on similar conditions generally, was again sworn under the auspices of Athens as president.

My conviction is, that it took place on the latter occasion, — at Athens. First, the reference of *Æschines* to the *δημόσια γράμματα* leads us to conclude that the affair was transacted in that city; secondly, I do not think that the Athenians would have been in any situation to exact such a reserve in their favor, prior to the battle of Leuktra; thirdly, the congress at Sparta was held, not for the purpose of *συμμαχία* or alliance, but for that of terminating the war and concluding peace; while the subsequent congress at Athens formed the basis of a defensive alliance, to which, either then or soon afterwards, Sparta acceded.

<sup>3</sup> The pretensions advanced by Philip of Macedon (in his *Epistola ad Athenienses*, ap. *Demosthen.* p. 164), that Amphipolis or its locality originally belonged to his ancestor Alexander son of Amyntas, as having expelled the Persians from it, — are unfounded, and contradicted by *Thucyd.*

Athens in 424–423 B. C. by Brasidas, through the improvidence of the Athenian officers Euklēs and Thucydides, then recolonized under Lacedæmonian auspices, — it had ever since remained an independent city; though Sparta had covenanted to restore it by the peace of Nikias (421 B. C.), but had never performed her covenant. Its unparalleled situation, near to both the bridge and mouth of the Strymon, in the midst of a fertile territory, within reach of the mining district of Pangæus, — rendered it a tempting prize; and the right of Athens to it was indisputable; so far as original colonization before the capture by Brasidas, and formal treaty of cession by Sparta after the capture, could confer a right. But this treaty, not fulfilled at the time, was now fifty years old. The repugnance of the Amphipolitan population, which had originally prevented its fulfilment, was strengthened by all the sanction of a long prescription; while the tomb and chapel of Brasidas their second founder, consecrated in the agora, served as an imperishable admonition to repel all pretensions on the part of Athens. Such pretensions, whatever might be the right, were deplorably impolitic unless Athens was prepared to back them by strenuous efforts of men and money; from which we shall find her shrinking now as she had done (under the unwise advice of Nikias) in 421 B. C., and the years immediately succeeding. In fact, the large renovated pretensions of Athens both to Amphipolis and to other places on the Macedonian and Chalkidic coast, combined with her languor and inertness in military action, — will be found henceforward among the greatest mischiefs to the general cause of Hellenic independence, and among the most effective helps to the well-conducted aggressions of Philip of Macedon.

ides. At least, if (which is barely possible) Alexander ever did acquire the spot, he must have lost it afterwards; for it was occupied by the Edonian Thracians, both in 465 B. C., when Athens made her first unsuccessful attempt to plant a colony there, — and in 437 B. C., when she tried again with better success under Agnon, and established Amphipolis (*Thucyd.* iv, 102).

The expression of *Æschines*, that Amyntas in 371 B. C. "gave up or receded from" Amphipolis (*ὡν δ' Ἀμύντας ἀπέστη* — *De Fals. Leg.* l. c.) can at most only be construed as referring to rights which he may have claimed, since he was never in actual possession of it; though we cannot wonder that the orator should use such language in addressing Philip son of Amyntas, who was really master of the town.



Though the claim of Athens to the recovery of a portion of her lost transmarine possessions was thus advanced and recognized in the congress of autumn 371 B. C., she does not seem to have been able to take any immediate steps for prosecuting it. Six months afterwards, the state of northern Greece was again completely altered by the death, nearly at the same time, of Jason in Thessaly, and of Amyntas in Macedonia.<sup>1</sup> The former was cut off (as has been mentioned in the preceding chapter) by assassination, while in the plenitude of his vigor; and his great power could not be held together by an inferior hand. His two brothers, Polyphron and Polydorus, succeeded him in the post of tagus of Thessaly. Polyphron, having put to death his brother, enjoyed the dignity for a short time; after which he too was slain by a third brother, Alexander of Pheræ; but not before he had committed gross enormities by killing and banishing many of the most eminent citizens of Larissa and Pharsalus; among them the estimable Polydamas.<sup>2</sup> The Larissæan exiles, many belonging to the great family of the Aleuadae, took refuge in Macedonia, where Amyntas (having died in 370 B. C.) had been succeeded in the throne by his youthful son Alexander. The latter, being persuaded to invade Thessaly for the purpose of restoring them, succeeded in getting possession of Larissa and Krannon; both which cities he kept under his own garrisons, in spite of unavailing resistance from Polyphron and Alexander of Pheræ.<sup>3</sup>

This Alexander, who succeeded to Jason's despotism in Pheræ, and to a considerable portion of his military power, was nevertheless unable to keep together the whole of it, or to retain Thessaly and its circumjacent tributaries in one united dominion. The Thessalian cities hostile to him invited assistance, not merely from Alexander of Macedon, but also from the Thebans; who despatched Pelopidas into the country, seemingly in 369 B. C., soon after the return of the army under Epaminondas from its victorious progress

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv. 60.

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4, 33, 34.

Diodorus (xv. 61) calls Alexander of Pheræ brother of Polydorus; Plutarch (Pelopid. c. 29) calls him nephew. Xenophon does not expressly say which; but his narrative seems to countenance the statement of Diodorus rather than that of Plutarch.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xv. 61.

in Laconia and Arcadia. Pelopidas entered Thessaly at the head of an army, and took Larissa with various other cities into Theban protection; apparently under the acquiescence of Alexander of Macedon, with whom he contracted an alliance.<sup>1</sup> A large portion of Thessaly thus came under the protection of Thebes in hostility to the dynasty of Pheræ, and to the brutal tyrant Alexander who now ruled in that city.

Alexander of Macedon found that he had difficulty enough in maintaining his own dominion at home, without holding Thessalian towns in garrison. He was harassed by intestine dissensions, and after a reign of scarcely two years, was assassinated (368 B. C.) by some conspirators of Alórus and Pydna, two cities (half Macedonian, half Hellenic) near the western coast of the Thermaic Gulf. Ptolemæus (or Ptolemy) of Alórus is mentioned as leader of the enterprise, and Apollophanês of Pydna as one of the agents.<sup>2</sup> But besides these conspirators, there was also another enemy, Pausanias, — a man of the royal lineage and a pretender to the throne;<sup>3</sup> who, having been hitherto in banishment, was now returning at the head of a considerable body of Greeks, supported by numerous partisans in Macedonia, — and was already master of Anthemus, Thermê, Strepsa, and other places in or

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv. 67.

The transactions of Macedonia and Thessaly at this period are difficult to make out clearly. What is stated in the text comes from Diodorus; who affirms, however, farther, — that Pelopidas marched into Macedonia, and brought back as a hostage to Thebes the youthful Philip, brother of Alexander. This latter affirmation is incorrect; we know that Philip was in Macedonia, and free, after the death of Alexander. And I believe that the march of Pelopidas into Macedonia, with the bringing back of Philip as a hostage, took place in the following year 368 B. C.

Justin also states (vii. 5) erroneously, that Alexander of Macedon gave his brother Philip as a hostage, first to the Illyrians, next to the Thebans.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. De Fals. Leg. c. 58, p. 402; Diodorus, xv. 71.

Diodorus makes the mistake of calling this Ptolemy son of Amyntas and brother of Perdikkas; though he at the same time describes him as Πτολεμαῖος Ἀλωριτης, which description would hardly be applied to one of the royal brothers. Moreover, the passage of Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 14, p. 250, shows that Ptolemy was not son of Amyntas; and Dexippus (ap. Syncellum, p. 263) confirms the fact.

See these points discussed in Mr Fynes Clinton's *Fasts Hellenici*, Appendix. c. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 2.



near the Thermaic Gulf. He was making war both against Ptolemy and against the remaining family of Amyntas. Eurydikê, the widow of that prince, was now left with her two younger children, Perdikkas, a young man, and Philip, yet a youth. She was in the same interest with Ptolemy, the successful conspirator against her son Alexander, and there was even a tale which represented her as his accomplice in the deed. Ptolemy was regent, administering her affairs and those of her minor children, against Pausanias.<sup>1</sup>

Deserted by many of their most powerful friends, Eurydikê and Ptolemy would have been forced to yield the country to Pausanias, had they not found by accident a foreign auxiliary near at hand. The Athenian admiral Iphikrates, with a squadron of moderate force, was then on the coast of Macedonia. He had been sent thither by his countrymen (369 B. C.) (soon after his partial conflict near Corinth with the retreating army of Epaminondas, on its way from Peloponnesus to Bœotia), for the purpose of generally surveying the maritime region of Macedonia and Thrace, opening negotiations with parties in the country, and laying his plans for future military operations. At the period when Alexander was slain, and when Pausanias was carrying on his invasion, Iphikrates happened to be on the Macedonian coast. He was there visited by Eurydikê with her two sons Perdikkas and Philip; the latter seemingly about thirteen or fourteen years of age, the former somewhat older. She urgently implored him

<sup>1</sup> Æschines, Fals. Legat. c. 13, 14, p. 249, 250; Justin, vii, 6.

Æschines mentions Ptolemy as regent, on behalf of Eurydikê and her younger sons. Æschines also mentions Alexander as having recently died, but says nothing about his assassination. Nevertheless there is no reason to doubt that he was assassinated, which we know both from Demosthenes and Diodorus; and assassinated by Ptolemy, which we know from Plutarch (Pelop. c. 27), Marsyas (ap. Athenæum, xiv, p. 629), and Diodorus. Justin states that Eurydikê conspired both against her husband Amyntas, and against her children, in concert with a paramour. The statements of Æschines rather tend to disprove the charge of her having been concerned in the death of Amyntas, but to support that of her having been accomplice with Ptolemy in the murder of Alexander.

Assassination was a fate which frequently befel the Macedonian kings. When we come to the history of Olympias, mother of Alexander the Great, it will be seen that Macedonian queens were capable of greater crimes than those imputed to Eurydikê.

to assist the family in their present emergency, reminding him that Amyntas had not only throughout his life been a faithful ally of Athens, but had also adopted him (Iphikrates) as his son, and had thus constituted him brother to the two young princes. Placing Perdikkas in his hands, and causing Philip to embrace his knees, she appealed to his generous sympathies, and invoked his aid as the only chance of restoration, or even of personal safety, to the family. Iphikrates, moved by this affecting supplication, declared in her favor, acted so vigorously against Pausanias as to expel him from Macedonia, and secured the sceptre to the family of Amyntas; under Ptolemy of Alôrus as regent for the time.

This striking incident is described by the orator Æschines<sup>1</sup> in an oration delivered many years afterwards at Athens. The boy, who then clasped the knees of Iphikrates, lived afterwards to overthrow the independence, not of Athens alone, but of Greece generally. The Athenian general had not been sent to meddle in the disputes of succession to the Macedonian crown. Nevertheless, looking at the circumstances of the time, his interference may really have promised beneficial consequences to Athens; so that we have no right to blame him for the unforeseen ruin which it was afterwards found to occasion.

Though the interference of Iphikrates maintained the family of Amyntas, and established Ptolemy of Alôrus as regent, it did not procure to Athens the possession of Amphipolis; which was not in the power of the Macedonian kings to bestow. Amphipolis was at that time a free Greek city, inhabited by a population in the main seemingly Chalkidic, and in confederacy with Olynthus.<sup>2</sup> Iphikrates prosecuted his naval operations on the coast of Thrace and Macedonia for a period of three years (368-365 B. C.). We make out very imperfectly what he achieved. He took into his service a general named Charidemus, a native of Oreus in Eu-

<sup>1</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 13, 14, p. 249, 250; Cornelius Nepos, Iphicrates, c. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 150.

μισθοὶ πάλιν αὐτὸν (Charidemus) τοῖς Ὀλυνθίοις, τοῖς ὑμετέροις ἔχουσι καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσιν Ἀμφιπολιν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον.

Demosthenes is here speaking of the time when Timotheus superseded Iphikrates in the command, that is, about 365-364 B. C. But we are fairly entitled to presume that the same is true of 369 or 368 B. C.



boea; one of those Condottieri (to use an Italian word familiar in the fourteenth century), who, having a band of mercenaries under his command, hired himself to the best bidder and to the most promising cause. These mercenaries served under Iphikrates for three years,<sup>1</sup> until he was dismissed by the Athenians from his command and superseded by Timotheus. What successes they enabled him to obtain for Athens, is not clear; but it is certain that he did not succeed in taking Amphipolis. He seems to have directed one or two attempts against the town by other officers, which proved abortive; but he got possession of some Amphipolitan prisoners or hostages,<sup>2</sup> which opened a prospect of accomplishing the surrender of the town.

It seems evident, however, in spite of our great dearth of information, that Iphikrates during his command between 369–365 B. C. did not satisfy the expectations of his countrymen. At that time, those expectations were large, as testified by sending out not only Iphikrates to Macedonia and Thrace, but also Timotheus (who had returned from his service with the Persians in 372–371 B. C.) to Ionia and the Hellespont, in conjunction with Ariobarzanes the satrap of Phrygia.<sup>3</sup> That satrap was in possession of Sestos, as well as of various other towns in the Thracian Chersonesus, towards which Athenian ambition now tended, according to that new turn, towards more special and separate acquisitions for Athens, which it had taken since the battle of Leuktra. But

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 149, c. 37.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 149, c. 37.

The passage in which the orator alludes to these hostages of the Amphipolitans in the hands of Iphikrates, is unfortunately not fully intelligible without farther information.

(Charidemus) Πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς Ἀμφιπολιτῶν δμήρους, οὓς παρ' Ἀρπάλου λαβὼν Ἰφικράτης ἔδωκε φυλάττειν αὐτῷ, ψηφισαμένων ὑμῶν ὡς ἡμᾶς κομίσαι, παρέδωκεν Ἀμφιπολίταις· καὶ τοῦ μὴ λαβεῖν Ἀμφίπολιν, τοῦτ' ἐμπόδιον κατέστη.

Who Harpalus was,—or what is meant by Iphikrates "obtaining (or capturing) from him the Amphipolitan hostages"—we cannot determine. Possibly Harpalus may have been commander of a body of Macedonians or Thracians acting as auxiliaries to the Amphipolitans and in this character exacting hostages from them as security. Charidemus, as we see afterwards when acting for Kersobleptes, received hostages from the inhabitants of Sestos (Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 679, c. 40 s. 177).

<sup>3</sup> Demosthen. De Rhodior. Libertat. c. 5, p. 193.

before we advert to the achievements of Timotheus (366–365 B. C.) in these regions, we must notice the main course of political conflict in Greece Proper, down to the partial pacification of 366 B. C.

Though the Athenians had sent Iphikrates (in the winter of 370–369 B. C.) to rescue Sparta from the grasp of Epaminondas, the terms of a permanent alliance had not yet been settled between them; envoys from Sparta and her allies visited Athens shortly afterwards for that purpose. All pretensions to exclusive head-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 1.

The words τῷ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει must denote the year beginning in the spring of 369 B. C. On this point I agree with Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. 40, p. 145 note); differing from him however (p. 146 note), as well as from Mr. Clinton, in this,—that I place the second expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus (as Sievers places it, p. 278) in 369 B. C.; not in 368 B. C.

The narrative of Xenophon carries to my mind conviction that this is what he meant to affirm. In the beginning of Book VII, he says, τῷ δ' ὑστέρῳ ἔτει Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων πρέσβεις ἦλθον αὐτοκράτορες Ἀθηναίᾳ, βουλευσόμενοι καθ' ὅτι ἡ συμμαχία ἔσοιτο Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Ἀθηναίους.

Now the words τῷ δ' ὑστέρῳ ἔτει denote the spring of 369 B. C.

Xenophon goes on to describe the assembly and the discussion at Athens, respecting the terms of alliance. This description occupies, from vii, 1, 1 to vii, 1, 14, where the final vote and agreement is announced.

Immediately after this vote, Xenophon goes on to say,—Στρατευσόμενοι δ' ἀμφοτέρων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων (Lacedæmonians, Athenians, and allies) εἰς Κόρινθον, ἔδοξε κοινῇ φυλάττειν τὸ Ὀνεῖον. Καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐπορεύοντο οἱ Θηβαῖοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι, παραταξάμενοι ἐφύλαττον ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν τοῦ Ὀνείου.

I conceive that the decision of the Athenian assembly,—the march of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians to guard the lines of Oneion,—and the march of the Thebans to enter Peloponnesus,—are here placed by Xenophon as events in immediate sequence, with no long interval of time between them. I see no ground to admit the interval of a year between the vote of the assembly and the march of the Thebans; the more so, as Epaminondas might reasonably presume that the building of Megalopolis and Messene, recently begun, would need to be supported by another Theban army in Peloponnesus during 369 B. C.

It is indeed contended (and admitted even by Sievers) that Epaminondas could not have been reëlected Bæotarch in 369 B. C. But in this point I do not concur. It appears to me that the issue of the trial at Thebes was triumphant for him; thus making it more probable,—not less probable,—that he and Pelopidas were reëlected Bæotarchs immediately.



ship on the part of Sparta were now at an end. Amidst abundant discussion in the public assembly, all the speakers, Lacedæmonian and others as well as Athenian, unanimously pronounced that the headship must be vested jointly and equally in Sparta and Athens; and the only point in debate was, how such an arrangement could be most suitably carried out. It was at first proposed that the former should command on land, the latter at sea; a distribution, which, on first hearing, found favor both as equitable and convenient, until an Athenian named Kephisodotus reminded his countrymen, that the Lacedæmonians had few ships of war, and those manned chiefly by Helots; while the land-force of Athens consisted of her horsemen and hoplites, the choice citizens of the state. Accordingly, on the distribution now pointed out, Athenians, in great numbers and of the best quality, would be placed under Spartan command; while few Lacedæmonians, and those of little dignity, would go under Athenian command; which would be, not equality, but the reverse. Kephisodotus proposed that both on land and at sea, the command should alternate between Athens and Sparta, in periods of five days; and his amendment was adopted.<sup>1</sup>

Though such amendment had the merit of perfect equality between the two competitors for headship, it was by no means well-calculated for success in joint operations against a general like Epaminondas. The allies determined to occupy Corinth as a main station, and to guard the line of Mount Oneium between that city and Kenchreæ,<sup>2</sup> so as to prevent the Thebans from again penetrating into Peloponnesus. It is one mark of the depression in the fortunes of Sparta, that this very station, now selected for the purpose of keeping a Theban invader away from her frontier, had been held, during the war from 394–387 B. C., by the Athenians and Thebans against herself, to prevent her from breaking out of Peloponnesus into Attica and Bœotia. Never since the invasion of Xerxes had there been any necessity for defending the Isthmus of Corinth against an extra-Peloponnesian assailant. But now, even to send a force from Sparta to Corinth, recourse must have been had to transport by sea, either across the Argolic

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 10–14.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 15, 16; Diodor. xv, 68.

Gulf from Prasîæ to Halieis, or round Cape Skyllæum to the Saronic Gulf and Kenchreæ; for no Spartan troops could march by land across Arcadia or Argos. This difficulty however was surmounted, and a large allied force (not less than twenty thousand men according to Diodorus), — consisting of Athenians with auxiliary mercenaries under Chabrias, Lacedæmonians, Pellenians, Epidaurians, Megarians, Corinthians, and all the other allies still adhering to Sparta, — was established in defensive position along the line of Oneium.

It was essential for Thebes to reopen communication with her Peloponnesian allies. Accordingly Epaminondas, at the head of the Thebans and their northern allies, arrived during the same summer in front of this position, on his march into Peloponnesus. His numbers were inferior to those of his assembled enemies, whose position prevented him from joining his Arcadian, Argeian, and Eleian allies, already assembled in Peloponnesus. After having vainly challenged the enemy to come down and fight in the plain, Epaminondas laid his plan for attacking the position. Moving from his camp a little before daybreak, so as to reach the enemy just when the night-guards were retiring, but before the general body had yet risen and got under arms,<sup>1</sup> — he directed an assault along the whole line. But his principal effort, at the head of the chosen Theban troops, was made against the Lacedæmonians and Pellenians, who were posted in the most assailable part of the line.<sup>2</sup> So skilfully was his movement conducted, that he

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 16; Polyænus, ii, 2, 9.

This was an hour known to be favorable to sudden assailants, affording a considerable chance that the enemy might be off their guard. It was at the same hour that the Athenian Thrasybulus surprised the troops of the Thirty, near Phylê in Attica (Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 6).

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. ib.; Pausanias, ix, 15, 2.

Pausanias describes the battle as having been fought *περὶ Λέχαιον*; not very exact, topographically, since it was on the other side of Corinth, between Corinth and Kenchreæ.

Diodorus (xv, 68) states that the whole space across, from Kenchreæ on one sea to Lechæum on the other, was trenched and palisaded by the Athenians and Spartans. But this cannot be true, because the Long Walls were a sufficient defence between Corinth and Lechæum; and even between Corinth and Kenchreæ, it is not probable that any such continuous line of defence was drawn, though the assailable points were probably thus guarded. Xenophon does not mention either trench or palisade.



completely succeeded in surprising them. The Lacedæmonian polemarch, taken unprepared, was driven from his position, and forced to retire to another point of the hilly ground. He presently sent to solicit a truce for burying his dead; agreeing to abandon the line of Oneium, which had now become indefensible. The other parts of the Theban army made no impression by their attack, nor were they probably intended to do more than occupy attention, while Epaminondas himself vigorously assailed the weak point of the position. Yet Xenophon censures the Lacedæmonian polemarch as faint-hearted, for having evacuated the whole line as soon as his own position was forced; alleging, that he might easily have found another good position on one of the neighboring eminences, and might have summoned reinforcements from his allies,—and that the Thebans, in spite of their partial success, were so embarrassed how to descend on the Peloponnesian side of Oneium, that they were half disposed to retreat. The criticism of Xenophon indicates doubtless an unfavorable judgment pronounced by many persons in the army; the justice of which we are not in a condition to appreciate. But whether the Lacedæmonian commander was to blame or not, Epaminondas, by his skilful and victorious attack upon this strong position, enhanced his already high military renown.<sup>1</sup>

Having joined his Peloponnesian allies, Arcadians, Eleians, and Argeians, he was more than a match for the Spartan and Athenian force, which appears now to have confined itself to Corinth, Lechæum, and Kenchreæ. He ravaged the territories of Epidaurus, Trœzen, and Phlius; and obtained possession of Sikyon as well as of Pellênê.<sup>2</sup> At Sikyon, a vote of the people being taken, it was resolved to desert Sparta, to form alliance with Thebes, and to admit a Theban harmost and garrison into the acropolis; Euphron, a citizen hitherto preponderant in the city by means of Sparta and devoted to her interest, now altered

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 14-17; Diodor. xv, 68.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 18; vii, 2, 11; Diodor. xv, 69.

This march against Sikyon seems alluded to by Pausanias (vi, 3, 1); the Eleian horse were commanded by Stomius, who slew the enemy's commander with his own hand.

The stratagem of the Boeotian Pammenes in attacking the harbor of Sikyon (Polyænus, v, 16, 4) may perhaps belong to this undertaking.

his politics and went along with the stronger tide.<sup>1</sup> We cannot doubt also that Epaminondas went into Arcadia to encourage and regulate the progress of his two great enterprises,—the foundation of Messênê and Megalopolis; nor does the silence of Xenophon on such a matter amount to any disproof. These new towns having been commenced less than a year before, cannot have been yet finished, and may probably have required the reappearance of his victorious army. The little town of Phlius,—situated south of Sikyon and west of Corinth,—which was one of the most faithful allies of Sparta, was also in great hazard of being captured by the Phliasian exiles. When the Arcadians and Eleians were marching through Nemea to join Epaminondas at Oneium, these exiles entreated them only to show themselves near Phlius; with the assurance that such demonstration would suffice to bring about the capture of the town. The exiles then stole by night to the foot of the town walls with scaling-ladders, and there lay hid, until, as day began to break, the scouts from the neighboring hill Trikaranon announced that the allied enemies were in sight. While the attention of the citizens within was thus engaged on the other side, the concealed exiles planted their ladders, overpowered the few unprepared guards, and got possession of the acropolis. Instead of contenting themselves with this position until the allied force came up, they strove also to capture the town; but in this they were defeated by the citizens, who, by desperate efforts of bravery, repulsed both the intruders within and the enemy without; thus preserving their town.<sup>2</sup> The fidelity of the Phliasians to Sparta entailed upon them severe hardships through the superiority of their enemies in the field, and through perpetual ravage of their territory from multiplied hostile neighbors (Argos, Arcadia, and Sikyon), who had established fortified posts on their borders; for it was only

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 18, 22, 44; vii, 3, 2-8.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 5-9.

This incident may have happened in 369 B.C., just about the time when Epaminondas surprised and broke through the defensive lines of Mount Oneium. In the second chapter of the seventh Book, Xenophon takes up the history of Phlius, and carries it on from the winter of 370-369 B.C., when Epaminondas invaded Laconia, through 369, 368, 367 B.C.



on the side of Corinth that the Phliasians had a friendly neighbor to afford them the means of purchasing provisions.<sup>1</sup>

Amidst general success, the Thebans experienced partial reverses. Their march carrying them near to Corinth, a party of them had the boldness to rush at the gates, and to attempt a surprise of the town. But the Athenian Chabrias, then commanding within it, disposed his troops so skilfully, and made so good a resistance, that he defeated them with loss and reduced them to the necessity of asking for the ordinary truce to bury their dead, which were lying very near to the walls.<sup>2</sup> This advantage over the victorious Thebans somewhat raised the spirits of the Spartan allies; who were still farther encouraged by the arrival in Lechæum of a squadron from Syracuse, bringing a body of two thousand mercenary Gauls and Iberians, with fifty horsemen, as a succor from the despot Dionysius. Such foreigners had never before been seen in Peloponnesus. Their bravery, and singular nimbleness of movement, gave them the advantage in several partial skirmishes, and disconcerted the Thebans. But the Spartans and Athenians were not bold enough to hazard a general battle, and the Syracusan detachment returned home after no very long stay,<sup>3</sup> while the Thebans also went back to Bœotia.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 17.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 19; Diodor. xv, 69.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 22; Diodor. xv, 70.

Diodorus states that these mercenaries had been furnished with pay for five months; if this is correct, I presume that we must understand it as comprehending the time of their voyage from Sicily and back to Sicily. Nevertheless, the language of Xenophon would not lead us to suppose that they remained in Peloponnesus even so long as three months.

I think it certain however that much more must have passed in this campaign than what Xenophon indicates. Epaminondas would hardly have forced the passage of the Oneium for such small objects as we find mentioned in the Hellenica.

An Athenian Inscription, extremely defective, yet partially restored and published by M. Boeckh (Corp. Inscr. No. 85 a. Addenda to vol. i, p. 897), records a vote of the Athenian people and of the synod of Athenian confederates, — praising Dionysius of Syracuse, — and recording him with his two sons as benefactors of Athens. It was probably passed somewhere near this time; and we know from Demosthenes that the Athenians granted the freedom of their city to Dionysius and his descendants (Demosthenes ad Philipp. Epistol. p. 161, as well as the Epistle of Philip, on which this is a comment). The Inscription is too defective to warrant any other inferences.

One proceeding of Epaminondas during this expedition merits especial notice. It was the general practice of the Thebans to put to death all the Bœotian exiles who fell into their hands as prisoners, while they released under ransom all other Greek prisoners. At the capture of a village named Phœbias in the Sikyonian territory, Epaminondas took captive a considerable body of Bœotian exiles. With the least possible delay, he let them depart under ransom, professing to regard them as belonging to other cities.<sup>1</sup> We find him always trying to mitigate the rigorous dealing then customary towards political opponents.

Throughout this campaign of 369 B. C., all the Peloponnesian allies had acted against Sparta cheerfully under Epaminondas and the Thebans. But in the ensuing year the spirit of the Arcadians had been so raised, by the formation of the new Pan-Arcadian communion, by the progress of Messênê and Megalopolis, and the conspicuous depression of Sparta, — that they fancied themselves not only capable of maintaining their independence by themselves, but also entitled to divide headship with Thebes, as Athens divided it with Sparta. Lykomedes the Mantinean, wealthy, energetic, and able, stood forward as the exponent of this new aspiration, and as the champion of Arcadian dignity. He reminded the Ten Thousand (the Pan-Arcadian synod), — that while all other residents in Peloponnesus were originally immigrants, they alone were the indigenous occupants of the peninsula; that they were the most numerous section, as well as the bravest and hardiest men, who bore the Hellenic name, — of which proof was afforded by the fact, that Arcadian mercenary soldiers were preferred to all others; that the Lacedæmonians had never ventured to invade Attica, nor the Thebans to invade Laconia, without Arcadian auxiliaries. "Let us follow no man's lead (he concluded), but stand up for ourselves. In former days, we built up the power of Sparta by serving in her armies; and now, if we submit quietly to follow the Thebans, without demanding alternate headship for ourselves, we shall presently find them to be Spartans under another name."<sup>2</sup>

Such exhortations were heard with enthusiasm by the assembled Arcadians, to whom political discussion and the sentiment of collective dignity was a novelty. Impressed with admiration for Ly-

<sup>1</sup> Pausanias, ix, 15, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 23.



komedes, they chose as officers every man whom he recommended calling upon him to lead them into active service, so as to justify their new pretensions. He conducted them into the territory of Epidaurus, now under invasion by the Argeians; who were however in the greatest danger of being cut off, having their retreat intercepted by a body of troops from Corinth under Chabrias, — Athenians and Corinthians. Lykomédès with his Arcadians, fighting his way through enemies as well as through a difficult country, repelled the division of Chabrias, and extricated the embarrassed Argeians. He next invaded the territory south of the new city of Messene and west of the Messenian Gulf, part of which was still held by Spartan garrisons. He penetrated as far as Asinê, where the Spartan commander, Geranor, drew out his garrison to resist them, but was defeated with loss, and slain, while the suburbs of Asinê were destroyed.<sup>1</sup> Probably the Spartan mastery of the south-western corner of the Peloponnesus was terminated by this expedition. The indefatigable activity which these Arcadians now displayed under their new commander, overpowering all enemies, and defying all hardships and difficulties of marching over the most rugged mountains, by night as well as by day, throughout the winter season, — excited everywhere astonishment and alarm; not without considerable jealousy even on the part of their allies the Thebans.<sup>2</sup>

While such jealousy tended to loosen the union between the Arcadians and Thebes, other causes tended at the same time to disunite them from Elis. The Eleians claimed rights of supremacy over Lepreon and the other towns of Triphylia, which rights they had been compelled by the Spartan arms to forego thirty years before.<sup>3</sup> Ever since that period, these towns had ranked as separate communities, each for itself as a dependent ally of Sparta. Now that the power of the latter was broken, the Eleians aimed at

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 25.

Στρατευόμενοι δὲ καὶ εἰς Ἀσίνην τῆς Λακωνικῆς, ἐνίκησαν τε τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων φρουρὰν, καὶ τὸν Γεράνορα, τὸν πολέμαρχον Σπαρτιάτην γεγεννημένον, ἀπέκτειναν, καὶ τὸ προὔστειον τῶν Ἀσιναιῶν ἐπόρθησαν.

Diodorus states that Lykomedes and the Arcadians took Pellênê, which is in a different situation, and can hardly refer to the same expedition (xv, 67).

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 26.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 30, 31.

resumption of their lost supremacy. But the formation of the new "commune Arcadum" at Megalopolis, interposed an obstacle never before thought of. The Tryphilian towns, affirming themselves to be of Arcadian origin, and setting forth as their eponymous Hero Triphylus son of Arkas,<sup>1</sup> solicited to be admitted as fully qualified members of the incipient Pan-Arcadian communion. They were cordially welcomed by the general Arcadian body (with a degree of sympathy similar to that recently shown by the Germans towards Sleswick-Holstein), received as political brethren, and guaranteed as independent against Elis.<sup>2</sup> The Eleians, thus finding themselves disappointed of the benefits which they had anticipated from the humiliation of Sparta, became greatly alienated from the Arcadians.

Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Phrygia, with whom the Athenians had just established a correspondence, now endeavored (perhaps at their instance) to mediate for peace in Greece, sending over a citizen of Abydus named Philiskus, furnished with a large sum of money. Choosing Delphi as a centre, Philiskus convoked thither, in the name of the Persian king, deputies from all the belligerent parties, Theban, Lacedæmonian, Athenian, etc., to meet him. These envoys never consulted the god as to the best means of attaining peace (says Xenophon), but merely took counsel among themselves; hence, he observes, little progress was made towards peace; since the Spartans<sup>3</sup> peremptorily insisted that Messênê should again be restored to them, while the Thebans were not less firm in resisting the proposition. It rather seems that the allies of Sparta were willing to concede the point, and even tried, though in vain, to overcome her reluctance. The congress accordingly broke up; while Philiskus, declaring himself in favor of Sparta and Athens, employed his money in levying mercenaries for the professed purpose of aiding them in the war.<sup>4</sup> We do not find

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. iv, 77.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 26; vii, 4, 12.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27. Ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐλθόντες, τῷ μὲν θεῷ οὐδὲν ἐκοινώσαντο, ὅπως ἂν ἡ εἰρήνη γένοιτο, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐβουλευοντο.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27; Diodor. xv, 70.

Diodorus states that Philiskus was sent by Artaxerxes; which seems not exact; he was sent by Ariobarzanes in the name of Artaxerxes. Diodorus also says that Philiskus left two thousand mercenaries with pay provided for the service of the Lacedæmonians; which troops are never afterwards mentioned.



however, that he really lent them any aid. It would appear that his mercenaries were intended for the service of the satrap himself, who was then organizing his revolt from Artaxerxes; and that his probable purpose in trying to close the war was, that he might procure Grecian soldiers more easily and abundantly. Though the threats of Philiskus produced no immediate result, however, they so alarmed the Thebans as to determine them to send an embassy up to the Great King; the rather, as they learnt that the Lacedæmonian Euthykles had already gone up to the Persian court, to solicit on behalf of Sparta.<sup>1</sup>

How important had been the move made by Epaminondas in reconstituting the autonomous Messenians, was shown, among other evidences, by the recent abortive congress at Delphi. Already this formed the capital article in Grecian political discussion; an article, too, on which Sparta stood nearly alone. For not only the Thebans (whom Xenophon<sup>2</sup> specifies as if there were no others of the same sentiment), but all the allies of Thebes, felt hearty sympathy and identity of interest with the newly-enfranchised residents in Mount Ithômê and in Western Laconia; while the allies even of Sparta were, at most, only lukewarm against them, if not positively inclined in their favor.<sup>3</sup> A new phenomenon soon presented itself, which served as a sort of recognition of the new-born, or newly-revived, Messenian community, by the public voice of Greece. At the one hundred and third Olympic festival (Midsummer 368 B. C.), — which occurred within less than two years after Epaminondas laid the foundation-stone of Messênê, — a Messenian boy named Damiskus gained the wreath as victor in the foot-race of boys. Since the first Messenian war, whereby the nation became subject to Sparta,<sup>4</sup> no Messenian victor had ever been enrolled; though before that war, in the earliest half-century of recorded Olympiads, several Messenian victors are found on the register. No competitor was admitted to enter the lists, except as

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27.

<sup>3</sup> See this fact indicated in Isokrates, Archidamus (Or. vi.) s. 2-11.

<sup>4</sup> Pausanias, vi, 2, 5.

Two Messenian victors had been proclaimed during the interval; but they were inhabitants of Messênê in Sicily. And these two were ancient citizens of Zanklê, the name which the Sicilian Messênê bore before Anaxilaus the despot chose to give to it this last-mentioned name.

a free Greek from a free community; accordingly so long as these Messenians had been either enslaved, or in exile, they would never have been allowed to contend for the prize under that designation. So much the stronger was the impression produced, when, in 368 B. C., after an interval of more than three centuries, Damiscus the Messenian was proclaimed victor. No Theôry (or public legation for sacrifice) could have come to Olympia from Sparta, since she was then at war both with Eleians and Arcadians; probably few individual Lacedæmonians were present; so that the spectators, composed generally of Greeks unfriendly to Sparta, would hail the proclamation of the new name as being an evidence of her degradation, as well as from sympathy with the long and severe oppression of the Messenians.<sup>1</sup> This Olympic festival, — the first after the great revolution occasioned by the battle of Leuktra, — was doubtless a scene of earnest anti-Spartan emotion.

During this year 368 B. C., the Thebans undertook no march into Peloponnesus; the peace-congress at Delphi probably occupied their attention, while the Arcadians neither desired nor needed their aid. But Pelopidas conducted in this year a Theban force into Thessaly, in order to protect Larissa and the other cities against Alexander of Pheræ, and to counterwork the ambitious projects of that despot, who was soliciting reinforcement from Athens. In his first object he succeeded. Alexander was compelled to visit him at Larissa, and solicit peace. This despot, however, alarmed at the complaints which came from all sides against his cruelty, — and at the language, first, admonitory, afterwards, menacing, of Pelopidas — soon ceased to think himself in safety, and fled home to Pheræ. Pelopidas established a defensive union against him among the other Thessalian cities, and then marched onward into Macedonia, where the regent Ptolemy, not strong enough to resist, entered into alliance with the Thebans; surrendering to them thirty hostages from the most distinguished families in Macedonia, as a guarantee for his faithful adherence. Among the hostages was the youthful Philip, son of Amyntas, who remained in this character at Thebes for some

<sup>1</sup> See the contrary, or Spartan, feeling, — disgust at the idea of persons who had just been their slaves, presenting themselves as spectators and competitors in the plain of Olympia, — set forth in Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus) s. 111, 112.



years, under the care of Pammenês.<sup>1</sup> It was thus that Ptolemy and the family of Amyntas, though they had been maintained in Macedonia by the active intervention of Iphikrates and the Athenians not many months before, nevertheless now connected themselves by alliance with the Thebans, the enemies of Athens. Æschines the Athenian orator denounces them for ingratitude; but possibly the superior force of the Thebans left them no option. Both the Theban and Macedonian force became thus enlisted for the protection of the freedom of Amphipolis against Athens.<sup>2</sup> And Pelopidas returned to Thebes, having extended the ascendancy of Thebes not only over Thessaly, but also over Macedonia, assured by the acquisition of the thirty hostages.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 26.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 14, p. 249.

... διδάσκων, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ὑπὲρ Ἀμφιπόλεως ἀντίπραττε (Ptolemy) ἡ πόλις (to Athens), καὶ πρὸς Θηβαίους διαφερομένων Ἀθηναίων, συμμαχίας ἐποιήσατο, etc.

Neither Plutarch nor Diodorus appear to me precise in specifying and distinguishing the different expeditions of Pelopidas into Thessaly. I cannot but think that he made four different expeditions; two before his embassy to the Persian court (which embassy took place in 367 B. C.; see Mr. Clinton, Fast. Hellen. on that year, who rightly places the date of the embassy), and two after it.

1. The first was, in 369 B. C., after the death of Amyntas, but during the short reign, less than two years, of his son Alexander of Macedon.

Diodorus mentions this fact (xv, 67), but he adds, what is erroneous, that Pelopidas on this occasion brought back Philip as a hostage.

2. The second was in 368 B. C.; also mentioned by Diodorus (xv, 71) and by Plutarch (Pelop. c. 26).

Diodorus (erroneously, as I think) connects this expedition with the seizure and detention of Pelopidas by Alexander of Pheræ. But it was really on this occasion that Pelopidas brought back the hostages.

3. The third (which was rather a mission than an expedition) was in 366 B. C., after the return of Pelopidas from the Persian court, which happened seemingly in the beginning of 366 B. C. In this third march, Pelopidas was seized and made prisoner by Alexander of Pheræ, until he was released by Epaminondas. Plutarch mentions this expedition, clearly distinguishing it from the second (Pelopidas, c. 27 — *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν*, etc.); but with this mistake, in my judgment, that he places it before the journey of Pelopidas to the Persian court; whereas it really occurred after and in consequence of that journey, which dates in 367 B. C.

4. The fourth and last, in 364–363 B. C.; wherein he was slain (Diodor. xv, 80; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 32).

Such extension of the Theban power, in Northern Greece, disconcerted the maritime projects of Athens on the coast of Macedonia, at the same time that it laid the foundation of an alliance between her and Alexander of Pheræ. While she was thus opposing the Thebans in Thessaly, a second squadron and reinforcement arrived at Corinth from Syracuse, under Kissidas, despatched by the despot Dionysius. Among the synod of allies assembled at Corinth, debate being held as to the best manner of employing them, the Athenians strenuously urged that they should be sent to act in Thessaly. But the Spartans took an opposite view, and prevailed to have them sent round to the southern coast of Laconia, in order that they might coöperate in repelling or invading the Arcadians.<sup>1</sup> Reinforced by these Gauls and other mercenaries, Archidamus led out the Lacedæmonian forces against Arcadia. He took Karyæ by assault, putting to death every man whom he captured in the place; and he farther ravaged all the Arcadian territory, in the district named after the Parrhasii, until the joint Arcadian and Argeian forces arrived to oppose him; upon which he retreated to an eminence near Midea.<sup>2</sup> Here Kissidas, the Syracusan commander, gave notice that he must retire, as the period to which his orders reached had expired. He accordingly marched back to Sparta; but midway in the march, in a narrow pass, the Messenian troops arrested his advance, and so hampered him, that he was forced to send to Archidamus for aid. The latter soon appeared, while the main body of Arcadians and Argeians followed also; and Archidamus resolved to attack them in general battle near Midea. Imploring his soldiers, in an emphatic appeal, to rescue the great name of Sparta from the disgrace into which it had fallen, he found them full of responsive ardor. They rushed with such fierceness to the charge, that the Arcadians and Argeians were thoroughly daunted, and fled with scarce any resistance. The pursuit was vehement, especially by the Gallic mercenaries, and the slaughter frightful. The

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28. The place here called Midea cannot be identified. The only place of that name known, is in the territory of Argos, quite different from what is here mentioned. O. Müller proposes to substitute Malæa for Midea; a conjecture, which there are no means of verifying.



thousand men (if we are to believe Diodorus) were slain, without the loss of a single Lacedæmonian. Of this easy and important victory, — or, as it came to be called, “the tearless battle,” — news was forthwith transmitted by the herald Demoteles to Sparta. So powerful was the emotion produced by his tale, that all the Spartans who heard it burst into tears; Agesilaus, the Senators, and the ephors, setting the example;<sup>1</sup> — a striking proof how humbled, and disaccustomed to the idea of victory, their minds had recently become! — a striking proof also, when we compare it with the inflexible self-control which marked their reception of the disastrous tidings from Leuktra, how much more irresistible is unexpected joy than unexpected grief, in working on these minds of iron temper!

So offensive had been the insolence of the Arcadians, that the news of their defeat was not unwelcome even to their allies the Thebans and Eleians. It made them feel that they were not independent of Theban aid, and determined Epaminondas again to show himself in Peloponnesus, with the special view of enrolling the Achæans in his alliance. The defensive line of Oneium was still under occupation by the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, who had their head-quarters at Corinth. Yet having remained unattacked all the preceding year, it was now so negligently guarded, that Peisias, the general of Argos, instigated by a private request of Epaminondas, was enabled suddenly to seize the heights above Kenchreæ, with a force of two thousand men and seven days' provision. The Theban commander, hastening his march, thus found the line of Oneium open near Kenchreæ, and entered Peloponnesus without resistance; after which he proceeded, joined by his Peloponnesian allies, against the cities in Achaia.<sup>2</sup> Until the battle of Leuktra, these cities had been among

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28-32; Diodor. xv, 72; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 33.

<sup>2</sup> I think that this third expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus belongs to 367 B. C., being simultaneous with the embassy of Pelopidas to the Persian court. Many chronologers place it in 366 B. C., after the conclusion of that embassy, because the mention of it occurs in Xenophon after he has brought the embassy to a close. But I do not conceive that this proves the fact of subsequent date. For we must recollect that the embassy lasted several months, moreover the expedition was made while Epaminondas was Bæotarch; and he ceased to be so during the year 366

the dependent allies of Sparta, governed by local oligarchies in her interest. Since that event, they had broken off from her, but were still under oligarchical governments (though doubtless not the same men), and had remained neutral without placing themselves in connection either with Arcadians or Thebans.<sup>1</sup> Not being in a condition to resist so formidable an invading force, they opened negotiations with Epaminondas, and solicited to be enrolled as allies of Thebes; engaging to follow her lead whenever summoned, and to do their duty as members of her synod. They tendered securities which Epaminondas deemed sufficient for the fulfilment of their promise. Accordingly, by virtue of his own personal ascendancy, he agreed to accept them as they stood, without requiring either the banishment of the existing rulers or substitution of democratical forms in place of the oligarchical.<sup>2</sup> Such a proceeding was not only suitable to the moderation of dealing so remarkable in Epaminondas, but also calculated to

B. C. Besides, if we place the expedition in 366 B. C., there will hardly be time left for the whole career of Euphron at Sikyon, which intervened before the peace of 366 B. C. between Thebes and Corinth (see Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 44 seq.).

The relation of contemporaneity between the embassy of Pelopidas to Persia, and the expedition of Epaminondas, seems indicated when we compare vii, 1, 33 with vii, 1, 48 — *Συνεχῶς δὲ βουλευόμενοι οἱ Θηβαῖοι, ὅπως ἂν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν λάβοιεν τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἐνόμισαν εἰ πέμψειαν πρὸς τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα*, etc. Then Xenophon proceeds to recount the whole embassy, together with its unfavorable reception on returning, which takes up the entire space until vii, 2, 41, when he says — *Αὐθις δ' Ἐπαμεινώνδας, δουλῆθεϊς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς προσπαγαγέσθαι, ὅπως μᾶλλον σφισι καὶ οἱ Ἀρκάδες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι σύμμαχοι προσέχοιεν τὸν νοῦν, ἐγνώκε στρατευτέον εἶναι ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀχαιάν*.

This fresh expedition of Epaminondas is one of the modes adopted by the Thebans of manifesting their general purpose expressed in the former words, — *συνεχῶς βουλευόμενοι*, etc.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 42-44.

The neutrality before observed, is implied in the phrase whereby Xenophon describes their conduct afterwards, *ἐπεὶ δὲ κατελθόντες οὐκ ἐτι ἐμεσενον*, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 42.

His expression marks how completely these terms were granted by the personal determination of Epaminondas, overruling opposition, — *ἐνδυναστεύει ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας, ὥστε μὴ φυγαδεύσαι τοὺς κρατιστοὺς, μηδὲ τὰς πολιτείας μεταστήσαι*, etc.



strengthen the interests of Thebes in Peloponnesus, in the present jealous and unsatisfactory temper of the Arcadians, by attaching to her on peculiar grounds Achæans as well as Eleians; the latter being themselves half-alienated from the Arcadians. Epaminondas farther liberated Naupaktus and Kalydon,<sup>1</sup> which were held by Achæan garrisons, and which he enrolled as separate allies of Thebes; whither he then returned, without any other achievements (so far as we are informed) in Peloponnesus.

But the generous calculations of this eminent man found little favor with his countrymen. Both the Arcadians, and the opposition-party in the Achæan cities, preferred accusations against him, alleging that he had discouraged and humiliated all the real friends of Thebes; leaving power in the hands of men who would join Sparta on the first opportunity. The accusation was farther pressed by Menekleidas, a Theban speaker of ability, strongly adverse to Epaminondas, as well as to Pelopidas. So pronounced was the displeasure of the Thebans, — partly perhaps from reluctance to offend the Arcadians, — that they not only reversed the policy of Epaminondas in Achaia, but also refrained from reelecting him as Bœotarch during the ensuing year.<sup>2</sup> They sent harmosts of their own to each of the Achæan cities, — put down the existing oligarchies, — sent the chief oligarchical members and partisans into exile, — and established democratical governments in each. Hence a great body of exiles soon became accumulated; who, watching for a favorable opportunity and combining their

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 75.

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 43; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 25.

Diodorus (xv, 72) refers the displeasure of the Thebans against Epaminondas to the events of the preceding year. They believed (according to Diodorus) that Epaminondas had improperly spared the Spartans, and not pushed his victory so far as might have been done, when he forced the lines of Mount Oneium in 369 B. C. But it is scarcely credible that the Thebans should have been displeased on this account; for the forcing of the lines was a capital exploit, and we may see from Xenophon that Epaminondas achieved much more than the Spartans and their friends believed to be possible.

Xenophon tells us that the Thebans were displeased with Epaminondas, on complaint from the Arcadians and others, for his conduct in Achaia two years after the action at Oneium; that is, in 367 B. C. This is much more probable in itself, and much more consistent with the general series of facts, than the cause assigned by Diodorus.

united forces against each city successively, were strong enough to overthrow the newly-created democracies, and to expel the Theban harmosts. Thus restored, the Achæan oligarchs took decided and active part with Sparta;<sup>1</sup> vigorously pressing the Arcadians on one side, while the Lacedæmonians, encouraged by the recent Tearless Battle, exerted themselves actively on the other.

The town of Sikyon, closely adjoining to Achaia, was at this time in alliance with Thebes, having a Theban harmost and garrison in its acropolis. But its government, which had always been oligarchical, still remained unaltered. The recent counter-revolution in the Achæan cities, followed closely by their junction with Sparta, alarmed the Arcadians and Argeians, lest Sikyon also should follow the example. Of this alarm a leading Sikyonian citizen named Euphron, took advantage. He warned them that if the oligarchy were left in power, they would certainly procure aid from the garrison at Corinth, and embrace the interests of Sparta. To prevent such defection (he said) it was indispensable that Sikyon should be democratized. He then offered himself, with their aid, to accomplish the revolution, seasoning his offer with strong protestations of disgust against the intolerable arrogance and oppression of Sparta: protestations not unnecessary, since he had himself, prior to the battle of Leuktra, carried on the government of his native city as local agent for her purposes and interest. The Arcadians and Argeians, entering into the views of Euphron, sent to Sikyon a large force, under whose presence and countenance he summoned a general assembly in the market-place, proclaimed the oligarchy to be deposed, and proposed an equal democracy for the future. His proposition being adopted, he next invited the people to choose generals; and the persons chosen were, as might naturally be expected, himself with five partisans. The prior oligarchy had not been without a previous mercenary force in their service, under the command of Lysimenês; but these men were overawed by the new foreign force introduced. Euphron now proceeded to reorganize them, to place them under the command of his son Adeas instead of

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 23.

For a similar case, in which exiles from many different cities, congregating in a body, became strong enough to carry their restoration in each city successively, see Thucyd. i, 113.



Lysimenês, and to increase their numerical strength. Selecting from them a special body-guard for his own personal safety, and being thus master of the city under the ostensible color of chief of the new democracy, he commenced a career of the most rapacious and sanguinary tyranny.<sup>1</sup> He caused several of his colleagues to be assassinated, and banished others. He expelled also by wholesale the wealthiest and most eminent citizens, on suspicion of Laconism; confiscating their properties to supply himself with money, pillaging the public treasure, and even stripping the temples of all their rich stock of consecrated gold and silver ornaments. He farther procured for himself adherents by liberating numerous slaves, exalting them to the citizenship, and probably enrolling them among his paid force.<sup>2</sup> The power which he thus acquired became very great. The money seized enabled him not only to keep in regular pay his numerous mercenaries, but also to bribe the leading Arcadians and Argeians, so that they connived at his enormities; while he was farther ready and active in the field to lend them military support. The Theban harmost still held the acropolis with his garrison, though Euphron was master of the town and harbor.

During the height of Euphron's power at Sikyon, the neighboring city of Phlius was severely pressed. The Phliasians had remained steadily attached to Sparta throughout all her misfortunes; notwithstanding incessant hostilities from Argos, Arcadia, Pellênê, and Sikyon, which destroyed their crops and inflicted upon them serious hardships. I have already recounted, that in the year 369 B. C., a little before the line of Oneium was forced by Epaminondas, the town of Phlius, having been surprised by its own exiles with the aid of Eleians and Arcadians, had only been saved by the desperate bravery and resistance of its citizens.<sup>3</sup> In the ensuing year, 368 B. C., the Argeian and Arcadian force again ravaged the Phliasian plain, doing great damage; yet not without some loss to themselves in their departure, from the attack of the chosen Phliasian hoplites and of some Athenian horsemen from Corinth.<sup>4</sup> In the ensuing year 367 B. C., a second invasion of the Phliasian territory was attempted by Euphron.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 44-46, Diodor. xv, 70

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 6-9

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 8.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 10

with his own mercenaries to the number of two thousand, — the armed force of Sikyon and Pellênê, — and the Theban harmost and garrison from the acropolis of Sikyon. On arriving near Phlius, the Sikyonians and Pelleneans were posted near the gate of the city which looked towards Corinth, in order to resist any sally from within; while the remaining invaders made a circuit round, over an elevated line of ground called the *Trikaranum* (which had been fortified by the Argeians and was held by their garrison), to approach and ravage the Phliasian plain. But the Phliasian cavalry and hoplites so bravely resisted them, as to prevent them from spreading over the plain to do damage, until at the end of the day they retreated to rejoin the Sikyonians and Pellenians. From these last, however, they happened to be separated by a ravine which forced them to take a long circuit; while the Phliasians, passing by a shorter road close under their own walls, were beforehand in reaching the Sikyonians and Pellenians, whom they vigorously attacked and defeated with loss. Euphron with his mercenaries, and the Theban division, arrived too late to prevent the calamity, which they made no effort to repair.<sup>1</sup>

An eminent Pellenian citizen, named Proxenus having been here made prisoner, the Phliasians, in spite of all their sufferings, released him without ransom. This act of generosity — coupled with the loss sustained by the Pellenians in the recent engagement, as well as with the recent oligarchical counter-revolutions which had disjoined the other Achæan cities from Thebes — altered the politics of Pellênê, bringing about a peace between that city and Phlius.<sup>2</sup> Such an accession afforded sensible

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 11-15.

<sup>2</sup> This change of politics at Pellênê is not mentioned by Xenophon, at the time, though it is noticed afterwards (vii, 4, 17) as a fact accomplished; but we must suppose it to have occurred now, in order to reconcile sections 11-14 with sections 18-20 of vii, 2.

The strong Laconian partialities of Xenophon induce him to allot not only warm admiration, but a space disproportionate compared with other parts of his history, to the exploits of the brave little Phliasian community. Unfortunately, here, as elsewhere, he is obscure in the description of particular events, and still more perplexing when we try to draw from him a clear idea of the general series.

With all the defects and partiality of Xenophon's narrative, however, we must recollect that it is a description of real events by a contemporary author who had reasonable means of information. This is a precious ingre-



relief, — it might almost be said, salvation, — to the Phliasians, in the midst of cruel impoverishment; since even their necessary subsistence, except what was obtained by marauding excursions from the enemy, being derived by purchase from Corinth, was found difficult to pay for, and still more difficult to bring home, in the face of an enemy. They were now enabled, by the aid of the Athenian general Chares and his mercenary troops from Corinth, to escort their families and their non-military population to Pellênê, where a kindly shelter was provided by the citizens. The military Phliasians, while escorting back a stock of supplies to Phlius, broke through and defeated an ambuscade of the enemy in their way; and afterwards, in conjunction with Charês, surprised the fort of Thyamia, which the Sikyonians were fortifying as an aggressive post on their borders. The fort became not only a defence for Phlius, but a means of aggression against the enemy, affording also great facility for the introduction of provisions from Corinth.<sup>1</sup>

Another cause, both of these successes and of general relief to the Phliasians, arose out of the distracted state of affairs in Sikyon. So intolerable had the tyranny of Euphron become, that the Arcadians, who had helped to raise him up, became disgusted. Æneas of Stymphalus, general of the collective Arcadian force, marched with a body of troops to Sikyon, joined the Theban harmost in the Acropolis, and there summoned the Sikyonian *notables* to an assembly. Under his protection, the intense sentiment against Euphron was freely manifested, and it was resolved to recall the numerous exiles, whom he had banished without either trial or public sentence. Dreading the wrath of these numerous and bitter enemies, Euphron thought it prudent to retire with his mercenaries to the harbor; where he invited Pasimêlus the Lacedæmonian to come, with a portion of the garrison of Corinth, and

dient, which gives value to all that he says; inasmuch as we are so constantly obliged to borrow our knowledge of Grecian history either from authors who write at second-hand and after the time, — or from orators whose purposes are usually different from those of the historian. Hence I have given a short abridgment of these Phliasian events as described by Xenophon, though they were too slight to exercise influence on the main course of the war.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 18-23.

immediately declared himself an open partisan of Sparta. The harbor, a separate town and fortification at some little distance from the city (as Lechæum was from Corinth), was thus held by and for the Spartans; while Sikyon adhered to the Thebans and Arcadians. In Sikyon itself however, though evacuated by Euphron, there still remained violent dissensions. The returning exiles were probably bitter in reactionary measures; the humbler citizens were fearful of losing their newly-acquired political privileges; and the liberated slaves, yet more fearful of forfeiting that freedom, which the recent revolution had conferred upon them.

Hence Euphron still retained so many partisans, that having procured from Athens a reinforcement of mercenary troops, he was enabled to return to Sikyon, and again to establish himself as master of the town in conjunction with the popular party. But as his opponents, the principal men in the place, found shelter along with the Theban garrison in the acropolis, which he vainly tried to take by assault,<sup>1</sup> — his possession even of the town was altogether precarious, until such formidable neighbors could be removed. Accordingly he resolved to visit Thebes, in hopes of obtaining from the authorities an order for expelling his opponents and handing over Sikyon a second time to his rule. On what grounds, after so recent a defection to the Spartans, he rested his hopes of success, we do not know; except that he took with him a large sum of money for the purpose of bribery.<sup>2</sup> His Sikyonian opponents, alarmed lest he should really carry his point, followed him to Thebes, where their alarm was still further increased by seeing him in familiar converse with the magistrates. Under the first impulse of terror and despair, they assassinated Euphron in broad daylight, — on the Kadmeia, and even before the doors of the Theban Senate-house, wherein both magistrates and Senate were sitting.

For an act of violence thus patent, they were of course seized forthwith, and put upon their trial, before the Senate. The magistrates invoked upon their heads the extreme penalty of death, insisting upon the enormity and even impudence of the outrage, committed almost under the eyes of the authorities, — as well as upon the sacred duty of vindicating not merely the majesty, but even the security of the city, by exemplary punishment upon of

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<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 4-6.



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<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 9.

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fenders who had despised its laws. How many in number were the persons implicated, we do not know. All, except one, denied actual hand-participation; but that one avowed it frankly, and stood up to justify it before the Theban Senate. He spoke in substance nearly as follows, — taking up the language of the accusing magistrates: —

“Despise you I cannot, men of Thebes; for you are masters of my person and life. It was on other grounds of confidence that I slew this man: first, I had the conviction of acting justly; next, I trusted in your righteous judgment. I knew that *you* did not wait for trial and sentence to slay Archias and Hypatês,<sup>1</sup> whom you caught after a career similar to that of Euphron, — but punished them at the earliest practicable opportunity, under the conviction that men manifest in sacrilege, treason, and despotism, were already under sentence by all men. Well! and was not Euphron, too, guilty of all these crimes? Did not he find the temples full of gold and silver offerings, and strip them until they were empty? How can there be a traitor more palpable than the man, who, favored and upheld by Sparta, first betrayed her to you; and then again, after having received every mark of confidence from you, betrayed you to her, — handing over the harbor of Sikyon to your enemies? Was not he a despot without reserve, the man who exalted slaves, not only into freemen, but into citizens? the man who despoiled, banished, or slew, not criminals, but all whom he chose, and most of all, the chief citizens? And now, after having vainly attempted, in conjunction with your enemies the Athenians, to expel your harmost by force from Sikyon, he has collected a great stock of money, and come hither to turn it to account. Had he assembled arms and soldiers against you, you would have thanked me for killing him. How then can you punish me for giving him his due, when he has come with money to corrupt you, and to purchase from you again the mastery of Sikyon, to your own disgrace as well as mis-

<sup>1</sup> This refers to the secret expedition of Pelopidas and the six other Theban conspirators from Athens to Thebes, at the time when the Lacedæmonians were masters of that town and garrisoned the Kadmeia. The conspirators, through the contrivance of the secretary Phyllidas, got access in disguise to the oligarchical leaders of Thebes, who were governing under Lacedæmonian ascendancy, and put them to death. This event is described in a former chapter, Ch. lxxvii. p. 85 seq.

chief? Had he been my enemy and your friend, I should undoubtedly have done wrong to kill him in your city; but as he is a traitor, playing you false, how is he more my enemy than yours? I shall be told that he came hither of his own accord, confiding in the laws of the city. Well! you would have thanked me for killing him anywhere out of Thebes; why not *in* Thebes also, when he has come hither only for the purpose of doing you new wrong in addition to the past? Where among Greeks has impunity ever been assured to traitors, deserters, or despots? Recollect, that *you* have passed a vote that exiles from any one of your allied cities might be seized as outlaws in any other. Now Euphron is a condemned exile, who has ventured to come back to Sikyon without any vote of the general body of allies. How can any one affirm that he has not justly incurred death? I tell you in conclusion, men of Thebes, — if you put me to death, you will have made yourselves the avengers of your very worst enemy, — if you adjudge me to have done right, you will manifest yourselves publicly as just avengers, both on your own behalf and on that of your whole body of allies.”<sup>1</sup>

This impressive discourse induced the Theban Senate to pronounce that Euphron had met with his due. It probably came from one of the principal citizens of Sikyon, among whom were most of the enemies as well as the victims of the deceased despot. It appeals, in a characteristic manner, to that portion of Grecian morality which bore upon men, who by their very crimes procured for themselves the means of impunity; against whom there was no legal force to protect others, and who were therefore considered as not being entitled to protection themselves, if the daggers of others could ever be made to reach them. The tyrannicide appeals to this sentiment with confidence, as diffused throughout all the free Grecian cities. It found responsive assent in the Theban Senate, and would probably have found the like assent, if set

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 7-11.

To the killing of Euphron, followed by a defence so characteristic and emphatic on the part of the agent, — Schneider and others refer, with great probability, the allusion in the Rhetoric of Aristotle (ii, 24, 2) — *καὶ περὶ τοῦ Θήβης ἀποθανόντος, περὶ οὗ ἐκέλευε κρίναι, εἰ δίκαιος ἦν ἀπὸ πλείων ὥς οὐκ ἄδικον ἐν ἀποκτείνειν τὸν δίκαιον ἀποθανόντα.*



forth with equal emphasis, in most Grecian senates or assemblies elsewhere.

Very different, however, was the sentiment in Sikyon. The body of Euphron was carried thither, and enjoyed the distinguished preëminence of being buried in the market-place.<sup>1</sup> There, along with his tomb, a chapel was erected, in which he was worshipped as Archégetês, or Patron-hero and Second Founder, of the city. He received the same honors as had been paid to Brasidas at Amphipolis. The humbler citizens and the slaves, upon whom he had conferred liberty and political franchise, — or at least the name of a political franchise, — remembered him with grateful admiration as their benefactor, forgetting or excusing the atrocities which he had wreaked upon their political opponents. Such is the retributive Nemesis which always menaces, and sometimes overtakes, an oligarchy who keep the mass of the citizens excluded from political privileges. A situation is thus created, enabling some ambitious and energetic citizen to confer favors and earn popularity among the many, and thus to acquire power, which, whether employed or not for the benefit of the many, goes along with their antipathies when it humbles or crushes the previously monopolizing few.

We may presume from these statements that the government of Sikyon became democratical. But the provoking brevity of Xenophon does not inform us of the subsequent arrangements made with the Theban harmost in the acropolis, — nor how the intestine dissensions, between the democracy in the town and the refugees in the citadel, were composed, — nor what became of those citizens who slew Euphron. We learn only that not long afterwards, the harbor of Sikyon, which Euphron had held in conjunction with the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, was left imperfectly defended by the recall of the latter to Athens; and that it was accordingly retaken by the forces from the town, aided by the Arcadians.<sup>2</sup>

It appears that these proceedings of Euphron (from his first proclamation of the democracy at Sikyon and real acquisition of despotism to himself, down to his death and the recovery of the harbor) took place throughout the year 367 B. C. and the earlier half of 366 B. C. No such enemy, probably, would have arisen

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 12.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1

to embarrass Thebes, unless the policy recommended by Epaminondas in Achaia had been reversed, and unless he himself had fallen under the displeasure of his countrymen. His influence too was probably impaired, and the policy of Thebes affected for the worse, by the accidental absence of his friend Pelopidas, who was then on his mission to the Persian court at Susa. Such a journey and return, with the transaction of the business in hand, must have occupied the greater part of the year 367 B. C., being terminated probably by the return of the envoys in the beginning of 366 B. C.

The leading Thebans had been alarmed by the language of Philiskus, — who had come over a few months before as envoy from the satrap Ariobarzanes and had threatened to employ Asiatic money in the interest of Athens and Sparta against Thebes, though his threats seem never to have been realized, as well as by the presence of the Lacedæmonian Euthyklês (after the failure of Antalkidas<sup>1</sup>) at the Persian court, soliciting aid. Moreover Thebes had now pretensions to the headship of Greece, at least as good as either of her two rivals; while since the fatal example set by Sparta at the peace called by the name of Antalkidas in 387 B. C., and copied by Athens after the battle of Leuktra in 371 B. C., — it had become a sort of recognized fashion that the leading Grecian state should sue out its title from the terror-striking rescript of the Great King, and proclaim itself as enforcing terms which he had dictated. On this ground of borrowed elevation Thebes now sought to place herself. There was in her case a peculiar reason which might partly excuse the value set upon it by her leaders. It had been almost the capital act of her policy to establish the two new cities, Megalopolis and Messênê. The vitality and chance for duration, of both, — especially that of the latter, which had the inextinguishable hostility of Sparta to contend with, — would be materially improved, in the existing state of the Greek mind, if they were recognized as autonomous under a Persian rescript. To attain this object,<sup>2</sup> Pelopidas and Isme-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

<sup>2</sup> It is plain that Messênê was the great purpose with Pelopidas in his mission to the Persian court; we see this not only from Cornelius Nepos (Pelop. c. 4) and Diodorus (xv 81), but also even from Xenophon, Hellen. vii, 1, 36.



nias now proceeded as envoys to Susa; doubtless under a formal vote of the allied synod, since the Arcadian Antiochus, a celebrated pankratiast, the Eleian Archidamus, and a citizen from Argos, accompanied them. Informed of the proceeding, the Athenians also sent Timagoras and Leon to Susa; and we read with some surprise that these hostile envoys all went up thither in the same company.<sup>1</sup>

Pelopidas, though he declined to perform the usual ceremony of prostration,<sup>2</sup> was favorably received by the Persian court. Xenophon, — who recounts the whole proceeding in a manner unfairly invidious towards the Thebans, forgetting that they were now only copying the example of Sparta in courting Persian aid, — affirms that his application was greatly furthered by the recollection of the ancient alliance of Thebes with Xerxes, against Athens and Sparta, at the time of the battle of Plataea; and by the fact that Thebes had not only refused to second, but had actually discountenanced, the expedition of Agesilaus against Asia. We may perhaps doubt, whether this plea counted for much; or the straightforward eloquence of Pelopidas, so much extolled by Plutarch,<sup>3</sup> which could only reach Persian ears through an interpreter. But the main fact for the Great King to know was, that the Thebans had been victorious at Leuktra; that they had subsequently trodden down still farther the glory of Sparta, by carrying their arms over Laconia, and emancipating the conquered half of the country; that when they were no longer in Pelopon-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33-38; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30; Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

The words of Xenophon *ἡκολούθει δὲ καὶ Ἀργεῖος* must allude to some Argeian envoy; though the name is not mentioned, and must probably have dropped out, — or perhaps the word *τις*, as Xenophon may not have heard the name.

It would appear that in the mission which Pharnabazus conducted up to the Persian court (or at least undertook to conduct) in 408 B. C., envoys from hostile Greek cities were included in the same company (Xen. Hellen. i, 3, 13), as on the present occasion.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

His colleague Ismenias, however, is said to have dropped his ring, and then to have stooped to pick it up, immediately before the king; thus going through the prostration.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30.

nesus, their allies the Arcadians and Argeians had been shamefully defeated by the Lacedæmonians (in the Tearless Battle). Such boasts on the part of Pelopidas, — confirmed as matters of fact even by the Athenian Timagoras, — would convince the Persian ministers that it was their interest to exercise ascendancy over Greece through Thebes in preference to Sparta. Accordingly Pelopidas being asked by the Great King what sort of rescript he wished, obtained his own terms. Messênê was declared autonomous and independent of Sparta: Amphipolis also was pronounced to be a free and autonomous city: the Athenians were directed to order home and lay up their ships of war now in active service, on pain of Persian intervention against them, in case of disobedience. Moreover Thebes was declared the head city of Greece, and any city refusing to follow her headship was menaced with instant compulsion by Persian force.<sup>1</sup> In reference to the points in dispute between Elis and Arcadia (the former claiming sovereignty over Triphylia, which professed itself Arcadian and had been admitted into the Arcadian communion), the rescript pronounced in favor of the Eleians;<sup>2</sup> probably at the instance of

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 36. *Ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἐρωτώμενος ὑπὸ βασιλέως ὁ Πελοπίδας τί βούλοιο ταύτῃ γραφῆναι, εἶπεν ὅτι Μεσσήνην τε αὐτόνομον εἶναι ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ Ἀθηναίους ἀνέλκειν τὰς ναῦς· εἰ δὲ ταῦτα μὴ πείθονται, στρατεύειν ἐπ' αὐτούς· εἰ τις δὲ πόλις μὴ ἐθέλοι ἀκολουθεῖν, ἐπὶ ταύτην πρῶτον λέναι.*

It is clear that these are not the exact words of the rescript of 367 B. C.; though in the former case of the peace of Antalkidas (387 B. C.) Xenophon seems to have given the rescript in its exact words (v, 1, 31).

What he states afterwards (vii, 1, 38) about Elis and Arcadia proves that other matters were included. Accordingly I do not hesitate to believe that Amphipolis also was recognized as autonomous. This we read in Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 383, c. 42. *Καὶ γὰρ τοὶ πρῶτον μὲν Ἀμφίπολιν πόλιν ἡμετέραν δούλην κατέστησεν (the king of Persia), ἣν τότε σύμμαχον αὐτῷ καὶ φίλην ἐγραψεν.* Demosthenes is here alluding to the effect produced on the mind of the Great King, and to the alteration in his proceedings, when he learnt that Timagoras had been put to death on returning to Athens; the adverb of time *τότε* alludes to the rescript given when Timagoras was present.

In the words of Xenophon, — *εἰ τις δὲ πόλις μὴ ἐθέλοι ἀκολουθεῖν*, — the headship of Thebes is declared or implied. Compare the convention imposed by Sparta upon Olynthus, after the latter was subdued (v, 3, 26.)

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38. *Τῶν δὲ ἄλλων πρεσβέων ὁ μὲν Ἠλεῖος Ἀρχίδα-*



Pelopidas, since there now subsisted much coldness between the Thebans and Arcadians.

Leon the Athenian protested against the Persian rescript, observing aloud when he heard it read, — "By Zeus, Athenians, I think it is time for you to look out for some other friend than the Great King." This remark, made in the King's hearing and interpreted to him, produced the following addition to the rescript: "If the Athenians have anything juster to propose, let them come to the King and inform him." So vague a modification, however, did little to appease the murmurs of the Athenians. On the return of their two envoys to Athens, Leon accused his colleague Timagoras of having not only declined to associate with him during the journey, but also of having lent himself to the purposes of Pelopidas, of being implicated in treasonable promises, and of receiving large bribes from the Persian King. On these charges Timagoras was condemned and executed.<sup>1</sup> The Arcadian envoy Antiochus was equally indignant at the rescript; refusing even to receive such presents of formal courtesy as were tendered to all, and accepted by Pelopidas himself, who however strictly declined everything beyond. The conduct of this eminent Theban thus exhibited a strong contrast with the large acquisitions of the Athenian Timagoras.<sup>2</sup> Antiochus, on returning to Arcadia,

μος, διὰ προὔτιμησης τὴν ἑλπίδα πρὸ τῶν Ἀρκάδων, ἐπὶ τὴν τὰ τοῦ βασιλέως ὁ δ' Ἀντίοχος, διὰ ἡλαττοῦτο τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν, οὔτε τὰ δῶρα ἐδέξατο, etc.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. c. 42, p. 383.

In another passage of the same oration (c. 57, p. 400), Demosthenes says that Leon had been joint envoy with Timagoras for four years. Certainly this mission of Pelopidas to the Persian court cannot have lasted four years; and Xenophon states that the Athenians sent the two envoys when they heard that Pelopidas was going thither. I imagine that Leon and Timagoras may have been sent up to the Persian court shortly after the battle of Leuktra, at the time when the Athenians caused the former rescript of the Persian king to be resworn, putting Athens as head into the place of Sparta (Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 1, 2). This was exactly four years before (371–367 B.C.). Leon and Timagoras having jointly undertaken and perhaps recently returned from their first embassy, were now sent jointly on a second. Demosthenes has summed up the time of the two as if it were one.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30.

Demosthenes speaks of the amount received, in money, by Timagoras from the Persian king as having been forty talents, ὡς λέγεται (Fals. Leg.

made report of his mission to the Pan-Arcadian synod, called the Ten Thousand, at Megalopolis. He spoke in the most contemptuous terms of all that he had seen at the Persian court. There were (he said) plenty of bakers, cooks, wine-pourers, porters, etc., but as for men competent to fight against Greeks, though he looked out for them with care, he could see none; and even the vaunted golden plane-tree was not large enough to furnish shade for a grasshopper.<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, the Eleian envoy returned with feelings of satisfaction, and the Thebans with triumph. Deputies from each of their allied cities were invited to Thebes, to hear the Persian rescript. It was produced by a native Persian, their official companion from Susa, — the first Persian probably ever seen in Thebes since the times immediately preceding the battle of Plataea, — who, after exhibiting publicly the regal seal, read the document aloud; as the satrap Tiribazus had done on the occasion of the peace of Antalkidas.<sup>2</sup>

But though the Theban leaders thus closely copied the conduct of Sparta both as to means and as to end, they by no means found the like ready acquiescence, when they called on the deputies present to take an oath to the rescript, to the Great King, and to Thebes. All replied that they had come with instructions, authorizing them to hear and report, but no more; and that acceptance or rejection must be decided in their respective cities. Nor was this the worst. Lykomedes and the other deputies from Arcadia, already jealous of Thebes, and doubtless farther alienated by the angry report of their envoy Antiochus, went yet farther, and entered a general protest against the headship of Thebes; affirming that the synod ought not to be held constantly in that city, but in the seat of war, wherever that might be. Incensed at such language, the Thebans accused Lykomedes of violating the cardinal principle of the confederacy; upon which he and his Arcadian comrades forthwith retired and went home, declaring that they would no longer sit in the synod. The other deputies appear to have followed his example. Indeed, as they had refused to

p. 383), besides other presents and conveniences. Compare also Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 22.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 30.



take the oath submitted to them, the special purpose of the synod was defeated.

Having thus failed in carrying their point with the allies collectively, the Thebans resolved to try the efficacy of applications individually. They accordingly despatched envoys, with the Persian rescript in hand, to visit the cities successively, calling upon each for acceptance with an oath of adhesion. Each city separately (they thought) would be afraid to refuse, under peril of united hostility from the Great King and from Thebes. So confident were they in the terrors of the king's name and seal, that they addressed this appeal not merely to the cities in alliance with them, but even to several among their enemies. Their envoys first set forth the proposition at Corinth; a city, not only at variance with them, but even serving as a centre of operation for the Athenian and Lacedæmonian forces to guard the line of Oneium, and prevent the entrance of a Theban army into Peloponnesus. But the Corinthians rejected the proposition altogether, declining formally to bind themselves by any common oaths towards the Persian king. The like refusal was experienced by the envoys as they passed on to Peloponnesus, if not from all the cities visited, at least from so large a proportion, that the mission was completely frustrated. And thus the rescript, which Thebes had been at such pains to procure, was found practically inoperative in confirming or enforcing her headship;<sup>1</sup> though doubtless the mere fact, that it comprised and recognized Messênê, contributed to strengthen the vitality, and exalt the dignity, of that new-born-city.

In their efforts to make the Persian rescript available towards the recognition of their headship throughout Greece, the Thebans would naturally visit Thessaly and the northern districts as well as Peloponnesus. It appears that Pelopidas and Ismenias themselves undertook this mission; and that in the execution of it they were seized and detained as prisoners by Alexander of Pheræ. That despot seems to have come to meet them, under pacific appearances, at Pharsalus. They indulged hopes of prevailing on him as well as the other Thessalians to accept the Persian

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 40. Καὶ αὐτὴ μὲν ἡ Πελοπίδω καὶ τῶν Θεβαίων τῆς ἀρχῆς περιβολῇ οὕτω διελύθη.

rescript; for we see by the example of Corinth, that they had tried their powers of persuasion on enemies as well as friends. But the Corinthians, while refusing the application, had nevertheless respected the public morality held sacred even between enemies in Greece, and had dismissed the envoys (whether Pelopidas was among them, we cannot assert) inviolate. Not so the tyrant of Pheræ. Perceiving that Pelopidas and Ismenias were unaccompanied by any military force, he seized their persons, and carried them off to Pheræ as prisoners.

Treacherous as this proceeding was, it proved highly profitable to Alexander. Such was the personal importance of Pelopidas, that his imprisonment struck terror among the partisans of Thebes in Thessaly, and induced several of them to submit to the despot of Pheræ; who moreover sent to apprise the Athenians of his capture, and to solicit their aid against the impending vengeance of Thebes. Greatly impressed with the news, the Athenians looked upon Alexander as a second Jason, likely to arrest the menacing ascendancy of their neighbor and rival.<sup>1</sup> They immediately despatched to his aid thirty triremes and one thousand hoplites under Autoklês; who, unable to get through the Euripus, when Bœotia and Eubœa were both hostile to Athens, were forced to circumnavigate the latter island. He reached Pheræ just in time; for the Thebans, incensed beyond measure at the seizure of Pelopidas, had despatched without delay eight thousand hoplites and six hundred cavalry to recover or avenge him. Unfortunately for them, Epaminondas had not been rechosen commander since his last year's proceedings in Achaia. He was now serving as an hoplite in the ranks, while Kleomenes with other Bœotarchs had the command. On entering Thessaly, they were joined by various allies in the country. But the army of Alex-

<sup>1</sup> The strong expressions of Demosthenes show what a remarkable effect was produced by the news at Athens (cont. Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 142).

Τὶ δ' ; 'Ἀλέξανδρον ἐκείνον τὸν Θετταλὸν, ἡνικ' εἶχε μὲν αἰχμάλωτον δῆσας Πελοπίδαν, ἐχθρὸς δ' ὡς οὐδεὶς ἦν Θεβαίοις, ὑμῖν δ' οἰκείως διέκειτο, οὕτως ὥστε παρ' ὑμῶν στρατηγὸν αἰτεῖν, ἐβοηθεῖτε δ' αὐτῷ καὶ πάντ' ἦν 'Ἀλέξανδρος, etc.

Alexander is said to have promised to the Athenians so ample a supply of cattle as should keep the price of meat very low at Athens (Plutarch. Apophtheg. Reg. p. 193 E.)



ander, aided by the Athenians, and placed under the command of Autoklês, was found exceedingly formidable, especially in cavalry. The Thessalian allies of Thebes, zealous with their habitual treachery, deserted in the hour of danger; and the enterprise, thus difficult and perilous, was rendered impracticable by the incompetence of the Boeotarchs. Unable to make head against Alexander and the Athenians, they were forced to retreat homeward. But their generalship was so unskilful, and the enemy's cavalry so active, that the whole army was in imminent danger of being starved or destroyed. Nothing saved them now, but the presence of Epaminondas as a common soldier in the ranks. Indignant as well as dismayed, the whole army united to depose their generals, and with one voice called upon him to extricate them from their peril. Epaminondas accepted the duty, — marshalled the retreat in consummate order, — took for himself the command of the rear-guard, beating off all the attacks of the enemy, — and conducted the army safely back to Thebes.<sup>1</sup>

This memorable exploit, while it disgraced the unsuccessful Boeotarchs, who were condemned to fine and deposition from their office, raised higher than ever the reputation of Epaminondas among his countrymen. But the failure of the expedition was for the time a fatal blow to the influence of Thebes in Thessaly; where Alexander now reigned victorious and irresistible, with Pelopidas still in his dungeon. The cruelties and oppressions, at all times habitual to the despot of Pheræ, were pushed to an excess beyond all former parallel. Besides other brutal deeds of which we read with horror, he is said to have surrounded by his military force the unarmed citizens of Melibœa and Skotussa, and slaughtered them all in mass. In such hands, the life of Pelopidas hung by a thread; yet he himself, with that personal courage which never forsook him, held the language of unsubdued defiance and provocation against the tyrant. Great sympathy was manifested by many Thessalians, and even by Thêbê the wife of Alexander, for so illustrious a prisoner; and Alexander, fearful of incurring the implacable enmity of Thebes, was induced to spare his life, though retaining him as a prisoner. His confinement, too, appears to have lasted some time before the Thebans, discouraged by their late ill-success, were prepared to undertake a second expedition.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 71; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 28; Pausanias ix, 15, 1.

At length they sent a force for the purpose; which was placed, on this occasion, under the command of Epaminondas. The renown of his name rallied many adherents in the country; and his prudence, no less than his military skill, was conspicuously exhibited, in defeating and intimidating Alexander, yet without reducing him to such despair as might prove fatal to the prisoner. The despot was at length compelled to send an embassy excusing his recent violence, offering to restore Pelopidas, and soliciting to be admitted to peace and alliance with Thebes. But Epaminondas would grant nothing more than a temporary truce,<sup>1</sup> coupled with the engagement of evacuating Thessaly; while he required in exchange the release of Pelopidas and Ismenias. His terms were acceded to, so that he had the delight of conveying his liberated friend in safety to Thebes. Though this primary object was thus effected, however, it is plain that he did not restore Thebes to the same influence in Thessaly which she had enjoyed prior to the seizure of Pelopidas.<sup>2</sup> That event with its consequences

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch (Pelopidas, c. 29) says, a truce for thirty days; but it is difficult to believe that Alexander would have been satisfied with a term so very short.

<sup>2</sup> The account of the seizure of Pelopidas by Alexander, with its consequences, is contained chiefly in Diodorus, xv, 71-75; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 27-29; Cornel. Nep. Pelop. c. 5; Pausanias, ix, 15, 1. Xenophon does not mention it.

I have placed the seizure in the year 366 B. C., after the return of Pelopidas from his embassy in Persia; which embassy I agree with Mr. Fynes Clinton in referring to the year 367 B. C. Plutarch places the seizure before the embassy; Diodorus places it in the year between Midsummer 368 and Midsummer 367 B. C.; but he does not mention the embassy at all, in its regular chronological order; he only alludes to it in summing up the exploits at the close of the career of Pelopidas.

Assuming the embassy to the Persian court to have occurred in 367 B. C., the seizure cannot well have happened before that time.

The year 368 B. C. seems to have been that wherein Pelopidas made his second expedition into Thessaly, from which he returned victorious, bringing back the hostages. See above, p. 264, note.

The seizure of Pelopidas was accomplished at a time when Epaminondas was not Boeotarch, nor in command of the Theban army. Now it seems to have been not until the close of 367 B. C., after the accusations arising out of his proceedings in Achaia, that Epaminondas missed being rechosen as general.



still remained a blow to Thebes and a profit to Alexander; who again became master of all or most part of Thessaly, together with the Magnètes, the Phthiot Achæans, and other tributary nations dependent on Thessaly — maintaining unimpaired his influence and connection at Athens.<sup>1</sup>

While the Theban arms were thus losing ground in Thessaly, an important point was gained in their favor on the other side of Bœotia. Orôpus, on the north-eastern frontier of Attica adjoining Bœotia, was captured and wrested from Athens by a party of exiles who crossed over from Eretria in Eubœa, with the aid of Themison, despot of the last-mentioned town. It had been more than once lost and regained between Athens and Thebes; being seemingly in its origin Bœotian, and never incorporated as a Deme or equal constituent member of the Athenian commonwealth, but only recognized as a dependency of Athens; though, as it was close on the frontier, many of its inhabitants were also citizens of Athens, de

Xenophon, in describing the embassy of Pelopidas to Persia, mentions his grounds for expecting a favorable reception, and the matters which he had to boast of (Hell. vii, 1, 35). Now if Pelopidas, immediately before had been seized and detained for some months in prison by Alexander of Phœæ, surely Xenophon would have alluded to it as an item on the other side. I know that this inference from the silence of Xenophon is not always to be trusted. But in this case, we must recollect that he dislikes both the Theban leaders; and we may fairly conclude, that where he is enumerating the trophies of Pelopidas, he would hardly have failed to mention a signal disgrace, if there had been one, immediately preceding.

Pelopidas was taken prisoner by Alexander, not in battle, but when in pacific mission, and under circumstances in which no man less infamous than Alexander would have seized him (*παρασπονδηθεὶς* — Plutarch, Apoph. p. 194 D.; Pausan. ix, 15, 1; "legationis jure satis tectum se arbitraretur" Corn. Nep.). His imprudence in trusting himself under any circumstances to such a man as Alexander, is blamed by Polybius (viii, 1) and others. But we must suppose such imprudence to be partly justified or explained by some plausible circumstances; and the proclamation of the Persian rescript appears to me to present the most reasonable explanation of his proceeding.

On these grounds, which, in my judgment, outweigh any probabilities on the contrary side, I have placed the seizure of Pelopidas in 366 B. C., after the embassy to Persia; not without feeling, however, that the chronology of this period cannot be rendered absolutely certain.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 31-35.

mots of the neighboring Deme Græa.<sup>1</sup> So recently before as the period immediately preceding the battle of Leuktra, angry remonstrances had been exchanged between Athens and Thebes respecting a portion of the Oropian territory. At that time, it appears, the Thebans were forced to yield, and their partisans in Oropus were banished.<sup>2</sup> It was these partisans who, through the aid of Themison and the Eretrians, now effected their return, so as to repossess themselves of Oropus, and doubtless to banish the principal citizens friendly to Athens.<sup>3</sup> So great was the sensation produced among the Athenians, that they not only marched with all their force to recover the place, but also recalled their general, Chares, with that mercenary force which he commanded in the territories of Corinth and Phlius. They farther requested aid from the Corinthians and their other allies in Peloponnesus. These allies did not obey the summons; but the Athenian force alone would have sufficed to retake Oropus, had not the Thebans occupied it so as to place it beyond their attack. Athens was obliged to acquiesce in their occupation of it; though under protest, and with the understanding that the disputed right should be referred to impartial arbitration.<sup>4</sup>

This seizure of Oropus produced more than one material consequence. Owing to the recall of Chares from Corinth, the harbor of Sikyon could no longer be maintained against the Sikyonians in the town; who, with the aid of the Arcadians, recaptured it, so

<sup>1</sup> See the instructive Inscription and comments published by Professor Ross, in which the Deme Γραῖς, near Oropus, was first distinctly made known (Ross, Die Deme von Attika, p. 6, 7 — Halle, 1846).

<sup>2</sup> Isokrates, Orat. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 22-40.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1; Diodor. xv, 76.

The previous capture of Oropus, when Athens lost it in 411 B. C., was accomplished under circumstances very analogous (Thucyd. viii, 60).

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1; Diodor. xv, 76.

Compare Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 259, s. 123, Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. p. 397, s. 85.

It would seem that we are to refer to this loss of Oropus the trial of Chabrias and Kallistratus in Athens, together with the memorable harangue of the latter which Demosthenes heard as a youth with such strong admiration. But our information is so vague and scanty, that we can make out nothing certainly on the point. Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, p. 109-114) brings together all the scattered testimonies in an instructive chapter.



that both town and harbor again came into the league of Thebans and Arcadians. Moreover, Athens became discontented with her Peloponnesian allies, for having neglected her summons on the emergency at Oropus, although Athenian troops had been constantly in service for the protection of Peloponnesus against the Thebans. The growth of such dispositions at Athens became known to the Mantinean Lykomedes; the ablest and most ambitious leader in Arcadia, who was not only jealous of the predominance of the Thebans, but had come to a formal rupture with them at the synod held for the reception of the Persian rescript.<sup>1</sup> Anxious to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes as well as from Sparta, Lykomedes now took advantage of the discontent of Athens to open negotiations with that city; persuading the majority of the Arcadian Ten Thousand to send him thither as ambassador. There was difficulty among the Athenians in entertaining his proposition, from the alliance subsisting between them and Sparta. But they were reminded, that to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes, was no less in the interest of Sparta than of Athens; and a favorable answer was then given to Lykomedes. The latter took ship at Peiræus for his return, but never reached Arcadia; for he happened to land at the spot where the Arcadian exiles of the opposite party were assembled, and these men put him to death at once.<sup>2</sup> In spite of his death, however, the alliance between Arcadia and Athens was still brought to pass, though not without opposition.

Thebes was during this year engaged in her unsuccessful campaign in Thessaly (alluded to already) for the rescue of Pelopidas, which disabled her from effective efforts in Peloponnesus. But as soon as that rescue had been accomplished, Epaminondas, her greatest man, and her only conspicuous orator, was despatched into Arcadia to offer, in conjunction with an envoy from Argos, diplomatic obstruction to the proposed Athenian alliance. He had to speak against Kallistratus, the most distinguished orator at Athens,

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 39; vii, 4, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 3.

Xenophon notices the singularity of the accident. There were plenty of vessels in Peiræus, Lykomedes had only to make his choice, and to determine where he would disembark. He fixed upon the exact spot where the exiles were assembled, not knowing that they were there — *δαμονιώτατα ἐποδὶ ἴσκει*.

who had been sent by his countrymen to plead their cause amidst the Arcadian Ten Thousand, and who, among other arguments, denounced the enormities which darkened the heroic legends both of Thebes and Argos. "Were not Orestes and Alkmæon, both murderers of their mothers (asked Kallistratus), natives of Argos? Was not Œdipus, who slew his father and married his mother, a native of Thebes?" — "Yes (said Epaminondas, in his reply) they were. But Kallistratus has forgotten to tell you, that these persons, while they lived at home were innocent, or reputed to be so. As soon as their crimes became known, Argos and Thebes banished them; and then it was that Athens received them, stained with confessed guilt."<sup>1</sup> This clever retort told much to the credit of the rhetorical skill of Epaminondas; but his speech as a whole, was not successful. The Arcadians concluded alliance with Athens; yet without formally renouncing friendship with Thebes.

As soon as such new alliance had been ratified, it became important to Athens to secure a free and assured entrance into Peloponnesus; while at the same time the recent slackness of the Corinthians, in regard to the summons to Oropus, rendered her mistrustful of their fidelity. Accordingly it was resolved in the Athenian assembly, on the motion of a citizen named Demotion, to seize and occupy Corinth; there being already some scattered Athenian garrisons, on various points of the Corinthian territory, ready to be concentrated and rendered useful for such a purpose. A fleet and land-force under Chares was made ready and despatched. But on reaching the Corinthian port of Kenchreæ, Chares found himself shut out even from admittance. The proposition of Demotion, and the resolution of the Athenians had become known to the Corinthians; who forthwith stood upon their guard, sent soldiers of their own to relieve the various Athenian outposts on their territory, and called upon these latter to give in any complaints for

<sup>1</sup> Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 6; Plutarch, Repub. Ger. Præc. p. 810 F.; Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 193 D.

Compare a similar reference, on the part of others, to the crimes embodied in Theban legend (Justin, ix, 3).

Perhaps it may have been during this embassy into Peloponnesus, that Kallistratus addressed the discourse to the public assembly at Messênê, to which Aristotle makes allusion (Rhetoric, iii, 17, 3); possibly enough, against Epaminondas also.



which they might have ground, as their services were no longer needed. Chares pretended to have learnt that Corinth was in danger. But both he and the remaining Athenians were dismissed, though with every expression of thanks and politeness.<sup>1</sup>

The treacherous purpose of Athens was thus baffled, and the Corinthians were for the moment safe. Yet their position was precarious and uncomfortable; for their enemies, Thebes and Argos, were already their masters by land, and Athens had now been converted from an ally into an enemy. Hence they resolved to assemble a sufficient mercenary force in their own pay;<sup>2</sup> but while thus providing for military security, they sent envoys to Thebes to open negotiations for peace. Permission was granted to them by the Thebans to go and consult their allies, and to treat for peace in conjunction with as many as could be brought to share their views. Accordingly the Corinthians went to Sparta and laid their case before the full synod of allies, convoked for the occasion. "We are on the point of ruin (said the Corinthian envoy), and must make peace. We shall rejoice to make it in conjunction with you, if you will consent; but if you think proper to persevere in the war, be not displeased if we make peace without you." The Epidaurians and Phliasians, reduced to the like distress, held the same language of weariness and impatience for peace.<sup>3</sup>

It had been ascertained at Thebes, that no propositions for peace could be entertained, which did not contain a formal recognition of the independence of Messênê. To this the Corinthians and other allies of Sparta had no difficulty in agreeing. But they vainly en-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 4-6.

The public debates of the Athenian assembly were not favorable to the success of a scheme, like that proposed by Demotion, to which secrecy was indispensable. Compare another scheme, divulged in like manner, in Thucydides, iii, 3.

<sup>2</sup> It seems probable that these were the mercenaries placed by the Corinthians under the command of Timophanes, and employed by him afterwards as instruments for establishing a despotism.

Plutarch (Timoleon, c. 3, 4) alludes briefly to mercenaries equipped about this time (as far as we can verify his chronology) and to the Corinthian mercenaries now assembled, in connection with Timoleon and Timophanes, of whom I shall have to say much in a future chapter.

<sup>3</sup> Compare Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 8, 9 with Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus), s. 106.

deavored to prevail upon Sparta herself to submit to the same concession. The Spartans resolutely refused to relinquish a territory inherited from victorious forefathers, and held under so long a prescription. They repudiated yet more indignantly the idea of recognizing as free Greeks and equal neighbors, those who had so long been their slaves; and they proclaimed their determination of continuing the war, even single-handed and with all its hazards, to regain what they had lost;<sup>1</sup> and although they could not directly prohibit the Corinthians and other allies, whose sickness of the war had become intolerable, from negotiating a separate peace for themselves, — yet they gave only a reluctant consent. Archidamus son of Agesilaus even reproached the allies with timorous selfishness, partly in deserting their benefactress Sparta at her hour of need, partly in recommending her to submit to a sacrifice ruinous to her honor.<sup>2</sup> The Spartan prince conjured his country-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 9.

<sup>2</sup> This sentiment of dissatisfaction against the allies is strongly and repeatedly set forth in the oration of Isokrates called Archidamus, composed as if to be spoken in this synod, — and good evidence (whether actually spoken or not) of the feelings animating the prince and a large party at Sparta. Archidamus treats those allies who recommended the Spartans to surrender Messênê, as worse enemies even than those who had broken off altogether. He specifies Corinthians, Phliasians, and Epidaurians, sect. 11-13, — *εἰς τοῦτο δ' ἤκουσι πλεονεξίας, καὶ τοσαύτην ἡμῶν κατεγνώκασιν ἀνανδρίαν, ὥστε πολλάκις ἡμᾶς ἀξιώσαντες ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτῶν πολεμεῖν, ὑπὲρ Μεσσηνίας οὐκ οἴονται δεῖν ἡμᾶς κινδυνεύειν. ἀλλ' ἰν' αἰτοὶ τὴν σφετέραν αὐτῶν ἀσφαλῶς καρπῶνται, πειρῶνται διδάσκειν ἡμᾶς ὡς χρὴ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς τῆς ἡμετέρας παραχωρῆσαι, καὶ πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπαπειλοῦσιν, ὥς, εἰ μὴ ταῦτα συγχωρήσομεν, ποιησόμενοι τὴν εἰρήνην κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτούς.* Compare sect. 67, 87, 99, 105, 106, 123.

We may infer from this discourse of Isokrates, that the displeasure of the Spartans against their allies, because the latter advised them to relinquish Messênê, — was much greater than the narrative of Xenophon (Hellen. vii, 4, 8-11) would lead us to believe.

In the argument prefixed to the discourse, it is asserted (among various other inaccuracies), that the Spartans had sent to Thebes to ask for peace, and that the Thebans had said in reply, — peace would be granted, *εἰ Μεσσηνίην ἀνοικίσωσι καὶ αὐτόνομον ἐάσωσι*. Now the Spartans had never sent to Thebes for this purpose; the Corinthians went to Thebes, and there learnt the peremptory condition requiring that Messênê should be recognized. Next, the Thebans would never require Sparta to recolonize or reconstitute (*ἀνοικίσαι*) Messênê; that had been already done by the Thebans themselves.



men, in the name of all their ancient dignity, to spurn the mandates of Thebes; to shrink neither from effort nor from peril for the reconquest of Messênê, even if they had to fight alone against all Greece; and to convert their military population into a permanent camp, sending away their women and children to an asylum in friendly foreign cities.

Though the Spartans were not inclined to adopt the desperate suggestions of Archidamus, yet this important congress ended by a scission between them and their allies. The Corinthians, Phliasi-ans, Epidaurians, and others, went to Thebes, and concluded peace; recognizing the independence of Messênê, and affirming the independence of each separate city within its own territory, without either obligatory alliance, or headship on the part of any city. Yet when the Thebans invited them to contract an alliance, they declined, saying that this would be only embarking in war on the other side; whereas that which they sighed for was peace. Peace was accordingly sworn, upon the terms indicated in the Persian rescript, so far as regarded the general autonomy of each separate town, and specially that of Messênê; but not including any sanction, direct or indirect, of Theban headship.<sup>1</sup>

This treaty removed out of the war, and placed in a position of neutrality, a considerable number of Grecian states; chiefly those near the Isthmus, — Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus; probably Trœzen and Hermionê, since we do not find them again mentioned among the contending parties. But it left the more powerful states, Thebes and Argos, — Sparta and Athens,<sup>2</sup> — still at war; as well as Arcadia, Achaia, and Elis. The relations between these states, however, were now somewhat complicated; for Thebes was at war with Sparta, and in alliance, though not altogether hearty alliance,

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus (xv, 76) states that the Persian king sent envoys to Greece who caused this peace to be concluded. But there seems no ground for believing that any Persian envoys had visited Greece since the return of Pelopidas, whose return with the rescript did in fact constitute a Persian intervention. The peace now concluded was upon the general basis of that rescript; so far, but no farther (as I conceive), the assertion of Diodorus about Persian intervention is exact.

<sup>2</sup> Diodorus (xv, 76) is farther inaccurate in stating the peace as universally accepted, and as being a conclusion of the Boeotian and Lacedæmonian war, which had begun with the battle of Leuktra.

with the Arcadians; while Athens was at war with Thebes, yet in alliance with Sparta as well as with Arcadia. The Argeians were in alliance with Thebes and Arcadia, and at war with Sparta; the Eleians were on unfriendly terms, though not yet at actual war, with Arcadia — yet still (it would appear) in alliance with Thebes. Lastly, the Arcadians themselves were losing their internal cooperation and harmony one with another, which had only so recently begun. Two parties were forming among them, under the old conflicting auspices of Mantinea and Tegea. Tegea, occupied by a Theban harriest and garrison, held strenuously with Megalopolis and Messênê as well as with Thebes, thus constituting a strong and united frontier against Sparta.

As the Spartans complained of their Peloponnesian allies, for urging the recognition of Messênê as an independent state, — so they were no less indignant with the Persian king; who, though still calling himself their ally, had inserted the same recognition in the rescript granted to Pelopidas.<sup>1</sup> The Athenians also were dissatisfied with this rescript. They had (as has been already stated) condemned to death Timagoras, one of their envoys who had accompanied Pelopidas, for having received bribes. They now availed themselves of the opening left for them in the very words of the rescript, to send a fresh embassy up to the Persian court, and solicit more favorable terms. Their new envoys, communicating the fact that Timagoras had betrayed his trust and had been punished for it, obtained from the Great King a fresh rescript, pronouncing Amphipolis to be an Athenian possession instead of a free city.<sup>2</sup> Whether that other article also in the

<sup>1</sup> Xenophon, Enc. Agesil. ii, 30. ἐνόμιζε — τῷ Πέρσῃ δίκην ἐπιδήσειν καὶ τῶν πρόσθεν, καὶ ὅτι νῦν, σύμμαχος εἶναι φάσκων, ἐπέταττε Μεσσηνὴν ἀφιέναι.

<sup>2</sup> This second mission of the Athenians to the Persian court (pursuant to the invitation contained in the rescript given to Pelopidas, (Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 37), appears to me implied in Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 384, s. 150 p. 420, s. 283; Or. De Halonneso, p. 84, s. 30.

If the king of Persia was informed that Timagoras had been put to death by his countrymen on returning to Athens, — and if he sent down (κατέπεμψεν) a fresh rescript about Amphipolis, — this information can only have been communicated, and the new rescript only obtained, by a second embassy sent to him from Athens.

Perhaps the Lacedæmonian Kallias may have accompanied this second



former rescript, which commanded Athens to call in all her armed ships, was now revoked, we cannot say; but it seems probable.

At the same time that the Athenians sent this second embassy they also despatched an armament under Timotheus to the coast of Asia Minor, yet with express instructions not to violate the peace with the Persian king. Agesilaus, king of Sparta, went to the same scene, though without any public force; availing himself only of his long-established military reputation to promote the interests of his country as negotiator. Both Spartan and Athenian attention was now turned, directly and specially, towards Ariobarzanes the satrap of Phrygia; who (as has been already related) had sent over to Greece, two years before, Philiskus of Abydus, with the view either of obtaining from the Thebans peace on terms favorable to Sparta, or of aiding the latter against them.<sup>1</sup> Ariobarzanes was then preparing, and apparently had since openly consummated, his revolt from the Persian king, which Agesilaus employed all his influence in fomenting. The Athenians, however, still wishing to avoid a distinct breach with Persia, instructed Timotheus to assist Ariobarzanes, — yet with a formal proviso, that he should not break truce with the Great King. They also conferred both upon Ariobarzanes (with his three sons), and upon Philiskus, the gift of Athenian citizenship.<sup>2</sup> That satrap seems now to have had a large mercenary force, and to have been in possession of both sides of the Hellespont, as well as of Perinthus on the Propontis; while Philiskus, as his chief officer, exercised extensive ascendancy, disgraced by much tyranny and brutality, over the Grecian cities in that region.

Precluded by his instructions from openly aiding the revolted Ariobarzanes, Timotheus turned his force against the island of Samos; which was now held by Kyprothemis, a Grecian chief with a military force in the service of Tigranes, Persian satrap

Athenian mission to Susa; we hear of him as having come back with a friendly letter from the Persian king to Agesilaus (Xenophon, *Enc. Ages.* viii, 3, Plutarch, *Apophth. Lacon.* p. 1213 E.), brought by a Persian messenger. But the statement is too vague to enable us to verify this as the actual occasion.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. *Hellen.* vii, 1, 27.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. *De Rhodior. Libert.* p. 193, s. 10, cont. *Aristokrat.* p. 666, s. 165, p. 687, s. 242.

on the opposite mainland. How or when Tigranes had acquired it we do not know; but the Persians, when once left by the peace of Antalkidas in quiet possession of the continental Asiatic Greeks, naturally tended to push their dominion over the neighboring islands. After carrying on his military operations in Samos, with eight thousand peltasts and thirty triremes, for ten or eleven months, Timotheus became master of it. His success was the more gratifying, as he had found means to pay and maintain his troops during the whole time at the cost of enemies; without either drawing upon the Athenian treasury, or extorting contributions from allies.<sup>1</sup> An important possession was thus acquired for Athens, while a considerable number of Samians of the opposite party went into banishment, with the loss of their properties. Since Samos was not among the legitimate possessions of the king of Persia, this conquest was not understood to import war between him and Athens. Indeed it appears that the revolt of Ariobarzanes, and the uncertain fidelity of various neighboring satraps, shook for some time the king's authority, and absorbed his revenues in these regions. Autophradates, the satrap of Lydia, — and Mausolus, native prince of Karia under Persian supremacy, — attacked Ariobarzanes, with the view, real or pretended, of quelling his revolt; and laid siege to Assus and Adramyttium. But they are said to have been induced to desist by the personal influence of Agesilaus.<sup>2</sup> As the latter had no army, nor any means of allurements (except perhaps some money derived from Ariobarzanes), we may fairly presume that the two besiegers were not very earnest in the cause. Moreover, we shall find both

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. *ut sup.*; Isokrates, *Or.* xv, (*De Permut.*) s. 118; Cornel. Nepos, *Timoth.* c. 1.

The stratagems whereby Timotheus procured money for his troops at Samos, are touched upon in the *Pseudo-Aristoteles*, *Œconomic.* ii, 23; and in *Polyæn.* iii, 10, 9; so far as we can understand them, they appear to be only contributions, levied under a thin disguise, upon the inhabitants.

Since Ariobarzanes gave money to Agesilaus, he may perhaps have given some to Timotheus during this siege.

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. *Enc. Ages.* ii, 26; *Polyænus*, vii, 26.

I do not know whether it is to this period that we are to refer the siege of Atarneus by Autophradates, which he was induced to relinquish by an ingenious proposition of Eubulus, who held the place (*Aristot. Politic.* ii, 4, 10).



of them, a few years afterwards, in joint revolt with Ariobarzanes himself against the Persian king.<sup>1</sup> Agesilaus obtained, from all three, pecuniary aid for Sparta.<sup>2</sup>

The acquisition of Samos, while it exalted the reputation of Timotheus, materially enlarged the maritime dominion of Athens. It seems also to have weakened the hold of the Great King on Asia Minor, — to have disposed the residents, both satraps and Grecian cities, to revolt, — and thus to have helped Ariobarzanes, who rewarded both Agesilaus and Timotheus. Agesilaus was enabled to carry home a sum of money to his embarrassed countrymen; but Timotheus, declining pecuniary aid, obtained for Athens the more valuable boon of readmission to the Thracian Chersonese. Ariobarzanes made over to him Sestus and Kri-thôtê in that peninsula; possessions doubly precious, as they secured to the Athenians a partial mastery of the passage of the Hellespont; with a large circumjacent territory for occupation.<sup>3</sup>

Samos and the Chersonese were not simply new tributary confederates aggregated to the Athenian synod. They were, in large proportion, new territories acquired to Athens, open to be occupied by Athenian citizens as out-settlers or kleruchs. Much of the Chersonese had been possessed by Athenian citizens, even from the time of the first Miltiades and afterwards down to the destruction of the Athenian empire in 405 B. C. Though all these proprietors had been then driven home and expropriated, they had never lost the hope of a favorable turn of fortune and

<sup>1</sup> It is with the greatest difficulty that we make out anything like a thread of events at this period; so miserably scanty and indistinct are our authorities.

Rehdantz (*Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei*, chap. v, p. 118-130) is an instructive auxiliary in putting together the scraps of information, compare also Weissenborn, *Hellen.* p. 192-194 (Jena, 1844).

<sup>2</sup> Xen. *Enc. Ages.* ii, 26, 27.

<sup>3</sup> Isokrates, *Or. xv.* (*De Permut.*) s. 115-119; Cornelius Nepos, *Timotheus*, c. 1.

Isokrates particularly dwells upon the fact that the conquests of Timotheus secured to Athens a large circumjacent territory — *ὡν ληφθεῖσων ἀπαρ δὲ τόπος περιέχων οἰκίους ἡναγκάσθη τῇ πόλει γενέσθαι*, etc. (s. 114).

From the value of the Hellespont to Athens as ensuring a regular supply of corn imported from the Euxine, Sestus was sometimes called "the flour-board of the Peiræus" — *ἡ τηλία τοῦ Πειραιῶς* (*Aristot. Rhetor.* iii, 10, 3)

eventual reentry.<sup>1</sup> That moment had now arrived. The formal renunciation of all private appropriations of land out of Attica, which Athens had proclaimed at the formation of her second confederacy in 378 B. C., as a means of conciliating maritime allies — was forgotten, now that she stood no longer in fear of Sparta. The same system of kleruchies, which had so much discredited her former empire, was again partially commenced. Many kleruchs, or lot-holders, were sent out to occupy lands both at Samos and in the Chersonese. These men were Athenian citizens, who still remained citizens of Athens even in their foreign domicile, and whose properties formed part of the taxable schedule of Athens. The particulars of this important measure are unknown to us. At Samos the emigrants must have been new men; for there had never been any kleruchs there before.<sup>2</sup> But in the Chersonese, the old Athenian proprietors, who had been expropriated forty years before (or their descendants), doubtless now went back, and tried, with more or less of success, to regain their

<sup>1</sup> See Andokides de Pace, s. 15.

<sup>2</sup> That the Athenian occupation of Samos (doubtless only in part) by kleruchs, began in 366 or 365 B. C., — is established by Diodorus, xviii, 8-18, when he mentions the restoration of the Samians forty-three years afterwards by the Macedonian Perdikkas. This is not inconsistent with the fact that additional detachments of kleruchs were sent out in 361 and in 352 B. C., as mentioned by the Scholiast on *Æschines* cont. *Timarch.* p. 31 c. 12; and by Philochorus, *Fr.* 131, ed. Didot. See the note of Wesseling, who questions the accuracy of the date in Diodorus. I dissent from his criticism, though he is supported both by Boeckh (*Public Econ. of Athens*, b. iii, p. 428) and by Mr. Clinton (*F. H. ad ann.* 352). I think it highly improbable that so long an interval should have elapsed between the capture of the island and the sending of the kleruchs, or that this latter measure, offensive as it was in the eyes of Greece, should have been first resorted to by Athens in 352 B. C., when she had been so much weakened both by the Social War, and by the Progress of Philip. Strabo mentions two thousand kleruchs as having been sent to Samos. But whether he means the first batch alone, or altogether, we cannot say (*Strabo* xiv, p. 638). The father of the philosopher Epikurus was among these kleruchs; compare *Diogen. Laert.* x, 1.

Rehdantz (*Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ et Timothei*, p. 127) seems to me to take a just view of the very difficult chronology of this period.

Demosthenes mentions the property of the kleruchs, in his general review of the ways and means of Athens; in a speech delivered in Olym. 106, before 352 B. C. (*De Symmoriis*, p. 182, s. 19).



previous lands; reinforced by bands of new emigrants. And Timotheus, having once got footing at Sestus and Krithôtê, soon extended his acquisitions to Elæus and other places; whereby Athens was emboldened publicly to claim the whole Chersonese, or at least most part of it, as her own ancient possession, — from its extreme northern boundary at a line drawn across the isthmus north of Kardia, down to Elæus at its southern extremity.<sup>1</sup>

This transfer of lands in Samos to Athenian proprietors, combined with the resumption of the Chersonese, appears to have excited a strong sensation throughout Greece, as a revival of ambitious tendencies on the part of Athens, and a manifest departure from those disinterested professions which she had set forth in 378 B. C. Even in the Athenian assembly, a citizen named Kydias pronounced an emphatic protest against the emigration of the kleruchs to Samos.<sup>2</sup> However, obnoxious as the measure was to criticism, yet having been preceded by a conquering siege and the expulsion of many native proprietors, it does not seem to have involved Athens in so much real difficulty as the resumption of her old rights in the Chersonese. Not only did she here come into conflict with independent towns, like Kardia,<sup>3</sup> which resisted her pretensions, — and with resident proprietors whom she was to aid her citizens in dispossessing, — but also with a new enemy, Kotys, king of Thrace. That prince, claiming the Chersonese as Thracian territory, was himself on the point of seizing Sestus, when Agesilaus or Ariobarzanes drove him away,<sup>4</sup> to make room for Timotheus and the Athenians.

It has been already mentioned, that Kotys,<sup>5</sup> — the new Thracian enemy, but previously the friend and adopted citizen, of Athens, — was father-in-law of the Athenian general Iphikrates, whom he had enabled to establish and people the town and settlement called Drys, on the coast of Thrace. Iphikrates had been employed by the Athenians for the last three or four years on the coasts of Macedonia and Chalkidikê, and especially against Am-

<sup>1</sup> See Demosthenes, De Halonneso, p. 86, s. 40-42, Æschines De Fale Legat. 264, s. 74.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii, 8, 4.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 201, p. 679, s. 205.

<sup>4</sup> Xenophon, Enc. Agesil. ii, 26.

<sup>5</sup> Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 141.

phipolis; but he had neither taken the latter place, nor obtained (so far as we know) any other success; though he had incurred the expense for three years of a mercenary general named Charidemus with a body of troops. How so unprofitable a result, on the part of an energetic man like Iphikrates, is to be explained, — we cannot tell. But it naturally placed him before the eyes of his countrymen in disadvantageous contrast with Timotheus, who had just acquired Samos and the Chersonese. An additional reason for mistrusting Iphikrates, too, was presented by the fact, that Athens was now at war with his father-in-law Kotys. Hence it was now resolved by the Athenians to recall him, and appoint Timotheus<sup>1</sup> to an extensive command, including Thrace and Macedonia as well as the Chersonese. Perhaps party enmities between the two Athenian chiefs, with their respective friends, may have contributed to the change. As Iphikrates had been the accuser of Timotheus a few years before, so the latter may have seized this opportunity of retaliating.<sup>2</sup> At all events the dismissed general conducted himself in such a manner as to justify the mistrust of his countrymen; taking part with his father-in-law Kotys in the war, and actually fighting against Athens.<sup>3</sup> He had got into his possession some hostages of Amphipolis, surrendered to him by Harpalus; which gave great hopes of extorting the

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 174. Ἐπειδὴ τὸν μὲν Ἰφικράτην ἀποστράτηγον ἐποιήσατε, Τιμόθεον δ' ἐπ' Ἀμφιπολιν καὶ Χερρόνησον ἐξεπέμψατε στρατηγόν, etc.

<sup>2</sup> See Demosthen. cont. Timoth. p. 1187, 1188, s. 10-15.

Timotheus swore and pledged himself publicly in the Athenian assembly, on one occasion, to prefer against Iphikrates a *γραφὴν ξενίας*; but he never realized this engagement, and he even afterwards became so far reconciled with Iphikrates, as to give his daughter in marriage to the son of the latter (ibid. p. 1204, s. 78).

To what precise date, or circumstance, this sworn engagement is to be referred, we cannot determine. Possibly the *γραφὴ ξενίας* may refer to the connection of Iphikrates with Kotys, which might entail in some manner the forfeiture of his right of citizenship; for it is difficult to understand how *γραφὴ ξενίας*, in its usual sense (implying the negation of any original right of citizenship), could ever be preferred as a charge against Iphikrates; who not only performed all the active duties of a citizen, but served in the highest post, and received from the people distinguished honors.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 153. ἐτόλμησεν ὑπὲρ τῶν Κοτύων πραγμάτων ἐνάντια τοῖς ὑμετέροις στρατηγοῖς ναυμαχεῖν



surrender of the town. These hostages he had consigned to the custody of the mercenary general Charidemus, though a vote had been passed in the Athenian assembly that they should be sent to Athens.<sup>1</sup> As soon as the appointment of Iphikrates was cancelled, Charidemus forthwith surrendered the hostages to the Amphipolitans themselves, thus depriving Athens of a material advantage. And this was not all. Though Charidemus had been three years with his band in the service of Athens under Iphikrates, yet when the new general Timotheus wished to reengage him, he declined the proposition; conveying away his troops in Athenian transports, to enter into the pay of a decided enemy of Athens — Kotys; and in conjunction with Iphikrates himself.<sup>2</sup> He was subsequently coming by sea from Kardia to take service under her other enemies, Olynthus and Amphipolis, when he was captured by the Athenian fleet. Under these circumstances, he was again prevailed on to serve Athens.

It was against these two cities, and to the general coast of Macedonia and the Chalkidic Thrace, that Timotheus devoted his first attention, postponing for the moment Kotys and the Chersonese. In this enterprise he found means to obtain the alliance of Macedonia, which had been hostile to his predecessor Iphikrates. Ptolemy of Alôrus, regent of that country, who had assassinated the preceding king, Alexander son of Amyntas, was himself assassinated (365 B. C.) by Perdikkas, brother of Alexander.<sup>3</sup> Perdikkas, during the first year or two of his reign, seems to have been friendly and not hostile to Athens. He lent aid to Timotheus, who turned his force against Olynthus and other towns both in the Chalkidic Thrace and on the coast of Macedonia.<sup>4</sup> Probably the Olynthian confederacy may have been again acquir-

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 174-177. Respecting these hostages, I can do nothing more than repeat the brief and obscure notice of Demosthenes. Of the various conjectures proposed to illustrate it, none appear to me at all satisfactory. Who Harpalus was, I cannot presume to say.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669. s. 175.

The orator refers to letters written by Iphikrates and Timotheus to the Athenian people, in support of these allegations. Unfortunately these letters are not cited in substance.

<sup>3</sup> Diodorus, xv, 77; Æschines de Fals. Leg. p. 250. c. 14.

<sup>4</sup> Demosthenes (Olynth. 1, p. 21. s. 14) mentions the assistance of the Macedonians to Timotheus against Olynthus. Compare also his oration

ing strength during the years of recent Spartan humiliation; so that Perdikkas now found his account in assisting Athens to subdue or enfeeble it, just as his father Amyntas had invoked Sparta for the like purpose. Timotheus, with the assistance of Perdikkas, was very successful in these parts; making himself master of Torônê, Potidæa, Pydna, Methônê, and various other places. As he mastered many of the Chalkidic towns allied with Olynthus, the means and adherents still retained by that city became so much diminished, that Timotheus is spoken of loosely as having conquered it.<sup>1</sup> Here, as at Samos, he obtained his successes not only without cost to Athens, but also (as we are told) without severities upon the allies, simply from the regular contributions of the Thracian confederates of Athens, assisted by the employment of a temporary coinage of base metal.<sup>2</sup> Yet though Timotheus was thus victorious in and near the Thermaic Gulf, he was not more fortunate than his predecessor in his attempt to achieve that which Athens had most at heart, — the capture of Amphipolis; although, by the accidental capture of Charidemus at sea, he was enabled again to enlist that chief with his band, whose services seem to have been gratefully appreciated at Athens.<sup>3</sup> Timotheus first despatched Alkimachus, who was repulsed, — then landed himself and attacked the city. But the Amphipolitans, aided by the neighboring Thracians, in large numbers (and perhaps by the Thracian Kotys), made so strenuous a resistance, that he was forced to retire with loss; and even to burn some triremes, which, having been carried across to assail the city from the wide part of

ad Philippi Epistolam (p. 154. s. 9). This can hardly allude to anything else than the war carried on by Timotheus on those coasts in 364 B. C. See also Polyæn. iii, 10, 14.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 81; Cornelius Nepos, Timoth. 1; Isokrates, Or. xv, (De Permut.) s. 115-119; Deinarchus cont. Demosth. s. 14. cont. Philokl. s. 19.

I give in the text what I apprehend to be the real truth contained in the large assertion of Isokrates, — *Χαλκιδεῖς ἅπαντας κατεπολέμησεν* (s. 119). The orator states that Timotheus acquired twenty-four cities in all; but this total probably comprises his conquests in other times as well as in other places. The expression of Nepos — "Olynthios bello subegit" is vague.

<sup>2</sup> Isokrates, l. c.; Aristotel. Œconomic. ii, 22; Polyæn. iii, 10, 14.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669. s. 177.



the river Strymon above, could not be brought off in the face of the enemy.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Polyænus (iii, 10, 8) mentions this fact, which is explained by comparing (in Thucydides, vii, 9) the description of the attack made by the Athenian Euction upon Amphipolis in 414 B. C.

These ill-successes of Timotheus stand enumerated, as I conceive, in that catalogue of nine defeats, which the Scholiast on Æschines (De Fals. Leg. p. 755, Reiske) specifies as having been undergone by Athens at the territory called *Nine Ways* ('Εννεα Ὀδοί), the previous name of the spot where Amphipolis was built. They form the eighth and ninth items of the catalogue.

The third item, is the capture of Amphipolis by Brasidas. The fourth is, the defeat of Kleon by Brasidas. Then come, —

5. οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες ἐπ' Ἡϊόνα Ἀθηναῖοι ἐξελάθησαν. The only way in which I can make historical fact out of these words, is, by supposing that they allude to the driving in of all the out-resident Athenians to Athens, after the defeat of Ægospotami. We know from Thucydides that when Amphipolis was taken by Brasidas, many of the Athenians who were there settled retired to Eion; where they probably remained until the close of the Peloponnesian war, and were then forced back to Athens. We should then have to construe οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες ἐπ' Ἡϊόνα Ἀθηναῖοι — "the Athenians residing at Eion;" which, though not a usual sense of the preposition ἐπὶ with an accusative case, seems the only definite meaning which can be made out here.

6. οἱ μετὰ Σιμμίχον στρατηγοῦντος διεφθάρσαν.

7. ὅτε Πρωτόμαχος ἀπέτυχεν ('Αμφιπολιτῶν αὐτοῦς παραδόντων τοῖς ὁμοροις Θραξί, these last words are inserted by Bekker from a MS.). These two last-mentioned occurrences are altogether unknown. We may perhaps suppose them to refer to the period when Iphikrates was commanding the forces of Athens in these regions, from 368–365 B. C.

8. ἐκπεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ Τιμοθέου Ἀλκίμαχος ἀπέτυχεν αὐτοῦ, παραδόντων αὐτοῦς Θραξὶν ἐπὶ Τιμοκράτους Ἀθηνησιν ἀρχοντος.

The word Τιμοθέου is here inserted by Bekker from a MS., in place of Τιμοσθένους, which appeared in Reiske's edition.

9. Τιμόθεος ἐπιστρατεύσας ἠττήθη ἐπὶ Καλαμίωνος.

Here are two defeats of Timotheus specified, one in the archonship of Timokrates, which exactly coincides with the command of Timotheus in these regions (Midsummer 364 to Midsummer 363 B. C.). But the other archon Kalamion, is unknown in the Fasti of Athens. Winiewski (Comment. in Demosth. de Corona, p. 39), Böhnecke, and other commentators follow Corsini in representing Kalamion to be a corruption of Kallimedes, who was archon from Midsummer 360–359 B. C.; and Mr. Clinton even inserts the fact in his tables for that year. But I agree with Rehdantz (Vit. Iph. Chab. et Tim. p. 153) that such an occurrence after Midsummer 360 B. C., can hardly be reconciled with the proceedings in the

Timotheus next turned his attention to the war against Kotys in Thrace, and to the defence of the newly-acquired Athenian possessions in the Chersonese, now menaced by the appearance of a new and unexpected enemy to Athens in the eastern waters of the Ægean, — a Theban fleet.

I have already mentioned that in 366 B. C., Thebes had sustained great misfortunes in Thessaly. Pelopidas had been fraudulently seized and detained as prisoner by Alexander of Pheræ; a Theban army had been sent to rescue him, but had been dishonorably repulsed, and had only been enabled to effect its retreat by the genius of Epaminondas, then serving as a private, and called upon by the soldiers to take the command. Afterwards, Epaminondas himself had been sent at the head of a second army to extricate his captive friend, which he had accomplished, but not without relinquishing Thessaly and leaving Alexander more powerful than ever. For a certain time after this defeat, the Thebans remained comparatively humbled and quiet. At length, the aggravated oppressions of the tyrant Alexander occasioned such suffering, and provoked such missions of complaint on the part of the Thessalians to Thebes, that Pelopidas, burning with ardor to revenge both his city and himself, prevailed on the Thebans to place him at the head of a fresh army for the purpose of invading Thessaly.<sup>1</sup>

At the same time, probably, the remarkable successes of the Athenians under Timotheus, at Samos and the Chersonese, had excited uneasiness throughout Greece, and jealousy on the part of the Thebans. Epaminondas ventured to propose to his countrymen that they should grapple with Athens on her own element,

Chersonese before and after that period, as reported by Demosthenes in the Oration against Aristokrates. Without being able to explain the mistake about the name of the archon, and without determining whether the real mistake may not consist in having placed ἐπὶ in place of ὑπὸ, — I cannot but think that Timotheus underwent two repulses, one by his lieutenant, and another by himself, near Amphipolis, — both of them occurring in 364 or the early part of 363 B. C. During great part of 363 B. C., the attention of Timotheus seems to have been turned to the Chersonese, Byzantium, Kotys, etc.

My view of the chronology of this period agrees generally with that of Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. vol. v. ch. 42. p. 244–257).

<sup>1</sup>Plutarch Pelopid, c. 31; Diodor. xv, 80.



and compete for the headship of Greece not only on land but on sea. In fact the rescript brought down by Pelopidas from the Persian court sanctioned this pretension, by commanding Athens to lay up her ships of war, on pain of incurring the chastisement of the Great King;<sup>1</sup> a mandate, which she had so completely defied as to push her maritime efforts more energetically than before. Epaminondas employed all his eloquence to impress upon his countrymen, that, Sparta being now humbled, Athens was their actual and prominent enemy. He reminded them, — in language such as had been used by Brasidas in the early years of the Peloponnesian war, and by Hermokrates at Syracuse,<sup>2</sup> — that men such as the Thebans, brave and trained soldiers on land, could soon acquire the like qualities on shipboard; and that the Athenians themselves had once been mere landsmen, until the exigencies of the Persian war forced them to take to the sea.<sup>3</sup> "We must put down this haughty rival (he exhorted his countrymen); we must transfer to our own citadel, the Kadmeia, those magnificent Propylæa which adorn the entrance of the acropolis at Athens."<sup>4</sup>

Such emphatic language, as it long lived in the hostile recollection of Athenian orators, so it excited at the moment extreme ardor on the part of the Theban hearers. They resolved to build and equip one hundred triremes, and to construct docks with ship-houses fit for the constant maintenance of such a number. Epaminondas himself was named commander, to sail with the first fleet, as soon as it should be ready, to the Hellespont and the islands near Ionia; while invitations were at the same time despatched to Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, encouraging them to prepare for breaking with Athens.<sup>5</sup> Some opposition however was made in the assembly to the new undertaking; especially by Menekleidas, an opposition speaker, who, being frequent and severe in his criticisms upon the leading men such as Pelopidas and Epaminon-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 36.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii, 87; vii, 21.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xv, 78.

<sup>4</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 276, c. 32, s. 111. Ἐπαμινώνδας, οὐχ ὑποπτήξας τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀξίωμα, εἶπε διαβήδην ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν Θεβαίων, ὡς δὲ τὰ τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἀκροπόλεως προπύλαια μετενεγκαῖν εἰς τὴν προστασίαν τῆς Καδμείας.

<sup>5</sup> Diodor. xv 78, 79.

das, has been handed down by Nepos and Plutarch in odious colors. Demagogues like him, whose power resided in the public assembly, are commonly represented as if they had a natural interest in plunging their cities into war, in order that there might be more matter of accusation against the leading men. This representation is founded mainly on the picture which Thucydides gives of Kleon in the first half of the Peloponnesian war: I have endeavored in my sixth volume to show,<sup>1</sup> that it is not a fair estimate even of Kleon separately, much less of the demagogues generally, unwarlike men both in tastes and aptitudes. Menekleidas at Thebes, far from promoting warlike expeditions in order that he might denounce the generals when they came back, advocated the prudence of continued peace, and accused Epaminondas of involving his country in distant and dangerous schemes, with a view to emulate the glories of Agamemnon by sailing from Aulis in Bœotia, as commander of an imposing fleet to make conquests in the Hellespont. "By the help of Thebes (replied Epaminondas) I have already done more than Agamemnon. He, with the forces of Sparta and all Greece besides, was ten years in taking a single city; while I, with the single force of Thebes and at the single day of Leuktra, have crushed the power of the Agamemnonian Sparta."<sup>2</sup> While repelling the charge of personal motives, Epaminondas contended that peace would be equivalent to an abnegation of the headship of Greece; and that, if Thebes wished to maintain that ascendant station, she must keep her citizens in constant warlike training and action.

To err with Epaminondas may be considered, by some readers, as better than being right with Menekleidas. But on the main point of this debate, Menekleidas appears to have been really right. For the general exhortations ascribed to Epaminondas

<sup>1</sup> See Vol. VI. Ch. liv. p. 475.

<sup>2</sup> Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 5; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 25; Plutarch, De Sui Laude, p. 542 A.

Neither of these the authors appear to me to conceive rightly either the attack, or the reply, in which the name of Agamemnon is here brought forward. As I have given it in the text, there is a real foundation for the attack, and a real point in the reply; as it appears in Cornelius Nepos there is neither one nor the other.

That the Spartans regarded themselves as having inherited the leadership of Greece from Agamemnon, may be seen by Herodotus, vii. 159.



resemble but too closely those feverish stimulants, which Alkibiades administered at Athens to wind up his countrymen for the fatal expedition against Syracuse.<sup>1</sup> If we should even grant his advice to be wise, in reference to land-warfare, we must recollect that he was here impelling Thebes into a new and untried maritime career, for which she had neither aptitude nor facilities. To maintain ascendancy on land alone, would require all her force, and perhaps prove too hard for her; to maintain ascendancy by land and sea at once would be still more impracticable. By grasping at both she would probably keep neither. Such considerations warrant us in suspecting, that the project of stretching across the Ægean for ultramarine dependencies was suggested to this great man not so much by a sound appreciation of the permanent interests of Thebes, as by jealousy of Athens, — especially since the recent conquests of Timotheus.<sup>2</sup>

The project however was really executed, and a large Theban fleet under Epaminondas crossed the Ægean in 363 B. C. In the same year, apparently, Pelopidas marched into Thessaly, at the head of a Theban land-force, against Alexander of Pheræ. What the fleet achieved, we are scarcely permitted to know. It appears that Epaminondas visited Byzantium; and we are told that he drove off the Athenian guard-squadron under Laches, prevailing upon several of the allies of Athens to declare in his favor.<sup>3</sup> Both he

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. vi, 17, 18.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch (Philopœmen, c. 14) mentions that some authors represented Epaminondas as having consented unwillingly to this maritime expedition. He explains such reluctance by reference to the disparaging opinion expressed by Plato about maritime service. But this opinion of Plato is founded upon reasons foreign to the character of Epaminondas; and it seems to me evident that the authors whom Plutarch here followed, introduced the opinion only as an hypothesis to explain why so great a general on land as Epaminondas had accomplished so little at sea, when he took command of a fleet; putting himself in a function for which he had little capacity, like Philopœmen (Plutarch, Reipublic. Gerend. Præcep. p. 812 E.).

Bauch (in his tract, Epaminondas und Thebens Kampf um die Hegemonie, Breslau, 1834, p. 70, 71) maintains that Epaminondas was constrained against his own better judgment to undertake this maritime enterprise. I cannot coincide in his opinion. The oracle which Bauch cites from Pausanias (viii, 11, 6) proves as little as the above extract from Plutarch.

<sup>3</sup> Isokrates, Or. v, (Philip) s. 53; Diodor. xv, 78. *ἰδίᾳ τὰς πόλεις τοῦ*

and Timotheus appear to have been in these seas, if not at the same time, at least with no great interval of time between. Both were solicited by the oligarchy of the Pontic Herakleia against the people; and both declined to furnish aid.<sup>1</sup> Timotheus is said to have liberated the besieged town of Kyzikus: by whom it was besieged, we do not certainly know, but probably by the Theban fleet.<sup>2</sup> Epaminondas brought back his fleet at the end of the year, without having gained any splendid victory or acquired any tenable possession for Thebes; yet not without weakening Athens, unsettling her hold upon her dependencies, and seconding indirectly the hostilities carried on by Kotys; insomuch that the Athenian affairs in the Chersonese and Thrace were much less prosperous in 362 B. C. than they had been in 364 B. C. Probably Epaminondas intended to return with his fleet in the next year (362 B. C.), and to push his maritime enterprises still farther;<sup>3</sup> but we shall find him imperatively called elsewhere, to another and a fatal battle-field. And thus the first naval expedition of Thebes was likewise the last.

Meanwhile his friend and colleague Pelopidas had marched into Thessaly against the despot Alexander; who was now at the height of his power, holding in dependence a large portion of Thessaly together with the Phthiot Achæans and the Magnetes, and having Athens as his ally. Nevertheless, so revolting had been his cruelties, and so numerous were the malcontents who had sent to invite aid from Thebes, that Pelopidas did not despair of overpowering him. Nor was he daunted even by an eclipse of the sun, which is said to have occurred just as he was commencing his march, nor by the gloomy warnings which the prophets founded upon it; though this event intimidated many of his fellow-citizens, so that his force was rendered less numerous as well as less confident. Arriving at Pharsalus, and strengthening himself by the junction of his Thessalian allies, he found Alexander approaching to meet him at the head of a well-appointed mercenary force, greatly superior in number. The two chiefs contended who should occupy first the hills called Kynos Kephalaë, or the Dog's Heads. Pelopidas

*Θηβαίους ἐποίησεν* I do not feel assured that these general words apply to Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium, which had before been mentioned.

<sup>1</sup> Justin, xvi, 4.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv, 81; Cornel. Nepos, Timotheus, c. 1.  
Diodor. xv, 79.



arrived there first with his cavalry, beat the cavalry of the enemy, and pursued them to some distance; but he thus left the hills open to be occupied by the numerous infantry of the enemy, while his own infantry, coming up later, were repulsed with loss in their attempt to carry the position. Thus unpromising did the battle appear, when Pelopidas returned from the pursuit. Ordering his victorious cavalry to charge the infantry on the hill in flank, he immediately dismounted, seized his shield, and put himself at the head of his own discouraged infantry, whom he again led up the hill to attack the position. His presence infused so much fresh ardor, that his troops, in spite of being twice repulsed, succeeded in a third attempt to drive the enemy from the summit of the hill. Thus master of the hill, Pelopidas saw before him the whole army of the enemy, retiring in some disorder, though not yet beaten; while Alexander in person was on the right wing, exerting himself to rally and encourage them. When Pelopidas beheld, as it were within his reach, this detested enemy, — whose treacherous arrest and dungeon he had himself experienced, and whose cruelties filled every one's mouth, — he was seized with a transport of rage and madness, like Cyrus the younger on the field of Kunaxa at the sight of his brother Artaxerxes. Without thinking of his duties as a general, or even looking to see by whom he was followed, he rushed impetuously forward, with loud cries and challenges to Alexander to come forth and fight. The latter, declining the challenge, retired among his guards, into the midst of whom Pelopidas plunged, with the few who followed him; and there, while fighting with desperate bravery, met his death. So rapidly had this rash proceeding been consummated, that his army behind did not at first perceive it. But they presently hastened forward to rescue or avenge him, vigorously charged the troops of Alexander, and put them to flight with severe loss.<sup>1</sup>

Yet this victory, though important to the Thebans, and still more important to the Thessalians, was to both of them robbed of all its sensible value by the death of Pelopidas. The demonstrations of grief throughout the army were unbounded and universal. The soldiers yet warm from their victory, the wounded men with wounds yet untended, flocked around the corpse, piling up near to it as a

<sup>1</sup> For the description of this memorable scene, see Plutarch, *Pelopidas* c. 31, 32; Diodor. xv, 80, 81; Cornel. Nepos. *Pelopid.* c. 5.

trophy the arms of the slain enemies. Many, refusing either to kindle fire, or to touch their evening meal, testified their affliction by cutting off their own hair as well as the manes of their horses. The Thessalian cities vied with each other in tokens of affectionate respect, and obtained from the Thebans permission to take the chief share in his funeral, as their lost guardian and protector. At Thebes, the emotion was no less strikingly manifested. Endeared to his countrymen first as the head of that devoted handful of exiles who braved every peril to rescue the city from the Lacedæmonians, Pelopidas had been reelected without interruption to the annual office of *Bœotarch* during all the years that had since elapsed<sup>1</sup> (378–364 B. C.). He had taken a leading part in all their struggles, and all their glories; he had been foremost to cheer them in the hour of despondency; he had lent himself, with the wisdom of a patriot and the generosity of a friend, to second the guiding ascendancy of Epaminondas, and his moderation of dealing towards conquered enemies.<sup>2</sup>

All that Thebes could do, was, to avenge the death of Pelopidas. The Theban generals, Malkitas and Diogeiton,<sup>3</sup> conducted a pow-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 81. Plutarch (*Pelop.* c. 34) states substantially the same.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, *Compar. Pelopid. and Marcell.* c. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. (xv, 78) places in one and the same year both, — 1. The maritime project of Epaminondas, including his recommendation of it, the equipment of the fleet, and the actual expedition. 2. The expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly, with its immediate consequences. — He mentions the former of the two first, but he places both in the first year of Olympiad 104, the year in which Timokrates was archon at Athens; that is, from Midsummer 364 to Midsummer 363 B. C. He passes immediately from the maritime expedition into an allusion to the battle of Mantinea, which (he says) proved fatal to Epaminondas and hindered him from following up his ideas of maritime activity.

The battle of Mantinea took place in June or July 362 B. C. The maritime expedition, immediately preceding that battle, would therefore naturally take place in the summer of 363 B. C.; the year 364 B. C. having been occupied in the requisite naval equipments.

I incline to think that the march of Pelopidas into Thessaly also took place during 353 B. C., and that his death thus occurred while Epaminondas was absent on ship-board. A probable reason is thus supplied why the second Theban army which went to avenge Pelopidas was commanded, not by his friend and colleague Epaminondas, but by other generals. Had Epaminondas been then at home, this would hardly have been.

The eclipse of the sun, which both Plutarch and Diodorus mention to



erful force of seven thousand hoplites into Thessaly, and put themselves at the head of their partisans in that country. With this united army, they pressed Alexander hard, completely worsted him, and reduced him to submit to their own terms. He was compelled to relinquish all his dependencies in Thessaly; to confine himself to Phæræ, with its territory near the Gulf of Pagasæ; and to swear adherence to Thebes as a leader. All Thessaly, together with the Phthiot Achæans and the Magnètes, became annexed to the headship of the Thebans, who thus acquired greater ascendancy in Northern Greece than they had ever enjoyed before.<sup>1</sup> The power of Alexander was effectually put down on land; but he still continued both powerful and predatory at sea, as will be seen in the ensuing year.

have immediately preceded the out-march of Pelopidas, does not seem to have been as yet certainly identified. Dodwell, on the authority of an astronomical friend, places it on the 13th of June, 364 B. C., at five o'clock in the morning. On the other hand, Calvisius places it on the 13th of July in the same Julian year, at a quarter before eleven o'clock in the day (see *L'Art de Vérifier les Dates*, tom. i, p. 257). We may remark, that the day named by Dodwell (as he himself admits) would not fall within the Olympic year 364–363 B. C., but during the months preceding the commencement of that year. Moreover Dodwell speaks as if there were no other months in the year, except June, July, and August, fit for military expeditions; an hypothesis not reasonable to admit.

Sievers and Dr. Thirlwall both accept the eclipse mentioned by Dodwell, as marking the time when the expedition of Pelopidas commenced — June 364 B. C. But against this, Mr. Clinton takes no notice of it in his tables, which seems to show that he was not satisfied as to the exactness of Dodwell's statement or the chronological identity. If it should turn out, on farther astronomical calculations, that there occurred no eclipse of the sun in the year 363 B. C., visible at Thebes, — I should then fix upon the eclipse mentioned by Calvisius (13 July 364 B. C.) as identifying the time of the expedition of Pelopidas; which would, on that supposition, precede by eight or nine months the commencement of the transmarine cruise of Epaminondas. The eclipse mentioned by Calvisius is preferable to that mentioned by Dodwell, because it falls within the Olympic year indicated by Diodorus.

But it appears to me that farther astronomical information is ~~here~~ required.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 35.

## CHAPTER LXXX.

### FROM THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA

It was during this period, — while Epaminondas was absent with the fleet, and while Pelopidas was engaged in that Thessalian campaign from whence he never returned, — that the Thebans destroyed Orchomenus. That city, the second in the Bœotian federation, had always been disaffected towards Thebes; and the absence of the two great leaders, as well as of a large Theban force in Thessaly, seems to have been regarded by the Orchomenian Knights or Horsemen (the first and richest among the citizens, three hundred in number) as a favorable moment for attack. Some Theban exiles took part in this scheme, with a view to overthrow the existing government; and a day, appointed for a military review near Thebes, was fixed for execution. A large number of conspirators joined, with apparent ardor. But before the day arrived, several of them repented and betrayed the plot to the Bœotarchs; upon which the Orchomenian horsemen were seized, brought before the Theban assembly, condemned to death, and executed. But besides this, the resolution was taken to destroy the town, to kill the male adults, and to sell the women and children into slavery.<sup>1</sup> This barbarous decree was executed, though probably a certain fraction found means to escape, forming the kernel of that population which was afterwards restored. The fulmeasure of ancient Theban hatred was thus satiated; a hatred, tracing its origin even to those mythical times when Thebes was said to have paid tribute to Orchomenus. But the erasure of this venerable city from the list of autonomous units in Hellas, with the wholesale execution and sale of so many free kinsmen into slavery, excited strong sympathy throughout the neighbors, as well as repugnance against Theban cruelty;<sup>2</sup> a sentiment probably aggra-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 79.

<sup>2</sup> See the sentiment expressed by Demosthenes cont. Leptinem, p. 489, § 121, — an oration delivered in 355 B. C.; eight years after the destruction of Orchomenus.



vated by the fact, which we must presume to have been concurrent,—that the Thebans appropriated the territory among their own citizens. It would seem that the neighboring town of Koroneia shared the same fate; at least the two are afterwards spoken of together in such manner as to make us suppose so.<sup>1</sup> Thebes thus absorbed into herself these two towns and territories to the north of her own city, as well as Plataea and Thespiæ to the south.

We must recollect that during the supremacy of Sparta and the period of Theban struggle and humiliation, before the battle of Leuktra, Orchomenus had actively embraced the Spartan cause. Shortly after that victory, the Thebans had been anxious under their first impulse of resentment to destroy the city, but had been restrained by the lenient recommendations of Epaminondas.<sup>2</sup> All their half-suppressed wrath was revived by the conspiracy of the Orchomenian Knights; yet the extreme severity of the proceeding would never have been consummated, but for the absence of Epaminondas, who was deeply chagrined on his return.<sup>3</sup> He well knew the bitter censures which Thebes would draw upon herself by punishing the entire city for the conspiracy of the wealthy Knights, and in a manner even more rigorous than Plataea and Thespiæ; since the inhabitants of these two latter were expelled with their families out of Bœotia, while the Orchome-

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Pace, p. 62, s. 21; Philippic. II, p. 69, s. 13; s. 15; Fals. Leg. p. 375, s. 122; p. 387, s. 162; p. 445, s. 373.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv, 57.

<sup>3</sup> Pausan. ix, 15, 2.

Diodorus places in the same year all the three facts:—1. The maritime expedition of Epaminondas. 2. The expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly, his death, and the following Theban victories over Alexander of Pheræ. The conspiracy of the Orchomenian Knights, and the destruction of Orchomenus.

The year in which he places them is, the archonship of Timokrates,—from Midsummer 364 to Midsummer 363 B. C.

That the destruction of Orchomenus occurred during the absence of Epaminondas, and that he was greatly distressed at it on his return,—is distinctly stated by Pausanias; who however is (in my judgment) so far mistaken, that he refers the absence of Epaminondas to that previous occasion when he had gone into Thessaly to rescue Pelopidas from the dungeon of Alexander, 366 B. C.

This date is not so probable as the date assigned by Diodorus: nor do the chronological conceptions of Pausanias seem to me exact.

nian male adults were slain, and the women and children sold into slavery.

On returning from his maritime expedition at the end of 363 B. C., Epaminondas was reelected one of the Bœotarchs. He had probably intended to renew his cruise during the coming year. But his chagrin for the Orchomenian affair, and his grief for the death of Pelopidas,—an intimate friend, as well as a political colleague whom he could trust,—might deter him from a second absence; while the affairs of Peloponnesus also were now becoming so complicated, as to render the necessity of renewed Theban interference again probable.

Since the peace concluded in 366 B. C. with Corinth, Phlius, etc., Thebes had sent no army into that peninsula; though her harcest and garrison still continued at Tegea, perhaps at Megalopolis and Messênê also. The Arcadians, jealous of her as well as disunited among themselves, had even gone so far as to contract an alliance with her enemy Athens. The main conflict however now was, between the Arcadians and the Eleians, respecting the possession of Triphylia and the Pisatid. The Eleians about this time (365 B. C.) came into alliance again with Sparta,<sup>1</sup> relinquishing their alliance with Thebes; while the Achæans, having come into vigorous coöperation with Sparta<sup>2</sup> ever since 367 B. C. (by reaction against the Thebans, who, reserving the judicious and moderate policy of Epaminondas, violently changed the Achæan governments), allied themselves with Elis also, in or before 365 B. C.<sup>3</sup> And thus Sparta, though robbed by the pacification of 366 B. C. of the aid of Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus, etc., had now acquired in exchange Elis and Achaia,—confederates not less valuable.

Triphylia, the territory touching the western coast of Peloponnesus, immediately north of the river Neda,—and the Pisatid (including the lower course of the river Alpheius and the plain of Olympia), immediately north of Triphylia,—both of them between Messenia and Elis,—had been in former times conquered and long held by the Eleians, but always as discontented subjects. Sparta, in the days of her unquestioned supremacy, had

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 19.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 43.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 17.



found it politic to vindicate their independence, and had compelled the Eleians, after a war of two or three years, to renounce formally all dominion over them.<sup>1</sup> No sooner, however, had the battle of Leuktra disarmed Sparta, than the Eleians reclaimed their lost dominion;<sup>2</sup> while the subjects on their side found new protectors in the Arcadians, and were even admitted, under pretence of kindred race, into the Pan-Arcadian confederacy.<sup>3</sup> The Persian rescript brought down by Pelopidas (367-366 B. C.) seems to have reversed this arrangement, recognizing the imperial rights of the Eleians.<sup>4</sup> But as the Arcadians had repudiated the rescript, it remained for the Eleians to enforce their imperial rights by arms, if they could. They found Sparta in the same interest as themselves; not only equally hostile to the Arcadians, but also complaining that she had been robbed of Messênê, as they complained of the loss of Triphylia. Sparta had just gained a slight advantage over the Arcadians, in the recapture of Sellasia; chiefly through the aid of a Syracusan reinforcement of twelve triremes, sent to them by the younger Dionysius, but with orders speedily to return.<sup>5</sup>

Besides the imperial claims over Triphylia and the Pisatid, which thus placed Elis in alliance with Sparta and in conflict with Arcadia, — there was also a territory lying north of the Alpheius (on the hilly ground forming the western or Eleian side of Mount Erymanthus, between Elis and the north-western portion of Arcadia), which included Lasion and the highland townships called Akroreii, and which was disputed between Elis and Arcadia. At this moment, it was included as a portion of the Pan-Arcadian aggregate;<sup>6</sup> but the Eleians, claiming it as their own and suddenly marching in along with a body of Arcadian exiles, seized and occupied Lasion as well as some of the neighboring Akroreii. The Arcadians were not slow in avenging the affront. A body of their Pan-Arcadian militia called the epariti, collected from the various cities and districts, marched to Lasion, defeated the Eleian hoplites with considerable loss both of men and arms, and

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 30, 31.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 26.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 12.

<sup>4</sup> It had been taken from Elis by Agis, at the peace of 399 B. C. after his victorious war (Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31).

<sup>5</sup> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 2.

<sup>6</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38.

drove them out of the district. The victors recovered both Lasion and all the Akroreii, except Thraustus; after which they proceeded to the sacred ground of Olympia, and took formal possession of it, planting a garrison, protected by a regular stockaded circle, on the hill called Kronion. Having made good this position, they marched on even to the city of Elis itself, which was unfortified (though it had a tenable acropolis), so that they were enabled to enter it, finding no resistance until they reached the agora. Here they found mustered the Eleian horsemen and the chosen hoplites, who repulsed them with some loss. But Elis was in great consternation; while a democratical opposition now manifested itself against the ruling oligarchy, — seizing the acropolis in hopes of admitting the Arcadians. The bravery of the horsemen and hoplites, however, put down this internal movement, recovered the acropolis, and forced the malcontents, to the number of four hundred, to evacuate the city. Thus expelled, the latter seized and established themselves at Pylus (in the Eleian territory, about nine miles from Elis towards the Arcadian border<sup>1</sup>), where they were reinforced not only by a body of Arcadians, but also by many of their partisans who came from the city to join them. From this fortified post, planted in the country like Dekeleia in Attica, they carried on harassing war against the Eleians in the city, and reduced them after some time to great straits. There were even hopes of compelling the city to surrender, and a fresh invasion of the Arcadians was invited to complete the enterprise. The Eleians were only rescued by a reinforcement from their allies in Achaia, who came in large force and placed the city in safety; so that the Arcadians could do nothing more than lay waste the territory around.<sup>2</sup>

Retiring on this occasion, the Arcadians renewed their invasion not long afterwards; their garrison still occupying Olympia, and the exiles continuing at Pylus. They now marched all across the country, even approaching Kyllênê, the harbor of Elis on the western sea. Between the harbor and the city, the Eleians ventured to attack them, but were defeated with such loss, that their general Andromachus (who had prompted the attack) fell upon his sword in despair. The distress of the Eleians became greater

<sup>1</sup> Pausanias, vi, 22, 3.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 13-18, Diodor. xv, 77.



than ever. In hopes of drawing off the Arcadian invaders, they sent an envoy to Sparta, entreating that the Lacedæmonians would make a diversion on their side of Arcadia. Accordingly, the Spartan prince Archidamus (son of king Agesilaus), invading the south-western portion of Arcadia, occupied a hill-town or post called Kromnus (seemingly in the territory of Megalopolis, and cutting off the communication between that city and Messênê), which he fortified and garrisoned with about two hundred Spartans and Pericæki. The effect which the Eleians contemplated was produced. The Arcadian army (except the garrison of Olympia) being withdrawn home, they had leisure to act against Pylus. The Pylian exiles had recently made an abortive attempt upon Thalamæ, on their return from which they were overtaken and worsted by the Eleians, with severe loss in killed, and two hundred of their number ultimately made prisoners. Among these latter, all the Eleian exiles were at once put to death; all the remainder sold for slaves.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile the main Arcadian force, which had returned from Elis, was joined by allies, — Thebans,<sup>2</sup> Argeians, and Messenians, — and marched at once to Kromnus. They there blocked up the Lacedæmonian garrison by a double palisade carried all around, which they kept a numerous force to occupy. In vain did Archidamus attempt to draw them off, by carrying his devastations into the Skiritis and other portions of Arcadia; for the Skiritæ, in former days dependents of Sparta and among the most valuable constituents of the Lacedæmonian armies,<sup>3</sup> had now become independent Arcadians. The blockade was still continued without interruption. Archidamus next tried to get possession of a hill-top which commanded the Arcadian position. But in marching along the road up, he encountered the enemy in great force, and was repulsed with some loss; himself being thrust through the thigh with a spear, and his relatives Polyænidas and Chilon slain.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 26.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 27.

The Thebans who are here mentioned must have been soldiers in garrison at Tegea, Megalopolis, or Messênê. No fresh Theban troops had come into Peloponnesus.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. v, 68; Xen. Rep. Laced. xii, 3; xiii, 6.

<sup>4</sup> The seizure of Kromnus by the Lacedæmonians, and the wound received by Archidamus, are alluded to by Justin, vi, 6.

The Lacedæmonian troops retreated for some space into a wider breadth of ground, where they were again formed in battle order, yet greatly discouraged both by the repulse and by the communication of the names of the slain, who were among the most distinguished soldiers of Sparta. The Arcadians on the contrary were advancing to the charge in high spirits, when an ancient Spartan, stepping forth from the ranks, shouted with a loud voice "What need to fight, gentlemen? Is it not better to conclude a truce and separate?" Both armies accepted the proposition joyfully. The truce was concluded; the Lacedæmonians took up their dead and retired: the Arcadians also retreated to the spot where they had gained their advantage, and there erected their trophy.<sup>1</sup>

Under the graphic description here given by Xenophon, seems to be concealed a defeat of the Lacedæmonians more serious than he likes to enunciate. The Arcadians completely gained their point, by continuing the blockade without interruption. One more attempt was made by the Lacedæmonians for the relief of their countrymen. Suddenly assailing the palisade at night, they succeeded in mastering the portion of it guarded by the Argeians.<sup>2</sup> They broke down an opening, and called to the besieged to hasten out. But the relief had come unexpected, so that only a few of those near at hand could profit by it to escape. The Arcadians, hurrying to the spot in large force, drove off the assailants and reenclosed the besieged, who were soon compelled to surrender for want of provisions. More than a hundred prisoners, Spartans and Pericæki together, were distributed among the captors, — Argeians, Thebans, Arcadians, and Messenians, — one share to each.<sup>3</sup> Sixty years before, the capture of two hundred and twenty Spartans and Lacedæmonians in Sphakteria, by Kleon and Demosthenes, had excited the extreme of incredulous wonder throughout all Greece; emphatically noted by the impartial Thucydides.<sup>4</sup> Now, not a trace of such sentiment appears, even in the philo-Laconian Xenophon. So sadly had Spartan glory declined!

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 20-25. 'Ως δὲ, πλῆσιον ὄντων, ἀναβήσας τις τῶν πρεσβυτέρων εἶπε — Τί δεῖ ἡμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες, μάχεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ σπεισάμενους διαλυθῆναι; ἄσμενοι δὲ ἀμφοτέροι ἀκούσαντες, ἐσπείσαντο.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 27. The conjecture of Palmerius, — τοῦ κατὰ τοὺς Ἀργείους, — seems here just and necessary.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 27.

<sup>4</sup> Thucyd. iv, 40.



Having thus put an end to the Spartan attack, the Arcadians resumed their aggression against Elis, in conjunction with a new project of considerable moment. It was now the spring immediately preceding the celebration of the great quadrennial Olympic festival, which came about midsummer. The presidency over this sacred ceremony had long been the cherished privilege of the Eleians, who had acquired it when they conquered the Pisatans — the inhabitants of the region immediately around Olympia, and the first curators of the festival in its most primitive state. These Pisatans, always reluctant subjects of Elis, had never lost the conviction that the presidency of the festival belonged to them of right; and had entreated Sparta to restore to them their right, thirty-five years before, when Agis as conqueror imposed terms of peace upon the Eleians.<sup>1</sup> Their request had been then declined, on the ground that they were too poor and rude to do worthy honor to the ceremony. But on now renewing it, they found the Arcadians more compliant than the Spartans had been. The Arcadian garrison, which had occupied the sacred plain of Olympia for more than a year, being strongly reinforced, preparation was made for celebrating the festival by the Pisatans under Arcadian protection.<sup>2</sup> The Grecian states would receive with surprise, on this occasion, two distinct notices from official heralds, announcing to them the commencement of the hieromenia or sacred season, and the precise day when the ceremonies would begin: for doubtless the Eleians, though expelled by force from Olympia, still asserted their rights and sent round their notices as usual.

It was evident that this memorable plain, consecrated as it was to Hellenic brotherhood and communion, would on the present occasion be dishonored by dispute and perhaps by bloodshed: for the Arcadians summoned to the spot, besides their own military strength, a considerable body of allies: two thousand hoplites from Argos, and four hundred horsemen from Athens. So imposing a force being considered sufficient to deter the unwarlike Eleians from any idea of asserting their rights by arms, the Arcadians and Pisatans began the festival with its ordinary routine of sacrifice and matches. Having gone through the chariot-race, they entered upon the pentathlon, or quintuple contest, wherein the running

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 29. Compare Pausanias, vi, 22, 2.

match and the wrestling-match came first in order. The running-match had already been completed, and those who had been successful enough in it to go on contending for the prize in the other four points, had begun to wrestle in the space between the stadium and the great altar,<sup>1</sup> — when suddenly the Eleians were seen entering the sacred ground in arms, accompanied by their allies the Achæans, and marching up to the opposite bank of the little river Kladeus, — which flowed at a little distance to the westward of the Altis, or interior enclosed precinct of Zeus, falling afterwards into the Alpheius. Upon this the Arcadians drew up in armed order, on their own side of the Kladeus, to resist the farther approach of the Eleians.<sup>2</sup> The latter, with a boldness for which no one gave

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 29. Καὶ τὴν μὲν ἵπποδρομίαν ἤδη ἐπεποιήκεσαν, καὶ τὰ ἄρομικὰ τοῦ πεντάθλου· οἱ δ' εἰς πάλιν ἀφικόμενοι οὐκ ἔτι ἐν τῷ δρόμῳ, ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ τοῦ δρόμου καὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ ἐπάλαιον. Οἱ γὰρ Ἡλείοι παρῆσαν ἤδη, etc.

Diodorus erroneously represents (xv, 78) the occurrence as if the Eleians had been engaged in celebrating the festival, and as if the Pisatans and Arcadians had marched up and attacked them while doing so. The Eleians were really the assailants.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. l. c. Οἱ γὰρ Ἡλείοι παρῆσαν σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις εἰς τὸ τέμενος. Οἱ δὲ Ἀρκάδες πορρωτέρω μὲν οὐκ ἀπήντησαν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ Κλαδέου ποταμοῦ παρετάξαντο, ὅς παρὰ τὴν Ἀλτιν καταρρέων εἰς τὸν Ἀλφειὸν ἐμβάλλει. Καὶ μὴν οἱ Ἡλείοι τὰ πλὴν θάτερα τοῦ ποταμοῦ παρετάξαντο, σφαγιασάμενοι δὲ εὐθὺς ἐχώρουν.

The τέμενος must here be distinguished from the Altis; as meaning the entire breadth of consecrated ground at Olympia, of which the Altis formed a smaller interior portion enclosed with a wall. The Eleians entered into the τέμενος before they crossed the river Kladeus, which flowed through the τέμενος, but alongside of the Altis. The tomb of Cnemus, which was doubtless included in the τέμενος, was on the right bank of the Kladeus (Pausan. vi, 21, 3); while the Altis was on the left bank of the river.

Colonel Leake (in his Peloponnesiaca, pp. 6, 107) has given a copious and instructive exposition of the ground of Olympia, as well as of the notices left by Pausanias respecting it. Unfortunately, little can be made out certainly, except the position of the great temple of Zeus in the Altis. Neither the positions assigned to the various buildings, the Stadion, or the Hippodrome, by Colonel Leake, — nor those proposed by Kiepert in the plan comprised in his maps — nor by Ernst Curtius, in the Plan annexed to his recent Dissertation called *Olympia* (Berlin, 1852) — rest upon very sufficient evidence. Perhaps future excavations may hereafter reveal much that is now unknown.



them credit, forded the rivulet, headed by Stratolas with his chosen band of three hundred, and vigorously charged first the Arcadians, next the Argeians; both of whom were defeated and driven back. The victorious Eleians forced their way into the Altis, and pressed forward to reach the great altar. But at every step of their advance the resistance became stronger, aided as it was by numerous buildings, — the senate-house, the temple of Zeus, and various porticos, — which both deranged their ranks, and furnished excellent positions of defence for darters and archers on the roofs. Stratolas was here slain; while his troops, driven out of the sacred ground, were compelled to recross the Kladeus. The festival was then resumed and prosecuted in its usual order. But the Arcadians were so afraid of a renewed attack on the following day, that they not only occupied the roofs of all the buildings more completely than before, but passed the night in erecting a palisade of defence; tearing down for that purpose the temporary booths which had been carefully put up to accommodate the crowd of visitors.<sup>1</sup> Such precautions rendered the place unassailable, so that the Eleians were obliged to return home on the next day; not without sympathy and admiration among many of the Greeks, for the unwonted boldness which they had displayed. They revenged themselves by pronouncing the 104th Olympiad to be no Olympiad at all, and by registering it as such in their catalogue, when they regained power; preserving however the names of those who had been proclaimed victors, which appeared in the lists like the rest.<sup>2</sup>

Such was the unholy combat which dishonored the sanctuary of Pan-hellenic brotherhood, and in which the great temple, with its enthroned inmate the majestic Zeus of Pheidias, was for the first time turned into a fortress against its habitual presidents the Eleians. It was a combat wherein, though both Thebes and Sparta, the competing leaders of Greece, stand clear, Athens as well as most of the Peloponnesian chief states were implicated. It had been brought on by the rapacious ambition of the Arcadians, and its result seemed to confirm them, under color of Pisatan presi-

I cannot agree with Colonel Leake however in supposing that Pisa was at any time a city, and afterwards deserted.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 32. ὥστε οὐδ' ἀνεπαύσαντο τῆς νυκτὸς ἐκκόπτου-  
σ' αὐτὰ διαπεποννημένα σκηνώματα, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv, 78; Pausanias. vi, 8, 2.

dency, in the permanent mastery of Olympia. But in spite of such apparent promise, it was an event which carried in itself the seeds of violent reaction. We cannot doubt that the crowd of Grecian spectators present were not merely annoyed by the interruption of the proceedings and by the demolition of their tents, but also deeply shocked by the outrage to the sacred ground, — "imminentium templorum religio."<sup>1</sup> Most of them probably believed the Eleians to be the rightful presidents, having never either seen or heard of any one else in that capacity. And they could hardly help feeling strong sympathy for the unexpected courage of these dispossessed presidents; which appeared so striking to Xenophon (himself perhaps a spectator) that he ascribes it to a special inspiration of the gods.<sup>2</sup>

If they disapproved of the conduct of the Arcadians and Pisatans as an unjust intrusion, they would disapprove yet more of that spoliation of the rich temples at Olympia, whereby the intruders rewarded themselves. The Arcadians, always on the look-out for plunder and pay as mercenary soldiers, found themselves supplied with both, in abundant measure, from this war: the one from the farms, the stock, and the field-laborers, of the Eleian neighborhood generally, more plentiful than in any part of Peloponnesus;<sup>3</sup> the other from the ample accumulation, both of money and of precious offerings, distributed over the numerous temples at Olympia. The Pisatans, now installed as administrators, would readily consent to appropriate these treasures to the pay of their own defenders, whom they doubtless considered as acting in the service of the Olympian Zeus. Accordingly the Epariti, the militia of joint Arcadia, were better paid than ever they had been before so that the service attracted numerous volunteers of the poorer class.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Tacitus, Hist. i, 40. He is describing the murder of Galba in the Forum at Rome, by the Othonian soldiers:—

"Igitur milites Romani, quasi Vologeser aut Pacorum avito Arsacidarum solio depulsuri, ac non Imperatorem suum, inermem et senem, trucidare pergerent — disiecta plebe, proculcato Senatu, truces armis, rapidis equis, forum irrumpunt: nec illos Capitolii aspectus, et imminentium templorum religio, et priores et futuri Principes, terruere, quominus facerent scelus, cujus ultor est quisquis successit."

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 26; Polybius, iv, 73.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 32

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 33, 34



At the outset of the Peloponnesian war, the Corinthians and Spartans had talked of prosecuting it in part by borrowed money from the treasuries of Delphi and Olympia.<sup>1</sup> How far the project had ever been executed, we have no information. But at least, it had not been realized in any such way as to form a precedent for the large sums now appropriated by the Pisatans and Arcadians; which appropriation accordingly excited much outcry, as flagrant rapacity and sacrilege. This sentiment was felt with peculiar force among many even of the Arcadians themselves, the guilty parties. Moreover some of the leaders employed had made important private acquisitions for themselves, so as to provoke both resentment and jealousy among their rivals. The Pan-Arcadian communion, recently brought together and ill-cemented, was little calculated to resist the effect of any strong special cause of dissension. It was composed of cities which had before been accustomed to act apart and even in hostility to each other; especially Mantinea and Tegea. These two cities now resumed their ancient rivalry.<sup>2</sup> The Mantineans, jealous both of Tegea and Megalopolis, began to labor underhand against Arcadian unity and the Theban alliance,—with a view to renewed connection with Sparta; though only five years before, they had owed to Thebes the reestablishment of their own city, after it had been broken up into villages by Spartan force. The appropriation of the sacred funds, offensive as it was to much of sincere sentiment, supplied them with a convenient ground for commencing opposition. In the Mantinean assembly, a resolution was passed, renouncing all participation in the Olympic treasures; while at the same time an adequate sum was raised among the citizens, to furnish pay for all members of the Epariti who came from their city. This sum was forwarded to the officers in command; who however not only refused to receive it; but even summoned the authors of the proceeding to take their trial before the Pan-Arcadian assembly,—the Ten Thousand at Megalopolis,—on the charge of breaking up the integrity of Arcadia.<sup>3</sup> The Mantinean leaders

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i, 121.

Perikles in his speech at Athens alludes to this understood purpose of the Spartans and their confederacy (Thucyd. i, 143).

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 33, 34; Diodor. xv, 82; Pausanias, vii, 8, 6.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 33. φάσκοντες αὐτοὺς λυμαίνεσθαι τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν ἐνεκαλοῦντο εἰς τοὺς μυρίους τοὺς προστάτας αὐτῶν, etc.

thus summoned, having refused to appear, and being condemned in their absence by the Ten Thousand,—a detachment of the epariti was sent to Mantinea to secure their persons. But the gates were found shut, and the order was set at defiance. So much sympathy was manifested in Arcadia towards the Mantineans, that many other towns copied their protest. Nay, even the majority of the Ten Thousand themselves, moved by repeated appeals made to them in the name of the offended gods, were gradually induced to adopt it also, publicly renouncing and interdicting all farther participation in the Olympic treasures.

Here was a just point carried, and an important advantage gained, in desisting from a scandalous misappropriation. The party which had gained it immediately sought to push it farther. Beginning as the advocates of justice and of the Olympic Zeus, the Mantineans speedily pronounced themselves more clearly as the champions of oligarchy; friendly to Sparta and adverse to Thebes. Supplies from Olympia being no longer obtained, the means presently failed, of paying the epariti or public militia. Accordingly, such members of that corps as were too poor to continue without pay, gradually relinquished the service; while on the other hand, the more wealthy and powerful citizens, by preconcerted understanding with each other, enrolled themselves in large numbers, for the purpose of getting the national force out of the hands of the opposite party and into their own.<sup>1</sup> The leaders of that opposite party saw plainly, that this oligarchical movement would not only bring them to severe account for the appropriation of the sacred treasure, but would also throw Arcadia again into alliance with Sparta. Accordingly they sent an amputation to the Thebans of the impending change of policy, inviting them to prevent it by an immediate expedition into Arcadia. Informed of this proceeding,<sup>2</sup> the opposite leaders brought it before the Pan-Arcadian assembly; in which they obtained a resolution, that

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 34.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 34. Οἱ δὲ τὰ κράτιστα τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ βουλευόμενοι ἐπεισαν τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκάδων, πέμψαντας βρέσβεις εἰπεῖν τοῖς Θεβαίοις, etc.

The phrase here used by Xenophon, to describe the oligarchical party, marks his philo-Laconian sentiment. Compare vii, 5, 1. οἱ κηδόμενοι τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ, etc.



envoys should be despatched to Thebes, desiring that no Theban army might enter into Arcadia until formally summoned, — and cancelling the preceding invitation as unauthorized. At the same time, the assembly determined to conclude peace with the Eleians, and to restore to them the locality of Olympia with all their previous rights. The Eleians gladly consented, and peace was accordingly concluded.<sup>1</sup>

The transactions just recounted occupied about one year and nine or ten months, from Midsummer 364 B. C. (the time of the battle at Olympia) to about April 362 B. C. The peace was generally popular throughout Arcadia, seemingly even among the cities which adhered to Thebes, though it had been concluded without consulting the Thebans. Even at Tegea, the centre of Theban influence, satisfaction was felt at the abandonment of the mischievous aggression and spoliation of Olympia, wherein the Thebans had had no concern. Accordingly when the peace, having been first probably sworn in other Arcadian cities, came to be sworn also at Tegea, — not only the city authorities, but also the Theban harmost, who occupied the town with a garrison of three hundred Boeotians, were present and took part in the ceremony. After it had been finished, most of the Mantineans went home; their city being both unfriendly to Tegea and not far distant. But many other Arcadians passed the evening in the town, celebrating the peace by libations, pæans, and feasting. On a sudden the gates were shut by order, and the most prominent of the oligarchical party were arrested as they sat at the feast, by the Boeotian garrison and the Arcadian Epariti of the opposite party. The leaders seized were in such considerable number, as to fill both the prison and the government-house; though there were few Mantineans among them, since most of these last had gone home. Among the rest the consternation was extreme. Some let themselves down from the walls, others escaped surreptitiously by the gates. Great was the indignation excited at Mantinea on the following morning, when the news of this violent arrest was brought thither. The authorities, — while they sent round the intelligence to the remaining Arcadian cities, inviting them at once to arms, — despatched heralds to Tegea, demanding all the Mantinean

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. i. c.

prisoners there detained. They at the same time protested emphatically against the arrest or the execution of any Arcadian, without previous trial before the Pan-Arcadian community; and they pledged themselves in the name of Mantinea, to answer for the appearance of any Arcadian against whom charges might be preferred.<sup>1</sup>

Upon receiving this requisition, the Theban harmost forthwith released all his prisoners. He then called together an assembly, — seemingly attended by only a few persons, from feelings of mistrust,<sup>2</sup> — wherein he explained that he had been misled, and that he had ordered the arrest upon a false report that a Lacedæmonian force was on the borders, prepared to seize the city in concert with treacherous correspondents within. A vote was passed accepting the explanation, though (according to Xenophon) no one believed it. Yet envoys were immediately sent to Thebes probably from the Mantineans and other Arcadians, complaining loudly of his conduct, and insisting that he should be punished with death.

On a review of the circumstances, there seems reason for believing that the Theban officer gave a true explanation of the motives under which he had acted. The fact of his releasing the prisoners at the first summons, is more consistent with this supposition than with any other. Xenophon indeed says that his main object was to get possession of the Mantineans, and that, when he found but few of the latter among the persons seized, he was indifferent to the detention of the rest. But if such had been his purpose, he would hardly have set about it in so blind and clumsy a manner. He would have done it while the Mantineans were still in the town, instead of waiting until after their departure. He would not have perpetrated an act offensive as well as iniquitous, without assuring himself that it was done at a time when the determining purpose was yet attainable. On the other hand, nothing can be more natural than the supposition that the more violent among the Arcadian epariti believed in the existence of a plot to betray Tegea to the Lacedæmonians, and impressed the Theban with a

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 37, 38.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 39. συγκαλέσας τῶν Ἀρκάδων ὅσοι γε δὴ συνελθόντες ἔμελλον, ἀπελογεῖτο, ὡς ἐξαπατηθεῖν.



persuasion of the like impending danger. To cause a revolution in Tegea, would be a great point gained for the oligarchical party, and would be rendered comparatively practicable by the congregation of a miscellaneous body of Arcadians in the town. It is indeed not impossible, that the idea of such a plot may really have been conceived; but it is at least highly probable, that the likelihood of such an occurrence was sincerely believed in by opponents.<sup>1</sup>

The explanation of the Theban governor, affirming that his order for arrest had either really averted, or appeared to him indispensable to avert, a projected treacherous betrayal, — reached Thebes at the same time as the complaints against him. It was not only received as perfectly satisfactory, but Epaminondas even replied to the complainants by counter-complaints of his own, — “The arrest (he said) was an act more justifiable than the release of those arrested. You Arcadians have already committed treason against us. It was on your account, and at your request, that we carried the war into Peloponnesus, — and you now conclude peace without consulting us! Be assured that we shall presently come in arms into Arcadia, and make war to support our partisans in the country.”<sup>2</sup>

Such was the peremptory reply which the Arcadian envoy brought back from Thebes, announcing to his countrymen that they must prepare for war forthwith. They accordingly concerted measures for resistance with the Eleians and Achæans. They sent an invitation to the Lacedæmonians to march into Arcadia, and assist in repelling any enemy who should approach for the purpose of subjugating Peloponnesus, — yet with the proviso, as to head-ship, that each state should take the lead when the war was in its own territory; and they farther sent to solicit aid from Athens. Such were the measures taken by the Mantineans and their partisans, now forming the majority in the Pan-Arcadian aggregate, who (to use the language of Xenophon) “were really solicitous for Peloponnesus.”<sup>3</sup> “Why do these Thebans (said

<sup>1</sup> The representation of Diodorus (xv, 82), though very loose and vague, gives us to understand that the two opposing parties at Tegea came to an actual conflict of arms, on occasion of the peace.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 40.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii 5, 1. Οἱ κηδόμενοι τῆς Πελοποννήσου.

they) march into our country when we desire them not to come? For what other purpose, except to do us mischief? to make us do mischief to each other, in order that both parties may stand in need of *them*? to enfeeble Peloponnesus as much as possible, in order that they may hold it the more easily in slavery?”<sup>1</sup> Such is the language which Xenophon repeats, with a sympathy plainly evincing his philo-Laconian bias. For when we follow the facts as he himself narrates them, we shall find them much more in harmony with the reproaches which he puts into the mouth of Epaminondas. Epaminondas had first marched into Peloponnesus (in 369 B. C.) at the request of both Arcadians and Eleians, for the purpose of protecting them against Sparta. He had been the first to give strength and dignity to the Arcadians, by organizing them into a political aggregate, and by forming a strong frontier for them against Sparta, in Messênê and Megalopolis. When thus organized, the Arcadians had manifested both jealousy of Thebes, and incompetence to act wisely for themselves. They had caused the reversal of the gentle and politic measures adopted by Epaminondas towards the Achæan cities, whom they had thus thrown again into the arms of Sparta. They had, of their own accord, taken up the war against Elis and the mischievous encroachment at Olympia. On the other hand, the Thebans had not marched into Peloponnesus since 367 B. C. — an interval now of nearly five years. They had tried to persuade the Arcadians to accept the Persian rescript, and to desist from the idea of alliance with Athens; but when refused, they had made no attempt to carry either of these points by force. Epaminondas had a fair right now to complain of them for having made peace with Elis and Achaia, the friends and allies of Sparta, without any consultation with Thebes. He probably believed that there had been a real plot to betray Tegea to the Lacedæmonians, as one fruit of this treacherous peace; and he saw plainly that the maintenance of the frontier line against Sparta. — Tegea, Megalopolis, and Messênê, — could no longer be assured without a new Theban invasion.

This appears to me the reasonable estimate of the situation in Peloponnesus, in June 362 B. C. — immediately before the last invasion of Epaminondas. We cannot trust the unfavorable judg-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 2, 3.



ment of Xenophon with regard either to this great man or to the Thebans. It will not stand good, even if compared with the facts related by himself; still less probably would it stand, if we had the facts from an impartial witness.

I have already recounted as much as can be made out of the proceedings of the Thebans, between the return of Pelopidas from Persia with the rescript (in the winter 367-366 B.C.) to the close of 363 B.C. In 366-365 B.C., they had experienced great loss and humiliation in Thessaly connected with the detention of Pelopidas, whom they had with difficulty rescued from the dungeon of Pheræ. In 364-363 B.C., Pelopidas had been invested with a fresh command in Thessaly, and though he was slain, the Theban arms had been eminently successful, acquiring more complete mastery of the country than ever they possessed before; while Epaminondas, having persuaded his countrymen to aim at naval supremacy, had spent the summer of 363 B.C. as admiral of a powerful Theban fleet on the coast of Asia. Returning to Thebes at the close of 363 B.C., he found his friend Pelopidas slain; while the relations of Thebes, both in Peloponnesus and in Thessaly, were becoming sufficiently complicated to absorb his whole attention on land, without admitting farther aspirations towards maritime empire. He had doubtless watched, as it went on, the gradual change of politics in Arcadia (in the winter and spring of 363-362 B.C.), whereby the Mantinean and oligarchical party, profiting by the reaction of sentiment against the proceedings at Olympia, had made itself a majority in the Pan-Arcadian assembly and militia, so as to conclude peace with Elis, and to present the prospect of probable alliance with Sparta, Elis, and Achaia. This political tendency was doubtless kept before Epaminondas by the Tegean party in Arcadia, opposed to the party of Mantinea; being communicated to him with partisan exaggerations even beyond the reality. The danger, actual or presumed, of Tegea, with the arrest which had been there operated, satisfied him that a powerful Theban intervention could be no longer deferred. As Bœotarch, he obtained the consent of his countrymen to assemble a Bœotian force, to summon the allied contingents, and to conduct this joint expedition into Peloponnesus.

The army with which he began his march was numerous and imposing. It comprised all the Bœotians and Eubœans, with a

large number of Thessalians (some even sent by Alexander of Pheræ, who had now become a dependent ally of Thebes), the Lokrians, Malians, Ænianes, and probably various other allies from Northern Greece; though the Phokians declined to join, alleging that their agreement with Thebes was for alliance purely defensive.<sup>1</sup> Having passed the line of Mount Oneium, — which was no longer defended, as it had been at his former entrance, — he reached Nemea, where he was probably joined by the Sikyonian contingent,<sup>2</sup> and where he halted, in hopes of intercepting the Athenian contingent in their way to join his enemies. He probably had information which induced him to expect them;<sup>3</sup> but the information turned out false. The Athenians never appeared, and it was understood that they were preparing to cross by sea to the eastern coast of Laconia. After a fruitless halt, he proceeded onward to Tegea, where his Peloponnesian allies all presently joined him: the Arcadians of Tegea, Pallantium, Asea, and Megalopolis, the Messenians — (all these forming the line of frontier against Laconia) — and the Argeians.

The halt at Nemea, since Epaminondas missed its direct purpose, was injurious in another way, as it enabled the main body of his Peloponnesian enemies to concentrate at Mantinea; which junction might probably have been prevented, had he entered Arcadia without delay. A powerful Peloponnesian army was there united, consisting of the Mantineans with the major part of the other Arcadians, — the Eleians, — and the Achæans. Invitation had been sent to the Spartans; and old Agesilaus, now in his eightieth year, was in full march with the Lacedæmonian forces to Mantinea. Besides this, the Athenian contingent was immediately expected; especially valuable from its cavalry, since the Peloponnesians were not strong in that description of force, — some of them indeed having none at all.

Epaminondas established his camp and place of arms within the walls of Tegea; a precaution which Xenophon praises, as making his troops more secure and comfortable, and his motions less ob-

Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 5; Diodor. xv, 85.

Diodor. xv, 85.

<sup>3</sup> The explanation which Xenophon gives of this halt at Nemea, — as if Epaminondas was determined to it by a peculiar hatred of Athens (Hellen vii, 5, 6) — seems alike fanciful and ill-tempered.



servable by the enemy.<sup>1</sup> He next marched to Mantinea, to provoke the enemy to an action before the Spartans and Athenians joined; but they kept carefully on their guard, close to Mantinea, too strongly posted to be forced.<sup>2</sup> On returning to his camp in Tegea, he was apprised that Agesilaus with the Spartan force, having quitted Sparta on the march to Mantinea, had already made some progress and reached Pellênê. Upon this he resolved to attempt the surprise of Sparta by a sudden night-march from Tegea, which lay in the direct road from Sparta to Mantinea, while Agesilaus in getting from Sparta to Mantinea had to pursue a more circuitous route to the westward. Moving shortly after the evening meal, Epaminondas led the Theban force with all speed towards Sparta; and he had well-nigh come upon that town, "like a nest of unprotected young birds," at a moment when no resistance could have been made. Neither Agesilaus, nor any one else, expected so daring and well-aimed a blow, the success of which would have changed the face of Greece. Nothing saved Sparta except the providential interposition of the gods,<sup>3</sup> signified by the accident that a Kretan runner hurried to Agesilaus, with the news that the Thebans were in full march southward from Tegea, and happened to arrest in time his farther progress towards Mantinea. Agesilaus instantly returned back with the troops around him to Sparta, which was thus put in a sufficient posture of defence before the Thebans arrived. Though sufficient for the emergency, however, his troops were not numerous; for the Spartan cavalry and mercenary forces were still absent, having been sent forward to Mantinea. Orders were sent for the main army at that city to hasten immediately to the relief of Sparta.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 8.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, De Gloriâ Athen. p. 346 B.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 10. *Kaî ei mē Krēs, θεία τι νὺ μοῖρα προσελθὼν, ἐξήγγειλε τῷ Ἀγησίλαῳ προσιδὼν τὸ στέτευμα, ἔλαβεν αὐτὴν πόλιν ὥσπερ ἰσοττιᾶν, παντάπασιν ἔρημον τῶν ἀμυνομένων.*

Diodorus coincides in the main fact (xv, 82, 83), though with many inaccuracies of detail. He gives a very imperfect idea of this narrow escape of Sparta, which is fully attested by Xenophon, even against his own partialities.

Kallisthenes asserted that the critical intelligence had been conveyed to Agesilaus by a Thespian named Euthynus (Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 34).

<sup>4</sup> Xenophon (Hellen. vii, 5, 10, 11) describes these facts in a manner different on several points from Polybius (ix, 8), and from Diodorus (xv, 83).

The march of Epaminondas had been undertaken only on the probability, well-nigh realized, of finding Sparta undefended. He was in no condition to assault the city, if tolerably occupied,—still less to spend time before it; for he knew that the enemy from Mantinea would immediately follow him into Laconia, within which he did not choose to hazard a general action. He found it impracticable to take this unfortified, yet unassailable city, Sparta, even at his former invasion of 370–369 B. C.; when he had most part of Peloponnesus in active cooperation with him, and when the Lacedæmonians had no army in the field. Accordingly, though he crossed the Eurotas and actually entered into the city of Sparta<sup>1</sup> (which had no walls to keep him out), yet as soon as he perceived the roofs manned with soldiers and other preparations for resistance, he advanced with great caution, not adventuring into the streets and amidst the occupied houses. He only tried to get possession of various points of high ground commanding the city, from whence it might be possible to charge down upon the defenders with advantage. But even here, though inferior in number they prevented him from making any impression. And Archidamus son of Agesilaus, sallying forth unexpectedly beyond the line

Xenophon's authority appears to me better in itself, while his narrative is also more probable. He states distinctly that Agesilaus heard the news of the Theban march while he was yet at Pellênê (on the road to Mantinea, to which place a large portion of the Spartan troops had already gone forward),—that he turned back forthwith, and reached Sparta before Epaminondas, with a division not numerous, yet sufficient to put the town in a state of defence. Whereas Polybius affirms, that Agesilaus heard the news when he was at Mantinea,—that he marched from thence with the whole army to Sparta, but that Epaminondas reached Sparta before him, had already attacked the town and penetrated into the market-place, when Agesilaus arrived and drove him back. Diodorus relates that Agesilaus never left Sparta, but that the other king Agis, who had been sent with the army to Mantinea, divining the plans of Epaminondas, sent word by some swift Kretan runners to Agesilaus and put him upon his guard.

Wesseling remarks justly that the mention of Agis must be a mistake; that the second king of Sparta at that time was named Kleomenes.

Polyænus (ii, 3, 10) states correctly that Agesilaus reached Sparta before Epaminondas; but he adds many other details which are too uncertain to copy.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 11. *Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγένετο Ἐπαμινώνας ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, etc.*



of defence, with a small company of one hundred hoplites, scrambled over some difficult ground in his front, and charged the Thebans even up the hill, with such gallantry, that he actually beat them back with some loss; pursuing them for a space, until he was himself repulsed and forced to retreat.<sup>1</sup> The bravery of the Spartan Isidas, too, son of Phœbidas the captor of the Theban Kadmeia, did signal honor to Sparta, in this day of her comparative decline. Distinguished for beauty and stature, this youth sallied forth naked and unshielded, with his body oiled as in the palaestra. Wielding in his right hand a spear and in his left a sword, he rushed among the enemy, dealing death and destruction; in spite of which he was suffered to come back unwounded: so great was the awe inspired by his singular appearance and desperate hardihood. The ephors decorated him afterwards with a wreath of honor, but at the same time fined him for exposing himself without defensive armor.<sup>2</sup>

Though the Spartans displayed here an honorable gallantry, yet these successes, in themselves trifling, are magnified into importance only by the partiality of Xenophon. The capital fact was, that Agesilaus had been accidentally forewarned so as to get back to Sparta and put it in defence before the Thebans arrived. As soon as Epaminondas ascertained this, he saw that his project was no longer practicable; nor did he do more than try the city round, to see if he could detect any vulnerable point, without involving himself in a hazardous assault. Baffled in his first scheme, he applied himself, with equal readiness of resource and celerity of motion, to the execution of a second. He knew that the hostile army from Mantinea would be immediately put in march for Sparta, to ward off all danger from that city. Now the straight road from Mantinea to Sparta (a course nearly due south all the way) lying through Tegea, was open to Epaminondas, but not to the enemy, who would be forced to take another and more circuitous route, probably by Asea and Pallantion; so that he was actually nearer to Mantinea than they. He determined to return to Tegea forthwith, while they were on their march towards Sparta, and before

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 12, 13.

Justin (vi, 7) greatly exaggerates the magnitude and violence of the contest. He erroneously represents that Agesilaus did not reach Sparta till after Epaminondas.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 34.

they could be apprised of his change of purpose. Breaking up accordingly, with scarce any interval of rest, he marched back to Tegea; where it became absolutely indispensable to give repose to his hoplites, after such severe fatigue. But he sent forward his cavalry without any delay, to surprise Mantinea, which would be now (he well knew) unprepared and undefended; with its military force absent on the march to Sparta, and its remaining population, free as well as slave, largely engaged in the fields upon the carrying of harvest. Nothing less than the extraordinary ascendancy of Epaminondas, — coupled with his earnestness in setting forth the importance of the purpose, as well as the probable plunder, — could have prevailed upon the tired horsemen to submit to such additional toil, while their comrades were enjoying refreshment and repose at Tegea.<sup>1</sup>

Everything near Mantinea was found in the state which Epaminondas anticipated. Yet the town was preserved, and his well-laid scheme defeated, by an unexpected contingency which the Mantineans doubtless ascribed to the providence of the gods, — as Xenophon regards the previous warning given to Agesilaus. The Athenian cavalry had arrived, not an hour before, and had just dismounted from their horses within the walls of Mantinea. Having departed from Eleusis (probably after ascertaining that Epaminondas no longer occupied Nemea), they took their evening meal and rested at the isthmus of Corinth, where they seem to have experienced some loss or annoyance.<sup>2</sup> They then passed forward through Kleonæ to Mantinea, arriving thither without having broken fast, either themselves or their horses, on that day. It was just after they reached Mantinea, and when they had yet taken no refreshment, — that the Theban and Thessalian cavalry suddenly

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 14. Πάλιν δὲ πορευθεὶς ὡς εἰδύνατο τάχιστα εἰς τὴν Τεγέαν, τοὺς μὲν ὀπλίτας ἀνέπαινε, τοὺς δὲ ἱππείας ἐπέμψεν εἰς τὴν Μαντινείαν, δεηθεὶς αὐτῶν προσκαρτεῖσθαι, καὶ διδάσκων ὡς πάντα μὲν εἰκὸς ἔξω εἶναι τὰ τῶν Μαντινέων βοσκήματα, πάντας δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἄλλως τε καὶ αὐτοῦ συγκομιδῆς οὐσης.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 15, 16.

The words — δυστυχήματος γεγεννημένου ἐν Κορίνθῳ τοῖς ἱππευσιν — allude to something which we have no means of making out. It is possible that the Corinthians, who were at peace with Thebes and had been ill-used by Athens (vii. 4, 6–10), may have seen with displeasure, and even molested, the Athenian horsemen while resting on their territory.



made their appearance, having advanced even to the temple of Poseidon, within less than a mile of the gates.<sup>1</sup>

The Mantineans were terror-struck at this event. Their military citizens were absent on the march to Sparta, while the remainder were dispersed about the fields. In this helpless condition, they implored aid from the newly-arrived Athenian cavalry; who, though hungry and tired, immediately went forth,—and indeed were obliged to do so, since their own safety depended upon it. The assailants were excellent cavalry, Thebans and Thessalians, and more numerous than the Athenians. Yet such was the gallantry with which the latter fought, in a close and bloody action, that on the whole they gained the advantage, forced the assailants to retire, and had the satisfaction to preserve Mantinea with all its citizens and property. Xenophon extols<sup>2</sup> (and doubtless with good reason) the generous energy of the Athenians, in going forth hungry and fatigued. But we must recollect that the Theban cavalry had undergone yet more severe hunger and fatigue,—that Epaminondas would never have sent them forward in such condition, had he expected any serious resistance; and that they probably dispersed to some extent, for the purpose of plundering and seizing subsistence in the fields through which they passed, so that they were found in disorder when the Athenians sallied out upon them. The Athenian cavalry-commander Kephisodorus,<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Polybius, ix, 8.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 15, 16, 17.

Plutarch (De Gloria Athen. p. 346 D.—E.) recounts the general fact of this battle and the rescue of Mantinea; yet with several inaccuracies which we refute by means of Xenophon.

Diodor. (xv, 84) mentions the rescue of Mantinea by the unexpected arrival of the Athenians; but he states them as being six thousand soldiers, that is hoplites, under Hegelochus; and he says nothing about the cavalry battle. Hegesilaus is named by Ephorus (ap. Diog. Laert. ii, 54, — compare Xenoph. De Vectigal. iii, 7) as the general of the entire force sent out by Athens on this occasion, consisting of infantry as well as cavalry. The infantry must have come up somewhat later.

Polybius also (ix, 8), though concurring in the main with Xenophon, differs in several details. I follow the narrative of Xenophon.

<sup>3</sup> Harpokration v, Κηφισόδωρος, Ephorus ap. Diogen. Laert. ii, 53; Pausan. i, 3, 4; viii, 9, 8; viii, 11, 5.

There is a confusion, on several points, between this cavalry battle near Mantinea, — and the great or general battle, which speedily followed it,

together with Gryllus (son of the historian Xenophon), then serving with his brother Diodorus among the Athenian horse, were both slain in the battle. A memorable picture at Athens by the contemporary painter Euphranor, commemorated both the battle and the personal gallantry of Gryllus, to whose memory the Mantineans also paid distinguished honors.

Here were two successive movements of Epaminondas, both well-conceived, yet both disappointed by accident, without any omission of his own. He had his forces concentrated at Tegea, while his enemies on their side, returning from Sparta, formed a united camp in the neighborhood of Mantinea. They comprised Lacedæmonians, Eleians, Arcadians, Achæans, and Athenians; to the number, in all, of twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse, if we could trust the assertion of Diodorus;<sup>1</sup> who also gives the numbers of Epaminondas as thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse. Little value can be assigned to either of these estimates; nor is it certain which of the two armies was the more numerous. But Epaminondas saw that he had now no chance left for striking a blow except through a pitched battle, nor did he at all despair of the result.<sup>2</sup> He had brought out his northern allies for a limited time; which time they were probably not disposed to prolong, as the season of harvest was now approaching. Moreover, his stock of provisions was barely sufficient;<sup>3</sup> the new crop being not yet gathered in, while the crop of the former year was probably almost exhausted. He took his resolution therefore to attack the enemy forthwith.

wherein Epaminondas was slain. Gryllus is sometimes said to have been slain in the battle of Mantinea, and even to have killed Epaminondas with his own hand. It would seem as if the picture of Euphranor represented Gryllus in the act of killing the Theban commander; and as if the latter tradition of Athens as well as of Thebes, erroneously bestowed upon that Theban commander the name of Epaminondas.

See this confusion discussed and cleared up, in a good article on the Battle of Mantinea, by Arnold Schäfer, p. 58, 59, in the *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* (1846 — Fünfter Jahrgang, Erstes Heft).

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 84.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 8. καὶ μὴν οἴομενος κρείττων τῶν ἀντιπάλων εἶναι, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 19. σπάνια δὲ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔχοντας διῶς πείθεσθαι θέλειν etc.



But I cannot adopt the view of Xenophon, that such resolution was forced upon Epaminondas, against his own will, by a desperate position, rendering it impossible for him to get away without fighting, — by the disappointment of finding so few allies on his own side, and so many assembled against him, — and by the necessity of wiping off the shame of his two recent failures (at Sparta and at Mantinea) or perishing in the attempt.<sup>1</sup> This is an estimate of the position of Epaminondas, not consistent with the facts narrated by Xenophon himself. It could have been no surprise to the Theban general that the time had arrived for ordering a battle. With what other view had he come into Peloponnesus? Or for what other purpose could he have brought so numerous an army? Granting that he expected greater support in Peloponnesus than he actually found, we cannot imagine him to have hoped that his mere presence, without fighting, would suffice to put down enemies courageous as well as powerful. Xenophon exaggerates the importance of the recent defeats (as he terms them) before Sparta and Mantinea. These were checks or disappointments rather than defeats. On arriving at Tegea, Epaminondas had found it practicable (which he could not have known beforehand) to attempt a *coup de main*, first against Sparta, next against Mantinea. Here were accidental opportunities which his genius discerned and turned to account. Their success, so near to actual attainment, would have been a prodigious point gained;<sup>2</sup> but their accidental failure left him not worse off than he was before. It remained for him then, having the enemy before him in the field, and no farther opportunities of striking at them unawares by side-blows, to fight them openly; which he and all around him must have contemplated, from their first entrance into Peloponnesus, as the only probable way of deciding the contest.

The army of Epaminondas, far from feeling that sentiment of disappointed hope and stern necessity which Xenophon ascribes to their commander, were impatient to fight under his orders, and

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 18. αὐτὸς δὲ λελυμασμένος παντάπασιν τῇ αὐτοῦ δόξῃ ἔσοιτο, ἡττημένος μὲν ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι σὺν πολλῷ ὀπλιτικῷ ὑπ' ὀλίγων, ἡττημένος δὲ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ ἱππομαχίᾳ, αἴτιος δὲ γεγενημένος διὰ τὴν ἐς Πελοπόννησον στράτειαν τοῦ συνεστάναι Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Ἀρκάδας καὶ Ἡλείους καὶ Ἀθηναίους· ὥστε οὐκ ἔδόκει δυνατόν εἶναι ἀμαχεῖ παρελθεῖν, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Polybius, ix, 8, 2.

full of enthusiastic alacrity when he at last proclaimed his intention. He had kept them within the walls of Tegea, thus not only giving them better quarters and fuller repose, but also concealing his proceedings from the enemy; who on their side were encamped on the border of the Mantinean territory. Rejoicing in the prospect of going forth to battle, the horsemen and hoplites of Epaminondas all put themselves in their best equipment. The horsemen whitened their helmets, — the hoplites burnished up their shields, and sharpened their spears and swords. Even the rustic and half-armed Arcadian villagers, who had nothing but clubs in place of sword or spear, were eager to share the dangers of the Thebans, and inscribed upon their shields (probably nothing but miserable squares of wood) the Theban ensign.<sup>1</sup> The best spirit and confidence animated all the allies, as they quitted the gates of Tegea, and disposed themselves in the order of march commanded by Epaminondas.

The lofty Mantinico-Tegeatic plain, two thousand feet above the level of the sea (now known as the plain of Tripolitza) — “is the greatest of that cluster of valleys in the centre of Peloponnesus, each of which is so closely shut in by the intersecting mountains that no outlet is afforded to the waters except through the moun-

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 20. Προθύμως μὲν ἐλευκοῦντο οἱ ἵππεις τὰ κράνη, αἰελοῦντος ἐκείνου· ἐπεγράφοντο δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἀρκάδων ὀπλῖται, ῥόπαλα ἔχοντες, ὡς Θηβαῖοι οὕτως· πάντες δὲ ἡκονῶντο καὶ λόγχας καὶ μαχαίρας, καὶ ἐλαμπρύνοντο τὰς ἀσπίδας.

There seems a sort of sneer in these latter words, both at the Arcadians and Thebans. The Arcadian club-men are called ὀπλῖται; and are represented as passing themselves off to be as good as Thebans.

Sievers (Geschicht. p. 342) and Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. c. 40, p. 200) follow Eckhel in translating this passage to mean that “the Arcadian hoplites inscribed upon their shields the figure of a club, that being the ensign of the Thebans.” I cannot think this interpretation is the best, — at least until some evidence is produced, that the Theban symbol on the shield was a club. Xenophon does not disdain on other occasions to speak sneeringly of the Theban hoplites, — see vii, 5, 12. The mention of λόγχας καὶ μαχαίρας, immediately afterwards, sustains the belief that ῥόπαλα ἔχοντες, immediately before, means “men armed with clubs”, the natural sense of the words.

The horsemen are said to have “whitened their helmets (or head-pieces).” Hence I presume that these head-pieces were not made of metal, but of wood or wicker-work. Compare Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 25.



tains themselves."<sup>1</sup> Its length stretches from north to south, bordered by the mountain range of Mænalus on the west, and of Artemisium and Parthenion on the east. It has a breadth of about eight miles in the broadest part, and of one mile in the narrowest. Mantinea is situated near its northern extremity, Tegea near its southern; the direct distance between the two cities, in a line not much different from north and south, being about ten English miles. The frontier line between their two domains was formed by a peculiarly narrow part of the valley, where a low ridge projecting from the range of Mænalus on the one side, and another from Artemisium on the opposite, contract the space and make a sort of defensible pass near four miles south of Mantinea;<sup>2</sup> thus about six miles distant from Tegea. It was at this position, covering the whole Mantinean territory, that the army opposed to Epaminondas was concentrated; the main Lacedæmonian force as well as the rest having now returned from Sparta.<sup>3</sup>

Epaminondas, having marched out from Tegea by the northern gate, arrayed his army in columns proper for advancing towards the enemy; himself with the Theban columns forming the van. His array being completed, he at first began his forward march in a direction straight towards the enemy. But presently he changed his course, turning to the left towards the Mænalian range of mountains which forms the western border of the plain, and which he probably reached somewhere near the site of the present Tripolitza. From thence he pursued his march northward, skirting the flank of the mountain on the side which lies over against or fronts towards Tegea;<sup>4</sup> until at length he neared the enemy's po-

<sup>1</sup> See Colonel Leake's *Travels in the Morea*, vol. iii, ch. 24, p. 45.

<sup>2</sup> Three miles from Mantinea (Leake, *ib.* p. 51-94) "a low ridge of rocks, which, advancing into the plain from a projecting part of the Mænalium, formed a natural division between the districts of Tegea and Mantinea."

Compare the same work, vol. i, ch. 3, p. 100, 112, 114, and the recent valuable work of Ernst Curtius, *Peloponnesos* (Gotha, 1851), pp. 232-247. Gell says that a wall has once been carried across the plain at this boundary (*Itinerary of the Morea*, p. 141-143).

<sup>3</sup> See the indications of the locality of the battle in Pausanias, viii, 11, 4, 5; and Colonel Leake — as above referred to.

<sup>4</sup> *Xen. Hellen.* vii, 5, 21.

Tripolitza is reckoned by Colonel Leake as about three miles and a half from the site of Tegea, Mr. Dodwell states it as about four miles, and Gell's *Itinerary of the Morea* much the same.

sition, upon their right flank. He here halted, and caused his columns to face to the right; thus forming a line, or phalanx of moderate depth, fronting towards the enemy. During the march, each lochus or company had marched in single file with the lochage or captain (usually the strongest and best soldier in it), at the head; though we do not know how many of these lochages marched abreast, or what was the breadth of the column. When the phalanx or front towards the enemy was formed, each lochage was of course in line with his company, and at its left hand; while the Thebans and Epaminondas himself were at the left of the whole line. In this position, Epaminondas gave the order to ground arms.<sup>1</sup>

The enemy, having watched him ever since he had left Tegea and formed his marching array, had supposed at first that he was coming straight up to the front of their position, and thus expected speedy battle. But when he turned to the left towards the mountains, so that for some time he did not approach sensibly nearer to their position, they began to fancy that he had no intention of fighting on that day. Such belief, having been once raised, still continued, even though, by advancing along the skirts of the mountain, he gradually arrived very close upon their right flank. They were farther confirmed in the same supposition, when they saw his phalanx ground arms; which they construed as an indication that he was about to encamp on the spot where he stood. It is probable that Epaminondas may have designedly simulated some other preliminaries of encampment, since his march from Tegea seems to have been arranged for the purpose partly of raising such false impression in his enemies, partly of getting upon their right flank instead of their front. He completely succeeded in his object. The soldiers on the Lacedæmonian side, believing that there would be no battle until the next day, suffered their ranks to

Colonel Leake reckons about eight miles from Tripolitza to Mantinea. Gell states it as two hours and three minutes, Dodwell as two hours and five minutes, — or seven miles.

Colonel Leake, *Travels in Morea*, vol. i, p. 88-100, Gell's *Itinerary*, p. 141; Dodwell's *Travels*, vol. ii, p. 418-422.

It would seem that Epaminondas, in this latter half of his march, must have followed nearly the road from Mantinea to Pallantium. Pallantium was situated west by south from Tegea.

<sup>1</sup> *Xen. Hellen.* vii, 5, 22.



fall into disorder, and scattered about the field. Many of the horse-men even took off their breast-plates and unbridled their horses. And what was of hardly less consequence,—that mental preparation of the soldier, whereby he was wound up for the moment of action, and which provident commanders never omitted, if possible, to inflame by a special harangue at the moment,—was allowed to slacken and run down.<sup>1</sup> So strongly was the whole army persuaded of the intention of Epaminondas to encamp, that they suffered him not only without hindrance, but even without suspicion, to make all his movements and dispositions preparatory to immediate attack.

Such improvidence is surprising, when we recollect that the ablest commander and the best troops in Greece were so close upon the right of their position. It is to be in part explained, probably, by the fact that the Spartan headship was now at an end, and that there was no supreme chief to whom the whole body of Lacedæmonian allies paid deference. If either of the kings of Sparta was present,—a point not distinctly ascertainable,—he would have no command except over the Lacedæmonian troops. In the entire allied army, the Mantineans occupied the extreme right (as on a former occasion, because the battle was in their territory,<sup>2</sup> and because the Lacedæmonians had lost their once-recognized privilege), together with the other Arcadians. On the right-centre and centre were the Lacedæmonians, Eleians, and Achæans; on the extreme left, the Athenians.<sup>3</sup> There was cavalry on both the wings; Athenian on the left,—Eleian on the right; spread out with no more than the ordinary depth, and without any intermixture of light infantry along with the horsemen.<sup>4</sup>

In the phalanx of Epaminondas, he himself with the Thebans and Bœotians was on the left; the Argeians on the right; the

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22. Καὶ γὰρ δὴ, ὡς πρὸς τῷ ὄρει ἐγένετο, ἐπεὶ ἐξετάσθη αὐτῷ ἡ φάλαγξ, ὑπὸ τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς ἐθετο τὰ ὄπλα· ὥστε εἰκάσθη στρατοπέδουμένου. Τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσας, ἔλυσε μὲν τῶν πλείστων πολεμίων τὴν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πρὸς μάχην παρασκευὴν, ἔλυσε δὲ τὴν ἐν ταῖς συντάξεσιν.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. v, 67; Pausanias, viii, 9, 5; viii, 10, 4.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xv, 85.

That the Athenians were on the left, we also know from Xenophon (Hellen. vii, 5, 24), though he gives no complete description of the arrangement of the allies on either side.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 23.

Arcadians, Messenians, Eubœans, Sikyonians and other allies in the centre.<sup>1</sup> It was his purpose to repeat the same general plan of attack which had succeeded so perfectly at Leuktra; to head the charge himself with his Bœotians on the left against the opposing right or right-centre, and to bear down the enemy on that side with irresistible force, both of infantry and cavalry; while he kept back his right and centre, composed of less trustworthy troops, until the battle should have been thus wholly or partially decided. Accordingly, he caused the Bœotian hoplites,—occupying the left of his line in lochi or companies, with the lochage or captain at the left extremity of each,—to wheel to the right and form in column fronting the enemy, in advance of his remaining line. The Theban lochages thus became placed immediately in face of the enemy, as the heads of a column of extraordinary depth; all the hoplites of each lochus, and perhaps of more than one lochus, being ranged in file behind them.<sup>2</sup> What the actual depth was, or what was the exact number of the lochus, we do not know. At Leuktra, Epaminondas had attacked with fifty shields of depth; at Mantinea, the depth of his column was probably not less. Himself, with the chosen Theban warriors, were at the head of it, and he relied upon breaking through the enemy's phalanx at whatever point he charged; since their files would hardly be more than eight deep, and very inadequate to resist so overwhelming a shock. His column would cut through the phalanx of the enemy, like the prow of a trireme impelled in sea-fight against the midships of her antagonist.

<sup>1</sup> Here again, we know from Xenophon that the Thebans were on the left; but the general arrangement of the other contingents we obtain only from Diodorus (xv, 85).

The *Tactica* of Arrian, also (xi, 2) inform us that Epaminondas formed his attacking column, at Leuktra, of the Thebans—at Mantinea, of all the Bœotians.

About the practice of the Thebans, both at and after the battle of Leuktra, to make their attack with the left, see Plutarch *Quæst. Roman.* p. 382 D.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22. Ἐπεὶ γε μὴν, παραγαγὼν τοὺς ἐπὶ κέρως πορευομένους λόχους εἰς μέτωπον, ἰσχυρὸν ἐποίησατο τὸ περὶ αὐτὸν ἐμβολόν, τότε δὴ ἀναλαβεῖν παραγγείλας τὰ ὄπλα, ἤγειτο· οἱ δὲ ἠκολούθουν. . . . Ὁ δὲ τὸ στράτευμα ἀντίπρωρον ὥσπερ τριήρη προσῆγε, νομίζων, ὅσοι ἐμβόλῳ διακόψει, διαφθερεῖν ὅλον τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων στράτευμα, etc.



It was apparently only the Boeotian hoplites who were thus formed in column, projecting forward in advance; while the remaining allies were still left in their ordinary phalanx or lines.<sup>1</sup> Epaminondas calculated, that when he should have once broken through the enemy's phalanx at a single point, the rest would either take flight, or become so dispirited, that his allies coming up in phalanx could easily deal with them.

Against the cavalry on the enemy's right, which was marshaled only with the ordinary depth of a phalanx of hoplites, four, six, or perhaps eight deep),<sup>2</sup> and without any light infantry intermingled with the ranks — the Theban general opposed on his left his own excellent cavalry, Theban and Thessalian, but in strong and deep column, so as to ensure to them also a superior weight of attack. He farther mingled in their ranks some active footmen, darters and slingers, of whom he had many from Thessaly and the Maliae Gulf.<sup>3</sup>

There remained one other precaution to take. His deep Theban and Boeotian column, in advancing to the charge, would be exposed on its right or unshielded side to the attack of the Athenians, especially the Athenian cavalry, from the enemy's left. To guard against any such movement, he posted, upon some rising ground near his right, a special body of reserve, both horse and

<sup>1</sup> I agree with Folard (*Traité de la Colonne*, p. lv-lxi, prefixed to the translation of Polybius) in considering *εμβολον* to be a column, — rather than a wedge tapering towards the front. And I dissent from Schneider's explanation, who says, — Epaminondas phalangem contrahit sensim et colligit in frontem, ut cunei seu rostri navalis formam efficeret. *Copiae igitur ex utroque latere explicatae transeunt in frontem; hoc est, παράγειν εἰς μέτωπον.* It appears to me that the troops which Epaminondas caused to wheel into the front and to form the advancing column, consisted only of the left or Theban division, the best troops in the army, — τῷ μὲν ἰσχυροτάτῳ παρεσκευάζετο ἀγωνίζεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀσθενέστατον πόρῳ ἀπέστειλεν. Moreover, the whole account of Xenophon implies that Epaminondas made the attack from his own left against the enemy's right, or right-centre. He was afraid that the Athenians would take him in flank from their own left.

<sup>2</sup> Compare a similar case in Xen. *Hellen.* iii, 4, 13, where the Grecian cavalry, in the Asiatic army of Agesilaus, is said to be drawn up ὥσπερ φάλαγξ ἐπὶ τεσσάρων, etc.

<sup>3</sup> These *πέζοι ἄμπτοι* — light-armed footmen, intermingled with the ranks of the cavalry, — are numbered as an important item in the military establishment of the Syracusan despot Gelon (*Herodot.* vii, 158).

foot, in order to take the Athenians in the rear if they should attempt it.

All these fresh dispositions for attack, made on the spot, must have occupied time, and caused much apparent movement. To constitute both the column of infantry, and the column of cavalry, for attack on his left — and to post the body of reserve on the rising ground at his right against the Athenians — were operations which the enemy from their neighboring position could not help seeing. Yet they either did not heed, or did not understand, what was going on.<sup>1</sup> Nor was it until Epaminondas, perceiving all to be completed, actually gave the word of command to "take up arms," that they had any suspicion of the impending danger. As soon as they saw him in full march moving rapidly towards them, surprise and tumultuous movement pervaded their body. The scattered hoplites ran to their places; the officers exerted every effort to establish regular array; the horsemen hastened to bridle their horses and resume their breast-plates.<sup>2</sup> And though the space dividing the two armies was large enough to allow such mischief to be partially corrected, — yet soldiers thus taken unawares, hurried, and troubled, were not in condition to stand the terrific shock of chosen Theban hoplites in deep column.

The grand force of attack, both of cavalry and infantry, which Epaminondas organized on his left, was triumphant in both its portions. His cavalry, powerfully aided by the intermingled darters and light troops from Thessaly, broke and routed the enemy's cavalry opposed to them, and then restraining themselves from pursuit, turned to fall upon the phalanx of infantry. Epaminondas, on his part, with his Theban column, came into close conflict with the Mantinean and Lacedæmonian line of infantry, whom, after a desperate struggle of shield, spear, and sword, he bore down by superior force and weight. He broke through the enemy's line of infantry at this point, compelling the Lacedæmonians opposed to him, after a brave and murderous resistance, to turn their backs and take to flight. The remaining troops of the enemy's line, seeing the best portion of their army defeated and in flight, turned

<sup>1</sup> Perhaps Epaminondas may have contrived in part to conceal what was going on by means of cavalry-movements in his front. Something of the kind seems alluded to by Polyænus (ii, 3, 14).

<sup>2</sup> Xen. *Hellen.* vii, 5, 22.



and fled also. The centre and right of Epaminondas, being on a less advanced front, hardly came into conflict with the enemy until the impression of his charge had been felt, and therefore found the troops opposed to them already wavering and disheartened. The Achæan, Eleian, and other infantry on that side, gave way after a short resistance; chiefly as it would appear, from contagion and alarm, when they saw the Lacedæmonians broken. The Athenians however, especially the cavalry, on the left wing of their own army, seem to have been engaged in serious encounter with the cavalry opposite to them. Diodorus affirms them to have been beaten, after a gallant fight,<sup>1</sup> until the Eleian cavalry from the right came to their aid. Here, as on many other points, it is difficult to reconcile his narrative with Xenophon, who plainly intimates that the stress of the action fell on the Theban left and Lacedæmonian right and centre, — and from whose narrative we should rather have gathered, that the Eleian cavalry, beaten on their own right, may have been aided by the Athenian cavalry from the left; reversing the statement of Diodorus.

In regard to this important battle, however, we cannot grasp with confidence anything beyond the capital determining feature and the ultimate result.<sup>2</sup> The calculations of Epaminondas were

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 85.

The orator Æschines fought among the Athenian hoplites on this occasion (Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 300. c. 53.)

<sup>2</sup> The remark made by Polybius upon this battle deserves notice. He states that the description given of the battle by Ephorus was extremely incorrect and absurd, arguing great ignorance both of the ground where it was fought and of the possible movements of the armies. He says that Ephorus had displayed the like incompetence also in describing the battle of Leuktra; in which case, however, his narrative was less misleading, because that battle was simple and easily intelligible, involving movements only of one wing of each army. But in regard to the battle of Mantinea (he says), the misdescription of Ephorus was of far more deplorable effect, because that battle exhibited much complication and generalship, which Ephorus did not at all comprehend, as might be seen by any one who measured the ground and studied the movements reported in his narrative (Polybius, xii, 25).

Polybius adds that Theopompus and Timæus were as little to be trusted in the description of land-battles as Ephorus. Whether this remark has special application to the battle of Mantinea, I do not clearly make out. He gives credit however to Ephorus for greater judgment and accuracy in his descriptions of naval battles.

completely realized. The irresistible charge, both of infantry and cavalry, made by himself with his left wing, not only defeated the troops immediately opposed, but caused the enemy's whole army to take flight. It was under these victorious circumstances, and while he was pressing on the retiring enemy at the head of his Theban column of infantry, that he received a mortal wound with a spear in the breast. He was by habit and temper, always foremost in braving danger, and on this day probably exposed himself preëminently, as a means of encouraging those around him, and ensuring the success of his own charge, on which so much depended; moreover, a Grecian general fought on foot in the ranks, and carried the same arms (spear, shield, etc.) as a private soldier. Diodorus tells us that the Lacedæmonian infantry were making a prolonged resistance, when Epaminondas put himself at the head of the Thebans for a fresh and desperate effort; that he stepped forward, darted his javelin, and slew the Lacedæmonian commander; that having killed several warriors, and intimidated others, he forced them to give way; that the Lacedæmonians, seeing him in advance of his comrades, turned upon him and overwhelmed him with darts, some of which he avoided, others he turned off with his shield, while others, after they had actually entered his body and wounded him, he plucked out and employed them in repelling the enemy. At length he received a mortal wound in his breast with a spear.<sup>1</sup> I cannot altogether admit to notice these details; which once passed as a portion of Grecian history, though they seem rather the offspring of an imagination fresh from the perusal of the Iliad than a recital of an actual combat of Thebans and Lacedæmonians, both eminent for close-rank fighting, with long spear and heavy shield.

Unfortunately, Polybius has not given us his own description of this battle of Mantinea. He only says enough to make us feel how imperfectly we know its details. There is too much reason to fear that the account which we now read in Diodorus may be borrowed in large proportion from that very narrative of Ephorus here so much disparaged.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 87. Cornelius Nepos (Epam. c. 9) seems to copy the same authority as Diodorus, though more sparing of details. He does not seem to have read Xenophon.

I commend the reader again to an excellent note of Dr. Arnold, on Thucydides, iv, 11; animadverting upon similar exaggerations and embellishments of Diodorus, in the description of the conduct of Brasidas at Pylos.

The mortal wound of Epaminondas, with a spear in the breast, is the only part of the case which we really know. The handle of the spear broke, and the point was left sticking in his breast. He immediately fell, and as the enemy were at that moment in retreat, fell into the arms of his own comrades. There was no dispute for the possession of his body, as there had been for Kleombrotus at Leuktra.

The news of his mortal wound spread like wild-fire through his army; and the effect produced is among the most extraordinary phenomena in all Grecian military history. I give it in the words of the contemporary historian. "It was thus (says Xenophon) that Epaminondas arranged his order of attack; and he was not disappointed in his expectation. For having been victorious, on the point where he himself charged, he caused the whole army of the enemy to take flight. But so soon as he fell, those who remained had no longer any power even of rightly using the victory. Though the phalanx of the enemy's infantry was in full flight, the Theban hoplites neither killed a single man more, nor advanced a step beyond the actual ground of conflict. Though the enemy's cavalry was also in full flight, yet neither did the Theban horsemen continue their pursuit, nor kill any more either of horsemen or of hoplites, but fell back through the receding enemies with the timidity of beaten men. The light troops and peltasts, who had been mingled with the Theban cavalry and had aided in their victory, spread themselves over towards the enemy's left with the security of conquerors; but there (being unsupported by their own horsemen) they were mostly cut to pieces by the Athenians."<sup>1</sup>

Astonishing as this recital is, we cannot doubt that it is literally

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 25. Τὴν μὲν δὴ συμβολὴν οὕτως ἐποίησατο, καὶ οὐκ ἐψεύσθη τῆς ἐλπίδος· κρατήσας γὰρ, ἢ προσέβαλεν, ὅλον ἐποίησε φεύγειν τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ μὴν ἐκεῖνος ἐπεσεν, οἱ λοιποὶ οὐδὲ τῇ νίκῃ ὀρθῶς ἐτι ἐδυνάσθησαν χρῆσασθαι, ἀλλὰ φυγούσης μὲν αὐτοῖς τῆς ἐναντίας φάλαγγος, οὐδένα ἀπέκτειναν οἱ ὀπλίται, οὐδὲ προῆλθον ἐκ τοῦ χωρίου ἐνθα ἡ συμβολὴ ἐγένετο· φυγόντων δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν ἱππέων, ἀπέκτειναν μὲν οὐδὲ οἱ ἱππεῖς διώκοντες οὔτε ἱππίας οὐθ' ἐπλίτας, ὥσπερ δὲ ἡττώμενοι πεφοβημένως διὰ τῶν φυγόντων πολεμίων διέπετον. Καὶ μὴν οἱ ἄμιπποι καὶ οἱ πελτασταί, συννεκτικότες τοῖς ἱππεύσιν, ἀφ' ἑκτοντο μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ὡς κρατοῦντες· ἐκεῖ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ πλείστοι αὐτῶν ἀπέθανον.



MITHRAS KILLS THE BULL.

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true, since it contradicts the sympathies of the reciting witness. Nothing but the pressure of undeniable evidence could have constrained Xenophon to record a scene so painful to him as the Lacedæmonian army beaten, in full flight, and rescued from destruction only by the untimely wound of the Theban general. That Epaminondas would leave no successor either equal or second to himself, now that Pelopidas was no more, — that the army which he commanded should be incapable of executing new movements or of completing an unfinished campaign, — we can readily conceive. But that on the actual battle-field, when the moment of dangerous and doubtful struggle has been already gone through, and when the soldier's blood is up, to reap his reward in pursuit of an enemy whom he sees fleeing before him — that at this crisis of exuberant impatience, when Epaminondas, had he been unwounded, would have found it difficult to restrain his soldiers from excessive forwardness, they should have become at once paralyzed and disarmed on hearing of his fall, — this is what we could not have believed, had we not found it attested by a witness at once contemporary and hostile. So striking a proof has hardly ever been rendered, on the part of soldiers towards their general, of devoted and absorbing sentiment. All the hopes of this army, composed of such diverse elements, were centred in Epaminondas; all their confidence of success, all their security against defeat, were derived from the idea of acting under his orders; all their power, even of striking down a defeated enemy, appeared to vanish when those orders were withdrawn. We are not indeed to speak of such a proceeding with commendation. Thebes and her allied cities had great reason to complain of their soldiers, for a grave dereliction of military duty, and a capital disappointment of well-earned triumph, — whatever may be our feelings about the motive. Assuredly the man who would be most chagrined of all, and whose dying moments must have been embittered if he lived to hear it, — was Epaminondas himself. But when we look at the fact simply as a mark and measure of the ascendancy established by him over the minds of his soldiers, it will be found hardly paralleled in history. I have recounted, a few pages ago, the intense grief displayed by the Thebans and their allies in Thessaly over the dead body of Pelopidas<sup>1</sup> on the

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 33, 34

hill of Kynoskephalæ. But all direct and deliberate testimonies of attachment to a dead or dying chief (and doubtless these too were abundant on the field of Mantinea) fall short of the involuntary suspension of arms in the tempting hour of victory.

That the real victory, the honors of the day, belonged to Epaminondas and the Thebans, we know from the conclusive evidence of Xenophon. But as the vanquished, being allowed to retire unpursued, were only separated by a short distance from the walls of Mantinea, and perhaps rallied even before reaching the town, — as the Athenian cavalry had cut to pieces some of the straggling light troops, — they too pretended to have gained a victory. Trophies were erected on both sides. Nevertheless the Thebans were masters of the field of battle; so that the Lacedæmonians, after some hesitation, were forced to send a herald to solicit truce for the burial of the slain, and to grant for burial such Theban bodies as they had in their possession.<sup>1</sup> This was the understood confession of defeat.

The surgeons, on examining the wound of Epaminondas, with the spear-head yet sticking in it, pronounced that he must die as soon as that was withdrawn. He first inquired whether his shield was safe; and his shield-bearer, answering in the affirmative, produced it before his eyes. He next asked about the issue of the battle, and was informed that his own army was victorious.<sup>2</sup> He then desired to see Iolaidas and Daiphantus, whom he intended to succeed him as commanders; but received the mournful reply, that both of them had been slain.<sup>3</sup> "Then (said he) you must make

<sup>1</sup> The statement of Diodorus (xv, 87) on this point appears to me more probable than that of Xenophon (vii, 5, 26).

The Athenians boasted much of this slight success with their cavalry, enhancing its value by acknowledging that all their allies had been defeated around them (Plutarch, *De Gloria Athen.* p. 350 A.).

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv, 88; Cicero, *De Finibus*, ii, 30, 97; *Epistol. ad Familiares*, v, 12, 5.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, *Apophthegm. Regum*, p. 194 C.; *Ælian*, V. H. xii, 3.

Both Plutarch and Diodorus talk of Epaminondas being carried back to the camp. But it seems that there could hardly have been any camp. Epaminondas had marched out only a few hours before from Tegea. A tent may have been erected on the field to receive him. Five centuries afterwards, the Mantineans showed to the traveller Pausanias a spot called *Skiope* near the field of battle, to which (they affirmed) the wounded Epami-

peace with the enemy." He ordered the spear-head to be withdrawn, when the efflux of blood speedily terminated his life.

Of the three questions here ascribed to the dying chief, the third is the gravest and most significant. The death of these two other citizens, the only men in the camp whom Epaminondas could trust, shows how aggravated and irreparable was the Theban loss, not indeed as to number, but as to quality. Not merely Epaminondas himself, but the only two men qualified in some measure to replace him, perished in the same field; and Pelopidas had fallen in the preceding year. Such accumulation of individual losses must be borne in mind when we come to note the total suspension of Theban glory and dignity, after this dearly bought victory. It affords emphatic evidence of the extreme forwardness with which their leaders exposed themselves, as well as of the gallant resistance which they experienced.

The death of Epaminondas spread rejoicing in the Lacedæmonian camp proportioned to the sorrow of the Theban. To more than one warrior was assigned the honor of having struck the blow. The Mantineans gave it to their citizen Machæriion; the Athenians, to Gryllus son of Xenophon; the Spartans, to their countryman Antikrates.<sup>1</sup> At Sparta, distinguished honor was shown, even in the days of Plutarch, to the posterity of Antikrates, who was believed to have rescued the city from her most formidable enemy. Such tokens afford precious testimony, from witnesses beyond all suspicion, to the memory of Epaminondas.

How the news of his death was received at Thebes, we have no positive account. But there can be no doubt that the sorrow,

Epaminondas had been carried off, in great pain, and with his hand on his wound — from whence he had looked with anxiety on the continuing battle (Pausan. viii, 11, 4).

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, *Agessilaus*, c. 35; Pausanias, i, 3, 3; viii, 9, 2-5; viii, 11, 4; ix, 15, 3.

The reports however which Pausanias gives, and the name of Machæriion which he heard both at Mantinea and at Sparta, are confused, and are hardly to be reconciled with the story of Plutarch.

Moreover, it would seem that the subsequent Athenians did not clearly distinguish between the first battle fought by the Athenian cavalry, immediately after their arrival at Mantinea, when they rescued that town from being surprised by the Thebans and Tnessalians — and the general action which followed a few days afterwards wherein Epaminondas was slain.



so paralysing to the victorious soldiers on the field of Mantinea, was felt with equal acuteness, and with an effect not less depressing, in the senate-house and market-place of Thebes. The city, the citizen-soldiers, and the allies, would be alike impressed with the mournful conviction, that the dying injunction of Epaminondas must be executed. Accordingly, negotiations were opened, and peace was concluded, — probably at once, before the army left Peloponnesus. The Thebans and their Arcadian allies exacted nothing more than the recognition of the *statu quo*; to leave everything exactly as it was, without any change or reactionary measure, yet admitting Megalopolis, with the Pan-Arcadian constitution attached to it, — and admitting also Messênê as an independent city. Against this last article Sparta loudly and peremptorily protested. But not one of her allies sympathized with her feelings. Some, indeed, were decidedly against her; to such a degree, that we find the maintenance of independent Messênê against Sparta ranking shortly afterwards as an admitted principle in Athenian foreign politics.<sup>1</sup> Neither Athenians, nor Eleians, nor Arcadians, desired to see Sparta strengthened. None had any interest in prolonging the war, with prospects doubtful to every one; while all wished to see the large armies now in Arcadia dismissed. Accordingly, the peace was sworn to on these conditions, and the autonomy of Messênê guaranteed, by all, except the Spartans; who alone stood out, keeping themselves without friends or auxiliaries, in the hope for better times, — rather than submit to what they considered as an intolerable degradation.<sup>2</sup>

Under these conditions, the armies on both sides retired. Xenophon is right in saying, that neither party gained anything, either city, territory, or dominion; though before the battle, considering

<sup>1</sup> See the oration of Demosthenes on behalf of the Megalopolitans (Orat. xvi, s. 10, p. 204; s. 21, p. 206).

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 35; Dio. l. xv, 89; Polybius, iv, 33.

Mr Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellen. B. C. 361) assigns the conclusion of peace to the succeeding year. I do not know however what ground there is for assuming such an interval between the battle and the peace. Diodorus appears to place the latter immediately after the former. This would not count for much, indeed, against any considerable counter-probability; but the probability here (in my judgment) is rather in favor of immediate sequence between the two events.

the magnitude of the two contending armies, every one had expected that the victors, whichever they were, would become masters, and the vanquished, subjects. But his assertion, — that "there was more disturbance, and more matter of dispute, in Greece, after the battle than before it," — must be interpreted, partly as the inspiration of a philo-Laconian sentiment, which regards a peace not accepted by Sparta as no peace at all, — partly as based on the circumstance, that no definite headship was recognized as possessed by any state. Sparta had once enjoyed it, and had set the disgraceful example of suing out a confirmation of it from the Persian king at the peace of Antalkidas. Both Thebes and Athens had aspired to the same dignity, and both by the like means, since the battle of Leuktra; neither of them had succeeded. Greece was thus left without a head, and to this extent the affirmation of Xenophon is true. But it would not be correct to suppose that the last expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus, was unproductive of any results, — though it was disappointed of its great and brilliant fruits by his untimely death. Before he marched in, the Theban party in Arcadia, (Tegea, Megalopolis, etc.), was on the point of being crushed by the Mantineans and their allies. His expedition, though ending in an indecisive victory, nevertheless broke up the confederacy enlisted in support of Mantinea; enabling Tegea and Megalopolis to maintain themselves against their Arcadian opponents, and thus leaving the frontier against Sparta unimpaired. While therefore we admit the affirmation of Xenophon, — that Thebes did not gain by the battle either city, or territory, or dominion, — we must at the same time add, that she gained the preservation of her Arcadian allies, and of her anti-Spartan frontier, including Messênê.

This was a gain of considerable importance. But dearly, indeed, was it purchased, by the blood of her first hero, shed on the field of Mantinea; not to mention his two seconds, whom we know only from his verdict, — Daiphantus and Iolaidas.<sup>1</sup> He was buried on the field of battle, and a monumental column was erected on his tomb.

Scarcely any character in Grecian history has been judged with so much unanimity as Epaminondas. He has obtained a meed of admiration, — from all, sincere and hearty, — from some,

<sup>1</sup> Pausanias, viii, 11, 4, 5.



enthusiastic. Cicero pronounces him to be the first man of Greece.<sup>1</sup> The judgment of Polybius, though not summed up so emphatically in a single epithet, is delivered in a manner hardly less significant and laudatory. Nor was it merely historians or critics who formed this judgment. The best men of action, combining the soldier and the patriot, such as Timoleon and Philopœmen,<sup>2</sup> set before them Epaminondas as their model to copy. The remark has been often made, and suggests itself whenever we speak of Epaminondas, though its full force will be felt only when we come to follow the subsequent history, — that with him the dignity and commanding influence of Thebes both began and ended. His period of active political life comprehends sixteen years, from the resurrection of Thebes into a free community, by the expulsion of the Lacedæmonian harmost and garrison, and the subversion of the ruling oligarchy, — to the fatal day of Mantinea (379–362 B. C.). His prominent and unparalleled ascendancy belongs to the last eight years, from the victory of Leuktra (371 B. C.). Throughout this whole period, both all that we know and all that we can reasonably divine, fully bears out the judgment of Polybius and Cicero, who had the means of knowing much more. And this too, — let it be observed, — though Epaminondas is tried by a severe canon: for the chief contemporary witness remaining is one decidedly hostile. Even the philo-Laconian Xenophon finds neither misdeeds nor omissions to reveal in the capital enemy of Sparta, — mentions him only to record what is honorable, — and manifests the perverting bias mainly by suppressing or slurring over his triumphs. The man whose eloquence bearded Agesilaus at the congress immediately preceding the battle of Leuktra,<sup>3</sup> — who in that battle stripped Sparta of her glory, and transferred the wreath to Thebes, — who a few months afterwards, not only ravaged all the virgin territory of Laconia, but cut off the best half of it for the restitution of independent Messênê, and erected the hostile Arcadian community of Megalopolis on its frontier, — the author of these fatal disasters inspires to Xenophon such intolerable

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, *Tusculan.* i, 2, 4; *De Orator.* iii, 34, 139. "Epaminondas, princeps, meo iudicio, Græciæ," etc.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, *Philopœmen*, c. 3; Plutarch, *Timoleon*, c. 36.

<sup>3</sup> See the inscription of four lines copied by Pausanias from the statue of Epaminondas at Thebes (*Paus.* ix, 16, 3): —

Ἡμετέρας βουλὰς Σπάρτῃ κείρατο δόλ' ν. etc.

ble chagrin and antipathy, that in the two first he keeps back the name, and in the third, suppresses the thing done. But in the last campaign, preceding the battle of Mantinea (whereby Sparta incurred no positive loss, and where the death of Epaminondas softened every predisposition against him), there was no such violent pressure upon the fidelity of the historian. Accordingly, the concluding chapter of Xenophon's 'Hellenica' contains a panegyric,<sup>1</sup> ample and unqualified, upon the military merits of the Theban general; upon his daring enterprise, his comprehensive foresight, his care to avoid unnecessary exposure of soldiers, his excellent discipline, his well-combined tactics, his fertility of aggressive resource in striking at the weak points of the enemy, who content themselves with following and parrying his blows (to use a simile of Demosthenes<sup>2</sup>) like an unskilful pugilist, and only succeed in doing so by signal aid from accident. The effort of strategic genius, then for the first time devised and applied, of bringing an irresistible force of attack to bear on one point of the hostile line, while the rest of his army was kept comparatively back until the action had been thus decided, — is clearly noted by Xenophon, together with its triumphant effect, at the battle of Mantinea; though the very same combination on the field of Leuktra is slurred over in his description, as if it were so common-place as not to require any mention of the chief with whom it originated. Compare Epaminondas with Agesilaus, — how great is the superiority of the first, — even in the narrative of Xenophon, the earnest panegyrist of the other! How manifestly are we made to see that nothing except the fatal spear-wound at Mantinea, prevented him from reaping the fruit of a series of admirable arrangements, and from becoming arbiter of Peloponnesus, including Sparta herself!

The military merits alone of Epaminondas, had they merely belonged to a general of mercenaries, combined with nothing praiseworthy in other ways, — would have stamped him as a man of high and original genius, above every other Greek, antecedent or contemporary. But it is the peculiar excellence of this great man that we are not compelled to borrow from one side of his character in order to compensate deficiencies in another.<sup>3</sup> His splendid mili-

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. *Hellen.* vii, 5, 8, 9.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes, *Philipp.* I, p. 51, s. 46.

<sup>3</sup> The remark of Diodorus (xv, 88) upon Epaminondas is more emphatic.



tary capacity was never prostituted to personal ends: neither to avarice, nor ambition, nor overweening vanity. Poor at the beginning of his life, he left at the end of it not enough to pay his funeral expenses; having despised the many opportunities for enrichment which his position afforded, as well as the richest offers from foreigners.<sup>1</sup> Of ambition he had so little, by natural temperament, that his friends accused him of torpor. But as soon as the perilous exposure of Thebes required it, he displayed as much energy in her defence as the most ambitious of her citizens, without any of that captious exigence, frequent in ambitious men, as to the amount of glorification or deference due to him from his countrymen. And his personal vanity was so faintly kindled, even after the prodigious success at Leuktra, that we find him serving in Thessaly as a private hoplite in the ranks, and in the city as an ædile or inferior street-magistrate, under the title of Telearchus. An illustrious specimen of that capacity and good-will, both to command and to be commanded, which Aristotle pronounces to form in their combination the characteristic feature of the worthy citizen.<sup>2</sup> He once incurred the displeasure of his fellow-citizens, for his wise and moderate policy in Achaia, which they were ill-judged enough to reverse. We cannot doubt also that he was frequently attacked by political censors and enemies, — the condition of eminence in every free state; but neither of these causes ruffled the dignified calmness of his political course. As he never courted popularity by unworthy arts, so he bore unpopularity without murmurs, and without angry renunciation of patriotic duty.<sup>3</sup>

than we usually find in him, — Παρὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκάστῳ τῶν ἄλλων ἐν αὐτῷ εὖροι προτέρημα τῆς δόξης, παρὰ δὲ τούτῳ πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς ἡθροισμένος.

<sup>1</sup> Polybius, xxxii, 8, 6. Cornelius Nepos (Epaminondas, c. 4) gives one anecdote, among several which he affirms to have found on record, of large pecuniary presents tendered to, and repudiated by, Epaminondas; an anecdote recounted with so much precision of detail, that it appears to deserve credit, though we cannot assign the exact time when the alleged briber Diomedon of Kyzicus, came to Thebes.

Plutarch (De Genio Socratis, p. 583 F.) relates an incident about Jason of Pheræ tendering money in vain to Epaminondas, which cannot well have happened before the liberation of the Kadmeia (the period to which Plutarch's dialogue assigns it), but may have happened afterwards.

Compare Plutarch, Apophthegm, Reg. p. 193 C.; and Plutarch's Life of Fabius Maximus, c. 27.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotel. Politic. iii, 2, 10

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Compar. Alkibiad. and Coriolanus, c. 4. Ἐπεὶ τό γε μὴ 2c

The mildness of his antipathies against political opponents at home was undeviating; and, what is even more remarkable, amidst the precedence and practice of the Grecian world, his hostility against foreign enemies, Bœotian dissentients, and Theban exiles, was uniformly free from reactionary vengeance. Sufficient proofs have been adduced in the preceding pages of this rare union of attributes in the same individual; of lofty disinterestedness, not merely as to corrupt gains, but as to the more seductive irritabilities of ambition, combined with a just measure of attachment towards partisans, and unparalleled gentleness towards enemies. His friendship with Pelopidas was never disturbed during the fifteen years of their joint political career; an absence of jealousy signal and creditable to both, though most creditable to Pelopidas, the richer, as well as the inferior, man of the two. To both, and to the harmonious coöperation of both, Thebes owed her short-lived splendor and ascendancy. Yet when we compare the one with the other, we not only miss in Pelopidas the transcendent strategic genius and conspicuous eloquence, but even the constant vigilance and prudence, which never deserted his friend. If Pelopidas had had Epaminondas as his companion in Thessaly, he would hardly have trusted himself to the good faith, nor tasted the dungeon, of the Pheræan Alexander; nor would he have rushed forward to certain destruction, in a transport of phrensy, at the view of that hated tyrant in the subsequent battle.

In eloquence, Epaminondas would doubtless have found superiors at Athens; but at Thebes, he had neither equal, nor predecessor, nor successor. Under the new phase into which Thebes passed by the expulsion of the Lacedæmonians out of the Kadmeia, such a gift was second in importance only to the great strategic qualities; while the combination of both elevated their possessor into the envoy, the counsellor, the debater, of his country,<sup>1</sup>

παρῇ μὴδὲ θεραπευτικῶν δόλων εἶναι, καὶ Μέτελλος εἶχε καὶ Ἀριστείδης καὶ Ἐπαμεινώνδας· ἀλλὰ τῷ καταφρονεῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὡν δῆμος ἐστὶ καὶ δοῦνα, καὶ ἀφελίσθαι κύριος, ἐξοστρακίζόμενοι καὶ ἀποχειροτονούμενοι καὶ καταδικαζόμενοι πολλάκις οὐκ ὠργίζοντο τοῖς πολίταις ἀγνωσκουῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἡγάπων σὺνθις μεταμελομένους καὶ διηλλάττοντο παρακαλοῦντάς τε.

<sup>1</sup> See an anecdote about Epaminondas as the diplomatist and negotiator on behalf of Thebes against Athens — δικαιολογούμενος, etc. Athenæus, xiv, p. 650 E.



as well as her minister at war and commander-in-chief. The shame of acknowledging Thebes as leading state in Greece, embodied in the current phrases about Boeotian stupidity, would be sensibly mitigated, when her representative in an assembled congress spoke with the flowing abundance of the Homeric Odysseus, instead of the loud, brief, and hurried bluster of Menelaus.<sup>1</sup> The possession of such eloquence, amidst the uninspiring atmosphere of Thebes, implied far greater mental force than a similar accomplishment would have betokened at Athens. In Epaminondas, it was steadily associated with thought and action, — that triple combination of thinking, speaking, and acting, which Isokrates and other Athenian sophists<sup>2</sup> set before their hearers as the stock and qualification for meritorious civic life. To the bodily training and soldier-like practice, common to all Thebans, Epaminondas added an ardent intellectual impulse and a range of discussion with the philosophical men around, peculiar to himself. He was not floated into public life by the accident of birth or wealth, — nor hoisted and propped up by oligarchical clubs, — nor even determined to it originally by any spontaneous ambition of his own. But the great revolution of 379 B. C., which expelled from Thebes both the Lacedæmonian garrison and the local oligarchy who ruled by its aid, forced him forward by the strongest obligations both of duty and interest; since nothing but an energetic defence could rescue both him and every other free Theban from slavery. It was by the like necessity that the American revolution, and the first French revolution, thrust into the front rank the most instructed and capable men of the country, whether ambitious by temperament or not. As the pressure of the time impelled Epaminondas forward, so it also disposed his countrymen to look out for a competent leader wherever he was to be found; and in

<sup>1</sup> Homer, *Iliad*, iii, 210–220 (Menelaus and Odysseus) —

‘Αλλ’ ὅτε δὴ Τρώεσσιν ἀγειρομένοισιν ἐμύθεν,

ἦτοι μὲν Μενέλαος ἐπιτροχάδην ἀγόρευε,

Παῦρα μὲν, ἀλλὰ μάλα λιγέως· ἐπεὶ οὐ πολὺμνθος, etc.

... ‘Αλλ’ ὅτε δὴ ῥ’ ὅπα τε μεγάλην ἐκ στήθεος ἔει (Odysseus),

Καὶ ἔπεια νηάδεσσιν ἐοικότα χειμερίσιν,

Οὐκέτ’ ἐπειτ’ Ὀδυσῆϊ γ’ ἐρίσσειε βροτὸς ἕλλος, etc.

See Vol. VIII. of this History, Ch. ixvii, p. 357–297 — φρονεῖν, λέγειν καὶ πράττειν etc.

no other living man could they obtain the same union of the soldier, the general, the orator, and the patriot. Looking through all Grecian history, it is only in Perikles that we find the like many-sided excellence; for though much inferior to Epaminondas as a general, Perikles must be held superior to him as a statesman. But it is alike true of both, — and the remark tends much to illustrate the sources of Grecian excellence, — that neither sprang exclusively from the school of practice and experience. They both brought to that school minds exercised in the conversation of the most instructed philosophers and sophists accessible to them, — trained to varied intellectual combinations and to a larger range of subjects than those that came before the public assembly, — familiarized with reasonings which the scrupulous piety of Nikias forswore, and which the devoted military patriotism of Pelopidas disdained.

On one point, as I have already noticed, the policy recommended by Epaminondas to his countrymen appears of questionable wisdom, — his advice to compete with Athens for transmarine and naval power. One cannot recognize in this advice the same accurate estimate of permanent causes, — the same long-sighted view, of the conditions of strength to Thebes and of weakness to her enemies, which dictated the foundation of Messênê and Megalopolis. These two towns, when once founded, took such firm root, that Sparta could not persuade even her own allies to aid in effacing them; a clear proof of the sound reasoning on which their founder had proceeded. What Epaminondas would have done, — whether he would have followed out maxims equally prudent and penetrating, — if he had survived the victory of Mantinea, — is a point which we cannot pretend to divine. He would have found himself then on a pinnacle of glory, and invested with a plenitude of power, such as no Greek ever held without abusing. But all that we know of Epaminondas justifies the conjecture that he would have been found equal, more than any other Greek, even to this great trial; and that his untimely death shut him out from a future not less honorable to himself, than beneficial to Thebes and to Greece generally.

Of the private life and habits of Epaminondas we know scarcely anything. We are told that he never married; and we find brief allusions, without any details, to attachments in which he is said



to have indulged.<sup>1</sup> Among the countrymen of Pindar,<sup>2</sup> devoted attachment between mature men and beautiful youths was more frequent than in other parts of Greece. It was confirmed by interchange of mutual oaths at the tomb of Iolaus, and was reckoned upon as the firmest tie of military fidelity in the hour of battle. Asopichus and Kaphisodorus are named as youths to whom Epaminondas was much devoted. The first fought with desperate bravery at the battle of Leuktra, and after the victory caused an image of the Leuktrian trophy to be carved on his shield, which he dedicated at Delphi;<sup>3</sup> the second perished along with his illustrious friend and chief on the field of Mantinea, and was buried in a grave closely adjacent to him.<sup>4</sup>

It rather appears that the Spartans, deeply incensed against their allies for having abandoned them in reference to Messênê, began to turn their attention away from the affairs of Greece to those of Asia and Egypt. But the dissensions in Arcadia were not wholly appeased even by the recent peace. The city of Megalopolis had been founded only eight years before by the coalescence of many smaller townships, all previously enjoying a separate autonomy more or less perfect. The vehement anti-Spartan impulse, which marked the two years immediately succeeding the battle of Leuktra, had overruled to so great a degree the prior instincts of these townships, that they had lent themselves to the plans of Lykomedes and Epaminondas for an enlarged community in the new city. But since that period, reaction had taken place. The Mantineans had come to be at the head of an anti-Megalopolitan party in Arcadia; and several of the communities which had been merged in Megalopolis, counting upon aid from them and from the Eleians, insisted on seceding, and returning to

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 192 E. Athenæ. xiii, p. 590 C.

<sup>2</sup> Hieronymus ap. Athenæ. xiii, p. 602 A.; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 18; Xen. Rep. Lacedæmon. ii, 12.

See the striking and impassioned fragment of Pindar, addressed by him when old to the youth Theoxenus of Tenedos, Fragm. 2 of the Skolia, in Dissen's edition, and Boeckh's edition of Pindar, vol. iii, p. 611, ap. Athenæum, xiii, p. 605 C.

<sup>3</sup> See Theopompus, Frag. 182, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæ. xiii, p. 605 A.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, Pelopid. *ut sup.*; Plutarch, Amatorius, p. 761 D.; compare Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 8, 39.

their original autonomy. But for foreign aid, Megalopolis would now have been in great difficulty. A pressing request was sent to the Thebans, who despatched into Arcadia three thousand hoplites under Pammenes. This force enabled the Megalopolitans, though not without measures of considerable rigor, to uphold the integrity of their city, and keep the refractory members in communion.<sup>1</sup> And it appears that the interference thus obtained was

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv, 94.

I venture here to depart from Diodorus, who states that these three thousand men were Athenians, not Thebans; that the Megalopolitans sent to ask aid from Athens, and that the Athenians sent these three thousand men under Pammenes.

That Diodorus (or the copyist) has here mistaken Thebans for Athenians, appears to me, on the following grounds:—

1. Whoever reads attentively the oration delivered by Demosthenes in the Athenian assembly (about ten years after this period) respecting the propriety of sending an armed force to defend Megalopolis against the threats of Sparta—will see, I think, that Athens can never before have sent any military assistance to Megalopolis. Both the arguments which Demosthenes urges, and those which he combats as having been urged by opponents, exclude the reality of any such previous proceeding.

2. Even at the time when the above-mentioned oration was delivered, the Megalopolitans were still (compare Diodorus, xvi, 39) under special alliance with, and guardianship of, Thebes—though the latter had then been so much weakened by the Sacred War and other causes, that it seemed doubtful whether she could give them complete protection against Sparta. But in the year next after the battle of Mantinea, the alliance between Megalopolis and Thebes, as well as the hostility between Megalopolis and Athens, was still fresher and more intimate. The Thebans (then in unimpaired power), who had fought for them in the preceding year,—not the Athenians, who had fought against them,—would be the persons invoked for aid to Megalopolis; nor had any positive reverses as yet occurred to disable the Thebans from furnishing aid.

3. Lastly, Pammenes is a Theban general, friend of Epaminondas. He is mentioned as such not only by Diodorus himself in another place (xvi, 34), but also by Pausanias (viii, 27, 2), as the general who had been sent to watch over the building of Megalopolis, by Plutarch (Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 26; Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p. 805 F.), and by Polyænus (v, 16, 3). We find a private Athenian citizen named Pammenes, a goldsmith, mentioned in the oration of Demosthenes against Meidias (s. 31. p. 521); but no Athenian officer or public man of that time so named.

Upon these grounds, I cannot but feel convinced that Pammenes and his troops were Thebans, and not Athenians.

I am happy to find myself in concurrence with Dr. Thirlwall on this point (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. xliii, p. 368 note).



permanently efficacious, so that the integrity of this recent Pan-Arcadian community was no farther disturbed.

The old king Agesilaus was compelled, at the age of eighty, to see the dominion of Sparta thus irrevocably narrowed, her influence in Arcadia overthrown, and the loss of Messênê formally sanctioned even by her own allies. All his protests, and those of his son Archidamus, so strenuously set forth by Isokrates, had only ended by isolating Sparta more than ever from Grecian support and sympathy. Archidamus probably never seriously attempted to execute the desperate scheme which he had held out as a threat some two or three years before the battle of Mantinea; that the Lacedæmonians would send away their wives and families, and convert their military population into a perpetual camp, never to lay down arms until they should have reconquered Messênê or perished in the attempt.<sup>1</sup> Yet he and his father, though deserted by all Grecian allies, had not yet abandoned the hope that they might obtain aid, in the shape of money for levying mercenary troops, from the native princes in Egypt and the revolted Persian satraps in Asia, with whom they seem to have been for some time in a sort of correspondence.<sup>2</sup>

About the time of the battle of Mantinea,—and as it would seem, for some years before,—a large portion of the western dominions of the Great King were in a state partly of revolt, partly of dubious obedience. Egypt had been for some years in actual revolt, and under native princes, whom the Persians had vainly endeavored to subdue (employing for that purpose the aid of the Athenian generals Iphikrates and Timotheus) both in 374 and 371 B. C. Ariobarzanes, satrap of the region near the Propontis and the Hellespont, appears to have revolted about the year 367–366 B. C. In other parts of Asia Minor, too,—Paphlagonia, Pisidia, etc,—the subordinate princes or governors became disaffected to Artaxerxes. But their disaffection was for a certain time kept down by the extraordinary ability and vigor of a Karian named Datames, commander for the king in a part of Kappadokia, who gained several important victories over them, by rapidity of movement and well-combined stratagem. At length the services of Datames became so distinguished as to

<sup>1</sup> See Isokrates, Orat. vi, (Archidamus) s. 85–93.

<sup>2</sup> Isokrates (Or. vi, (Archid.) s. 73.

excite the jealousy of many of the Persian grandees; who poisoned the royal mind against him, and thus drove him to raise the standard of revolt in his own district of Kappadokia, under alliance and concert with Ariobarzanes. It was in vain that Autophradates, satrap of Lydia, was sent by Artaxerxes with a powerful force to subdue Datames. The latter resisted all the open force of Persia, and was at length overcome only by the treacherous conspiracy of Mithridates (son of Ariobarzanes), who, corrupted by the Persian court and becoming a traitor both to his father Ariobarzanes and to Datames, simulated zealous coöperation, tempted the latter to a confidential interview, and there assassinated him.<sup>1</sup>

Still, however, there remained powerful princes and satraps in Asia Minor, disaffected to the court; Mausôlus, prince of Karia; Orontes, satrap of Mysia, and Autophradates, satrap of Lydia,—the last having now apparently joined the revolters, though he had before been active in upholding the authority of the king. It seems too that the revolt extended to Syria and Phœnicia, so that all the western coast with its large revenues, as well as Egypt, was at once subtracted from the empire. Tachos, native king of Egypt, was prepared to lend assistance to this formidable combination of disaffected commanders, who selected Orontes as their chief; confiding to him their united forces, and sending Rheomithres to Egypt to procure pecuniary aid. But the Persian court broke the force of this combination by corrupting both Orontes and Rheomithres, who betrayed their confederates, and caused the enterprise to fail. Of the particulars we know little or nothing.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cornelius Nepos has given a biography of Datames at some length, recounting his military exploits and stratagems. He places Datames, in point of military talent, above all *barbari*, except Hamilcar Barca and Hannibal (c. 1). Polyænus also (vii, 29) recounts several memorable proceedings of the same chief. Compare too Diodorus, xv, 91; and Xen. Cyropæd., viii, 8, 4.

We cannot make out with any certainty either the history, or the chronology, of Datames. His exploits seem to belong to the last ten years of Artaxerxes Mnemon, and his death seems to have taken place a little before the death of that prince; which last event is to be assigned to 359–358 B. C. See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fast. Hell. ch. 18. p. 316, Appendix.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv, 91, 92; Xenophon, Cyropæd. viii, 8, 4.

Our information about these disturbances in the interior of the Persian



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<sup>1</sup> See Isokrates, Orat. vi, (Archidamus) s. 85–93.

<sup>2</sup> Isokrates (Or. vi, (Archid.) s. 73.

excite the jealousy of many of the Persian grandees; who poisoned the royal mind against him, and thus drove him to raise the standard of revolt in his own district of Kappadokia, under alliance and concert with Ariobarzanes. It was in vain that Autophradates, satrap of Lydia, was sent by Artaxerxes with a powerful force to subdue Datames. The latter resisted all the open force of Persia, and was at length overcome only by the treacherous conspiracy of Mithridates (son of Ariobarzanes), who, corrupted by the Persian court and becoming a traitor both to his father Ariobarzanes and to Datames, simulated zealous coöperation, tempted the latter to a confidential interview, and there assassinated him.<sup>1</sup>

Still, however, there remained powerful princes and satraps in Asia Minor, disaffected to the court; Mausôlus, prince of Karia; Orontes, satrap of Mysia, and Autophradates, satrap of Lydia,—the last having now apparently joined the revolters, though he had before been active in upholding the authority of the king. It seems too that the revolt extended to Syria and Phœnicia, so that all the western coast with its large revenues, as well as Egypt, was at once subtracted from the empire. Tachos, native king of Egypt, was prepared to lend assistance to this formidable combination of disaffected commanders, who selected Orontes as their chief; confiding to him their united forces, and sending Rheomithres to Egypt to procure pecuniary aid. But the Persian court broke the force of this combination by corrupting both Orontes and Rheomithres, who betrayed their confederates, and caused the enterprise to fail. Of the particulars we know little or nothing.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cornelius Nepos has given a biography of Datames at some length, recounting his military exploits and stratagems. He places Datames, in point of military talent, above all *barbari*, except Hamilcar Barca and Hannibal (c. 1). Polyænus also (vii, 29) recounts several memorable proceedings of the same chief. Compare too Diodorus, xv, 91; and Xen. Cyropæd., viii, 8, 4.

We cannot make out with any certainty either the history, or the chronology, of Datames. His exploits seem to belong to the last ten years of Artaxerxes Mnemon, and his death seems to have taken place a little before the death of that prince; which last event is to be assigned to 359–358 B. C. See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fast. Hell. ch. 18. p. 316, Appendix.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv, 91, 92; Xenophon, Cyropæd. viii, 8, 4.

Our information about these disturbances in the interior of the Persian



Both the Spartan king Agesilaus, with a thousand Lacedæmonian or Peloponnesian hoplites,—and the Athenian general Chabrias, were invited to Egypt to command the forces of Tachos; the former on land, the latter at sea. Chabrias came simply as a volunteer, without any public sanction or order from Athens. But the service of Agesilaus was undertaken for the purposes and with the consent of the authorities at home, attested by the presence of thirty Spartans who came out as his counsellors. The Spartans were displeased with the Persian king for having sanctioned the independence of Messênê; and as the prospect of overthrowing or enfeebling his empire appeared at this moment considerable, they calculated on reaping a large reward for their services to the Egyptian prince, who would in return lend them assistance towards their views in Greece. But dissension and bad judgment marred all the combinations against the Persian king. Agesilaus, on reaching Egypt,<sup>1</sup> was received with little respect. The Egyptians saw with astonishment, that one, whom they had invited as a formidable warrior, was a little deformed old man, of mean attire, and sitting on the grass with his troops, careless of show or luxury. They not only vented their disappointment in sarcastic remarks, but also declined to invest him with the supreme command, as he had anticipated. He was only recognized as general of the mercenary land force, while Tachos himself commanded in chief, and Chabrias was at the head of the fleet. Great efforts were made to assemble a force competent to act against the Great King; and Chabrias is said to have suggested various stratagems for obtaining money from the Egyptians.<sup>2</sup> The army having been thus strengthened, Agesilaus, though discontented and indignant, nevertheless accompanied Tachos on an expedition against the Persian forces in Phœnicia; from whence they were forced to return by the revolt of Nektanebis, cousin of Tachos, who caused himself

empire is so scanty and confused, that few of the facts can be said to be certainly known. Diodorus has evidently introduced into the year 362–361 B. C. a series of events, many of them belonging to years before and after Rehdantz (Vit. Iphicrat. Chabr. et. Timoth. p. 154–161) brings together all the statements; but unfortunately with little result.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 36; Athenæus, xiv, p. 616 D.; Cornelius Nepos, Agesil. c. 8.

<sup>2</sup> See Pseudo-Aristotel. *CEconomic.* ii, 25.

to be proclaimed king of Egypt. Tachos was now full of supplications to Agesilaus to sustain him against his competitor for the Egyptian throne; while Nektanebis, also on his side, began to bid high for the favor of the Spartans. With the sanction of the authorities at home, but in spite of the opposition of Chabrias, Agesilaus decided in favor of Nektanebis, withdrawing the mercenaries from the camp of Tachos,<sup>1</sup> who was accordingly obliged to take flight. Chabrias returned home to Athens; either not choosing to abandon Tachos, whom he had come to serve,—or recalled by special order of his countrymen, in consequence of the remonstrance of the Persian king. A competitor for the throne presently arose in the Mendesian division of Egypt. Agesilaus, vigorously maintaining the cause of Nektanebis, defeated all the efforts of his opponent. Yet his great schemes against the Persian empire were abandoned, and nothing was effected as the result of his Egyptian expedition except the establishment of Nektanebis; who, having in vain tried to prevail upon him to stay longer, dismissed him in the winter season with large presents, and with a public donation to Sparta of two hundred and thirty talents. Agesilaus marched from the Nile towards Kyrênê, in order to obtain from that town and its ports ships for the passage home. But he died on the march, without reaching Kyrênê. His body was conveyed home by his troops, for burial, in a preparation of wax, since honey was not to be obtained.<sup>2</sup>

Thus expired, at an age somewhat above eighty, the ablest and most energetic of the Spartan kings. He has enjoyed the advantage, denied to every other eminent Grecian leader, that his character and exploits have been set out in the most favorable point of view by a friend and companion,—Xenophon. Making every allowance for partiality in this picture, there will still remain a really great and distinguished character. We find the virtues of

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus (xv, 93) differs from Plutarch and others (whom I follow) in respect to the relations of Tachos and Nektanebis with Agesilaus; affirming that Agesilaus supported Tachos, and supported him with success against Nektanebis.

Compare Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c. 2, 3.

We find Chabrias serving Athens in the Chersonese—in 359–358 B. C. (Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 204).

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv, 93; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 38–40; Cornelius Nepos, Agesil. 8.



a soldier, and the abilities of a commander, combined with strenuous personal will and decision, in such measure as to ensure for Agesilaus constant ascendancy over the minds of others far beyond what was naturally incident to his station; and that, too, in spite of conspicuous bodily deformity, amidst a nation eminently sensitive on that point. Of the merits which Xenophon ascribes to him, some are the fair results of a Spartan education;—his courage, simplicity of life, and indifference to indulgences,—his cheerful endurance of hardship under every form. But his fidelity to engagements, his uniform superiority to pecuniary corruption, and those winning and hearty manners which attached to him all around—were virtues not Spartan but personal to himself. We find in him, however, more analogy to Lysander—a man equally above reproach on the score of pecuniary gain—than to Brasidas or Kallikratidas. Agesilaus succeeded to the throne, with a disputed title, under the auspices and through the intrigues of Lysander; whose influence, at that time predominant both at Sparta and in Greece, had planted everywhere dekharchies and harmosts as instruments of ascendancy for imperial Sparta—and under the name of Sparta, for himself. Agesilaus, too high-spirited to comport himself as second to any one, speedily broke through so much of the system as had been constructed to promote the personal dominion of Lysander; yet without following out the same selfish aspirations, or seeking to build up the like individual dictatorship, on his own account. His ambition was indeed unbounded, but it was for Sparta in the first place, and for himself only in the second. The misfortune was, that in his measures for upholding and administering the imperial authority of Sparta, he still continued that mixture of domestic and foreign coercion (represented by the dekharchy and the harmost) which had been introduced by Lysander; a sad contrast with the dignified equality, and emphatic repudiation of partisan interference, proclaimed by Brasidas, as the watchword of Sparta, at Akanthus and Torônê—and with the still nobler Pan-hellenic aims of Kallikratidas.

The most glorious portion of the life of Agesilaus was that spent in his three Asiatic campaigns, when acting under the miso-Persian impulse for which his panegyrist gives him so much credit.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Encom. Ages. vii. 7. *Εἰ δ' αὖ καλὸν καὶ μισοπέρσιν εἶναι, etc.*

He was here employed in a Pan-hellenic purpose, to protect the Asiatic Greeks against that subjection to Persia which Sparta herself had imposed upon them a few years before, as the price of Persian aid against Athens.

The Persians presently succeeded in applying the lessons of Sparta against herself, and in finding Grecian allies to make war upon her near home. Here was an end of the Pan-hellenic sentiment, and of the truly honorable ambition, in the bosom of Agesilaus. He was recalled to make war nearer home. His obedience to the order of recall is greatly praised by Plutarch and Xenophon—in my judgment, with little reason, since he had no choice but to come back. But he came back an altered man. His miso-Persian feeling had disappeared, and had been exchanged for a miso-Theban sentiment which gradually acquired the force of a passion. As principal conductor of the war between 394–387 B. C., he displayed that vigor and ability which never forsook him in military operations. But when he found that the empire of Sparta near home could not be enforced except by making her the ally of Persia and the executor of a Persian rescript, he was content to purchase such aid, in itself dishonorable, by the still greater dishonor of sacrificing the Asiatic Greeks. For the time, his policy seemed to succeed. From 387–379 B. C. (that is, down to the time of the revolution at Thebes, effected by Pelopidas and his small band), the ascendancy of Sparta on land, in Central Greece, was continually rising. But her injustice and oppression stand confessed even by her panegyrist Xenophon; and this is just the period when the influence of Agesilaus was at its maximum. Afterwards we find him personally forward in sheltering Sphodrias from punishment, and thus bringing upon his countrymen a war with Athens as well as with Thebes. In the conduct of that war his military operations were, as usual, strenuous and able, with a certain measure of success. But on the whole, the war turns out unfavorably for Sparta. In 371 B. C., she is obliged to accept peace on terms very humiliating, as compared with her position in 387 B. C.; and the only compensation which she receives, is, the opportunity of striking the Thebans out of the treaty, thus leaving them to contend single-handed against what seemed overwhelming odds. Of this intense miso-Theban impulse, which so speedily brought about the unexpected and crushing disaster at Leuktra, Agesilaus stands



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out as the prominent spokesman. In the days of Spartan misfortune which followed, we find his conduct creditable and energetic, so far as the defensive position, in which Sparta then found herself, allowed; and though Plutarch seems displeased with him for obstinacy in refusing to acknowledge the autonomy of Messênê (at the peace concluded after the battle of Mantinea), when acknowledged by all the other Greeks, — yet it cannot be shown that this refusal brought any actual mischief to Sparta; and circumstances might well have so turned out, that it would have been a gain.

On the whole, in spite of the many military and personal merits of Agesilaus, as an adviser and politician he deserves little esteem. We are compelled to remark the melancholy contrast between the state in which he found Sparta at his accession, and that wherein he left her at his death — “*Marmoream invenit, lateritiam reliquit.*” Nothing but the death of Epaminondas at Mantinea saved her from something yet worse; though it would be unfair to Agesilaus, while we are considering the misfortunes of Sparta during his reign, not to recollect that Epaminondas was an enemy more formidable than she had ever before encountered.

The efficient service rendered by Agesilaus during his last expedition to Egypt, had the effect of establishing firmly the dominion of Nektanebis the native king, and of protecting that country for the time from being re-conquered by the Persians; an event that did not happen until a few years afterwards, during the reign of the next Persian king. Of the extensive revolt, however, which at one time threatened to wrest from the Persian crown Asia Minor as well as Egypt, no permanent consequence remained. The treachery of Orontes and Rheomithres so completely broke up the schemes of the revolt, that Artaxerxes Mnemon still maintained the Persian empire (with the exception of Egypt), unimpaired.

He died not long after the suppression of the revolt (apparently about a year after it, in 359–358 B. C.), having reigned forty-five or forty-six years.<sup>2</sup> His death was preceded by one of those

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 35.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv, 93.

There is a difference between Diodorus and the Astronomical Canon, in the statements about the length of reign, and date of death, of Artaxerxes Mnemon, of about two years — 361 or 359 B. C. See Mr. Clinton's *Fast*.

bloody tragedies which so frequently stained the transmission of a Persian sceptre. Darius, the eldest son of Artaxerxes, had been declared by his father successor to the throne. According to Persian custom, the successor thus declared was entitled to prefer any petition which he pleased; the monarch being held bound to grant it. Darius availed himself of the privilege to ask for one of the favorite inmates of his father's harem, for whom he had contracted a passion. The request so displeased Artaxerxes, that he seemed likely to make a new appointment as to the succession; discarding Darius and preferring his younger son Ochus, whose interests were warmly espoused by Atossa, wife as well as daughter of the monarch. Alarmed at this prospect, Darius was persuaded by a discontented courtier, named Teribazus, to lay a plot for assassinating Artaxerxes; but the plot was betrayed, and the king caused both Darius and Teribazus to be put to death. By this catastrophe the chance of Ochus was improved, and his ambition yet farther stimulated. But there still remained two princes, older than he — Arsamés and Ariaspes. Both these brothers he contrived to put out of the way; the one by a treacherous deceit, entrapping him to take poison, — the other by assassination. Ochus thus stood next as successor to the crown, which was not long denied to him, — for Artaxerxes, now very old and already struck down by the fatal consummation respecting his eldest son, Darius, did not survive the additional sorrow of seeing his two other sons die so speedily.

Hellenici, Appendix, ch. 18. p. 316 — where the statements are brought together and discussed. Plutarch states the reign of Artaxerxes Mnemon to have lasted sixty-two years (Plutarch, Artax. c. 33); which cannot be correct, though in what manner the error is to be amended, we cannot determine.

An Inscription of Mylasa in Karia recognizes the forty-fifth year of the reign of Artaxerxes, and thus supports the statement in the Astronomical Canon, which assigns to him forty-six years of reign. See Boeckh, Corp. Inscr. No. 2691, with his comments, p. 470.

This same inscription affords ground of inference respecting the duration of the revolt; for it shows that the Karian Mausolus recognized himself as satrap, and Artaxerxes as his sovereign, in the year beginning November 359 B. C., which corresponds with the forty-fifth year of Artaxerxes Mnemon. The revolt therefore must have been suppressed before that period. See Sievers, *Geschichte von Griechenland bis zur Schlacht von Mantinea*, p. 373, note.



afterwards.<sup>1</sup> He expired, and his son Ochus, taking the name of Artaxerxes, succeeded to him without opposition; manifesting as king the same sanguinary dispositions as those by which he had placed himself on the throne.

During the two years following the battle of Mantinea, Athens, though relieved by the general peace from land-war, appears to have been entangled in serious maritime contests and difficulties. She had been considerably embarrassed by two events; by the Theban naval armament under Epaminondas, and by the submission of Alexander of Phæræ to Thebes, — both events belonging to 364–363 B. C. It was in 363–362 B. C. that the Athenian Timotheus, — having carried on war with eminent success against Olynthus and the neighboring cities in the Thermaic Gulf, but with very bad success against Amphipolis, — transferred his forces to the war against Kotys king of Thrace near the Thracian Chersonese. The arrival of the Theban fleet in the Hellespont greatly distracted the Athenian general, and served as a powerful assistance to Kotys; who was moreover aided by the Athenian gen-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 29, 30; Justin, x, 1–3.

Plutarch states that the lady whom the prince Darius asked for, was, Aspasia of Phokææ — the Greek mistress of Cyrus the younger, who had fallen into the hands of Artaxerxes after the battle of Kunaxa, and had acquired a high place in the monarch's affections.

But if we look at the chronology of the case, it will appear hardly possible that the lady who inspired so strong a passion to Darius, in or about 361 B. C., as to induce him to risk the displeasure of his father — and so decided a reluctance on the part of Artaxerxes to give her up — can have been the person who accompanied Cyrus to Kunaxa *forty years* before; for the battle of Kunaxa was fought in 401 B. C. The chronological improbability would be still greater, if we adopted Plutarch's statement that Artaxerxes reigned sixty-two years; for it is certain that the battle of Kunaxa occurred very near the beginning of his reign, and the death of his son Darius near the end of it.

Justin states the circumstances which preceded the death of Artaxerxes Mnemon in a manner yet more tragical. He affirms that the plot against the life of Artaxerxes was concerted by Darius in conjunction with several of his brothers; and that, on the plot being discovered, all these brothers, together with their wives and children, were put to death. Ochus, on coming to the throne, put to death a great number of his kinsmen and of the principal persons about the court, together with their wives and children — fearing a like conspiracy against himself.

eral Iphikrates, on this occasion serving his father-in-law against his country.<sup>1</sup> Timotheus is said to have carried on war against Kotys with advantage, and to have acquired for Athens a large plunder.<sup>2</sup> It would appear that his operations were of an aggressive character, and that during his command in those regions the Athenian possessions in the Chersonese were safe from Kotys; for Iphikrates would only lend his aid to Kotys towards defensive warfare; retiring from his service when he began to attack the Athenian possessions in the Chersonese.<sup>3</sup>

We do not know what circumstances brought about the dismissal or retirement of Timotheus from the command. But in the next year, we find Ergophilus as Athenian commander in the Chersonese, and Kallisthenes (seemingly) as Athenian commander against Amphipolis.<sup>4</sup> The transmarine affairs of Athens, however, were far from improving. Besides that under the new general she seems to have been losing strength near the Chersonese, she had now upon her hands a new maritime enemy — Alexander of Phæræ. A short time previously, he had been her ally against Thebes; but the victories of the Thebans during the preceding year had so completely humbled him, that he now identified his cause with theirs; sending troops to join the expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus,<sup>5</sup> and equipping a fleet to attack the maritime allies of Athens. His fleet captured the island of Tenos, ravaged several of the other Cyclades, and laid siege to Peparethos. Great alarm prevailed in Athens, and about the end of August (362 B. C.),<sup>6</sup> two months after the battle of Mantinea,

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 153.

<sup>2</sup> The affirmation of Cornelius Nepos (Timotheus, c. 1), that Timotheus made war on Kotys with such success as to bring into the Athenian treasury twelve hundred talents, appears extravagant as to amount; even if we accept it as generally true.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 155.

<sup>4</sup> See Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, p. 151, and the preceding page.

M. Rehdantz has put together, with great care and sagacity, all the fragments of evidence respecting this obscure period; and has elicited, as it seems to me, the most probable conclusions deducible from such scanty premises.

<sup>5</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 5, 4.

<sup>6</sup> We are fortunate enough to get this date exactly, — the twenty third



a fleet was equipped with the utmost activity, for the purpose of defending the insular allies, as well as of acting in the Hellespont. Vigorous efforts were required from all the trierarchs, and really exerted by some, to accelerate the departure of this fleet. But that portion of it, which, while the rest went to the Hellespont, was sent under Leosthenes to defend Peparethos,—met with a defeat from the ships of Alexander, with the loss of five triremes and six hundred prisoners.<sup>1</sup> We are even told that soon after this naval advantage, the victors were bold enough to make a dash into the Peiræus itself (as Teleutias had done twenty-seven years before), where they seized both property on shipboard and men on the quay, before there was any force ready to repel them.<sup>2</sup> The Thessalian marauders were ultimately driven back to their harbor of Pegasæ; yet not without much annoyance to the insular confederates, and some disgrace to Athens. The defeated admiral Leosthenes was condemned to death; while several trierarchs,—who, instead of serving in person, had performed the duties incumbent on them by deputy and by contract, were censured or put upon trial.<sup>3</sup>

Not only had the affairs of Athens in the Hellespont become worse under Ergophilus than under Timotheus, but Kallisthenes also, who had succeeded Timotheus in the operations against Amphipolis, achieved no permanent result. It would appear that the Amphipolitans, to defend themselves against Athens, had invoked the aid of the Macedonian king Perdikkas; and placed their city in his hands. That prince had before acted in conjunction with the Athenian force under Timotheus against Olynthus; and their

of the month Metageitnion, in the archonship of Molon,—mentioned by Demosthenes *adv. Polyklem*, p. 1207, s. 5, 6.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi, 95; Polyænus, vi, 2, 1.

<sup>2</sup> Polyænus, vi, 2, 2.

It must have been about this time (362–361 B. C.) that Alexander of Phœre sent envoys into Asia to engage the service of Charidemus and his mercenary band, then in or near the troad. His application was not accepted (*Demosth. cont. Aristokrat.* p. 675, s. 192).

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenes, *de Coronâ Trierarch.* p. 1230, s. 9.

Diodorus farther states that the Athenians place Chares in command of a fleet for the protection of the Ægean; but that this admiral took himself off to Korkyra, and did nothing but plunder the allies (*Diodor.* xvi 95).

joint invasion had so much weakened the Olynthians as to disable them from affording aid to Amphipolis. At least, this hypothesis explains how Amphipolis came now, for the first time, to be no longer a free city; but to be disjoined from Olynthus, and joined with (probably garrisoned by) Perdikkas, as a possession of Macedonia.<sup>1</sup> Kallisthenes thus found himself at war under greater disadvantages than Timotheus; having Perdikkas as his enemy, together with Amphipolis. Nevertheless, it would appear, he gained at first great advantages, and reduced Perdikkas to the necessity of purchasing a truce by the promise to abandon the Amphipolitans. The Macedonian prince, however, having gained time during the truce to recover his strength, no longer thought of performing his promise, but held Amphipolis against the Athenians as obstinately as before. Kallisthenes had let slip an opportunity which never again returned. After having announced at Athens the victorious truce and the approaching surrender, he seems to have been compelled, on his return, to admit that he had been cheated into suspending operations, at a moment when (as it seemed) Amphipolis might have been conquered. For this misjudgment or misconduct he was put upon trial at Athens, on returning to his disappointed countrymen; and at the same time Ergophilus also, who had been summoned home from the Chersonesus for his ill-success or bad management of the war against Kotys.<sup>2</sup> The people were much incensed against both; but most against Ergophilus. Nevertheless it happened that Kallisthenes was tried first, and condemned to death. On the next day, Ergophilus was tried. But the verdict of the preceding day had discharged the wrath of the dikasts, and rendered them so much more indulgent, that they acquitted him.<sup>3</sup>

Autokles was sent in place of Ergophilus to carry on war for Athens in the Hellespont and Bosphorus. It was not merely against Kotys that his operations were necessary. The Prokon-

<sup>1</sup> Compare Demosthen. *cont. Aristokrat.* p. 669, s. 174–176, and *Æschines*, *Fals. Leg.* p. 250, c. 14.

<sup>2</sup> The facts as stated in the text are the most probable result, as it seems to me, derivable from *Æschines*, *Fals. Leg.* p. 250, c. 14.

<sup>3</sup> *Aristotel. Rhetoric.* ii, 3, 3.

Ergophilus seems to have been fined (*Demosthen. Fals. Leg.* p. 308, s. 300).



nesians, allies of Athens, required protection against the attacks of Kyzikus; besides which, there was another necessity yet more urgent. The stock of corn was becoming short, and the price rising, not merely at Athens, but at many of the islands in the Ægean, and at Byzantium and other places. There prevailed therefore unusual anxiety, coupled with keen competition, for the corn in course of importation from the Euxine. The Byzantines, Chalkedonians, and Kyzikenese, had already begun to detain the passing corn-ships, for the supply of their own markets; and nothing less than a powerful Athenian fleet could ensure the safe transit of such supplies to Athens herself.<sup>1</sup> The Athenian fleet, guarding the Bosphorus even from the Hieron inwards (the chapel near the junction of the Bosphorus with the Euxine), provided safe convoy for the autumnal exports of this essential article.

In carrying on operations against Kotys, Autokles was favored with an unexpected advantage by the recent revolt of a powerful Thracian named Miltokythes against that prince. This revolt so alarmed Kotys, that he wrote a letter to Athens in a submissive tone, and sent envoys to purchase peace by various concessions. At the same time Miltokythes also first sent envoys — next, went in person — to Athens, to present his own case and solicit aid. He was however coldly received. The vote of the Athenian assembly, passed on hearing the case (and probably procured in part through the friends of Iphikrates), was so unfavorable,<sup>2</sup> as to send him away not merely in discouragement, but in alarm; while Kotys recovered all his power in Thrace, and even became master of the Sacred Mountain with its abundance of wealthy deposits. Nevertheless, in spite of this imprudent vote, the Athenians really intended to sustain Miltokythes against Kotys. Their general Autokles was recalled after a few months, and put upon his trial for having suffered Kotys to put down this enemy unassisted.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. adv. Polyklem. p. 1207, s. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 655, s. 122; cont. Polyklem. p. 1207. *ὅτε Μιλτοκύθης ἀπέστη Κότυος . . . ἐγράφη τι παρ' ὑμῖν ψήφισμα τοιούτου, ὅτι οὐ Μιλτοκύθης μὲν ἀπὴλθε φοβηθεὶς καὶ νομισας ὑμᾶς οὐ προσέχειν αὐτῷ, Κότυς δὲ ἐγκρατὴς τοῦ τε ὄρους τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ τῶν θησαυρῶν ἐγένετο.*

The word ἀπὴλθε implies that Miltokythes was at Athens in person.

The humble letter written by Kotys, in his first alarm at the revolt of Miltokythes, is referred to by the orator, p. 658, s. 136, 137.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenes adv. Polykl. p. 1210, s. 16; Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 655, s. 123.

How the trial ended or how the justice of the case stood, we are unable to make out from the passing allusions of Demosthenes.

Menon was sent as commander to the Hellespont to supersede Autokles; and was himself again superseded after a few months, by Timomachus. Convoy for the corn-vessels out of the Euxine became necessary anew, as in the preceding year; and was furnished a second time during the autumn of 361 B. C. by the Athenian ships of war;<sup>1</sup> not merely for provisions under transport to Athens, but also for those going to Maroneia, Thasos, and other places in or near Thrace. But affairs in the Chersonese became yet more unfavorable to Athens. In the winter of 361–360 B. C., Kotys, with the coöperation of a body of Abydene citizens and Sestian exiles, who crossed the Hellespont from Abydos, contrived to surprise Sestos;<sup>2</sup> the most important place in the Chersonese, and the guard-post of the Hellespont on its European side, for all vessels passing in or out. The whole Chersonese was now thrown open to his aggressions. He made preparations for attacking Elaüs and Krithôtê, the two other chief possessions

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. adv. Polyklem. p. 1212, s. 24–26; p. 1213, s. 27; p. 1225, s. 71.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 673, s. 187. *Ἐκ γὰρ Ἀβύδου, τῆς τοῦ παντὸς χρόνου ὑμῖν ἐχθρᾶς, καὶ ὅθεν ἦσαν οἱ Σηστών καταλαβόντες, εἰς Σηστόν διέβαινον, ἣν εἶχε Κότυς.* (He is speaking of Charidemus.)

The other oration of Demosthenes (adv. Polykl. p. 1212) contains distinct intimation that Sestos was not lost by the Athenians until after November 361 B. C. Apollodorus the Athenian trierarch was in the town at that time, as well as various friends whom he mentions; so that Sestos must have been still an Athenian possession in November 361 B. C.

It is lucky for some points of historical investigation, that the purpose of this oration against Polykles (composed by Demosthenes, but spoken by Apollodorus) requires great precision and specification of dates, even to months and days. Apollodorus complains that he has been constrained to bear the expense of a trierarchy, for four months beyond the year in which it was incumbent upon him jointly with a colleague. He sues the person whose duty it was to have relieved him as successor at the end of the year, but who had kept aloof and cheated him. The trierarchy of Apollodorus began in August 362 B. C., and lasted (not merely to Aug. 361 B. C., its legal term, but) to November 361 B. C.

Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 144, note), in the valuable chapters which he devotes to the obscure chronology of the period, has overlooked this exact indication of the time after which the Athenians lost Sestos. He supposes the loss to have taken place two or three years earlier.



of Athens, and endeavored to prevail on Iphikrates to take part in his projects. But that general, though he had assisted Kotys in defence against Athens, refused to commit the more patent treason involved in aggressive hostility against her. He even quitted Thrace, but not daring at once to visit Athens, retired to Lesbos.<sup>1</sup> In spite of his refusal, however, the settlers and possessions of Athens in the Chersonese were attacked and imperiled by Kotys, who claimed the whole peninsula as his own, and established toll-gatherers at Sestos to levy the dues both of strait and harbor.<sup>2</sup>

The fortune of Athens in these regions was still unpropitious. All her late commanders, Ergophilus, Autokles, Menon, Timomachus, had been successively deficient in means, in skill, or in fidelity, and had undergone accusation at home.<sup>3</sup> Timomachus was now superseded by Kephisodotus, a man of known enmity towards both Iphikrates and Kotys.<sup>4</sup> But Kephisodotus achieved no more than his predecessors, and had even to contend against a new enemy, who crossed over from Abydos to Sestos to reinforce Kotys — Charidemus with the mercenary division under his command. That officer, since his service three years before under Timotheus against Amphipolis, had been for some time in Asia, especially in the troad. He hired himself to the satrap Artabazus; of whose embarrassments he took advantage to seize by fraud the towns of Skepsis, Kebren, and Ilium; intending to hold them as a little principality.<sup>5</sup> Finding his position, however, ultimately untenable against the probable force of the satrap, he sent a letter across to the Chersonese, to the Athenian commander Kephisodotus, asking for Athenian triremes to transport his division across to Europe; in return for which, if granted, he engaged to crush Kotys and reconquer the Chersonese for Athens. This proposition, whether accepted or not, was never realized; for

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 155.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 658, s. 136; p. 679, s. 211.

What is said in the latter passage about the youthful Kersobleptes, is doubtless not less true of his father Kotys.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthen. pro Phormione, p. 960, s. 64; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 398, s. 200.

<sup>4</sup> Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 672, s. 184.

<sup>5</sup> Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 671 s. 183. Compare Pseudo-Aristot. Economic. ii, 30.

Charidemus was enabled, through a truce unexpectedly granted to him by the satrap, to cross over from Abydos to Sestos without any Athenian ships. But as soon as he found himself in the Chersonese, far from aiding Athens to recover that peninsula, he actually took service with Kotys against her; so that Elaüs and Krithôtê, her chief remaining posts, were in greater peril than ever.<sup>1</sup>

The victorious prospects of Kotys, however, were now unexpectedly arrested. After a reign of twenty-four years he was assassinated by two brothers, Python and Herakleides, Greeks from the city of Ænus in Thrace, and formerly students under Plato at Athens. They committed the act to avenge their father; upon whom, as it would appear, Kotys had inflicted some brutal insult, under the influence of that violent and licentious temper which was in him combined with an energetic military character.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 672, 673.

The orator reads a letter (not cited however) from the governor of Krithôtê, announcing the formidable increase of force which threatened the place since the arrival of Charidemus.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle (Politic. v, 8, 12) mentions the act and states that the two young men did it to avenge their father. He does not expressly say what Kotys had done to the father; but he notices the event in illustration of the general category, — Πολλὰ δ' ἐπιθέσεις γέγονεν καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσχύνεσθαι τῶν μονάρχων τινάς (compare what Tacitus says about *mos regius* — Annal. vi, 1). Aristotle immediately adds another case of cruel mutilation inflicted by Kotys, — Ἀδάμας δ' ἀπέστη Κόππος διὰ τὸ ἐκτεμῆσθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ παῖς ὄν, ὡς ὑβρισμένος.

Compare, about Kotys, Theopompus, Fragm. 33, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæ. xii, p. 531, 532.

Böhnecke Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte, p. 725, 726) places the death of Kotys in 359 B. C.; and seems to infer from Athenæus (vi, p. 248; xii, p. 531) that he had actual communication with Philip of Macedon as king, whose accession took place between Midsummer 360 and Midsummer 359 B. C. But the evidence does not appear to me to bear out such a conclusion.

The story cited by Athenæus from Hegesander, about letters reaching Philip from Kotys, cannot be true about this Kotys, because it seems impossible that Philip, in the first year of his reign, can have had any such flatterer as Kleisophus; Philip being at that time in the greatest political embarrassments, out of which he was only rescued by his indefatigable energy and ability. And the journey of Philip to Onokarsis, also mentioned by Athenæus out of Theopompus, does not imply any personal communication with Kotys.



Having made their escape, Python and his brother retired to Athens, where they were received with every demonstration of honor, and presented with the citizenship as well as with golden wreaths; partly as tyrannicides, partly as having relieved the Athenians from an odious and formidable enemy.<sup>1</sup> Disclaiming the warm eulogies heaped upon him by various speakers in the assembly, Python is said to have replied — "It was a god who did the deed; we only lent our hands:"<sup>2</sup> an anecdote, which, whether it be truth or fiction, illustrates powerfully the Greek admiration of tyrannicide.

The death of Kotys gave some relief to Athenian affairs in the Chersonese. Of his children, even the eldest, Kersobleptes, was only a youth;<sup>3</sup> moreover two other Thracian chiefs, Berisades and Amadokus, now started up as pretenders to shares in the kingdom of Thrace. Kersobleptes employed as his main support and minister the mercenary general Charidemus, who either had already married, or did now marry, his sister; a nuptial connection had been formed in like manner by Amadokus with two Greeks named Simon and Bianor — and by Berisades with an Athenian citizen named Athenodorus, who (like Iphikrates and others) had founded a city, and possessed a certain independent dominion, in or near the Chersonese.<sup>4</sup> These Grecian mercenary chiefs thus united themselves by nuptial ties to the princes whom they served, as Seuthes had proposed to Xenophon, and as the Italian Condottieri of the fifteenth century ennobled themselves by similar alliances with princely families — for example, Sforza with the Visconti of Milan. All these three Thracian competitors were now represented by Grecian agents. But at first, it seems, Charidemus on behalf of Kersobleptes was the strongest. He and his army were near Perinthus on the north coast of the Propontis, where the Athenian

My opinion is, that the assassination of Kotys dates more probably in 360 B. C.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 142; p. 662, s. 150; p. 675, s. 193. Plutarch, De Sui Laude, p. 542 E.; Plutarch, adv. Koloten, p. 1126, B.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, De Sui Laude, *ut sup.*

<sup>3</sup> Demosthen. cont. Aristokr. p. 674, s. 193. *μειρακίλλιον*, etc.

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 623, 624, s. 8-12; p. 664, s. 153 (in which passage *κηδεστής* may be fairly taken to mean any near connection by marriage).

About Athenodorus compare Isokrates Or. viii. (de Pace) s. 31.

commander, Kephisodotus, visited him, with a small squadron of ten triremes, in order to ask for the fulfilment of those fair promises which Charidemus had made in his letter from Asia. But Charidemus treated the Athenians as enemies, attacked by surprise the seamen on shore, and inflicted upon them great damage. He then pressed the Chersonese severely for several months, and marched even into the midst of it, to protect a nest of pirates whom the Athenians were besieging at the neighboring islet on its western coast — Alopekonneseus. At length, after seven months of unprofitable warfare (dating from the death of Kotys), he forced Kephisodotus to conclude with him a convention so disastrous and dishonorable, that as soon as known at Athens, it was indignantly repudiated.<sup>1</sup> Kephisodotus, being recalled in disgrace, was put upon his trial, and fined; the orator Demosthenes (we are told), who had served as one of the trierarchs in the fleet, being among his accusers.<sup>2</sup>

Among the articles of this unfavorable convention, one was that

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 674-676, s. 193-199.

In sect. 194, are the words, *ἦκε δὲ Κηφισόδοτος στρατηγὼν, πρὸς δὲ αὐτὸς (Charidemus) ἐπεμψε τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἐκείνην, καὶ αἱ τριήρεις, αἱ δὲ ἦν ἀόηλα τὰ τῆς σωτηρίας αὐτῶ, καὶ μὴ συγχωροῦντος Ἀρταβάζου σώζειν μέλλον αὐτόν.*

The verb *ἦκε* refers, in my judgment — not to the first coming out of Kephisodotus from Athens to take the command, as Weber (Comment. ad Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 460) and other commentators think, but — to the coming of Kephisodotus with ten triremes to Perinthus, near which place Charidemus was, for the purpose of demanding fulfilment of what the latter had promised; see s. 196. When Kephisodotus came to him at Perinthus (*παρόντος τοῦ στρατηγοῦ* — *πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἐπεπόμψεν* — s. 195) to make this demand, then Charidemus, instead of behaving honestly, acted like a traitor and an enemy. The allusion to this antecedent letter from Charidemus to Kephisodotus, shows that the latter must have been on the spot for some time, and therefore that *ἦκε* cannot refer to his first coming out.

The term *ἑτὰ μῆνας* (s. 196) counts, I presume, from the death of Kotys.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676, s. 199; Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. p. 384, c. 20.

Demosthenes himself may probably have been among the trierarchs called before the dikastery as witnesses to prove what took place at Perinthus and Alopekonneseus (Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676, s. 200); Euthykles the speaker of the discourse against Aristokrates, had been himself also among the officers serving (p. 675, s. 196; p. 683, s. 223).



the Greek city of Kardias should be specially reserved to Charidemus himself. That city — eminently convenient from its situation on the isthmus connecting the Chersonese with Thrace — claimed by the Athenians as within the Chersonese, yet at the same time intensely hostile to Athens — became his principal station.<sup>1</sup> He was fortunate enough to seize, through treachery, the person of the Thracian Miltokythes, who had been the pronounced enemy of Kotsys, and had coöperated with Athens. But he did not choose to hand over this important prisoner to Kersobleptes, because the life of Miltokythes would thus have been saved: it not being the custom of Thracians, in their intestine disputes, to put each other to death.<sup>2</sup> We remark with surprise a practice milder than that of Greece, amidst a people decidedly more barbarous and bloodthirsty than the Greeks. Charidemus accordingly surrendered Miltokythes to the Kardians, who put the prisoner with his son into a boat, took them a little way out to sea, slew the son before the eyes of the father, and then drowned the father himself.<sup>3</sup> It is not improbable that there may have been some special antecedent causes, occasioning intense antipathy on the part of the Kardians towards Miltokythes, and inducing Charidemus to hand him over to them as an acceptable subject for revenge. However this may be, their savage deed kindled violent indignation among all the Thracians, and did much injury to the cause of Kersobleptes and Charidemus. Though Kephisodotus had been recalled, and though a considerable interval elapsed before any successor came from Athens, yet Berisades and Amadokus joined their forces in one common accord, and sent to the Athenians propositions of alliance, with request for pecuniary aid. Athenodorus, the general of Berisades, putting himself at the head of Thracians and Athenians together, found himself superior in the field to Kersobleptes and Charidemus; whom he constrained to accept a fresh convention dictated by himself. Herein it was provided, that the kingdom of Thrace should be divided in equal portions between the three competitors; that all three should concur in surrendering the Chersonese to Athens;

Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 679, s. 209; p. 681, s. 216. Demosthen. de Halonneso. p. 87, s. 42.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676, s. 201. οὐκ ὁτις νομῖμου τοῖς Θεοῖς ἐν ἀλλήλων ἀποκτείναναι, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenes, cont. Aristokrat. p. 677 s. 201.

and that the son of a leading man named Iphiades at Sestos, held by Charidemus as hostage for the adherence of that city, should be surrendered to Athens also.<sup>1</sup>

This new convention, sworn on both sides, promised to Athens the full acquisition which she desired. Considering the thing as done, the Athenians sent Chabrias as commander in one trireme to receive the surrender, but omitted to send the money requested by Athenodorus; who was accordingly constrained to disband his army for want of pay. Upon this Kersobleptes and Charidemus at once threw up their engagement, refused to execute the convention just sworn, and constrained Chabrias, who had come without any force, to revert to the former convention concluded with Kephisodotus. Disappointed and indignant, the Athenians disavowed the act of Chabrias, in spite of his high reputation. They sent ten envoys to the Chersonese, insisting that the convention of Athenodorus should be resworn by all the three Thracian competitors — Berisades, Amadokus, Kersobleptes; if the third declined, the envoys were instructed to take measures for making war upon him, while they received the engagements of the other two. But such a mission, without arms, obtained nothing from Charidemus and Kersobleptes, except delay or refusal; while Berisades and Amadokus sent to Athens bitter complaints respecting the breach of faith. At length, after some months — just after the triumphant conclusion of the expedition of Athens against Eubœa (358 B. C.) — the Athenian Chares arrived in the Chersonese, at the head of a considerable mercenary force. Then at length the two recusants were compelled to swear anew to the convention of Athenodorus, in the presence of the latter as well as of Berisades and Amadokus.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 202-204.

Aristotle (Politic. v. 5, 9) mentions the association or faction of Iphiades as belonging to Abydos, not to Sestos. Perhaps there may have been an Abydene association now exercising influence at Sestos; at least we are told, that the revolution which deprived the Athenians of Sestos, was accomplished in part by exiles who crossed from Abydos; something like the relation between Argos and Corinth in the years immediately preceding the peace of Antalkidas.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 678, p. 205, 206; p. 680. s. 211, 212. The arrival of Chares in the Hellespont is marked by Demosthenes as immediately following the expedition of Athens to drive the Thebans out of Eubœa, which took place about the middle of 358 B. C.



And it would appear that before long, its conditions were realized. Charidemus surrendered the Chersonese, of course including its principal town Sestos, to Athens;<sup>1</sup> yet he retained for himself Kardias,<sup>2</sup> which was affirmed (though the Athenians denied it) not to be included in the boundaries of that peninsula. The kingdom of Thrace was also divided between Kersobleptes, Berisades, and Amadokus; which triple division, diminishing the strength of each, was regarded by Athens as a great additional guarantee for her secure possession of the Chersonese.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> We see that Sestos must have been surrendered on this occasion, although Diodorus describes it as having been conquered by Chares five years afterwards, in the year 353 B. C. (Diod. xvi, 34). It is evident from the whole tenor of the oration of Demosthenes, that Charidemus did actually surrender the Chersonese at this time. Had he still refused to surrender Sestos, the orator would not have failed to insist on the fact emphatically against him. Besides, Demosthenes says, comparing the conduct of Philip towards the Olynthians, with that of Kersobleptes towards Athens — *ἐκεῖνος ἐκεῖνους Ποτιδαίαν οὐχὶ τηλικαύτ' ἀπέδωκεν, ἥνικ' ἀποστερεῖν οὐκέτι' οἷός τ' ἦν, ὥσπερ ὑμῖν Κερσοβλέπτης Χερρόνησον* (p. 656. s. 128). This distinctly announces that the Chersonese was given back to Athens, though reluctantly and tardily, by Kersobleptes. Sestos must have been given up along with it, as the principal and most valuable post upon all accounts. If it be true (as Diodorus states) that Chares in 353 B. C. took Sestos by siege, slew the inhabitants of military age and reduced the rest to slavery — we must suppose the town again to have revolted between 356 and 353 B. C.; that is, during the time of the Social War; which is highly probable. But there is much in the statement of Diodorus which I cannot distinctly make out; for he says that Kersobleptes in 353 B. C., on account of his hatred towards Philip, surrendered to Athens all the cities in the Chersonese except Kardias. That had already been done in 358 B. C., and without any reference to Philip; and if after surrendering the Chersonese in 358 B. C., Kersobleptes had afterwards reconquered it, so as to have it again in his possession in the beginning of 353 B. C. — it seems unaccountable that Demosthenes should say nothing about the reconquest in his oration against Aristokrates, where he is trying to make all points possible against Kersobleptes.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 681, s. 216.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 623, s. 8; p. 654, s. 121. The chronology of these events as given by Rehdantz (*Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabrias, etc.* p. 147) appears to me nearly correct, in spite of the strong objection expressed against it by Weber (*Prolegg. ad Demosth. cont. Aristokrat.* p. lxxiii.) — and more exact than the chronology of Böhnecke, *Forschungen*, p. 727, who places the coming out of Kephisodotus as general to the Chersonese in 358 B. C., which is, I think, a full year too late. Rehdantz does not allow,

It was thus that Athens at length made good her possession of the Chersonese against the neighboring Thracian potentates. And it would seem that her transmarine power, with its dependencies and confederates, now stood at a greater height than it had ever reached since the terrible reverses of 405 B. C. Among them were numbered not only a great number of the Ægean islands (even the largest, Eubœa, Chios, Samos, and Rhodes), but also the continental possessions of Byzantium — the Chersonese — Maroneia<sup>1</sup> with other places on the southern coast of Thrace — and Pydna, Methônê, and Potidæa, with most of the region surrounding the Thermaic Gulf.<sup>2</sup> This last portion of empire had been acquired at the cost of the Olynthian fraternal alliance of neighboring cities, against which Athens too, as well as Sparta, by an impulse most disastrous for the future independence of Greece, had made war with inauspicious success. The Macedonian king Perdikkas, with a just instinct towards the future aggrandizement of his dynasty, had assisted her in thus weakening Olynthus; feeling that the towns on the Thermaic Gulf, if they formed parts of a strong Olynthian confederacy of brothers and neighbors, reciprocally attached and self-sustaining, would resist Macedonia more effectively, than if they were half-reluctant dependencies of Athens, even with the chances of Athenian aid by sea. The aggressive hand of Athens against Olynthus, indeed, between 368–363 B. C., was hardly less mischievous, to Greece generally, than that of Sparta had been between 382–380 B. C. Sparta had crushed the Olynthian confederacy in its first brilliant promise — Athens prevented it from rearing its head anew. Both conspired to break down the most effective barrier against Macedonian aggrandizement; neither were found competent to provide any adequate protection to Greece in its room.

The maximum of her second empire, which I have remarked that Athens attained by the recovery of the Chersonese,<sup>3</sup> lasted

as I think he ought to do, for a certain interval between Kephisodotus and the Ten Envoys, during which Athenodorus acted for Athens.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. cont. Polyklem, p. 1212, s. 26.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. Philippic. I, p. 41, s. 6. *εἰχομέν τοις ἡμεῖς, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Πύδναν καὶ Ποτιδαίαν καὶ Μεθώνην καὶ πάντα τῶν τόπων τοῦ τοῦ οἰκείου κύκλου, etc.*

<sup>3</sup> I have not made any mention of the expedition against Eubœa (where



but for a moment. During the very same year, there occurred that revolt among her principal allies, known by the name of the Social War, which gave to her power a fatal shock, and left the field comparatively clear for the early aggressions of her yet more formidable enemy — Philip of Macedon. That prince had already emerged from his obscurity as a hostage in Thebes, and had succeeded his brother Perdikkas, slain in a battle with the Illyrians, as king (360–359 B. C.). At first, his situation appeared not merely difficult, but almost hopeless. Not the most prescient eye in Greece could have recognized, in the inexperienced youth struggling at his first accession against rivals at home, enemies abroad, and embarrassments of every kind — the future conqueror of Chæroneia, and destroyer of Grecian independence. How, by his own genius, energy, and perseverance, assisted by the faults and dissensions of his Grecian enemies, he attained his inauspicious eminence — will be recounted in my subsequent volume.

At the opening of my ninth volume, after the surrender of Athens, Greece was under the Spartan empire. Its numerous independent city-communities were more completely regimented under one chief than they had ever been before, Athens and Thebes being both numbered among the followers of Sparta.

But the conflicts recounted in these two volumes (during an interval of forty-four years — 404–403 B. C. to 360–359 B. C.) have wrought the melancholy change of leaving Greece more disunited, and more destitute of presiding Hellenic authority, than she had been at any time since the Persian invasion. Thebes, Sparta, and Athens, had all been engaged in weakening each other; in which, unhappily, each has been far more successful than in strengthening

by Athens drove the Theban invaders out of that island), though it occurred just about the same time as the recovery of the Chersonese.

That expedition will more properly come to be spoken of in my next volume. But the recovery of the Chersonese was the closing event of a series of proceedings which had been going on for four years; so that I could hardly leave that series unfinished.

herself. The maritime power of Athens is now indeed considerable, and may be called very great, if compared with the state of degradation to which she had been brought in 403 B. C. But it will presently be seen how unsubstantial is the foundation of her authority, and how fearfully she has fallen off from that imperial feeling and energy which ennobled her ancestors under the advice of Perikles.

It is under these circumstances, so untoward for defence, that the aggressor from Macedonia arises.

## CHAPTER LXXXI.

### SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT BEFORE SYRACUSE.

In the sixtieth chapter of this work, I brought down the history of the Grecian communities in Sicily to the close of the Athenian siege of Syracuse, where Nikias and Demosthenes with nearly their entire armament perished by so lamentable a fate. I now resume from that point the thread of Sicilian events, which still continues so distinct from those of Peloponnesus and Eastern Greece, that it is inconvenient to include both in the same chapters.

If the destruction of the great Athenian armament (in September 413 B. C.) excited the strongest sensation throughout every part of the Grecian world, we may imagine the intoxication of triumph with which it must have been hailed in Sicily. It had been achieved (Gylippus and the Peloponnesian allies aiding) by the united efforts of nearly all the Grecian cities in the island, — for all of them had joined Syracuse as soon as her prospects became decidedly encouraging; except Naxos and Katana, which were allied with the Athenians, — and Agrigentum, which remained neutral. Unfortunately we know little or nothing of the proceedings

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. vii, 50–53.



of the Syracusans, immediately following upon circumstances of so much excitement and interest. They appear to have carried on war against Katana, where some fugitives from the vanquished Athenian army contributed to the resistance against them.<sup>1</sup> But both this city and Naxos, though exposed to humiliation and danger as allies of the defeated Athenians, contrived to escape without the loss of their independence. The allies of Syracuse were probably not eager to attack them, and thereby to aggrandize that city farther; while the Syracusans themselves also would be sensible of great exhaustion, arising from the immense efforts through which alone their triumph had been achieved. The pecuniary burdens to which they had been obliged to submit — known to Nikias during the last months of the siege,<sup>2</sup> and fatally misleading his judgment, — were so heavy as to task severely their powers of endurance. After paying, and dismissing with appropriate gratitude, the numerous auxiliaries whom they had been obliged to hire, — after celebrating the recent triumph, and decorating the temples, in a manner satisfactory to the exuberant joy of the citizens<sup>3</sup> — there would probably be a general disposition to repose rather than to aggressive warfare. There would be much destruction to be repaired throughout their territory, poorly watched or cultivated during the year of the siege.

In spite of such exhaustion, however, the sentiment of exasperation and vengeance against Athens, combined with gratitude towards the Lacedæmonians, was too powerful to be balked. A confident persuasion reigned throughout Greece that Athens could not hold out for one single summer after her late terrific disaster; a persuasion, founded greatly on the hope of a large auxiliary squadron to act against her from Syracuse and her other enemies in Sicily and Italy. In this day of Athenian distress, such enemies of course became more numerous. Especially the city of Thurii in Italy,<sup>4</sup> which had been friendly to Athens and had furnished aid to Demosthenes in his expedition to Sicily, now underwent a change, banished three hundred of the leading Athenian citizens (among them the rhetor Lysias), and espoused

<sup>1</sup> Lysias, Orat. xx, (pro Polystrato) s. 26, 27.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. vii, 48, 49.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiii, 34.

Thucyd. viii, 2; compare vii, 55.

<sup>4</sup> Thucyd. vii, 33-57; Dionysius Halikarn. *Judic. de Lysiâ*, p. 453.

the Peloponnesian cause with ardor. The feeling of reaction at Thurii, and of vengeance at Syracuse, stimulated the citizens of both places to take active part in an effort promising to be easy and glorious, for the destruction of Athens and her empire. And volunteers were doubtless the more forward, as the Persian satraps of the sea-board were now competing with each other in invitations to the Greeks, with offers of abundant pay.

Accordingly, in the summer of the year 412 B. C. (the year following the catastrophe of the Athenian armament,) a Sicilian squadron of twenty triremes from Syracuse and two from Selinus, under the command of Hermokrates, reached Peloponnesus and joined the Lacedæmonian fleet in its expedition across the Ægean to Miletus. Another squadron of ten triremes from Thurii, under the Rhodian Dorieus, and a farther reinforcement from Tarentum, and Lokri, followed soon after. It was Hermokrates who chiefly instigated his countrymen to this effort.<sup>1</sup> Throughout the trying months of the siege, he had taken a leading part in the defence of Syracuse, seconding the plans of Gylippus with equal valor and discretion. As commander of the Syracusan squadron in the main fleet now acting against Athens in the Ægean (events already described in my sixty-first chapter), his conduct was not less distinguished. He was energetic in action, and popular in his behavior towards those under his command; but what stood out most conspicuously as well as most honorably, was his personal incorruptibility. While the Peloponnesian admiral and trierarchs accepted the bribes of Tissaphernes, conniving at his betrayal of the common cause and breach of engagement towards the armament, with indifference to the privations of their own unpaid seamen, — Hermokrates and Dorieus were strenuous in remonstrance, even to the extent of drawing upon themselves the indignant displeasure of the Peloponnesian admiral Astyochus, as well as of the satrap himself.<sup>2</sup> They were the more earnest in performing this duty, because the Syracusan and Thurian triremes were manned by freemen in larger proportion than the remaining fleet.<sup>3</sup>

The sanguine expectation, however, entertained by Hermokrates and his companions in crossing the sea from Sicily, — that one

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. viii, 26, 35, 91.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. viii, 29, 45, 78, 84.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. viii, 84.



single effort would gloriously close the war, — was far from being realized. Athens resisted with unexpected energy; the Lacedæmonians were so slack and faint-hearted, that they even let slip the golden opportunity presented to them by the usurpation of the Athenian Four Hundred. Tissaphernes was discovered to be studiously starving and protracting the war for purposes of his own, which Hermokrates vainly tried to counter-work by a personal visit and protest at Sparta.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, the war trailed on with fluctuating success, and even renovated efficiency on the part of Athens; so that the Syracusans at home, far from hearing announced the accomplishment of those splendid anticipations under which their squadron had departed, received news generally unfavorable, and at length positively disastrous. They were informed that their seamen were ill-paid and distressed; while Athens, far from striking her colors, had found means to assemble a fleet at Samos competent still to dispute the mastery of the Ægean. They heard of two successive naval defeats, which the Peloponnesian and Syracusan fleets sustained in the Hellespont<sup>2</sup> (one at Kynossema, — 411 B. C., — a second between Abydos and Dardanus, — 410 B. C.); and at length of a third, more decisive and calamitous than the preceding, — the battle of Kyzikus (409 B. C.), wherein the Lacedæmonian admiral Mindarus was slain, and the whole of his fleet captured or destroyed. In this defeat the Syracusan squadron were joint sufferers. Their seamen were compelled to burn all their triremes without exception, in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy; and were left destitute, without clothing or subsistence, on the shores of the Propontis amidst the satrapy of Pharnabazus.<sup>3</sup> That satrap, with generous forwardness, took them into his pay, advanced to them clothing and provision for two months, and furnished them with timber from the woods of Mount Ida to build fresh ships. At Antandrus (in the Gulf of Adramyttium, one great place of export for Idæan timber), where the reconstruction took place, the Syracusans made themselves so acceptable and useful to the citizens, that a vote of thanks and a grant of citizenship was passed to all of them who chose to accept it.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. viii, 85.<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 19.<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. viii, 105; Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 7.<sup>4</sup> Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 23-26.

In recounting this battle, I cited the brief and rude despatch, addressed to the Lacedæmonians by Hippokrates, surviving second officer of the slain Mindarus, describing the wretched condition of the defeated armament — "Our honor is gone. Mindarus is slain. The men are hungry. We know not what to do."<sup>1</sup> This curious despatch has passed into history, because it was intercepted by the Athenians, and never reached its destination. But without doubt the calamitous state of facts, which it was intended to make known, flew rapidly, under many different forms of words, both to Peloponnesus and to Syracuse. Sad as the reality was, the first impression made by the news would probably be yet sadder; since the intervention of Pharnabazus, whereby the sufferers were so much relieved, would hardly be felt or authenticated until after some interval. At Syracuse, the event on being made known excited not only powerful sympathy with the sufferers, but also indignant displeasure against Hermokrates and his colleagues; who, having instigated their countrymen three years before, by sanguine hopes and assurances, to commence a foreign expedition for the purpose of finally putting down Athens, had not only achieved nothing, but had sustained a series of reverses, ending at length in utter ruin, from the very enemy whom they had pronounced to be incapable of farther resistance.

It was under such sentiment of displeasure, shortly after the defeat of Kyzikus, that a sentence of banishment was passed at Syracuse against Hermokrates and his colleagues. The sentence was transmitted to Asia, and made known by Hermokrates himself to the armament, convoked in public meeting. While lamenting and protesting against its alleged injustice and illegality, he entreated the armament to maintain unabated good behavior for the future, and to choose new admirals for the time, until the successors nominated at Syracuse should arrive. The news was heard with deep regret by the trierarchs, the pilots, and the maritime soldiers or marines; who, attached to Hermokrates from his popular manner, his constant openness of communication with them, and his anxiety to collect their opinions, loudly proclaimed that they would neither choose, nor serve under, any other lead-

<sup>1</sup> Hen. Hellen. i, 1, 23. Ἐρβει τὰ καλὰ. Μίνδαρος ἀπεσσοῖα πεινῶντι τῶνδρες ἀπορίμεν τί χρὴ δοῦν.



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ers.<sup>1</sup> But the admirals repressed this disposition, deprecating any resistance to the decree of the city. They laid down their command, inviting any man dissatisfied with them to prefer his complaint at once publicly, and reminding the soldiers of the many victories and glorious conflicts, both by land and sea, which had knit them together by the ties of honorable fellowship. No man stood forward to accuse them; and they consented, on the continued request of the armament, to remain in command, until their three successors arrived — Demarchus, Myskon, and Potamis. They then retired amidst universal regret; many of the trierarchs even binding themselves by oath, that on returning to Syracuse they would procure their restoration. The change of commanders took place at Miletus.<sup>2</sup>

Though Hermokrates, in his address to the soldiers, would doubtless find response when he invoked the remembrance of past victories, yet he would hardly have found the like response in a Syracusan assembly. For if we review the proceedings of the armament since he conducted it from Syracuse to join the Peloponnesian fleet, we shall find that on the whole his expedition had been a complete failure, and that his assurances of success against Athens had ended in nothing but disappointment. There was therefore ample cause for the discontent of his countrymen. But on the other hand, as far as our limited means of information enable us to judge, the sentence of banishment against him appears to have been undeserved and unjust. For we cannot trace the ill-success of Hermokrates to any misconduct or omission on his part; while in regard to personal incorruptibility, and strenuous resistance to the duplicity of Tissaphernes, he stood out as an honorable exception among a body of venal colleagues. That satrap, indeed, as soon as Hermokrates had fallen into disgrace, circulated a version of his own, pretending that the latter, having asked money from him and been refused, had sought by calumnious means to revenge such refusal.<sup>3</sup> But this story, whether believed elsewhere or not, found no credit with the other satrap Pharnabazus; who warmly espoused the cause of the banished general, presenting him with a sum of money even unsolicited. This money

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. i. 1, 27.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. viii, 85.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hellen. i. 1, 27-31.

Hermokrates immediately employed in getting together triremes and mercenary soldiers to accomplish his restoration to Syracuse by force.<sup>1</sup> We shall presently see how he fared in this attempt. Meanwhile we may remark that the sentence of banishment, though in itself unjust, would appear amply justified in the eyes of his countrymen by his own subsequent resort to hostile measures against them.

The party opposed to Hermokrates had now the preponderance in Syracuse, and by their influence probably the sentence against him was passed, under the grief and wrath occasioned by the defeat of Kyzikus. Unfortunately we have only the most scanty information as to the internal state of Syracuse during the period immediately succeeding the Athenian siege; a period of marked popular sentiment and peculiar interest. As at Athens under the pressure of the Xerxeian invasion — the energies of all the citizens, rich and poor, young and old, had been called forth for repulse of the common enemy, and had been not more than enough to achieve it. As at Athens after the battles of Salamis and Plataea, so at Syracuse after the destruction of the Athenian besiegers — the people, elate with the plenitude of recent effort, and conscious that the late successful defence had been the joint work of all, were in a state of animated democratical impulse, eager for the utmost extension and equality of political rights. Even before the Athenian siege, the government had been democratical; a fact, which Thucydides notices as among the causes of the successful defence, by rendering the citizens unanimous in resistance, and by preventing the besiegers from exciting intestine discontent.<sup>2</sup> But in the period immediately after the siege, it underwent changes which are said to have rendered it still more democratical. On the proposition of an influential citizen named Dioklès, a commission of Ten was named, of which he was president, for the purpose of revising both the constitution and the legislation of the city. Some organic alterations were adopted, one of which was, that the lot should be adopted, instead of the principle of election, in the nomination of magistrates. Furthermore, a new code, or collection of criminal and civil enactments, was drawn up and sanctioned. We know nothing of its details, but we are told that

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. i. 1, 31; Diodor. xiii, 63.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. vii, 56.



its penalties were extremely severe, its determination of offences minute and special, and its language often obscure as well as brief. It was known by the name of the Laws of Dioklès, the chief of the Committee who had prepared it. Though now adopted at Syracuse, it did not last long; for we shall find in five or six years the despotism of Dionysius extinguishing it, just as Peisistratus had put down the Solonian legislation at Athens. But it was again revived at the extinction of the Dionysian dynasty, after the lapse of more than sixty years; with comments and modifications by a committee, among whose members were the Corinthians Kephalus and Timoleon. It is also said to have been copied in various other Sicilian cities, and to have remained in force until the absorption of all Sicily under the dominion of the Romans.<sup>1</sup>

We have the austere character of Dioklès illustrated by a story (of more than dubious credit,<sup>2</sup> and of which the like is recounted respecting other Grecian legislators), that having inadvertently violated one of his own enactments, he enforced the duty of obedience by falling on his own sword. But unfortunately we are not permitted to know the substance of his laws, which would have thrown so much light on the sentiments and position of the Sicilian Greeks. Nor can we distinctly make out to what extent the political constitution of Syracuse was now changed. For though Diodorus tells us that the lot was now applied to the nomination of magistrates, yet he does not state whether it was applied to all magistrates, or under what reserves and exceptions — such, for example, as those adopted at Athens. Aristotle too states that the Syracusan people, after the Athenian siege, changed their constitution from a partial democracy into an entire democracy. Yet he describes Dionysius, five or six years afterwards, as pushing himself up to the despotism, by the most violent demagogic opposition; and as having accused, disgraced, and overthrown certain rich leaders then in possession of the functions of government.<sup>3</sup> If the constitutional forms were rendered more democratical, it would seem that the practice cannot have materially changed, and

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xii, 33–35.

<sup>2</sup> Compare Diodor. xiii, 75 — about the banishment of Dioklès.

<sup>3</sup> Aristotel. Politic. v, 3, 6. Καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις ὁ δῆμος, αἰτίας γενομένην

that the persons actually in leading function still continued to be rich men.

The war carried on by the Syracusans against Naxos and Katana, after continuing more than three years,<sup>1</sup> was brought to a close by an enemy from without, even more formidable than Athens. This time, the invader was not Hellenic, but Phœnician — the ancient foe of Hellas, Carthage.

It has been already recounted, how in the same eventful year (480 B. C.) which transported Xerxes across the Hellespont to meet his defeat at Salamis, the Carthaginians had poured into Sicily a vast mercenary host under Hamilkar, for the purpose of reinstating in Himera the despot Terillus, who had been expelled by Theron of Agrigentum. On that occasion, Hamilkar had been slain, and his large army defeated, by the Syracusan despot Gelon, in the memorable battle of Himera. So deep had been the impression left by this defeat, that for the seventy years which intervened between 480–410 B. C., the Carthaginians had never again invaded the island. They resumed their aggressions shortly after the destruction of the Athenian power before Syracuse; which same event had also stimulated the Persians, who had been kept in restraint while the Athenian empire remained unimpaired, again to act offensively for the recovery of their dominion over the Asiatic Greeks. The great naval power of Athens, inspiring not merely reserve but even alarm to Carthage,<sup>2</sup> had been a safeguard to the Hellenic world both at its eastern and its western extremity. No sooner was that safeguard overthrown, than the hostile pressure of the foreigner began to be felt, as well upon Western Sicily as on the eastern coast of the Ægean.

From this time forward for two centuries, down to the conclusion of the second Punic war, the Carthaginians will be found frequent in their aggressive interventions in Sicily, and upon an extensive

τῆς νίκης τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἐκ πολιτείας εἰς δημοκρατίαν μετέβαλε.

v, 4, 4, 5. Καὶ Διονύσιος κατηγορῶν Δαφναίου καὶ τῶν πλουσίων ἡξιώθη τῆς τυραννίδος, διὰ τὴν ἐχθρὰν πιστευθεὶς ὡς δημοτικὸς ὢν.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 56.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. vi, 34. Speech of Hermokrates to his countrymen at Syracuse — δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ ἐκ Καρχηδόνα ἄμεινον εἶναι πέμψαι. Οὐ γὰρ ἀνέλπιστον αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ διὰ φόβου εἰσὶ μὴ ποτε Ἀθηναῖοι αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐλθῶσιν. etc.



scale, so as to act powerfully on the destinies of the Sicilian . . . Whether any internal causes had occurred to make them abstain from intervention during the preceding generations, we are unable to say. The history of this powerful and wealthy city is very little known. We make out a few facts, which impart a general idea both of her oligarchical government and of her extensive colonial possessions, but which leave us in the dark as to her continuous history. Her possessions were most extensive, along the coast of Africa both eastward and westward from her city; comprehending also Sardinia and the Balearic isles, but (at this time, probably) few settlements in Spain. She had quite enough to occupy her attention elsewhere, without meddling in Sicilian affairs; the more so, as her province in Sicily was rather a dependent ally than a colonial possession. In the early treaties made with Rome, the Carthaginians restrict and even interdict the traffic of the Romans both with Sardinia and Africa (except Carthage itself), but they grant the amplest license of intercourse with the Carthaginian province of Sicily; which they consider as standing in the same relation to Carthage as the cities of Latium stood in to Rome.<sup>1</sup> While the connection of Carthage with Sicily was thus less close, it would appear that her other dependencies gave her much trouble, chiefly in consequence of her own harsh and extortionate dominion.

All our positive information, scanty as it is, about Carthage and her institutions, relates to the fourth, third, or second centuries B. C., yet it may be held to justify presumptive conclusions as to the fifth

<sup>1</sup> Polybins, iii, 22, 23, 24.

He gives three separate treaties (either wholly or in part) between the Carthaginians and Romans. The latest of the three belongs to the days of Pyrrhus, about 278 B. C.; the earliest to 508 B. C. The intermediate treaty is not marked as to date by any specific evidence, but I see no ground for supposing that it is so late as 345 B. C., which is the date assigned to it by Casaubon, identifying it with the treaty alluded to by Livy, vii, 27. I cannot but think that it is more likely to be of earlier date, somewhere between 480-410 B. C. This second treaty is far more restrictive than the first, against the Romans; for it interdicts them from all traffic either with Sardinia or Africa, except the city of Carthage itself; the first treaty permitted such trade under certain limitations and conditions. The second treaty argues a comparative superiority of Carthage to Rome, which would rather seem to belong to the latter half of the fifth century B. C., than to the latter half of the fourth.

century B. C., especially in reference to the general system pursued. The maximum of her power was attained before her first war with Rome, which began in 264 B. C.; the first and second Punic wars both of them greatly reduced her strength and dominion. Yet in spite of such reduction we learn that about 150 B. C., shortly before the third Punic war, which ended in the capture and depopulation of the city, not less than seven hundred thousand souls<sup>1</sup> were computed in it, as occupants of a fortified circumference of above twenty miles, covering a peninsula with its isthmus. Upon this isthmus its citadel Byrsa was situated, surrounded by a triple wall of its own, and crowned at its summit by a magnificent temple of Æsculapius. The numerous population is the more remarkable, since Utica (a considerable city, colonized from Phœnicia more anciently than even Carthage itself, and always independent of the Carthaginians, though in the condition of an inferior and discontented ally), was within the distance of seven miles from Carthage<sup>2</sup> on the one side, and Tunis seemingly not much farther off on the other. Even at that time, too, the Carthaginians are said to have possessed three hundred tributary cities in Libya.<sup>3</sup> Yet this was but a small fraction of the prodigious empire which had belonged to them certainly in the fourth century B. C., and in all probability also between 480-410 B. C. That empire extended eastward as far as the Altars of the Philæni, near the Great Syrtis, — westward, all along the coast to the Pillars of Herakles and the western coast of Morocco. The line of coast south-east of Carthage, as far as the bay called the Lesser Syrtis, was proverbial (under the name of Byzacium and the Emporia) for its fertility. Along this extensive line were distributed indigenous Libyan tribes, living by agriculture; and a mixed population called Liby-Phœnicians, formed by intermarriage and coalition of some of these tribes either with colonists from Tyre and Sidon, or perhaps with a Canaanitish population akin in race to the Phœnicians, yet of still earlier settlement in the country.<sup>4</sup> These Liby-Phœnicians

<sup>1</sup> Strabo, xvii, p. 832, 833; Livy, Epitome, lib. 51.

Strabo gives the circumference as three hundred and sixty stadia, and the breadth of the isthmus as sixty stadia. But this is noticed by Barth as much exaggerated (*Wanderungen auf der Küste des Mittelmeers*, p. 85).

<sup>2</sup> Appian, *Reb. Punic.* viii, 75.

<sup>3</sup> Strabo, *ut sup.*

<sup>4</sup> This is the view of Mövers, sustained with much plausibility, in his



dwelt in towns, seemingly of moderate size and unfortified, but each surrounded by a territory ample and fertile, yielding large produce. They were assiduous cultivators, but generally unwarlike, which latter quality was ascribed by ancient theory to the extreme richness of their soil.<sup>1</sup> Of the Liby-Phœnician towns the number is not known to us, but it must have been prodigiously great, since we are told that both Agathokles and Regulus in their respective invasions captured no less than two hundred. A single district, called Tuska, is also spoken of as having fifty towns.<sup>2</sup>

A few of the towns along the coast, — Hippo, Utica, Adrumetum, Thapsus, Leptis, etc., — were colonies from Tyre, like Carthage herself. With respect to Carthage, therefore, they stood upon a different footing from the Liby-Phœnician towns, either maritime or in the interior. Yet the Carthaginians contrived in time to render every town tributary, with the exception of Utica. They thus derived revenue from all the inhabitants of this fertile region, Tyrian, Liby-Phœnician, and indigenous Libyan; and the amount which they imposed appears to have been exorbitant. At one time, immediately after the first Punic war, they took from the rural cultivators as much as one-half of their produce,<sup>3</sup> and doubled at one stroke the tribute levied upon the towns. The town and district of Leptis paid to them a tribute of one talent per day, or three hundred and sixty-five talents annually. Such exactions were not collected without extreme harshness of enforcement,

learned and instructive work — *Geschichte der Phœnizier*, vol. ii, part ii, p. 435–455. See Diodor. xx, 55.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, xxix, 25. Compare the last chapter of the history of Herodotus.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xx, 17; Appian, viii, 3, 68.

<sup>3</sup> Colonel Leake observes, with respect to the modern Greeks, who work on the plains of Turkey, upon the landed property of Turkish proprietors — "The Helots seem to have resembled the Greeks, who labor on the Turkish farms in the plains of Turkey, and who are bound to account to their masters for one-half of the produce of the soil, as Tyrtæus says of the Messenians of his time —

Ὡς περ ὄνοι μεγάλοις ἄχθεσι τειρόμενοι  
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The condition of the Greeks in the mountainous regions is not so hard (Leake, *Peloponnesiaca*, p. 168).

sometimes stripping the tax-payer of all that he possessed, and even tearing him from his family to be sold in person for a slave. Accordingly the general sentiment among the dependencies towards Carthage was one of mingled fear and hatred, which rendered them eager to revolt on the landing of any foreign invader. In some cases the Carthaginians seem to have guarded against such contingencies by paid garrisons; but they also provided a species of garrison from among their own citizens; by sending out from Carthage poor men, and assigning to them lots of land with the cultivators attached. This provision for poor citizens as emigrants (mainly analogous to the Roman colonies), was a standing feature in the Carthaginian political system, serving the double purpose of obviating discontent among their own town population at home, and of keeping watch over their dependencies abroad.<sup>4</sup>

In the fifth century B. C., the Carthaginians had no apprehension of any foreign enemy invading them from seaward; an enterprise first attempted in 316 B. C., to the surprise of every one, by the boldness of the Syracusan Agathokles. Nor were their enemies on the land side formidable as conquerors, though they were extremely annoying as plunderers. The Numidians and other native tribes, half-naked and predatory horsemen, distinguished for speed as well as for indefatigable activity, so harassed the individ-

<sup>1</sup> Polybius, i, 72; Livy, xxxiv, 62.

Mövers (*Geschichte der Phœnizier*, ii, 2, p. 455) assigns this large assessment to Leptis Magna; but the passage of Livy can relate only to *Leptis Parva*, in the region called Emporia.

Leptis Magna was at a far greater distance from Carthage, near the Great Syrtis.

Dr. Barth (*Wanderungen durch die Küstenländer des Mittelländischen Meers*, p. 81–146) has given a recent and valuable examination of the site of Carthage and of the neighboring regions. On his map, however, the territory called Emporia is marked near the Lesser Syrtis, two hundred miles from Carthage (Pliny, H. N. v, 3). Yet it seems certain that the name Emporia must have comprised the territory south of Carthage and approaching very near to the city; for Scipio Africanus, in his expedition from Sicily, directed his pilots to steer for Emporia. He intended to land very near Carthage; and he actually did land on the White Cape, near to that city, but on the north side, and still nearer to Utica. This region north of Carthage was probably not included in the name Emporia (Livy, xxix, 25–27).

<sup>2</sup> Aristotel. *Politic.* ii, 8, 9, vi, 3, 5.



dwelt in towns, seemingly of moderate size and unfortified, but each surrounded by a territory ample and fertile, yielding large produce. They were assiduous cultivators, but generally unwarlike, which latter quality was ascribed by ancient theory to the extreme richness of their soil.<sup>1</sup> Of the Liby-Phœnician towns the number is not known to us, but it must have been prodigiously great, since we are told that both Agathokles and Regulus in their respective invasions captured no less than two hundred. A single district, called Tuska, is also spoken of as having fifty towns.<sup>2</sup>

A few of the towns along the coast, — Hippo, Utica, Adrumetum, Thapsus, Leptis, etc., — were colonies from Tyre, like Carthage herself. With respect to Carthage, therefore, they stood upon a different footing from the Liby-Phœnician towns, either maritime or in the interior. Yet the Carthaginians contrived in time to render every town tributary, with the exception of Utica. They thus derived revenue from all the inhabitants of this fertile region, Tyrian, Liby-Phœnician, and indigenous Libyan; and the amount which they imposed appears to have been exorbitant. At one time, immediately after the first Punic war, they took from the rural cultivators as much as one-half of their produce,<sup>3</sup> and doubled at one stroke the tribute levied upon the towns. The town and district of Leptis paid to them a tribute of one talent per day, or three hundred and sixty-five talents annually. Such exactions were not collected without extreme harshness of enforcement,

learned and instructive work — Geschichte der Phœnizier, vol. ii, part ii, p. 435–455. See Diodor. xx, 55.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, xxix, 25. Compare the last chapter of the history of Herodotus.

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nal cultivators of the soil, that the Carthaginians dug a long line of ditch to keep them off.<sup>1</sup> But these barbarians did not acquire sufficient organization to act for permanent objects, until the reign of Masinissa and the second Punic war with Rome. During the fifth and fourth centuries B. C., therefore (prior to the invasion of Agathokles), the warfare carried on by the Carthaginians was constantly aggressive and in foreign parts. For these purposes they chiefly employed foreign mercenaries, hired for the occasion from Italy, Gaul, Spain, and the islands of the Western Mediterranean, together with conscripts from their Libyan dependencies. The native Carthaginians,<sup>2</sup> though encouraged by honorary marks to undertake this military service, were generally averse to it, and sparingly employed. But these citizens, though not often sent on foreign service, constituted a most formidable force when called upon. No less than forty thousand hoplites went forth from the gates of Carthage to resist Agathokles, together with one thousand cavalry, and two thousand war-chariots.<sup>3</sup> An immense public magazine, — of arms, muniments of war of all kinds, and provisions, — appears to have been kept in the walls of Byrsa, the citadel of Carthage.<sup>4</sup> A chosen division of two thousand five hundred citi-

<sup>1</sup> Appian, viii, 32, 54, 59; Phlegon, Trall. de Mirabilibus, c. 18. *Εὐμαχὸς δὲ φησὶν ἐν Περιγῆσει, Καρχηδονίους περιταφρεύοντας τὴν ἰδίαν ἐπαρχίαν, τῶρεϊν ὀρύσσοντας δύο σκελετοὺς ἐν σόρῳ κειμένους*, etc.

The line of trench however was dug apparently at an early stage of the Carthaginian dominion; for the Carthaginians afterwards, as they grew more powerful, extended their possessions beyond the trench; as we see by the passages of Appian above referred to.

Mörsers (Gesch. der Phœniz. ii, 2, p. 457) identifies this trench with the one which Pliny names near Thénæ on the Lesser Syrtis, as having been dug by order of the second Africanus — to form a boundary between the Roman province of Africa, and the dominion of the native kings (Pliny, H. N. v, 3). But I greatly doubt such identity. It appears to me that this last is distinct from the Carthaginian trench.

<sup>2</sup> A Carthaginian citizen wore as many rings as he had served campaigns (Aristotel. Politic. vii, 2, 6).

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xx, 10.

<sup>4</sup> Appian, viii, 80. Twenty thousand panoplies, together with an immense stock of weapons and engines of siege, were delivered up to the perfidious manœuvres of the Romans, a little before the last siege of Carthage.

See Bötticher, Geschichte der Carthager, p. 20–25.

zens, men of wealth and family, formed what was called the Sacred Band of Carthage,<sup>1</sup> distinguished for their bravery in the field as well as for the splendor of their arms, and the gold and silver plate which formed part of their baggage. We shall find these citizen-troops occasionally employed on service in Sicily: but most part of the Carthaginian armies consists of Gauls, Iberians, Libyans, etc., a mingled host got together for the occasion, discordant in language as well as in customs. Such men had never any attachment to the cause in which they fought, — seldom, to the commanders under whom they served; while they were often treated by Carthage with bad faith, and recklessly abandoned to destruction.<sup>2</sup> A military system such as this was pregnant with danger, if ever the mercenary soldiers got footing in Africa; as happened after the first Punic war, when the city was brought to the brink of ruin. But on foreign service in Sicily, these mercenaries often enabled Carthage to make conquest at the cost only of her money, without any waste of the blood of her own citizens. The Carthaginian generals seem generally to have relied, like Persians, upon numbers, — manifesting little or no military skill; until we come to the Punic wars with Rome, conducted under Hamilkar Barca and his illustrious son Hannibal.

Respecting the political constitution of Carthage, the facts known are too few, and too indistinct, to enable us to comprehend its real working. The magistrates most conspicuous in rank and precedence were, the two kings or suffetes, who presided over the Senate.<sup>3</sup> They seem to have been renewed annually, though how far the same persons were reëligible, or actually rechosen, we do not

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi, 8.

<sup>2</sup> See the striking description in Livy, of the motley composition of the Carthaginian mercenary armies, where he bestows just admiration on the genius of Hannibal, for having always maintained his ascendancy over them, and kept them in obedience and harmony (Livy, xxviii, 12). Compare Polybius, i, 65–67, and the manner in which Imilkon abandoned his mercenaries to destruction at Syracuse (Diodor. xiv, 75–77).

<sup>3</sup> There were in like manner two suffetes in Gades and each of the other Phœnician colonies (Livy, xxviii, 37). Cornelius Nepos (Hannibal, c. 7) talks of Hannibal as having been made *king* (rex) when he was invested with his great foreign military command, at twenty-two years of age. So Diodorus (xiv, 54) talks about Imilkon, and Herodotus (vii, 166) about Hamilkar.



know ; but they were always selected out of some few principal families or Gentes. There is reason for believing that the genuine Carthaginian citizens were distributed into three tribes, thirty curiæ, and three hundred gentes — something in the manner of the Roman patricians. From these gentes emanated a Senate of three hundred, out of which again was formed a smaller council or committee of thirty *principes* representing the curiæ;<sup>1</sup> sometimes a still smaller, of only ten *principes*. These little councils are both frequently mentioned in the political proceedings of Carthage ; and perhaps the Thirty may coincide with what Polybius calls the Gerusia, or Council of Ancients, — the Three Hundred, with that which he calls the Senate.<sup>2</sup> Aristotle assimilates the two kings (suffetes) of Carthage to the two kings of Sparta — and the Gerusia of Carthage also to that of Sparta ;<sup>3</sup> which latter consisted of thirty members, including the kings who sat in it. But Aristotle does not allude to any assembly at Carthage analogous to what Polybius calls the Senate. He mentions two Councils, one of one hundred members, the other of one hundred and four ; and certain Boards of Five, — the pentarchies. He compares the Council of one hundred and four to the Spartan ephors ; yet again he talks of the pentarchies as invested with extensive functions, and terms the Council of one hundred the greatest authority in the state. Perhaps this last Council was identical with the assembly of one hundred Judges (said to have been chosen from the Senate as a check upon the generals employed), or Ordo Judicum ; of which Livy speaks after the second Punic war, as existing with its members perpetual and so powerful that it overruled all the other assemblies and magistracies of the state. Through the influence of Hannibal, a law was passed to lessen the overweening power of this Order of Judges ; causing them to be elected only for one year, instead of being perpetual.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Mövers, Die Phönizier, ii, 1, p. 483-499.

<sup>2</sup> Polybius, x, 18 ; Livy, xxx, 16.

Yet again Polybius in another place speaks of the Gerontion at Carthage as representing the aristocratical force, and as opposed to the *πληθος* or people (vi, 51). It would seem that by *Γερόντιον* he must mean the same as the assembly called in another passage (x, 18) *Σύγκλητος*.

<sup>3</sup> Aristotel. Politic. ii, 8, 2.

<sup>4</sup> Livy, xxxiii. 46. Justin (xix, 2) mentions the one hundred select Senators set apart as judges.

These statements, though coming from valuable authors, convey so little information and are withal so difficult to reconcile, that both the structure and working of the political machine at Carthage may be said to be unknown.<sup>1</sup> But it seems clear that the general spirit of the government was highly oligarchical ; that a few rich, old, and powerful families, divided among themselves the great offices and influence of the state ; that they maintained themselves in pointed and even insolent distinction from the multitude ;<sup>2</sup> that they stood opposed to each other in bitter feuds, often stained by gross perfidy and bloodshed ; and that the treatment with which, through these violent party-antipathies, unsuccessful generals were visited, was cruel in the extreme.<sup>3</sup> It appears that wealth was one indispensable qualification, and that magistrates and generals procured their appointments in a great measure by corrupt means. Of such corruption, one variety was, the habit of constantly regaling the citizens in collective banquets of the *curiæ* or the political associations ; a habit so continual, and embracing so wide a circle of citizens, that Aristotle compares these banquets to the *phiditia* or public mess of Sparta.<sup>4</sup> There was a *demos* or people at Carthage, who were consulted on particular occasions, and before whom propositions were publicly debated, in cases where the suffetes and the small Council were not all of one mind.<sup>5</sup> How numerous

<sup>1</sup> Heeren (Ideen über den Verkehr der Alten Welt, part ii, p. 138, 3rd edit.) and Kluge (in his Dissertation, Aristoteles de Politia Carthaginiensium, Wratisl. 1824) have discussed all these passages with ability. But their materials do not enable them to reach any certainty.

<sup>2</sup> Valerius Max. ix, 5, 4. "Insolentiæ inter Carthaginiensem et Campanum senatum quasi æmulatio fuit. Ille enim separato à plebe balneo lavabatur, hic diverso foro utebatur."

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xx, 10 ; xxiii, 9 ; Valer. Max. ii, 7, 1.

<sup>4</sup> Aristotel. Politic. iii, 5, 6.

These banquets must have been settled, daily proceedings, — as well as multitudinous, in order to furnish even apparent warrant for the comparison which Aristotle makes with the Spartan public mess. But even granting the analogy on these external points, — the intrinsic difference of character and purpose between the two must have been so great, that the comparison seems not happy.

Livy (xxxiv, 61) talks of the *circuli et convivia* at Carthage ; but this is probably a general expression, without particular reference to the public banquets mentioned by Aristotle.

<sup>5</sup> Aristotel. Polit. ii, 8, 2.



this *demos* was, or what proportion of the whole population it comprised, we have no means of knowing. But it is plain, that whether more or less considerable, its multitude was kept under dependence to the rich families by stratagems such as the banquets, the lucrative appointments with lots of land in foreign dependencies, etc. The purposes of government were determined, its powers wielded and the great offices held — suffetes, senators, generals, or judges, — by the members of a small number of wealthy families; and the chief opposition which they encountered, was from their feuds against each other. In the main, the government was conducted with skill and steadiness, as well for internal tranquillity as for systematic foreign and commercial aggrandizement. Within the knowledge of Aristotle, Carthage had never suffered either the successful usurpation of a despot, or any violent intestine commotion.<sup>1</sup>

The first eminent Carthaginian leader brought to our notice, is Mago (seemingly about 530–500 B. C.), who is said to have mainly contributed to organize the forces, and extend the dominion, of Carthage. Of his two sons, one, Hasdrubal, perished after a victorious career in Sardinia;<sup>2</sup> the other, Hamilkar, commanding at the battle of Himera in Sicily, was there defeated and slain by Gelon, as has been already recounted. After the death of Hamilkar, his son Giskon was condemned to perpetual exile, and passed his life in Sicily at the Greek city of Selinus.<sup>3</sup> But the sons of Hasdrubal

<sup>1</sup> Aristot. Polit. ii, 8, 1. He briefly alludes to the abortive conspiracy of Hanno (v, 6, 2), which is also mentioned in Justin (xxi, 4). Hanno is said to have formed the plan of putting to death the Senate, and making himself despot. But he was detected, and executed under the severest tortures; all his family being put to death along with him.

Not only is it very difficult to make out Aristotle's statements about the Carthaginian government, — but some of them are even contradictory. One of these (v, 10, 3) has been pointed out by M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, who proposes to read *ἐν Χαλκηδόνι* instead of *ἐν Καρχηδόνι*. In another place (v, 10, 4) Aristotle calls Carthage (*ἐν Καρχηδόνι δημοκρατούμενη*) a state democratically governed; which cannot be reconciled with what he says in ii, 8, respecting its government.

Aristotle compares the Council of One Hundred and Four at Carthage to the Spartan ephors. But it is not easy to see how so numerous a body could have transacted the infinite diversity of administrative and other business performed by the five ephors.

<sup>2</sup> Justin, xix, 1

Diodor. xiii

still remained at Carthage, the most powerful citizens in the state carrying on hostilities against the Moors and other indigenous Africans, whom they compelled to relinquish the tribute which Carthage had paid, down to that time, for the ground whereon the city was situated. This family are said indeed to have been so powerful, that a check upon their ascendancy was supposed to be necessary; and for that purpose the select One Hundred Senators sitting as judges were now nominated for the first time.<sup>1</sup> Such wars in Africa doubtless tended to prevent the Carthaginians from farther interference in Sicily, during the interval between 480–410 B. C. There were probably other causes also, not known to us, — and down to the year 413 B. C., the formidable naval power of Athens (as has been already remarked) kept them on the watch even for themselves. But now, after the great Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, apprehensions from that quarter were dissipated; so that Carthage again found leisure, as well as inclination, to seek in Sicily both aggrandizement and revenge.

It is remarkable that the same persons, acting in the same quarrel, who furnished the pretext or the motive for the recent invasion by Athens, now served in the like capacity as prompters to Carthage. The inhabitants of Egesta, engaged in an unequal war with rival neighbors at Selinus, were in both cases the soliciting parties. They had applied to Carthage first, without success,<sup>2</sup> before they thought of sending to invoke aid from Athens. This war indeed had been for the time merged and forgotten in the larger Athenian enterprise against Syracuse; but it revived after that catastrophe, wherein Athens and her armament were shipwrecked. The Egestæans had not only lost their protectors, but had incurred aggravated hostility from their neighbors, for having brought upon Sicily so formidable an ultramarine enemy. Their original quarrel with Selinus had related to a disputed portion of border territory. This point they no longer felt competent to maintain, under

<sup>1</sup> Justin, xix, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xii, 82.

It seems probable that the war which Diodorus mentions to have taken place in 452 B. C., between the Egestæans and Lilybæans — was really a war between Egesta and Selinus (see Diodor. xi, 86 — with Wesseling's note) Lilybæum as a town attained no importance until after the capture of Motyé by the elder Dionysius in 393 B. C.



their present disadvantageous circumstances. But the Selinuntines, confident as well as angry, were now not satisfied with success in their original claim. They proceeded to strip the Egestæans of other lands indisputably belonging to them, and seriously menaced the integrity as well as the independence of the city. To no other quarter could the Egestæans turn, with any chance of finding both will and power to protect them, except to Carthage.<sup>1</sup>

The town of Egesta (non-Hellenic or at least only semi-Hellenic) was situated on or near the northern line of Sicilian coast, not far from the western cape of the island, and in the immediate neighborhood of the Carthaginian settlements, — Motyê, Panormus (now Palermo), and Soloeis or Soluntum. Selinus also was near the western cape, but on the southern coast of Sicily, with its territory conterminous to the southern portion of Egesta. When therefore the Egestæan envoys presented their urgent supplications at Carthage for aid, proclaiming that unless assisted they must be subjugated and become a dependency of Selinus, — the Carthaginians would not unreasonably conceive, that their own Sicilian settlements would be endangered, if their closest Hellenic neighbor were allowed thus to aggrandize herself. Accordingly they agreed to grant the aid solicited; yet not without much debate and hesitation. They were uneasy at the idea of resuming military operations in Sicily, — which had been laid aside for seventy years, and had moreover left such disastrous recollections<sup>2</sup> — at a moment when Syracusan courage stood in high renown, from the recent destruction of the Athenian armament. But the recollections of the Gelonian victory at Himera, while they suggested apprehension, also kindled the appetite of revenge; especially in the bosom of Hannibal, the grandson of that general Hamilkar who had there met his death. Hannibal was at this moment king, or rather first of the two suffetes, chief executive magistrates of Carthage, as his grandfather had been seventy years before. So violent had been the impression made upon the Carthaginians by the defeat of Himera, that they had banished Giskon, son of the slain general Hamilkar and father of Hannibal, and had condemned him to pass his whole life in exile. He had chosen the Greek city of Selinus; where probably Hannibal also had spent his youth, though restored

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 43.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiii, 43.

since to his country and to his family consequence, — and from whence he brought back an intense antipathy to the Greek name, as well as an impatience to wipe off by a signal revenge the dishonor both of his country and of his family. Accordingly, espousing with warmth the request of the Egestæans, he obtained from the Senate authority to take effective measures for their protection.<sup>1</sup>

His first proceeding was to send envoys to Egesta and Selinus, to remonstrate against the encroachments of the Selinuntines; with farther instructions, in case remonstrance proved ineffectual, to proceed with the Egestæans to Syracuse, and there submit the whole dispute to the arbitration of the Syracusans. He foresaw that the Selinuntines, having superiority of force on their side, would refuse to acknowledge any arbitration; and that the Syracusans, respectfully invoked by one party but rejected by the other, would stand aside from the quarrel altogether. It turned out as he had expected. The Selinuntines sent envoys to Syracuse, to protest against the representations from Egesta and Carthage; but declined to refer their case to arbitration. Accordingly, the Syracusans passed a vote that they would maintain their alliance with Selinus, yet without impeachment of their pacific relations with Carthage: thus leaving the latter free to act without obstruction. Hannibal immediately sent over a body of troops to the aid of Egesta: five

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 43. Κατέστησαν στρατηγὸν τὸν Ἀννίβαν, κατὰ νόμους τότε βασιλεύοντα. Οὗτος δὲ ἦν νῆωνος μὲν τοῦ πρὸς Γέλωνα πολέμησαντος Ἀμίλκον, καὶ πρὸς Ἰμέρα τελευτήσαντος, νῆος δὲ Γέσκωνος, ὃς διὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἦτταν ἐφυγαδένθη, καὶ κατεβίωσεν ἐν τῇ Σελινούντι. Ὁ δ' οὖν Ἀννίβας, ὃν μὲν καὶ φύσει μισέλλην, ὁμῶς δὲ τὰς τῶν προγόνων ἀτιμίας διορθώσασθαι βουλόμενος, etc.

The banishment of Giskon, and that too for the whole of his life, deserves notice, as a point of comparison between the Greek republics and Carthage. A defeated general in Greece, if he survived his defeat, was not unfrequently banished, even where there seems neither proof nor probability that he had been guilty of misconduct, or misjudgment, or omission. But I do not recollect any case in which, when a Grecian general thus apparently innocent was not merely defeated but slain in the battle, his son was banished for life, as Giskon was banished by the Carthaginians. In appreciating the manner in which the Grecian states, both democratical and oligarchical, dealt with their officers, the contemporary republic of Carthage is one important standard of comparison. Those who censure the Greeks, will have to find stronger terms of condemnation when they review the proceedings of the Carthaginians.



thousand Libyans or Africans; and eight hundred Campanian mercenaries, who had been formerly in the pay and service of the Athenians before Syracuse, but had quitted that camp before the final catastrophe occurred.<sup>1</sup>

In spite of the reinforcement and the imposing countenance of Carthage, the Selinuntines, at this time in full power and prosperity, still believed themselves strong enough to subdue Egesta. Under such persuasion, they invaded the territory with their full force. They began to ravage the country, yet at first with order and precaution; but presently, finding no enemy in the field to oppose them, they became careless, and spread themselves about for disorderly plunder. This was the moment for which the Egestæans and Carthaginians were watching. They attacked the Selinuntines by surprise, defeated them with the loss of a thousand men, and recaptured the whole booty.<sup>2</sup>

The war, as hitherto carried on, was one offensive on the part of the Selinuntines, for the purpose of punishing or despoiling their ancient enemy Egesta. Only so far as was necessary for the defence of the latter, had the Carthaginians yet interfered. But against such an interference the Selinuntines, if they had taken a prudent measure of their own force, would have seen that they were not likely to achieve any conquest. Moreover, they might perhaps have obtained peace now, had they sought it; as a considerable minority among them, headed by a citizen named Empedion,<sup>3</sup> urgently recommended: for Selinus appears always to have been on more friendly terms with Carthage than any other Grecian city in Sicily. Even at the great battle of Himera, the Selinuntine troops had not only not assisted Gelon, but had actually fought in the Carthaginian army under Hamilkar;<sup>4</sup> a plea, which, had it been pressed, might probably have had weight with Hannibal. But this claim upon the goodwill of Carthage appears only to have rendered them more confident and passionate in braving her force and in prosecuting the war. They sent to Syracuse to ask for aid, which the Syracusans, under present circumstances, promised to send them. But the promise was given with little cordiality, as appears by the manner in which they fulfilled it, as well as from

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 43, 44.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiii, 59.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiii, 44.

<sup>4</sup> Diodor. xiii, 55; xi. 21.

the neutrality which they had professed so recently before; for the contest seemed to be aggressive on the part of Selinus, so that Syracuse had little interest in helping her to conquer Egesta. Neither Syracusans nor Selinuntines were prepared for the immense preparations, and energetic rapidity of movement by which Hannibal at once altered the character, and enlarged the purposes, of the war. He employed all the ensuing autumn and winter in collecting a numerous host of mercenary troops from Africa, Spain, and Campania, with various Greeks who were willing to take service.<sup>1</sup>

In the spring of the memorable year 409 B. C., through the exuberant wealth of Carthage, he was in a condition to leave Africa with a great fleet of sixty triremes, and fifteen hundred transports or vessels of burthen;<sup>2</sup> conveying an army, which, according to the comparatively low estimate of Timæus, amounted to more than one hundred thousand men; while Ephorus extended the number to two hundred thousand infantry, and four thousand cavalry, together with muniments of war and battering machines for siege. With these he steered directly for the western Cape of Sicily, Lilybæum; taking care, however, to land his troops and to keep his fleet on the northern side of that cape, in the bay near Motyê,—and not to approach the southern shore, lest he should alarm the Syracusans with the idea that he was about to prosecute his voyage farther eastward along the southern coast towards their city. By this precaution, he took the best means for prolonging the period of Syracusan inaction. The Selinuntines, panic-struck at the advent of an enemy so much more overwhelming than they had expected, sent pressing messengers to Syracuse to accelerate the promised help. They had made no provision for standing on the defensive against a really formidable aggressor. Their walls, though strong enough to hold out against Sicilian neighbors, had been neglected during the long-continued absence of any foreign besieger, and were now in many places out of

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 54–58. οἱ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις Ἕλληνας ἐνμαχοῦντες, etc.

It cannot therefore be exact,—that which Plutarch affirms, Timoleon, c. 10,—that the Carthaginians had never employed Greeks in their service, at the time of the battle of the Krimêsus,—B. C. 340.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. vi, 34. δυνατοὶ δὲ εἶσι (the Carthaginians) μάλιστα τῶν νηῶν, βουλόμενοι χρῆσθαι γὰρ καὶ ἰσχυροῦσι πλείστον κέκτηνται, ὅθεν ὁ τε πόλεμος καὶ τὰλλα εὐπορεῖ.



repair. Hannibal left them no time to make good past deficiencies. Instead of wasting his powerful armament (as the unfortunate Nikias had done five years before) by months of empty flourish and real inaction, he waited only until he was joined by the troops from Egesta and the neighboring Carthaginian dependencies, and then marched his whole force straight from Lilybæum to Selinus. Crossing the river Mazara in his way, and storming the fort which lay near its mouth, he soon found himself under the Selinuntine walls. He distributed his army into two parts, each provided with battering machines and movable wooden towers; and then assailed the walls on many points at once, choosing the points where they were most accessible or most dilapidated. Archers and slingers in great numbers were posted near the walls, to keep up a discharge of missiles and chase away the defenders from the battlements. Under cover of such discharge, six wooden towers were rolled up to the foot of the wall, to which they were equal or nearly equal in height, so that the armed men in their interior were prepared to contend with the defenders almost on a level. Against other portions of the wall, battering-rams with iron heads were driven by the combined strength of multitudes, shaking or breaking through its substance, especially where it showed symptoms of neglect or decay. Such were the methods of attack which Hannibal now brought to bear upon the unprepared Selinuntines. He was eager to forestal the arrival of auxiliaries, by the impetuous movements of his innumerable barbaric host, the largest seen in Sicily since his grandfather Hamilkar had been defeated before Himera. Collected from all the shores of the western Mediterranean, it presented soldiers heterogeneous in race, in arms, in language, — in everything, except bravery and common appetite for blood as well as plunder.<sup>1</sup>

The dismay of the Selinuntines, when they suddenly found themselves under the sweep of this destroying hurricane, is not to be described. It was no part of the scheme of Hannibal to impose conditions or grant capitulation; for he had promised the plunder of their town to his soldiers. The only chance of the besieged was, to hold out with the courage of desperation, until they could receive aid from their Hellenic brethen on the south

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 54, 55

ern coast, — Agrigentum, Gela, and especially Syracuse, — all of whom they had sent to warn and to supplicate. Their armed population crowded to man the walls, with a resolution worthy of Greeks and citizens; while the old men and the females, though oppressed with agony from the fate which seemed to menace them, lent all the aid and encouragement in their power. Under the sound of trumpets, and every variety of war-cry, the assailants approached the walls, encountering everywhere a valiant resistance. They were repulsed again and again, with the severest loss. But fresh troops came up to relieve those who were slain or fatigued; and at length, after a murderous struggle, a body of Campanians forced their way over the walls into the town. Yet in spite of such temporary advantage, the heroic efforts of the besieged drove them out again or slew them, so that night arrived without the capture being accomplished. For nine successive days was the assault thus renewed with undiminished fury; for nine successive days did this heroic population maintain a successful resistance, though their enemies were numerous enough to relieve each other perpetually, — though their own strength was every day failing, — and though not a single friend arrived to their aid. At length, on the tenth day, and after terrible loss to the besiegers, a sufficient breach was made in the weak part of the wall, for the Iberians to force their way into the city. Still however the Selinuntines, even after their walls were carried, continued with unabated resolution to barricade and defend their narrow streets, in which their women also assisted, by throwing down stones and tiles upon the assailants from the house-tops. All these barriers were successively overthrown, by the unexhausted numbers, and increasing passion, of the barbaric host; so that the defenders were driven back from all sides into the agora, where most of them closed their gallant defence by an honorable death. A small minority, among whom was Empedion, escaped to Agrigentum, where they received the warmest sympathy and the most hospitable treatment.<sup>1</sup>

Resistance being thus at an end, the assailants spread themselves through the town in all the fury of insatiate appetites, — murderous, lustful, and rapacious. They slaughtered indiscrimi-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 56, 57.



nately elders and children, preserving only the grown women as captives. The sad details of a town taken by storm are to a great degree the same in every age and nation; but the destroying barbarians at Selinus manifested one peculiarity, which marks them as lying without the pale of Hellenic sympathy and sentiment. They mutilated the bodies of the slain; some were seen with amputated hands strung together in a row and fastened round their girdles; while others brandished heads on the points of their spears and javelins.<sup>1</sup> The Greeks (seemingly not numerous) who served under Hannibal, far from sharing in these ferocious manifestations, contributed somewhat to mitigate the deplorable fate of the sufferers. Sixteen thousand Selinuntines are said to have been slain, five thousand to have been taken captive; while two thousand six hundred escaped to Agrigentum.<sup>2</sup> These figures are probably under, rather than above, the truth. Yet they do not seem entitled to any confidence; nor do they give us any account of the entire population in its different categories,—old and young,—men and women,—freemen and slaves,—citizens and metics. We can only pretend to appreciate this mournful event in the gross. All exact knowledge of its details is denied to us.

It does little honor either to the generosity or to the prudence of the Hellenic neighbors of Selinus, that this unfortunate city should have been left to its fate unassisted. In vain was messenger after messenger despatched, as the defence became more and more critical, to Agrigentum, Gela, and Syracuse. The military force of the two former was indeed made ready, but postponed its march until joined by that of the last; so formidable was the account given of the invading host. Meanwhile the Syracusans were not ready. They thought it requisite, first, to close the war which they were prosecuting against Katana and Naxos,—next, to muster a large and carefully-appointed force. Before these preliminaries were finished, the nine days of siege were past, and the death-hour of Selinus had sounded. Probably the Syracusans were misled by the Sicilian operations of Nikias, who, beginning with a long interval of inaction, had then approached their town by slow blockade, such as the circumstances of his case required. Expecting in the case of Selinus that Hannibal would enter upon

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii. 57.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiii. 57, 58.

the like elaborate siege,—and not reflecting that he was at the head of a vast host of miscellaneous foreigners hired for the occasion, of whose lives he could afford to be prodigal, while Nikias commanded citizens of Athens and other Grecian states, whom he could not expose to the murderous but thorough-going process of ever-renewed assault against strong walls recently erected,—they were thunderstruck on being informed that nine days of carnage had sufficed for the capture. The Syracusan soldiers, a select body of three thousand, who at length joined the Geloans and Agrigentines at Agrigentum, only arrived in time to partake in the general dismay everywhere diffused. A joint embassy was sent by three cities to Hannibal, entreating him to permit the ransom of the captives, and to spare the temples of the gods; while Empedion went at the same time to sue for compassion on behalf of his own fugitive fellow-citizens. To the former demand the victorious Carthaginian returned an answer at once haughty and characteristic,—“The Selinuntines have not been able to preserve their freedom, and must now submit to a trial of slavery. The gods have become offended with them, and have taken their departure from the town.”<sup>1</sup> To Empedion, an ancient friend and pronounced partisan of the Carthaginians, his reply was more indulgent. All the relatives of Empedion, found alive among the captives, were at once given up; moreover permission was granted to the fugitive Selinuntines to return, if they pleased, and reoccupy the town with its lands, as tributary subjects of Carthage. At the same time that he granted such permission, however, Hannibal at once caused the walls to be razed, and even the town with its temples to be destroyed.<sup>2</sup> What was done about the proposed ransom, we do not hear.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii. 59. Ὁ δὲ Ἀννίβας ἀπεκρίθη, τοὺς μὲν Σελινουντίους μὴ δυναμένους τηρεῖν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, πείραν τῆς δουλείας λήψεσθαι· τοὺς δὲ θεοὺς ἐκτὸς Σελινούντος οἴχεσθαι, προσκόψαντας τοῖς ἐνοικοῦσιν.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiii. 59. The ruins, yet remaining, of the ancient temples of Selinus, are vast and imposing; characteristic as specimens of Doric art, during the fifth and sixth centuries B. C. From the great magnitude of the fallen columns, it has been supposed that they were overthrown by an earthquake. But the ruins afford distinct evidence, that these columns have been first undermined, and then overthrown by crow-bars.

This impressive fact, demonstrating the agency of the Carthaginian destroyers, is stated by Niebuhr, *Vorträge über alte Geschichte*, vol. iii, p. 207.



Having satiated his troops with this rich plunder Hannibal now quitted the scene of bloodshed and desolation, and marched across the island to Himera on its northern coast. Though Selinus, as the enemy of Egesta, had received the first shock of his arms, yet it was against Himera that the grand purpose of his soul was directed. Here it was that Hamilkar had lost both his army and his life, entailing inexpiable disgrace upon the whole life of his son Giskon: here it was that his grandson intended to exact full vengeance and requital from the grandchildren of those who then occupied the fated spot. Not only was the Carthaginian army elated with the past success, but a number of fresh Sikels and Sikans, eager to share in plunder as well as to gratify the antipathies of their races against the Grecian intruders, flocked to join it; thus making up the losses sustained in the recent assault. Having reached Himera, and disposed his army in appropriate positions around, Hannibal proceeded to instant attack, as at Selinus; pushing up his battering machines and towers against the vulnerable portions of the walls, and trying at the same time to undermine them. The Himeræans defended themselves with desperate bravery; and on this occasion the defence was not unassisted; for four thousand allies, chiefly Syracusans, and headed by the Syracusan Dioklès, had come to the city as a reinforcement. For a whole day they repelled with slaughter repeated assaults. No impression being made upon the city, the besieged became so confident in their own valor, that they resolved not to copy the Selinuntines in confining themselves to defence, but to sally out at daybreak the next morning and attack the besiegers in the field. Ten thousand gallant men, — Himeræans, Syracusans, and other Grecian allies, — accordingly marched out with the dawn; while the battlements were lined with old men and women as anxious spectators of their exploits. The Carthaginians near the walls, who, preparing to renew the assault, looked for nothing less than for a sally, were taken by surprise. In spite of their great superiority of number, and in spite of great personal bravery, they fell into confusion, and were incapable of long resisting the gallant and orderly charge of the Greeks. At length they gave way and fled towards the neighboring hill, where Hannibal himself with his body of reserve was posted to cover the operations of assault. The Greeks pursued them fiercely and slaughtered great numbers (six thousand according to Timæus

but not less than twenty thousand, if we are to accept the broad statement of Ephorus), exhorting each other not to think of making prisoners. But in the haste and exultation of pursuit, they became out of breath, and their ranks fell into disorder. In this untoward condition, they found themselves face to face with the fresh body of reserve brought up by Hannibal, who marched down the hill to receive and succor his own defeated fugitives. The fortune of the battle was now so completely turned, that the Himeræans, after bravely contending for some time against these new enemies, found themselves overpowered and driven back to their own gates. Three thousand of their bravest warriors, however, despairing of their city and mindful of the fate of Selinus, disdained to turn their backs, and perished to a man in obstinate conflict with the overwhelming numbers of the Carthaginians.<sup>1</sup>

Violent was the sorrow and dismay in Himera, when the flower of her troops were thus driven in as beaten men, with the loss of half their numbers. At this moment there chanced to arrive at the port a fleet of twenty-five triremes, belonging to Syracuse and other Grecian cities in Sicily; which triremes had been sent to aid the Peloponnesians in the *Ægean*, but had since come back, and were now got together for the special purpose of relieving the besieged city. So important a reinforcement ought to have revived the spirit of the Himeræans. It announced that the Syracusans were in full march across the island, with the main force of the city, to the relief of Himera. But this good news was more than counter-vailed by the statement, that Hannibal was ordering out the Carthaginian fleet in the bay of Motyê, in order that it might sail round cape Lilybæum and along the southern coast into the harbor of Syracuse, now defenceless through the absence of its main force. Apparently the Syracusan fleet, in sailing from Syracuse to Himera, had passed by the bay of Motyê, observed maritime movement among the Carthaginians there, and picked up these tidings in explanation. Here was intelligence more than sufficient to excite alarm for home, in the bosom of Dioklès and the Syracusans at Himera; especially under the despondency now reigning. Dioklès not only enjoined the captains of the fleet to sail back immediately to Syracuse, in order to guard against the apprehended

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 60.



surprise, but also insisted upon marching back thither himself by land with the Syracusan forces, and abandoning the farther defence of Himera. He would in his march home meet his fellow-citizens on their march outward, and conduct them back along with him. To the Himereans, this was a sentence of death, or worse than death. It plunged them into an agony of fright and despair. But there was no safer counsel to suggest, nor could they prevail upon Dioklès to grant anything more than means of transport for carrying off the Himerean population, when the city was relinquished to the besiegers. It was agreed that the fleet, instead of sailing straight to Syracuse, should employ itself in carrying off as much of the population as could be put on board, and in depositing them safely at Messênê; after which it would return to fetch the remainder, who would in the mean time defend the city with their utmost force.

Such was the frail chance of refuge now alone open to these unhappy Greeks, against the devouring enemy without. Immediately the feeble part of the population, — elders, women, and children, — crowding on board until the triremes could hold no more, sailed away along the northern coast to Messênê. On the same night, Dioklès also marched out of the city with his Syracusan soldiers; in such haste to get home, that he could not even tarry to bury the numerous Syracusan soldiers who had been just slain in the recent disastrous sally. Many of the Himereans, with their wives and children, took their departure along with Dioklès, as their only chance of escape; since it was but too plain that the triremes could not carry away all. The bravest and most devoted portion of the Himerean warriors still remained, to defend their city until the triremes came back. After keeping armed watch on the walls all night, they were again assailed on the next morning by the Carthaginians, elate with their triumph of the preceding day and with the flight of so many defenders. Yet notwithstanding all the pressure of numbers, ferocity, and battering machines, the resistance was still successfully maintained; so that night found Himera still a Grecian city. On the next day, the triremes came back, having probably deposited their unfortunate cargo in some place of safety not so far off as Messênê. If the defenders could have maintained their walls until another sunset, many of them might yet have escaped. But the good fortune, and probably the

physical force, of these brave men, was now at an end. The gods were quitting Himera, as they had before quitted Selinus. At the moment when the triremes were seen coming near to the port, the Iberian assailants broke down a wide space of the fortification with their battering-rams, poured in through the breach, and overcame all opposition. Encouraged by their shouts, the barbaric host now on all sides forced the walls, and spread themselves over the city, which became one scene of wholesale slaughter and plunder. It was no part of the scheme of Hannibal to interrupt the plunder, which he made over as a recompense to his soldiers. But he speedily checked the slaughter, being anxious to take as many prisoners as possible, and increasing the number by dragging away all who had taken sanctuary in the temples. A few among this wretched population may have contrived to reach the approaching triremes; all the rest either perished or fell into the hands of the victor.<sup>1</sup>

It was a proud day for the Carthaginian general when he stood as master on the ground of Himera; enabled to fulfil the duty, and satisfy the exigencies, of revenge for his slain grandfather. Tragical indeed was the consummation of this long-cherished purpose. Not merely the walls and temples (as at Selinus), but all the houses in Himera, were razed to the ground. Its temples, having been first stripped of their ornaments and valuables, were burnt. The women and children taken captive were distributed as prizes among the soldiers. But all the male captives, three thousand in number, were conveyed to the precise spot where Hamilkar had been slain, and there put to death with indignity,<sup>2</sup> as an expiatory satisfaction to his lost honor. Lastly, in order that even the hated name of Himera might pass into oblivion, a new town called Therma (so designated because of some warm springs) was shortly afterwards founded by the Carthaginians in the neighborhood.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 61, 62.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiii, 62. Τῶν δ' αἰχμαλώτων γυναῖκας τε καὶ παῖδας διαδοὺς εἰς τὴν στρατόπεδον παρεφύλαττε· τῶν δ' ἀνδρῶν τοὺς ἀλόντας, εἰς τρισχιλίους ὄντας, ἀρήγαγεν ἐπὶ τὸν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ πρότερον Ἀμίλκας ὁ πάππος αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ Γέλωνος ἀνῆρέθη, καὶ πάντας αἰκισάμενος κατέσφαξε.

The Carthaginians, after their victory over Agathokles in 307 B. c., sacrificed their finest prisoners as offerings of thanks to the gods (Diodor. xiii, 65.)

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiii, 79.



No man can now read the account of this wholesale massacre without horror and repugnance. Yet we cannot doubt, that among all the acts of Hannibal's life, this was the one in which he most gloried; that it realized, in the most complete and emphatic manner, his concurrent inspirations of filial sentiment, religious obligation, and honor as a patriot; that to show mercy would have been regarded as a mean dereliction of these esteemed impulses; and that if the prisoners had been even more numerous, all of them would have been equally slain, rendering the expiatory fulfilment only so much the more honorable and efficacious. In the Carthaginian religion, human sacrifices were not merely admitted, but passed for the strongest manifestation of devotional fervor, and were especially resorted to in times of distress, when the necessity for propitiating the gods was accounted most pressing. Doubtless the feelings of Hannibal were cordially shared, and the plenitude of his revenge envied, by the army around him. So different, sometimes so totally contrary, is the tone and direction of the moral sentiments, among different ages and nations.

In the numerous wars of Greeks against Greeks, which we have been unfortunately called upon to study, we have found few or no examples of any considerable town taken by storm. So much the more terrible was the shock throughout the Grecian world, of the events just recounted; Selinus and Himera, two Grecian cities of ancient standing and uninterrupted prosperity, — had both of them been stormed, ruined, and depopulated, by a barbaric host, within the space of three months.<sup>1</sup> No event at all parallel had occurred since the sack of Miletus by the Persians after the Ionic revolt (495 B. C.),<sup>2</sup> which raised such powerful sympathy and mourning in Athens. The war now raging in the Ægean, between Athens and Sparta with their respective allies, doubtless contributed to deaden, throughout Central Greece, the impression of calamities sustained by Greeks at the western extremity of Sicily. But within that island, the sympathy with the sufferers was most acute, and aggravated by terror for the future. The Carthaginian general had displayed a degree of energy equal to any Grecian officer throughout the war, with a command of besieging and battering machinery surpassing even the best equipped Grecian cities.

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 37<sup>2</sup> Herodot. vi, 28

The mercenaries whom he had got together were alike terrible from their bravery and ferocity; encouraging Carthaginian ambition to follow up its late rapid successes by attacks against the other cities of the island. No such prospects indeed were at once realized. Hannibal, having completed his revenge at Himera, and extended the Carthaginian dominion all across the north-west corner of Sicily (from Selinus on the southern sea to the site of Himera or Therma on the northern), dismissed his mercenary troops and returned home. Most of them were satiated with plunder as well as pay, though the Campanians, who had been foremost at the capture of Selinus, thought themselves unfairly stinted, and retired in disgust.<sup>1</sup> Hannibal carried back a rich spoil, with glorious trophies, to Carthage, where he was greeted with enthusiastic welcome and admiration.<sup>2</sup>

Never was there a time when the Greek cities in Sicily, — and Syracuse especially, upon whom the others would greatly rest in the event of a second Carthaginian invasion, — had stronger motives for keeping themselves in a condition of efficacious defence. Unfortunately, it was just at this moment that a new cause of intestine discord burst upon Syracuse; fatally impairing her strength, and proving in its consequences destructive to her liberty. The banished Syracusan general Hermokrates had recently arrived at Messênê in Sicily; where he appears to have been, at the time when the fugitives came from Himera. It has already been mentioned that he, with two colleagues, had commanded the Syracusan contingent serving with the Peloponnesians under Mindarus in Asia. After the disastrous defeat of Kyzikus, in which Mindarus was slain and every ship in the fleet taken or destroyed, sentence of banishment was passed at Syracuse against the three admirals. Hermokrates was exceedingly popular among the trierarchs and the officers; he had stood conspicuous for incorruptibility, and had conducted himself (so far as we have means of judging) with energy and ability in his command. The sentence, unmerited by his behavior, was dictated by acute vexation for the loss of the fleet, and for the disappointment of those expectations which Hermokrates had held out; combined with the fact that Diokles and the opposite party were now in the ascendant at Sy-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 62-80.<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiii, 62.



racuse. When the banished general, in making it known to the armament, complained of its injustice and illegality, he obtained warm sympathy, and even exhortations still to retain the command, in spite of orders from home. He forbade them earnestly to think of raising sedition against their common city and country;<sup>1</sup> upon which the trierarchs, when they took their last and affectionate leave of him, bound themselves by oath, as soon as they should return to Syracuse, to leave no means untried for procuring his restoration.

The admonitory words addressed by Hermokrates to the forwardness of the trierarchs, would have been honorable to his patriotism, had not his own conduct at the same time been worthy of the worst enemies of his country. For immediately on being superseded by the new admirals, he went to the satrap Pharnabazus, in whose favor he stood high; and obtained from him a considerable present of money, which he employed in collecting mercenary troops and building ships, to levy war against his opponents in Syracuse and procure his own restoration.<sup>2</sup> Thus strengthened, he returned from Asia to Sicily, and reached the Sicilian Messênê rather before the capture of Himera by the Carthaginians. At Messênê he caused five fresh triremes to be built, besides taking into his pay one thousand of the expelled Himæans. At the head of these troops, he attempted to force his way into Syracuse, under concert with his friends in the city, who engaged to assist his admission by arms. Possibly some of the trierarchs of his armament, who had before sworn to lend him their aid, had now returned and were among this body of interior partisans.

The moment was well chosen for such an enterprise. As the disaster at Kyzikus had exasperated the Syracusans against Hermokrates, so we cannot doubt that there must have been a strong reaction against Diokles and his partisans, in consequence of the fall of Selinus unaided, and the subsequent abandonment of Himera. What degree of blame may fairly attach to Diokles for these misfortunes, we are not in a condition to judge. But such

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 28. Οἱ δ' οὐκ ἔλασαν δεῖν στασιάζειν πρὸς τῇ πόλει, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 31; Diodor. xiii, 63.

reverses in themselves were sure to discredit him more or less, and to lend increased strength and stimulus to the partisans of the banished Hermokrates. Nevertheless that leader, though he came to the gates of Syracuse, failed in his attempt to obtain admission, and was compelled to retire; upon which he marched his little army across the interior of the island, and took possession of the dismantled Selinus. Here he established himself as the chief of a new settlement, got together as many as he could of the expelled inhabitants (among whom probably some had already come back along with Empedion), and invited many fresh colonists from other quarters. Reestablishing a portion of the demolished fortifications, he found himself gradually strengthened by so many new-comers, as to place at his command a body of six thousand chosen hoplites,—probably independent of other soldiers of inferior merit. With these troops he began to invade the Carthaginian settlements in the neighborhood, Motyê and Panormus.<sup>1</sup> Having defeated the forces of both in the field, he carried his ravages successfully over their territories, with large acquisitions of plunder. The Carthaginians had now no army remaining in Sicily; for their immense host of the preceding year had consisted only of mercenaries levied for the occasion, and then disbanded.

These events excited strong sensation throughout Sicily. The valor of Hermokrates, who had restored Selinus and conquered the Carthaginians on the very ground where they had stood so recently in terrific force, was contrasted with the inglorious proceeding of Diokles at Himera. In the public assemblies of Syracuse, this topic, coupled with the unjust sentence whereby Hermokrates had been banished, was emphatically set forth by his partisans; producing some reaction in his favor, and a still greater effect in disgracing his rival Diokles. Apprised that the tide of Syracusan opinion was turning towards him, Hermokrates made renewed preparations for his return, and resorted to a new stratagem for the purpose of smoothing the difficulty. He marched from Selinus to the ruined site of Himera, informed himself of the spot where the Syracusan troops had undergone their murderous defeat, and collected together the bones of his slain fellow-citizens; which (or rather the unburied bodies) must have lain

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 63.



upon the field unheeded for about two years. Having placed these bones on cars richly decorated, he marched with his forces and conveyed them across the island from Himera to the Syracusan border. Here as an exile he halted; thinking it suitable now to display respect for the law, — though in his previous attempt he had gone up to the very gates of the city, without any similar scruples. But he sent forward some friends with the cars and the bones, tendering them to the citizens for the purpose of being honored with due funeral solemnities. Their arrival was the signal for a violent party discussion, and for an outburst of aggravated displeasure against Diokles, who had left the bodies unburied on the field of battle. "It was to Hermokrates (so his partisans urged) and to his valiant efforts against the Carthaginians, that the recovery of these remnants of the slain, and the opportunity of administering to them the funeral solemnities, was now owing. Let the Syracusans, after duly performing such obsequies, testify their gratitude to Hermokrates by a vote of restoration, and their displeasure against Diokles by a sentence of banishment."<sup>1</sup> Diokles with his partisans was thus placed at great disadvantage. In opposing the restoration of Hermokrates, he thought it necessary also to oppose the proposition for welcoming and burying the bones of the slain citizens. Here the feelings of the people went vehemently against him; the bones were received and interred, amidst the respectful attendance of all; and so strong was the reactionary sentiment generally, that the partisans of Hermokrates carried their proposition for sentencing Diokles to banishment. But on the other hand, they could not so far prevail as to obtain the restoration of Hermokrates himself. The purposes of the latter had been so palpably manifested, in trying a few months before to force his way into the city by surprise, and in now presenting himself at the frontier with an armed force under his command, — that his readmission would have been nothing less than a deliberate surrender of the freedom of the city to a despot.<sup>2</sup>

Having failed in this well-laid stratagem for obtaining a vote of

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 63, 75.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiii, 75. Καὶ ὁ μὲν Διοκλῆς ἐφυγαδύθη, τὸν δὲ Ἑρμοκράτην οὐδ' ὡς προσεδέξαντο· ὑπώπτενον γὰρ τὴν τάνδρὸς τόλμαν, μὴ ποτε τυχεῖν ἡγεμονίας, ἀναδείξει αὐτὸν τύραννον.

consent, Hermokrates saw that his return could not at that moment be consummated by open force. He therefore retired from the Syracusan frontier; yet only postponing his purposes of armed attack until his friends in the city could provide for him a convenient opportunity. We see plainly that his own party within had been much strengthened, and his opponents enfeebled, by the recent manœuvre. Of this a proof is to be found in the banishment of Diokles, who probably was not succeeded by any other leader of equal influence. After a certain interval, the partisans of Hermokrates contrived a plan which they thought practicable, for admitting him into the city by night. Forewarned by them, he marched from Selinus at the head of three thousand soldiers, crossed the territory of Gela,<sup>1</sup> and reached the concerted spot near the gate of Achradina during the night. From the rapidity of his advance, he had only a few troops along with him; the main body not having been able to keep up. With these few, however, he hastened to the gate, which he found already in possession of his friends, who had probably (like Pasimêlus at Corinth<sup>2</sup>) awaited a night on which they were posted to act as sentinels. Master of the gate, Hermokrates, though joined by his partisans within in arms, thought it prudent to postpone decisive attack until his own main force came up. But during this interval, the Syracusan authorities in the city, apprised of what had happened, mustered their full military strength in the agora, and lost no time in falling upon the band of aggressors. After a sharply contested combat, these aggressors were completely worsted, and Hermokrates himself slain with a considerable proportion of his followers. The remainder having fled, sentence of banishment was passed upon them. Several among the wounded, however, were reported by their relatives as slain, in order that they might escape being comprised in such a condemnation.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 75. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἑρμοκράτης τότε τὸν καιρὸν οὐχ ὁρῶν εὐθετον εἰς τὸ βιάσασθαι, πάλιν ἀνεχώρησεν εἰς Σελινοῦντα. Μετὰ δὲ τινα χρόνον, τὸν φίλων αὐτοῦ μεταπεμπομένων, ὤρμησε μετὰ τρισχιλίων στρατιωτῶν καὶ πορευθεὶς διὰ τῆς Γελῶας, ἤκε νυκτὸς ἐπὶ τὸν συντεταγμένον τόπον.

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 4, 8.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiii, 75.

Xenophon (Hellen. i, 3, 13) states that Hermokrates, ἤδη φεύγων ἐκ Συρακουσῶν, was among those who accompanied Pharnabazus along with the



Thus perished one of the most energetic of the Syracusan citizens; a man not less effective as a defender of his country against foreign enemies, than himself dangerous as a formidable enemy to her internal liberties. It would seem, as far as we can make out, that his attempt to make himself master of his country was powerfully seconded, and might well have succeeded. But it lacked that adventitious support arising from present embarrassment and danger in the foreign relations of the city, which we shall find so efficacious two years afterwards in promoting the ambitious projects of Dionysius.

Dionysius, — for the next coming generation the most formidable name in the Grecian world, — now appears for the first time in history. He was a young Syracusan of no consideration from family or position, described as even of low birth and low occupation; as a scribe or secretary, which was looked upon as a subordinate, though essential, function.<sup>1</sup> He was the son of Hermokrates, — not that eminent person whose death has been just described, but another person of the same name, whether related or

envoys intended to go to Susa, but who only went as far as Gordium in Phrygia, and were detained by Pharnabazus (on the requisition of Cyrus) for three years. This must have been in the year 407 B. C. Now I cannot reconcile this with the proceedings of Hermokrates as described by Diodorus; his coming to the Sicilian Messênê, — his exploits near Selinus, — his various attempts to procure restoration to Syracuse: — all of which must have occurred in 408–407 B. C., ending with the death of Hermokrates.

It seems to me impossible that the person mentioned by Xenophon as accompanying Pharnabazus into the interior can have been the eminent Hermokrates. Whether it was another person of the same name, — or whether Xenophon was altogether misinformed, — I will not take upon me to determine. There were really two contemporary Syracusans bearing that name, for the father of Dionysius the despot was named Hermokrates.

Polybius (xii, 25, p.) states that Hermokrates fought with the Lacedæmonians at Ægospotami. He means the eminent general so called; who however cannot have been at Ægospotami in the summer or autumn of 405 B. C. There is some mistake in the assertion of Polybius, but I do not know how to explain it.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 96; xiv, 66.

Isokrates, Or. v, Philipp. s. 73 — Dionysius, πολλοστὸς ὢν Συρακοσίων καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δόξῃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἁπασιν, etc.

Demosthenes, adv. Leptinem, p. 506, s. 178. γραμματέως, ὡς φασί, etc. Polybius (xv, 35), ἐκ δημοτικῆς καὶ ταπεινῆς ὑποθέσεως ὀρμηθεὶς, etc. Compare Polyænus, v, 2, 2.

not, we do not know.<sup>1</sup> It is highly probable that he was a man of literary ability and instruction, since we read of him in after-days as a composer of odes and tragedies; and it is certain that he stood distinguished in all the talents for military action, — bravery, force of will, and quickness of discernment. On the present occasion, he espoused strenuously the party of Hermokrates, and was one of those who took arms in the city on his behalf. Having distinguished himself in the battle, and received several wounds, he was among those given out for dead by his relations.<sup>2</sup> In this manner he escaped the sentence of banishment passed against the survivors. And when, in the course of a certain time, after recovering from his wounds, he was produced as unexpectedly living, — we may presume that his opponents and the leading men in the city left him unmolested, not thinking it worth while to reopen political inquisition in reference to matters already passed and finished. He thus remained in the city, marked out by his daring and address to the Hermokratæan party, as the person most fit to take up the mantle, and resume the anti-popular designs, of their late leader. It will presently be seen how the chiefs of this party lent their aid to exalt him.

Meanwhile the internal condition of Syracuse was greatly enfeebled by this division. Though the three several attempts of Hermokrates to penetrate by force or fraud into the city had all failed, yet they had left a formidable body of malcontents behind; while the opponents also, the popular government and its leaders, had been materially reduced in power and consideration by the banishment of Diokles. This magistrate was succeeded by Daphnæus and others, of whom we know nothing, except that they are spoken of as rich men and representing the sentiments of the rich, — and that they seem to have manifested but little ability. Nothing could be more unfortunate than the weakness of Syracuse at this particular juncture: for the Carthaginians, elate with their successes at Selinus and Himera, and doubtless also piqued by the subsequent retaliation of Hermokrates upon their dependencies at Motyé and Panormus, were just now meditating a second invasion of Sicily on a still larger scale. Not uninformed of their

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 24. Διονύσιος ὁ Ἐρμοκράτου Diodor. xiii, 91.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiii, 75.



projects, the Syracusan leaders sent envoys to Carthage to remonstrate against them, and to make propositions for peace. But no satisfactory answer could be obtained, nor were the preparations discontinued.<sup>1</sup>

In the ensuing spring, the storm gathering from Africa burst with destructive violence upon this fated island. A mercenary force had been got together during the winter, greater than that which had sacked Selinus and Himera; three hundred thousand men, according to Ephorus, — one hundred and twenty thousand, according to Xenophon and Timæus. Hannibal was again placed in command; but his predominant impulses of family and religion having been satiated by the great sacrifice of Himera, he excused himself on the score of old age, and was only induced to accept the duty by having his relative Imilkon named as colleague. By their joint efforts, the immense host of Iberians, Mediterranean islanders, Campanians, Libyans, and Numidians, was united at Carthage, and made ready to be conveyed across, in a fleet of one hundred and twenty triremes, with no less than one thousand five hundred transports.<sup>2</sup> To protect the landing, forty Carthaginian triremes were previously sent over to the Bay of Motyé. The Syracusan leaders, with commendable energy and watchfulness, immediately despatched the like number of triremes to attack them, in hopes of thereby checking the farther arrival of the grand armament. They were victorious, destroying fifteen of the Carthaginian triremes, and driving the rest back to Africa; yet their object was not attained; for Hannibal himself, coming forth immediately with fifty fresh triremes, constrained the Syracusans to retire. Presently afterwards the grand armament appeared, disembarking its motley crowd of barbaric warriors near the western cape of Sicily.

Great was the alarm caused throughout Sicily by their arrival. All the Greek cities either now began to prepare for war, or pushed with a more vigorous hand equipments previously begun, since they seem to have had some previous knowledge of the purpose of the enemy. The Syracusans sent to entreat assistance both from the Italian Greeks and from Sparta. From the latter city, however, little was to be expected, since her whole

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 79.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiii, 80, Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5 21.

efforts were now devoted to the prosecution of the war against Athens; this being the year wherein Kallikratidas commanded, and when the battle of Arginusæ was fought.

Of all Sicilian Greeks, the Agrigentines were both the most frightened and the most busily employed. Conterminous as they were with Selinus on their western frontier, and foreseeing that the first shock of the invasion would fall upon them, they immediately began to carry in their outlying property within the walls, as well as to accumulate a stock of provisions for enduring blockade. Sending for Dexippus, a Lacedæmonian then in Gela as commander of a body of mercenaries for the defence of that town, they engaged him in their service, with one thousand five hundred hoplites; reinforced by eight hundred of those Campanians who had served with Hannibal at Himera, but had quitted him in disgust.<sup>1</sup>

Agrigentum was at this time in the highest state of prosperity and magnificence; a tempting prize for any invader. Its population was very great; comprising, according to one account, twenty thousand citizens among an aggregate total of two hundred thousand males, — citizens, metics, and slaves; according to another account, an aggregate total of no less than eight hundred thousand persons;<sup>2</sup> numbers unauthenticated, and not to be trusted farther than as indicating a very populous city. Situated a little more than two miles from the sea, and possessing a spacious territory highly cultivated, especially with vines and olives, Agrigentum carried on a lucrative trade with the opposite coast of Africa, where at that time no such plantations flourished. Its temples and porticos, especially the spacious temple of Zeus Olympius, — its statues and pictures, — its abundance of chariots and horses, — its fortifications, — its sewers, — its artificial lake of near a mile in circumference, abundantly stocked with fish, — all these placed it on a par with the most splendid cities of the Hellenic world.<sup>3</sup> Of the numerous prisoners taken at the defeat of the Carthaginians near Himera seventy years before, a very large proportion had fallen to the lot of the Agrigentines, and had been employed by them in public works contributing to the advantage or ornament of the city.<sup>4</sup> The hospitality of the wealthy citizens, — Gellias,

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 81-84.

<sup>2</sup> Diogen. Laërt. viii, 63.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiii, 81-84 Polyb ix, 7

<sup>4</sup> Diodor. xi. 25.



Antisthenes, and others,—was carried even to profusion. The surrounding territory was celebrated for its breed of horses,<sup>1</sup> which the rich Agrigentines vied with each other in training and equipping for the chariot-race. At the last Olympic games immediately preceding this fatal Carthaginian invasion (that is at the 93rd Olympiad,—408 B. C.), the Agrigentine Exænetus gained the prize in a chariot-race. On returning to Sicily after his victory, he was welcomed by many of his friends, who escorted him home in procession with three hundred chariots, each drawn by a pair of white horses, and all belonging to native Agrigentines. Of the festival by which the wealthy Antisthenes celebrated the nuptials of his daughter, we read an account almost fabulous. Amidst all this wealth and luxury, it is not surprising to hear that the rough duties of military exercise were imperfectly kept up, and that indulgences, not very consistent with soldierlike efficiency, were allowed to the citizens on guard.

Such was Agrigentum in May 406 B. C., when Hannibal and Imilkon approached it with their powerful army. Their first propositions, however were not of a hostile character. They invited the Agrigentines to enter into alliance with Carthage; or if this were not acceptable, at any rate to remain neutral and at peace. Both propositions were declined.<sup>2</sup>

Besides having taken engagements with Gela and Syracuse, the Agrigentines also felt a confidence, not unreasonable, in the strength of their own walls and situation. Agrigentum with its citadel was placed on an aggregate of limestone hills, immediately above the confluence of two rivers, both flowing from the north; the river Akragas on the eastern and southern sides of the city, and the Hypsas on its western side. Of this aggregate of hills, separated from each other by clefts and valleys, the northern half is the loftiest, being about eleven hundred feet above the level of the sea—the southern half is less lofty. But on all sides, except on the south-west, it rises by a precipitous ascent; on the side towards the sea, it springs immediately out of the plain, thus presenting a fine prospect to ships passing along the coast. The whole of this aggregate of hills was encompassed by a continuous wall, built round the declivity, and in some parts hewn out of the solid rock. The town

<sup>1</sup> Virgil, *Æneid* iii, 704.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiii, 85.

of Agrigentum was situated in the southern half of the walled enclosure. The citadel, separated from it by a ravine, and accessible only by one narrow ascent, stood on the north-eastern hill; it was the most conspicuous feature in the place, called the Athenæum, and decorated by temples of Athênê and of Zeus Atabyrius. In the plain under the southern wall of the city stood the Agrigentine sepulchres.<sup>1</sup>—Reinforced by eight hundred Campanian mercenaries, with the fifteen hundred other mercenaries brought by Dexippus from Gela,—the Agrigentines awaited confidently the attack upon their walls, which were not only in far better condition than those of Selinus, but also unapproachable by battering-machines or movable towers, except on one part of the south-western side. It was here that Hannibal, after reconnoitering the town all round, began his attack. But after hard fighting without success for one day, he was forced to retire at nightfall; and even lost his battering train, which was burnt during the night by a sally of the besieged.<sup>2</sup> Desisting from farther attempts on that point, Hannibal now ordered his troops to pull down the tombs; which were numerous on the lower or southern side of the city, and many of which, especially that of the despot Theron, were of conspicuous grandeur. By this measure he calculated on providing materials adequate to the erection of immense mounds, equal in height to the southern wall, and sufficiently close to it for the purpose of assault. His numerous host had made considerable progress in demolishing these tombs, and were engaged in breaking down the monument of Theron,

<sup>1</sup> See about the Topography of Agrigentum,—Seyfert, *Akragas*, p 21, 23, 40 (Hamburg, 1845).

The modern town of Girgenti stands on one of the hills of this vast aggregate, which is overspread with masses of ruins, and around which the traces of the old walls may be distinctly made out, with considerable remains of them in some particular parts.

Compare Polybius, i, 18; ix, 27.

Pindar calls the town ποταμὸν τ' Ἀκραγαντι—*Pyth.* vi, 6. *τερὸν οἰκημα ποταμοῦ*—*Olymp* ii, 10.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiii, 85.

We read of a stratagem in Polyænus (v, 10, 4), whereby Imilkon is said to have enticed the Agrigentines, in one of their sallies, into incautious pursuit, by a simulated flight and thus to have inflicted upon them a serious defeat.



when their progress was arrested by a thunderbolt falling upon it. This event was followed by religious terrors, suddenly overspreading the camp. The prophets declared that the violation of the tombs was an act of criminal sacrilege. Every night the spectres of those whose tombs had been profaned manifested themselves, to the affright of the soldiers on guard; while the judgment of the gods was manifested in a violent pestilential distemper. Numbers of the army perished, Hannibal himself among them; and even of those who escaped death, many were disabled from active duty by distress and suffering. Imilkon was compelled to appease the gods, and to calm the agony of the troops, by a solemn supplication according to the Carthaginian rites. He sacrificed a child, considered as the most propitiatory of all offerings, to Kronus; and cast into the sea a number of animal victims as offerings to Poseidon.<sup>1</sup>

These religious rites calmed the terrors of the army, and mitigated, or were supposed to have mitigated, the distemper; so that Imilkon, while desisting from all farther meddling with the tombs, was enabled to resume his batteries and assaults against the walls, though without any considerable success. He also dammed up the western river Hypsas, so as to turn the stream against the wall; but this manœuvre produced no effect. His operations were presently interrupted by the arrival of a powerful army which marched from Syracuse, under Daphnæus, to the relief of Agrigentum. Reinforced in its road by the military strength of Kamarina and Gela, it amounted to thirty thousand foot and five thousand horse, on reaching the river Himera, the eastern frontier of the Agrigentine territory; while a fleet of thirty Syracusan triremes sailed along the coast to second its efforts. As these troops neared the town, Imilkon despatched against them a body of Iberians and Campanians;<sup>2</sup> who however, after a strenuous

<sup>1</sup> Diodor xiii, 86.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor xiii, 87.

It appears that an eminence a little way eastward from Agrigentum still bears the name of *Il Campo Cartaginese*, raising some presumption that it was once occupied by the Carthaginians. Evidently, the troops sent out by Imilkon to meet and repel Daphnæus, must have taken post to the eastward of Agrigentum, from which side the Syracusan army of relief was approaching. Seyfert (*Akragas*, p. 41) contests this point, and supposes

combat, were completely defeated, and driven back to the Carthaginian camp near the city, where they found themselves under the protection of the main army. Daphnæus, having secured the victory and inflicted severe loss upon the enemy, was careful to prevent his troops from disordering their ranks in the ardor of pursuit, in the apprehension that Imilkon with the main body might take advantage of that disorder to turn the fortune of the day,—as had happened in the terrible defeat before Himera, three years before. The routed Iberians were thus allowed to get back to the camp. At the same time the Agrigentines, witnessing from the walls, with joyous excitement, the flight of their enemies, vehemently urged their generals to lead them forth for an immediate sally, in order that the destruction of the fugitives might thus be consummated. But the generals were inflexible in resisting such demand; conceiving that the city itself would thus be stripped of its defenders, and that Imilkon might seize the occasion for assaulting it with his main body, when there was not sufficient force to repel them. The defeated Iberians thus escaped to the main camp; neither pursued by the Syracusans, nor impeded, as they passed near the Agrigentine walls, by the population within.

Presently Daphnæus with his victorious army reached Agrigentum, and joined the citizens; who flocked in crowds, along with the Lacedæmonian Dexippus, to meet and welcome them. But the joy of meeting, and the reciprocal congratulations on the recent victory, were fatally poisoned by general indignation for the unmolested escape of the defeated Iberians; occasioned by nothing less than remissness, cowardice, or corruption, (so it was contended), on the part of the generals,—first the Syracusan generals, and next the Agrigentine. Against the former, little was now said, though much was held in reserve, as we shall soon hear. But against the latter, the discontent of the Agrigentine population burst forth instantly and impetuously. A public assembly being held on the spot, the Agrigentine generals, five in number, were put under accusation. Among many speakers who denounced them as guilty of treason, the most violent of all was

that they must have been on the western side; misled by the analogy of the Roman siege in 262 B. C., when the Carthaginian relieving army under Hanno were coming from the westward,—from Heraklei (*Polyb. i. 19*).



the Kamarinaean Menês, — himself one of the leaders, seemingly of the Kamarinaean contingent in the army of Daphnaeus. The concurrence of Menês, carrying to the Agrigentines a full sanction of their sentiments, wrought them up to such a pitch of fury, that the generals, when they came to defend themselves, found neither sympathy nor even common fairness of hearing. Four out of the five were stoned and put to death on the spot; the fifth, Argeius, was spared only on the ground of his youth; and even the Lacedæmonian Dexippus was severely censured.<sup>1</sup>

How far, in regard to these proceedings, the generals were really guilty, or how far their defence, had it been fairly heard, would have been valid, — is a point which our scanty information does not enable us to determine. But it is certain that the arrival of the victorious Syracusans at Agrigentum completely altered the relative position of affairs. Instead of farther assaulting the walls, Imilkon was attacked in his camp by Daphnaeus. The camp, however, was so fortified as to repel all attempts, and the siege from this time forward became only a blockade; a contest of patience and privation between the city and the besiegers, lasting seven or eight months from the commencement of the siege. At first Daphnaeus, with his own force united to the Agrigentines, was strong enough to harass the Carthaginians and intercept their supplies, so that the greatest distress began to prevail among their army. The Campanian mercenaries even broke out into mutiny, crowding, with clamorous demands for provision and with menace of deserting, around the tent of Imilkon; who barely pacified them by pledging to them the gold and silver drinking-cups of the chief Carthaginians around him,<sup>2</sup> coupled with entreaties that they

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 87.

The youth of Argeius, combined with the fact of his being in high command, makes us rather imagine that he was of noble birth: compare Thucyd. vi, 38, — the speech of Athenagoras.

<sup>2</sup> Mention is again made, sixty-five years afterwards, in the description of the war of Timoleon against the Carthaginians, — of the abundance of gold and silver drinking cups, and rich personal ornaments, carried by the native Carthaginians on military service (Diodor. xvi, 81; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 28, 29).

There was a select body of Carthaginians, — a Sacred Band, — mentioned in these later times, consisting of two thousand five hundred men of distinguished bravery as well as of conspicuous position in the city (Diodor. xvi, 80; xx, 10).

would wait yet a few days. During that short interval, he meditated and executed a bold stroke of relief. The Syracusans and Agrigentines were mainly supplied by sea from Syracuse; from whence a large transport of provision-ships was now expected, under convoy of some Syracusan triremes. Apprised of their approach, Imilkon silently brought out forty Carthaginian triremes from Motyê and Panormus, with which he suddenly attacked the Syracusan convoy, no way expecting such a surprise. Eight Syracusan triremes were destroyed; the remainder were driven ashore, and the whole fleet of transports fell into the hands of Imilkon. Abundance and satisfaction now reigned in the camp of the Carthaginians, while the distress, and with it the discontent, was transferred to Agrigentum. The Campanian mercenaries in the service of Dexippus began the mutiny, complaining to him of their condition. Perhaps he had been alarmed and disgusted at the violent manifestation of the Agrigentines against their generals, extending partly to himself also. At any rate, he manifested no zeal in the defence, and was even suspected of having received a bribe of fifteen talents from the Carthaginians. He told the Campanians that Agrigentum was no longer tenable, for want of supplies; upon which they immediately retired, and marched away to Messênê, affirming that the time stipulated for their stay had expired. Such a secession struck every one with discouragement. The Agrigentine generals immediately instituted an examination, to ascertain the quantity of provision still remaining in the city. Having made the painful discovery that there remained but very little, they took the resolution of causing the city to be evacuated by its population during the coming night.<sup>1</sup>

A night followed, even more replete with woe and desolation than that which had witnessed the flight of Diokles with the inhabitants of Himera from their native city. Few scenes can be imagined more deplorable than the vast population of Agrigentum obliged to hurry out of their gates during a December night, as their only chance of escape from famine or the sword of a merciless enemy. The road to Gela was beset by a distracted crowd, of both sexes and of every age and condition, confounded in one indiscriminate lot of suffering. No thought could be bestowed on

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 88.



the preservation of property or cherished possessions. Happy were they who could save their lives; for not a few, through personal weakness or the immobility of despair, were left behind. Perhaps here and there a citizen, combining the personal strength with the filial piety of Æneas, might carry away his aged father with the household gods on his shoulders; but for the most part, the old, the sick, and the impotent, all whose years were either too tender or too decrepit to keep up with a hurried flight, were of necessity abandoned. Some remained and slew themselves, refusing even to survive the loss of their homes and the destruction of their city; others, among whom was the wealthy Gellias, consigned themselves to the protection of the temples, but with little hope that it would procure them safety. The morning's dawn exhibited to Imilkon unguarded walls, a deserted city, and a miserable population of exiles huddled together in disorderly flight on the road to Gela.

For these fugitives, however, the Syracusan and Agrigentine soldiers formed a rear-guard sufficient to keep off the aggravated torture of a pursuit. But the Carthaginian army found enough to occupy them in the undefended prey which was before their eyes. They rushed upon the town with the fury of men who had been struggling and suffering before it for eight months. They ransacked the houses, slew every living person that was left, and found plunder enough to satiate even a ravenous appetite. Temples as well as private dwellings were alike stripped, so that those who had taken sanctuary in them became victims like the rest: a fate which Gellius only avoided by setting fire to the temple in which he stood and perishing in its ruins. The great public ornaments and trophies of the city, — the bull of Phalaris, together with the most precious statues and pictures, — were preserved by Imilkon and sent home as decorations to Carthage.<sup>1</sup> While he gave up the houses of Agrigentum to be thus gutted, he still kept them standing, and caused them to serve as winter-quarters for the repose of his soldiers, after the hardships of an eight months' siege. The unhappy Agrigentine fugitives first found shelter and kind hospitality at Gela; from whence they were afterwards, by permission of the Syracusans, transferred to Leontini.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 89, 90.

I have described, as far as the narrative of Diodorus permits us to know, this momentous and tragical portion of Sicilian history; a suitable preface to the long despotism of Dionysius. It is evident that the seven or eight months (the former of these numbers is authenticated by Xenophon, while the latter is given by Diodorus) of the siege or blockade must have contained matters of the greatest importance which are not mentioned, and that even of the main circumstances which brought about the capture, we are most imperfectly informed. But though we cannot fully comprehend its causes, its effects are easy to understand. They were terror-striking and harrowing in the extreme. When the storm which had beaten down Selinus and Himera was now perceived to have extended its desolation to a city so much more conspicuous, among the wealthiest and most populous in the Grecian world, — when the surviving Agrigentine population, including women and children, and the great proprietors of chariots whose names stood recorded as victors at Olympia, were seen all confounded in one common fate of homeless flight and nakedness — when the victorious host and its commanders took up their quarters in the deserted houses, ready to spread their conquests farther after a winter of repose, — there was hardly a Greek in Sicily who did not tremble for his life and property.<sup>1</sup> Several of them sought shelter at Syracuse, while others even quitted the island altogether, emigrating to Italy.

Amidst so much anguish, humiliation, and terror, there were loud complaints against the conduct of the Syracusan generals under whose command the disaster had occurred. The censure which had been cast upon them before, for not having vigorously pursued the defeated Iberians, was now revived, and aggravated tenfold by the subsequent misfortune. To their inefficiency the capture of Agrigentum was ascribed, and apparently not without substantial cause; for the town was so strongly placed as to defy assault, and could only be taken by blockade; now we discern no impediments adequate to hinder the Syracusan generals from procuring supplies of provisions; and it seems clear that the surprise of the Syracusan store-ships might have been prevented by proper precautions; upon which surprise the whole question turned, between famine in

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 91.



the Carthaginian camp and famine in Agrigentum.<sup>1</sup> The efficiency of Dexippus and the other generals, in defending Agrigentum (as depicted by Diodorus), stands sadly inferior to the vigor and ability displayed by Gylippus before Syracuse, as described by Thucydides: and we can hardly wonder that by men in the depth of misery, like the Agrigentines,—or in extreme alarm, like the other Sicilian Greeks—these generals, incompetent or treasonable, should be regarded as the cause of the ruin.

Such a state of sentiment, under ordinary circumstances, would have led to the condemnation of the generals and to the nomination of others, with little farther result. But it became of far graver import, when combined with the actual situation of parties in Syracuse. The Hermokratean opposition party,—repelled during the preceding year with the loss of its leader, yet nowise crushed,—now re-appeared more formidable than ever, under a new leader more aggressive even than Hermokrates himself. Throughout ancient as well as modern history, defeat and embarrassment in the foreign relations have proved fruitful causes of change in the internal government. Such auxiliaries had been wanting to the success of Hermokrates in the preceding year; but alarms of every kind now overhung the city in terrific magnitude, and when the first Syracusan assembly was convoked on returning from Agrigentum, a mournful silence reigned;<sup>2</sup> as in the memorable description given by Demosthenes of the Athenian assembly held immediately after the taking of Elateia.<sup>3</sup> The generals had lost the confidence of their fellow-citizens; yet no one else was forward, at a juncture so full of peril, to assume their duty, by proffering fit counsel for the future conduct of the war. Now was the time for the Hermokratean party to lay their train for putting down the government. Dionysius, though both young and of mean family, was adopted as leader in consequence of that audacity and bravery

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 88.

Xenophon confirms the statement of Diodorus, that Agrigentum was taken by famine (Hellen. i, 5, 21; ii, 2, 24).

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiii, 91.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenes de Coronâ, p. 286, s. 220.

This comparison is made by M. Brunet de Presle, in his valuable historical work (*Recherches sur les Etablissements des Grecs en Sicile, Part ii, s. 30, p. 219*).

which even already he had displayed, both in the fight along with Hermokrates and in the battles against the Carthaginians. Hipparinus, a Syracusan of rich family, who had ruined himself by dissolute expenses, was eager to renovate his fortunes by seconding the elevation of Dionysius to the despotism;<sup>1</sup> Philistus (the subsequent historian of Syracuse), rich, young, and able, threw himself ardently into the same cause; and doubtless other leading persons, ancient Hermokrateans and others, stood forward as partisans in the conspiracy. But it either was, from the beginning, or speedily became, a movement organized for the purpose of putting the sceptre into the hands of Dionysius, to whom all the rest, though several among them were of far greater wealth and importance, served but as satellites and auxiliaries.

Amidst the silence and disquietude which reigned in the Syracusan assembly, Dionysius was the first who rose to address them. He enlarged upon a topic suitable alike to the temper of his auditors and to his own views. He vehemently denounced the generals as having betrayed the security of Syracuse to the Carthaginians,—and as the persons to whom the ruin of Agrigentum, together with the impending peril of every man around, was owing. He set forth their misdeeds, real or alleged, not merely with fulness and acrimony, but with a ferocious violence outstripping all the limits of admissible debate, and intended to bring upon them a lawless murder, like the death of the generals recently at Agrigentum. "There they sit, the traitors! Do not wait for legal trial or verdict; but lay hands upon them at once, and inflict upon them summary justice."<sup>2</sup> Such a brutal exhortation, not unlike that of

<sup>1</sup> Aristotel. Politic. v, 5, 6. *Γίνονται δὲ μεταβολαὶ τῆς ἀλιγαρχίας, καὶ ὅταν ἀναλώσῃσι τὰ ἴδια, ζῶντες ἀσελγῶς· καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι καινοτομεῖν ζητοῦσι, καὶ ἡ τυραννίδι ἐπιτίθενται αὐτοί, ἢ κατασκευάζουσιν ἕτερον· ὥσπερ Ἱππαρίνος Διονύσιον ἐν Συρακούσαις.*

Hipparinus was the father of Dion, respecting whom more hereafter.

Plato, in his warm sympathy for Dion, assigns to Hipparinus more of an equality of rank and importance with the elder Dionysius, than the subsequent facts justify (Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 353 A.; p. 355 F.).

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiii, 91. *Ἀπορουμένων δὲ πάντων παρελθὼν Διονύσιος ὁ Ἑρμοκράτους, τῶν μὲν στρατηγῶν κατηγορήσεν, ὡς προδιδόντων τὰ πράγματα τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις· τὰ δὲ πλήθη παρώξυνε πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν τ. μωρίαν, παρακαλὼν μὴ περιμεῖναι τὸν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους κλήρον, ἀλλ' ἐκ χειρὸς εὐθὺς ἐπιθεῖναι τὴν δίκην.*



the Athenian Kritias, when he caused the execution of Theramenes in the oligarchical senate, was an offence against law as well as against parliamentary order. The presiding magistrates reproved Dionysius as a disturber of order, and fined him, as they were empowered by law.<sup>1</sup> But his partisans were loud in his support. Philistus not only paid down the fine for him on the spot, but publicly proclaimed that he would go on for the whole day paying all similar fines which might be imposed,—and incited Dionysius to persist in such language as he thought proper. That which had begun as illegality, was now aggravated into open defiance of the law. Yet so enfeebled was the authority of the magistrates, and so vehement the cry against them, in the actual position of the city, that they were unable either to punish or to repress the speaker. Dionysius pursued his harangue in a tone yet more inflammatory, not only accusing the generals of having corruptly betrayed Agrigentum, but also denouncing the conspicuous and wealthy citizens generally, as oligarchs who held tyrannical sway,—who treated the many with scorn, and made their own profit out of the misfortunes of the city. Syracuse (he contended) could never be saved, unless men of a totally different character were invested with authority; men, not chosen from wealth and station, but of humble birth, belonging to the people by position, and kind in their deportment from consciousness of their own weakness.<sup>2</sup> His bitter invective against generals already discredited, together with the impetuous warmth of his apparent sympathy for the people against the rich, were both alike favorably received. Plato states that the assembly became so furiously exasperated, as to follow literally the lawless and blood-thirsty inspirations of Dionysius, and to stone all these generals, ten in number, on the spot, without any form of trial. But Diodorus simply tells us, that a vote was passed to cashier

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 91. Τῶν δ' ἀρχόντων ζημιούντων τὸν Διονύσιον κατὰ τοῦ νόμου, ὡς θορυβούντα, Φίλιστος, ὁ τὰς ἱστορίας ὑστερον συγγράψας, οὐσίας ἔχων μεγάλην, etc.

In the description given by Thucydides (vi, 32-39) of the debate in the Syracusan assembly (prior to the arrival of the Athenian expedition) in which Hermokrates and Athenagoras speak, we find the magistrates interfering to prevent the continuance of a debate which had become very personal and acrimonious; though there was nothing in it at all brutal, nor any exhortation to personal violence or infringement of the law.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiii, 91

the generals, and to name in their places Dionysius, Hipparinus, and others.<sup>1</sup> This latter statement is, in my opinion, the more probable.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Epistol. viii, p. 354. Οἱ γὰρ πρὸς Διονύσιον καὶ Ἰππαρίνον ἀρξάντων Σικελιώται τότε ὡς φοντο εὐδαιμόνως ἔζων, τρυφῶντες τε καὶ ἅμα ἀρχόντων ἀρχόντες· οἱ καὶ τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς κατέλευσαν βαλλόντες τοὺς πρὸς Διονύσιον, κατὰ νόμον οὐδένα κρίναντες, ἵνα δὴ δουλεύοιεν μηδένι μήτε σὺν δίκῃ μήτε νόμῳ δεσπότη, ἐλεύθεροι δ' εἶεν πάντῃ πάντως· ὅθεν αἱ τυραννίδες ἐγένοντο αὐτοῖς.

Diodor. xiii, 92. παραυτίκα τοὺς μὲν ἔλυσε τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἑτέρους δὲ εἴλετο στρατηγοὺς, ἐν οἷς καὶ τὸν Διονύσιον. Some little time afterwards, Diodorus farther mentions that Dionysius accused before the public assembly, and caused to be put to death, Daphnæus and Demarchus (xiii, 96); now Daphnæus was one of the generals (xiii, 86-88).

If we assume the fact to have occurred as Plato affirms it, we cannot easily explain how something so impressive and terror-striking came to be transformed into the more commonplace statement of Diodorus, by Ephorus, Theopompus, Hermias, Timæus, or Philistus, from one of whom probably his narrative is borrowed.

But if we assume Diodorus to be correct, we can easily account for the erroneous belief in the mind of Plato. A very short time before this scene at Syracuse, an analogous circumstance had really occurred at Agrigentum. The assembled Agrigentines, being inflamed against their generals for what they believed to be slackness or treachery in the recent fight with the Carthaginians, had stoned four of them on the spot, and only spared the fifth on the score of his youth (Diodor. xiii, 87).

I cannot but think that Plato confounded in his memory the scene and proceedings at Syracuse with the other events, so recently antecedent, at Agrigentum. His letter (from which the above citation is made) was written in his old age,—fifty years after the event.

This is one inaccuracy as to matter-of-fact, which might be produced in support of the views of those who reject the letters of Plato as spurious, though Ast does not notice it, while going through the letters *seriatim*, and condemning them not only as un-Platonic but as despicable compositions. After attentively studying both the letters themselves, and his reasoning, I dissent entirely from Ast's conclusion. The first letter, that which purports to come not from Plato, but from Dion, is the only one against which he seems to me to have made out a good case (see Ast, Ueber Platon's Leben und Schriften, p. 504-530). Against the others, I cannot think that he has shown any sufficient ground for pronouncing them to be spurious and I therefore continue to treat them as genuine, following the opinion of Cicero and Plutarch. It is admitted by Ast that their authenticity was not suspected in antiquity, as far as our knowledge extends. Without considering the presumption hence arising as conclusive, I think it requires to be



Such was the first stage of what we may term the despot's progress, successfully consummated. The pseudo-demagogue Dio-

countervailed by stronger substantive grounds than those which Ast has urged.

Among the total number of thirteen letters, those relating to Dion and Dionysius (always setting aside the first letter) — that is the second, third, fourth, seventh, eighth, and thirteenth, — are the most full of allusions to fact and details. Some of them go very much into detail. Now had they been the work of a forger, it is fair to contend that he could hardly avoid laying himself more open to contradiction than he has done, on the score of inaccuracy and inconsistency with the supposed situation. I have already mentioned one inaccuracy which I take to be a fault of memory, both conceivable and pardonable. Ast mentions another, to disprove the authenticity of the eighth letter, respecting the son of Dion. Plato, in this eighth letter, speaking in the name of the deceased Dion, recommends the Syracusans to name Dion's son as one of the members of a tripartite kingship, along with Hipparinus (son of the elder Dionysius) and the younger Dionysius. This (contends Ast, p. 523) cannot be correct, because Dion's son died before his father. To make the argument of Ast complete, we ought to be sure that Dion had only one son; for which there is doubtless the evidence of Plutarch, who after having stated that the son of Dion, a youth nearly grown up, threw himself from the roof of the house and was killed, goes on to say that Kallippus, the political enemy of Dion, founded upon this misfortune a false rumor which he circulated, — *ὅτι ὁ Δίων ἄπαις γεγονώς ἐγνώκε τὸν Διονυσίου καλεῖν Ἀπολλοκράτην καὶ ποιεῖσθαι διάδοχον* (Plutarch, Dion. c. 55, 56: compare also c. 21, — *τὸν παῖδα*). But since the rumor was altogether false, we may surely imagine that Kallippus, taking advantage of a notorious accident which had just proved fatal to the eldest son of Dion, may have fabricated a false statement about the family of Dion, though there might be a younger boy at home. It is not certain that the number of Dion's children was familiarly known among the population of Syracuse; nor was Dion himself in the situation of an assured king, able to transfer his succession at once to a boy not yet adult. And when we find in another chapter of Plutarch's Life of Dion (c. 31), that the son of Dion was called by Timæus, *Areteus*, — and by Timonides, *Hipparinus*, — this surely affords some presumption that there were two sons, and not one son called by two different names.

I cannot therefore admit that Ast has proved the eighth Platonic letter to be inaccurate in respect to matter of fact. I will add that the letter does not mention the name of Dion's son (though Ast says that it calls him *Hipparinus*); and that it does specify the three partners in the tripartite kingship suggested (though Ast says that it only mentioned two).

Most of Ast's arguments against the authenticity of the letters, however, are founded, not upon alleged inaccuracies of fact, but upon what he maintains to be impropriety and meanness of thought, childish intrusion of

nysius outdoes, in fierce professions of antipathy against the rich, anything that we read as coming from the real demagogues, Athenagoras at Syracuse, or Kleon at Athens. Behold him now sitting as a member of the new Board of generals, at a moment when the most assiduous care and energy, combined with the greatest unanimity, were required to put the Syracusan military force into an adequate state of efficiency. It suited the policy of Dionysius not only to bestow no care or energy himself, but to nullify all that was bestowed by his colleagues, and to frustrate deliberately all chance of unanimity. He immediately began a systematic opposition and warfare against his colleagues. He refused to attend at their Board, or to hold any communication with them. At the frequent assemblies held during this agitated state of the public mind, he openly denounced them as engaged in treasonable correspondence with the enemy. It is obvious that his colleagues, men newly chosen in the same spirit with himself, could not as yet have committed any such treason in favor of the Carthaginians. But among them was his accomplice Hipparinus; while probably the rest also, nominated by a party devoted to him personally, were selected in a spirit of collusion, as either thorough-going partisans,

philosophy, unseasonable mysticism and pedantry, etc. In some of his criticisms I coincide, though by no means in all. But I cannot accept them as evidence to prove the point for which he contends, — the spuriousness of the letters. The proper conclusion from his premises appears to me to be, that Plato wrote letters which, when tried by our canons about letter-writing, seem awkward, pedantic, and in bad taste. Dionysius of Halikarnassus (De adm. vi dicend. in Demosth. p. 1025-1044), while emphatically extolling the admirable composition of Plato's dialogues, does not scruple to pass an unfavorable criticism upon him as a speech-writer; referring to the speeches in the Symposium as well as to the funeral harangue in the Menexenus. Still less need we be afraid to admit, that Plato was not a graceful letter-writer.

That Plato would feel intensely interested, and even personally involved, in the quarrel between Dionysius II. and Dion, cannot be doubted. That he would write letters to Dionysius on the subject, — that he would anxiously seek to maintain influence over him, on all grounds, — that he would manifest a lofty opinion of himself and his own philosophy, — is perfectly natural and credible. And when we consider both the character and the station of Dionysius, it is difficult to lay down beforehand any assured canon as to the epistolary tone which Plato would think most suitable to address him.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.



or worthless and incompetent men, easy for him to set aside. At any rate, his calumnies, though received with great repugnance by the leading and more intelligent citizens, found favor with the bulk of the assembly, predisposed at that moment from the terrors of the situation to suspect every one. The new Board of generals being thus discredited, Dionysius alone was listened to as an adviser. His first and most strenuous recommendation was, that a vote should be passed for restoring the exiles; men (he affirmed) attached to their country, and burning to serve her, having already refused the offers of her enemies; men who had been thrown into banishment by previous political dispute, but who, if now generously recalled, would manifest their gratitude by devoted patriotism, and serve Syracuse far more warmly than the allies invoked from Italy and Peloponnesus. His discredited colleagues either could not, or would not, oppose the proposition; which, being warmly pressed by Dionysius and all his party, was at length adopted by the assembly. The exiles accordingly returned, comprising all the most violent men who had been in arms with Hermokrates when he was slain. They returned glowing with party-antipathy and revenge, prepared to retaliate upon others the confiscation under which themselves had suffered, and looking to the despotism of Dionysius as their only means of success.<sup>1</sup>

The second step of the despot's progress was now accomplished. Dionysius had filled up the ranks of the Hermokratean party, and obtained an energetic band of satellites, whose hopes and interests were thoroughly identified with his own. Meanwhile letters arrived from Gela, entreating reinforcements, as Imilkon was understood to be about to march thither. Dionysius being empowered to march thither a body of two thousand hoplites, with four hundred horsemen, turned the occasion to profitable account. A regiment of mercenaries, under the Lacedæmonian Dexippus, was in garrison at Gela; while the government of the town is said to have been oligarchical, in the hands of the rich, though with a strong and discontented popular opposition. On reaching Gela, Dionysius immediately took part with the latter; originating the most violent propositions against the governing rich, as he had done at Syracuse. Accusing them of treason in the public assembly, he obtained

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 93.

a condemnatory vote under which they were put to death and their properties confiscated. With the funds so acquired, he paid the arrears due to the soldiers of Dexippus, and doubled the pay of his own Syracusan division. These measures procured for him immense popularity, not merely with all the soldiers, but also with the Geloan Demos, whom he had relieved from the dominion of their wealthy oligarchy. Accordingly, after passing a public vote testifying their gratitude, and bestowing upon him large rewards, they despatched envoys to carry the formal expression of their sentiments to Syracuse. Dionysius resolved to go back thither at the same time, with his Syracusan soldiers; and tried to prevail on Dexippus to accompany him with his own division. This being refused, he went thither with his Syracusans alone. To the Geloans, who earnestly entreated that they might not be forsaken when the enemy was daily expected, he contented himself with replying that he would presently return with a larger force.<sup>1</sup>

A third step was thus obtained. Dionysius was going back to Syracuse with a testimonial of admiration and gratitude from Gela, — with increased attachment on the part of his own soldiers, on account of the double pay, — and with the means of coining and circulating a new delusion. It was on the day of a solemn festival that he reached the town, just as the citizens were coming in crowds out of the theatre. Amidst the bustle of such a scene as well as of the return of the soldiers, many citizens flocked around him to inquire, What news about the Carthaginians? “Do not ask about your foreign enemies (was the reply of Dionysius); you have much worse enemies within among you. Your magistrates, — these very men upon whose watch you rely during the indulgence of the festival, — they are the traitors who are pillaging the public money, leaving the soldiers unpaid, and neglecting all necessary preparation, at a moment when the enemy with an immense host is on the point of assailing you. I knew their treachery long ago, but I have now positive proof of it. For Imilkon sent to me an envoy, under pretence of treating about the prisoners, but in reality to purchase my silence and connivance; he tendered to me a larger bribe than he had given to them, if I would consent to refrain from hindering them, since I could not be induced to take

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 93.



part in their intrigues. This is too much. I am come home now to throw up my command. While my colleagues are corruptly bartering away their country, I am willing to take my share as a citizen in the common risk, but I cannot endure to incur shame as an accomplice in their treachery."

Such bold allegations, scattered by Dionysius among the crowd pressing round him, — renewed at length, with emphatic formality in the regular assembly held the next day, — and concluding with actual resignation, — struck deep terror into the Syracusan mind. He spoke with authority, not merely as one fresh from the frontier exposed, but also as bearing the grateful testimonial of the Gelonians, echoed by the soldiers whose pay he had recently doubled. His assertion of the special message from Imilkon, probably an impudent falsehood, was confidently accepted and backed by all these men, as well as by his other partisans, the Hermokratean party, and most of all by the restored exiles. What defence the accused generals made, or tried to make, we are not told. It was not likely to prevail, nor did it prevail, against the positive deposition of a witness so powerfully seconded. The people, persuaded of their treason, were incensed against them, and trembled at the thought of being left, by the resignation of Dionysius, to the protection of such treacherous guardians against the impending invasion. Now was the time for his partisans to come forward with their main proposition: "Why not get rid of these traitors, and keep Dionysius alone? Leave them to be tried and punished at a more convenient season; but elect him at once general with full powers, to make head against the pressing emergency from without. Do not wait until the enemy is actually assaulting our walls. Dionysius is the man for our purpose, the only one with whom we have a chance of safety. Recollect that our glorious victory over the three hundred thousand Carthaginians at Himera was achieved by Gelon acting as general with full powers." Such rhetoric was irresistible in the present temper of the assembly, — when the partisans of Dionysius were full of audacity and acclamation, — when his opponents were discomfited, suspicious of each other, and without any positive scheme to propose, — and when the storm, which had already overwhelmed Selinus, Himera, and Agrigentum, was about to burst on Gela and Syracuse. A vote of the assembly was

passed, appointing Dionysius general of the city, alone, and with full powers;<sup>1</sup> by what majority we do not know.

The first use which the new general-plenipotentiary made of his dignity was to propose, in the same assembly, that the pay of the soldiers should be doubled. Such liberality (he said) would be the best means of stimulating their zeal; while in regard to expense, there need be no hesitation; the money might easily be provided.

Thus was consummated the fourth, and most important, act of the despot's progress. A vote of the assembly had been obtained, passed in constitutional forms, vesting in Dionysius a single-handed power unknown to and above the laws, — unlimited and irresponsible. But he was well aware that the majority of those who thus voted had no intention of permanently abnegating their freedom, — that they meant only to create a temporary dictatorship, under the pressing danger of the moment, for the express purpose of preserving that freedom against a foreign enemy, — and that even thus much had been obtained by impudent delusion and calumny, which subsequent reflection would speedily dissipate. No sooner had the vote passed, than symptoms of regret and alarm became manifest among the people. What one assembly had conferred, a second repentant assembly might revoke.<sup>2</sup> It therefore now remained for Dionysius to ensure the perpetuity of his power by some organized means; so as to prevent the repentance, of which he already discerned the commencement, from realizing itself in any actual revocation. For this purpose he required a military force extra-popular and anti-popular; bound to himself and not to the city. He had indeed acquired popularity with the Syracusan as well as with the mercenary soldiers, by doubling and ensuring their pay. He had energetic adherents, prepared to go all lengths on his behalf, especially among the restored exiles. This was an

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 94.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiii, 95. Διαλυθείσης δὲ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, οὐκ ὀλίγοι τῶν Συρακουσίων κατηγοροῦν τῶν πραχθέντων, ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ ταῦτα κεκυρωκότες τοῖς γὰρ λογισμοῖς εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ἐρχόμενοι, τὴν ἐσομένην δυνάσκειαν ἀνεθεώρουν. Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν βεβαιῶσι βουλόμενοι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ἔλαθον ἑαυτοὺς δεσπότην τῆς πατρίδος καθεστακότες. Ὁ δὲ Διονύσιος, τὴν μετάνοιαν τῶν ὀχλῶν φθάσαι βουλούμενος, ἐπέζητει δὲ οὐ τῶν δυνάμεων φύλακας αἰτήσασθαι τοῦ σώματος τοῦ οὐ γὰρ συγχωρηθέντος, βραδίῳ ἡμελλε κυριεύσειν τῆς τυραννίδος.



important basis, but not sufficient for his objects without the presence of a special body of guards, constantly and immediately available, chosen as well as controlled by himself, yet acting in such vocation under the express mandate and sanction of the people. He required a farther vote of the people, legalizing for his use such a body of guards.

But with all his powers of delusion, and all the zeal of his partisans, he despaired of getting any such vote from an assembly held at Syracuse. Accordingly, he resorted to a manœuvre, proclaiming that he had resolved on a march to Leontini, and summoning the full military force of Syracuse (up to the age of forty) to march along with him, with orders for each man to bring with him thirty days' provision. Leontini had been, a few years before, an independent city; but was now an outlying fortified post, belonging to the Syracusans; wherein various foreign settlers, and exiles from the captured Sicilian cities, had obtained permission to reside. Such men, thrown out of their position and expectations as citizens, were likely to lend either their votes or their swords willingly to the purposes of Dionysius. While he thus found many new adherents there, besides those whom he brought with him, he foresaw that the general body of the Syracusans, and especially those most disaffected to him, would not be disposed to obey his summons or accompany him.<sup>1</sup> For nothing could be more preposterous, in a public point of view, than an outmarch of the whole Syracusan force for thirty days to Leontini, where there was neither danger to be averted nor profit to be reaped; at a moment too when the danger on the side of Gela was most serious, from the formidable Carthaginian host at Agrigentum.

Dionysius accordingly set out with a force which purported, ostensibly and according to summons, to be the full military manifestation of Syracuse; but which, in reality, comprised mainly his own adherents. On encamping for the night near to Leontini, he caused a factitious clamor and disturbance to be raised during the

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 95. Ἀντὶ δ' ἣ (Leontini) τότε φρούριον ἦν τοῖς Συρακουσίοις, πλήρες ὑπαρχόντων φυγάδων καὶ ξένων ἀνθρώπων. Ἐλπίζε γὰρ τοῦτον συναγωνιστὰς ἔχειν, ἀνθρώπους δεομένους μεταβιᾶσθαι τῶν δὲ Συρακουσίων τοὺς πλείστους οὐδ' ἤξειν εἰς Λεοντίνους.

Many of the expelled Agrigentines settled at Leontini, by permission of the Syracusans (Diodor. xiii, 89).

darkness, around his own tent,—ordered fires to be kindled,—summoned on a sudden his most intimate friends,—and affected to retire under their escort to the citadel. On the morrow an assembly was convened, of the Syracusans and residents present, purporting to be a Syracusan assembly; Syracuse in military guise, or as it were in Comitia Centuriata,—to employ an ancient phrase belonging to the Roman republic. Before this assembly Dionysius appeared, and threw himself upon their protection; affirming that his life had been assailed during the preceding night,—calling upon them emphatically to stand by him against the incessant snares of his enemies,—and demanding for that purpose a permanent body of guards. His appeal, plausibly and pathetically turned, and doubtless warmly seconded by zealous partisans, met with complete success. The assembly,—Syracusan or quasi-Syracusan, though held at Leontini,—passed a formal decree, granting to Dionysius a body-guard of six hundred men, selected by himself and responsible to him alone.<sup>1</sup> One speaker indeed proposed to limit the guards to such a number as should be sufficient to protect him against any small number of personal enemies, but not to render him independent of, or formidable to, the many.<sup>2</sup> But such precautionary refinement was not likely to be much considered, when the assembly was dishonest or misguided enough to pass the destructive vote here solicited; and even if embodied in the words of the resolution, there were no means of securing its observance in practice. The regiment of guards being once formally sanctioned, Dionysius heeded little the limit of number prescribed to him. He immediately enrolled more than one thousand men, selected as well for their bravery as from their poverty and desperate position. He provided them with the choicest arms, and promised to them the most munificent pay. To this basis of a certain, permanent, legalized, regiment of household troops, he added farther a sort of standing army, composed of mercenaries hardly less at his devotion than the guards properly so called. In addition to the mercenaries already around

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 95.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotel. Politic. iii, 10, 10. Καὶ Διονυσίῳ τις, ὅτ' ἤτει τοὺς φύλακας, συνεβούλευε τοῖς Συρακουσίοις δίδοναι τοσούτους τοὺς φύλακας—ἰ. ε. τοσούτην τὴν ἰσχύον, ὥσθ' ἐκάστου μὲν καὶ ἐνὸς καὶ συμπλείονων κρείττω, τοῦ δὲ πλείονος ἥττω, εἶναι.



him, he invited others from all quarters, by tempting offers, choosing by preference outlaws and profligates, and liberating slaves for the purpose.<sup>1</sup> Next, summoning from Gela Dexippus the Lacedæmonian, with the troops under his command, he sent this officer away to Peloponnesus, — as a man not trustworthy for his purpose and likely to stand forward on behalf of the freedom of Syracuse. He then consolidated all the mercenaries under one organization, officering them anew with men devoted to himself.

This fresh military levy and organization was chiefly accomplished during his stay at Leontini, without the opposition which would probably have arisen if it had been done at Syracuse; to which latter place Dionysius marched back, in an attitude far more imposing than when he left it. He now entered the gates at the head not only of his chosen body-guard, but also of a regular army of mercenaries, hired by and dependent upon himself. He marched them at once into the islet of Ortygia (the interior and strongest part of the city, commanding the harbor), established his camp in that acropolis of Syracuse, and stood forth as despot conspicuously in the eyes of all. Though the general sentiment among the people was one of strong repugnance, yet his powerful military force and strong position rendered all hope of open resistance desperate. And the popular assembly, — convoked under the pressure of this force, and probably composed of none but his partisans, — was found so subservient, as to condemn and execute, upon his requisition, Daphnæus and Demarchus. These two men, both wealthy and powerful in Syracuse, had been his chief opponents, and were seemingly among the very generals whom he had incited the people to massacre on the spot without any form of trial, in one of the previous public assemblies.<sup>2</sup> One step alone remained to decorate the ignoble origin of Dionysius, and to mark the triumph of the Hermokratean party by whom its elevation had been mainly brought about. He immediately married the daughter of Hermokrates; giving his own sister in marriage to Polyxenus, the brother of that deceased chief.<sup>3</sup>

Thus was consummated the fifth or closing act of the despot's progress, rendering Dionysius master of the lives and fortunes of

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 7 τὸς ἡλευθερωμένους δούλους, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiii, 96.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. 1, c.; Plutarch, Dien. c. 3

his fellow-countrymen. The successive stages of his rise I have detailed from Diodorus, who (excepting a hint or two from Aristotle) is our only informant. His authority is on this occasion better than usual, since he had before him not merely Ephorus and Timæus, but also Philistus. He is, moreover, throughout this whole narrative at least clear and consistent with himself. We understand enough of the political strategy pursued by Dionysius, to pronounce that it was adapted to his end with a degree of skill that would have greatly struck a critical eye like Machiavel; whose analytical appreciation of means, when he is canvassing men like Dionysius, has been often unfairly construed as if it implied sympathy with and approbation of their end. We see that Dionysius, in putting himself forward as the chief and representative of the Hermokratean party, acquired the means of employing a greater measure of fraud and delusion than an exile like Hermokrates, in prosecution of the same ambitious purposes. Favored by the dangers of the state and the agony of the public mind, he was enabled to simulate an ultra-democratical ardor both in defence of the people against the rich, and in denunciation of the unsuccessful or incompetent generals, as if they were corrupt traitors. Though it would seem that the government of Syracuse, in 406 B. C., must have been strongly democratical, yet Dionysius in his ardor for popular rights, treats it as an anti-popular oligarchy; and tries to acquire the favor of the people by placing himself in the most open quarrel and antipathy to the rich. Nine years before, in the debate between Hermokrates and Athenagoras in the Syracusan assembly, the former stood forth, or at least was considered to stand forth, as champion of the rich; while the latter spoke as a conservative democrat, complaining of conspiracies on the part of the rich. In 406 B. C., the leader of the Hermokratean party has reversed this policy, assuming a pretended democratical fervor much more violent than that of Athenagoras. Dionysius, who took up the trade of what is called a demagogue on this one occasion, simply for the purpose of procuring one single vote in his own favor, and then shutting the door by force against all future voting and all correction, — might resort to grosser falsehood than Athenagoras; who, as an habitual speaker, was always before the people, and even if successful by fraud at one meeting, was nevertheless open to exposure at a second.



In order that the voting of any public assembly shall be really available as a protection to the people, its votes must not only be preceded by full and free discussion, but must also be open from time to time to rediscussion and correction. That error will from time to time be committed, as well by the collective people as by particular fractions of the people, is certain; opportunity for amendment is essential. A vote which is understood to be final, and never afterwards to be corrigible, is one which can hardly turn to the benefit of the people themselves, though it may often, as in the case of Dionysius, promote the sinister purposes of some designing protector.

## CHAPTER LXXXII.

### SICILY DURING THE DESPOTISM OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS AT SYRACUSE.

THE proceedings, recounted at the close of my last chapter, whereby Dionysius erected his despotism, can hardly have occupied less than three months; coinciding nearly with the first months of 405 B. C., inasmuch as Agrigentum was taken about the winter solstice of 406 B. C.<sup>1</sup> He was not molested during this

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 24. Ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς ἔληγεν, ἐν ᾧ μεσοῦντι Διονύσιος ἐτυοάννησε, etc.

The year meant here is an Olympic year, from Midsummer to Midsummer; so that the middle months of it would fall in the first quarter of the Julian year.

If we compare however Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 21 with ii, 2, 24, we shall see that the indications of time cannot both be correct; for the acquisition of the despotism by Dionysius followed immediately, and as a consequence directly brought about, upon the capture of Agrigentum by the Carthaginians.

It seems to me that the mark of time is not quite accurate in either one passage or the other. The capture of Agrigentum took place at the close of B. C. 406; the acquisition of the despotism by Dionysius, in the early

period by the Carthaginians, who were kept inactive in quarters at Agrigentum, to repose after the hardships of the blockade; employed in despoiling the city of its movable ornaments, for transmission to Carthage, and in burning or defacing, with barbarous antipathy, such as could not be carried away.<sup>1</sup> In the spring Imilkon moved forward towards Gela, having provided himself with fresh siege-machines, and ensured his supplies from the Carthaginian territory in his rear. Finding no army to oppose him, he spread his troops over the territory both of Gela and of Kamarina, where much plunder was collected and much property ruined. He then returned to attack Gela, and established a fortified camp by clearing some plantation-ground near the river of the same name, between the city and the sea. On this spot stood, without the walls, a colossal statue of Apollo, which Imilkon caused to be carried off and sent as a present to Tyre.

Gela was at this moment defended only by its own citizens, for Dionysius had called away Dexippus with the mercenary troops. Alarmed at the approach of the formidable enemy who had already mastered Agrigentum, Himera, and Selinus, — the Geloans despatched pressing entreaties to Dionysius for aid; at the same time resolving to send away their women and children for safety to Syracuse. But the women, to whom the idea of separation was intolerable, supplicated so earnestly to be allowed to stay and share the fortunes of their fathers and husbands, that this resolution was abandoned. In expectation of speedy relief from Dionysius, the defence was brave and energetic. While parties of the Geloans, well-acquainted with the country, sallied out and acted with great partial success against the Carthaginian plunderers, — the mass of the citizens repelled the assaults of Imilkon against the walls. His battering-machines and storming-parties were brought to bear on several places at once; the walls themselves, — being neither in so good a condition, nor placed upon so

months of 405 B. C., as Diodorus places them. Both events are in the same Olympic year, between Midsummer 406 B. C. and Midsummer 405 B. C. But this year is exactly the year which falls between the two passages above referred to in Xenophon; not coinciding exactly with either one or the other. Compare Dodwell, Chronolog. Xenoph. ad ann. 407 B. C.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii 82, 96, 108. τὰς γλυφὰς καὶ τὰ περιττοτέρως ἐργασμένα ἀντίσκαψεν, etc.



unassailable an eminence, as those of Agrigentum, — gave way on more than one point. Yet still the besieged, with obstinate valor, frustrated every attempt to penetrate within; reestablishing during the night the breaches which had been made during the day. The feebler part of their population aided, by every means in their power, the warriors on the battlements; so the defence was thus made good until Dionysius appeared with the long-expected reinforcement. It comprised his newly-levied mercenaries, with the Syracusan citizens, and succors from the Italian as well as from the Sicilian Greeks; amounting in all to fifty thousand men, according to Ephorus, — to thirty thousand foot, and one thousand horse, as Timæus represented. A fleet of fifty ships of war sailed round Cape Pachynus to cooperate with them off Gela.<sup>1</sup>

Dionysius fixed his position between Gela and the sea, opposite to that of the Carthaginians, and in immediate communication with his fleet. His presence having suspended the assaults upon the town, he became in his turn the aggressor; employing both his cavalry and his fleet to harass the Carthaginians and intercept their supplies. The contest now assumed a character nearly the same as had taken place before Agrigentum, and which had ended so unfavorably to the Greeks. At length, after twenty days of such desultory warfare, Dionysius, finding that he had accomplished little, laid his plan for a direct attack upon the Carthaginian camp. On the side towards the sea, as no danger had been expected, that camp was unfortified; it was there, accordingly, that Dionysius resolved to make his principal attack with his left division, consisting principally of Italiot Greeks, sustained by the Syracusan ships, who were to attack simultaneously from seaward. He designed at the same time also to strike blows from two other points. His right division, consisting of Sicilian allies, was ordered to march on the right or western side of the town of Gela, and thus fall upon the left of the Carthaginian camp; while he himself, with the mercenary troops which he kept specially around him, intended to advance through the town itself, and assail the advanced or central portion of their position near the walls, where their battering-machinery was posted. His cavalry were directed

<sup>1</sup> Diodor xiii, 109.

to hold themselves in reserve for pursuit, in case the attack proved successful; or for protection to the retreating infantry, in case it failed.<sup>1</sup>

Of this combined scheme, the attack upon the left or seaward side of the Carthaginian camp, by the Italiot division and the fleet in concert, was effectively executed, and promised at first to be successful. The assailants overthrew the bulwarks, forced their way into the camp, and were only driven out by extraordinary efforts on the part of the defenders; chiefly Iberians and Campanians, but reinforced from the other portions of the army, which were as yet unmolested. But of the two other divisions of Dionysius, the right did not attack until long after the moment intended, and the centre never attacked at all. The right had to make a circuitous march, over the Geloan plain round the city, which occupied longer time than had been calculated; while Dionysius with the mercenaries around him, intending to march through the city, found themselves so obstructed and embarrassed that they made very slow progress, and were yet longer before they could emerge on the Carthaginian side. Probably the streets, as in so many other ancient towns, were crooked, narrow, and irregular; perhaps also, farther blocked up by precautions recently taken for defence. And thus the Sicilians on the right, not coming up to the attack until the Italians on the left had been already repulsed, were compelled to retreat, after a brave struggle, by the concurrent force of the main Carthaginian army. Dionysius and his mercenaries, coming up later still, found that the moment for attack had passed altogether, and returned back into the city without fighting at all.

Whether the plan or the execution was here at fault, — or both the one and the other, — we are unable certainly to determine. There will appear reasons for suspecting, that Dionysius was not displeased at a repulse which should discourage his army, and furnish an excuse for abandoning Gela. After retiring again within the walls, he called together his principal friends to consult what was best to be done. All were of opinion that it was imprudent to incur farther hazard for the preservation of the town. Dionysius now found himself in the same position as Diokles after the defeat

<sup>1</sup> Diodor xiii, 109.



near Himera, and as Daphnæus and the other Syracusan generals before Agrigentum, after the capture of their provision-fleet by the Carthaginians. He felt constrained to abandon Gela, taking the best means in his power for protecting the escape of the inhabitants. Accordingly, to keep the intention of flight secret, he sent a herald to Imilkon to solicit a burial-truce for the ensuing day; he also set apart a body of two thousand light troops, with orders to make noises in front of the enemy throughout the whole night, and to keep the lights and fires burning, so as to prevent any suspicion on the part of the Carthaginians.<sup>1</sup> Under cover of these precautions, he caused the Geloan population to evacuate their city in mass at the commencement of night, while he himself with his main army followed at midnight to protect them. All hurried forward on their march to Syracuse, turning to best account the hours of darkness. On their way thither lay Kamarina, — Kamarina the immovable,<sup>2</sup> as it was pronounced by an ancient oracle or legend, yet on that fatal night seeming to falsify the epithet. Not thinking himself competent to defend this city, Dionysius forced all the Kamarinaean population to become partners in the flight of the Geloans. The same heart-rending scene, which has already been recounted at Agrigentum and Himera, was now seen repeated on the road from Gela to Syracuse: a fugitive multitude, of all ages and of both sexes, free as well as slave, destitute and terror-stricken, hurrying they knew not whither, to get beyond the reach of a merciless enemy. The flight to Syracuse, however, was fortunately not molested by any pursuit. At daybreak the Carthaginians, discovering the abandonment of the city, immediately rushed in and took possession of it. As very little of the valuable property within it had been removed, a rich plunder fell into the hands of the conquering host, whose barbarous hands massacred indiscriminately the miserable remnant left behind: old men, sick, and children, unable to accompany a flight so sudden and so rapid. Some of the conquerors farther satiated their ferocious instincts by crucifying or mutilating these unhappy prisoners.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 111.

<sup>2</sup> Μὴ κινεῖ Καμάριναν, ἀκινήτον περ ἔοῦσαν —

"fatis nunquam concessa moveri

Apparet Camarina procul." — Virgil, *Æneid*, iii, 701.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiii, 111. Οὐδέμια γὰρ ἦν παρ' αὐτοῖς φειδῶ τῶν ἀλίσκομένων

Amidst the sufferings of this distressed multitude, however, and the compassion of the protecting army, other feelings also were powerfully aroused. Dionysius, who had been so unmeasured and so effective in calumniating unsuccessful generals before, was now himself exposed to the same arrows. Fierce were the bursts of wrath and hatred against him, both among the fugitives and among the army. He was accused of having betrayed to the Carthaginians, not only the army, but also Gela and Kamarina, in order that the Syracusans, intimidated by these formidable neighbors so close to their borders, might remain in patient servitude under his dominion. It was remarked that his achievements for the relief of Gela had been unworthy of the large force which he brought with him; that the loss sustained in the recent battle had been nowise sufficient to compel, or even to excuse, a disgraceful flight; that the mercenaries, especially, the force upon which he most relied, had not only sustained no loss, but had never been brought into action; that while his measures taken against the enemy had thus been partial and inefficient, they on their side had manifested no disposition to pursue him in his flight, — thus affording a strong presumption of connivance between them. Dionysius was denounced as a traitor by all, — except his own mercenaries, whom he always kept near him for security. The Italiot allies, who had made the attack and sustained the main loss during the recent battle, were so incensed against him for having left them thus unsupported, that they retired in a body, and marched across the centre of the island home to Italy.

But the Syracusans in the army, especially the horsemen, the principal persons in the city, had a double ground of anger against Dionysius; partly from his misconduct or supposed treachery in this recent enterprise, but still more from the despotism which he had just erected over his fellow-citizens. This despotism, having been commenced in gross fraud and consummated by violence, was now deprived of the only plausible color which it had ever worn, since Dionysius had been just as disgracefully unsuccessful against the Carthaginians as those other generals whom he had denounced and superseded. Determined to rid themselves of one whom they

ἀλλ' ἀσυμπαθῶς τῶν ἡττηθέντων οὐκ μὲν ἀνεσταύρουν, οἷς δ' ἀφορήτους ἐπέγοντο ὄβρις.



hated at once as a despot and as a traitor, the Syracusan horsemen watched for an opportunity of setting upon Dionysius during the retreat, and killing him. But finding him too carefully guarded by the mercenaries who always surrounded his person, they went off in a body, and rode at their best speed to Syracuse, with the full purpose of reëstablishing the freedom of the city, and keeping out Dionysius. As they arrived before any tidings had been received of the defeat and flight at Gela, they obtained admission without impediment into the islet of Ortygia; the primitive interior city, commanding the docks and harbor, set apart by the despot for his own residence and power. They immediately assaulted and plundered the house of Dionysius, which they found richly stocked with gold, silver, and valuables of every kind. He had been despot but a few weeks; so that he must have begun betimes to despoil others, since it seems ascertained that his own private property was by no means large. The assailants not only plundered his house with all its interior wealth, but also maltreated his wife so brutally that she afterwards died of the outrage.<sup>1</sup> Against this unfortunate woman they probably cherished a double antipathy, not only as the wife of Dionysius, but also as the daughter of Hermokrates. They at the same time spread abroad the news that Dionysius had fled never to return; for they fully confided in the disruption which they had witnessed among the retiring army, and in the fierce wrath which they had heard universally expressed against him.<sup>2</sup> After having betrayed his army, together with Gela and Kamarina, to the Carthaginians, by a flight without any real ground of necessity (they asserted), — he had been exposed, disgraced, and forced to flee in reality, before the just displeasure of his own awakened fellow-citizens. Syracuse was now free; and might, on the morrow, reconstitute formally her popular government.

Had these Syracusans taken any reasonable precautions against adverse possibilities, their assurances would probably have proved correct. The career of Dionysius would here have ended. But while they abandoned themselves to the plunder of his house and brutal outrage against his wife, they were so rashly confident in his supposed irretrievable ruin, and in their own mastery of the insular portion of the city, that they neglected to guard the gate of

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 112; xiv, 44. Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiii, 112.

Achradina (the outer city) against his reëntry. The energy and promptitude of Dionysius proved too much for them. Informed of their secession from the army, and well knowing their sentiments, he immediately divined their projects, and saw that he could only defeat them by audacity and suddenness of attack. Accordingly, putting himself at the head of his best and most devoted soldiers, — one hundred horsemen and six hundred foot, — he left his army and proceeded by a forced march to Syracuse; a distance of about four hundred stadia, or about forty-five English miles. He arrived there about midnight, and presented himself, not at the gate of Ortygia, which he had probably ascertained to be in possession of his enemies, but at that of Achradina; which latter (as has been already mentioned) formed a separate fortification from Ortygia, with the Nekropolis between them.<sup>1</sup> Though the gate was shut, he presently discovered it to be unguarded, and was enabled to apply to it some reeds gathered in the marshes on his road, so as to set it on fire and burn it. So eager had he been for celerity of progress, that at the moment when he reached the gate, a part only of his division were with him. But as the rest arrived while the flames were doing their work, he entered, with the whole body, into Achradina or the outer city. Marching rapidly through the streets, he became master, without resistance, of all this portion of the city, and of the agora, or market-place, which formed its chief open space. His principal enemies, astounded by this alarming news, hastened out of Ortygia into Achradina, and tried to occupy the agora. But they found it already in possession of Dionysius and being themselves very few in number, having taken no time to get together any considerable armed body, they were overpowered and slain by his mercenaries. Dionysius was thus strong enough to vanquish all his enemies, who entered Achradina in small and successive parties, without any order, as they came out of Ortygia. He then proceeded to attack the houses of those whom he knew to be unfriendly to his dominion, slew such as he could find within, and forced the rest to seek shelter in exile. The great body of the Syracusan horsemen, — who but the evening before were masters of the city, and might with common prudence have maintained themselves in it, were thus either destroyed or

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 113. παρὶν περὶ μέσας νύκτας πρὸς τὴν πύλιν τῆς Ἀχρ. δυνῆς . . . εἰσῆλθαι διὰ τῆς Ἀχρ. νῆς, etc.



driven into banishment. As exiles they established themselves in the town of Ætna.<sup>1</sup>

Thus master of the city, Dionysius was joined on the ensuing day by the main body of his mercenaries, and also by the Sicilian allies, who had now completed their march. The miserable sufferers from Gela and Kamarina, who looked upon him with indignation as their betrayer, — went to reside at Leontini; seemingly as companions of the original Leontine citizens, who had been for some time domiciliated at Syracuse, but who no longer chose to remain there under Dionysius. Leontini thus became again an independent city.<sup>2</sup>

Though the disasters at Gela had threatened to ruin Dionysius, yet he was now, through his recent victory, more master of Syracuse than ever; and had more completely trodden down his opponents. The horsemen, whom he had just destroyed and chased away, were for the most part the rich and powerful citizens of Syracuse. To have put down such formidable enemies, almost indispensable as leaders to any party which sought to rise against him, was the strongest of all negative securities for the prolongation of his reign. There was no public assembly any longer at Syracuse, to which he had to render account of his proceedings at Gela and Kamarina, and before which he was liable to be arraigned, — as he himself had arraigned his predecessors who had commanded at Himera and Agrigentum. All such popular securities he had already overridden or subverted. The superiority of force, and intimidation of opponents, upon which his rule rested, were now more manifest and more decisive than ever.

Notwithstanding such confirmed position, however, Dionysius might still have found defence difficult, if Imilkon had marched on with his victorious army, fresh from the plunder of Gela and Kamarina, and had laid energetic siege to Syracuse. From all

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 113. Compare Xenoph. Hellen. i, 3, 5.

<sup>2</sup> Xenophon (Hellen. ii, 3, 5) states that "the Leontines, co-residents at Syracuse, revolted to their own city from Dionysius and the Syracusans."

This migration to Leontini seems a part of the same transaction as what Diodorus notices (xiii, 113). Leontini, recognized as independent by the peace which speedily followed, is mentioned again shortly afterwards as independent (xiv, 14). It had been annexed to Syracuse before the Athenian siege

hazard and alarm of this sort he was speedily relieved, by propositions for peace, which came spontaneously tendered by the Carthaginian general. Peace was concluded between them, on the following terms:—

1. The Carthaginians shall retain all their previous possessions, and all their Sikanian dependencies, in Sicily. They shall keep, besides, Selinus, Himera, Agrigentum. The towns of Gela and Kamarina may be reoccupied by their present fugitive inhabitants; but on condition of paying tribute to Carthage, and destroying their walls and fortifications.

2. The inhabitants of Leontini and Messênê, as well as all the Sikel inhabitants, shall be independent and autonomous.

3. The Syracusans shall be subject to Dionysius.<sup>1</sup>

4. All the captives, and all the ships, taken on both sides, shall be mutually restored.

Such were the conditions upon which peace was now concluded. Though they were extremely advantageous to Carthage, assigning to her, either as subject or as tributary, the whole of the southern shore of Sicily, — yet as Syracuse was, after all, the great prize to be obtained, the conquest of which was essential to the security of all the remainder, we are astonished that Imilkon did not push forward to attack it, at a moment so obviously promising. It appears that immediately after the conquest of Gela and Kamarina, the Carthaginian army was visited by a pestilential distemper, which is said to have destroyed nearly the half of it, and to have forbidden future operations. The announcement of this event however, though doubtless substantially exact, comes to us in a way somewhat confused.<sup>2</sup> And when we read, as one of the

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii, 114. καὶ Συρακουσίους μὲν ὑπὸ Διονύσιον τετάχθαι, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiii, 114.

Diodorus begins this chapter with the words, — Διόπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀναγκαζόμενος Ἰμίλκων, ἐπεψεν εἰς Συρηκούσας κήρυκα, παρακαλὼν τοὺς ἡττημένους διαλύσασθαι. Ἀσμένως δ' ὑπακούσαντος τοῦ Διονυσίου, τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἔθεντο, etc.

Now there is not the smallest matter of fact either mentioned or indicated before, to which the word *διόπερ* can have reference. Nothing is mentioned but success on the part of the Carthaginians, and disaster on the part of the Greeks; the repulse of the attack made by Dionysius upon the Carthaginian camp, — his retreat and evacuation of Gela and Kamarina, — the occupation of Gela by the Carthaginians, — the disorder, mutiny, and par-



articles in the treaty, the express and formal provision that "The Syracusans shall be subject to Dionysius,"—we discern plainly, that there was also an additional cause for this timely overture, so suitable to his interests. There was real ground for those bitter complaints against Dionysius, which charged him with having betrayed Gela and Kamarina to the Carthaginians in order to assure his own dominion at Syracuse. The Carthaginians, in renouncing all pretensions to Syracuse and recognizing its autonomy, could have no interest in dictating its internal government. If they determined to recognize by formal treaty the sovereignty as vested in Dionysius, we may fairly conclude that he had purchased the favor from them by some underhand service previously rendered. In like manner both Hiketas and Agathoklēs,—the latter being the successor, and in so many points the parallel of Dionysius, ninety years afterwards,—availed themselves of Carthaginian support as one stepping-stone to the despotism of Syracuse.<sup>1</sup>

The pestilence, however, among the Carthaginian army is said to have been so terrible as to destroy nearly the half of their numbers. The remaining half, on returning to Africa, either found it already there, or carried it with them; for the mortality at and around Carthage was not less deplorable than in Sicily.<sup>2</sup>

total dispersion of the army of Dionysius in its retreat,—the struggle within the walls of Syracuse. There is nothing in all this to which *διότι* can refer. But a few lines farther on, after the conditions of peace have been specified, Diodorus alludes to the terrible disease (*ὅτι τῆς νόσου*) which laid waste the Carthaginian army, as if he had mentioned it before.

I find in Niebuhr (*Vorträge über alte Geschichte*, vol. iii, p. 212, 213) the opinion expressed, that here is a gap in Diodorus "intentionally disguised in the MSS., and not yet noticed by any editor." Some such conclusion seems to me unavoidable. Niebuhr thinks, that in the lost portion of the text, it was stated that Imilkon marched on to Syracuse, formed the siege of the place, and was there visited with the terrific pestilence to which allusion is made in the remaining portion of the text. This also is nowise improbable; yet I do not venture to assert it,—since the pestilence may possibly have broken out while Imilkon was still at Gela.

Niebuhr farther considers, that Dionysius lost the battle of Gela through miserable generalship,—that he lost it by design, as suitable to his political projects,—and that by the terms of the subsequent treaty, he held the territory around Syracuse only under Carthaginian supremacy.

<sup>1</sup> Justin, xxii, 2; Plutarch, *Timoleon*, c. 2, 7, 9. <sup>2</sup> Diodor. xlii, 114.

It was in the summer of 405 B. C., that this treaty was concluded, which consigned all the Hellenic ground on the south of Sicily to the Carthaginian dominion, and Syracuse with its population to that of Dionysius. It was in September or October of the same year that Lysander effected his capture of the entire Athenian fleet at Ægospotami, destroyed the maritime ascendancy and power of Athens, and gave commencement to the Lacedæmonian empire, completed by the actual surrender of Athens during the ensuing year. The *dekarchies* and *harmosts*, planted by Lysander in so many cities of the central Hellenic world, commenced their disastrous working nearly at the same time as the despotism of Dionysius in Syracuse. This is a point to be borne in mind, in reference to the coming period. The new position and policy wherein Sparta now became involved, imparted to her a sympathy with Dionysius such as in earlier times she probably would not have felt; and which contributed materially, in a secondary way, to the durability of his dominion, as well by positive intrigues of Lacedæmonian agents, as by depriving the oppressed Syracusans of effective aid or countenance from Corinth or other parts of Greece.<sup>1</sup>

The period immediately succeeding this peace was one of distress, depression, and alarm, throughout all the south of Sicily. According to the terms of the treaty, Gela and Kamarina might be reoccupied by their fugitive population; yet with demolished walls,—with all traces of previous opulence and comfort effaced by the plunderers,—and under the necessity of paying tribute to Carthage. The condition of Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera, now actually portions of Carthaginian territory, was worse; especially Agrigentum, hurled at one blow from the loftiest pinnacle of prosperous independence. No free Hellenic territory was any longer to be found between Cape Pachynus and Cape Lilybæum, beyond the Syracusan frontier.

Amidst the profound discouragement of the Syracusan mind, the withdrawal from Sicily of the terror-striking Carthaginian army

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 10.

The valuable support lent to Dionysius by the Spartans is emphatically denounced by Isokrates, *Orat.* iv, (*Panegyric.*) s. 145; *Orat.* viii, (*De Pace*) s. 122.



would be felt as a relief, and would procure credit for Dionysius.<sup>1</sup> It had been brought about under him, though not as a consequence of his exploits; for his military operations against Imilkon at Gela had been completely unsuccessful (and even worse); and the Carthaginians had suffered no harm except from the pestilence. While his partisans had thus a plea for extolling him as the savior of the city, he also gathered strength in other ways out of the recent events. He had obtained a formal recognition of his government from the Carthaginians; he had destroyed or banished the chief Syracusan citizens opposed to his dominion, and struck terror into the rest; he had brought back all his mercenary troops and guards, without loss or dissatisfaction. He now availed himself of his temporary strength to provide precautions for perpetuity, before the Syracusans should recover spirit, or obtain a favorable opportunity, to resist.

His first measure was to increase the fortifications of the islet called Ortygia, strengthening it as a position to be held separately from Achradina and the remaining city. He constructed a new wall, provided with lofty turrets and elaborate defences of every kind, immediately outside of the mole which connected this islet with Sicily. On the outside of this new wall, he provided convenient places for transacting business, porticos spacious enough to shelter a considerable multitude, and seemingly a distinct strong fort, destined for a public magazine of corn.<sup>2</sup> It suited his purpose that the trade of the town should be carried on, and the persons of the traders congregated, under or near the outer walls of his peculiar fortress. As a farther means of security, he also

<sup>1</sup> Plato, while he speaks of Dionysius and Hipparinus on this occasion as the saviors of Syracuse, does not insist upon extraordinary valor and ability on their parts, but assigns the result mainly to fortune and the favor of the gods (Plato, Epistol. viii, p. 353 B.; p. 355 F.).

His letter is written with a view of recommending a compromise at Syracuse, between the party of freedom, and the descendants of Dionysius and Hipparinus; he thus tries to set up as good a case as he can, in favor of the title of both the two latter to the gratitude of the Syracusans.

He reluctantly admits how much Dionysius the elder afterwards abused the confidence placed in him by the Syracusans (p. 353 C.).

<sup>2</sup> That this was the situation of the fortified *horrea publica* at Syracuse, we see from Livy, xxiv, 21. I think we may presume that they were begun at this time by Dionysius, as they form a natural part of his scheme.

erected a distinct citadel or acropolis within the islet and behind the new wall. The citadel was close to the Lesser Harbor or Portus Lakkius. Its walls were so extended as to embrace the whole of this harbor, closing it up in such a way as to admit only one ship at a time, though there was room for sixty ships within. He was thus provided with an almost impregnable stronghold, not only securing him against attack from the more numerous population in the outer city, but enabling him to attack them whenever he chose, — and making him master, at the same time, of the grand means of war and defence against foreign enemies.

To provide a fortress in the islet of Ortygia, was one step towards perpetual dominion at Syracuse; to fill it with devoted adherents, was another. For Dionysius, the instruments of dominion were his mercenary troops and body-guards; men chosen by himself from their aptitude to his views, identified with him in interest, and consisting in large proportion not merely of foreigners, but even of liberated slaves. To these men he now proceeded to assign a permanent support and residence. He distributed among them the houses in the islet or inferior stronghold, expelling the previous proprietors, and permitting no one to reside there except his own intimate partisans and soldiers. Their quarters were in the islet, while he dwelt in the citadel, — a fortress within a fortress, sheltering his own person against the very garrison or standing army, by means of which he kept Syracuse in subjection.<sup>1</sup> Having provided houses for his soldiers, by extruding the residents in Ortygia, — he proceeded to assign to them a comfortable maintenance, by the like wholesale dispossession of proprietors, and reappropriation of lands, without. He distributed anew the entire Syracusan territory; reserving the best lands, and the best shares, for his own friends and for the officers in command of his mercenaries, — and apportioning the remaining territory in equal shares to all the inhabitants, citizens as well as non-citizens. By this distribution the latter became henceforward citizens as well as the former; so far at least, as any man

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 7.

The residence of Dionysius in the acropolis, and the quarters of his mercenaries without the acropolis, but still within Ortygia, — are noticed in Plato's account of his visit to the younger Dionysius (Plato, Epistol. vii, p. 350; Epist. iii, p. 315).



could be properly called a citizen under his despotism. Even the recently enfranchised slaves became new citizens and proprietors as well as the rest.<sup>1</sup>

Respecting this sweeping change of property, it is mortifying to have no farther information than is contained in two or three brief sentences of Diodorus. As a basis for entire redivision of lands, Dionysius would find himself already possessed of the property of those Syracusan Horsemen or Knights whom he had recently put down or banished. As a matter of course, their property would be confiscated, and would fall into his possession for reassignment. It would doubtless be considerable, inasmuch as these Horsemen were for the most part wealthy men. From this basis, Dionysius enlarged his scheme to the more comprehensive idea of a general spoliation and reappropriation, for the benefit of his partisans and his mercenary soldiers. The number of these last we do not know; but on an occasion not very long afterwards, the mercenaries under him are mentioned as amounting to about ten thousand.<sup>2</sup> To ensure landed properties to each of these men, together with the monopoly of residence in Ortygia, nothing less than a sweeping confiscation would suffice. How far the equality of share, set forth in principle, was or could be adhered to in practice, we cannot say. The maxim of allowing residence in Ortygia to none but friends and partisans, passed from Dionysius into a traditional observance for future anti-popular governments of Syracuse. The Roman consul Marcellus, when he subdued the city near two centuries afterwards, prescribed the rule of admitting into the islet none but Romans, and of excluding all native Syracusan residents.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 7. Τῆς δὲ χώρας τὴν μὲν ἀρίστην ἐξελέμενος ἐδωρήσατο τοῖς τε φίλοις καὶ τοῖς ἐφ' ἡγεμονίας τεταγμένοις· τὴν δ' ἄλλην ἐμέρισε ἐπίσης ξένῳ τε καὶ πολίτῃ, συμπεριλαβὼν τῷ τῶν πολιτῶν ὀνόματι τοὺς ἡλευθερωμένους δούλους, οὓς ἐκάλεε νεοπολίτας. Διέδωκε δὲ καὶ τὰς οἰκίας τοῖς ὀχλοῖς, πλὴν τῶν ἐν τῇ Νήσῳ· ταύτας δὲ τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τοῖς μισθοφόροις ἐδωρήσατο. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὴν τυραννίδα καλῶς ἐδόκει διαμνησθῆναι, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 78.

So also, after the death of the elder Dionysius, Plutarch speaks of his military force as having been βαρβάρων μυριάδων φυλακῇ (Plutarch, Dion. c. 10). These expressions however have little pretence to numerical accuracy.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero in Verrem, v 32, 84; 38, 98

Such mighty works of fortification, combined with so extensive a revolution both in property and in domicile, cannot have been accomplished in less than a considerable time, nor without provoking considerable resistance in detail. Nor is it to be forgotten that the pecuniary cost of such fortifications must have been very heavy. How Dionysius contrived to levy the money, we do not know. Aristotle informs us that the contributions which he exacted from the Syracusans were so exorbitant, that within the space of five years, the citizens had paid into his hands their entire property; that is, twenty per cent. per annum upon their whole property.<sup>1</sup> To what years this statement refers, we do not know; nor what was the amount of contribution exacted on the special occasion now before us. But we may justly infer from it that Dionysius would not scruple to lay his hand heavily upon the Syracusans for the purpose of defraying the cost of his fortifications; and that the simultaneous burthen of large contributions would thus come to aggravate the painful spoliation and transfers of property, and the still more intolerable mischiefs of a numerous standing army domiciled as masters in the heart of the city. Under such circumstances, we are not surprised to learn that the discontent among the Syracusans was extreme, and that numbers of them were greatly mortified at having let slip the favorable opportunity of excluding Dionysius, when the Horsemen were actually for a moment masters of Syracuse, before he suddenly came back from Gela.<sup>2</sup>

Whatever might be the extent of indignation actually felt, there could be no concert or manifestation in Syracuse, under a watchful despot with the overwhelming force assembled in Ortygia. But a suitable moment speedily occurred. Having completed his fortress and new appropriation for the assured maintenance of the mercenaries, Dionysius resolved to attempt a conquest of the autonomous Sikel tribes in the interior of the island, some of whom had sided with Carthage in the recent war. He accordingly marched out with a military force, consisting partly of his mercenary troops, part-

<sup>1</sup> Aristotel. Politic. v, 9, 4. Καὶ ἡ εἰσφορὰ τῶν τελῶν (τυραννικὸν ἐστὶ) ἐν πέντε γὰρ ἔτεσιν ἐπὶ Διονυσίου τὴν οὐσίαν ἅπασαν εἰσενηνοχέαι συνέβαινε.

<sup>2</sup> Diodorus, xiv, 7



ly of armed Syracusan citizens under a commander named Dorikus. While he was laying siege to the town of Erbessus, the Syracusan troops, finding themselves assembled in arms and animated with one common sentiment, began to concert measures for open resistance to Dionysius. The commander Dorikus, in striving to repress these manifestations, lifted up his hand to chastise one of the most mutinous speakers;<sup>1</sup> upon which the soldiers rushed forward in a body to defend him. They slew Dorikus, and proclaimed themselves again, with loud shouts, free Syracusan citizens; calling upon all their comrades in the camp to unite against the despot. They also sent a message forthwith to the town of Ætna, inviting the immediate junction of the Syracusan Horsemen, who had sought shelter there in their exile from Dionysius. Their appeal found the warmest sympathy among the Syracusan soldiers in the camp, all of whom declared themselves decisively against the despot, and prepared for every effort to recover their liberty.

So rapidly did this sentiment break out into vehement and unanimous action, that Dionysius was too much intimidated to attempt to put it down at once by means of his mercenaries. Profiting by the lesson which he had received, after the return march from Gela, he raised the siege of Erbessus forthwith, and returned to Syracuse to make sure of his position in Ortygia, before his Syracusan enemies could arrive there. Meanwhile the latter, thus left full of joy and confidence, as well as masters of the camp, chose for their leaders those soldiers who had slain Dorikus, and found themselves speedily reinforced by the Horsemen, or returning exiles from Ætna. Resolved to spare no effort for liberating Syracuse, they sent envoys to Messênê and Rhegium, as well as to Corinth, for aid; while they at the same time marched with all their force to Syracuse, and encamped on the heights of Epipolæ. It is not clear whether they remained in this position, or whether they were enabled, through the sympathy of the population, to possess themselves farther of the outer city Achradina, and with its appendages Tyche and Neapolis. Dionysius was certainly cut off from all communication with the country; but he maintained himself in his impregnable position in Ortygia, now exclusively occupied by his chosen

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 7. Compare an occurrence very similar, at Mendê in Thrace (Thucyd. iv, 130).

partisans and mercenaries. If he even continued master of Achradina, he must have been prevented from easy communication with it. The assailants extended themselves under the walls of Ortygia, from Epipolæ to the Greater as well as the Lesser Harbor.<sup>1</sup> A considerable naval force was sent to their aid from Messênê and Rhegium, giving to them the means of blocking him up on the sea side; while the Corinthians, though they could grant no farther assistance, testified their sympathy by sending Nikoteles as adviser.<sup>2</sup> The leaders of the movement proclaimed Syracuse again a free city, offered large rewards for the head of Dionysius, and promised equal citizenship to all the mercenaries who should desert him.

Several of the mercenaries, attracted by such offers, as well as intimidated by that appearance of irresistible force which characterizes the first burst of a popular movement, actually came over and were well received. Everything seemed to promise success to the insurgents, who, not content with the slow process of blockade, brought up battering-machines, and vehemently assaulted the walls of Ortygia. Nothing now saved Dionysius except those elaborate fortifications which he had so recently erected, defying all attack. And even though sheltered by them, his position appeared to be so desperate, that desertion from Ortygia every day increased. He himself began to abandon the hope of maintaining his dominion; discussing with his intimate friends the alternative, between death under a valiant but hopeless resistance, and safety purchased by a dishonorable flight. There remained but one means of rescue: to purchase the immediate aid of a body of twelve hundred mercenary Campanian cavalry, now in the Carthaginian service, and stationed probably at Gela or Agrigentum. His brother-in-law Polyxenus advised him to mount his swiftest horse, to visit in person the Campanians, and bring them to the relief of Ortygia. But this counsel was strenuously resisted by two intimate friends, — Helôris and Megaklês, — who both impressed upon him, that the royal robe was the only honorable funeral garment, and that, instead of quitting his post at full speed, he ought to cling to it until he was dragged away by the leg.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, Dionysius determined to hold out, without quitting Ortygia; sending private en-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 8.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 10.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiv, 8; xx, 78. Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus) sect. 49. It appears that Timæus the historian ascribed this last observation to



voys to the Campanians, with promises of large pay if they would march immediately to his defence. The Carthaginians were probably under obligation not to oppose this, having ensured to Dionysius by special article of treaty the possession of Syracuse.

To gain time for their arrival, by deluding and disarming the assailants, Dionysius affected to abandon all hope of prolonged defence, and sent to request permission to quit the city, along with his private friends and effects. Permission was readily granted to him to depart with five triremes. But as soon as this evidence of success had been acquired, the assailants without abandoning themselves to extravagant joy and confidence, considering Dionysius as already subdued, and the siege as concluded. Not merely was all farther attack suspended, but the forces were in a great measure broken up. The Horsemen were disbanded, by a proceeding alike unjust and ungrateful, to be sent back to Ætna, while the hoplites dispersed about the country to their various lands and properties. The same difficulty of keeping a popular force long together for any military operation requiring time, which had been felt when the Athenians besieged their usurpers Kylon and Peisistratus in the acropolis,<sup>1</sup> was now experienced in regard to the siege of Ortygia. Tired with the length of the siege, the Syracusans blindly abandoned themselves to the delusive assurance held out by Dionysius; without taking heed to maintain their force and efficiency undiminished, until his promised departure should be converted into a reality. In this unprepared and disorderly condition, they were surprised by the sudden arrival of the Campanians,<sup>2</sup> who, attacking and defeating them with considerable loss, forced

Philistus; and Diodorus copies Timæus in one of the passages above referred to, though not in the other. But Philistus himself in his history asserted that the observation had been made by another person (Plutarch, Dion. c. 35).

The saying seems to have been remembered and cited long afterwards in Syracuse; but cited as having been delivered by Dionysius himself not as addressed to him (Livy, xxiv, 22).

Isokrates, while recording the saying, represents it as having been delivered when the Carthaginians were pressing Syracuse hardly by siege; having in mind doubtless the siege or blockade undertaken by Imilkon seven years afterwards. But I apprehend this to be a misconception. The story seems to suit better to the earlier occasion named by Diodorus

<sup>1</sup> Herodotus, v, 71; Thucydides, i, 112.

It is said that the Campanians, on their way to Syracuse, passed by

their way through to join Dionysius in Ortygia. At the same time, a reinforcement of three hundred fresh mercenaries reached him by sea. The face of affairs was now completely changed. The recent defeat produced among the assailants not only discouragement, but also mutual recrimination and quarrel. Some insisted upon still prosecuting the siege of Ortygia, while others, probably the friends of the recently dismissed Horsemen, declared in favor of throwing it up altogether and joining the Horsemen at Ætna; a resolution, which they seem at once to have executed. Observing his opponents thus enfeebled and torn by dissension, Dionysius sallied out and attacked them, near the suburb called Neapolis or Newtown, on the south-west of Achradina. He was victorious, and forced them to disperse. But he took great pains to prevent slaughter of the fugitives, riding up himself to restrain his own troops; and he subsequently buried the slain with due solemnity. He was anxious by these proceedings to conciliate the remainder; for the most warlike portion of his opponents had retired to Ætna, where no less than seven thousand hoplites were now assembled along with the Horsemen. Dionysius sent thither envoys to invite them to return to Syracuse, promising the largest amnesty for the past. But it was in vain that his envoys expatiated upon his recent forbearance towards the fugitives and decent interment of the slain. Few could be induced to come back, except such as had left their wives and families at Syracuse in his power. The larger proportion, refusing all trust in his word and all submission to his command, remained in exile at Ætna. Such as did return were well treated, in hopes of inducing the rest gradually to follow their example.<sup>1</sup>

Thus was Dionysius rescued from a situation apparently desperate, and reestablished in his dominion; chiefly through the rash presumption (as on the former occasion after the retreat from Gela), the want of persevering union, and the absence of any commanding leader, on the part of his antagonists. His first proceeding was to

Agyrium, and deposited their baggage in the care of Agyris the despot of that town (Diodor. xiv, 9). But if we look at the position of Agyrium on the map, it seems difficult to understand how mercenaries coming from the Carthaginian territory, and in great haste to reach Syracuse, can have passed anywhere near to it.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 9.



dismiss the newly-arrived Campanians. For though he had to thank them mainly for his restoration, he was well aware that they were utterly faithless, and that on the first temptation they were likely to turn against him.<sup>1</sup> But he adopted more efficient means for strengthening his dominion in Syracuse, and for guarding against a repetition of that danger from which he had so recently escaped. He was assisted in his proceedings by a Lacedæmonian envoy named Aristus, recently despatched by the Spartans for the ostensible purpose of bringing about an amicable adjustment of parties at Syracuse. While Nikoteles, who had been sent from Corinth, espoused the cause of the Syracusan people, and put himself at their head to obtain for them more or less of free government, — Aristus, on the contrary, lent himself to the schemes of Dionysius. He seduced the people away from Nikoteles, whom he impeached and caused to be slain. Next, pretending himself to act along with the people, and to employ the great ascendancy of Sparta in defence of their freedom,<sup>2</sup> he gained their confidence and then betrayed them. The despot was thus enabled to strengthen himself more decisively than before, and probably to take off the effective popular leaders thus made known to him; while the mass of the citizens were profoundly discouraged by finding Sparta enlisted in the conspiracy against their liberties.

Of this renovated tide of success Dionysius took advantage, to strike another important blow. During the season of harvest,

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 9. The subsequent proceedings of the Campanians justified his wisdom in dismissing them. They went to Entella (a town among the dependencies of Carthage, in the south-western portion of Sicily, — Diod. xiv, 48), where they were welcomed and hospitably treated by the inhabitants. In the night, they set upon the Entellan citizens by surprise, put them all to death, married their widows and daughters, and kept possession of the town for themselves.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 10. Ἀπέστειλαν (οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι) Ἀρίστον, ἄνδρα τῶν ἐπιφανῶν, εἰς Συρακούσας, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ προσποιούμενοι καταλιπεῖν τὴν δυνάσκειαν, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ σπεύδοντες αὐξήσαι τὴν τυραννίδα. ἤλπιζον γὰρ συγκατασκευάζοντες τὴν ἀρχὴν, ὑπήκοον εἶναι τὸν Διονύσιον διὰ τὰς εὐεργεσίας. Οὗ δ' Ἀρίστος κατακλέψας εἰς Συρακούσας, καὶ τῷ τυράννῳ λάθρα περὶ τούτων διαλεχθεὶς, τοὺς τε Συρακουσίους ἀνασείων, Νικοτέλην τὸν Κορίνθιον ἀνείλεν, ἀφηγοῦμεναι τῶν Συρακουσίων· τοὺς δὲ πιστεύσαντας προδοὺς τὸν μὲν τυράννον ἰσχυρὸν κατέστησε, διὰ δὲ τῆς πράξεως ταύτης ἀσχημονεῖν ἐποίησε· τὴν δὲ χώραν καὶ τὴν πατρίδα. Compare xiv, 70.

while the citizens were busy in the fields, he caused the houses to be searched, and seized all the arms found therein. Not satisfied with thus robbing his opponents of the means of attack, he farther proceeded to construct additional fortifications around the islet of Ortygia, to augment his standing army of mercenaries, and to build fresh ships. Feeling more than ever that his dominion was repugnant to the Syracusans, and rested only on naked force, he thus surrounded himself with precautions probably stronger than any other Grecian despot had ever accumulated. He was yet farther strengthened by the pronounced and active support of Sparta, now at the maximum of her imperial ascendancy;<sup>1</sup> and by the presence of the mighty Lysander at Syracuse as her ambassador to countenance and exalt him.<sup>2</sup> The Spartan alliance, however, did not prevent him from enrolling among his mercenaries a considerable fraction of the Messenians, the bitter enemies of Sparta; who were now driven out of Naupaktus and Kephallenia, with no other possession left except their arms<sup>3</sup>—and whose restoration to Peloponnesus by Epaminondas, about thirty years afterwards, has been described in a preceding chapter.

So large a mercenary force, while the people in Syracuse were prostrate and in no condition for resistance, naturally tempted Dionysius to seek conquest as well as plunder beyond the border. Not choosing as yet to provoke a war with Carthage, he turned his arms to the north and north-west of the Syracusan territory; the Grecian (Chalkidic or Ionic) cities, Naxos, Katana, and Leontini — and the Sikels, towards the centre of Sicily. The three Chalkidic cities were the old enemies of Syracuse, but Leontini had been conquered by the Syracusans even before the Athenian expedition, and remained as a Syracusan possession until the last peace with the Carthaginians, when it had been declared independent. Naxos and Katana had contrived to retain their independence against Syracuse, even after the ruin of the Athenian armament under Nikias. At the head of a powerful force, Dionysius marched out from Syracuse first against the town of Ætna, occupied by a considerable body of Syracusan exiles hostile to his dominion.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 10. Καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ παρεσκευάζετο πρὸς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν τῆς τυραννίδος, ὡς ἂν ἐργοῖς ἤδη πείραν εἰληφῶς, ὅτι πᾶν ὑπομένουσιν οἱ Συρακοῖται χάριν τοῦ μὴ δουλεύειν.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Lysander, c. 9.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiv, 34.



Though the place was strong by situation,<sup>1</sup> yet these men, too feeble to resist, were obliged to evacuate it; upon which he proceeded to attack Leontini. But on summoning the inhabitants to surrender, he found his propositions rejected, and every preparation made for a strenuous defence; so that he could do nothing more than plunder the territory around, and then advanced onward into the interior Sikel territory, towards Enna and Erbita. But his march in this direction was little more than a feint, for the purpose of masking his real views upon Naxos and Katana, with both which cities he had already opened intrigues. Arkesilaus, general of Katana, and Prokles, general of Naxos, were both carrying on corrupt negotiations for the purpose of selling to him the liberty of their native cities. Until the negotiations were completed, Dionysius wished to appear as if turning his arms elsewhere, and therefore marched against Enna. Here he entered into conspiracy with an Ennaean citizen named Aeimnestus, whom he instigated to seize the sceptre of his native town, — by promises of assistance, on condition of being himself admitted afterwards. Aeimnestus made the attempt and succeeded, but did not fulfil his engagement to Dionysius; who resented this proceeding so vehemently, that he assisted the Ennaeans in putting down Aeimnestus, delivered him as prisoner into their hands, and then retired, satisfied with such revenge, without farther meddling. He next marched against Erbita, before which he passed his time with little or no result, until the bribes promised at Naxos and Katana had taken effect. At length the terms were fully settled. Dionysius was admitted at night by Arkesilaus into Katana, seized the city, disarmed the inhabitants, and planted there a powerful garrison. Naxos was next put into his hands, by the like corruption on the part of Prokles; who was rewarded with a large bribe, and with the privilege of preserving his kinsmen. Both cities were given up to be plundered by his soldiers; after which the walls as well as the houses were demolished, and the inhabitants sold as slaves. The dismantled site of Katana was then assigned to a body of Campanian mercenaries in the service of Dionysius, who however retained in his possession hostages for their fidelity;<sup>2</sup> the site of Naxos to the indigenous Sikels in the neighborhood. These captures struck so

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 58.<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 61.

much terror into the Leontines, that when Dionysius renewed his attack upon them, they no longer felt competent to resist. He required them to surrender their city, to remove to Syracuse, and there to reside for the future as citizens; which term meant, at the actual time, as subjects of his despotism. The Leontines obeyed the requisition, and their city thus again became an appendage of Syracuse.<sup>1</sup>

These conquests of Dionysius, achieved mainly by corrupting the generals of Naxos and Katana, were of serious moment, and spread so much alarm among the Sikels of the interior, that Archonides, the Sikel prince of Erbita, thought it prudent to renounce his town and soil; withdrawing to a new site beyond the Nebrode mountains, on the northern coast of the island, more out of the reach of Syracusan attack. Here, with his mercenary soldiers and with a large portion of his people who voluntarily accompanied him, he founded the town of Alæsa.<sup>2</sup>

Strengthened at home by these successes abroad, the sanguine despot of Syracuse was stimulated to still greater enterprises. He resolved to commence aggressive war with the Carthaginians. But against such formidable enemies, large preparations were indispensable, defensive as well as offensive, before his design could be proclaimed. First, he took measures to ensure the defensibility of Syracuse against all contingencies. Five Grecian cities on the south of the island, one of them the second in Sicily, had already undergone the deplorable fate of being sacked by a Carthaginian host; a calamity, which might possibly be in reserve for Syracuse also, especially if she herself provoked a war, unless the most elaborate precautions were taken to render a successful blockade impossible.

Now the Athenian blockade under Nikias had impressed valuable lessons on the mind of every Syracusan. The city had then been well-nigh blocked up by a wall of circumvallation carried from sea to sea; which was actually more than half completed, and would have been entirely completed, had the original com-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 15.<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 16. This Archonides may probably have been son of the Sikel prince Archonides, who, having taken active part as an ally of Nikias and the Athenian invaders against Syracuse, died just before Gylippus reached Sicily (Thucyd. vii, 1).



mander been Demosthenes instead of Nikias. The prodigious importance of the slope of Epipolæ to the safety of the city had been demonstrated by the most unequivocal evidence. In my seventh volume, I have already described the site of Syracuse and the relation of this slope to the outer city called Achradina. Epipolæ was a gentle ascent west of Achradina. It was bordered, along both the north side and the south side, by lines of descending cliff, cut down precipitously, about twenty feet deep in their lowest part. These lines of cliff nearly converged at the summit of the slope, called Euryalus; leaving a narrow pass or road between elevated banks, which communicated with the country both north and west of Syracuse. Epipolæ thus formed a triangle upon an inclined plane, sloping upward from its base, the outer wall of Achradina, to its apex at Euryalus; and having its two sides formed, the one by the northern, the other by the southern, line of cliffs. This apex formed a post of the highest importance, commanding the narrow road which approached Epipolæ from its western extremity or summit, and through which alone it was easy for an army to get on the declivity of Epipolæ, since the cliffs on each side were steep, though less steep on the northern side than on the southern.<sup>1</sup> Unless an enemy acquired possession of this slope, Syracuse could never be blocked up from the northern sea at Trogilus to the Great Harbor; an enterprise, which Nikias and the Athenians were near accomplishing, because they first surprised from the northward the position of Euryalus, and from thence poured down upon the slope of Epipolæ. I have already described, in my seventh volume, how the arrival of Gylippus deprived them of superiority in the field, at a time when their line of circumvallation was already half finished, — having been carried from the centre of Epipolæ southward down to Great Harbor, and being partially completed from the same point across the northern half of Epipolæ to the sea at Trogilus; how he next intercepted their farther progress, by carrying out, from the outer wall of Achradina, a cross wall traversing their intended line of circumvallation and ending at the northern cliff; how he finally erected a fort or guard-post on the summit of Euryalus, which he

<sup>1</sup> See the Dissertation of Saverio Cavallari, — *Sur Topographie von Syrakus* (Göttingen, 1845), p. 22.

connected with the cross-wall just mentioned by a single wall of junction carried down the slope of Epipolæ.<sup>1</sup>

Both the danger which Syracuse had then incurred, and the means whereby it had been obviated, were fresh in the recollection of Dionysius. Since the Athenian siege, the Syracusans may perhaps have preserved the fort erected by Gylippus near Euryalus; but they had pulled down the wall of junction, the cross-wall, and the outer wall of protection constructed between the arrival of Nikias in Sicily and his commencement of the siege, enclosing the sacred precinct of Apollo Temenites. The outer city of Syracuse was thus left with nothing but the wall of Achradina, with its two suburbs or excrescences, Tychê and Neapolis. Dionysius now resolved to provide for Syracuse a protection substantially similar to that contrived by Gylippus, yet more comprehensive, elaborate, and permanent. He carried out an outer line of defence, starting from the sea near the port called Trogilus, enclosing the suburb called Tychê (which adjoined Achradina to the north-west), and then ascending westward, along the brink of the northern cliff of Epipolæ, to the summit of that slope at Euryalus. The two extremities thus became connected together, — not as in the time of Gylippus,<sup>2</sup> by a single cross-wall carried out from the city-wall to the northern cliff, and then joined at an angle by another single wall descending the slope of Epipolæ from Euryalus, but, — by one continuous new line bordering the northern cliff down to the sea. And the new line, instead of being a mere single wall, was now built under the advice of the best engineers, with lofty and frequent towers interspersed throughout its length, to serve both as means of defence and as permanent quarters for soldiers. Its length was thirty stadia (about three and a half English miles); it was constructed of large stones carefully hewn, some of them four feet in length.<sup>3</sup> The quarries at hand supplied abundant materials, and for the labor necessary, Dionysius brought together all the population of the city and its neighborhood, out of whom he selected sixty thousand of the most

See, for a farther exposition of these points, my account of the siege of Syracuse by the Athenians, Vol. VII, ch. lix, lx.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. vi, 75.

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effective hands, to work on the wall. Others were ordered to cut the stones in the quarry, while six thousand teams of oxen were put in harness to draw them to the spot. The work was set out by furlongs and by smaller spaces of one hundred feet each, to regiments of suitable number, each under the direction of an overseer.<sup>1</sup>

As yet, we have heard little about Dionysius except acts of fraud, violence, and spoliation, for the purpose of establishing his own dominion over Syracuse, and aggrandizing himself by new conquests on the borders. But this new fortification was a work of different import. Instead of being, like his forts and walls in Ortygia, a guardhouse both of defence and aggression merely for himself against the people of Syracuse, — it was a valuable protection to the people, and to himself along with them, against foreign besiegers. It tended much to guarantee Syracuse from those disasters which had so recently befallen Agrigentum and the other cities. Accordingly, it was exceeding popular among the Syracusans, and produced between them and Dionysius a sentiment of friendship and harmony such as had not before been seen. Every man labored at the work not merely with good will, but with enthusiasm; while the despot himself displayed unwearied zeal, passing whole days on the spot, and taking part in all the hardship and difficulty. He showed himself everywhere amidst the mass, as an unguarded citizen, without suspicion or reserve, in marked contrast with the harshness of his previous demeanor,<sup>2</sup> proclaiming rewards for the best and most rapid workmen; he also provided attendance or relief for those whose strength gave way. Such was the emulation thus inspired, that the numbers assembled, often toiling by night as well as by day, completed the whole wall in the space of twenty days. The fort at Euryalus, which formed the termination of this newly-constructed line of wall, is probably not to be understood as comprised within so short a period of execution; at least in its complete consummation. For the defences provided at this fort (either now or at a later

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 18.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 18. Καθόλου δὲ ἀποθέμενος τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς βάρος, ἰδιώτην αὐτὸν ἀπέδεικνυε, etc.

Compare cap. 45 and cap. 47 — μισοῦντες τὸ βάρος τῆς τῶν φοινίκων ἐπεκρατείας, etc.

period) were prodigious in extent as well as elaborate in workmanship; and the remains of them exhibit, even to modern observers, the most complete specimen preserved to us of ancient fortification.<sup>1</sup> To bring them into such a condition must have occupied a longer time than twenty days. Even as to the wall, perhaps, twenty days is rather to be understood as indicating the time required for the essential continuity of its line, leaving towers, gates, etc., to be added afterwards.

To provide defence for Syracuse against a besieging army, however, was only a small part of the extensive schemes of Dionysius. What he meditated was aggressive war against the Carthaginians; for which purpose, he not only began to accumulate preparations of every kind on the most extensive scale, but also modified his policy both towards the Syracusans and towards the other Sicilian Greeks.

Towards the Syracusans his conduct underwent a material change. The cruelty and oppression which had hitherto marked his dominion was discontinued; he no longer put men to death, or sent them into banishment, with the same merciless hand as before. In place of such tyranny, he now substituted comparative mildness, forbearance, and conciliation.<sup>2</sup> Where the system had before been so fraught with positive maltreatment to many and alarm to all, the mitigation of it must have been sensibly as well as immediately felt. And when we make present to our minds the relative position of Dionysius and the Syracusans, we shall see that the evil inflicted by his express order by no means represented the whole amount of evil which they suffered. He occupied the impregnable fortress of Ortygia, with the entire harbor, docks, and maritime means of the city. The numerous garrison in his pay, and devoted to him, consisted in great part of barbaric or non-Hellenic soldiers and of liberated slaves, probably also non-Hellenic. The Syracusans resident in the outer city and around were not only destitute of the means of defensive concert and

<sup>1</sup> According to the testimony of Saverio Cavallari, the architect under whose directions the excavations were made in 1839, whereby these remains were first fully disclosed (Zur Topographie von Syrakus, p. 21).

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 45. Ἀπετίθετο γὰρ ἤδη τὸ πικρὸν τῆς τυραννίδος, καὶ μεταβαλλόμενος εἰς ἐπιείκειαν, φιλανθρωπότερον ἤρχε τῶν ὑποταγμένων, οὐτε φονέων, οὐτε φυγάδας ποίων. καθ' ὅπερ εἰώθει.



organization, but were also disarmed. For these mercenaries either pay was to be provided from the contributions of the citizens, or lands from their properties; for them, and for other partisans also, Dionysius had enforced spoliation and transfers of land and house-property by wholesale.<sup>1</sup> Now, while the despot himself was inflicting tyrannical sentences for his own purposes, we may be sure that these men, the indispensable instruments of his tyranny, would neither of themselves be disposed to respect the tranquillity of the other citizens, nor be easily constrained to do so. It was not, therefore, merely from the systematic misrule of the chief that the Syracusans had to suffer, but also from the insolence and unruly appetites of the subordinates. And accordingly they would be doubly gainers, when Dionysius, from anxiety to attack the Carthaginians, thought it prudent to soften the rigor of his own proceedings; since his example, and in case of need his interference, would restrict the license of his own partisans. The desire for foreign conquest made it now his interest to conciliate some measure of good-will from the Syracusans; or at least to silence antipathies which might become embarrassing if they broke out in the midst of a war. And he had in this case the advantage of resting on another antipathy, powerful and genuine in their minds. Hating as well as fearing Carthage, the Syracusans cordially sympathized in the aggressive schemes of Dionysius against her; which held out a prospect of relief from the tyranny under which they groaned, and some chance of procuring a restoration of the arms snatched from them.<sup>2</sup>

Towards the Sicilian Greeks, also, the conduct of Dionysius was mainly influenced by his anti-Carthaginian projects, which made him eager to put aside, or at least to defer, all possibilities of war in other quarters. The inhabitants of Rhegium, on the Italian side of the Strait of Messina, had recently manifested a disposition to attack him. They were of common Chalkidic origin with Naxos and Katana, the two cities which Dionysius had recently conquered and enslaved. Sixteen years before, when the powerful Athenian armament visited Sicily with the ostensible view of protecting the Chalkidic cities against Syracuse, the Rhegines in spite of their fellowship of race, had refused the invitation of Nikias<sup>3</sup> to lend assistance, being then afraid of Athens

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv. 7.<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv. 45.<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. vi. 46.

But subsequent painful experience had taught them, that to residents in or near Sicily, Syracuse was the more formidable enemy of the two. The ruin of Naxos and Katana, with the great extension of Syracusan dominion northward, had filled them with apprehension from Dionysius, similar to the fears of Carthage, inspired to the Syracusans themselves by the disasters of Agrigentum and Gela. Anxious to revenge their enslaved kinsmen, the Rhegines projected an attack upon Dionysius before his power should become yet more formidable; a resolution, in which they were greatly confirmed by the instigations of the Syracusan exiles (now driven from Ætna and the other neighboring cities to Rhegium), confident in their assurances that insurrection would break out against Dionysius at Syracuse, so soon as any foreign succor should be announced as approaching. Envoys were sent across the strait to Messênê, soliciting cooperation against Dionysius, upon the urgent plea that the ruin of Naxos and Katana could not be passed over, either in generosity or in prudence, by neighbors on either side of the strait. These representations made so much impression on the generals of Messênê, that without consulting the public assembly, they forthwith summoned the military force of the city, and marched along with the Rhegines towards the Syracusan frontier,—six thousand Rhegine and four thousand Messenian hoplites,—six hundred Rhegine and four hundred Messenian horsemen,—with fifty Rhegine triremes. But when they reached the frontiers of the Messenian territory, a large portion of the soldiers refused to follow their generals farther. A citizen named Laomedon headed the opposition, contending that the generals had no authority to declare war without a public vote of the city, and that it was imprudent to attack Dionysius unprovoked. Such was the effect of these remonstrances, that the Messenian soldiers returned back to their city; while the Rhegines, believing themselves to be inadequate to the enterprise single handed, went home also.<sup>1</sup>

Apprised of the attack meditated, Dionysius had already led his troops to defend the Syracusan frontier. But he now reconducted them back to Syracuse, and listened favorably to propositions for peace which speedily reached him, from Rhegium and

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv. 40.



Messênê.<sup>1</sup> He was anxious to conciliate them for the present, at all price, in order that the Carthaginians, when he came to execute his plans, might find no Grecian allies to coöperate with them in Sicily. He acquired an influence in Messênê, by making to the city large concessions of conterminous territory; on which side of the border, or how acquired, we do not know. He farther endeavored to open an intimate connection with Rhegium by marrying a Rhegine wife; with which view he sent a formal message to the citizens, asking permission to contract such an alliance, accompanied with a promise to confer upon them important benefits, both in territorial aggrandizement and in other ways. After a public debate, the Rhegines declined his proposition. The feeling in their city was decidedly hostile to Dionysius, as the recent destroyer of Naxos and Katana; and it appears that some of the speakers expressed themselves with contemptuous asperity, remarking that the daughter of the public executioner was the only fit wife for him.<sup>2</sup> Taken by itself, the refusal would be sufficiently galling to Dionysius. But when coupled with such insulting remarks (probably made in public debate in the presence of his own envoys, for it seems not credible that the words should have been embodied in the formal reply or resolution of the assembly<sup>3</sup>), it left the bitterest animosity; a feeling, which we shall hereafter find in full operation.

Refused at Rhegium, Dionysius sent to prefer a similar request, with similar offers, at the neighboring city of Lokri; where it was favorably entertained. It is remarkable that Aristotle comments upon this acquiescence of the Lokrians as an act of grave imprudence, and as dictated only by the anxiety of the principal citizens, in an oligarchical government, to seek for aggrandizement to themselves out of such an alliance. The request would not have been granted (Aristotle observes) either in a democracy or in a well-regulated aristocracy. The marital connection now contracted by Dionysius with a Lokrian female, Doris, the daughter of a citizen of distinction named Xenetus, produced as an ultimate conse-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 40.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 44, 106, 107.

<sup>3</sup> Diodorus, when he first mentions the answer, does not give this remark as comprised in it; though he afterwards alludes to it as having been said to be (φασί) so comprised (xix. 44-107).

quence the overthrow of the oligarchy of Lokri.<sup>1</sup> And even among the Lokrians, the request was not granted without opposition. A citizen named Aristides (one of the companions of Plato), whose daughter Dionysius had solicited in marriage, returned for answer that he would rather see her dead than united to a despot. In revenge for this bitter reply, Dionysius caused the sons of Aristides to be put to death.<sup>2</sup>

But the amicable relations which Dionysius was at so much pains to establish with the Greek cities near the Strait of Messênê, were destined chiefly to leave him free for preparations against Carthage; which preparations he now commenced on a gigantic scale. Efforts so great and varied, combined not merely with forecast but with all the scientific appliances then available, have not hitherto come before us throughout this history. The terrible effect with which Hannibal had recently employed his battering-machines against Selinus and Himera, stimulated Dionysius to provide himself with the like implements in greater abundance than any Greek general had ever before possessed. He collected at Syracuse, partly by constraint, partly by allurements, all the best engineers, mechanists, armorers, artisans, etc., whom Sicily or Italy could furnish. He set them upon the construction of machines and other muniments of war, and upon the manufacture of arms offensive as well as defensive, with the greatest possible assiduity. The arms provided were of great variety; not merely such as were suitable for Grecian soldiers, heavy or light, but also such as were in use among the different barbaric tribes around the Mediterranean, Gauls, Iberians, Tyrrhenians, etc., from whom Dionysius intended to hire mercenaries; so that every different soldier would be furnished, on arriving, with the sort of weapon which had become habitual to him. All Syracuse became a bustling military workshop, — not only the market-places, porticos, palæstræ, and large private houses, but also the fore-cham-

<sup>1</sup> Aristot. Politic. v, 6, 7. "Ἐπὶ διὰ τὸ πᾶσας τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικὰς εἶναι, μᾶλλον πλεονεκτοῦσιν οἱ γνώριμοι· οἷον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσίαι ἔρχονται, καὶ ἐξεστὶ ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν θέλωσι τοῖς γνωρίμοις μᾶλλον, καὶ κηδεύειν ὅτι θέλουσι. Διὸ καὶ ἡ Λοκρῶν πολιτεία ἀπώλετο ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον κηδείας· ὃ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, εἰδ' ἂν ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ τὸ μεμιγμένον.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch Timoleo m, c. 6.



bers and back-chambers of the various temples. Dionysius distributed the busy multitude into convenient divisions, each with some eminent citizen as superintendent. Visiting them in person frequently, and reviewing their progress, he recompensed largely, and invited to his table, those who produced the greatest amount of finished work. As he farther offered premiums for inventive skill, the competition of ingenious mechanists originated several valuable warlike novelties; especially the great projectile engine for stones and darts, called Catapulta, which was now for the first time devised. We are told that the shields fabricated during this season of assiduous preparation were not less than one hundred and forty thousand in number, and the breast-plates fourteen thousand, many of them unrivalled in workmanship, destined for the body-guard and the officers. Helmets, spears, daggers, etc., with other arms and weapons in indefinite variety, were multiplied in corresponding proportion.<sup>1</sup> The magazines of arms, missiles, machines, and muniments of war in every variety, accumulated in Ortygia, continued stupendous in amount through the whole life of Dionysius, and even down to the downfall of his son.<sup>2</sup>

If the preparations for land-warfare were thus stupendous, those for sea-warfare were fully equal, if not superior. The docks of Syracuse were filled with the best ship-builders, carpenters, and artisans; numerous wood-cutters were sent to cut ship-timber on the well-clothed slopes of Ætna and the Calabrian Apennines; teams of oxen were then provided to drag it to the coast, from whence it was towed in rafts to Syracuse. The existing naval establishment of Syracuse comprised one hundred and ten triremes; the existing docks contained one hundred and fifty ship-houses, or covered slips for the purpose either of building or housing a trireme. But this was very inadequate to the conceptions of Dionysius, who forthwith undertook the construction of one hundred and sixty new ship-houses, each competent to hold two vessels,—and then commenced the building of new ships of war to the number of two hundred; while he at the same time put all

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 42, 43.

The historian Philistus had described with much minuteness these warlike preparations of Dionysius. Diodorus has probably abridged from him (Philisti Fragment. xxxiv, ed. Marx and ed. Didot.)

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13.

the existing vessels and docks into the best state of repair. Here too, as in the case of the catapulta, the ingenuity of his architects enabled him to stand forth as a maritime inventor. As yet, the largest ship of war which had ever moved on the Grecian or Mediterranean waters, was the trireme, which was rowed by three banks or tiers of oars. It was now three centuries since the first trireme had been constructed at Corinth and Samos by the inventive skill of the Corinthian Ameinokles:<sup>1</sup> it was not until the period succeeding the Persian invasion that even triremes had become extensively employed; nor had any larger vessels ever been thought of. The Athenians, who during the interval between the Persian invasion and their great disaster at Syracuse had stood preëminent and set the fashion in all nautical matters, were under no inducement to build above the size of the trireme. As their style of manœuvring consisted of rapid evolutions and changes in the ship's direction, for the purpose of striking the weak parts of an enemy's ship with the beak of their own,—so, if the size of their ship had been increased, her capacity for such nimble turns and movements would have been diminished. But the Syracusans had made no attempt to copy the rapid evolutions of the Athenian navy. On the contrary, when fighting against the latter in the confined harbor of Syracuse,<sup>2</sup> they had found every advantage in their massive build of ships, and straightforward impact of bow driven against bow. For them, the larger ships were the more suitable and efficient; so that Dionysius or his naval architects, full of ambitious aspirations, now struck out the plan of building ships of war with four or five banks of oars instead of three; that is, quadriremes, or quinqueremes, instead of triremes.<sup>3</sup> Not only did the Syracusan despot thus equip a naval force equal in number of ships to Athens in her best days; but he also exhibited ships larger than Athens had ever possessed, or than Greece had ever conceived.

In all these offensive preparations against Carthage, as in the previous defences on Epipolæ, the spontaneous impulse of the Syracusans generally went hand in hand with Dionysius.<sup>4</sup> Their

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i, 13.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. vii, 36–62.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiv, 42.

<sup>4</sup> Diodor. xiv, 41. Συμπροθυμονμένων δὲ τῶν Συρακουσίων τῇ τοῦ Διονυσίου προαίρεσει, πολλὰν συνέβαινε γενέσθαι τὴν φιλοτιμίαν περὶ τῶν ἔκλων κατασκευῇν.



sympathy and concurrence greatly promoted the success of his efforts, for this immense equipment against the common enemy. Even with all this sympathy, indeed, we are at a loss to understand, nor are we at all informed, how he found money to meet so prodigious an outlay.

After the material means for war had thus been completed,—an operation which can hardly have occupied less than two or three years,—it remained to levy men. On this point, the ideas of Dionysius were not less aspiring. Besides his own numerous standing force, he enlisted all the most effective among the Syracusan citizens, as well as from the cities in his dependency. He sent friendly addresses, and tried to acquire popularity, among the general body of Greeks throughout the island. Of his large fleet, one-half was manned with Syracusan rowers, marines, and officers; the other half with seamen enlisted from abroad. He farther sent envoys both to Italy and to Peloponnesus to obtain auxiliaries, with offers of the most liberal pay. From Sparta, now at the height of her power, and courting his alliance as a means of perpetuity to her own empire, he received such warm encouragement, that he was enabled to enlist no inconsiderable numbers in Peloponnesus; while many barbaric or non-Hellenic soldiers from the western regions near the Mediterranean were hired also.<sup>1</sup> He at length succeeded, to his satisfaction, in collecting an aggregate army, formidable not less from numbers and bravery, than from elaborate and diversified equipment. His large and well-stocked armory (already noticed) enabled him to furnish each newly-arrived soldier, from all the different nations, with native and appropriate weapons.<sup>2</sup>

When all his preparations were thus complete, his last step was to celebrate his nuptials, a few days previous to the active commencement of the war. He married, at one and the same time, two wives,—the Lokrian Doris (already mentioned), and a Syracusan woman named Aristomachê, daughter of his partisan Hipparinus (and sister of Dion, respecting whom much will occur hereafter). The first use made of one among his newly-invented quinquere vessels, was to sail to Lokri, decked out in the richest ornaments of gold and silver, for the purpose of conveying Doris

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 43, 44, 45.

Diodor. xiv, 41

in state to Ortygia. Aristomachê was also brought to his house in a splendid chariot with four white horses.<sup>1</sup> He celebrated his nuptials with both of them in his house on the same day; no one knew which bed-chamber he visited first; and both of them continued constantly to live with him at the same table, with equal dignity, for many years. He had three children by Doris, the eldest of whom was Dionysius the Younger; and four by Aristomachê; but the latter was for a considerable time childless; which greatly chagrined Dionysius. Ascribing her barrenness to magical incantations, he put to death the mother of his other wife Doris, as the alleged worker of these mischievous influences.<sup>2</sup> It was the rumor at Syracuse that Aristomachê was the most beloved of the two. But Dionysius treated both of them well, and both of them equally; moreover his son by Doris succeeded him, though he had two sons by the other. His nuptials were celebrated with banquets and festive recreations, wherein all the Syracusan citizens as well as the soldiers partook. The scene was probably the more grateful to Dionysius, as he seems at this moment, when every man's mind was full of vindictive impulse and expected victory against Carthage, to have enjoyed a real short-lived popularity, and to have been able to move freely among the people; without that fear of assassination which habitually tormented his life even in his inmost privacy and bedchamber—and that extremity of suspicion which did not except either his wives or his daughters.<sup>3</sup>

After a few days devoted to such fellowship and festivity, Dionysius convoked a public assembly, for the purpose of formally announcing the intended war. He reminded the Syracusans that the Carthaginians were common enemies to Greeks in general, but most of all to the Sicilian Greeks—as recent events but too plainly testified. He appealed to their generous sympathies on behalf of the five Hellenic cities, in the southern part of the island, which had lately undergone the miseries of capture by the generals of Carthage, and were still groaning under her yoke. Nothing prevented Carthage (he added) from attempting to extend her dominion over the rest of the island, except the pestilence under which she had herself been suffering in Africa. To the Syracusans

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 44; xvi, 6.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v, 20, 57-63; Valer. Maxim. ix, 13; Diodor. xiv, 2 VOL. X. 21 310c.



this ought to be an imperative stimulus for attacking her at once, and rescuing their Hellenic brethren, before she had time to recover.<sup>1</sup>

These motives were really popular and impressive. There was besides another inducement, which weighed with Dionysius to hasten the war, though he probably did not dwell upon it in his public address to the Syracusans. He perceived that various Sicilian Greeks were migrating voluntarily with their properties into the territory of Carthage; whose dominion, though hateful and oppressive, was, at least while untried, regarded by many with less terror than his dominion when actually suffered. By commencing hostilities at once, he expected not only to arrest such emigration, but to induce such Greeks as were actually subjects of Carthage to throw off her yoke and join him.<sup>2</sup>

Loud acclamations from the Syracusan assembly hailed the proposition for war with Carthage; a proposition, which only converted into reality what had been long the familiar expectation of every man. And the war was rendered still more popular by the permission, which Dionysius granted forthwith, to plunder all the Carthaginian residents and mercantile property either in Syracuse or in any of his dependent cities. We are told that there were not only several domiciliated Carthaginians at Syracuse, but also many loaded vessels belonging to Carthage in the harbor, so that the plunder was lucrative.<sup>3</sup> But though such may have been the case in ordinary times, it seems hardly credible, that under the actual circumstances, any Carthaginian (person or property) can have been at Syracuse except by accident; for war with Carthage

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 45.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 46.

There were also Greeks, and seemingly Greeks of some consideration, who resided at Carthage, and seemed to have continued resident there throughout the war between the Carthaginians and Dionysius (Diodor. xiv, 77). We should infer, from their continuing to reside there, that the Carthaginians did not retaliate upon them the plunder now authorized by Dionysius against their countrymen resident at Syracuse; and farther, it affords additional probability that the number of Carthaginians actually plundered at Syracuse was not considerable.

For instances of intermarriage, and inter-residence, between Carthage and Syracuse, see Herodot. vii, 166; Livy, xxiv, 6.

Phœnician coins have been found in Ortygia, bearing a Phœnician inscription signifying *The Island*, — which was the usual denomination of Ortygia (Mörs, Die Phönizier. ii, 2, p. 327).

had been long announced, not merely in current talk, but in the more unequivocal language of overwhelming preparation. Nor is it easy to understand how the prudent Carthaginian Senate (who probably were not less provided with spies at Syracuse than Dionysius was at Carthage)<sup>1</sup> can have been so uninformed as to be taken by surprise at the last moment, when Dionysius sent thither a herald formally declaring war; which herald was not sent until after the license for private plunder had been previously granted. He peremptorily required the Carthaginians to relinquish their dominion over the Greek cities in Sicily,<sup>2</sup> as the only means of avoiding war. To such a proposition no answer was returned, nor probably expected. But the Carthaginians were now so much prostrated (like Athens in the second or third years of the Peloponnesian war) by depopulation, suffering, terrors, and despondency, arising out of the pestilence which beset them in Africa, that they felt incompetent to any serious effort, and heard with alarm the letter read from Dionysius. There was, however, no alternative, so that they forthwith despatched some of their ablest citizens to levy troops for the defence of their Sicilian possessions.<sup>3</sup>

The first news that reached them was indeed appalling. Dionysius had marched forth with his full power, Syracusan as well as foreign, accumulated by so long a preparation. It was a power, the like of which had never been beheld in Greece; greater even than that wielded by his predecessor Gelon eighty years before. If the contemporaries of Gelon had been struck with awe<sup>4</sup> at the superiority of his force to anything that Hellas could show elsewhere, as much or more would the same sentiment be felt by those who surrounded Dionysius. More intimately still was a similar comparison, with the mighty victor of Himera, present to Dionysius himself. He exulted in setting out with an army yet more imposing, against the same enemy, and for the same purpose of liberating the maritime cities of Sicily subject to Carthage;<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 55. Τοῦτο δ' ἐμχανήσατο (ἱμῖλκων) πρὸς τὸ μηδένα τῶν κατασκόπων ἀπαγγεῖλαι τὸν καταπλοῦν τῷ Διονυσίῳ, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 46, 47.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiv, 47.

<sup>4</sup> Herodot. vii, 145. Τὰ δὲ Γελῶνος πρήγματα μέγαλα ἐλέγετο εἶναι, οὐδ' αὖ μὲν Ἑλληνικῶν τῶν οὐ πολλῶν μέγ' αὖ. Compare c. 160-162.

<sup>5</sup> Herodot. vii, 158. Gelon's speech to the Lacedæmonians who come to solicit his aid against Xerxes.



cities, whose number and importance had since fearfully augmented.

These subject-cities, from Kamarina on one side of the island to Selinus and Himera on the other, though there were a certain number of Carthaginian residents established there, had no effective standing force to occupy or defend them on the part of Carthage; whose habit it was to levy large mercenary hosts for the special occasion and then to disband them afterwards. Accordingly, as soon as Dionysius with his powerful army passed the Syracusan border, and entered upon his march westward along the southern coast of the island, proclaiming himself as liberator — the most intense anti-Carthaginian manifestations burst forth at once, at Kamarina, Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera. These Greeks did not merely copy the Syracusans in plundering the property of all Carthaginians found among them, but also seized their persons, and put them to death with every species of indignity and torture. A frightful retaliation now took place for the cruelties recently committed by the Carthaginian armies, in the sacking of Selinus, Agrigentum, and the other conquered cities.<sup>1</sup> The Hellenic war-practice, in itself sufficiently rigorous, was aggravated into a merciless and studied barbarity, analogous to that which had disfigured the late proceedings of Carthage and her western mercenaries. These "Sicilian vespers," which burst out throughout all the south of Sicily against the Carthaginian residents, surpassed even the memorable massacre known under that name in the thirteenth century, wherein the Angevine knights and soldiers were indeed assassinated, but not tortured. Diodorus tells us that the Carthaginians learnt from the retaliation thus suffered, a lesson of forbearance. It will not appear however, from their future conduct, that the lesson was much laid to heart; while it is unhappily cer-

Αὐτοὶ δὲ, ἐμεῦ πρότερον δεηθέντος βαρβαρικοῦ στρατοῦ συνεπάσθαι, οἱ πρὸς Καρχηδονίους νεῖκος συνήπτο. . . . ὑποτεινοντός τε τὰ ἐμπόρια συνελευθεροῦν, etc.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 46. Οὐ μόνον γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς οὐσίας διήρπασαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὺς συλλαμβάνοντες, πᾶσαν αἰκίαν καὶ ὕβριν εἰς τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν ἀπέτιθεντο, μνημονεύοντες ὅτι αὐτοὶ κατὰ τὴν αἰχμαλωσίαν ἔπαθον. Ἐπὶ τοσούτου δὲ τῆς κατὰ τῶν Φοινίκων τιμωρίας προεβήσαν, καὶ τότε καὶ κατὰ τὸν ὑστερον χρόνον ὥστε τοὺς Καρχηδονίους διδάχθηναι μηκέτι παρανομεῖν εἰς τοὺς ὑποπαύοντας

tain, that such interchange of cruelties with less humanized neighbors, contributed to lower in the Sicilian Greeks that measure of comparative forbearance which characterized the Hellenic race in its own home.

Elate with this fury of revenge, the citizens of Kamarina, Gela, Agrigentum, and Selinus joined Dionysius on his march along the coast. He was enabled, from his abundant stock of recently fabricated arms, to furnish them with panoplies and weapons; for it is probable that as subjects of Carthage they had been disarmed. Strengthened by all these reinforcements, he mustered a force of eighty thousand men, besides more than three thousand cavalry; while the ships of war which accompanied him along the coast were nearly two hundred, and the transports, with stores and battering machines, not less than five hundred. With this prodigious army, the most powerful hitherto assembled under Grecian command, he appeared before the Carthaginian settlement of Motyê, a fortified seaport in a little bay immediately north of Cape Lilybæum.<sup>1</sup>

Of the three principal establishments of Carthage in Sicily, — Motyê, Panormus (Palermo), and Soloeis, — Motyê was at once the nearest to the mother-city,<sup>2</sup> the most important, and the most devoted. It was situated (like the original Syracuse in Ortygia) upon a little islet, separated from Sicily by a narrow strait about two-thirds of a mile in breadth, which its citizens had bridged over by means of a mole, so as to form a regular, though narrow, footpath. It was populous, wealthy, flourishing, and distinguished for the excellence both of its private houses and its fortifications. Perceiving the approach of Dionysius, and not intimidated by the surrender of their neighbors and allies, the Elymi at Eryx, who did not dare to resist so powerful a force, — the Motyênes put themselves in the best condition of defence. They broke up their mole, and again insulated themselves from Sicily, in the hope of holding out until relief should be sent from Carthage. Resolved to avenge upon Motyê the sufferings of Agrigentum and Selinus, Dionysius took a survey of the place in conjunction with his principal engineers. It deserves notice, that this is among the earliest sieges recorded in Grecian history wherein we read of a pro-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 47.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. vi, 2; Pausan. v, 25, 3.



fessed engineer as being directly and deliberately called on to advise the best mode of proceeding.<sup>1</sup>

Having formed his plans, he left his admiral Leptines with a portion of the army to begin the necessary works, while he himself with the remainder laid waste the neighboring territory dependent on or allied with Carthage. The Sikani and others submitted to him; but Ankyræ, Soloeis, Panormus, Egesta, and Entella, all held out, though the citizens were confined to their walls, and obliged to witness, without being able to prevent, the destruction of their lands.<sup>2</sup> Returning from this march, Dionysius pressed the siege of Motyê with the utmost ardor, and with all the appliances which his engineers could devise. Having moored his transports along the beach, and hauled his ships of war ashore in the harbor, he undertook the laborious task of filling up the strait (probably of no great depth) which divided Motyê from the main island;<sup>3</sup> — or at least as much of the length of the strait as was sufficient to march across both with soldiers and with battering engines, and to bring them up close against the walls of the city. The numbers under his command enabled him to achieve this enterprise, though not without a long period of effort, during which the Carthaginians tried more than once to interrupt his proceedings. Not having a fleet capable of contending in pitched battle against the besiegers, the Carthaginian general Imilkon tried two successive manœuvres. He first sent a squadron of ten ships of war to sail suddenly into the harbor of Syracuse, in hopes that the diversion thus operated would constrain Dionysius to detach a portion of his fleet from Motyê. Though the attack, however, was so far successful as to destroy many merchantmen in the harbor, yet the assailants were beaten off without making any more serious impression, or creating the diversion intended.<sup>4</sup> Imilkon next made an attempt to surprise the armed ships of Dionysius,

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 48. Διονύσιος δὲ μετὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτόνων κατασκευάμενος τοὺς τόπους, etc.

Artemon the engineer was consulted by Perikles at the siege of Samos (Plutarch, Perikles, c. 27).

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 48, 49.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiv, 49. ἐχώννυε τὸν μεταξὺ πόρον, καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ λόγον ὅμα τῇ τοῦ χώματος ἀξίῃ προσηγάγε τοῖς τείχεσι.

<sup>4</sup> Diodor. xiv, 50.

as they lay hauled ashore in the harbor near Motyê. Crossing over from Carthage by night, with one hundred ships of war, to the Selinuntine coast, he sailed round Cape Lilybæum, and appeared at daybreak off Motyê. His appearance took every man by surprise. He destroyed or put to flight the ships on guard, and sailed into the harbor prepared for attack while as yet only a few of the Syracusan ships had been got afloat. As the harbor was too confined to enable Dionysius to profit by his great superiority in number and size of ships, a great portion of his fleet would have been now destroyed, had it not been saved by his numerous land force and artillery on the beach. Showers of missiles, from this assembled crowd as well as from the decks of the Syracusan ships, prevented Imilkon from advancing far enough to attack with effect. The newly-invented engine called the catapulta, of which the Carthaginians had as yet had no experience, was especially effective; projecting large masses to a great distance, it filled them with astonishment and dismay. While their progress was thus arrested, Dionysius employed a new expedient to rescue his fleet from the dilemma in which it had been caught. His numerous soldiers were directed to haul the ships, not down to the harbor, but landward, across a level tongue of land, more than two miles in breadth, which separated the harbor of Motyê from the outer sea. Wooden planks were laid so as to form a pathway for the ships; and in spite of the great size of the newly-constructed quadriremes and quinqueremes, the strength and ardor of the army sufficed for this toilsome effort of transporting eighty ships across in one day. The entire fleet, double in number to that of the Carthaginians, being at length got afloat, Imilkon did not venture on a pitched battle, but returned at once back to Africa.<sup>1</sup>

Though the citizens of Motyê saw from the walls the mournful spectacle of their friends retiring, their courage was nowise abated. They knew well that they had no mercy to expect; that the general ferocity of the Carthaginians in their hour of victory, and especially the cruel treatment of Greek captives even in Motyê itself, would now be retaliated; and that their only chance lay in a brave despair. The road across the strait having been at length completed, Dionysius brought up his engines and began his

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 50; Polyænus, v, 2, 6.



assault. While the catapulta with its missiles prevented defenders from showing themselves on the battlements, battering-rams were driven up to shake or overthrow the walls. At the same time large towers on wheels were rolled up, with six different stories in them one above the other, and in height equal to the houses. Against these means of attack the besieged on their side elevated lofty masts above the walls, with yards projecting outwards. Upon these yards stood men protected from the missiles by a sort of breastwork, and holding burning torches, pitch, and other combustibles, which they cast down upon the machines of the assailants. Many machines took fire in the woodwork, and it was not without difficulty that the conflagration was extinguished. After a long and obstinate resistance, however, the walls were at length overthrown or carried by assault, and the besiegers rushed in, imagining the town to be in their power. But the indefatigable energy of the besieged had already put the houses behind into a state of defence, and barricaded the streets, so that a fresh assault, more difficult than the first, remained to be undertaken. The towers on wheels were rolled near, but probably could not be pushed into immediate contact with the houses in consequence of the ruins of the overthrown wall which impeded their approach. Accordingly the assailants were compelled to throw out wooden platforms or bridges from the towers to the houses, and to march along these to the attack. But here they were at great disadvantage, and suffered severe loss. The Motyenes, resisting desperately, prevented them from setting firm foot on the houses, slew many of them in hand-combat, and precipitated whole companies to the ground, by severing or oversetting the platform. For several days this desperate combat was renewed. Not a step was gained by the besiegers, yet the unfortunate Motyenes became each day more exhausted, while portions of the foremost houses were also overthrown. Every evening Dionysius recalled his troops to their night's repose, renewing the assault next morning. Having thus brought the enemy into an expectation that the night would be undisturbed, he on one fatal night took them by surprise, sending the Thurian Archylus with a chosen body of troops to attack the foremost defences. This detachment, planting ladders and climbing up by means of the half-demolished houses, established themselves firmly in a position within the town before re-

sistance could be organized. In vain did the Motyenes, discovering the stratagem too late, endeavor to dislodge them. The main force of Dionysius was speedily brought up across the artificial earth-way to confirm their success, and the town was thus carried, in spite of the most gallant resistance, which continued even after it had become hopeless.<sup>1</sup>

The victorious host who now poured into Motyæ, incensed not merely by the length and obstinacy of the defence, but also by antecedent Carthaginian atrocities at Agrigentum and elsewhere, gave full loose to the sanguinary impulses of retaliation. They butchered indiscriminately men and women, the aged and the children, without mercy to any one. The streets were thus strewn with the slain, in spite of all efforts on the part of Dionysius, who desired to preserve the captives that they might be sold as slaves, and thus bring in a profitable return. But his orders to abstain from slaughter were not obeyed, nor could he do anything more than invite the sufferers by proclamation to take refuge in the temples; a step, which most of them would probably resort to uninvited. Restrained from farther slaughter by the sanctuary of the temples, the victors now turned to pillage. Abundance of gold, silver, precious vestments, and other marks of opulence, the accumulations of a long period of active prosperity, fell into their hands; and Dionysius allowed to them the full plunder of the town, as a recompense for the toils of the siege. He farther distributed special recompenses to those who had distinguished themselves; one hundred minæ being given to Archylus, the leader of the successful night-surprise. All the surviving Motyenes he sold into slavery; but he reserved for a more cruel fate Daimenês and various other Greeks who had been taken among them. These Greeks he caused to be crucified;<sup>2</sup> a specimen of the Phœnician penalties transferred by example to their Hellenic neighbors and enemies.

The siege of Motyæ having occupied nearly all the summer, Dionysius now reconducted his army homeward. He left at the place a Sikel garrison under the command of the Syracusan Biton, as well as a large portion of his fleet, one hundred and twenty ships, under the command of his brother Leptines; who was in-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 51, 52, 53.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 53.



structed to watch for the arrival of any force from Carthage, and to employ himself in besieging the neighboring towns of Egesta and Entella. The operations against these two towns however had little success. The inhabitants defended themselves bravely, and the Egestæans were even successful, through a well-planned nocturnal sally, in burning the enemy's camp, with many horses, and stores of all kinds in the tents. Neither of the two towns was yet reduced, when, in the ensuing spring, Dionysius himself returned with his main force from Syracuse. He reduced the inhabitants of Halikyæ to submission, but effected no other permanent conquest, nor anything more than devastation of the neighboring territory dependent upon Carthage.<sup>1</sup>

Presently the face of the war was changed by the arrival of Imilkon from Carthage. Having been elevated to the chief magistracy of the city, he now brought with him an overwhelming force, collected as well from the subjects in Africa as from Iberia and the Western Mediterranean. It amounted, even in the low estimate of Timæus, to one hundred thousand men, reinforced afterwards in Sicily by thirty thousand more, — and in the more ample computations of Ephorus, to three hundred thousand foot, four thousand horse, four hundred chariots of war, four hundred ships of war, and six hundred transports carrying stores and engines. Dionysius had his spies at Carthage,<sup>2</sup> even among men of rank and politicians, to apprise him of all movements or public orders. But Imilkon, to obviate knowledge of the precise point in Sicily where he intended to land, gave to the pilots sealed instructions, to be opened only when they were out at sea, indicating Panormus (Palermo) as the place of rendezvous.<sup>3</sup> The transports made directly for that port, without nearing the land elsewhere; while Imilkon with the ships of war approached the

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 54.

Leptines was brother of Dionysius (xiv, 102; xv, 7), though he afterwards married the daughter of Dionysius, — a marriage not condemned by Grecian sentiment.

<sup>2</sup> Justin, xx, 5. One of these Carthaginians of rank, who, from political enmity to Hanno, wrote letters in Greek to communicate information to Dionysius, was detected and punished as a traitor. On this occasion, the Carthaginian senate is said to have enacted a law, forbidding all citizens to learn Greek, — either to write it or to speak it.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiv, 54; Polyænus, v, 10, 1.

harbor of Motyê and sailed from thence along the coast to Panormus. He probably entertained the hope of intercepting some portion of the Syracusan fleet. But nothing of the kind was found practicable; while Leptines on his side was even fortunate enough to be able to attack, with thirty triremes, the foremost vessels of the large transport-fleet on their voyage to Panormus. He destroyed no less than fifty of them, with five thousand men, and two hundred chariots of war; but the remaining fleet reached the port in safety, and were there joined by Imilkon with the ships of war. The land force being disembarked, the Carthaginian general led them to Motyê, ordering his ships of war to accompany him along the coast. In his way he regained Eryx, which was at heart Carthaginian, having only been intimidated into submission to Dionysius during the preceding year. He then attacked Motyê, which he retook, seemingly after very little resistance. It had held out obstinately against the Syracusans a few months before, while in the hands of its own Carthaginian inhabitants, with their families and properties around them; but the Sikel garrison had far less motive for stout defence.<sup>1</sup>

Thus was Dionysius deprived of the conquest which had cost him so much blood and toil during the preceding summer. We are surprised to learn that he made no effort to prevent its recapture, though he was then not far off, besieging Egesta, — and though his soldiers, elate with the successes of the preceding year were eager for a general battle. But Dionysius, deeming this measure too adventurous, resolved to retreat to Syracuse. His provisions were failing, and he was at a great distance from allies, so that defeat would have been ruinous. He therefore returned to Syracuse, carrying with him some of the Sikanians, whom he persuaded to evacuate their abode in the Carthaginian neighborhood, promising to provide them with better homes elsewhere. Most of them, however, declined his offers; some (among them, the Halikyæans) preferring to resume their alliance with Carthage. Of the recent acquisitions nothing now remained to Dionysius beyond the Selinuntine boundary; but Gela, Kamarina, Agrigentum, and Selinus had been emancipated from Carthage, and were still in a state of dependent alliance with him;

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 55.



a result of moment, — yet seemingly very inadequate to the immense warlike preparations whereby it had been attained. Whether he exercised a wise discretion in declining to fight the Carthaginians, we have not sufficient information to determine. But his army appear to have been dissatisfied with it, and it was among the causes of the outbreak against him shortly afterwards at Syracuse.<sup>1</sup>

Thus left master of the country, Imilkon, instead of trying to reconquer Selinus and Himera, which had probably been impoverished by recent misfortunes, — resolved to turn his arms against Messênê in the north-east of the island; a city as yet fresh and untouched, — so little prepared for attack that its walls were not in good repair, — and moreover at the present moment yet farther enfeebled by the absence of its horsemen in the army of Dionysius.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, he marched along the northern coast of Sicily, with his fleet coasting in the same direction to cooperate with him. He made terms with Kephalœdium and Therma, captured the island of Lipara, and at length reached Cape Pelôrus, a few miles from Messênê. His rapid march and unexpected arrival struck the Messenians with dismay. Many of them, conceiving defence to be impossible against so numerous a host, sent away their families and their valuable property to Rhegium or elsewhere. On the whole, however, a spirit of greater confidence prevailed, arising in part from an ancient prophecy preserved among the traditions of the town, purporting that the Carthaginians should one day carry water in Messênê. The interpreters affirmed that "to carry water" meant, of course, "to be a slave," — and the Messenians, persuading themselves that this portended defeat to Imilkon, sent out their chosen military force to meet him at Pelôrus, and oppose his disembarkation. The Carthaginian commander, seeing these troops on their march, ordered his fleet to sail forward into the harbor of the city, and attack it from seaward during the absence of the defenders. A north wind so fa-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 55.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 56, 57. τῶν ἰδίων ἱππέων ἐν Συρακούσαις ὄντων, etc. . . διὰ τῶν πεπτωκότων τειχῶν εἰσβιασάμενοι, etc. τὰ τεῖχη καταπεπωκότα, etc.

Compare another example of inattention to the state of their walls, on the part of the Messenians (xix, 65).

vored the advance of the ships, that they entered the harbor full sail, and found the city on that side almost unguarded. The troops who had marched out towards Pelôrus hastened back, but were too late;<sup>1</sup> while Imilkon himself also, pushing forward by land, forced his way into the town over the neglected parts of the wall. Messênê was taken; and its unhappy population fled in all directions for their lives. Some found refuge in the neighboring cities; others ran to the hill-forts of the Messenian territory, planted as a protection against the indigenous Sikels; while about two hundred of them near the harbor, cast themselves into the sea, and undertook the arduous task of swimming across to the Italian coast, in which fifty of them succeeded.<sup>2</sup>

Though Imilkon tried in vain to carry by assault some of the Messenian hill-forts, which were both strongly placed and gallantly defended, — yet his capture of Messênê itself was an event both imposing and profitable. It deprived Dionysius of an important ally, and lessened his facilities for obtaining succor from Italy. But most of all, it gratified the anti-Hellenic sentiment of the Punic general and his army, counterbalancing the capture of Motyê in the preceding year. Having taken scarce any captives, Imilkon had nothing but unconscious stone and wood upon which to vent his antipathy. He ordered the town, the walls, and all the buildings, to be utterly burnt and demolished; a task which his numerous host are said to have executed so effectually, that there remained hardly anything but ruins, without a trace of human residence.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Kleon and the Athenians took Torônê by a similar manoeuvre (Thucyd. v, 2).

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 57.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiv, 58. Ἰμίλκων δὲ τῆς Μεσσηνίας τὰ τεῖχη κατασκάψας, προσέταξε τοῖς στρατιώταις καταβαλεῖν τὰς οἰκίας εἰς ἑδαφος, καὶ μῆτε κέραμον, οὐδ' ὕλην, μῆτ' ἄλλο μηδὲν ὑπολιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν κατακαῦσαι, τὰ δὲ συντρίβειν. Ταχὺ δὲ τῇ τῶν στρατιωτῶν πολυχειρίᾳ λαβόντων τῶν ἔργων συντέλειαν, ἡ πόλις ἄγνωστος ἦν, ὅπου πρότερον αὐτὴν οἰκίσθαι συνέβαιεν. Ὅρων γὰρ τὸν τόπον πόρρω μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν συμμαχίδων πόλεων κεχωρισμένον, εὐκαιρότατον δὲ τῶν περὶ Σικελίαν ὄντα, προήρητο δοῖν θάτερον, ἢ τελέως ἀοίκητον διατρεῖν, ἢ δυσχερὴ καὶ πολυχρόνιον τὴν κτίσιν αὐτῆς γίνεσθαι.

Ἐναποδείξαμενος οὖν τὸ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας μῖσος ἐν τῇ τῶν Μεσσηνίων ἀτυχίᾳ, etc.

It would appear, however, that the demolition of Messênê can hardly have been carried so far in fact as Imilkon intended; since the city reappears shortly afterwards in renewed dignity.



He received adhesion and reinforcements from most of the Sikels of the interior, who had been forced to submit to Dionysius a year or two before, but detested his dominion. To some of these Sikels, the Syracusan despot had assigned the territory of the conquered Naxians, with their city probably unwall'd. But anxious as they were to escape from him, many had migrated to a point somewhat north of Naxos, — to the hill of Taurus, immediately over the sea, unfavorably celebrated among the Sikel population as being the spot where the first Greek colonists had touched on arriving in the island. Their migration was encouraged, multiplied, and organized, under the auspices of Imilkon, who prevailed upon them to construct, upon the strong eminence of Taurus, a fortified post, which formed the beginning of the city afterwards known as Tauromenium.<sup>2</sup> Magon was sent with the Carthaginian fleet to assist in the enterprise.

Meanwhile Dionysius, greatly disquieted at the capture of Mes-senê, exerted himself to put Syracuse in an effective position of defence on her northern frontier. Naxos and Katana being both unfortified, he was forced to abandon them, and he induced the Campanians whom he had planted in Katana to change their quarters to the strong town called Ætna, on the skirt of the mountain so named. He made Leontini his chief position; strengthening as much as possible the fortifications of the city as well as those of the neighboring country forts, wherein he accumulated magazines of provisions from the fertile plains around. He had still a force of thirty thousand foot and more than three thousand horse; he had also a fleet of one hundred and eighty ships of war, — triremes and others. During the year preceding, he had brought out both a land force and a naval force much superior to this, even for purposes of aggression; how it happened that he could now command no more, even for defence and at home, — or what had become of the difference, — we are not told. Of the one hundred and eighty ships of war, sixty only were manned by the extraordinary proceeding of liberating slaves. Such sudden and serious changes in the amount of military force from year to year, are perceptible among Carthaginians as well as Greeks, — indeed throughout most part of Grecian history; — the armies being got together chiefly

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 59-76

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 50

for special occasions, and then dismissed. Dionysius farther despatched envoys to Sparta, soliciting a reinforcement of a thousand mercenary auxiliaries. Having thus provided the best defence that he could through the territory, he advanced forward with his main land-force to Katana, having his fleet also moving in coöperation, immediately off shore.

Towards this same point of Katana the Carthaginians were now moving, in their march against Syracuse. Magon was directed to coast along with the fleet from Taurus (Tauromenium) to Katana, while Imilkon intended himself to march with the land force on shore, keeping constantly near the fleet for the purpose of mutual support. But his scheme was defeated by a remarkable accident. A sudden eruption took place from Ætna; so that the stream of lava from the mountain to the sea forbade all possibility of marching along the shore to Katana, and constrained him to make a considerable circuit with his army on the land-side of the mountain. Though he accelerated his march as much as possible, yet for two days or more he was unavoidably cut off from the fleet; which under the command of Magon was sailing southward towards Katana. Dionysius availed himself of this circumstance to advance beyond Katana along the beach stretching northward, to meet Magon in his approach, and attack him separately. The Carthaginian fleet was much superior in number, consisting of five hundred sail in all; a portion of which, however, were not strictly ships of war, but armed merchant-men, — that is, furnished with brazen bows for impact against an enemy, and rowed with oars. But on the other hand, Dionysius had a land-force close at hand to coöperate with his fleet; an advantage which in ancient naval warfare counted for much, serving in case of defeat as a refuge to the ships, and in case of victory as intercepting or abridging the enemy's means of escape. Magon, alarmed when he came in sight of the Grecian land-force mustered on the beach, and the Grecian fleet rowing up to attack him, — was nevertheless constrained unwillingly to accept the battle. Leptines, the Syracusan admiral, — though ordered by Dionysius to concentrate his ships as much as possible, in consequence of his inferior numbers, — attacked with boldness, and even with temerity; advancing himself with thirty ships greatly before the rest, and being apparently farther out to sea than the enemy. His bravery at first appeared successful, destroying or damaging the headmost ships of the enemy. But their superior numbers



presently closed around him, and after a desperate combat, fought in the closest manner, ship to ship and hand to hand, he was forced to sheer off, and to seek escape seaward. His main fleet, coming up in disorder, and witnessing his defeat, were beaten also, after a strenuous contest. All of them fled, either landward or seaward as they could, under vigorous pursuit by the Carthaginian vessels; and in the end, no less than a hundred of the Syracusan ships, with twenty thousand men, were numbered as taken, or destroyed. Many of the crews, swimming or floating in the water on spars, strove to get to land to the protection of their comrades. But the Carthaginian small craft, sailing very near to the shore, slew or drowned these unfortunate men, even under the eyes of friends ashore who could render no assistance. The neighboring water became strewed, both with dead bodies and with fragments of broken ships. As victors, the Carthaginians were enabled to save many of their own seamen, either on board of damaged ships, or swimming for their lives. Yet their own loss too was severe; and their victory, complete as it proved, was dearly purchased.

Though the land-force of Dionysius had not been at all engaged, yet the awful defeat of his fleet induced him to give immediate orders for retreating, first to Katana and afterwards yet farther to Syracuse. As soon as the Syracusan army had evacuated the adjoining shore, Magon towed all his prizes to land, and there hauled them up on the beach; partly for repair, wherever practicable, — partly as visible proofs of the magnitude of the triumph, for encouragement to his own armament. Stormy weather just then supervening, he was forced to haul his own ships ashore also for safety, and remained there for several days refreshing the crews. To keep the sea under such weather would have been scarcely practicable; so that if Dionysius, instead of retreating, had continued to occupy the shore with his unimpaired land-force, it appears that the Carthaginian ships would have been in the greatest danger; constrained either to face the storm, to run back a considerable distance northward, or to make good their landing against a formidable enemy, without being able to wait for the arrival of Imilkon.<sup>1</sup> The latter, after no very long interval, came up, so that the land-force and the navy of the Carthaginians were now

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 60 61. Compare the speech of Theodorus at Syracuse afterwards (c. 68), from which we gather a more complete idea of what passed after the battle.

again in coöperation. While allowing his troops some days of repose and enjoyment of the victory, he sent envoys to the town of Ætna, inviting the Campanian mercenary soldiers to break with Dionysius and join him. Reminding them that their countrymen at Entella were living in satisfaction as a dependency of Carthage (which they had recently testified by resisting the Syracusan invasion), he promised to them an accession of territory, and a share in the spoils of the war, to be wrested from Greeks who were enemies of Campanians not less than of Carthaginians.<sup>1</sup> The Campanians of Ætna would gladly have complied with his invitation, and were only restrained from joining him by the circumstance that they had given hostages to the despot of Syracuse, in whose army also their best soldiers were now serving.

Meanwhile Dionysius, in marching back to Syracuse, found his army grievously discontented. Withdrawn from the scene of action without even using their arms, they looked forward to nothing better than a blockade at Syracuse, full of hardship and privation. Accordingly many of them protested against retreat, conjuring him to lead them again to the scene of action, that they might either assail the Carthaginian fleet in the confusion of landing, or join battle with the advancing land-force under Imilkon. At first, Dionysius consented to such change of scheme. But he was presently reminded that unless he hastened back to Syracuse, Magon with the victorious fleet might sail thither, enter the harbor, and possess himself of the city; in the same manner as Imilkon had recently succeeded at Messênê. Under these apprehensions he renewed his original order for retreat, in spite of the vehement protest of his Sicilian allies; who were indeed so incensed that most of them quitted him at once. Which of the two was the wiser plan, we have no sufficient means to determine. But the circumstances seem not to have been the same as those preceding the capture of Messênê; for Magon was not in a condition to move forward at once with the fleet, partly from his loss in the recent action, partly from the stormy weather; and might perhaps have been intercepted in the

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 61. Καὶ καθόλου δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος ἀπεδείκνυε πολλέμιον ὑπαρχόντων ἄλλων ἐθνῶν.

These manifestations of anti-Hellenic sentiment, among the various neighbors of the Sicilian Greeks, are important to notice, though they are not often brought before us.



very act of landing, if Dionysius had moved rapidly back to the shore. As far as we can judge, it would appear that the complaints of the army against the hasty retreat of Dionysius rested on highly plausible grounds. He nevertheless persisted, and reached Syracuse with his army not only much discouraged, but greatly diminished by the desertion of allies. He lost no time in sending forth envoys to the Italian Greeks and to Peloponnesus, with ample funds for engaging soldiers, and urgent supplications to Sparta as well as to Corinth.<sup>1</sup> Polyxenus, his brother-in-law, employed on this mission, discharged his duty with such diligence, that he came back in a comparatively short space of time, with thirty-two ships of war under the command of the Lacedæmonian Pharakidas.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile Imilkon, having sufficiently refreshed his troops after the naval victory off Katana, moved forward towards Syracuse both with the fleet and the land-force. The entry of his fleet into the Great Harbor was ostentatious and imposing; far above even that of the second Athenian armament, when Demosthenes first exhibited its brilliant but short-lived force.<sup>3</sup> Two hundred and eight ships of war first rowed in, marshalled in the best order, and adorned with the spoils of the captured Syracusan ships. These were followed by transports, five hundred of them carrying soldiers, and one thousand others either empty or bringing stores and machines. The total number of vessels, we are told, reached almost two thousand, covering a large portion of the Great Harbor.<sup>4</sup> The numerous land-force marched up about the same time; Imilkon establishing his head quarters in the temple of Zeus Olympius, nearly one English mile and a half from the city. He presently drew up his forces in order of battle, and advanced nearly to the city walls; while his ships of war also, being

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 61.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 63.

Polyænus (v, 8, 2) recounts a manœuvre of *Leptines*, practised in bringing back a Lacedæmonian reinforcement from Sparta to Sicily on his voyage along the Tarentine coast. Perhaps this may be the Lacedæmonian division intended.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. vii, 42; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 21; Diodor. xiii, 11.

<sup>4</sup> Diodor. xiv, 62.

The text of Diodorus is here so perplexed as to require conjectural alteration, which Rhodomannus has supplied yet not so as to remove all that is obscure. The word *εἰσθρόμεναι* still remains to be explained or corrected.

divided into two fleets of one hundred ships each, showed themselves in face of the two interior harbors or docks (on each side of the connecting strait between Ortygia and the main land) wherein the Syracusan ships were safely lodged. He thus challenged the Syracusans to combat on both elements; but neither challenge was accepted.

Having by such defiance farther raised the confidence of his own troops, he first spread them over the Syracusan territory, and allowed them for thirty days to enrich themselves by unlimited plunder. Next, he proceeded to establish fortified posts, as essential to the prosecution of a blockade which he foresaw would be tedious. Besides fortifying the temple of the Olympian Zeus, he constructed two other forts; one at Cape Plemmyrium (on the southern entrance of the harbor, immediately opposite to Ortygia, where Nikias had erected a post also), the other on the Great Harbor, midway between Plemmyrium and the temple of the Olympian Zeus, at the little bay called Daskon. He farther encircled his whole camp, near the last-mentioned temple, with a wall; the materials of which were derived in part from the demolition of the numerous tombs around; especially one tomb, spacious and magnificent, commemorating Gelon and his wife Damaretê. In these various fortified posts he was able to store up the bread, wine, and other provisions which his transports were employed in procuring from Africa and Sardinia, for the continuous subsistence of so mighty an host.

It would appear as if Imilkon had first hoped to take the city by assault; for he pushed up his army as far as the very walls of Achradina (the outer city). He even occupied the open suburb of that city, afterwards separately fortified under the name of Neapolis, wherein were situated the temples of Demeter and Persephonê, which he stripped of their rich treasures.<sup>1</sup> But if such

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 63. Κατελύβετο δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς προαστεῖον, καὶ οὐκ ἔως τῆς τε Δήμητρος καὶ Κόρης ἐσύλησεν.

Cicero (in Verrem, iv, 52, 53) distinctly mentions the temples of Demeter and Persephonê, and the statue of Apollo Temenites, among the characteristic features of Neapolis; which proves the identity of Neapolis with what Diodorus calls the suburb of Achradina. This identity, recognized by Serra di Falco, Colonel Leake, and other authors, is disputed by Saverio Cavallari, on grounds which do not appear to me sufficient.

See Colonel Leake, notes on Syracuse, pp. 7-10; Cavallari, zur Topographie von Syrakus, p. 20.



was his plan, he soon abandoned it, and confined himself to the slower process of reducing the city by famine. His progress in this enterprise, however, was by no means encouraging. We must recollect that he was not, like Nikias, master of the centre of Epipolæ; able from thence to stretch his right arm southward to the Great Harbor, and his left arm northward to the sea at Trogilus. As far as we are able to make out, he never ascended the southern cliff, nor got upon the slope of Epipolæ; though it seems that at this time there was no line of wall along the southern cliff, as Dionysius had recently built along the northern. The position of Imilkon was confined to the Great Harbor and to the low lands adjoining, southward of the cliff of Epipolæ; so that the communications of Syracuse with the country around remained partially open on two sides,—westward, through the Euryalus at the upper extremity of Epipolæ,—and northward towards Thapsus and Megara, through the Hexapylon, or the principal gate in the new fortification constructed by Dionysius along the northern cliff of Epipolæ. The full value was now felt of that recent fortification, which, protecting Syracuse both to the north and west, and guarding the precious position of Euryalus, materially impeded the operations of Imilkon. The city was thus open, partially at least, on two sides, to receive supplies by land. And even by sea means were found to introduce provisions. Though Imilkon had a fleet so much stronger than the Syracusans did not dare to offer pitched battle, yet he found it difficult to keep such constant watch as to exclude their store-ships, and ensure the arrival of his own. Dionysius and Leptines went forth themselves from the harbor with armed squadrons to accelerate and protect the approach of their supplies; while several desultory encounters took place, both of land-force and of shipping, which proved advantageous to the Syracusans, and greatly raised their spirits.

One naval conflict especially, which occurred while Dionysius was absent on his cruise, was of serious moment. A corn-ship belonging to Imilkon's fleet being seen entering the Great Harbor, the Syracusans suddenly manned five ships of war, mastered it, and hauled it into their own dock. To prevent such capture, the Carthaginians from their station sent out forty ships of war; upon which the Syracusans equipped their whole naval force, bore down upon the forty with numbers decidedly superior, and completely

defeated them. They captured the admiral's ship, damaged twenty-four others, and pursued the rest to the naval station; in front of which they paraded, challenging the enemy to battle. As the challenge was not accepted, they returned to their own dock, towing in their prizes in triumph.

This naval victory indicated, and contributed much to occasion, that turn in the fortune of the siege which each future day still farther accelerated. Its immediate effect was to fill the Syracusan public with unbounded exultation. "Without Dionysius we conquer our enemies; under his command we are beaten; why submit to slavery under him any longer?" Such was the burst of indignant sentiment which largely pervaded the groups and circles in the city; strengthened by the consciousness that they were now all armed and competent to extort freedom,—since Dionysius, when the besieging enemy actually appeared before the city, had been obliged, as the less of two hazards, to produce and redistribute the arms which he had previously taken from them. In the midst of this discontent, Dionysius himself returned from his cruise. To soothe the prevalent temper, he was forced to convene a public assembly; wherein he warmly extolled the recent exploit of the Syracusans, and exhorted them to strenuous confidence, promising that he would speedily bring the war to a close.

It is possible that Dionysius, throughout his despotism, may have occasionally permitted what were called public assemblies; but we may be very sure, that, if ever convened, they were mere matters of form, and that no free discussion or opposition to his will was ever tolerated. On the present occasion, he anticipated the like passive acquiescence; and after having delivered a speech, doubtless much applauded by his own partisans, he was about to dismiss the assembly, when a citizen named Theodorus unexpectedly rose. He was a Horseman or Knight,—a person of wealth and station in the city, of high character and established reputation for courage. Gathering boldness from the time and circumstances, he now stood forward to proclaim publicly that hatred of Dionysius, and anxiety for freedom, which so many of his fellow-citizens around had been heard to utter privately and were well known to feel.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 64. Οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ τοιούτων λόγων γινόμενων, Διονύσιος κατέπλευσε, καὶ συναγαγὼν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπὶναι τοὺς Συρακούσιους, καὶ παρεκάλε



Diodorus in his history gives us a long harangue (whether composed by himself, or copied from others, we cannot tell) as pronounced by Theodorus. The main topics of it are such as we should naturally expect, and are probably, on the whole, genuine. It is a full review, and an emphatic denunciation, of the past conduct of Dionysius, concluding with an appeal to the Syracusans to emancipate themselves from his dominion. "Dionysius (the speaker contends, in substance) is a worse enemy than the Carthaginians: who, if victorious, would be satisfied with a regular tribute, leaving us to enjoy our properties and our paternal polity. Dionysius has robbed us of both. He has pillaged our temples of their sacred deposits. He has slain or banished our wealthy citizens, and then seized their properties by wholesale, to be transferred to his own satellites. He has given the wives of these exiles in marriage to his barbarian soldiers. He has liberated our slaves, and taken them into his pay, in order to keep their masters in slavery. He has garrisoned our own citadel against us, by means of these slaves, together with a host of other mercenaries. He has put to death every citizen who ventured to raise his voice in defence of the laws and constitution. He has abused our confidence, — once, unfortunately, carried so far as to nominate him general, — by employing his powers to subvert our freedom, and rule us according to his own selfish rapacity in place of justice. He has farther stripped us of our arms; these, recent necessity has compelled him to restore, — and these, if we are men, we shall now employ for the recovery of our own freedom.<sup>1</sup>

θαρρύνειν, ἐπαγγελλόμενος ταχέως καταλύσειν τὸν πόλεμον. Ἦδη δ' αὐτοῦ μέλλοντος διαλύειν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἀναστὰς Θεόδωρος ὁ Συρακοῦσιος, ἐν τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν εὐδοκίμων, καὶ δοκῶν εἶναι πρακτικὸς, ἀπετόλμησε περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τοιοῦτοις χρήσασθαι λόγοις.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 65. Οὗτος δὲ, τὰ μὲν ἱερὰ συλῆσας, τοὺς δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν πλούτους ἅμα ταῖς τῶν κεκτημένων ψυχαῖς ἀφελόμενος, τοὺς οἰκέτας μισθοδοτεῖ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν δεσποτῶν δουλείᾳ. . . .

c. 66. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρόπολις, δούλων ὄπλοις τηρουμένη, κατὰ τῆς πόλεως ἐπιτετεῖχισται· τὸ δὲ τῶν μισθοφόρων πλῆθος ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἡθροισται. Καὶ κρατεῖ τῆς πέλειως οὐκ ἐπίσης βραβεύων τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ μόναρχος πλεονεξία κρίνων πράττειν πάντα. Καὶ νῦν μὲν οἱ πολέμιοι βραχὺ μέρος ἔχουσι τῆς χώρας· Διονύσιος δὲ, πᾶσαν ποιήσας ἀνάστατον, τοῖς τὴν τυραννίδα συναύξουσιν ἐδώρησατο. . . .

. . . . . Καὶ πρὸς μὲν Καρχηδονίους δύο μάχας ἐνστυφάμενος ἐν ἑκατέραις ἡττηται· παρὰ δὲ τοῖς πολίταις πιστευθεὶς ἅπαξ στρατὴν ἄν, εἰθένως ἀφείλετο τὴν ἐλευθερίαν· φονεύων μὲν τοὺς παρῆρησιαν ἄγοντας ὑπὲρ τῶν νόμων, φυγα

"If the conduct of Dionysius towards Syracuse has been thus infamous, it has been no better towards the Sicilian Greeks generally. He betrayed Gela and Kamarina, for his own purposes, to the Carthaginians. He suffered Messênê to fall into their hands without the least help. He reduced to slavery, by gross treachery, our Grecian brethren and neighbors of Naxos and Katana; transferring the latter to the non-Hellenic Campanians, and destroying the former. He might have attacked the Carthaginians immediately after their landing from Africa at Panormus, before they had recovered from the fatigue of the voyage. He might have fought the recent naval combat near the port of Katana, instead of near the beach north of that town; so as to ensure to our fleet, if worsted, an easy and sure retreat. Had he chosen to keep his land-force on the spot, he might have prevented the victorious Carthaginian fleet from approaching land, when the storm came on shortly after the battle; or he might have attacked them, if they tried to land, at the greatest advantage. He has conducted the war, altogether, with disgraceful incompetence; not wishing sincerely, indeed, to get rid of them as enemies, but preserving the terrors of Carthage, as an indirect engine to keep Syracuse in subjection to himself. As long as we fought with him, we have been constantly unsuccessful; now that we have come to fight without him, recent experience tells us that we can beat the Carthaginians, even with inferior numbers.

"Let us look out for another leader (concluded Theodorus), in place of a sacrilegious temple-robber whom the gods have now abandoned. If Dionysius will consent to relinquish his dominion, let him retire from the city with his property unmolested; if he will not, we are here all assembled, we are possessed of our arms, and we have both Italian and Peloponnesian allies by our side. The assembly will determine whether it will choose leaders from our own citizens, — or from our metropolis Corinth, — or from the Spartans, the presidents of all Greece."

δεῦν δὲ τοὺς ταῖς οὐσίαις προέχοντας· καὶ τὰς μὲν τῶν φυγάδων γυναῖκας οἰκέταις καὶ μιγάσιν ἀνθρώποις συνοικίζων, τῶν δὲ πολιτικῶν ὄπλων βαρβάρους καὶ ξένους ποιῶν κυρίους. . . . .

c. 67. Οὐκ αἰσχυνόμενα τὸν πολέμιον ἔχοντες ἡγεμόνα, τὸν τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἱερὰ σεσυληκότα;

c. 69. Διόπερ ἕτερον ἡγεμόνα ζητητέον, ὅπως μὴ τὸν σεσυληκότα τοὺς τῶν θεῶν ναοὺς στρατηγὸν ἔχοντες ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, θεομαχῶμεν. . .



Such are the main points of the long harangue ascribed to Theodorus; the first occasion, for many years, on which the voice of free speech had been heard publicly in Syracuse. Among the charges advanced against Dionysius, which go to impeach his manner of carrying on the war against the Carthaginians, there are several which we can neither admit nor reject, from our insufficient knowledge of the facts. But the enormities ascribed to him in his dealing with the Syracusans,—the fraud, violence, spoliation, and bloodshed, whereby he had first acquired, and afterwards upheld, his dominion over them,—these are assertions of matters of fact, which coincide in the main with the previous narrative of Diodorus, and which we have no ground for contesting.

Hailed by the assembly with great sympathy and acclamation, this harangue seriously alarmed Dionysius. In his concluding words, Theodorus had invoked the protection of Corinth as well as of Sparta, against the despot, whom with such signal courage he had thus ventured publicly to arraign. Corinthians as well as Spartans were now lending aid in the defence, under the command of Pharakidas. That Spartan officer came forward to speak next after Theodorus. Among various other sentiments of traditional respect towards Sparta, there still prevailed a remnant of the belief that she was adverse to despots; as she really had once been, at an earlier period of her history.<sup>1</sup> Hence the Syracusans hoped, and even expected, that Pharakidas would second the protest of Theodorus, and stand forward as champion of freedom to the first Grecian city in Sicily.<sup>2</sup> Bitterly indeed were they disappointed. Dionysius had established with Pharakidas relations as friendly as those of the Thirty tyrants at Athens with Kallibius the Lacedæmonian harmost in the acropolis.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly Pharakidas in his speech not only discountenanced the proposition just made, but declared himself emphatically in favor of the despot; intimating that he had been sent to aid the Syracusans and Dionysius against the Carthaginians,—not to put down

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i, 18; Herodot. v. 92.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 70. Τοιούτους τοῦ Θεοδώρου χρησαμένον λόγοις, οἱ μὲν Συρακοῦσιοι μετέωροι ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγένοντο, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους ἀπέβλεπον. Φαρακίδου δὲ τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίου ναυαρχοῦντος τῶν συμμάχων, καὶ παρελθόντος ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα, πάντες προσεδόκων ἀρχηγὸν εἰσεῖναι τῆς ἐλευθερίας.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiv, 70. Ὁ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸν τύραννον ἔχων οἰκείας, etc.; compare Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 14.

the dominion of Dionysius. To the Syracusans this declaration was a denial of all hope. They saw plainly that in any attempt to emancipate themselves, they would have against them not merely the mercenaries of Dionysius, but also the whole force of Sparta, then imperial and omnipotent; represented on the present occasion by Pharakidas, as it had been in a previous year by Aristus. They were condemned to bear their chains in silence, not without unavailing curses against Sparta. Meanwhile Dionysius, thus powerfully sustained, was enabled to ride over the perilous and critical juncture. His mercenaries crowded in haste around his person,—having probably been sent for, as soon as the voice of a free spokesman was heard.<sup>1</sup> And he was thus enabled to dismiss an assembly, which had seemed for one short instant to threaten the perpetuity of his dominion, and to promise emancipation for Syracuse.

During this interesting and momentous scene, the fate of Syracuse had hung upon the decision of Pharakidas: for Theodorus, well aware that with a besieging enemy before the gates, the city could not be left without a supreme authority, had conjured the Spartan commander, with his Lacedæmonian and Corinthian allies, to take into his own hands the control and organization of the popular force. There can be little doubt that Pharakidas could have done this, if he had been so disposed, so as at once to make head against the Carthaginians without, and to restrain, if not to put down, the despotism within. Instead of undertaking the tutelary intervention solicited by the people, he threw himself into the opposite scale, and strengthened Dionysius more than ever, at the moment of his greatest peril. The proceeding of Pharakidas was doubtless conformable to his instructions from home, as well as to the oppressive and crushing policy which Sparta, in these days of her unresisted empire (between the victory of Ægospotami and the defeat of Knidus), pursued throughout the Grecian world.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 70. Παρὰ δὲ τὴν προσδοκίαν γενομένης τῆς ἀποφάσεως, οἱ μὲν μισθόφοροι συνέδραμον πρὸς τὸν Διονύσιον, οἱ δὲ Συρακοῦσιοι καταπληγόντες τὴν ἡσυχίαν, εἶχον, πολλὰ τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις καταρώμενοι. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ πρότερον Ἀρέτης ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος (he is called previously *Aristus*, xiv, 10), ἀντιλαμβανομένων αὐτῶν τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐγένετο προδότης· καὶ τότε Φαρακίδας ἐνέστη ταῖς ὁρμαῖς τῶν Συρακουσίων.



Dionysius was fully sensible of the danger which he had thus been assisted to escape. Under the first impressions of alarm, he strove to gain something like popularity; by a conciliatory language and demeanor, by presents adroitly distributed, and by invitations to his table. Whatever may have been the success of such artifices, the lucky turn, which the siege was now taking, was the most powerful of all aids for building up his full power anew.

It was not the arms of the Syracusans, but the wrath of Demeter and Persephonê, whose temple (in the suburb of Achradina) Imilkon had pillaged, that ruined the besieging army before Syracuse. So the piety of the citizens interpreted that terrific pestilence which now began to rage among the multitude of their enemies without. The divine wrath was indeed seconded (as the historian informs us<sup>1</sup>) by physical causes of no ordinary severity. The vast numbers of the host were closely packed together; it was now the beginning of autumn, the most unhealthy period of the year; moreover this summer had been preternaturally hot, and the low marshy ground near the Great Harbor, under the chill of morning contrasted with the burning sun of noon, was the constant source of fever and pestilence. These unseen and irresistible enemies fell with appalling force upon the troops of Imilkon; especially upon the Libyans, or native Africans, who were found the most susceptible. The intense and varied bodily sufferings of this distemper,—the rapidity with which it spread from man to man,—and the countless victims which it speedily accumulated,—appear to have equalled, if not surpassed, the worst days of the pestilence of Athens in 429 B. C. Care and attendance upon the sick, or even interment of the dead, became impracticable; so that the whole camp presented a scene of deplorable agony, aggravated by the horrors and stench of one hundred and fifty thousand unburied bodies.<sup>2</sup> The military strength of the Carthaginians was completely prostrated by such a visita-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 70. Συνεπελάβετο δὲ καὶ τῇ τοῦ δαιμονίου συμφορᾷ τὸ μυριάδας εἰς ταῦτ' ἀναθροισθῆναι, καὶ τὸ τῆς ὥρας εἶναι πρὸς τὰς νόσους ἐνεργώτατον, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv, 71-76. πεντεκαίδεκα μυριάδας ἐπέιδον ἀτάφους διὰ τὸν λοιμὸν σεσωρευμένους.

I give the figure as I find it, without pretending to trust it as anything more than an indication of a great number.

tion. Far from being able to make progress in the siege, they were not even able to defend themselves against moderate energy on the part of the Syracusans; who (like the Peloponnesians during the great plague of Athens) were themselves untouched by the distemper.<sup>1</sup>

Such was the wretched spectacle of the Carthaginian army, clearly visible from the walls of Syracuse. To overthrow it by a vigorous attack, was an enterprise not difficult; indeed, so sure, in the opinion of Dionysius, that in organizing his plan of operation, he made it the means of deliberately getting rid of some troops in the city who had become inconvenient to him. Concerting measures for a simultaneous assault upon the Carthaginian station both by sea and land, he entrusted eighty ships of war to Pharakidas and Leptines, with orders to move at daybreak; while he himself conducted a body of troops out of the city, during the darkness of night; issuing forth by Epipolæ and Euryalus (as Gylippus had formerly done when he surprised Plemmyrium<sup>2</sup>), and making a circuit until he came, on the other side of the Anapus, to the temple of Kyanê; thus getting on the land-side or south-west of the Carthaginian position. He first despatched his horsemen, together with a regiment of one thousand mercenary foot-soldiers, to commence the attack. These latter troops had become peculiarly obnoxious to him, having several times engaged in revolt and disturbance. Accordingly, while he now ordered them up to the assault in conjunction with the horse, he at the same time gave secret directions to the horse, to desert their comrades and take flight. Both his orders were obeyed. The onset having been made jointly, in the heat of combat the horsemen fled, leaving their comrades all to be cut to pieces by the Carthaginians.<sup>3</sup> We have as yet heard nothing about difficulties arising

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii, 54.

When the Roman general Marcellus was besieging Syracuse in 212 B. C., a terrific pestilence, generated by causes similar to that of this year, broke out. All parties, Romans, Syracusans, and Carthaginians, suffered from it considerably, but the Carthaginians worst of all; they are said to have all perished (Livy, xxv, 26).

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. vii, 22, 23.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiv, 72. Οὗτοι δ' ἦσαν οἱ μισθοφόροι τῷ Διονυσίῳ παρὰ πάντας ἄλλοτριώτατοι, καὶ πλεονάκις ἀποστάσεις καὶ ταραχὰς ποιοῦντες. Διόπερ ὁ αὖν Διονύσιος τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν ἦν παρηγγελκὼς, δταν ἐξάπτωνται τῶν πολεμίων.



to Dionysius from his mercenary troops, on whose arms his dominion rested; and what we are here told is enough merely to raise curiosity without satisfying it. These men are said to have been mutinous and disaffected; a fact, which explains, if it does not extenuate, the gross perfidy of deliberately inveigling them to destruction, while he still professed to keep them under his command.

In the actual state of the Carthaginian army, Dionysius could afford to make them a present of this obnoxious division. His own attack, first upon the fort of Polichnê, next upon that near the naval station at Daskon, was conducted with spirit and success. While the defenders, thinned and enfeebled by the pestilence, were striving to repel him on the land-side, the Syracusan fleet came forth from its docks in excellent spirits and order to attack the ships at the station. These Carthaginian ships, though afloat and moored, were very imperfectly manned. Before the crews could get aboard to put them on their defence, the Syracusan triremes and quinqueremes, ably rowed and with their brazen beaks well directed, drove against them on the quarter or midships, and broke through the line of their timbers. The crash of such impact was heard afar off, and the best ships were thus speedily disabled.<sup>1</sup> Following up their success, the Syracusans jumped aboard, overpowered the crews, or forced them to seek safety as they could in flight. The distracted Carthaginians being thus pressed at the same time by sea and by land, the soldiers of Dionysius from the land-side forced their way through the entrenchment to the shore, where forty pentekonters were hauled up, while immediately near them were moored both merchantmen and triremes. The assailants set fire to the pentekonters; upon which the flames, rapidly spreading under a strong wind, communicated presently to all the merchantmen and triremes adjacent. Unable to arrest this terrific conflagration, the crews were obliged to leap overboard; while the vessels, severed from their moorings by the burning of the cables, drifted against each other under the wind, until the naval station at Dascon became one scene of ruin.

Such a volume of flame, though destroying the naval resources

φεύγειν, καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους ἐγκαταλείπειν ὡς ποιησάντων τὸ προσταχθέν, οὗτοι μὲν ἅπαντες κατεκόπησαν.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv. 12. Πάντη δὲ τῶν ἐξοχωτάτων νεῶν θρανομένων, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἐμβόλων ἀναδρόντομεναι λακίδες ἐξαίσιον ἐποιούντο ψόφον, etc.

of the Carthaginians, must at the same time have driven off the assailing Syracusan ships of war, and probably also the assailants by land. But to those who contemplated it from the city of Syracuse, across the breadth of the Great Harbor, it presented a spectacle grand and stimulating in the highest degree; especially when the fire was seen towering aloft amidst the masts, yards, and sails of the merchantmen. The walls of the city were crowded with spectators, women, children, and aged men, testifying their exultation by loud shouts, and stretching their hands to heaven, — as on the memorable day, near twenty years before, when they gained their final victory in the same harbor, over the Athenian fleet. Many lads and elders, too much excited to remain stationary, rushed into such small craft as they could find, and rowed across the harbor to the scene of action, where they rendered much service by preserving part of the cargoes, and towing away some of the enemy's vessels deserted but not yet on fire. The evening of this memorable day left Dionysius and the Syracusans victorious by land as well as by sea; encamped near the temple of Olympian Zeus which had so recently been occupied by Imilkon. Though they had succeeded in forcing the defences of the latter both at Polichnê and at Daskon, and in inflicting upon him a destructive defeat, yet they would not aim at occupying his camp, in its infected and deplorable condition.

On two former occasions during the last few years, we have seen the Carthaginian armies decimated by pestilence, — near Agrigentum and near Gela, — previous to this last and worst calamity. Imilkon, copying the weakness of Nikias rather than the resolute prudence of Demosthenes, had clung to his insalubrious camp near the Great Harbor, long after all hope of reducing Syracuse had ceased, and while suffering and death to the most awful extent were daily accumulating around him. But the recent defeat satisfied even him that his position was no longer tenable. Retreat was indispensable; yet nowise impracticable, — with the brave men, Iberians and others, in his army, and with the Sikels of the interior on his side, — had he possessed the good qualities as well as the defects of Nikias, or been capable of anything like that unconquerable energy which ennobled the closing days of the latter. Instead of taking the best measures available for a retiring march, Imilkon despatched a secret envoy to Dionysius, unknown to the Syracusans generally; tendering to him the sum of



three hundred talents which yet remained in the camp, on condition of the fleet and army being allowed to sail to Africa unmolested. Dionysius would not consent, nor would the Syracusans have confirmed any such consent, to let them all escape; but he engaged to permit the departure of Imilkon himself with the native Carthaginians. The sum of three hundred talents was accordingly sent across by night to Ortygia; and the fourth night ensuing was fixed for the departure of Imilkon and his Carthaginians, without opposition from Dionysius. During that night forty of their ships, filled with Carthaginians, put to sea and sailed in silence out of the harbor. Their stealthy flight, however, did not altogether escape the notice of the Corinthian seamen in Syracuse; who not only apprised Dionysius, but also manned some of their own ships and started in pursuit. They overtook and destroyed one or two of the slowest sailers; but all the rest with Imilkon himself, accomplished their flight to Carthage.

Dionysius, — while he affected to obey the warning of the Corinthians, with movements intentionally tardy and unavailing, — applied himself with earnest activity to act against the forsaken army remaining. During the same night he led out his troops from the city to the vicinity of their camp. The flight of Imilkon speedily promulgated, had filled the whole army with astonishment and consternation. No command, — no common cause, — no bond of union, — now remained among this miscellaneous host, already prostrated by previous misfortune. The Sikels in the army, being near to their own territory and knowing the roads, retired at once, before daybreak, and reached their homes. Scarcely had they passed, when the Syracusan soldiers occupied the roads, and barred the like escape to others. Amidst the general dispersion of the abandoned soldiers, some perished in vain attempts to force the passes, others threw down their arms and solicited mercy. The Iberians alone, maintaining their arms and order with unshaken resolution, sent to Dionysius propositions to transfer to him their service; which he thought proper to accept, enrolling them among his mercenaries. All the remaining host, principally Libyans, being stripped and plundered by his soldiers, became his captives, and were probably sold as slaves.<sup>1</sup>

The heroic efforts of Nikias, to open for his army a retreat in

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv, 75.

the face of desperate obstacles, had ended in a speedy death as prisoner at Syracuse, — yet without anything worse than the usual fate of prisoners of war. But the base treason of Imilkon, though he insured a safe retreat home by betraying the larger portion of his army, earned for him only a short prolongation of life amidst the extreme of ignominy and remorse. When he landed at Carthage with the fraction of his army preserved, the city was in the deepest distress. Countless family losses, inflicted by the pestilence, added a keener sting to the unexampled public loss and humiliation now fully made known. Universal mourning prevailed; all public and private business was suspended, all the temples were shut, while the authorities and the citizens met Imilkon in sad procession on the shore. The defeated commander strove to disarm their wrath, by every demonstration of a broken and prostrate spirit. Clothed in the sordid garment of a slave, he acknowledged himself as the cause of all the ruin, by his impiety towards the gods; for it was they, and not the Syracusans, who had been his real enemies and conquerors. He visited all the temples, with words of atonement and supplication, — replied to all the inquiries about relatives who had perished under the disaster, — and then retiring, blocked up the doors of his house, where he starved himself to death.

But the season of misfortune to Carthage was not closed by his decease. Her dominion over her Libyan subjects was always harsh and unpopular, rendering them disposed to rise against her at any moment of calamity. Her recent disaster in Sicily would have been in itself perhaps sufficient to stimulate them into insurrection; but its effect was aggravated by their resentment for the deliberate betrayal of their troops serving under Imilkon, not one of whom lived to come back. All the various Libyan subject towns had on this matter one common feeling of indignation; all came together in congress, agreed to unite their forces, and formed an army which is said to have reached one hundred and twenty thousand men. They established their head-quarters at Tunès (Tunis), a town within a short distance of Carthage itself, and were for a certain time so much stronger in the field, that the Carthaginians were obliged to remain within their walls. For a moment it seemed as if the star of this great commercial city was about to set for ever. The Carthaginians themselves were in the depth of despondency, believing themselves to be under the wrath




of the goddesses Demeter and her daughter Persephonê; who, not content with the terrible revenge already taken in Sicily, for the sacrilege committed by Imilkon, were still pursuing them into Africa. Under the extreme religious terror which beset the city, every means were tried to appease the offended goddesses. Had it been supposed that the Carthaginian gods had been insulted, expiation would have been offered by the sacrifice of human victims, — and those too the most precious, such as beautiful captives, or children of conspicuous citizens. But on this occasion, the insult had been offered to Grecian gods, and atonement was to be made according to the milder ceremonies of Greece. The Carthaginians had never yet instituted in their city any worship of Demeter or Persephonê; they now established temples in honor of these goddesses, appointed several of their most eminent citizens to be priests, and consulted the Greeks resident among them, as to the form of worship most suitable to be offered. After having done this, and cleared their own consciences, they devoted themselves to the preparation of ships and men for the purpose of carrying on the war. It was soon found that Demeter and Persephonê were not implacable, and that the fortune of Carthage was returning. The insurgents, though at first irresistible, presently fell into discord among themselves about the command. Having no fleet, they became straitened for want of provisions, while Carthage was well supplied by sea from Sardinia. From these and similar causes, their numerous host gradually melted away, and rescued the Carthaginians from alarm at the point where they were always weakest. The relations of command and submission, between Carthage and her Libyan subjects, were established as they had previously stood, leaving her to recover slowly from her disastrous reverses.<sup>1</sup>

But though the power of Carthage in Africa was thus restored, in Sicily it was reduced to the lowest ebb. It was long before she could again make head with effect against Dionysius, who was left at liberty to push his conquests in another direction, against the Italic Greeks. The remaining operations of his reign, — successful against the Italiots, unsuccessful against Carthage, — will come to be recounted in my next succeeding chapter and volume.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor xiv, 77.



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


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
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# GREECE

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- II. GRECIAN HISTORY TO THE REIGN  
OF PEISISTRATUS AT ATHENS

BY  
 GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.

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## PREFACE TO VOL. XI.

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THIS History has already occupied a far larger space than I at first intended or anticipated.

Nevertheless, to bring it to the term marked out in my original preface — the close of the generation contemporary with Alexander, on whose reign we are about to enter — one more Volume will yet be required.

That Volume will include a review of Plato and Aristotle, so far as the limits of a general history permit. Plato, indeed, belonging to the period already described, is partially noticed in the present Volume; at an epoch of his life when, as counsellor of Dionysius II., he exercised positive action on the destinies of Syracuse. But I thought it more convenient to reserve the appreciation of his philosophical character and influence, until I could present him in juxtaposition with his pupil Aristotle, whose maturity falls within the



generation now opening. These two distinguished thinkers will be found to throw light reciprocally upon each other, in their points both of contrast and similarity.

G. G.

LONDON, APRIL 15, 1858.

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## GREECE

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# HISTORY OF GREECE.

## CHAPTER LXXXIII.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS (*continued*). — FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE  
CARTHAGINIAN ARMY BY PESTILENCE BEFORE SYRACUSE,  
DOWN TO THE DEATH OF DIONYSIUS THE ELDER. B.C. 394-367.

In my preceding volume, I have described the first eleven years of the reign of Dionysius called the Elder, as despot at Syracuse, down to his first great war against the Carthaginians; which war ended by a sudden turn of fortune in his favor, at a time when he was hard pressed and actually besieged. The victorious Carthaginian army before Syracuse was utterly ruined by a terrible pestilence, followed by ignominious treason on the part of its commander Imilkon.

Within the space of less than thirty years, we read of four distinct epidemic distempers,<sup>1</sup> each of frightful severity, as having afflicted Carthage and her armies in Sicily, without touching either Syracuse or the Sicilian Greeks. Such epidemics were the most irresistible of all enemies to the Carthaginians, and the most effective allies to Dionysius. The second and third, — conspicuous among the many fortunate events of his life, — occurred at the exact juncture necessary for rescuing him from a tide of superiori-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii. 86-114; xiv. 70; xv. 24. Another pestilence is alluded to by Diodorus in 368 B. C. (Diodor. xv. 73).

Mövers notices the intense and frequent sufferings of the ancient Phœnicians, in their own country, from pestilence; and the fearful expiations to which these sufferings gave rise (Die Phönizier, vol. ii. part ii. p. 9)



ty in the Carthaginian arms, which seemed in a fair way to overwhelm him completely. Upon what physical conditions the frequent repetition of such a calamity depended, together with the remarkable fact that it was confined to Carthage and her armies, — we know partially in respect to the third of the four cases, but not at all in regard to the others.

The flight of Imilkon with his Carthaginians from Syracuse left Dionysius and the Syracusans in the full swing of triumph. The conquests made by Imilkon were altogether lost, and the Carthaginian dominion in Sicily was now cut down to that restricted space in the western corner of the island, which it had occupied prior to the invasion of Hannibal in 409 B. C. So prodigious a success probably enabled Dionysius to put down the opposition recently manifested among the Syracusans to the continuance of his rule. We are told that he was greatly embarrassed by his mercenaries; who, having been for some time without pay, manifested such angry discontent as to threaten his downfall. Dionysius seized the person of their commander, the Spartan Aristoteles: upon which the soldiers mutined and flocked in arms around his residence, demanding in fierce terms both the liberty of their commander and the payment of their arrears. Of these demands, Dionysius eluded the first by saying that he would send away Aristoteles to Sparta, to be tried and dealt with among his own countrymen: as to the second, he pacified the soldiers by assigning to them, in exchange for their pay, the town and territory of Leontini. Willingly accepting this rich bribe, the most fertile soil of the island, the mercenaries quitted Syracuse to the number of ten thousand, to take up their residence in the newly assigned town; while Dionysius hired new mercenaries in their place. To these (including perhaps the Iberians or Spaniards who had recently passed from the Carthaginian service into his) and to the slaves whom he had liberated, he intrusted the maintenance of his dominion.<sup>1</sup>

These few facts, which are all that we hear, enable us to see that the relations between Dionysius and the mercenaries by whose means he ruled Syracuse, were troubled and difficult to

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv. 78

manage. But they do not explain to us the full cause of such discord. We know that a short time before, Dionysius had rid himself of one thousand obnoxious mercenaries by treacherously betraying them to death in a battle with the Carthaginians. Moreover, he would hardly have seized the person of Aristoteles, and sent him away for trial, if the latter had done nothing more than demand pay really due to his soldiers. It seems probable that the discontent of the mercenaries rested upon deeper causes, perhaps connected with that movement in the Syracusan mind against Dionysius, manifested openly in the invective of Theodorus. We should have been glad also to know how Dionysius proposed to pay the new mercenaries, if he had no means of paying the old. The cost of maintaining his standing army, upon whomsoever it fell, must have been burdensome in the extreme. What became of the previous residents and proprietors at Leontini, who must have been dispossessed when this much-coveted site was transferred to the mercenaries? On all these points we are unfortunately left in ignorance.

Dionysius now set forth towards the north of Sicily to reestablish Messênê; while those other Sicilians, who had been expelled from their abodes by the Carthaginians, got together and returned. In reconstituting Messênê after its demolition by Imilkon, he obtained the means of planting there a population altogether in his interests, suitable to the aggressive designs which he was already contemplating against Rhegium and the other Italian Greeks. He established in it one thousand Lokrians, — four thousand persons from another city the name of which we cannot certainly make out,<sup>1</sup> — and six hundred of the Peloponnesian Messenians. These latter had been expelled by Sparta from Zakynthus and

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv. 78. Διονύσιος δ' εἰς Μεσσηνίην κατέκισε χιλίους μὲν Λοκροὺς, τετρακισχιλίους δὲ Μεδιμναίους, ἑξακοσίους δὲ τῶν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου Μεσσηνίων, ἐκ τε Ζακύνθου καὶ Ναυπάκτου φευγόντων.

The Medimnæans are completely unknown. Cluverius and Wesseling conjecture *Medmnæans*, from *Medmæ* or *Medamæ*, noticed by Strabo as a town in the south of Italy. But this supposition cannot be adopted as certain; especially as the total of persons named is so large. The conjecture of Palmerius — *Μηθυμναίους* — has still less to recommend it. See the note of Wesseling.



Naupaktus at the close of the Peloponnesian war, and had taken service in Sicily with Dionysius. Even here, the hatred of Sparta followed them. Her remonstrances against his project of establishing them in a city of consideration bearing their own ancient name, obliged him to withdraw them: upon which he planted them on a portion of the Abakene territory on the northern coast. They gave to their new city the name of Tyndaris, admitted many new residents, and conducted their affairs so prudently, as presently to attain a total of five thousand citizens.<sup>1</sup> Neither here, nor at Messênê, do we find any mention made of the reestablishment of those inhabitants who had fled when Imilkon took Messênê, and who formed nearly all the previous population of the city, for very few are mentioned as having been slain. It seems doubtful whether Dionysius readmitted them, when he re-constituted Messênê. Renewing with care the fortifications of the city, which had been demolished by Imilkon, he placed in it some of his mercenaries as garrison.<sup>2</sup>

Dionysius next undertook several expeditions against the Sikels in the interior of the island, who had joined Imilkon in his recent attack upon Syracuse. He conquered several of their towns, and established alliances with two of their most powerful princes, at Agyrium and Kentoripæ. Enna and Kephalaedium were also betrayed to him, as well as the Carthaginian dependency of Solûs. By these proceedings, which appear to have occupied some time, he acquired powerful ascendancy in the central and north-east parts of the island, while his garrison at Messênê ensured to him the command of the strait between Sicily and Italy.<sup>3</sup>

His acquisition of this important fortified position was well understood to imply ulterior designs against Rhegium and the other Grecian cities in the south of Italy, among whom accordingly a lively alarm prevailed. The numerous exiles whom he had expelled, not merely from Syracuse, but also from Naxos, Katana, and the other conquered towns, having no longer any assured

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv. 78.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv. 87.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiv. 78. *εἰς τὴν τῶν Σικελῶν χώραν πλεονάκις στρατεύσας*, etc. Wesseling shows in his note, that these words, and those which follow must refer to Dionysius.

shelter in Sicily, had been forced to cross over into Italy, where they were favorably received both at Kroton and at Rhegium.<sup>1</sup> One of these exiles, Helôris, once the intimate friend of Dionysius, was even appointed general of the forces of Rhegium; forces at that time not only powerful on land, but sustained by a fleet of seventy or eighty triremes.<sup>2</sup> Under his command, a Rhegine force crossed the strait for the purpose partly of besieging Messênê, partly of establishing the Naxian and Katanean exiles at Mylæ on the northern coast of the island, not far from Messênê. Neither scheme succeeded: Helôris was repulsed from Messênê with loss, while the new settlers at Mylæ were speedily expelled. The command of the strait was thus fully maintained to Dionysius; who, on the point of undertaking an aggressive expedition over to Italy, was delayed only by the necessity of capturing the newly established Sikel town on the hill of Taurus—or Tauromenium. The Sikels defended this position, in itself high and strong, with unexpected valor and obstinacy. It was the spot on which the primitive Grecian colonists who first came to Sicily, had originally landed, and from whence, therefore, the successive Hellenic encroachments upon the pre-established Sikel population, had taken their commencement. This fact, well known to both parties, rendered the capture on one side as much a point of honor, as the preservation on the other. Dionysius spent months in the siege, even throughout midwinter, while the snow covered this hill-top. He made reiterated assaults, which were always repulsed. At last, on one moonless winter night, he found means to scramble over some almost inaccessible crags to a portion of the town less defended, and to effect a lodgment in one of the two fortified portions into which it was divided. Having taken the first part, he immediately proceeded to attack the second. But the Sikels, resisting with desperate valor, repulsed him, and compelled the storming party to flee in disorder, amidst the darkness of night, and over the most difficult ground. Six hundred of them were slain on the spot, and scarcely any escaped without throwing away their arms. Even Dionysius himself, being overthrown by the thrust

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv. 87-103.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv. 8, 87, 106.



of a spear on his cuirass, was with difficulty picked up and carried off alive; all his arms, except the cuirass, being left behind. He was obliged to raise the siege, and was long in recovering from his wound: the rather as his eyes also had suffered considerably from the snow.<sup>1</sup>

So manifest a reverse, before a town comparatively insignificant, lowered his military reputation, and encouraged his enemies throughout the island. The Agrigentines and others, throwing off their dependence upon him, proclaimed themselves autonomous; banishing those leaders among them who upheld his interest.<sup>2</sup> Many of the Sikels also, elate with the success of their countrymen at Tauromenium, declared openly against him; joining the Carthaginian general Magon, who now, for the first time since the disaster before Syracuse, again exhibited the force of Carthage in the field.

Since the disaster before Syracuse, Magon had remained tranquil in the western or Carthaginian corner of the island, recruiting the strength and courage of his countrymen, and taking unusual pains to conciliate the attachment of the dependent native towns. Reinforced in part by the exiles expelled by Dionysius, he was now in a condition to assume the aggressive, and to espouse the cause of the Sikels after their successful defence of Tauromenium. He even ventured to overrun and ravage the Messenian territory; but Dionysius, being now recovered from his wound, marched against him, defeated him in a battle near Abakæna, and forced him again to retire westward, until fresh troops were sent to him from Carthage.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv. 88.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv. 88. *μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἀτυχίαν ταύτην, Ἀκραγαντῖνοι καὶ Μεσσηνιοὶ τοὺς τὰ Διονυσίου φρονούντας μεταστησάμενοι, τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀντείχοντο, καὶ τῆς τοῦ τυράννου συμμαχίας ἀπέστησαν.*

It appears to me that the words *καὶ Μεσσηνιοὶ* in this sentence cannot be correct. The Messenians were a new population just established by Dionysius, and relying upon him for protection against Rhegium: moreover they will appear, during the events immediately succeeding, constantly in conjunction with him, and objects of attack by his enemies.

I cannot but think that Diodorus has here inadvertently placed the word *Μεσσηνιοὶ* instead of a name belonging to some other community — what community, we cannot tell.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiv. 90-95.

Without pursuing Magon, Dionysius returned to Syracuse, from whence he presently set forth to execute his projects against Rhegium, with a fleet of one hundred ships of war. So skilfully did he arrange or mask his movements, that he arrived at night at the gates and under the walls of Rhegium, without the least suspicion on the part of the citizens. Applying combustibles to set fire to the gate (as he had once done successfully at the gate of Achradina),<sup>1</sup> he at the same time planted his ladders against the walls, and attempted an escalade. Surprised and in small numbers, the citizens began their defence; but the attack was making progress, had not the general Helôris, instead of trying to extinguish the flames, bethought himself of encouraging them by heaping on dry faggots and other matters. The conflagration became so violent, that even the assailants themselves were kept off until time was given for the citizens to mount the walls in force; and the city was saved from capture by burning a portion of it. Disappointed in his hopes, Dionysius was obliged to content himself with ravaging the neighboring territory; after which, he concluded a truce of one year with the Rhegines, and then returned to Syracuse.<sup>2</sup>

This step was probably determined by news of the movements of Magon, who was in the field anew with a mercenary force reckoned at eighty thousand men — Libyan, Sardinian, and Italian — obtained from Carthage, where hope of Sicilian success was again reviving. Magon directed his march through the Sikel population in the centre of the island, receiving the adhesion of many of their various townships. Agyrium, however, the largest and most important of all, resisted him as an enemy. Agyris, the despot of the place, who had conquered much of the neighboring territory, and had enriched himself by the murder of several opulent proprietors, maintained strict alliance with Dionysius. The latter speedily came to his aid, with a force stated at twenty thousand men, Syracusans and mercenaries. Admitted into the city, and co-operating with Agyris, who furnished abundant supplies, he soon reduced the Carthaginians to great straits. Magon was encamped near the river Chrysas, between Agyrium

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiii. 113.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv. 90.



and Morgantiê; in an enemy's country, harassed by natives who perfectly knew the ground, and who cut off in detail all his parties sent out to obtain provisions. The Syracusans, indeed, disliking or mistrusting such tardy methods, impatiently demanded leave to make a vigorous attack; and when Dionysius refused, affirming that with a little patience the enemy must be speedily starved out, they left the camp and returned home. Alarmed at their desertion, he forthwith issued a requisition for a large number of slaves to supply their places. But at this very juncture, there arrived a proposition from the Carthaginians to be allowed to make peace and retire; which Dionysius granted, on condition that they should abandon to him the Sikels and their territory — especially Tauromenium. Upon these terms peace was accordingly concluded, and Magon again returned to Carthage.<sup>1</sup>

Relieved from these enemies, Dionysius was enabled to restore those slaves, whom he had levied under the recent requisition, to their masters. Having established his dominion fully among the Sikels, he again marched against Tauromenium, which on this occasion was unable to resist him. The Sikels, who had so valiantly defended it, were driven out, to make room for new inhabitants, chosen from among the mercenaries of Dionysius.<sup>2</sup>

Thus master both of Messênê and Tauromenium, the two most important maritime posts on the Italian side of Sicily, Dionysius prepared to execute his ulterior schemes against the Greeks in the south of Italy. These still powerful, though once far more powerful, cities, were now suffering under a cause of decline common to all the Hellenic colonies on the coast of the continent. The indigenous population of the interior had been reinforced, or enslaved, by more warlike emigrants from behind, who now pressed upon the maritime Grecian cities with encroachment difficult to resist.

It was the Samnites, a branch of the hardy Sabellian race, mountaineers from the central portion of the Apennine range, who had been recently spreading themselves abroad as formidable assailants. About 420 B. C., they had established themselves in Capua and the fertile plains of Campania, expelling or dispos-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv. 95, 96.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv. 96.

sessing the previous Tuscan proprietors. From thence, about 416 B. C., they reduced the neighboring city of Cumæ, the most ancient western colony of the Hellenic race.<sup>1</sup> The neighboring Grecian establishments of Neapolis and Dikæarchia seem also to have come, like Cumæ, under tribute and dominion to the Campanian Samnites, and thus became partially dis-hellenised.<sup>2</sup> These Campanians, of Samnite race, have been frequently mentioned in the two preceding chapters, as employed on mercenary service both in the armies of the Carthaginians, and in those of Dionysius.<sup>3</sup> But the great migration of this warlike race was farther to the south-east, down the line of the Apennines towards the Tarentine Gulf and the Sicilian strait. Under the name of Lucanians, they established a formidable power in these regions, subjugating the Enotrian population there settled.<sup>4</sup> The Luca-

<sup>1</sup> Livy, iv. 37-44; Strabo, v. p. 243-250. Diodorus (xii. 31-76) places the commencement of the Campanian nation in 438 B. C., and their conquest of Cumæ in 421 B. C. Skylax in his *Periplus* mentions both Cumæ and Neapolis as in Campania (s. 10.) Thucydides speaks of Cumæ as being *ἐν Ὀνικίᾳ* (vi. 4).

<sup>2</sup> Strabo, v. p. 246.

<sup>3</sup> Thucydides (vii. 53-57) does not mention *Campanians* (he mentions *Tyrrhenians*) as serving in the besieging Athenian armament before Syracuse (414-413 B. C.) He does not introduce the name *Campanians* at all; though alluding to Iberian mercenaries as men whom Athens calculated on engaging in her service (vi. 90).

But Diodorus mentions, that eight hundred Campanians were engaged by the Chalkidian cities in Sicily for service with the Athenians under Nikias, and that they had escaped during the disasters of the Athenian army (xiii. 44).

The conquest of Cumæ in 416 B. C. opened to these Campanian Samnites an outlet for hired military service beyond sea. Cumæ being in its origin Chalkidic, would naturally be in correspondence with the Chalkidic cities in Sicily. This forms the link of connection, which explains to us how the Campanians came into service in 413 B. C. under the Athenian general before Syracuse, and afterwards so frequently under others in Sicily (Diodor. xiii. 62-80, etc.).

<sup>4</sup> Strabo, vi. p. 253, 254. See a valuable section on this subject in Niebuhr, *Römisch. Geschichte*, vol. i. p. 94-98.

It appears that the Syracusan historian Antiochus made no mention either of Lucanians or of Bruttians, though he enumerated the inhabitants of the exact line of territory afterwards occupied by these two nations. After repeating the statement of Antiochus that this territory was occupied



nian power seems to have begun and to have gradually increased from about 430 B. C. At its maximum (about 380-360 B. C.), it comprehended most part of the inland territory, and considerable portions of the coast, especially the southern coast, — bounded by an imaginary line drawn from Metapontum on the Tarentine Gulf, across the breadth of Italy to Poseidonia or Pæstum, near the mouth of the river Silaris, on the Tyrrhenian or Lower sea. It was about 356 B. C., that the rural serfs, called Bruttians,<sup>1</sup> rebelled against the Lucanians, and robbed them of the southern part of this territory; establishing an independent dominion in the inland portion of what is now called the Farther Calabria — extending from a boundary line drawn across Italy between Thurii and Lâus, down to near the Sicilian strait. About 332 B. C., commenced the occasional intervention of the Epirotic kings from the one side, and the persevering efforts of Rome from the other, which, after long and valiant struggles, left Samnites, Lucanians, Bruttians, all Roman subjects.

At the period which we have now reached, these Lucanians,

by Italians, CEnotrians, and Chonians, Strabo proceeds to say — Οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἀπλοστέρως εἶρηκε καὶ ἀρχαίως, οὐδὲν διαρίσας περὶ τῶν Λευκανῶν καὶ τῶν Βρυττίων. The German translator Grosskurd understands these words as meaning, that Antiochus "did not distinguish the Lucanians from the Bruttians." But if we read the paragraph through, it will appear, I think, that Strabo means to say, that Antiochus had stated nothing positive respecting either Lucanians or Bruttians. Niebuhr (p. 96 *ut supra*) affirms that Antiochus represented the Lucanians as having extended themselves as far as Lâus; which I cannot find.

The date of Antiochus seems not precisely ascertainable. His work on Sicilian history was carried down from early times to 424 B. C. (Diodor. xii. 71). His silence respecting the Lucanians goes to confirm the belief that the date of their conquest of the territory called Lucania was considerably later than that year.

Polyænus (ii. 10. 2-4) mentions war as carried on by the inhabitants of Thurii, under Kleandridas the father of Gylippus, against the Lucanians. From the age and circumstances of Kleandridas, this can hardly be later than 420 B. C.

<sup>1</sup> Strabo, vi. p. 256. The Periplus of Skylax (s. 12, 13) recognizes Lucania as extending down to Rhegium. The date to which this Periplus refers appears to be about 370-360 B. C.: see an instructive article among Niebuhr's *Kleine Schriften*, p. 105-130. Skylax does not mention the Bruttians (Klausen, Hekataeus and Skylax, p. 27a. Berlin, 1831).

having conquered the Greek cities of Poseidonia (or Pæstum) and Lâus, with much of the territory lying between the Gulfs of Poseidonia and Tarentum, severely harassed the inhabitants of Thurii, and alarmed all the neighboring Greek cities down to Rhegium. So serious was the alarm of these cities, that several of them contracted an intimate defensive alliance, strengthening for the occasion that feeble synodical band, and sense of Italiot communion,<sup>1</sup> the form and trace of which seems to have subsisted without the reality, even under marked enmity between particular cities. The conditions of the newly-contracted alliance were most stringent; not only binding each city to assist at the first summons any other city invaded by the Lucanians, but also pronouncing, that if this obligation were neglected, the generals of the disobedient city should be condemned to death.<sup>2</sup> However, at this time the Italiot Greeks were not less afraid of Dionysius and his aggressive enterprises from the south, than of the Lucanians from the north; and their defensive alliance was intended against both. To Dionysius, on the contrary, the invasion of the Lucanians from landward was a fortunate incident for the success of his own schemes. Their concurrent designs against the same enemies, speedily led to the formation of a distinct alliance between the two.<sup>3</sup> Among the allies of Dionysius, too, we must number the Epizephyrian Lokrians; who not only did not join the Italiot confederacy, but espoused his cause against it with ardor. The enmity of the Lokrians against their neighbors, the Rhegines, was ancient and bitter; exceeded only by that of Dionysius, who never forgave the refusal of the Rhegines to permit him to marry a wife out of their city, and was always grateful to the Lokrians for having granted to him the privilege which their neighbors had refused.

Wishing as yet, if possible, to avoid provoking the other members of the Italiot confederacy, Dionysius still professed to be revenging himself exclusively upon Rhegium; against which he

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv. 91-101. Compare Polybius, ii. 39. When Nikias on his way to Sicily, came near to Rhegium and invited the Rhegines to coöperate against Syracuse, the Rhegines declined, replying, *ὅτι ἂν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἰταλιώταις ξυνδοκῇ τοῦτο, ποιῆσειν* (Thucyd. vi. 44).

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv. 101.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiv. 100.



conducted a powerful force from Syracuse. Twenty thousand foot, one thousand horse, and one hundred and twenty ships of war, are mentioned as the total of his armament. Disembarking near Lokri, he marched across the lower part of the peninsula in a westerly direction, ravaged with fire and sword the Rhegian territory, and then encamped near the strait on the northern side of Rhegium. His fleet followed coastwise round Cape Zephyrium to the same point. While he was pressing the siege, the members of the Italiot synod despatched from Kroton a fleet of sixty sail, to assist in the defence. Their ships, having rounded Cape Zephyrium, were nearing Rhegium from the south, when Dionysius himself approached to attack them, with fifty ships detached from his force. Though inferior in number, his fleet was probably superior in respect to size and equipment; so that the Krotoniate captains, not daring to hazard a battle, ran their ships ashore. Dionysius here attacked them, and would have towed off all the ships (without their crews) as prizes, had not the scene of action lain so near to Rhegium, that the whole force of the city could come forth in reinforcement, while his own army was on the opposite side of the town. The numbers and courage of the Rhegines baffled his efforts, rescued the ships, and hauled them all up upon the shore in safety. Obligated to retire without success, Dionysius was farther overtaken by a terrific storm, which exposed his fleet to the utmost danger. Seven of his ships were driven ashore; their crews, fifteen hundred in number, being either drowned, or falling into the hands of the Rhegines. The rest, after great danger and difficulty, either rejoined the main fleet or got into the harbor of Messênê; where Dionysius himself in his quinquereme also found refuge, but only at midnight, and after imminent risk for several hours. Disheartened by this misfortune as well as by the approach of winter, he withdrew his forces for the present, and returned to Syracuse.<sup>1</sup>

A part of his fleet, however, under Leptines, was despatched northward along the south-western coast of Italy to the Gulf of Elea, to cooperate with the Lucanians; who from that coast and from inland were invading the inhabitants of Thurii on the Ta-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv. 100.

rentine Gulf. Thurii was the successor, though with far inferior power, of the ancient Sybaris; whose dominion had once stretched across from sea to sea, comprehending the town of Lâus, now a Lucanian possession.<sup>1</sup> Immediately on the appearance of the Lucanians, the Thurians had despatched an urgent message to their allies, who were making all haste to arrive, pursuant to covenant. But before such junction could possibly take place, the Thurians, confiding in their own native force of fourteen thousand foot, and one thousand horse, marched against the enemy single-handed. The Lucanian invaders retreated, pursued by the Thurians, who followed them even into that mountainous region of the Appenines which stretches between the two seas, and which presents the most formidable danger and difficulty for all military operations.<sup>2</sup> They assailed successfully a fortified post or village of the Lucanians, which fell into their hands with a rich plunder. By such partial advantage they were so elated, that they ventured to cross over all the mountain passes even to the neighborhood of the southern sea, with the intention of attacking the flourishing town of Lâus<sup>3</sup> — once the dependency of their Sybaritan predecessors. But the Lucanians, having allured them into these impracticable paths, closed upon them behind with greatly increased numbers, forbade all retreat, and shut them up in a plain surrounded with high and precipitous cliffs. Attacked in this plain by numbers double their own, the unfortunate Thurians underwent one of the most bloody defeats recorded in Grecian history. Out of their fourteen thousand men, ten thousand were slain, under merciless order from the Lucanians to give no quarter. The remainder contrived to flee to a hill near the sea-shore, from whence they saw a fleet of ships of war coasting along at no great distance.

<sup>1</sup> Herodot. vi. 21; Strabo, vi. p. 253.

<sup>2</sup> See the description of this mountainous region between the Tarentine Gulf and the Tyrrhenian Sea, in an interesting work by a French General employed in Calabria in 1803 — Calabria during a military residence of Three Years, Letters, 17, 18, 19 (translated and published by Effingham Wilson. London, 1832).

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiv. 101. *βουλόμενοι Λάον, πόλιν εὐδαίμονα, πολιορκῆσαι.* This appears the true reading: it is an acute conjecture proposed by Niebuhr (Römisch. Geschicht. i. p. 96) in place of the words — *βουλόμενοι Λάον καὶ πόλιν εὐδαίμονα πολιορκῆσαι.*



Distracted with terror, they were led to fancy, or to hope, that these were the ships expected from Rhegium to their aid; though the Rhegines would naturally send their ships, when demanded, to Thurii, on the Tarentine Gulf, not to the Lower sea near Laus. Under this impression, one thousand of them swam off from the shore to seek protection on ship-board. But they found themselves, unfortunately, on board the fleet of Leptines, brother and admiral of Dionysius, come for the express purpose of aiding the Lucanians. With a generosity not less unexpected than honorable, this officer saved their lives, and also, as it would appear, the lives of all the other defenceless survivors; persuading or constraining the Lucanians to release them, on receiving one mine of silver per man.<sup>1</sup>

This act of Hellenic sympathy restored three or four thousand citizens on ransom to Thurii, instead of leaving them to be massacred or sold by the barbarous Lucanians, and procured the warmest esteem for Leptines personally among the Thurians and other Italiot Greeks. But it incurred the strong displeasure of Dionysius, who now proclaimed openly his project of subjugating these Greeks, and was anxious to encourage the Lucanians as indispensable allies. Accordingly he dismissed Leptines, and named as admiral his other brother Thearides. He then proceeded to conduct a fresh expedition; no longer intended against Rhegium alone, but against all the Italiot Greeks. He departed from Syracuse with a powerful force — twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse, with which, he marched by land in five days to Messênê; his fleet under Thearides accompanying him — forty ships of war, and three hundred transports with provisions. Having first successfully surprised and captured near the Lipari isles a Rhegian squadron of ten ships, the crews of which he constituted prisoners at Messênê, he transported his army across the strait into Italy, and laid siege to Kaulonia — on the eastern coast of the peninsula, and conterminous with the northern border of his allies the Lokrians. He attacked this place vigorously, with the best siege machines which his arsenal furnished.

The Italiot Greeks, on the other hand, mustered their united

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv. 102

force to relieve it. Their chief centre of action was Kroton where most of the Syracusan exiles, the most forward of all champions in the cause, were now assembled. One of these exiles, Helôris (who had before been named general by the Rhegines), was intrusted with the command of the collective army; an arrangement neutralizing all local jealousies. Under the cordial sentiment prevailing, an army was mustered at Kroton, estimated at twenty-five thousand foot and two thousand horse; by what cities furnished, or in what proportion, we are unable to say.<sup>1</sup> At the head of these troops, Helôris marched southward from Kroton to the river Elleporus not far from Kaulonia; where Dionysius, raising the siege, met him.<sup>2</sup> He was about four miles and a half from the Krotoniate army, when he learnt from his scouts that Helôris with a chosen regiment of five hundred men (perhaps Syracusan exiles like himself), was considerably in advance of the main body. Moving rapidly forward in the night, Dionysius surprised this advanced guard at break of day, completely isolated from the rest. Helôris, while he despatched instant messages to accelerate the coming up of the main body, defended himself with his small band against overwhelming superiority of numbers. But the odds were too great. After an heroic resistance, he was slain, and his companions nearly all cut to pieces, before the main body, though they came up at full speed, could arrive.

The hurried pace of the Italiot army, however, though it did not suffice to save the general, was of fatal efficacy in deranging their own soldierlike array. Confused and disheartened by finding that Helôris was slain, which left them without a general to direct the battle or restore order, the Italiots fought for some time against Dionysius, but were at length defeated with severe loss. They effected their retreat from the field of battle to a neighboring eminence, very difficult to attack, yet destitute of water and provisions. Here Dionysius blocked them up, without attempting an attack, but keeping the strictest guard round the hill during the whole remaining day and the ensuing night. The heat of the next day, with total want of water, so subdued their courage, that

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv. 103.

<sup>2</sup> Polybius (i. 6) gives us the true name of this river. Diodorus calls it the river Helôris.



they sent to Dionysius a herald with propositions, entreating to be allowed to depart on a stipulated ransom. But the terms were peremptorily refused; they were ordered to lay down their arms, and surrender at discretion. Against this terrible requisition they stood out yet awhile, until the increasing pressure of physical exhaustion and suffering drove them to surrender, about the eighth hour of the day.<sup>1</sup>

More than ten thousand disarmed Greeks descended from the hill and defiled before Dionysius, who numbered the companies as they passed with a stick. As his savage temper was well known, they expected nothing short of the harshest sentence. So much the greater was their astonishment and delight, when they found themselves treated not merely with lenity, but with generosity.<sup>2</sup> Dionysius released them all without even exacting a ransom; and concluded a treaty with most of the cities to which they belonged, leaving their autonomy undisturbed. He received the warmest thanks, accompanied by votes of golden wreaths, from the prisoners as well as from the cities; while among the general public of Greece, the act was hailed as forming the prominent glory of his political life.<sup>3</sup> Such admiration was well deserved, looking to the laws of war then prevalent.

With the Krotoniates and other Italiot Greeks (except Rhegium and Lokri) Dionysius had had no marked previous relations and therefore had not contracted any strong personal sentiment either of antipathy or favor. With Rhegium and Lokri, the case was different. To the Lokrians he was strongly attached: against the Rhegines his animosity was bitter and implacable, manifesting itself in a more conspicuous manner by contrast with his recent dismissal of the Krotoniate prisoners; a proceeding which had been probably dictated, in great part, by his anxiety to have his hands free for the attack of isolated Rhegium. After having finished the arrangements consequent upon his victory, he marched against that city, and prepared to besiege it. The citizens, feel-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv. 105. παρέδωκαν αὐτοὺς περὶ ὀγδοὴν ὥραν, ἤδη τὰ σώματα παρείμενοι.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv. 105. Καὶ πάντων αὐτοῦ ὑποπτευόντων τὸ θηριώδες, τοῦ εὐντίον ἐφάνη πάντων ἐπιεικέστατος.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiv. 105. καὶ σχεδὸν τοῦτ' ἰδοῦς πράττειν ἐν τῷ ᾧ καλλίστου Strabo, vi. p. 261.

ing themselves without hope of succor, and intimidated by the disaster of their Italiot allies, sent out heralds to beg for moderate terms, and imploring him to abstain from extreme or unmeasured rigor.<sup>1</sup> For a moment, Dionysius seemed to comply with their request. He granted them peace, on condition that they should surrender all their ships of war, seventy in number — that they should pay to him three hundred talents in money — and that they should place in his hands one hundred hostages. All these demands were strictly complied with; upon which Dionysius withdrew his army, and agreed to spare the city.<sup>2</sup>

His next proceeding was, to attack Kaulonia and Hipponium; two cities which seem between them to have occupied the whole breadth of the Calabrian peninsula, immediately north of Rhegium and Lokri; Kaulonia on the eastern coast, Hipponium on or near the western. Both these cities he besieged, took, and destroyed: probably neither of them, in the hopeless circumstances of the case, made any strenuous resistance. He then caused the inhabitants of both of them, such at least as did not make their escape, to be transported to Syracuse, where he domiciliated them as citizens, allowing them five years of exemption from taxes.<sup>3</sup> To be a citizen of Syracuse meant at this moment, to be a subject of his despotism, and nothing more: how he made room for these new citizens, or furnished them with lands and houses, we are unfortunately not informed. But the territory of both these towns, evacuated by its free inhabitants (though probably not by its slaves, or serfs), was handed over to the Lokrians and annexed to their city. That favored city, which had accepted his offer of marriage, was thus immensely enriched both in lands and in collective property. Here again it would have been interesting to hear what measures were taken to appropriate or distribute the new lands; but our informant is silent.

Dionysius had thus accumulated into Syracuse, not only all Sicily<sup>4</sup> (to use the language of Plato), but even no inconsiderable portion of Italy. Such wholesale changes of domicile and prop-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv. 106. καὶ παρακαλεῖσαι μηδὲν περὶ αὐτῶν ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων βουλευέσθαι.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv. 106.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiv. 106, 107.

<sup>4</sup> Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 332 D. Διονύσιος δὲ εἰς Σίαν πόλιν ἀθροίσας ἔασαν Σικελίαν ὑπὸ σοφίας, etc.



erty must probably have occupied some months; during which time the army of Dionysius seems never to have quitted the Calabrian peninsula, though he himself may probably have gone for a time in person to Syracuse. It was soon seen that the depopulation of Hipponium and Kaulonia was intended only as a prelude to the ruin of Rhegium. Upon this Dionysius had resolved. The recent covenant into which he had entered with the Rhegines, was only a fraudulent device for the purpose of entrapping them into a surrender of their navy, in order that he might afterwards attack them at greater advantage. Marching his army to the Italian shore of the strait, near Rhegium, he affected to busy himself in preparations for crossing to Sicily. In the mean time, he sent a friendly message to the Rhegines, requesting them to supply him for a short time with provisions, under assurance that what they furnished should speedily be replaced from Syracuse. It was his purpose, if they refused, to resent it as an insult, and attack them; if they consented, to consume their provisions, without performing his engagement to replace the quantity consumed; and then to make his attack after all, when their means of holding out had been diminished. At first the Rhegines complied willingly, furnishing abundant supplies. But the consumption continued, and the departure of the army was deferred — first on pretence of the illness of Dionysius, next on other grounds — so that they at length detected the trick, and declined to furnish any more. Dionysius now threw off the mask, gave back to them their hundred hostages, and laid siege to the town in form.<sup>1</sup>

Regretting too late that they had suffered themselves to be defrauded of their means of defence, the Rhegines nevertheless prepared to hold out with all the energy of despair. Phyton was chosen commander, the whole population was armed, and all the line of wall carefully watched. Dionysius made vigorous assaults, employing all the resources of his battering machinery to effect a breach. But he was repelled at all points obstinately, and with much loss on both sides: several of his machines were also burnt or destroyed by opportune sallies of the besieged. In one of the

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv 107 108. Polyænus relates this stratagem of Dionysius about the provisions, as if it had been practised at the siege of Himera and not of Rhegium (Polyæn, v. 3. 10).

assaults, Dionysius himself was seriously wounded by a spear thrust in the groin, from which he was long in recovering. He was at length obliged to convert the siege into a blockade, and to rely upon famine alone for subduing these valiant citizens. For eleven months did the Rhegines hold out, against the pressure of want gradually increasing, and at last terminating in the agony and destruction of famine. We are told that a medimnus of wheat came to be sold for the enormous price of five minæ; at the rate of about £14 sterling per bushel: every horse and every beast of burthen was consumed: at length hides were boiled and eaten, and even the grass on parts of the wall. Many perished from absolute hunger, while the survivors lost all strength and energy. In this intolerable condition, they were constrained, at the end of near eleven months, to surrender at discretion.

So numerous were these victims of famine, that Dionysius, on entering Rhegium, found heaps of unburied corpses, besides six thousand citizens in the last stage of emaciation. All these captives were sent to Syracuse, where those who could provide a mina (about £3 17s.) were allowed to ransom themselves, while the rest were sold as slaves. After such a period of suffering, the number of those who retained the means of ransom was probably very small. But the Rhegine general, Phyton, was detained with all his kindred, and reserved for a different fate. First, his son was drowned, by order of Dionysius: next, Phyton himself was chained to one of the loftiest siege-machines, as a spectacle to the whole army. While he was thus exhibited to scorn, a messenger was sent to apprise him, that Dionysius had just caused his son to be drowned. "He is more fortunate than his father by one day," was the reply of Phyton. After a certain time, the sufferer was taken down from his pillory, and led round the city, with attendants scourging and insulting him at every step; while a herald proclaimed aloud, "Behold the man who persuaded the Rhegines to war, thus signally punished by Dionysius!" Phyton, enduring all these torments with heroic courage and dignified silence, was provoked to exclaim in reply to the herald, that the punishment was inflicted because he had refused to betray the city to Dionysius, who would himself soon be overtaken by the divine vengeance. At length the prolonged outrages, combined with the noble demeanor and high reputation of the victim, excited com-



passion even among the soldiers of Dionysius himself. Their murmurs became so pronounced, that he began to apprehend an open mutiny for the purpose of rescuing Phyton. Under this fear he gave orders that the torments should be discontinued, and that Phyton with his entire kindred should be drowned.<sup>1</sup>

The prophetic persuasion under which this unhappy man perished, that divine vengeance would soon overtake his destroyer, was noway borne out by the subsequent reality. The power and prosperity of Dionysius underwent abatement by his war with the Carthaginians in 383 B. C., yet remained very considerable even to his dying day. And the misfortunes which fell thickly upon his son the younger Dionysius, more than thirty years afterwards, though they doubtless received a religious interpretation from contemporary critics, were probably ascribed to acts more recent than the barbarities inflicted on Phyton. But these barbarities, if not avenged, were at least laid to heart with profound sympathy by the contemporary world, and even commemorated with tenderness and pathos by poets. While Dionysius was composing tragedies (of which more presently) in hopes of applause in Greece, he was himself furnishing real matter of history, not less tragical than the sufferings of those legendary heroes and heroines to which he (in common with other poets) resorted for a subject. Among the many acts of cruelty, more or less aggravated, which it is the melancholy duty of an historian of Greece to recount, there are few so revolting as the death of the Rhegine general; who was not a subject, nor a conspirator, nor a rebel, but an enemy in open warfare — of whom the worst that even Dionysius himself could say, was, that he had persuaded his countrymen into the war. And even this could not be said truly;

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv. 112. 'Ο δὲ Φύτων, κατὰ τὴν πολιορκίαν στρατηγὸς ἀγαθὸς γεγενημένος, καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ἐπαινούμενος, οὐκ ἀγεννῶς ὑπέμενε τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς τελευτῆς τιμωρίαν· ἀλλ' ἀκατάπληκτον τὴν ψυχὴν φυλάσσας, καὶ βοῶν, ὅτι τὴν πόλιν οὐ βουληθεὶς προδοῦναι Διονυσίῳ τυγχάνει τῆς τιμωρίας, ἣν αὐτῷ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐκείνῳ συντόμως ἐπιστήσει· ὥστε τὴν ἀρετὴν τάνδρως καὶ παρὰ τοῖς στρατιώταις τοῦ Διονυσίου κατελεεῖσθαι, καὶ τινὰς ἤδη θορυβεῖν. Ὁ δὲ Διονύσιος, εὐλαβηθεὶς μή τινες τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀποτολμήσωσιν ἐξαρπάξειν τὸν Φύτωνα, πανσάμενος τῆς τιμωρίας, κατεπόντωσε τὸν ἀτυχῆ μετὰ τῆς συγγενείας. Οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἀναξίως τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκνόμοις περιέπεσε τιμωρίας, καὶ πολλοὺς ἔσχε καὶ τότε τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς ἀλγίσαντας τὴν συμφορὰν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ποιητὰς τοὺς θοηνήσουσας τὸ τῆς περιπετείας ἐλεεινόν.

since the antipathy of the Rhegines towards Dionysius was of old standing, traceable to his enslavement of Naxos and Katana, if not to causes yet earlier — though the statement of Phyton may very probably be true, that Dionysius had tried to bribe him to betray Rhegium (as the generals of Naxos and Katana had been bribed to betray their respective cities), and was incensed beyond measure at finding the proposition repelled. The Hellenic war-practice was in itself sufficiently cruel. Both Athenians and Lacedæmonians put to death prisoners of war by wholesale, after the capture of Melos, after the battle of Ægospotami, and elsewhere. But to make death worse than death by a deliberate and protracted tissue of tortures and indignities, is not Hellenic; it is Carthaginian and Asiatic. Dionysius had shown himself better than a Greek when he released without ransom the Krotoniate prisoners captured at the battle of Kaulonia; but he became far worse than a Greek, and worse even than his own mercenaries, when he heaped aggravated suffering, beyond the simple death-warrant, on the heads of Phyton and his kindred.

Dionysius caused the city of Rhegium to be destroyed<sup>1</sup> or dismantled. Probably he made over the lands to Lokri, like those of Kaulonia and Hipponium. The free Rhegine citizens had all been transported to Syracuse for sale; and those who were fortunate enough to save their liberty by providing the stipulated ransom, would not be allowed to come back to their native soil. If Dionysius was so zealous in enriching the Lokrians, as to transfer to them two other neighboring town-domains, against the inhabitants of which he had no peculiar hatred — much more would he be disposed to make the like transfer of the Rhegine territory, whereby he would gratify at once his antipathy to the one state and his partiality to the other. It is true that Rhegium did not permanently continue incorporated with Lokri; but neither did Kaulonia nor Hipponium. The maintenance of all the three transfers depended on the ascendancy of Dionysius and his dynasty; but for the time immediately succeeding the capture of Rhegium, the Lokrians became masters of the Rhegine territory as well as of the two other townships, and thus possessed all the

<sup>1</sup> Strabo, vi. p. 258 ἐπιφανῆ δ' οὖν λόλιν οὖσαν . . . κατασκάψαι Διονύσιον, etc.



Calabrian peninsula south of the Gulf of Squillace. To the Italiot Greeks generally, these victories of Dionysius were fatally ruinous, because the political union formed among them, for the purpose of resisting the pressure of the Lucanians from the interior, was overthrown, leaving each city to its own weakness and isolation.<sup>1</sup>

The year 387, in which Rhegium surrendered, was also distinguished for two other memorable events; the general peace in Central Greece under the dictation of Persia and Sparta, commonly called the peace of Antalkidas; and the capture of Rome by the Gauls.<sup>2</sup>

The two great ascendent powers in the Grecian world were now, Sparta in Peloponnesus, and Dionysius in Sicily; each respectively fortified by alliance with the other. I have already in a former chapter<sup>3</sup> described the position of Sparta after the peace of Antalkidas; how greatly she gained by making herself the champion of that Persian rescript — and how she purchased, by surrendering the Asiatic Greeks to Artaxerxes, an empire on land equal to that which she had enjoyed before the defeat of Knidus, though without recovering the maritime empire fortified by that defeat.

To this great imperial state, Dionysius in the west formed a suitable counterpart. His recent victories in Southern Italy had already raised his power to a magnitude transcending all the far-famed recollections of Gelon; but he now still farther extended it by sending an expedition against Kroton. This city, the largest in Magna Græcia, fell under his power; and he succeeded in capturing, by surprise or bribery, even its strong citadel; on a rock overhanging the sea.<sup>4</sup> He seems also to have advanced yet far

<sup>1</sup> Polybius, ii. 39, 67.

<sup>2</sup> Chap. LXXVI. Vol. X.

<sup>3</sup> Livy has preserved the mention of this important acquisition of Dionysius (xxiv. 3).

<sup>4</sup> "Sed arx Crotonis, unâ parte imminens mari, alterâ vergente in agrum, situ tantum naturali quondam munita, postea et muro cineta est, quâ per aversas rupes ab Dionysio Siciliae tyranno per dolum fuerat capta."

Justin also (xx. 5) mentions the attack of Dionysius upon Kroton.

We may, with tolerable certainty, refer the capture to the present part of the career of Dionysius.

See also Ælian, V. H. xii. 61.

<sup>5</sup> Polybius, i. 6.

ther with his fleet to attack Thurii; which city owed its preservation solely to the violence of the north winds. He plundered the temple of Hêrê near Cape Lakinium, in the domain of Kroton. Among the ornaments of this temple was one of pre-eminent beauty and celebrity, which at the periodical festivals was exhibited to admiring spectators: a robe wrought with the greatest skill, and decorated in the most costly manner, the votive offering of a Sybarite named Alkimenes. Dionysius sold this robe to the Carthaginians. It long remained as one of the permanent religious ornaments of their city, being probably dedicated to the honor of those Hellenic Deities recently introduced for worship; whom (as I have before stated) the Carthaginians were about this time peculiarly anxious to propitiate, in hopes of averting or alleviating the frightful pestilences wherewith they had been so often smitten. They purchased the robe from Dionysius at the prodigious price of one hundred and twenty talents, or about £27,600 sterling.<sup>1</sup> Incredible as this sum may appear, we must recollect that the honor done to the new gods would be mainly estimated according to the magnitude of the sum laid out. As the Carthaginians would probably think no price too great to transfer an unrivalled vestment from the wardrobe of the Lakinian Hêrê to the newly-established temple and worship of Dêmêtêr and Persephonê in their city — so we may be sure that the loss of such an ornament, and the spoliation of the holy place, would deeply humiliate the Krotoniates, and with them the crowd of Italiot Greeks who frequented the Lakinian festivals.

Thus master of the important city of Kroton, with a citadel near the sea capable of being held by a separate garrison, Dionysius divested the inhabitants of their southern possession of Skyllætum, which he made over to aggrandize yet farther the town of Lokri.<sup>2</sup> Whether he pushed his conquests farther along the Tarentine Gulf so as to acquire the like hold on Thurii or Metapontum, we cannot say. But both of them must have been overawed by the rapid extension and near approach of his power;

<sup>1</sup> Aristotel. Auscult. Mirab. s. 96; Athenæus, xii. p. 541; Diodor. xiv. 37.

<sup>2</sup> Polemon specified this costly robe, in his work Περὶ τῶν ἐν Καρχηδὸν Περλων...

<sup>3</sup> Strabo, vi. p. 261.



especially *Thurii*, not yet recovered from her disastrous defeat of the *Lucanians*.

Profiting by his maritime command of the Gulf, *Dionysius* was enabled to enlarge his ambitious views even to distant ultramarine enterprises. To escape from his long arm, *Syracusan* exiles were obliged to flee to a greater distance, and one of their divisions either founded, or was admitted into, the city of *Ancona*, high up the *Adriatic* Gulf.<sup>1</sup> On the other side of that Gulf, in vicinity and alliance with the *Illyrian* tribes, *Dionysius* on his part sent a fleet, and established more than one settlement. To these schemes he was prompted by a dispossessed prince of the *Epirotic* *Molossians*, named *Alketas*, who, residing at *Syracuse* as an exile, had gained his confidence. He founded the town of *Lissus* (now *Alessio*) on the *Illyrian* coast, considerably north of *Epidamnus*; and he assisted the *Parians* in their plantation of two *Grecian* settlements, in sites still farther northward up the *Adriatic* Gulf — the islands of *Issa* and *Pharos*. His admiral at *Lissus* defeated the neighboring *Illyrian* coast-boats, which harassed these newly-settled *Parians*; but with the *Illyrian* tribes near to *Lissus*, he maintained an intimate alliance, and even furnished a large number of them with *Grecian* panoplies. It is affirmed to have been the purpose of *Dionysius* and *Alketas* to employ these warlike barbarians, first in invading *Epirus* and restoring *Alketas* to his *Molossian* principality; next in pillaging the wealthy temple of *Delphi* — a scheme far-reaching, yet not impracticable, and capable of being seconded by a *Syracusan* fleet, if circumstances favored its execution. The invasion of *Epirus* was accomplished, and the *Molossians* were defeated in a bloody battle, wherein fifteen thousand of them are said to have been slain. But the ulterior projects against *Delphi* were arrested by the intervention of *Sparta*, who sent a force to the spot and prevented all further march southward.<sup>2</sup> *Alketas* however seems to have remained prince of a portion of *Epirus*, in the territory nearly opposite to

<sup>1</sup> *Strabo*, v. p. 241. It would seem that the two maritime towns, said to have been founded on the coast of *Apulia* on the *Adriatic* by *Dionysius* the younger during the first years of his reign — according to *Diodorus* (xvi. 5) — must have been really founded by the elder *Dionysius*, near about the time to which we have now reached.

<sup>2</sup> *Diodorus* xv. 13, 14.

*Korkyra*; where we have already recognized him, in a former chapter, as having become the dependent of *Jason* of *Pheræ* in *Thessaly*.

Another enterprise undertaken by *Dionysius* about this time was a maritime expedition along the coasts of *Latium*, *Etruria*, and *Corsica*; partly under color of repressing the piracies committed from their maritime cities; but partly also, for the purpose of pillaging the rich and holy temple of *Leukothea*, at *Agylla* or its sea-port *Pyrgi*. In this he succeeded, stripping it of money and precious ornaments to the amount of one thousand talents. The *Agyllaans* came forth to defend their temple, but were completely worsted, and lost so much both in plunder and in prisoners, that *Dionysius*, after returning to *Syracuse* and selling the prisoners, obtained an additional profit of five hundred talents.<sup>1</sup>

Such was the military celebrity now attained by *Dionysius*,<sup>2</sup> that the *Gauls* from *Northern Italy*, who had recently sacked *Rome*, sent to proffer their alliance and aid. He accepted the proposition; from whence perhaps the *Gallic* mercenaries whom we afterwards find in his service as mercenaries, may take their date. His long arms now reached from *Lissus* on one side to *Agylla* on the other. Master of most of *Sicily* and much of *Southern Italy*, as well as of the most powerful standing army in *Greece* — the unscrupulous plunderer of the holiest temples everywhere<sup>3</sup> — he inspired much terror and dislike throughout *Central Greece*. He was the more vulnerable to this sentiment, as he was not only a triumphant prince, but also a tragic poet; competitor, as such, for that applause and admiration which no force can extort. Since none of his tragedies have been preserved, we can form no judgment of our own respecting them. Yet when we learn that he had stood

<sup>1</sup> *Diodorus* xv. 14; *Strabo*, v. p. 226; *Servius* ad *Virgil*. *Æneid*. x. 184.

<sup>2</sup> *Justin*, xx. 5; *Xenophon*. *Hellen*. vii. 1, 20.

<sup>3</sup> See *Pseudo-Aristotle*. *Æconomic*. ii. 20-41; *Cicero*, *De Natur. Deor.* iii. 34, 82, 85: in which passages, however, there must be several incorrect assertions as to the actual temples pillaged; for *Dionysius* could not have been in *Peloponnesus* to rob the temple of *Zeus* at *Olympia*, or of *Æsculapius* at *Epidauros*.

*Athenæus* (xv. p. 693) recounts an anecdote that *Dionysius* plundered the temple of *Æsculapius* at *Syracuse* of a valuable golden table, which is far more probable.



second or third, and that one of his compositions gained even the first prize at the Lenæan festival at Athens,<sup>1</sup> in 368-367 B. C. — the favorable judgment of an Athenian audience affords good reason for presuming that his poetical talents were considerable.

During the years immediately succeeding 387 B. C., however, Dionysius the poet was not likely to receive an impartial hearing anywhere. For while on the one hand his own circle would applaud every word — on the other hand, a large proportion of independent Greeks would be biassed against what they heard by their fear and hatred of the author. If we believed the anecdotes recounted by Diodorus, we should conclude not merely that the tragedies were contemptible compositions, but that the irritability of Dionysius in regard to criticism was exaggerated even to silly weakness. The dithyrambic poet Philoxenus, a resident or visitor at Syracuse, after hearing one of these tragedies privately recited, was asked his opinion. He gave an unfavorable opinion, for which he was sent to prison;<sup>2</sup> on the next day the intercession of friends procured his release, and he contrived afterwards, by delicate wit and double-meaning phrases, to express an inoffensive sentiment without openly compromising truth. At the Olympic festival of 388 B. C., Dionysius had sent some of his compositions to Olympia, together with the best actors and chorists to recite them. But so contemptible were the poems (we are told), that in spite of every advantage of recitation, they were disgracefully hissed and ridiculed; moreover the actors in coming back to Syracuse were shipwrecked, and the crew of the ship ascribed all the suffering of their voyage to the badness of the poems entrusted to them. The flatterers of Dionysius, however (it is said), still continued to extol his genius, and to assure him that his ultimate success as a poet, though for a time interrupted by envy, was infallible; which Dionysius believed, and continued to compose tragedies without being disheartened.<sup>3</sup>

Amidst such malicious jests, circulated by witty men at the expense of the princely poet, we may trace some important matter

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv. 74. See Mr. Fynes Clinton, *Fast. Hellen.* ad ann. 367 B. C.

<sup>2</sup> See a different version of the story about Philoxenus in Plutarch, *De Fortun. Alexand. Magni*, p. 334 C.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiv. 109, 27.

of fact. Perhaps in the year 388 B. C., but certainly in the year 384 B. C. (both of them Olympic years), Dionysius sent tragedies to be recited, and chariots to run, before the crowd assembled in festival at Olympia. The year 387 B. C. was a memorable year both in Central Greece and in Sicily. In the former, it was signalized by the momentous peace of Antalkidas, which terminated a general war of eight years' standing: in the latter, it marked the close of the Italian campaign of Dionysius, with the defeat and humiliation of Kroton and the other Italiot Greeks, and subversion of three Grecian cities, — Hipponium, Kaulonia, and Rhegium — the fate of the Rhegines having been characterized by incidents most pathetic and impressive. The first Olympic festival which occurred after 387 B. C. was accordingly a distinguished epoch. The two festivals immediately preceding (those of 392 B. C. and 388 B. C.) having been celebrated in the midst of a general war, had not been visited by a large proportion of the Hellenic body; so that the next ensuing festival, the 99th Olympiad in 384 B. C., was stamped with a peculiar character (like the 90th Olympiad in 420 B. C.) as bringing together in religious fraternity those who had long been separated.<sup>2</sup> To every ambitious Greek (as to Alkibiades in 420 B. C.) it was an object of unusual ambition to make individual figure at such a festival. To Dionysius, the temptation was peculiarly seductive, since he was triumphant over all neighboring enemies — at the pinnacle of his power — and disengaged from all war requiring his own personal command. Accordingly he sent thither his Theôre, or solemn legation for sacrifice, decked in the richest garments, furnished with abundant gold and silver plate, and provided with splendid tents to serve for their lodging on the sacred ground of Olympia. He farther sent several chariots-and-four to contend in the regular chariot races: and lastly, he also sent reciters and chorists, skilful as well as highly trained, to exhibit his own poetical compositions before such as were willing to hear them. We

<sup>1</sup> See Vol. VII. of this History, Ch. LV. p. 57 *seqq.*

<sup>2</sup> See above, in this work, Vol. X. Ch. LXXVII. p. 76. I have already noticed the peculiarity of this Olympic festival of 384 B. C., in reference to the position and sentiment of the Greeks in Peloponnesus and Asia. I am now obliged to notice it again, in reference to the Greeks of Sicily and Italy — especially to Dionysius.



must remember that poetical recitation was not included in the formal programme of the festival.

All this prodigious outfit, under the superintendence of Thearides, brother of Dionysius, was exhibited with dazzling effect before the Olympic crowd. No name stood so prominently and ostentatiously before them as that of the despot of Syracuse. Every man, even from the most distant regions of Greece, was stimulated to inquire into his past exploits and character. There were probably many persons present, peculiarly forward in answering such inquiries — the numerous sufferers, from Italian and Sicilian Greece, whom his conquests had thrown into exile; and their answers would be of a nature to raise the strongest antipathy against Dionysius. Besides the numerous depopulations and mutations of inhabitants which he had occasioned in Sicily, we have already seen that he had, within the last three years, extinguished three free Grecian communities — Rhegium, Kaulonia, Hipponium; transporting all the inhabitants of the two latter to Syracuse. In the case of Kaulonia, an accidental circumstance occurred to impress its recent extinction vividly upon the spectators. The runner who gained the great prize in the stadium, in 384 B. C., was Dikon, a native of Kaulonia. He was a man preëminently swift of foot, celebrated as having gained previous victories in the stadium, and always proclaimed (pursuant to custom) along with the title of his native city — “Dikon the Kauloniate.” To hear this well-known runner now proclaimed as “Dikon the Syracusan,”<sup>1</sup> gave

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv. 14. Παρὰ δ' Ἑλλείους Ὀλυμπιάς ἤχθη ἐννενηκόστη ἐννάτη (B. C. 384), καθ' ἣν ἐνίκᾳ στάδιον Δίκων Συρακούσιος.

Pausanias, vi. 3, 5. Δίκων δὲ ὁ Καλλιμαβρότου πέντε μὲν Πυθοὶ δρόμου νίκας, τρεῖς δὲ ἀνείλετο Ἰσθμίων, τεσσάρων δὲ ἐν Νεμέᾳ, καὶ Ὀλυμπιακὰς μίαν μὲν ἐν παισὶ, δύο δὲ ἄλλας ἀνδρῶν· καὶ οἱ καὶ ἀνδριαντεῖς ἴσοι ταῖς νίκαις εἰσὶν ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ· παιδὶ μὲν δὴ ὄντι αὐτῷ Κανλωνιάτῃ, καθάπερ γε καὶ ἦν, ὑπὴρξεν ἀναγορευθῆναι· τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τούτου Συρακούσιον αὐτὸν ἀναγορεύσειν ἐπὶ χρήμασι.

Pausanias here states, that Dikon received a bribe to permit himself to be proclaimed as a Syracusan, and not as a Kauloniate. Such corruption did occasionally take place (compare another case of similar bribery, at tempted by Syracusan envoys, Pausan. vi. 2, 4), prompted by the vanity of the Grecian cities to appropriate to themselves the celebrity of a distinguished victor at Olympia. But in this instance, the blame imputed to Dikon is more than he deserves. Kaulonia had been already depopulated

ainful publicity to the fact, that the free community of Kaulonia no longer existed,—and to the absorptions of Grecian freedom effected by Dionysius.

In following the history of affairs in Central Greece, I have already dwelt upon the strong sentiment excited among Grecian patriots by the peace of Antalkidas, wherein Sparta made herself the ostentatious champion and enforcer of a Persian rescript, purchased by surrendering the Asiatic Greeks to the Great King. It was natural that this emotion should manifest itself at the next ensuing Olympic festival in 384 B. C., wherein not only Spartans, Athenians, Thebans, and Corinthians, but also Asiatic and Sicilian Greeks, were reunited after a long separation. The emotion found an eloquent spokesman in the orator Lysias. Descended from Syracusan ancestors, and once a citizen of Thurii,<sup>1</sup> Lysias had peculiar grounds for sympathy with the Sicilian and Italian Greeks. He delivered a public harangue upon the actual state of political affairs, in which he dwelt upon the mournful present and upon the serious dangers of the future. “The Grecian world (he said) is burning away at both extremities. Our eastern brethren have passed into slavery under the Great King, our western under the despotism of Dionysius.<sup>2</sup> These two are the great potentates, both in naval force and in money, the real instruments of dominion: if both of them combine, they will extinguish what remains of freedom in Greece. They have been allowed to consummate all this ruin unopposed, because of the past dissensions among the leading Gre-

and incorporated with Lokri; the inhabitants being taken away to Syracuse and made Syracusan citizens (Diodor. xiv. 106). Dikon therefore could not have been proclaimed a Kauloniate, even had he desired it — when the city of Kaulonia no longer existed. The city was indeed afterwards reëstablished; and this circumstance doubtless contributed to mislead Pausanias, who does not seem to have been aware of its temporary subversion by Dionysius.

<sup>1</sup> Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysâ, p. 452, Reisk.

<sup>2</sup> Lysias, Fragm. Orat. 33. ap. Dionys. Hal. p. 521. ὁρῶν οὕτως ἀσυχρῶς διακειμένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν αὐτῆς ὄντα ἐπὶ τῷ βαρβάρῳ, πολλὰς δὲ πόλεις ἐπὶ τυράννων ἀναστάτους γεγενημένας.

<sup>3</sup> Lysias, Fr. Or. 33. l. c. Ἐπίστασθε δὲ, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῶν κρατούντων τῆς θαλάττης, τῶν δὲ χρημάτων βασιλεὺς ταμίης· τὰ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων σώματα τῶν δαπανᾶσθαι δυναμένων· ναὺς δὲ πολλὰς αὐτὸς κέκτηται, πολλὰς δὲ ἰέρανος τῆς Σικελίας.



cian cities; but it is now high time that these cities should unite cordially to oppose farther ruin. How can Sparta, our legitimate president, sit still while the Hellenic world is on fire and consuming? The misfortunes of our ruined brethren ought to be to us as our own. Let us not lie idle, waiting until Artaxerxes and Dionysius attack us with their united force: let us check their insolence at once, while it is yet in our power."<sup>1</sup>

Unfortunately we possess but a scanty fragment of this emphatic harangue (a panegyric harangue, in the ancient sense of the word) delivered at Olympia by Lysias. But we see the alarming picture of the time which he labored to impress: Hellas already enslaved, both in the east and in the west, by the two greatest potentates of the age,<sup>2</sup> Artaxerxes and Dionysius — and now threatened in her centre by their combined efforts. To feel the full probability of so gloomy an anticipation, we must recollect that only in the preceding year Dionysius, already master of Sicily and of a considerable fraction of Italian Greece, had stretched his naval force across to Illyria, armed a host of Illyrian barbarians, and sent them southward under Alketas against the Molossians, with the view of ultimately proceeding farther and pillaging the Delphian temple. The Lacedæmonians had been obliged to send a force to arrest their progress.<sup>3</sup> No wonder then that Lysias should depict the despot of Syracuse as meditating ulterior projects against Central Greece; and as an object not only of hatred for what he had done, but of terror for what he was about to do, in conjunction with the other great enemy from the east.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lysias, Orat. Frag. l. c. Θαυμάζω δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους πάντων μάλιστα, τίνοι ποτε γνώμη χρώμενοι, καιομένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιορῶσιν, ἡγεμόνες ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐκ ἀδίκως, etc.

Ὁ δὲ γὰρ ἀλλοτρίας δει τὰς τῶν ἀπολωλότων συμφορὰς νομίζειν, ἀλλ' οἰκείας· οὐδ' ἀναμεῖναι, ἕως ἂν ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς αἱ δυνάμεις ἀμφοτέρων ἐλθῶσιν, ἀλλ' ἕως ἔτι ἐξεστί, τὴν τούτων ὕβριν κωλύσαι.

I give in the text the principal points of what remains out of this discourse of Lysias, without confining myself to the words.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv. 23. οἱ μέγιστοι τῶν τότε δυναστῶν, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xv. 13.

<sup>4</sup> Isokrates holds similar language, both about the destructive conquests of Dionysius, and the past sufferings and present danger of Hellas, in his Orat. IV. (Panegyric.) composed about 380 B. C., and (probably enough)

Of these two enemies, one (the Persian King) was out of reach. But the second — Dionysius — though not present in person, stood forth by his envoys and appurtenances conspicuous even to ostentation, beyond any man on the ground. His Theôry or solemn legation outshone every other by the splendor of its tents and decorations: his chariots to run in the races were magnificent: his horses were of rare excellence, bred from the Venetian stock, imported out of the innermost depths of the Adriatic Gulf:<sup>1</sup> his poems, recited by the best artists in Greece, solicited applause — by excellent delivery and fine choric equipments, if not by superior intrinsic merit. Now the antipathy against Dionysius was not only aggravated by all this display, contrasted with the wretchedness of impoverished exiles whom he had dispossessed — but was also furnished with something to strike at and vent itself upon. Of such opportunity for present action against a visible object, Lysias did not fail to avail himself. While he vehemently preached a crusade to dethrone Dionysius and liberate Sicily, he at the same time pointed to the gold and purple tent before them, rich and proud above all its fellows, which lodged the brother of the despot with his Syracusan legation. He exhorted his hearers to put forth at once an avenging hand, in partial retribution for the sufferings of free Greece, by plundering the tent which insulted them by its showy decorations. He adjured them to interfere and prevent the envoys of this impious despot from sacrificing or entering their chariots in the lists, or taking any part in the holy Pan-hellenic festival.<sup>2</sup>

read at the Olympic festival of that year (s. 197). ἵσως δ' ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς ἐκδηθείας πολλοὶ καταγελάσειαν, εἰ δυστυχίας ἀνδρῶν ὀδυροίμην ἐν τοιοῦτοις καιροῖς, ἐν οἷς Ἰταλία μὲν ἀνάστατος γέγονε, Σικελία δὲ καταδεδοίλωται, compare s. 145), τοσαῦται δὲ πόλεις τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐκδεδόνται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μέρη τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις ἐστίν.

Isokrates had addressed a letter to the elder Dionysius. He alludes briefly to it in his Orat. ad Philippum (Orat. v. s. 93), in terms which appear to indicate that it was bold and plain spoken (θρασύτερον τῶν ἄλλων). The first letter, among the ten ascribed to Isokrates, purports to be a letter to Dionysius; but it seems rather (to judge by the last words) to be the preface of a letter about to follow. Nothing distinct can be made out from it as it now stands.

<sup>1</sup> Strabo, v. p. 212.

<sup>2</sup> Dionys. Hal. p. 519. Jud. de Lysiâ. 'Ἐστὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ πανηγυρικὸν



We cannot doubt that a large proportion of the spectators on the plain of Olympia felt with greater or less intensity the generous Pan-hellenic patriotism and indignation to which Lysias gave utterance. To what extent his hearers acted upon the unbecoming violence of his practical recommendations — how far they actually laid hands on the tents, or tried to hinder the Syracusans from sacrificing, or impeded the bringing out of their chariots for the race — we are unable to say. We are told that some ventured to plunder the tents:<sup>1</sup> how much was effected we do not hear. It is certain that the superintending Eleian authorities would interfere most strenuously to check any such attempt at desecrating the festival, and to protect the Syracusan envoys in their tents, their regular sacrifice, and their chariot-running. And it is farther certain, as far as our account goes, that the Syracusan chariots actually did run on the lists; because they were, though by various accidents, disgracefully unsuccessful, or overturned and broken in pieces.<sup>2</sup>

To any one however who reflects on the Olympic festival, with all its solemnity and its competition for honors of various kinds, it will appear that the mere manifestation of so violent an antipathy, even though restrained from breaking out into act, would be sufficiently galling to the Syracusan envoys. But the case would be far worse, when the poems of Dionysius came to be recited. These were volunteer manifestations, delivered (like the harangue of Lysias) before such persons as chose to come and hear; not comprised in the regular solemnity, nor therefore under any peculiar protection by the Eleian authorities. Dionysius stood forward of his own accord to put himself upon his trial as a poet before the auditors. Here therefore the antipathy against the despot might be manifested by the most unreserved explosions. And

λόγος, ἐν ᾧ πείθει τοὺς Ἕλληνας . . . ἐκβάλλειν Διονύσιον τὸν τυράννον, τῆς ἀρχῆς, καὶ Σικελίαν ἐλευθερώσαι, ἀρξασθαι τε τῆς ἐχθρῆς αὐτίκα μάλα, διαρπάσαντας τὴν τοῦ τυράννου σκηνὴν χρυσῷ τε καὶ πορφύρᾳ καὶ ἄλλῳ πλούτῳ πολλῷ κεκοσμημένην, etc.

Diodor. xiv. 109. Λυσίας . . . προετρέπετο τὰ πλήθη μὴ προσδέχεσθαι τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ ἀγῶνι τοῦ ἐξ ἀσεβειᾶς τυραννίδος ἀπεσταλμένους θεωροῦς.

Compare Plutarch Vit. x. Orator. p. 836 D.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv. 109. ὡς . . . τινες τολμήσαι διαρπάζειν τὰς σκηνάς.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xiv. 109.

when we are told that the badness of the poems<sup>1</sup> caused them to be received with opprobrious ridicule, in spite of the excellence of the recitation, it is easy to see that the hatred intended for the person of Dionysius was discharged upon his verses. Of course the hissers and hooters would make it clearly understood what they really meant, and would indulge in the full license of heaping curses upon his name and acts. Neither the best reciters of Greece, nor the best poems even of Sophokles or Pindar, could have any chance against such predetermined antipathy. And the whole scene would end in the keenest disappointment and humiliation, inflicted upon the Syracusan envoys as well as upon the actors; being the only channel through which the retributive chastisement of Hellas could be made to reach the author.

Though not present in person at Olympia, the despot felt the chastisement in his inmost soul. The mere narrative of what had passed plunged him into an agony of sorrow, which for some time seemed to grow worse by brooding on the scene, and at length drove him nearly mad. He was smitten with intolerable consciousness of the profound hatred borne towards him, even throughout a large portion of the distant and independent Hellenic world. He fancied that this hatred was shared by all around him, and suspected every one as plotting against his life. To such an excess of cruelty did this morbid excitement carry him, that he seized several of his best friends, under false accusations, or surmises, and caused them to be slain.<sup>2</sup> Even his brother Leptinês, and his ancient partisan Philistus, men who had devoted their lives first to his exaltation, and afterwards to his service, did not escape. Having given umbrage to him by an intermarriage between their families made without his privity, both were banished from Syracuse, and retired to Thurii in Italy, where they received that shelter and welcome which Leptinês had pecu-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv. 109.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv. 7. Ὁ δὲ Διονύσιος, ἀκούσας τὴν τῶν ποιημάτων καταφρόνησιν, ἐνέπεσεν εἰς ὑπερβολὴν λύπης. Ἀεὶ δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ πάθους ἐπίτασιν λαμβάνοντος, μανιωδῆς διάνεσις κάτεσχε τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ, καὶ φθονεῖν αὐτῷ φάσκων ἅπαντας, τοὺς φίλους ὑπώπτευσεν ὡς ἐπιβουλεύοντας· καὶ πέρας, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο προήλθε λύπης καὶ παρακοπῆς, ὥστε τῶν φίλων πολλοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ φευδέσιν αἰτίαις ἀνελεῖν, οὐκ ὀλίγους δὲ καὶ ἐφυγάδευσεν ἐν οἷς ἦν Φίλιστος καὶ Λεπτίνης ὁ ἀδελφός, etc.



liably merited by his conduct in the Lucanian war. The exile of Leptinês did not last longer than (apparently) about a year, after which Dionysius relented, recalled him, and gave him his daughter in marriage. But Philistus remained in banishment more than sixteen years; not returning to Syracuse until after the death of Dionysius the elder, and the accession of Dionysius the younger.<sup>1</sup>

Such was the memorable scene at the Olympic festival of 384 B. C., together with its effect upon the mind of Dionysius. Diodorus, while noticing all the facts, has cast an air of ridicule over them by recognizing nothing except the vexation of Dionysius, at the ill success of his poem, as the cause of his mental suffering; and by referring to the years 388 B. C. and 386 B. C., that which properly belongs to 384 B. C.<sup>2</sup> Now it is improbable, in the first

<sup>1</sup> For the banishment, and the return of Philistus and Leptinês, compare Diodor. xv. 7, and Plutarch, Dion. c. 11. Probably it was on this occasion that Polyxenus, the brother-in-law of Dionysius, took flight as the only means of preserving his life (Plutarch, Dion. c. 21).

Plutarch mentions the incident which offended Dionysius and caused both Philistus and Leptinês to be banished. Diodorus does not notice this incident; yet it is not irreconcilable with his narrative. Plutarch does not mention the banishment of Leptinês, but only that of Philistus.

On the other hand, he affirms (and Nepos also, Dion. c. 3) that Philistus did not return until after the death of the elder Dionysius, while Diodorus states his return conjointly with that of Leptinês—not indicating any difference of time. Here I follow Plutarch's statement as the more probable.

There is, however, one point which is perplexing. Plutarch (Timoleon, c. 15) animadverts upon a passage in the history of Philistus, wherein that historian had dwelt, with a pathos which Plutarch thinks childish and excessive, upon the melancholy condition of the daughters of Leptinês, "who had fallen from the splendor of a court into a poor and mean condition." How is this reconcilable with the fact stated by Diodorus, that Leptinês was recalled from exile by Dionysius after a short time, taken into favor again, and invested with command at the battle of Kronium, where he was slain? It seems difficult to believe that Philistus could have insisted with so much sympathy upon the privations endured by the daughters of Leptinês, if the exile of the father had lasted only a short time.

<sup>2</sup> In a former chapter of this History (Vol. X. Ch. LXXVII. p. 75), I have already shown grounds, derived from the circumstances of Central Greece and Persia, for referring the discourse of Lysias, just noticed, to Olympiad 99 or 384 B. C. I here add certain additional reasons, derived from what is said about Dionysius, towards the same conclusion.

In xiv. 109, Diodorus describes the events of 388 B. C., the year of Olym-

place, that the poem of Dionysius,—himself a man of ability and having every opportunity of profiting by good critics whom he

piad 98, during which Dionysius was still engaged in war in Italy, besieging Rhegium. He says that Dionysius made unparalleled efforts to send a great display to this festival; a splendid legation, with richly decorated tents, several fine chariots-and-four, and poems to be recited by the best actors. He states that Lysias the orator delivered a strong invective against him, exciting those who heard it to exclude the Syracusan despot from sacrificing, and to plunder the rich tents. He then details how the purposes of Dionysius failed miserably on every point; the fine tents were assailed, the chariots all ran wrong or were broken, the poems were hissed, the ships returning to Syracuse were wrecked, etc. Yet in spite of this accumulation of misfortunes (he tells us) Dionysius was completely soothed by his flatterers (who told him that such envy always followed upon greatness), and did not desist from poetical efforts.

Again, in xv. 6, 7, Diodorus describes the events of 386 B. C. Here he again tells us, that Dionysius, persevering in his poetical occupations, composed verses which were very indifferent—that he was angry with and punished Philoxenus and others who criticized them freely—that he sent some of these compositions to be recited at the Olympic festival, with the best actors and reciters—that the poems, in spite of these advantages, were despised and derided by the Olympic audience—that Dionysius was distressed by this repulse, even to anguish and madness, and to the various severities and cruelties against his friends which have been already mentioned in my text.

Now upon this we must remark:—

1. The year 386 B. C. is *not* an Olympic year. Accordingly, the proceedings described by Diodorus in xv. 6, 7, all done by Dionysius after his hands were free from war, must be transferred to the next Olympic year, 384 B. C. The year in which Dionysius was so deeply stung by the events of Olympia, must therefore have been 384 B. C., or Olympiad 99 (relating to 388 B. C.).

2. Compare Diodor. xiv. 109 with xv. 7. In the first passage, Dionysius is represented as making the most prodigious efforts to display himself at Olympia in every way, by fine tents, chariots, poems, etc.—and also as having undergone the signal insult from the orator Lysias, with the most disgraceful failure in every way. Yet all this he is described to have borne with tolerable equanimity, being soothed by his flatterers. But, in xv. 7 (relating to 386 B. C., or more probably to 384 B. C.) he is represented as having merely failed in respect to the effect of his poems; nothing whatever being said about display of any other kind, nor about an harangue from Lysias, nor insult to the envoys or the tents. Yet the simple repulse of the poems is on this occasion affirmed to have thrown Dionysius into a paroxysm of sorrow and madness.

Now if the great and insulting treatment, which Diodorus refers to



had purposely assembled around him!—should have been so ridiculously bad as to disgust an impartial audience: next, it is still more improbable that a simple poetical failure, though doubtless mortifying to him, should work with such fearful effect as to plunge him into anguish and madness. To unnerve thus violently a person like Dionysius—deeply stained with the great crimes of unscrupulous ambition, but remarkably exempt from infirmities—some more powerful cause is required; and that cause stands out conspicuously, when we conceive the full circumstances of the Olympic festival of 384 B. C. He had accumulated for this occasion all the means of showing himself off, like Kroesus in his interview with Solon, as the most prosperous and powerful man

388 B. C., could be borne patiently by Dionysius—how are we to believe that he was driven mad by the far less striking failure in 384 B. C.? Surely it stands to reason that the violent invective of Lysias and the profound humiliation of Dionysius, are parts of one and the same Olympic phenomenon; the former as cause, or an essential part of the cause—the latter as effect. The facts will then read consistently and in proper harmony. As they now appear in Diodorus, there is no rational explanation of the terrible suffering of Dionysius described in xv. 7; it appears like a comic exaggeration of reality.

3. Again, the prodigious efforts and outlay, which Diodorus affirms Dionysius to have made in 388 B. C. for display at the Olympic games—come just at the time when Dionysius, being in the middle of his Italian war, could hardly have had either leisure or funds to devote so much to the other purpose; whereas at the next Olympic festival, or 384 B. C., he was free from war, and had nothing to divert him from preparing with great efforts all the means of Olympic success.

It appears to me that the facts which Diodorus has stated are nearly all correct, but that he has misdated them, referring to 388 B. C., or Olymp. 98—what properly belongs to 384 B. C., or Olymp. 99. Very possibly Dionysius may have sent one or more chariots to run in the former of the two Olympiads; but his signal efforts, with his insulting failure brought about partly by Lysias, belong to the latter.

Dionysius of Halikarnassus, to whom we owe the citation from the oration of Lysias, does not specify to which of the Olympiads it belongs.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv. 7. διὰ καὶ ποιήματα γράφειν ὑπεστήσαντο μετὰ πολλῆς σπουδῆς, καὶ τοὺς ἐν τούτοις δόξαν ἔχοντας μετεπέμπετο, καὶ προτιμῶν αὐτοὺς συνδιέτριβε, καὶ τῶν ποιημάτων ἐπιστάτας καὶ διορδωτὰς εἶχεν.

The Syracusan historian Athanis (or Athenis) had noticed some peculiar phrases which appeared in the verses of Dionysius: see *Athenæus*, iii. p. 98.

in the Hellenic world;<sup>1</sup> means beyond the reach of any contemporary, and surpassing even Hiero or Thero of former days, whose praises in the odes of Pindar he probably had in his mind. He counted, probably with good reason, that his splendid legation, chariots, and outfit of acting and recitation for the poems, would surpass everything else seen on the holy plain; and he fully expected such reward as the public were always glad to bestow on rich men who exhausted their purses in the recognized vein of Hellenic pious ostentation. In this high wrought state of expectation, what does Dionysius hear, by his messengers returning from the festival? That their mission had proved a total failure, and even worse than a failure; that the display had called forth none of the usual admiration, not because there were rivals on the ground equal or superior, but simply because it came from *him*; that its very magnificence had operated to render the explosion of antipathy against him louder and more violent; that his tents in the sacred ground had been actually assailed, and that access to sacrifice, as well as to the matches, had been secured to him only by the interposition of authority. We learn indeed that his chariots failed in the field by unlucky accidents; but in the existing temper of the crowd, these very accidents would be seized as occasions for derisory cheering against him. To this we must add explosions of hatred, yet more furious, elicited by his poems, putting the reciters to utter shame. At the moment when Dionysius expected to hear the account of an unparalleled triumph, he is thus informed, not merely of disappointment, but of insults to himself, direct and personal, the most poignant ever offered by Greeks to a Greek, amidst the holiest and most frequented ceremony of the Hellenic world.<sup>2</sup> Never in any other case do we

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. vi. 16. Οἱ γὰρ Ἕλληνες καὶ ὑπὲρ δύναμιν μείζω ἡμῶν τὴν πόλιν ἐνόμισαν, τῷ ἐμῷ διαπρεπεῖ τῆς Ὀλυμπιάζε θεωρίας (speech of Alkibiadēs).

<sup>2</sup> See a striking passage in the discourse called *Archidamus* (Or. vi. s. 111, 112) of Isokrates, in which the Spartans are made to feel keenly their altered position after the defeat of Leuktra: especially the insupportable pain of encountering, when they attended the Olympic festival, slights or disparagement from the spectators, embittered by open taunts from the re-established Messenians—instead of the honor and reverence which they had become accustomed to expect.

This may help us to form some estimate of the painful sentiment of Dionysius, when his envoys returned from the Olympic festival of 384 B. C.



read of public antipathy, against an individual, being carried to the pitch of desecrating by violence the majesty of the Olympic festival.

Here then were the real and sufficient causes — not the mere ill-success of his poem — which penetrated the soul of Dionysius, driving him into anguish and temporary madness. Though he had silenced the Vox Populi at Syracuse, not all his mercenaries, ships, and forts in Ortygia, could save him from feeling its force, when thus emphatically poured forth against him by the free-spoken crowd at Olympia.

It was apparently shortly after the peace of 387 B. C., that Dionysius received at Syracuse the visit of the philosopher Plato.<sup>1</sup> The latter — having come to Sicily on a voyage of inquiry and curiosity, especially to see Mount Ætna — was introduced by his friends, the philosophers of Tarentum, to Dion, then a young man, resident at Syracuse, and brother of Aristomachê, the wife of Dionysius. Of Plato and Dion I shall speak more elsewhere: here I notice the philosopher only as illustrating the history and character of Dionysius. Dion, having been profoundly impressed with the conversation of Plato, prevailed upon Dionysius to invite and talk with him also. Plato discoursed eloquently upon justice and virtue, enforcing his doctrine that wicked men were inevitably miserable — that true happiness belonged only to the

<sup>1</sup> There are different statements about the precise year in which Plato was born: see Diogenes Laert. iii. 1–6. The accounts fluctuate between 429 and 428 B. C.; and Hermodorus (ap. Diog. L. iii. 6) appears to have put it in 427 B. C.: see Corsini, *Fast. Attic.* iii. p. 230; *Ast. Platon's Leben.* p. 14.

Plato (*Epistol.* vii. p. 324) states himself to have been about (σχεδόν) forty years of age when he visited Sicily for the first time. If we accept as the date of his birth 428 B. C., he would be forty years of age in 388 B. C.

It seems improbable that the conversation of Plato with Dion at Syracuse (which was continued sufficiently long to exercise a marked and permanent influence on the character of the latter,) and his interviews with Dionysius, should have taken place while Dionysius was carrying on the Italian war or the siege of Rhegium. I think that the date of the interview must be placed after the capture of Rhegium in 387 B. C. And the expression of Plato (given in a letter written more than thirty years afterwards) about his own age, is not to be taken as excluding the supposition that he might have been forty-one or forty-two when he came to Syracuse. Athenæus (*xi.* p. 507) mentions the visit of Plato

virtuous — and that despots could not lay claim to the merit of courage.<sup>1</sup> This meagre abstract does not at all enable us to follow the philosopher's argument. But it is plain that he set forth his general views on social and political subjects with as much freedom and dignity of speech before Dionysius as before any simple citizen; and we are farther told, that the by-standers were greatly captivated by his manner and language. Not so the despot himself. After one or two repetitions of the like discourse, he became not merely averse to the doctrine, but hostile to the person, of Plato. According to the statement of Diodorus, he caused the philosopher to be seized, taken down to the Syracusan slave-market, and there put up for sale as a slave at the price of twenty minæ; which his friends subscribed to pay, and thus released him. According to Plutarch, Plato himself was anxious to depart, and was put by Dion aboard a trireme which was about to convey home the Lacedæmonian envoy Pollis. But Dionysius secretly entreated Pollis to cause him to be slain on the voyage — or at least to sell him as a slave. Plato was accordingly landed at Ægina, and there sold. He was purchased, or repurchased, by Annikeris of Kyrênê, and sent back to Athens. This latter is the more probable story of the two; but it seems to be a certain fact that Plato was really sold, and became for a moment a slave.<sup>2</sup>

That Dionysius should listen to the discourse of Plato with repugnance, not less decided than that which the Emperor Napoleon was wont to show towards ideologists — was an event naturally to be expected. But that, not satisfied with dismissing the philosopher, he should seek to kill, maltreat, or disgrace him, illustrates forcibly the vindictive and irritable elements of his character, and shows how little he was likely to respect the lives of those who stood in his way as political opponents.

Dionysius was at the same time occupied with new constructions, military, civil, and religious, at Syracuse. He enlarged the fortifications of the city by adding a new line of wall, extending along the southern cliff of Epipolæ, from Euryalus to the suburb called Neapolis; which suburb was now, it would appear, sur-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, *Dion.* c. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, *Dion.* c. 5; *Diodor.* xv. 7; *Diogen. Laert.* iii. 17; *Cornelius Nepos*, *Dion.* c. 2.



rounded by a separate wall of its own — or perhaps may have been so surrounded a few years earlier, though we know that it was unfortified and open during the attack of Imilkon in 396 B. C.<sup>1</sup> At the time, probably, the fort at the Euryalus was enlarged and completed to the point of grandeur which its present remains indicate. The whole slope of Epipolæ became thus bordered and protected by fortifications, from its base at Achradina to its apex at Euryalus. And Syracuse now comprised five separately fortified portions, — Epipolæ, Neapolis, Tyche, Achradina, and Ortygia; each portion having its own fortification, though the four first were included within the same outer walls. Syracuse thus became the largest fortified city in all Greece; larger even than Athens in its then existing state, though not so large as Athens had been during the Peloponnesian war, while the Phaleric wall was yet standing.

Besides these extensive fortifications, Dionysius also enlarged the docks and arsenals so as to provide accommodation for two hundred men of war. He constructed spacious gymnasia on the banks of the river Anapus, without the city walls; and he further decorated the city with various new temples in honor of different gods.<sup>2</sup>

Such costly novelties added grandeur as well as security to Syracuse, and conferred imposing celebrity on the despot himself. They were dictated by the same aspirations as had prompted his ostentatious legation to Olympia in 384 B. C.; a legation of which the result had been so untoward and intolerable to his feelings. They were intended to console, and doubtless did in part console,

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xiv. 63. It was in the construction of these extensive fortifications, seemingly, that Dionysius demolished the chapel which had been erected by the Syracusans in honor of Dioklès (Diodor. xiii. 635).

Serra di Falco (*Antichità di Sicilia*, vol. iv. p. 107) thinks that Dionysius constructed only the northern wall up the cliff of Epipolæ, not the southern. This latter (in his opinion) was not constructed until the time of Hiero II.

I dissent from him on this point. The passage here referred to in Diodorus affords to my mind sufficient evidence that the elder Dionysius constructed both the southern wall of Epipolæ and the fortification of Neapolis. The same conclusion moreover appears to result from what we read of the proceedings of Dion and Timoleon afterwards.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv. 13.

the Syracusan people for the loss of their freedom. And they were further designed to serve as fuller preparations for the war against Carthage, which he was now bent upon renewing. He was obliged to look about for a pretext, since the Carthaginians had given him no just cause. But this, though an aggression, was a Pan-hellenic aggression,<sup>1</sup> calculated to win for him the sympathies of all Greeks, philosophers as well as the multitude. And as the war was begun in the year immediately succeeding the insult cast upon him at Olympia, we may ascribe it in part to a wish to perform exploits such as might rescue his name from the like opprobrium in future.

The sum of fifteen hundred talents, recently pillaged from the temple at Agylla,<sup>2</sup> enabled Dionysius to fit out a large army for his projected war. Entering into intrigues with some of the disaffected dependencies of Carthage in Sicily, he encouraged them to revolt, and received them into his alliance. The Carthaginians sent envoys to remonstrate, but could obtain no redress; upon which they on their side prepared for war, accumulated a large force of hired foreign mercenaries under Magon, and contracted alliance with some of the Italian Greeks hostile to Dionysius. Both parties distributed their forces so as to act partly in Sicily, partly in the adjoining peninsula of Italy; but the great stress of war fell on Sicily, where Dionysius and Magon both commanded in person. After several combats partial and indecisive, a general battle was joined at a place called Kabala. The contest was murderous, and the bravery great on both sides; but at length Dionysius gained a complete victory. Magon himself and ten thousand men of his army were slain; five thousand were made prisoners; while the remainder were driven to retreat to a neighboring eminence, strong, but destitute of water. They were forced to send envoys entreating peace; which Dionysius consented to grant, but only on condition that every Carthaginian should be immediately withdrawn from all the cities in the island, and that he should be reimbursed for the costs of the war.<sup>3</sup>

See Plato, *Epist.* vii. p. 333, 336 — also some striking lines, addressed by the poet Theokritus to Hiero II. despot at Syracuse in the succeeding century: *Theokrit.* xvi. 75-85.

Dionysius — *ἐζητεῖ λαβεῖν πρόφασιν εὐλογον τοῦ πολέμου*, etc.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv. 15.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xv. 15.



The Carthaginian generals affected to accept the terms offered, but stated (what was probably the truth), that they could not pledge themselves for the execution of such terms, without assent from the authorities at home. They solicited a truce of a few days, to enable them to send thither for instructions. Persuaded that they could not escape, Dionysius granted their request. Accounting the emancipation of Sicily from the Punic yoke to be already a fact accomplished, he triumphantly exalted himself on a pedestal higher even than that of Gelon. But this very confidence threw him off his guard and proved ruinous to him; as it happened frequently in Grecian military proceedings. The defeated Carthaginian army gradually recovered their spirits. In place of the slain general Magon, who was buried with magnificence, his son was named commander; a youth of extraordinary energy and ability, who so contrived to reassure and reorganize his troops, that when the truce expired, he was ready for a second battle. Probably the Syracusans were taken by surprise and not fully prepared. At least the fortune of Dionysius had fled. In this second action, fought at a spot called Kronium, he underwent a terrible and ruinous defeat. His brother Leptinês, who commanded on one wing, was slain gallantly fighting; those around him were defeated; while Dionysius himself, with his select troops on the other wing, had at first some advantage, but was at length beaten and driven back. The whole army fled in disorder to the camp, pursued with merciless vehemence by the Carthaginians, who, incensed by their previous defeat, neither gave quarter nor took prisoners. Fourteen thousand dead bodies, of the defeated Syracusan army, are said to have been picked up for burial; the rest were only preserved by night and by the shelter of their camp.<sup>1</sup>

Such was the signal victory — the salvation of the army, perhaps even of Carthage herself — gained at Kronium by the youthful son of Magon. Immediately after it, he retired to Panormus. His army probably had been too much enfeebled by the former defeat to undertake farther offensive operations; moreover he himself had as yet no regular appointment as general. The Carthaginian authorities too had the prudence to seize this favorable

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv. 16, 17.

moment for making peace, and sent to Dionysius envoys with full powers. But Dionysius only obtained peace by large concessions; giving up to Carthage Selinus with its territory, as well as half the Agrigentine territory — all that lay to the west of the river Halykus; and farther covenanting to pay to Carthage the sum of one thousand talents.<sup>1</sup> To these unfavorable conditions Dionysius was constrained to subscribe; after having but a few days before required the Carthaginians to evacuate all Sicily, and pay the costs of the war. As it seems doubtful whether Dionysius would have so large a sum ready to pay down at once, we may reasonably presume that he would undertake to liquidate it by annual instalments. And we thus find confirmation of the memorable statement of Plato, that Dionysius became tributary to the Carthaginians.<sup>2</sup>

Such are the painful gaps in Grecian history as it is transmitted to us, that we hear scarcely anything about Dionysius for thirteen years after the peace of 383–382 B. C. It seems that the Carthaginians (in 379 B. C.) sent an armament to the southern portion of Italy for the purpose of reestablishing the town of Hipponium and its inhabitants.<sup>3</sup> But their attention appears to have been withdrawn from this enterprise by the recurrence of previous misfortunes — fearful pestilence, and revolt of their Libyan dependencies, which seriously threatened the safety of their city. Again, Dionysius also, during one of these years, undertook some operations, of which a faint echo reaches us, in this same Italian peninsula (now Calabria Ultra). He projected a line of wall across the narrowest portion or isthmus of the peninsula, from the Gulf of Skylletium to that of Hipponium, so as to separate the territory of Lokri from the northern portion of Italy, and secure it completely to his own control. Professedly the wall was destined to repel the incursions of the Lucanians; but in reality (we

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 333 A. After reciting the advice which Dion and he had given to Dionysius the younger, he proceeds to say — *ἐτοιμον γὰρ εἶναι, τούτων γενομένων, πολὺ μᾶλλον δουλώσασθαι Καρχηδονίους τῆς ἐπὶ Γέλωνος αὐτοῖς γενομένης δουλείας, ἀλλ' οὐχ, ὥσπερ νῦν τοῦνάν τιον, ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ φόρον ἐτάξατο φέρειν τοῖς βαρβάροις, etc.*

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xv. 24.



are told) Dionysius wished to cut off the connection between Lokri and the other Greeks in the Tarentine Gulf. These latter are said to have interposed from without, and prevented the execution of the scheme; but its natural difficulties would be in themselves no small impediment, nor are we sure that the wall was even begun.<sup>1</sup>

During this interval, momentous events (recounted in my previous chapters) had occurred in Central Greece. In 382 B. C., the Spartans made themselves by fraud masters of Thebes, and placed a permanent garrison in the Kadmeia. In 380 B. C., they put down the Olynthian confederacy, thus attaining the maximum of their power. But in 379 B. C., there occurred the revolution at Thebes achieved by the conspiracy of Pelopidas, who expelled the Lacedæmonians from the Kadmeia. Involved in a burdensome war against Thebes and Athens, together with other allies, the Lacedæmonians gradually lost ground, and had become much reduced before the peace of 371 B. C., which left them to contend with Thebes alone. Then came the fatal battle of Leuktra which prostrated their military ascendancy altogether. These incidents have been already related at large in former chapters. Two years before the battle of Leuktra, Dionysius sent to the aid of the Lacedæmonians at Korkyra a squadron of ten ships, all of which were captured by Iphikrates; about three years after the battle, when the Thebans and their allies were pressing Sparta in Peloponnesus, he twice sent thither a military force of Gauls and Iberians to reinforce her army. But his troops neither stayed long, nor rendered any very conspicuous service.<sup>2</sup>

In this year we hear of a fresh attack by Dionysius against the Carthaginians. Observing that they had been lately much enfeebled by pestilence and by mutiny of their African subjects, he thought the opportunity favorable for trying to recover what the peace of 383 B. C., had obliged him to relinquish. A false pretence being readily found, he invaded the Carthaginian possessions in the west of Sicily with a large land force of thirty thou-

<sup>1</sup> Strabo, vi. p. 261; Pliny, H. N. iii. 10. The latter calls the isthmus twenty miles broad, and says that Dionysius wished (intercisam) to cut it through: Strabo says that he proposed to wall it across (*κατακλιῆσαι*), which is more probable.

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 2, 4. 33; vii. i. 20-28. Diodor. xv. 70.

sand foot, and three thousand horse; together with a fleet of three hundred sail, and store ships in proportion. After ravaging much of the open territory of the Carthaginians, he succeeded in mastering Selinus, Entella, and Eryx — and then laid siege to Lilybæum. This town, close to the western cape of Sicily,<sup>1</sup> appears to have arisen as a substitute for the neighboring town of Motyê (of which we hear little more since its capture by Dionysius in 396 B. C.), and to have become the principal Carthaginian station. He began to attack it by active siege and battering machines. But it was so numerously garrisoned, and so well defended, that he was forced to raise the siege and confine himself to blockade. His fleet kept the harbor guarded, so as to intercept supplies from Africa. Not long afterwards, however, he received intelligence that a fire had taken place in the port of Carthage whereby all her ships had been burnt. Being thus led to conceive that there was no longer any apprehension of naval attack from Carthage, he withdrew his fleet from continuous watch off Lilybæum; keeping one hundred and thirty men-of-war near at hand, in the harbor of Eryx, and sending the remainder home to Syracuse. Of this incautious proceeding the Carthaginians took speedy advantage. The conflagration in their port had been much overstated. There still remained to them two hundred ships of war, which, after being equipped in silence, sailed across in the night to Eryx. Appearing suddenly in the harbor, they attacked the Syracusan fleet completely by surprise; and succeeded, without serious resistance, in capturing and towing off nearly all of them. After so capital an advantage, Lilybæum became open to reinforcement and supplies by sea, so that Dionysius no longer thought it worth while to prosecute the blockade. On the approach of winter, both parties resumed the position which they had occupied before the recent movement.<sup>2</sup>

The despot had thus gained nothing by again taking up arms, nor were the Sicilian dependencies of the Carthaginians at all cut down below that which they acquired by the treaty of 383 B. C. But he received (about January or February 367 B. C.) news of a different species of success, which gave him hardly less satisfaction than a victory by land or sea. In the Lenæan festival of

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xxii. p. 304.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv. 73; xvi. 5.



Athens, one of his tragedies had been rewarded with the first prize. A chorist who had been employed in the performance — eager to convey the first intelligence of this success to Syracuse and to obtain the recompense which would naturally await the messenger — hastened from Athens to Corinth, found a vessel just starting for Syracuse, and reached Syracuse by a straight course with the advantage of favorable winds. He was the first to communicate the news, and received the full reward of his diligence. Dionysius was overjoyed at the distinction conferred upon him; for though on former occasions he had obtained the second or third place in the Athenian competitions, he had never before been adjudged worthy of the first prize. Offering sacrifice to the gods for the good news, he invited his friends to a splendid banquet, wherein he indulged in an unusual measure of conviviality. But the joyous excitement, coupled with the effects of the wine, brought on an attack of fever, of which he shortly afterwards died, after a reign of thirty-eight years.<sup>1</sup>

Thirty-eight years, of a career so full of effort, adventure, and danger, as that of Dionysius, must have left a constitution sufficiently exhausted to give way easily before acute disease. Throughout this long period he had never spared himself. He was a man of restless energy and activity, bodily as well as mental; always personally at the head of his troops in war — keeping a vigilant eye and a decisive hand upon all the details of his government at home — yet employing spare time (which Philip of Macedon was surprised that he could find<sup>2</sup>) in composing tragedies of his own, to compete for prizes fairly adjudged. His personal bravery was conspicuous, and he was twice severely wounded in leading his soldiers to assault. His effective skill as an ambitious politician — his military resource as a commander — and the long-sighted care with which he provided implements of offence as well as of defence before undertaking war, — are remarkable features in his character. The Roman Scipio Africanus was wont to single out Dionysius and Agathokles (the history of the latter begins about fifty years after the death of the former), both of them despots of Syracuse, as the two Greeks of greatest ability for action known to him — men who combined, in the most

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv. 74.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 15.

memorable degree, daring with sagacity.<sup>1</sup> This criticism, coming from an excellent judge, is borne out by the biography of both, so far as it comes to our knowledge. No other Greek can be pointed out, who, starting from a position humble and unpromising, raised himself to so lofty a pinnacle of dominion at home, achieved such striking military exploits abroad, and preserved his grandeur unimpaired throughout the whole of a long life. Dionysius boasted that he bequeathed to his son an empire fastened by adamantine chains;<sup>2</sup> so powerful was his mercenary force — so firm his position in Ortygia — so completely had the Syracusans been broken into subjection. There cannot be a better test of vigor and ability than the unexampled success with which Dionysius and Agathokles played the game of the despot, and to a certain extent that of the conqueror. Of the two, Dionysius was the most favored by fortune. Both indeed profited by one auxiliary accident, which distinguished Syracuse from other Grecian cities; the local speciality of Ortygia. That islet seemed expressly made to be garrisoned as a separate fortress, — apart from, as well as against, the rest of Syracuse, — having full command of the harbor, docks, naval force, and naval approach. But Dionysius had, besides, several peculiar interventions of the gods in his favor, sometimes at the most critical moments: such was the interpretation put by his enemies (and doubtless by his friends also) upon those repeated pestilences which smote the Carthaginian armies with a force far more deadly than the spear of the Syracusan hoplite. On four or five distinct occasions, during the life of Dionysius, we read of this unseen foe as destroying the Carthaginians both in Sicily and in Africa, but leaving the Syracusans untouched. Twice did it arrest the progress of Imilkon, when in the full career of victory; once, after the capture of Gela and Kamarina — a second time, when, after his great naval victory off Katana, he had brought his numerous host under the walls of Syracuse, and was actually master of the open suburb of Achradina. On both these occasions the pestilence made a complete revolution in the face of the

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. xv. 35. Διὸ καὶ Πόπλιον Σκιπίωνα φασὶ, τὸν πρῶτον καταπολεμήσαντα Καρχηδονίους, ἐρωτηθέντα, τίνας ὑπολαμβάνει πραγματικωτάτους ἀνδρας γεγονέναι καὶ σὺν νῷ τολμηροτάτους, εἰπεῖν, τοὺς περὶ Ἀναδουλεον καὶ Διονύσιον τοὺς Σικελιώτας.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 7.



war; exalting Dionysius from impending ruin, to assured safety in the one, and to unmeasured triumph in the other. We are bound to allow for this good fortune (the like of which never befel Agathokles), when we contemplate the long prosperity of Dionysius<sup>1</sup>, and when we adopt, as in justice we must, the panegyric of Scipio Africanus.

The preceding chapter has detailed the means whereby Dionysius attained his prize, and kept it: those employed by Agathokles — analogous in spirit but of still darker coloring in the details — will appear hereafter. That Hermokrates — who had filled with credit the highest offices in the state and whom men had acquired the habit of following — should aspire to become despot, was no unusual phenomenon in Grecian politics; but that Dionysius should aim at mounting the same ladder, seemed absurd or even insane — to use the phrase of Isokrates.<sup>2</sup> If, then, in spite of such disadvantage he succeeded in fastening round his countrymen, accustomed to a free constitution as their birth-right, those “adamantine chains” which they were well known to abhor — we may be sure that his plan of proceeding must have been dexterously chosen, and prosecuted with consummate perseverance and audacity; but we may be also sure that it was nefarious in the extreme. The machinery of fraud whereby the people were to be cheated into a temporary submission, as a prelude to the machinery of force whereby such submission was to be perpetuated against their consent — was the stock in trade of Grecian usurpers. But seldom does it appear prefaced by more impudent calumnies, or worked out with a larger measure of violence and spoliation, than in the case of Dionysius. He was indeed powerfully seconded at the outset by the danger of Syracuse from the Carthaginian arms. But his scheme of usurpation, far from diminishing such danger, tended materially to increase it, by disuniting the city at so critical a moment. Dionysius achieved nothing in his first enterprise for the relief of Gela and Kamarina.

<sup>1</sup> The example of Dionysius — his long career of success and quiet death — is among those cited by Cotta in Cicero (*De Nat. Deor.* iii. 33. 81, 85) to refute the doctrine of Balbus, as to the providence of the gods and their moral government over human affairs.

<sup>2</sup> Isokratēs, *Or.* v. (Philipp.) s. 73. Διονύσιος . . . ἐπιθυμῶν μοναρχίας ἀλόγως καὶ μανικῶς. καὶ τολμήσας ὑπαντα πρᾶττειν τὰ φέροντα πρὸς τῇ δυνάμει τάσσειν. etc.

He was forced to retire with as much disgrace as those previous generals whom he had so bitterly vituperated; and apparently even with greater disgrace — since there are strong grounds for believing that he entered into traitorous collusion with the Carthaginians. The salvation of Syracuse, at that moment of peril, arose not from the energy or ability of Dionysius, but from the opportune epidemic which disabled Imilkon in the midst of a victorious career.

Dionysius had not only talents to organize, and boldness to make good, a despotism more formidable than anything known to contemporary Greeks, but also systematic prudence to keep it unimpaired for thirty-eight years. He maintained carefully those two precautions which Thucydides specifies as the causes of permanence to the Athenian Hippias, under similar circumstances — intimidation over the citizens, and careful organization, with liberal pay among his mercenaries.<sup>1</sup> He was temperate in indulgencies; never led by any of his appetites into the commission of violence.<sup>2</sup> This abstinence contributed materially to prolong his life, since many a Grecian despot perished through desperate feelings of individual vengeance provoked by his outrages. With Dionysius, all other appetites were merged in the love of dominion, at home and abroad; and of money as a means of dominion. To the service of this master-passion all his energies were devoted, together with those vast military resources which an unscrupulous ability served both to accumulate and to recruit. How his treasury was supplied, with the large exigencies continually

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. vi. 55. ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πρότερον ξύνηθες, τοῖς μὲν πολίταις φοβερὸν, τοῖς δὲ ἐπικούροις ἀκριβές, πολλῶ τῷ περιόντι τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς ἐκράτησε (Hippias).

On the liberality of the elder Dionysius to his mercenaries, see an allusion in Plato, *Epistol.* vii. p. 348 A.

The extension and improvement of engines for warlike purposes, under Dionysius, was noticed as a sort of epoch (*Athenæus de Machinis ap. Mathemat. Veteres*, ed. Paris. p. 3).

<sup>2</sup> Cornelius Nepos, *De Regibus*, c. 2. “Dionysius prior, et manu fortis, et belli peritus fuit, et, id quod in tyranno non facile reperitur, minime libidinosus, non luxuriosus, non avarus, nullius rei denique cupidus, nisi singularis perpetuæ imperii, ob eamque rem crudelis. Nam dum id studuit munire, nullius pepercit vitæ, quem ejus insidiatorem putaret.” To the same purpose Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* v. 20.



pressing upon it, we are but little informed. We know however that his exactions from the Syracusans were exorbitant;<sup>1</sup> that he did not hesitate to strip the holiest temples; and that he left behind him a great reputation for ingenious tricks in extracting money from his subjects.<sup>2</sup> Besides the large garrison of foreign mercenaries by whom his orders were enforced, he maintained a regular body of spies, seemingly of both sexes, disseminated among the body of the citizens.<sup>3</sup> The vast quarry-prison of Syracuse was his work.<sup>4</sup> Both the vague general picture, and the fragmentary details which come before us, of his conduct towards the Syracusans, present to us nothing but an oppressive and extortionate tyrant, by whose fiat numberless victims perished; more than ten thousand according to the general language of Plutarch.<sup>5</sup> He enriched largely his younger brothers and auxiliaries; among which latter, Hipparinus stood prominent, thus recovering a fortune equal to or larger than that which his profligacy had dissipated.<sup>6</sup> But we hear also of acts of Dionysius, indicating a jealous and cruel temper, even towards near relatives. And it appears certain that he trusted no one, not even them;<sup>7</sup> that though in the

<sup>1</sup> Aristotel. Politic. v. 9, 5.

<sup>2</sup> Pseudo-Aristotel. Economic. ii. c. 21, 42; Cicero, De Nat. Deorum, iii. 34, 83, 84; Valerius Maxim. i. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 28; Plutarch, De Curiositate, p. 523 A; Aristotel. Politic. v. 9, 3. The titles of these spies — *αἱ ποταγωγίδες καλούμεναι* — as we read in Aristotle; or *οἱ ποταγωγεῖς* — as we find in Plutarch — may perhaps both be correct.

<sup>4</sup> Cicero in Verrem, v. 55, 143.

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch, De Fortunâ Alexandr. Magni, p. 338 B. What were the crimes of Dionysius which Pausanias had read and describes by the general words *Διονυσίου τὰ ἀνοσιώτατα* — and which he accuses Philistus of having intentionally omitted in his history — we cannot now tell (Pausan. i. 13, 2: compare Plutarch, Dion, c. 36). An author named Amyntianus, contemporary with Pausanias, and among those perused by Photius (Codex 131), had composed parallel lives of Dionysius and the Emperor Domitian.

<sup>6</sup> Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 332 A; Aristol. Politic. v. 5, 6.

<sup>7</sup> Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 332 D. *Διονύσιος δὲ εἰς μίαν πόλιν ἀθροίσας πᾶσαν Σικελίαν ὑπὸ σοφίας, πιστεύων οὐδενὶ, μόγις ἐσώθη*, etc.

This brief, but significant expression of Plato, attests the excessive mistrust which haunted Dionysius, as a general fact; which is illustrated by the anecdotes of Cicero, Tuscul. Disput. v. 20, 28; and De Officiis, ii. 7; Plutarch, Dion, c. 9; Diodor. xiv. 2.

The well-known anecdote of Damoklès, and the sword which Dionysius

field he was a perfectly brave man, yet his suspicion and timorous anxiety as to every one who approached his person, were carried to the most tormenting excess, and extended even to his wives, his brothers, his daughters. Afraid to admit any one with a razor near to his face, he is said to have singed his own beard with a burning coal. Both his brother and his son were searched for concealed weapons, and even forced to change their clothes in the presence of his guards, before they were permitted to see him. An officer of the guards named Marsyas, having dreamt that he was assassinating Dionysius, was put to death for this dream, as proving that his waking thoughts must have been dwelling upon such a project. And it has already been mentioned that Dionysius put to death the mother of one of his wives, on suspicion that she had by incantations brought about the barrenness of the other — as well as the sons of a Lokrian citizen named Aristeides, who had refused, with indignant expressions, to grant to him his daughter in marriage.<sup>1</sup>

Such were the conditions of existence — perpetual mistrust, danger even from the nearest kindred, enmity both to and from every dignified freeman, and reliance only on armed barbarians or liberated slaves — which beset almost every Grecian despot, and from which the greatest despot of his age enjoyed no exemption. Though philosophers emphatically insisted that such a man must be miserable,<sup>2</sup> yet Dionysius himself, as well as the great mass of admiring spectators, would probably feel that the necessities of his position were more than compensated by its awe-striking grandeur, and by the full satisfaction of ambitious dreams; subject indeed to poignant suffering when wounded in the tender point, and when reaping insult in place of admiration, at the memorable Olympic festival of 384 B. C., above-described. But the

caused to be suspended over his head by a horsehair, in the midst of the enjoyments of the banquet, as an illustration how little was the value of grandeur in the midst of terror — is recounted by Cicero.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 3; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 6.

<sup>2</sup> This sentiment, pronounced by Plato, Isokratès, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, etc., is nowhere so forcibly laid out as in the dialogue of Xenophon called *Hiero* — of which indeed it forms the text and theme. Whoever reads this picture of the position of a Grecian *τύραννος*, will see that it was scarcely possible for a man so placed to be other than a cruel and oppressive ruler.



Syracusans, over whom he ruled, enjoyed no such compensation for that which they suffered from his tax-gatherers — from his garrison of Gauls, Iberians, and Campanians, in Ortygia — from his spies — his prison — and his executioners.

Nor did Syracuse suffer alone. The reign of the elder Dionysius was desolating for the Hellenic population generally, both of Sicily and Italy. Syracuse became a great fortress, with vast military power in the hands of its governor, "whose policy<sup>1</sup> it was to pack all Sicily into it;" while the remaining free Hellenic communities were degraded, enslaved, and half depopulated. On this topic, the mournful testimonies already cited from Lysias and Isokrates, are borne out by the letters of the eye-witness Plato. In his advice, given to the son and successor of Dionysius, Plato emphatically presses upon him two points: first, as to the Syracusans, to transform his inherited oppressive despotism into the rule of a king, governing gently and by fixed laws; next, to reconstitute and repopulate, under free constitutions, the other Hellenic communities in Sicily, which at his accession had become nearly barbarised and half deserted.<sup>2</sup> The elder Dionysius had imported

<sup>1</sup> See the citation from Plato, in a note immediately preceding.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Epistol. iii. p. 315 E. (to the younger Dionysius). Φασὶ δ' οὐκ ὀλίγοι λέγειν σε πρὸς τινὰς τῶν παρὰ σε πρεσβυνόντων, ὡς ἄρα σοῦ ποτὲ λέγοντος ἀκούσας ἐγὼ μέλλοντος τὰς τε Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἰκίζειν, καὶ Συρακουσίους ἐπικουφίσαι, τὴν ἀρχὴν ὧντι τυραννίδος εἰς βασιλείαν μεταστήσαντα, ταῦτ' ἄρα σὲ μὲν τότε διεκώλυσα, σοῦ σφόδρα προθυμονμένου, νῦν δὲ Δίωνα διδάσκοιμι ὁρᾶν αὐτὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τοῖς διανοήμασι τοῖς σοῖς τὴν σὴν ἀρχὴν ἀφαιρούμενά σε.

Ibid. p. 319 C. Μὴ με διάβαλλε λέγων, ὡς οὐκ εἶων σε πόλεις Ἑλληνίδας ἡρβούσας ὑπὸ βαρβάρων οἰκίζειν, οὐδὲ Συρακουσίους ἐπικουφίσαι. . . ὡς ἐγὼ μὲν ἐκέλευον, σὺ δ' οὐκ ἠθέλες πράττειν αὐτά.

Again, see Epistol. vii. p. 331 F 332 B. 334 D. 336 A.-D.—and the brief notice given by Photius (Codex, 93) of the lost historical works of Arrian, respecting Dion and Timoleon.

Epistol. viii. p. 357 A. (What Dion intended to do, had he not been prevented by death)—Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα Σικελίαν ἂν τὴν ἄλλην κατώκισα τοὺς μὲν βαρβάρους ἦν νῦν ἔχουσιν ἀφελόμενος, ὅσοι μὴ ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς ἐλευθερίας διεπολέμησαν πρὸς τὴν τυραννίδα, τοὺς δ' ἐμπροσθεν οἰκητὰς τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τόπων εἰς τὰς ἀρχαίας καὶ πατρῶας οἰκῆσεις κατοικίσας. Compare Plutarch. Timoleon, c. 2. αἱ δὲ πλείσται πόλεις ὑπὸ βαρβάρων μιγνύων καὶ στρατιωτῶν ἀμίσθων κατείχοντο.

into Sicily large bodies of mercenaries, by means of whom he had gained his conquests, and for whom he had provided settlements at the cost of the subdued Hellenic cities. In Naxos, Katana, Leontini, and Messênê, the previous residents had been dispossessed and others substituted, out of Gallic and Iberian mercenaries. Communities thus transformed, with their former free citizens degraded into dependence or exile, not only ceased to be purely Hellenic, but also became far less populous and flourishing. In like manner Dionysius had suppressed, and absorbed into Syracuse and Lokri, the once autonomous Grecian communities of Rhegium, Hipponium, and Kaulonia, on the Italian side of the strait. In the inland regions of Italy, he had allied himself with the barbarous Lucanians; who, even without his aid, were gaining ground and pressing hard upon the Italian Greeks on the coast.

If we examine the results of the warfare carried on by Dionysius against the Carthaginians, from the commencement to the end of his career, we shall observe, that he began by losing Gela and Kamarina, and that the peace by which he was enabled to preserve Syracuse itself, arose, not from any success of his own, but from the pestilence which ruined his enemies; to say nothing about traitorous collusion with them, which I have already remarked to have been the probable price of their guarantee to his dominion. His war against the Carthaginians in 397 B. C., was undertaken with much vigor, recovered Gela, Kamarina, Agrigentum, and Selinus, and promised the most decisive success. But presently again the tide of fortune turned against him. He sustained capital defeats, and owed the safety of Syracuse, a second time, to nothing but the terrific pestilence which destroyed the army of Imilkon. A third time, in 383 B. C., Dionysius gratui-

The *βαρβαροι* to whom Plato alludes in this last passage, are not the Carthaginians (none of whom could be expected to come in and fight for the purpose of putting down the despotism at Syracuse), but the Campanian and other mercenaries provided for by the elder Dionysius on the lands of the extruded Greeks. These men would have the strongest interest in upholding the despotism, if the maintenance of their own properties was connected with it. Dion thought it prudent to conciliate this powerful force by promising confirmation of their properties to such of them as would act upon the side of freedom.



tously renewed the war against Carthage. After brilliant success at first, he was again totally defeated, and forced to cede to Carthage all the territory west of the river Halykus, besides paying a tribute. So that the exact difference between the Sicilian territory of Carthage—as it stood at the beginning of his command and at the end of his reign—amounts to this: that at the earlier period it reached to the river Himera—at the later period only to the river Halykus. The intermediate space between the two comprehends Agrigentum with the greater part of its territory; which represents therefore the extent of Hellenic soil rescued by Dionysius from Carthaginian dominion.

#### CHAPTER LXXXIV.

##### SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DEATH OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS —DIONYSIUS THE YOUNGER—AND DION.

THE Elder Dionysius, at the moment of his death, boasted of having left his dominion “fastened by chains of adamant;” that is, sustained by a large body of mercenaries,<sup>1</sup> well trained and well paid—by impregnable fortifications on the islet of Ortygia—by four hundred ships of war—by immense magazines of arms and military stores—and by established intimidation over the minds of the Syracusans. These were really “chains of adamant”—so long as there was a man like Dionysius to keep them in hand. But he left no successor competent to the task; nor indeed an unobstructed succession. He had issue by two wives, whom he had married both at the same time, as has been already mentioned. By the Lokrian wife, Doris, he had his eldest son named Dionysius, and two others; by the Syracusan wife

<sup>1</sup> Both Diodorus (xvi. 9) and Cornelius Nepos (Dion, c. 5) speak of one hundred thousand foot and ten thousand horse. The former speaks of four hundred ships of war; the latter of five hundred.

The numbers of foot and horse appear evidently exaggerated. Both authors must have copied from the same original; possibly Ephorus

Aristomachê, daughter of Hipparinus, he had two sons, Hipparinus and Nysæus—and two daughters, Sophrosynê and Aretê.<sup>1</sup> Dionysius the younger can hardly have been less than twenty-five years old at the death of his father and namesake. Hipparinus, the eldest son by the other wife, was considerably younger. Aristomachê his mother had long remained childless; a fact which the elder Dionysius ascribed to incantations wrought by the mother of the Lokrian wife, and punished by putting to death the supposed sorceress.<sup>2</sup>

The offspring of Aristomachê, though the younger brood of the two, derived considerable advantage from the presence and countenance of her brether Dion. Hipparinus, father of Dion and Aristomachê, had been the principal abettor of the elder Dionysius in his original usurpation, in order to retrieve his own fortune,<sup>3</sup> ruined by profligate expenditure. So completely had that object been accomplished, that his son Dion was now among the richest men in Syracuse,<sup>4</sup> possessing property estimated at above one hundred talents (about £23,000). Dion was, besides, son-in-law to the elder Dionysius, who had given his daughter Sophrosynê in marriage to his son (by a different mother) the younger Diony-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 6; Theopompus, Fr. 204, ed. Didot. ap. Athenæum, x. p. 435; Diodor. xvi. 6; Cornel. Nepos (Dion, c. 1).

The Scholiast on Plato's fourth Epistle gives information respecting the personal relations and marriages of the elder Dionysius, not wholly agreeing with what is stated in the sixth chapter of Plutarch's Life of Dion.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 3. The age of the younger Dionysius is nowhere positively specified. But in the year 356 B. C.—or 355 B. C., at the latest—he had a son, Apollokratês, old enough to be entrusted with the command of Ortygia, when he himself evacuated it for the first time (Plutarch, Dion, c. 37). We cannot suppose Apollokratês to have been less than sixteen years of age at the moment when he was entrusted with such a function, having his mother and sisters under his charge (c. 50). Apollokratês therefore must have been born at least as early as 372 B. C.; perhaps even earlier. Suppose Dionysius the younger to have been twenty years of age when Apollokratês was born; he would thus be in his twenty-fifth year in the beginning of 367 B. C., when Dionysius the elder died. The expressions of Plato, as to the youth of Dionysius the younger at that juncture, are not unsuitable to such an age.

<sup>3</sup> Aristotel. Polit. v. 5, 6.

<sup>4</sup> Plato Epistol. vii. p. 347 A. Compare the offer of Dion to maintain fifty triremes at his own expense (Plutarch, Dion, c. 6.)



sus; and his daughter Aretê, first to his brother Thearides — next, on the death of Thearides, to Dion. As brother of Aristomachê, Dion was thus brother-in-law to the elder Dionysius, and uncle both to Aretê his own wife and to Sophrosynê the wife of the younger Dionysius; as husband of Aretê, he was son-in-law to the elder Dionysius, and brother-in-law (as well as uncle) to the wife of the younger. Marriages between near relatives (excluding any such connection between uterine brother and sister) were usual in Greek manners. We cannot doubt that the despot accounted the harmony likely to be produced by such ties between the members of his two families and Dion, among the "adamantine chains" which held fast his dominion.

Apart from wealth and high position, the personal character of Dion was in itself marked and prominent. He was of an energetic temper, great bravery, and very considerable mental capacities. Though his nature was haughty and disdainful towards individuals, yet as to political communion, his ambition was by no means purely self-seeking and egoistic, like that of the elder Dionysius. Animated with vehement love of power, he was at the same time penetrated with that sense of regulated polity, and submission of individual will to fixed laws, which floated in the atmosphere of Grecian talk and literature, and stood so high in Grecian morality. He was moreover capable of acting with enthusiasm, and braving every hazard in prosecution of his own convictions.

Born about the year 408 B. C.,<sup>1</sup> Dion was twenty-one years of age in 378 B. C., when the elder Dionysius, having dismantled Rhegium and subdued Kroton, attained the maximum of his dominion, as master of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks. Standing high in the favor of his brother-in-law Dionysius, Dion doubtless took part in the wars whereby this large dominion had been acquired; as well as in the life of indulgence and luxury which prevailed generally among wealthy Greeks in Sicily and Italy, and which to the Athenian Plato appeared alike surprising and

<sup>1</sup> Dion was fifty-five years of age at the time of his death, in the fourth year after his departure from Peloponnesus (Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 10).

His death took place seemingly about 354 B. C. He would thus be born about 408 B. C.

repulsive.<sup>1</sup> That great philosopher visited Italy and Sicily about 387 B. C., as has been already mentioned. He was in acquaintance and fellowship with the school of philosophers called Pythagoreans; the remnant of that Pythagorean brotherhood, who had once exercised so powerful a political influence over the cities of those regions — and who still enjoyed considerable reputation, even after complete political downfall, through individual ability and rank of the members, combined with habits of recluse study, mysticism, and attachment among themselves. With these Pythagoreans Dion also, a young man of open mind and ardent aspirations, was naturally thrown into communication by the proceedings of the elder Dionysius in Italy.<sup>2</sup> Through them he came into intercourse with Plato, whose conversation made an epoch in his life.

The mystic turn of imagination, the sententious brevity, and the mathematical researches of the Pythagoreans, produced doubtless an imposing effect upon Dion; just as Lysis, a member of that brotherhood, had acquired the attachment and influenced the sentiments of Epaminondas at Thebes. But Plato's power of working upon the minds of young men was far more impressive and irresistible. He possessed a large range of practical experience, a mastery of political and social topics, and a charm of eloquence, to which the Pythagoreans were strangers. The stirring effect of the Sokratic talk, as well as of the democratical atmos-

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 326 D. *ἔλθοντα δὲ με ὁ ταύτη λεγόμενος αὐ βίος ἐνδαίμων, Ἰταλιωτικῶν τε καὶ Συρακουσίων τραπεζῶν πλήρης, οὐδαμῇ οὐδ' αὖτε ἡρεσκε, δις τε τῆς ἡμέρας ἐμπιπλάμενον ζῆν καὶ μηδέποτε κοιμώμενον μόνον νύκτωρ, etc.*

<sup>2</sup> Cicero, De Finibus, v. 20; De Republic. i. 10. Jamblichus (Vit. Pythagoræ, c. 199) calls Dion a member of the Pythagorean brotherhood, which may be doubted; but his assertion that Dion procured for Plato, though only by means of a large price (one hundred minæ), the possession of a book composed by the Pythagorean Philolaus, seems not improbable. The ancient Pythagoreans wrote nothing. Philolaus (seemingly about contemporary with Sokrates) was the first Pythagorean who left any written memorial. That this book could only be obtained by the intervention of an influential Syracusan — and even by him only for a large price — is easy to believe.

See the instructive Dissertation of Gruppe, *Über die Fragmente des Archytas und der älteren Pythagoreer*, p. 24, 26, 48, etc.



phere in which Plato had been brought up, had developed all the communicative aptitude of his mind; and great as that aptitude appears in his remaining dialogues, there is ground for believing that it was far greater in his conversation; greater perhaps in 387 B. C., when he was still mainly the Sokratic Plato — than it became in later days, after he had imbibed to a certain extent the mysticism of these Pythagoreans.<sup>1</sup> Brought up as Dion had been at the court of Dionysius — accustomed to see around him only slavish deference and luxurious enjoyment — unused to open speech or large philosophical discussion — he found in Plato a new man exhibited, and a new world opened before him.

The conception of a free community — with correlative rights and duties belonging to every citizen, determined by laws and protected or enforced by power emanating from the collective entity called the City — stood in the foreground of ordinary Grecian morality — reigned spontaneously in the bosoms of every Grecian festival crowd — and had been partially imbibed by Dion, though not from his own personal experience, yet from teachers, sophists, and poets. This conception, essential and fundamental with philosophers as well as with the vulgar, was not merely set forth by Plato with commanding powers of speech, but also exalted with improvements and refinements into an ideal perfection. Above all, it was based upon a strict, even an abstemious and ascetic, canon, as to individual enjoyment; and upon a careful training both of mind and body, qualifying each man for the due performance of his duties as a citizen; a subject which Plato (as we see by his dialogues) did not simply propound with the direct enforcement of a preacher, but touched with the quickening and pungent effect, and reinforced with the copious practical illustrations, of Sokratic dialogue.

As the stimulus from the teacher was here put forth with consummate efficacy, so the predisposition of the learner enabled it to take full effect. Dion became an altered man both in public sentiment and in individual behavior. He recollected that twenty years before, his country Syracuse had been as free as Athens. He learnt to abhor the iniquity of the despotism by which her liberty had been overthrown, and by which subsequently the lib-

<sup>1</sup> See a remarkable passage, Plato, Epist. vii. p. 328 F.

erties of so many other Greeks in Italy and Sicily had been trodden down also. He was made to remark, that Sicily had been half-barbarized through the foreign mercenaries imported as the despot's instruments. He conceived the sublime idea or dream of rectifying all this accumulation of wrong and suffering. It was his wish first to cleanse Syracuse from the blot of slavery, and to clothe her anew in the brightness and dignity of freedom; yet not with the view of restoring the popular government as it had stood prior to the usurpation, but of establishing an improved constitutional policy, originated by himself, with laws which should not only secure individual rights, but also educate and moralize the citizens.<sup>1</sup> The function which he imagined to himself, and which the conversation of Plato suggested, was not that of a despot like Dionysius, but that of a despotic legislator like Lykurgus,<sup>2</sup> taking advantage of a momentary omnipotence, conferred upon him by grateful citizens in a state of public confusion, to originate a good system; which, when once put in motion, would keep itself alive by fashioning the minds of the citizens to its own intrinsic excellence. After having thus both liberated and reformed Syracuse, Dion promised to himself that he would employ Syracusan force, not in annihilating, but in recreating, other free Hellenic communities throughout the island; expelling from thence all the barbarians — both the imported mercenaries and the Carthaginians.

Such were the hopes and projects which arose in the mind of the youthful Dion as he listened to Plato; hopes pregnant with future results which neither of them contemplated — and not unworthy of being compared with those enthusiastic aspirations

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 335 F. Δίωνα γὰρ ἐγὼ σαφῶς οἶδα, ὡς οὐδὲν τε περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώπων δὲ δισχυρίζεσθαι, ὅτι τὴν ἀρχὴν εἰ κατέσχευεν, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐπ' ἄλλο γε σχῆμα τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐτράπετο, ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ — Συρακούσας μὲν πρῶτον, τὴν πατρίδα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ, ἐπεὶ τὴν δούλειαν αὐτῆς ἀπηλλάξε καὶ φαιδρύνας ἐλευθερίῳ ἐν σχήματι κατέστησε, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτ' ἂν πάσῃ μηχανῇ ἐκόσμησε νόμοις τοῖς προσήκουσί τε καὶ ἀρίστοις τοὺς πολίτας — τὸ τε ἐφεξῆς τοῦτοις προθυμεῖτ' ἂν πράξαι, πᾶσαν Σικελίαν κατοικίσειν καὶ ἐλευθέραν ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων ποιεῖν, τοὺς μὲν ἐκβάλλων, τοὺς δὲ χειροῦμενος ῥῆσον ἱέρωνος, etc.

Compare the beginning of the same epistle, p. 324 A.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Epist. iv. p. 320 F. (addressed to Dion). . . . ὡς οὐδὲν ὑπὸ πάντων ὁρώμενος παρασκευάζου τον τε Λυκούργον ἐκείνον ἀρχαῖον ἀποδείξων, καὶ τὸν Κῦρον καὶ εἰτις ἄλλοι πώποτε ἔδοξεν ἡθεὶ καὶ πολιτείᾳ διενεγκεῖν, etc.



which the young Spartan kings Agis and Kleomenes imbibed, a century afterwards, in part from the conversation of the philosopher Sphærus.<sup>1</sup> Never before had Plato met with a pupil who so quickly apprehended, so profoundly meditated, or so passionately laid to heart, his lessons.<sup>2</sup> Inflamed with his newly communicated impulse towards philosophy, as the supreme guide and directress of virtuous conduct, Dion altered his habits of life; exchanging the splendor and luxury of a Sicilian rich man for the simple fare and regulated application becoming a votary of the Academy. In this course he persisted without faltering throughout all his residence at the court of Dionysius, in spite of the unpopularity contracted among his immediate companions. His enthusiasm even led him to believe, that the despot himself, unable to resist that persuasive tongue by which he had been himself converted, might be gently brought round into an employment of his mighty force for beneficent and reformatory purposes. Accordingly Dion, inviting Plato to Syracuse, procured for him an interview with Dionysius. How miserably the speculation failed, has been recounted in my last chapter. Instead of acquiring a new convert, the philosopher was fortunate in rescuing his own person, and in making good his returning footsteps out of that lion's den, into which the improvident enthusiasm of his young friend had inveigled him.

The harsh treatment of Plato by Dionysius was a painful, though salutary, warning to Dion. Without sacrificing either his own convictions, or the philosophical regularity of life which he had thought fit to adopt — he saw that patience was imperatively necessary, and he so conducted himself as to maintain unabated the favor and confidence of Dionysius. Such a policy would

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Kleomenes, c. 2-11.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 327 A. Δίων μὲν γὰρ δὴ μάλ' εὐμαθὴς ὢν πρὸς τε πάντα, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς τότε ὑπ' ἐμοῦ λεγομένους λόγους, οὕτως ὀξέως ὑπήκουσε καὶ σφόδρα, ὥς οὐδεὶς πώποτε ὢν ἐγὼ προσέτυχον νέων καὶ τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον ζῆν ἠθέλησε διαφερόντως τῶν πολλῶν Ἰταλιῶν καὶ Σικελιωτῶν, ἀρετῇ περὶ πλείονος ἡδονῆς τῆς τε ἄλλης τρυφῆς ποιούμενος· ὁθεν ἐπαχθέστεροι τοῖς περὶ τὰ τυραννικὰ νόμιμα ζῶσιν ἐβίω, μέχρι τοῦ θανάτου τοῦ τιρὶ Διονύσιον γενομένου.

Plutarch, Dion, c. 4. ὡς πρῶτον ἐγεύσατο λόγον καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἡγεμονίας πρὸς ἀρετῇ, ἀνεφλέκθη τὴν ψυχὴν, etc.

probably be recommended to him even by Plato, in prospect of a better future. But it would be strenuously urged by the Pythagoreans of Southern Italy; among whom was Archytas, distinguished not only as a mathematician and friend of Plato, but also as the chief political magistrate of Tarentum. To these men, who dwelt all within the reach,<sup>1</sup> if not under the dominion, of this formidable Syracusan despot, it would be an unspeakable advantage to have a friend like Dion near him, possessing his confidence, and serving as a shield to them against his displeasure or interference. Dion so far surmounted his own unbending nature as to conduct himself towards Dionysius with skill and prudence. He was employed by the despot in several important affairs, especially in embassies to Carthage, which he fulfilled well, especially with conspicuous credit for eloquence; and also in the execution of various cruel orders, which his humanity secretly mitigated.<sup>2</sup> After the death of Thearides, Dionysius gave to Dion in marriage the widow Aretê (his daughter), and continued until the last to treat him with favor, accepting from him a freedom of censure such as he would tolerate from no other adviser.

During the many years which elapsed before the despot died, we cannot doubt that Dion found opportunities of visiting Peloponnesus and Athens, for the great festivals and other purposes. He would thus keep up his friendship and philosophical communication with Plato. Being as he was minister and relative, and perhaps successor presumptive, of the most powerful prince in Greece, he would enjoy everywhere great importance, which would be enhanced by his philosophy and eloquence. The Spartans, at that time the allies of Dionysius, conferred upon Dion the rare honor of a vote of citizenship;<sup>3</sup> and he received testimonies

<sup>1</sup> See the story in Jamblichus (Vit. Pythagoræ, c. 189) of a company of Syracusan troops under Eurymenes the brother of Dion, sent to lay in ambush for some Pythagoreans between Tarentum and Metapontum. The story has not the air of truth; but the state of circumstances, which it supposes, illustrates the relation between Dionysius and the cities in the Tarentine Gulf.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 5, 6; Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 1, 2.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 17, 49. Respecting the rarity of the vote of Spartan citizenship, see a remarkable passage of Herodotus, ix. 33-35.

Plutarch states that the Spartans voted their citizenship to Dion during his exile, while he was in Peloponnesus after the year 367 B. C., at enmity



of respect from other cities also. Such honors tended to exalt his reputation at Syracuse; while the visits to Athens and the cities of Central Greece enlarged his knowledge both of politicians and philosophers.

At length occurred the death of the elder Dionysius, occasioned by an unexpected attack of fever, after a few days' illness. He had made no special announcement about his succession. Accordingly, as soon as the physicians pronounced him to be in imminent danger, a competition arose between his two families: on the one hand Dionysius the younger, his son by the Lokrian wife Doris; on the other, his wife Aristomachê and her brother Dion, representing her children Hipparinus and Nysæus, then very young. Dion, wishing to obtain for these two youths either a partnership in the future power, or some other beneficial provision, solicited leave to approach the bedside of the sick man. But the physicians refused to grant his request without apprising the younger Dionysius; who, being resolved to prevent it, directed a soporific potion to be administered to his father, from the effects of which the latter never awoke so as to be able to see any one.<sup>1</sup> The interview with Dion being thus frustrated, and the father dying without giving any directions, Dionysius the younger succeeded as eldest son, without opposition. He was presented to that which was called an assembly of the Syracusan people,<sup>2</sup> and delivered some conciliatory phrases, requesting them to continue to him that good-will which they had so long shown to his father.

with the younger Dionysius then despot of Syracuse; whom (according to Plutarch) the Spartans took the risk of offending, in order that they might testify their extreme admiration for Dion.

I cannot but think that Plutarch is mistaken as to the time of this grant. In and after 367 B. C. the Spartans were under great depression, playing the losing game against Thebes. It is scarcely conceivable that they should be imprudent enough to alienate a valuable ally for the sake of gratuitously honoring an exile whom he hated and had banished. Whereas if we suppose the vote to have been passed during the lifetime of the elder Dionysius, it would count as a compliment to him as well as to Dion, and would thus be an act of political prudence as well as of genuine respect. Plutarch speaks as if he supposed that Dion was never in Peloponnesus until the time of his exile, which is, in my judgment, highly improbable.

<sup>1</sup> Cornelius Nepos, Dion. c. 2; Plutarch, Dion, c. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xv. 74

Consent and acclamation were of course not wanting, to the new master of the troops, treasures, magazines, and fortifications in Ortygia; those "adamantine chains" which were well known to dispense with the necessity of any real popular good-will.

Dionysius II. (or the younger), then about twenty-five years of age, was a young man of considerable natural capacity, and of quick and lively impulses;<sup>1</sup> but weak and vain in his character, given to transitory caprices, and eager in his appetite for praise without being capable of any industrious or resolute efforts to earn it. As yet he was wholly unpractised in serious business of any kind. He had neither seen military service nor mingled in the discussion of political measures; having been studiously kept back from both, by the extreme jealousy of his father. His life had been passed in the palace or acropolis of Ortygia, amidst all the indulgences and luxuries belonging to a princely station, diversified with amateur carpenter's work and turnery. However, the tastes of the father introduced among the guests at the palace a certain number of poets, reciters, musicians, etc., so that the younger Dionysius had contracted a relish for poetical literature, which opened his mind to generous sentiments, and large conceptions of excellence, more than any portion of his very confined experience. To philosophy, to instructive conversation, to the exercise of reason, he was a stranger.<sup>2</sup> But the very feebleness and indecision of his character presented him as impressible, perhaps improvable, by a strong will and influence brought to bear upon him from that quarter, at least as well as from any other.

Such was the novice who suddenly stepped into the place of the most energetic and powerful despot of the Grecian world. Dion — being as he was of mature age, known service and experience, and full enjoyment of the confidence of the elder Dionysius, — might have probably raised material opposition to the younger. But he attempted no such thing. He acknowledged and supported

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 338 E. Ὁ δὲ οὐτε ἄλλως ἐστὶν ἀφῆς πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μανθάνειν δύναμιν, φιλοτιμος δὲ θαυμαστῶς, etc. Compare p. 330 A. p. 328 B.; also Epist. iii. p. 316 C. p. 317 E.

Plutarch, Dion, c. 7-9.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 332 E. ἐπειδὴ τὰ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτῷ ἐννεβέβηκε οὕτως ἀνομιλήτῳ μὲν παιδείας, ἀνομιλήτῳ δὲ συνουσιῶν τῶν προσηκουσῶν, γεγονέναι, etc.



the young prince with cordial sincerity, dropping altogether those views, whatever they were, on behalf of the children of Aristomachê, which had induced him to solicit the last interview with the sick man. While exerting himself to strengthen and facilitate the march of the government, he tried to gain influence and ascendancy over the mind of the young Dionysius. At the first meeting of council which took place after the accession, Dion stood conspicuous not less for his earnest adhesion than for his dignified language and intelligent advice. The remaining councillors — accustomed, under the self-determining despot who had just quitted the scene, to the simple function of hearing, applauding, and obeying, his directions — exhausted themselves in phrases and compliments, waiting to catch the tone of the young prince before they ventured to pronounce any decided opinion. But Dion, to whose freedom of speech even the elder Dionysius had partially submitted, disdained all such tampering, entered at once into a full review of the actual situation, and suggested the positive measures proper to be adopted. We cannot doubt that, in the transmission of an authority which had rested so much on the individual spirit of the former possessor, there were many precautions to be taken, especially in regard to the mercenary troops both at Syracuse and in the outlying dependencies. All these necessities of the moment Dion set forth, together with suitable advice. But the most serious of all the difficulties arose out of the war with Carthage still subsisting, which it was foreseen that the Carthaginians were likely to press more vigorously, calculating on the ill-assured tenure and inexperienced management of the new prince. This difficulty Dion took upon himself. If the council should think it wise to make peace, he engaged to go to Carthage and negotiate peace — a task in which he had been more than once employed under the elder Dionysius. If, on the other hand, it were resolved to prosecute the war, he advised that imposing forces should be at once put in equipment, promising to furnish, out of his own large property, a sum sufficient for the outfit of fifty triremes.<sup>1</sup>

The young Dionysius was not only profoundly impressed with the superior wisdom and suggestive resource of Dion, but also

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 6

grateful for his generous offer of pecuniary as well as personal support.<sup>1</sup> In all probability Dion actually carried the offer into effect, for to a man of his disposition, money had little value except as a means of extending influence and acquiring reputation. The war with Carthage seems to have lasted at least throughout the next year,<sup>2</sup> and to have been terminated not long afterwards. But it never assumed those perilous proportions which had been contemplated by the council as probable. As a mere contingency, however, it was sufficient to inspire Dionysius with alarm, combined with the other exigencies of his new situation. At first he was painfully conscious of his own inexperience; anxious about hazards which he now saw for the first time, and not merely open to advice, but eager and thankful for suggestions, from any quarter where he could place confidence. Dion, identified by ancient connection as well as by marriage with the Dionysian family — trusted, more than any one else, by the old despot, and surrounded with that accessory dignity which ascetic strictness of life usually confers in excess — presented every title to such confidence. And when he was found not only the most trustworthy, but the most frank and fearless, of councillors, Dionysius gladly yielded both to the measures which he advised and to the impulses which he inspired.

Such was the political atmosphere of Syracuse during the period immediately succeeding the new accession, while the splendid obsequies in honor of the departed Dionysius were being solemnized; coupled with a funeral pile so elaborate as to confer celebrity on Timæus the constructor — and commemorated by ar-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 7. 'Ο μὲν οὖν Διονύσιος ὑπερφύως τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ἐθαύμασε καὶ τὴν προθυμίαν ἠγάπησεν

<sup>2</sup> Dionysius II. was engaged at war at the time when Plato first visited him at Syracuse, within the year immediately after his accession (Plato Epistol. iii. p. 317 A). We may reasonably presume that this was the war with Carthage.

Compare Diodorus (xvi. 5), who mentions that the younger Dionysius also carried on war for some little time, in a languid manner, against the Lucanians; and that he founded two cities on the coast of Apulia in the Adriatic. I think it probable that these two last-mentioned foundations were acts of Dionysius I., not of Dionysius II. They were not likely to be undertaken by a young prince of backward disposition, at his first accession.



chitectural monuments, too grand to be permanent,<sup>1</sup> immediately outside of Ortygia, near the Rega. Gates leading to that citadel. Among the popular measures, natural at the commencement of a new reign, the historian Philistus was recalled from exile.<sup>2</sup> He had been one of the oldest and most attached partisans of the elder Dionysius; by whom, however, he had at last been banished, and never afterwards forgiven. His recall now seemed to promise a new and valuable assistant to the younger, whom it also presented as softening the rigorous proceedings of his father. In this respect, it would harmonize with the views of Dion, though Philistus afterwards became his great opponent.

Dion was now both the prime minister, and the confidential monitor, of the young Dionysius. He upheld the march of the government with undiminished energy, and was of greater political importance than Dionysius himself. But success in this

<sup>1</sup> Tacitus, *Histor.* ii. 49. "Othoni sepulcrum exstructum est, modicum, et mansurum."

A person named Timæus was immortalized as the constructor of the funeral pile: see Athenæus, v. p. 206. Both Gölter (*Timæi Fragm.* 95) and M. Didot (*Timæi Fr.* 126) have referred this passage to Timæus the historian, and have supposed it to relate to the description given by Timæus of the funeral-pile. But the passage in Athenæus seems to me to indicate Timæus as the builder, not the describer, of this famous *πυρά*.

It is he who is meant, probably, in the passage of Cicero (*De Natura Deor.* iii. 35)—(Dionysius) "in suo lectulo mortuus in *Tympanidis rogam* illatus est, eamque potestatem quam ipse per scelus erat nactus, quasi justam et legitimam hereditatis loco filio tradidit." This seems at least the best way of explaining a passage which perplexes the editors: see the note of Davis.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch (*De Exilio.* p. 637) and Cornelius Nepos (*Dion.* c. 3) represent that Philistus was recalled at the persuasion of the enemies of Dion, as a counterpoise and corrective to the ascendancy of the latter over Dionysius the younger. Though Philistus afterwards actually performed this part, I doubt whether such was the motive which caused him to be recalled. He seems to have come back before the obsequies of Dionysius the elder; that is, very early after the commencement of the new reign. Philistus had described, in his history, these obsequies in a manner so elaborate and copious, that this passage in his work excited the special notice of the ancient critics (see *Philisti Fragment.* 42, ed. Didot; Plutarch, *Pelopidas*, c. 34). I venture to think that this proves him to have been present at the obsequies; which would of course be very impressive to him, since they were among the first things which he saw after his long exile.

subject was not the end for which Dion labored. He neither wished to serve a despot, nor to become a despot himself. The moment was favorable for resuming that project which he had formerly imbibed from Plato, and which, in spite of contemptuous disparagement by his former master, had ever since clung to him as the dream of his heart and life. To make Syracuse a free city, under a government, not of will, but of good laws, with himself as lawgiver in substance, if not in name—to enfranchise and re-plant the semi-barbarised Hellenic cities in Sicily—and to expel the Carthaginians—were schemes to which he now again devoted himself with unabated enthusiasm. But he did not look to any other means of achieving them than the consent and initiative of Dionysius himself. The man who had been sanguine enough to think of working upon the iron soul of the father, was not likely to despair of shaping anew the more malleable metal of which the son was composed. Accordingly, while lending to Dionysius his best service as minister, he also took up the Platonic profession, and tried to persuade him to reform both himself and his government. He endeavored to awaken in him a relish for a better and nobler private conduct than that which prevailed among the luxurious companions around him. He dwelt with enthusiasm on the scientific and soul-stirring conversation of Plato; specimens<sup>1</sup> of which he either read aloud or repeated, exalting the hearer not only to a higher intellectual range, but also to the full majesty of mind requisite for ruling others with honor and improvement. He pointed out the unrivalled glory which Dionysius would acquire in the eyes of Greece, by consenting to employ his vast power, not as a despot working on the fears of subjects, but as a king enforcing temperance and justice, by his own paternal example as well as by good laws. He tried to show that Dionysius, after having liberated Syracuse, and enrolled himself as a king limited and responsible amidst grateful citizens, would have far more real force against the barbarians than at present.<sup>2</sup>

Such were the new convictions which Dion tried to work into the mind of the young Dionysius, as a living faith and sentiment.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, *Dion.* c. 11. Ταῦτα πολλάκις τοῦ Δίωνος παραινούντος, καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν Πλάτωνος ἐστὶν οὐσιν ὑποσπείροντος, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, *Dion.* c. 10, 11, Plato, *Epist.* vii. p. 327 C.



Penetrated as he was with the Platonic idea — that nothing could be done for the improvement and happiness of mankind,<sup>1</sup> until philosophy and ruling power came together in the same hands; but everything, if the two did so come together — he thought that he saw before him a chance of realizing the conjunction, in the case of the greatest among all Hellenic potentates. He already beheld in fancy his native country and fellow citizens liberated, moralized, ennobled, and conducted to happiness, without murder or persecution,<sup>2</sup> simply by the well-meaning and instructed employment of power already organized. If accident had thrown the despotism into the hands of Dion himself, at this period of his life, the Grecian world would probably have seen an experiment tried, as memorable and generous as any event recorded in its history: what would have been its result, we cannot say. But it was enough to fire his inmost soul, to see himself separated from the experiment only by the necessity of persuading an impressible young man over whom he had much influence; and for himself he was quite satisfied with the humbler position of nominal minister, but real originator and chief, in so noble an enterprise.<sup>3</sup> His persuasive powers, strengthened as they were by intense earnestness as well as by his imposing station and practical capacity, actually wrought a great effect upon Dionysius. The young man appeared animated with a strong desire of self-improvement, and of qualifying himself for such a use of the powers of government as Dion depicted. He gave proof of the sincerity of his feeling by expressing eagerness to see and converse with Plato, to whom he sent several personal messages, warmly requesting him to visit Syracuse.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Epist. vii. p. 328 A. p. 335 E.; Plato, Republic. vi. p. 499 C. D

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Epist. vii. p. 327 E. .... "Ὁ δὲ καὶ νῦν εἰ διαπράξαιτο ἐν Διονυσίῳ ὡς ἐπεχειρήσε, μεγάλας ἐλπίδας εἶχεν, ἄνευ σφαγῶν καὶ θανάτων καὶ τῶν νῦν γεγονότων κακῶν, βίον ἂν εὐδαίμονα καὶ ἀληθινὸν ἐν πάσῃ τῇ χώρᾳ κατασκευάσαι.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 333 B. Ταῦτόν πρὸς Δίωνα Συρακόσιοι τότε ἔπαθον, ὅπερ καὶ Διονύσιος, ὅτε αὐτὸν ἐπεχείρει παιδεύσας καὶ θρέψας βασιλέα τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄξιον, οὕτω κοινωνεῖν αὐτῷ τοῦ βίου παντός.

<sup>4</sup> Plato, Epist. vii. p. 327 E.; Plutarch, Dion, c. 11. ἔσχεν ἔρωσιν τὸν Διονύσιον ὅς τις καὶ περιμανῆς τῶν τε λόγων καὶ τῆς συνουσίας τοῦ Πλάτωνος. Εὐθύς οὖν Ἀθήναζε πολλὰ μὲν ἐφοῖτα γράμματα παρὰ τοῦ Διονυσίου, πολλὰ δὲ ἐπισκήψεις τοῦ Δίωτος, ἄλλαι δ' ἐξ Ἰταλίας παρὰ τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν, etc.

This was precisely the first step which Dion had been laboring to bring about. He well knew, and had personally felt, the wonderful magic of Plato's conversation when addressed to young men. To bring Plato to Syracuse, and to pour his eloquent language into the predisposed ears of Dionysius, appeared like realizing the conjunction of philosophy and power. Accordingly he sent to Athens, along with the invitation from Dionysius, the most pressing and emphatic entreaties from himself. He represented the immense prize to be won — nothing less than the means of directing the action of an organized power, extending over all the Greeks of Italy and Sicily — provided only the mind of Dionysius could be thoroughly gained over. This (he said) was already half done; not only Dionysius himself, but also his youthful half brothers of the other line, had been impressed with earnest mental aspirations, and longed to drink at the pure fountain of true philosophy. Everything presaged complete success, such as would render them hearty and active proselytes, if Plato would only come forthwith — before hostile influences could have time to corrupt them — and devote to the task his unrivalled art of penetrating the youthful mind. These hostile influences were indeed at work, and with great activity; if victorious, they would not only defeat the project of Dion, but might even provoke his expulsion, or threaten his life. Could Plato, by declining the invitation, leave his devoted champion and apostle to fight so great a battle, alone and unassisted? What could Plato say for himself afterwards, if by declining to come, he not only let slip the greatest prospective victory which had ever been opened to philosophy, but also permitted the corruption of Dionysius and the ruin of Dion?<sup>1</sup>

Such appeals, in themselves emphatic and touching, reached Athens reinforced by solicitations, hardly less strenuous, from Archytas of Tarentum and the other Pythagorean philosophers in the south of Italy; to whose personal well-being, over and above the interests of philosophy, the character of the future Syracusan government was of capital importance. Plato was deeply agitated and embarrassed. He was now sixty-one years of age. He enjoyed preeminent estimation, in the grove of Aka-

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Epist. vii. p. 328.



démus near Athens, amidst admiring hearers from all parts of Greece. The Athenian democracy, if it accorded to him no influence on public affairs, neither molested him nor dimmed his intellectual glory. The proposed voyage to Syracuse carried him out of his enviable position into a new field of hazard and speculation; brilliant indeed and flattering, beyond anything which had ever been approached by philosophy, if it succeeded; but fraught with disgrace, and even with danger to all concerned, if it failed. Plato had already seen the elder Dionysius surrounded by his walls and mercenaries in Ortygia, and had learnt by cruel experience the painful consequences of propounding philosophy to an intractable hearer, whose displeasure passed so readily into act. The sight of contemporary despots nearer home, such as Euphron of Sikyon and Alexander of Pheræ, was by no means reassuring; nor could he reasonably stake his person and reputation on the chance, that the younger Dionysius might prove a glorious exception to the general rule. To outweigh such scruples, he had indeed the positive and respectful invitation of Dionysius himself; which however would have passed for a transitory, though vehement caprice on the part of a young prince, had it not been backed by the strong assurances of a mature man and valued friend like Dion. To these assurances, and to the shame which would be incurred by leaving Dion to fight the battle and incur the danger alone, Plato sacrificed his own grounds for hesitation. He went to Syracuse, less with the hope of succeeding in the intended conversion of Dionysius, than from the fear of hearing both himself and his philosophy taunted with confessed impotence — as fit only for the discussions of the school, shrinking from all application to practice, betraying the interest of his Pythagorean friends, and basely deserting that devoted champion who had half opened the door to him for triumphant admission.<sup>1</sup>

Such is the account which the philosopher gives of his own

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 328. Ταῦτα μὲν τῇ διανοίᾳ καὶ τόλμῃ ἀπὸ τοῦ οἴκουθεν, οὐχ ὅτι τινὲς ἐδόξαζον, ἀλλ' αἰσχυρόμενος μὲν ἑμαυτὸν τὸν τὸ μέγιστον, μὴ δοῦναι ποτε ἑμαυτῷ παντάπασιν λόγον μόνον ἀτεχνῶς εἶναι τις, ἔργον δὲ οὐδενὸς ἂν ποτε ἐκὼν ἀνθίστασθαι, κινδυνεύσειν δὲ προδοῦναι πρῶτον μὲν τὴν Δίωνα ξενίαν ἐν κινδύνοις ὄντως γεγονότος οὐ μικροῦς· εἴτ' οὖν πάντοι τι, εἴτ' ἐκπεσὼν ὑπὸ Διονυσίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐχθρῶν ἔλθοι παρ' ἡμᾶς φεύγων, καὶ ἀνέροιτο, εἰπὼν, etc.

state of mind in going to Syracuse. At the same time, he intimates that his motives were differently interpreted by others.<sup>1</sup> And as the account which we possess was written fifteen years after the event — when Dion had perished, when the Syracusan enterprise had realized nothing like what was expected, and when Plato looked back upon it with the utmost grief and aversion,<sup>2</sup> which must have poisoned the last three or four years of his life — we may fairly suspect that he partially transfers back to 367 B. C. the feelings of 352 B. C.; and that at the earlier period, he went to Syracuse not merely because he was ashamed to decline, but because he really flattered himself with some hopes of success.

However desponding he may have been before, he could hardly fail to conceive hopes from the warmth of his first reception. One of the royal carriages met him at his landing, and conveyed him to his lodging. Dionysius offered a sacrifice of thanksgiving to the gods for his safe arrival. The banquets at the acropolis became distinguished for their plainness and sobriety. Never had Dionysius been seen so gentle in answering suitors or transacting public business. He began immediately to take lessons in geometry from Plato. Every one around him, of course, was suddenly smitten with a taste for geometry;<sup>3</sup> so that the floors were all spread with sand, and nothing was to be seen except triangles and other figures inscribed upon it, with expositors and a listening crowd around them. To those who had been inmates of the acropolis, under the reign of the former despot, this change was surprising enough. But their surprise was converted into alarm, when, at a periodical sacrifice just then offered, Dionysius himself arrested the herald in pronouncing the customary prayer to the gods — “That the despotism might long remain unshaken.” “Stop! (said Dionysius to the herald) imprecate no such curse upon us!”<sup>4</sup> To the ears of Philistus, and the old politicians,

<sup>1</sup> This is contained in the words οὐχ ὅτι τινὲς ἐδόξαζον — before cited.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 350 E. ταῦτα εἶπον μεμνηκῶς τὴν περὶ Σκελίας πλάνην καὶ ἀτυχίαν, etc.

Xenokrates seems to have accompanied Plato to Sicily (Diogen Laert. iv. 2, 1).

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, De Adulator. et Amici Discrimine, p. 52 C.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 13. Οὐ πάσῃ καταρώμενος ἡμῖν.



these words portended nothing less than revolution to the dynasty, and ruin to Syracusan power. A single Athenian sophist (they exclaimed), with no other force than his tongue and his reputation, had achieved the conquest of Syracuse; an attempt in which thousands of his countrymen had miserably perished half a century before.<sup>1</sup> Ineffably were they disgusted to see Dionysius abdicate in favor of Plato, and exchange the care of his vast force and dominion for geometrical problems and discussions on the *summum bonum*.<sup>1</sup>

For a moment Plato seemed to be despot of Syracuse; so that the noble objects for which Dion had labored were apparently within his reach, either wholly or in part. And as far as we can judge, they really were to a great degree within his reach — had this situation, so interesting and so fraught with consequences to the people of Sicily, been properly turned to account. With all reverence for the greatest philosopher of antiquity, we are forced to confess that upon his own showing, he not only failed to turn the situation to account, but contributed even to spoil it by an unseasonable rigor. To admire philosophy in its distinguished teachers, is one thing; to learn and appropriate it, is another stage, rarer and more difficult, requiring assiduous labor, and no common endowments; while that which Plato calls "the philosophical life," or practical predominance of a well-trained intellect and well-chosen ethical purposes, combined with the minimum of

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 14. "Ἐνιοὶ δὲ προσποιούντο δυσχεραίνειν, εἰ πρότερον μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ναυτικαῖς καὶ πεζικαῖς δυνάμεσι δεῦρο πλεονάντες ἀπώλοντο καὶ διεφθάρσαν πρότερον ἢ λαβεῖν Συρακούσας, νυνὶ δὲ οὐ ἐνδὲς σοφιστοῦ καταλύουσι τὴν Διονυσίου τυραννίδα, etc.

Plato is here described as a *Sophist*, in the language of those who did not like him. Plato, the great authority who is always quoted in disparagement of the persons called *Sophists*, is as much entitled to the name as they, and is called so equally by unfriendly commentators. I drew particular attention to this fact in my sixty-eighth chapter (Vol. VIII.), where I endeavored to show that there was no school, sect, or body of persons distinguished by uniformity of doctrine or practice, properly called *Sophists*, and that the name was common to all literary men or teachers, when spoken of in an unfriendly spirit.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 330 B. "Ἐγὼ δὲ πάντα ὑπέμενον, τὴν πρώτῃ μάνοιαν φυλάττων ἥπερ ὑφικόμεν, εἰπὼς εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν ἔλθοι τῆς φιλοσοφίας (Dionysius) — ὃ δ' ἐνίκησεν ἀντιτείνων.

personal appetite — is a third stage, higher and rarer still. Now Dionysius had reached the first stage only. He had contracted a warm and profound admiration for Plato. He had imbibed this feeling from the exhortations of Dion; and we shall see by his subsequent conduct that it was really a feeling both sincere and durable. But he admired Plato without having either inclination or talent to ascend higher, and to acquire what Plato called philosophy. Now it was an unexpected good fortune, and highly creditable to the persevering enthusiasm of Dion, that Dionysius should have been wound up so far as to admire Plato, to invoke his presence, and to instal him as a sort of spiritual power by the side of the temporal. Thus much was more than could have been expected; but to demand more, and to insist that Dionysius should go to school and work through a course of mental regeneration — was a purpose hardly possible to attain, and positively mischievous if it failed. Unfortunately, it was exactly this error which Plato, and Dion in deference to Plato, seem to have committed. Instead of taking advantage of the existing ardor of Dionysius to instigate him at once into active political measures beneficial to the people of Syracuse and Sicily, with the full force of an authority which, at that moment, would have been irresistible — instead of heartening him up against groundless fears or difficulties of execution, and seeing that full honor was done to him for all the good which he really accomplished, meditated, or adopted — Plato postponed all these as matters for which his royal pupil was not yet ripe. He and Dion began to deal with Dionysius as a confessor treats his penitent; to probe the interior man<sup>1</sup> — to expose him to his own unworthiness — to show that

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 332 E. "Ἄ δὲ καὶ Διονυσίῳ συνεβουλευόμεν ἐγὼ καὶ Δίων, ἐπειδὴ τὰ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτῷ ξυνεβεβήκει, οὕτως ἀνομιλήτῳ μὲν παιδείας, ἀνομιλήτῳ δὲ συνουσιῶν τῶν προσηκουσῶν γεγονέναι, πρῶτον ἐπὶ ταῦτα ὁρμήσαντα φίλους ἄλλους αὐτῷ τῶν οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ ἡλικιωτῶν καὶ συμφώνους πρὸς ἀρετὴν κτήσασθαι, μάλιστα δὲ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ, τοῦτου γὰρ αὐτὸν θαυμαστῶς ἐνδεῆ γεγονέναι. λέγοντες οὐκ ἐναργῶς οὕτως — οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἀσφαλὲς — ὥς οὕτω μὲν πᾶς ἀνὴρ αὐτόν τε καὶ ἐκείνους ὧν ἂν ἡγεμὼν γένηται σώσει, καὶ ταύτῃ δὲ τραπόμενος τάναντια πάντα ἀποτελεῖ. πορευθεὶς δὲ ὡς λέγομεν, καὶ ἐαυτὸν ἐμφρονα καὶ σώφρονα ποιησάμενος, εἰ τὰς ἐξηρηνωμένας Σικελίας πόλεις κατοικήσει νόμοις τε ξυνδήσειε καὶ πολιτείας, etc.

Compare also p. 331 F.



his life, his training, his companions, had all been vicious — to insist upon repentance and amendment upon these points, before he could receive absolution, and be permitted to enter upon active political life — to tell him that he must reform himself, and become a rational and temperate man, before he was fit to enter seriously on the task of governing others.

Such was the language which Plato and Dion held to Dionysius. They well knew indeed that they were treading on delicate ground — that while irritating a spirited horse in the sensitive part, they had no security against his kicks.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, they resorted to many circumlocutory and equivocal expressions, so as to soften the offence given. But the effect was not the less produced, of disgusting Dionysius with his velleities towards political good. Not only did Plato decline entering upon political recommendations or his own, but he damped, instead of enforcing, the positive good resolutions which Dion had already succeeded in infusing. Dionysius announced freely, in the presence of Plato, his wish and intention to transform his despotism at Syracuse into a limited kingship, and to replant the dis-hellenized cities in Sicily. These were the two grand points to which Dion had been laboring so generously to bring him, and which he had invoked Plato for the express purpose of seconding. Yet what does Plato say when this momentous announcement is made? Instead of bestowing any praise or encouragement, he drily remarks to Dionysius, — “First go through your schooling, and then do all these things; otherwise leave them undone.”<sup>2</sup> Dionysius after-

<sup>1</sup> Horat. Satir. ii. 1, 17.

“Haud mihi deero  
Cum res ipsa feret. Nisi dextro tempore, Flacci  
Verba per attentam non ibunt Cæsaris aurem.  
Cui male si palpere, recalcitrat undique tutus.”

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Epist. iii. 315 E. Φάσι δὲ οὐκ ὀλίγοι λέγειν σε πρὸς τινὰς τῶν παρὰ σε πρεσβυόντων, ὡς ἄρα σοῦ ποτὲ λεγοντος ἀκουσας ἐγὼ μέλλοντος τὰς τε Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἰκίζειν, καὶ Συρακουσίους ἐπικυβερτῆσαι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀντὶ τυραννίδος εἰς βασιλείαν μεταστήσαντα, ταυτ' ἄρα σὲ μέν τότε, ὡς σὺ φης, διεκώλυσα—νυν δὲ Δίωνα διδασκοίμην δρᾶν αὐτὰ, καὶ τοῖς διανοήμασι τοῖς σοῖς τὴν σὴν ἀρχὴν ἀφαιρούμενά σε....

Ibid. p. 319 B. εἶπες δὲ καὶ μὲν ἀπλᾶς γελῶν, εἰ μέν τι, ὡς Πλάτων.

wards complained, and with good show of reason (when Dion was in exile, menacing attack upon Syracuse, under the favorable sympathies of Plato), that the great philosopher had actually deterred him (Dionysius) from executing the same capital improvements which he was now encouraging Dion to accomplish by an armed invasion. Plato was keenly sensitive to this reproach afterwards; but even his own exculpation proves it to have been in the main not undeserved.

Plutarch observes that Plato felt a proud consciousness of philosophical dignity in disdaining respect to persons, and in refusing to the defects of Dionysius any greater measure of indulgence than he would have shown to an ordinary pupil of the Academy.<sup>1</sup> If we allow him credit for a sentiment in itself honorable, it can only be at the expense of his fitness for dealing with practical life; by admitting (to quote a remarkable phrase from one of his own dialogues) that “he tried to deal with individual men without knowing those rules of art or practice which bear on human affairs.”<sup>2</sup> Dionysius was not a common pupil, nor could Plato reasonably expect the like unmeasured docility from one for whose ear so many hostile influences were competing. Nor were Plato and Dionysius the only parties concerned. There was, besides, in the first place, Dion, whose whole position was at stake — next, and of yet greater moment, the relief of the people of Syracuse and Sicily. For them, and on their behalf, Dion had been laboring with such zeal, that he had inspired

ἀνθρώπωντα με ἐκέλευες ποιεῖν πάντα ταῦτα, ἢ μὴ ποιεῖν. Ἐφην ἐγὼ Κάλλιστα μνημονεῦσαί σε

Cornelius Nepos (Dion, c. 3) gives to Plato the credit, which belongs altogether to Dion, of having inspired Dionysius with these ideas.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, De Adulator. et Amici Discrimine, p. 52 E. We may set against this, however, a passage in one of the other treatises of Plutarch (Philosophand. cum Principibus, p. 779 *ad finem*), in which he observes, that Plato, coming to Sicily with the hope of converting his political doctrines into laws through the agency of Dionysius, found the latter already corrupted by power, unsusceptible of cure, and deaf to admonition.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Phædon, c. 88. p. 89 D. Οὐκοῦν αἰσχρόν; καὶ δῆλον, ὅτι ἀνετέχνης τῆς περὶ τὰνθρώπειά οὗτοι τοιοῦτοι χρῆσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις;

He is expounding the causes and growth of misanthropic dispositions one of the most striking passages in his dialogues.



Dionysius with readiness to execute the two best resolves which the situation admitted; resolves not only pregnant with benefit to the people, but also insuring the position of Dion — since if Dionysius had once entered upon this course of policy, Dion would have been essential to him as an auxiliary and man of execution.

It is by no means certain, indeed, that such schemes could have been successfully realized, even with full sincerity on the part of Dionysius, and the energy of Dion besides. With all governments, to do evil is easy — to effect beneficial change, difficult; and with a Grecian despot, this was true in a peculiar manner. Those great mercenary forces and other instruments, which had been strong as adamant for the oppressive rule of the elder Dionysius would have been found hardly manageable, perhaps even obstructive, if his son had tried to employ them for more liberal purposes. But still the experiment would have been tried, with a fair chance of success — if only Plato, during his short-lived spiritual authority at Syracuse, had measured more accurately the practical influence which a philosopher might reasonably hope to exercise over Dionysius. I make these remarks upon him with sincere regret; but I am much mistaken if he did not afterwards hear them in more poignant language from the banished Dion, upon whom the consequences of the mistake mainly fell.

Speedily did the atmosphere at Syracuse become overclouded. The conservative party — friends of the old despotism, with the veteran Philistus at their head — played their game far better than that of the reformers was played by Plato, or by Dion since the arrival of Plato. Philistus saw that Dion, as the man of strong patriotic impulses and of energetic execution, was the real enemy to be aimed at. He left no effort untried to calumniate Dion, and to set Dionysius against him. Whispers and misrepresentations from a thousand different quarters beset the ear of Dionysius, alarming him with the idea that Dion was usurping to himself the real authority in Syracuse, with the view of ultimately handing it over to the children of Aristomachê, and of reigning in their name. Plato had been brought thither (it was said) as an agent in the conspiracy, for the purpose of winning over Dionysius into idle speculations, enervating his active vigor, and ultimately setting him aside: in order that all serious political agen-

cy might fall into the hands of Dion.<sup>1</sup> These hostile intrigues were no secret to Plato himself, who, even shortly after his arrival, began to see evidence of their poisonous activity. He tried sincerely to counterwork them;<sup>2</sup> but unfortunately the language which he himself addressed to Dionysius was exactly such as to give them the best chance of success. When Dionysius recounted to Philistus or other courtiers, how Plato and Dion had humiliated him in his own eyes, and told him that he was unworthy to govern until he had undergone a thorough purification — he would be exhorted to resent it as presumption and insult; and would be assured that it could only arise from a design to dispossess him of his authority, in favor of Dion, or perhaps of the children of Aristomachê with Dion as regent.

It must not be forgotten that there was a real foundation for jealousy on the part of Dionysius towards Dion; who was not merely superior to him in age, in dignity, and in ability, but also personally haughty in his bearing, and rigid in his habits, while Dionysius relished conviviality and enjoyments. At first, this jealousy was prevented from breaking out — partly by the consciousness of Dionysius that he needed some one to lean upon — partly by what seems to have been great self-command on the part of Dion, and great care to carry with him the real mind and good will of Dionysius. Even from the beginning, the enemies of Dion were doubtless not sparing in their calumnies, to alienate Dionysius from him; and the wonder only is, how, in spite of such intrigues and in spite of the natural causes of jealousy, Dion could have implanted his political aspirations, and maintained his friendly influence over Dionysius until the arrival of Plato. After that event, the natural causes of antipathy tended to manifest themselves more and more powerfully, while the counteracting circumstances all disappeared.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 14; Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 333 C. Ὁ δὲ (Dionysius) τοῖς διαβάλλουσι (ἐπίστευε) καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς ἐπιβουλεύων τῇ τυραννίδι Δίῳ τράττοι πάντα ὅσα ἐπαρτεν ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ, ἵνα ὁ μὲν (Dionysius) ταιδείᾳ δὴ τὰν νοῦν κληθεὶς ἀμελοῖ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπιτρέψας ἐκείνῳ ὁ δὲ (Dion) σφετερίζαιτο, καὶ Διονύσιον ἐκβάλοι ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς δόλῳ.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 329 C. ἐλθὼν δὲ, οὐ γὰρ δεῖ μηκύνειν, εὖρος στάσεις τὰ περὶ Διονύσιον μεστὰ ζήμπαντα καὶ διαβολὰν πρὸς τὴν τυραννίδα Δίῳ περὶ ἡμῶν μὲν οὐ κατ' ὅσον ἡδυνάμην, σμικρὰ δ' οἷός τε ἡ, etc.



Three important months thus passed away, during which those precious public inclinations, which Plato found instilled by Dion into the bosom of Dionysius, and which he might have fanned into life and action—to liberalize the government of Syracuse, and to restore the other free Grecian cities—disappeared never to return. In place of them, Dionysius imbibed an antipathy, more and more rancorous, against the friend and relative with whom these sentiments had originated. The charges against Dion, of conspiracy and dangerous designs, circulated by Philistus and his cabal, became more audacious than ever. At length in the fourth month, Dionysius resolved to get rid of him.

The proceedings of Dion being watched, a letter was detected which he had written to the Carthaginian commanders in Sicily (with whom the war still subsisted, though seemingly not in great activity), inviting them, if they sent any proposition for peace to Syracuse, to send it through him, as he would take care that it should be properly discussed. I have already stated, that even in the reign of the elder Dionysius, Dion had been the person to whom the negotiations with Carthage were habitually intrusted. Such a letter from him, as far as we make out from the general description, implied nothing like a treasonable purpose. But Dionysius, after taking counsel with Philistus, resolved to make use of it as a final pretext. Inviting Dion into the acropolis, under color of seeking to heal their growing differences,—and beginning to enter into an amicable conversation,—he conducted him unsuspectingly down to the adjacent harbor, where lay moored, close in shore, a boat with the rowers aboard, ready for starting. Dionysius then produced the intercepted letter, handed it to Dion, and accused him to his face of treason. The latter protested against the imputation, and eagerly sought to reply. But Dionysius stopped him from proceeding, insisted on his going aboard the boat, and ordered the rowers to carry him off forthwith to Italy.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The story is found in Plutarch (Dion, c. 14), who refers to Timæus as his authority. It is confirmed in the main by Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 329 D *μηνὶ δὲ σχεδὸν ἰσως τετάρτῳ Δίωνα Διονύσιος, αἰτιώμενος ἐπιβουλεύειν τῇ τυραννίδι, σμικρὸν εἰς πλοῖον ἐμβιβάσας, ἐξέβαλεν ἀτίμως.*

Diodorus (xvi. 6) states that Dionysius sought to put Dion to death, and that he only escaped by flight. But the version of Plato and Plutarch is to be preferred.

This abrupt and ignominious expulsion, of so great a person as Dion, caused as much consternation among his numerous friends, as triumph to Philistus and the partisans of the despotism. All consummation of the liberal projects conceived by Dion was now out of the question; not less from the incompetency of Dionysius to execute them alone, than from his indisposition to any such attempt. Aristomachê the sister, and Aretê the wife, of Dion (the latter half-sister of Dionysius himself), gave vent to their sorrow and indignation; while the political associates of Dion, and Plato beyond all others, trembled for their own personal safety. Among the mercenary soldiers, the name of Plato was particularly odious. Many persons instigated Dionysius to kill him, and rumors even gained footing that he had been killed, as the author of the whole confusion.<sup>1</sup> But the despot, having sent away the person whom he most hated and feared, was not disposed to do harm to any one else. While he calmed the anxieties of Aretê by affirming that the departure of her husband was not to be regarded as an exile, but only as a temporary separation, to allow time for abating the animosity which prevailed—he at the same time ordered two triremes to be fitted out, for sending to Dion his slaves and valuable property, and everything necessary to personal dignity as well as to his comfort. Towards Plato—who was naturally agitated in the extreme, thinking only of the readiest means to escape from so dangerous a situation—his manifestations were yet more remarkable. He soothed the philosopher's apprehensions—entreated him to remain, in a manner gentle indeed but admitting no denial—and conveyed him at once into his own residence the acropolis, under color of doing him honor. From hence there was no possibility of escaping, and Plato remained there for some time. Dionysius treated him well, communicated with him freely and intimately, and proclaimed everywhere that they were on the best terms of friendship. What is yet more curious—he displayed the greatest anxiety to obtain the esteem and approbation of the sage, and to occupy a place in his mind higher than that

Justin (xxi. 1, 2) gives an account, different from all, of the reign and proceedings of the younger Dionysius. I cannot imagine what authority he followed. He does not even name Dion.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Epistol. iii. p. 315 F.; Epist. vii. p. 329 D.; p. 340 A. Plutarch Dion, c. 15.



accorded to Dion; shrinking nevertheless from philosophy, or the Platonic treatment and training, under the impression that there was a purpose to ensnare and paralyze him, under the auspices of Dion.<sup>1</sup> This is a strange account, given by Plato himself; but it reads like a real picture of a vain and weak prince, admiring the philosopher — coquetting with him, as it were — and anxious to captivate his approbation, so far as it could be done without submitting to the genuine Platonic discipline.

During this long and irksome detention, which probably made him fully sensible of the comparative comforts of Athenian liberty, Plato obtained from Dionysius one practical benefit. He prevailed upon him to establish friendly and hospitable relations with Archytas and the Tarentines, which to these latter was a real increase of security and convenience.<sup>2</sup> But in the point which he strove most earnestly to accomplish, he failed. Dionysius resisted all entreaties for the recall of Dion. Finding himself at length occupied with a war (whether the war with Carthage previously mentioned, or some other, we do not know), he consented to let Plato depart; agreeing to send for him again as soon as peace and leisure should return, and promising to recall Dion at the same time; upon which covenant, Plato, on his side, agreed to come back. After a certain interval, peace arrived, and Dionysius re-invited Plato; yet without recalling Dion — whom he required still to wait another year. But Plato, appealing to the terms of the covenant, refused to go without Dion. To himself personally, in spite of the celebrity which his known influence with Dionysius tended to confer, the voyage was nothing less than repugnant, for he had had sufficient experience of Syracuse and its despotism. Nor would he even listen to the request of Dion himself; who, partly in the view of promoting his own future restoration, earnestly exhorted him to go. Dionysius besieged Plato with solicitations to come,<sup>3</sup> promising that all which he might insist upon in favor of Dion should be granted, and putting in motion a second time Archytas and the Tarentines to prevail upon him. These men, through their companion and friend Archedemus, who came to Athens in a Syracusan trireme, assured Plato that Dionysius

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Epist. vii. p. 329, 330.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Epistol. iii. p. 317 B. C.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, Epist. vii. p. 338 C.

was now ardent in the study of philosophy, and had even made considerable progress in it. By their earnest entreaties, coupled with those of Dion, Plato was at length induced to go to Syracuse. He was received, as before, with signal tokens of honor. He was complimented with the privilege, enjoyed by no one else, of approaching the despot without having his person searched; and was affectionately welcomed by the female relatives of Dion. Yet this visit, prolonged much beyond what he himself wished, proved nothing but a second splendid captivity, as the companion of Dionysius in the acropolis at Ortygia.<sup>1</sup>

Dionysius the philosopher obtained abundance of flatterers — as his father Dionysius the poet had obtained before him — and was even emboldened to proclaim himself as the son of Apollo.<sup>2</sup> It is possible that even an impuissant embrace of philosophy, on the part of so great a potentate, may have tended to exalt the reputation of philosophers in the contemporary world. Otherwise the dabbings of Dionysius would have merited no attention; though he seems to have been really a man of some literary talent<sup>3</sup> — retaining to the end a sincere admiration of Plato, and jealously pettish because he could not prevail upon Plato to admire him. But the second visit of Plato to him at Syracuse — very different from his first — presented no chance of benefit to the people of Syracuse, and only deserves notice as it bore upon the destiny of Dion. Here, unfortunately Plato could accomplish nothing; though his zeal on behalf of his friend was unwearied. Dionysius broke all his promises of kind dealing, became more rancorous in his hatred, impatient of the respect which Dion enjoyed even as an exile, and fearful of the revenge which he might one day be able to exact.

When expelled from Syracuse, Dion had gone to Peloponnesus and Athens, where he had continued for some years to receive regular remittances of his property. But at length, even while

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Epist. vii. p. 338-346; Plutarch, Dion, c. 19. Æschines, the companion of Sokrates along with Plato, is said to have passed a long time at Syracuse with Dionysius, until the expulsion of that despot (Diogen. Laert. ii. 63).

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, De Fortunâ Alex. Magn. p. 338 B. Δωρίδος ἐκ μητρὸς Φοῖβου σκηνώμασι βλαστὼν.

See a passage in Plato, Epistol. ii. p. 314 E.



Plato was residing at Syracuse, Dionysius thought fit to withhold one half of the property, on pretence of reserving it for Dion's son. Presently he took steps yet more violent, threw off all disguise, sold the whole of Dion's property, and appropriated or distributed among his friends the large proceeds, not less than one hundred talents.<sup>1</sup> Plato, who had the mortification to hear this intelligence while in the palace of Dionysius, was full of grief and displeasure. He implored permission to depart. But though the mind of Dionysius had now been thoroughly set against him by the multiplied insinuations of the calumniators,<sup>2</sup> it was not without difficulty and tiresome solicitations that he obtained permission; chiefly through the vehement remonstrances of Archytas and his companions, who represented to the despot that they had brought him to Syracuse, and that they were responsible for his safe return. The mercenaries of Dionysius were indeed so ill-disposed to Plato, that considerable precautions were required to bring him away in safety.<sup>3</sup>

It was in the spring of 360 B. C. that the philosopher appeared to have returned to Peloponnesus from this, his second visit to the younger Dionysius, and third visit to Syracuse. At the Olympic festival of that year, he met Dion, to whom he recounted the recent proceedings of Dionysius.<sup>4</sup> Incensed at the seizure of the property, and hopeless of any permission to return, Dion was now meditating enforcement of his restoration at the point of the sword. But there occurred yet another insult on the part of Dionysius, which infused a more deadly exasperation into the quarrel. Aretê, wife of Dion and half-sister of Dionysius, had continued to reside at Syracuse ever since the exile of her husband. She formed a link between the two, the continuance of which Dionysius could no longer tolerate, in his present hatred towards Dion.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Epistol. iii. p. 318 A.; vii. p. 346, 347. Plutarch, Dion, c. 13, 16.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 15 — on the authority of Aristoxenus.

Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 350 A. B.

Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 350 C. The return of Plato and his first meeting with Dion is said to have excited considerable sensation among the spectators at the festival (Diogenes Laert. iii. 25).

The Olympic festival here alluded to, must be (I conceive) that of 360 B. C.: the same also in Epistol. ii. p. 310 D.

Accordingly he took upon him to pronounce her divorced, and to remarry her, in spite of her own decided repugnance, with one of his friends named Timokrates.<sup>1</sup> To this he added another cruel injury, by intentionally corrupting and brutalizing Dion's eldest son, a youth just reaching puberty.

Outraged thus in all the tenderest points, Dion took up with passionate resolution the design of avenging himself on Dionysius, and of emancipating Syracuse from despotism into liberty. During the greater part of his exile he had resided at Athens, in the house of his friend Kallippus, enjoying the society of Speusippus and other philosophers of the Academy, and the teaching of Plato himself when returned from Syracuse. Well supplied with money, and strict as to his own personal wants, he was able largely to indulge his liberal spirit towards many persons, and among the rest towards Plato, whom he assisted towards the expense of a choric exhibition at Athens.<sup>2</sup> Dion also visited Sparta and various other cities; enjoying a high reputation, and doing himself credit everywhere; a fact not unknown to Dionysius, and aggravating his displeasure. Yet Dion was long not without hope that that displeasure would mitigate, so as to allow of his return to Syracuse on friendly terms. Nor did he cherish any purposes of hostility, until the last proceedings with respect to his property and his wife at once cut off all hope and awakened vindictive sentiments.<sup>3</sup> He began therefore to lay a train for attacking Dionysius and enfranchising Syracuse by arms, invoking the countenance of Plato; who gave his approbation, yet not without mournful reserves; saying that he was now seventy years of age — that though he admitted the just wrongs of Dion and the bad conduct of Dionysius, armed conflict was nevertheless repugnant to his feelings, and he could anticipate little good from it — that he

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 21; Cornel. Nepos, Dion, c. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 17; Athenaus, xi. p. 508. Plato appears also to have received, when at Athens, pecuniary assistance remitted by Dionysius from Syracuse, towards expenses of a similar kind, as well as towards furnishing a dowry for certain poor nieces. Dion and Dionysius had both aided him (Plato, Epistol. xiii. p. 361).

An author named Onêtor affirmed that Dionysius had given to Plato the prodigious sum of eighty talents, a story obviously exaggerated (Diogenes Laert. iii. 9).

<sup>3</sup> Plato, Epistol. vii. n. 350 F.



had labored long in vain to reconcile the two exasperated kinsmen, and could not now labor for any opposite end.<sup>1</sup>

But though Plato was lukewarm, his friends and pupils at the Academy cordially sympathized with Dion. Speusippus especially, the intimate friend and relative, having accompanied Plato to Syracuse, had communicated much with the population in the city, and gave encouraging reports of their readiness to aid Dion, even if he came with ever so small a force against Dionysius. Kallippus, with Eudemus (the friend of Aristotle), Timonides, and Miltas — all three members of the society at the Academy, and the last a prophet also — lent him aid and embarked in his enterprise. There were a numerous body of exiles from Syracuse, not less than one thousand altogether; with most of whom Dion opened communication, inviting their fellowship. He at the same time hired mercenary soldiers in small bands, keeping his measures as secret as he could.<sup>2</sup> Alkimenas, one of the leading Achæans in Peloponnesus, was warm in the cause (probably from sympathy with the Achæan colony Kroton, then under the dependence of Dionysius), conferring upon it additional dignity by his name and presence. A considerable quantity of spare arms, of every description, was got together, in order to supply new unarmed partisans on reaching Sicily. With all these aids Dion found himself in the island of Zakynthus, a little after Midsummer 357 B. C.; mustering eight hundred soldiers of tried experience and bravery, who had been directed to come thither silently and in small parties, without being informed whither they were going. A little squadron was prepared, of no more than five merchantmen, two of them vessels of thirty cars, with victuals adequate to the direct passage across the sea from Zakynthus to Syracuse; since the ordinary passage, across from Korkyra and

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Epistol.* vii. p. 350. This is the account which Plato gives after the death of Dion, when affairs had taken a disastrous turn, about the extent of his own interference in the enterprise. But Dionysius supposed him to have been more decided in his countenance of the expedition; and Plato's letter addressed to Dion himself, after the victory of the latter at Syracuse, seems to bear out that supposition.

Compare *Epistol.* iii. p. 315 E.; iv. p. 320 A.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, *Dion*, c. 22. Eudemus was afterwards slain in one of the combats at Syracuse (*Aristotle apud Ciceron. Tusc. Disp.* i. 27. 53).

along the Tarentine Gulf was impracticable, in the face of the maritime power of Dionysius.<sup>1</sup>

Such was the contemptible force with which Dion ventured to attack the greatest of all Grecian potentates in his own stronghold and island. Dionysius had now reigned as despot at Syracuse between ten and eleven years. Inferior as he personally was to his father, it does not seem that the Syracusan power had yet materially declined in his hands. We know little about the political facts of his reign; but the veteran Philistus, his chief adviser and officer, appears to have kept together the larger part of the great means bequeathed by the elder Dionysius. The disparity of force, therefore, between the assailant and the party assailed, was altogether extravagant. To Dion, personally, indeed, such disparity was a matter of indifference. To a man of his enthusiastic temperament, so great was the heroism and sublimity of the enterprise, — combining liberation of his country from a despot, with revenge for gross outrages to himself, — that he was satisfied if he could only land in Sicily with no matter how small a force, accounting it honor enough to perish in such a cause.<sup>2</sup> Such was the emphatic language of Dion, reported to us by Aristotle; who (being then among the pupils of Plato) may probably have heard it with his own ears. To impartial contemporary spectators, like Demosthenes, the attempt seemed hopeless.<sup>3</sup>

But the intelligent men of the Academy who accompanied Dion, would not have thrown their lives away in contemplation of a glorious martyrdom; nor were either they or he ignorant, that there existed circumstances, not striking the eye of the ordinary spectator, which materially weakened the great apparent security of Dionysius.

First, there was the pronounced and almost unanimous discontent of the people of Syracuse. Though prohibited from all public manifestations, they had been greatly agitated by the original project of Dion to grant liberty to the city — by the inclinations even of Dionysius himself towards the same end, so soon un-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, *Dion*, c. 23-25.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotel *Politic.* v. 8, 17.

<sup>3</sup> See *Orat. adv. Leptinem*, s. 179. p. 506: an oration delivered about two years afterwards; not long after the victory of Dion.

Compare *Diodor.* xvi. 2; Plutarch, *Timoleon*, c. 2.



happily extinguished — by the dissembling language of Dionysius, the great position of Dion's wife and sister, and the second coming of Plato, all of which favored the hope that Dion might be amicably recalled. At length such chance disappeared, when his property was confiscated and his wife re-married to another. But as his energetic character was well known, the Syracusans now both confidently expected, and ardently wished, that he would return by force, and help them to put down one who was alike his enemy and theirs. Speusippus, having accompanied Plato to Syracuse and mingled much with the people, brought back decisive testimonies of their disaffection towards Dionysius, and of their eager longing for relief by the hands of Dion. It would be sufficient (they said) if he even came alone; they would flock around him, and arm him at once with an adequate force.<sup>1</sup>

There were doubtless many other messages of similar tenor sent to Peloponnesus; and one Syracusan exile, Herakleides, was in himself a considerable force. Though a friend of Dion,<sup>2</sup> he had continued high in the service of Dionysius, until the second visit of Plato. At that time he was disgraced, and obliged to save his life by flight, on account of a mutiny among the mercenary troops, or rather of the veteran soldiers among them, whose pay Dionysius had cut down. The men so curtailed rose in arms, demanding continuance of the old pay; and when Dionysius shut the gates of the acropolis, refusing attention to their requisitions, they raised the furious barbaric paean or war shout, and rushed up to scale the walls.<sup>3</sup> Terrible were the voices of these Gauls, Iberians, and Campanians, in the ears of Plato, who knew himself to be the object of their hatred, and who happened to be then in the garden of the acropolis. But Dionysius, no less terrified than Plato, appeased the mutiny, by conceding all that was asked, and even more. The blame of this misadventure was thrown

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 22. Speusippus, from Athens, corresponded both with Dion and with Dionysius at Syracuse; at least there was a correspondence between them, read as genuine by Diogenes Laertius (iv. 1, 2, 5).

<sup>2</sup> Plato Epistol. iii. p. 318 C.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 348 B. Οἱ δ' ἐφέροντο εὐθὺς πρὸς τὰ τεῖχη, πειθὴν ἢ τινα ἀναβούσαντες βάρβαρον καὶ πολεμικόν· οὐ δὲ γεραιότης Διονυσίου γινόμενος, etc.

upon Herakleides, towards whom Dionysius conducted himself with mingled injustice and treachery — according to the judgment both of Plato and of all around him.<sup>1</sup> As an exile, he brought word that Dionysius could not even rely upon the mercenary troops, whom he treated with a parsimony the more revolting as they contrasted it with the munificence of his father.<sup>2</sup> Herakleides was eager to coöperate in putting down the despotism at Syracuse. But he waited to equip a squadron of triremes, and was not ready so soon as Dion; perhaps intentionally, as the jealousy between the two soon broke out.<sup>3</sup>

The second source of weakness to Dionysius lay in his own character and habits. The commanding energy of the father, far from being of service to the son, had been combined with a jealousy which intentionally kept him down, and cramped his growth. He had always been weak, petty, destitute of courage or foresight, and unfit for a position like that which his father had acquired and maintained. His personal incompetency was recognized by all, and would probably have manifested itself even more conspicuously, had he not found a minister of so much ability, and so much devotion to the dynasty, as Philistus. But in addition to such known incompetency, he had contracted recently habits which inspired every one around him with contempt. He was perpetually intoxicated and plunged in dissipation. To put down such a chief, even though surrounded by walls, soldiers, and armed ships, appeared to Dion and his confidential companions an enterprise noway impracticable.<sup>4</sup>

Nevertheless, these causes of weakness were known only to close observers; while the great military force of Syracuse was obvious to the eyes of every one. When the soldiers, mustered by Dion at Zakynthus, were first informed that they were destined to strike straight across the sea against Syracuse, they shrank from the proposition as an act of insanity. They complained of their

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Epistol. iii. p. 318; vii. p. 348, 349.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 348 A. .... ἐπεχείρησεν ὀλιγομισθοτέρους ποιεῖν παρὰ τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐσθ, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 32; Diodor. xvi. 6-16.

<sup>4</sup> Aristotel. Politic. v. 8, 14; Plutarch, Dion, c. 7. These habits must have probably grown upon him since the second departure of Plato, who does not notice them in his letters.



leaders for not having before told them what was projected; just as the Ten Thousand Greeks in the army of Cyrus, on reaching Tarsus, complained of Klearchus for having kept back the fact that they were marching against the Great King. It required all the eloquence of Dion, with his advanced age,<sup>1</sup> his dignified presence, and the quantity of gold and silver plate in his possession, to remove their apprehensions. How widely these apprehensions were felt, is shown by the circumstance, that out of one thousand Syracusan exiles, only twenty-five or thirty dared to join him.<sup>2</sup>

After a magnificent sacrifice to Apollo, and an ample banquet to the soldiers in the stadium at Zakynthus, Dion gave orders for embarkation in the ensuing morning. On that very night the moon was eclipsed. We have already seen what disastrous consequences turned upon the occurrence of this same phenomenon fifty-six years before, when Nikias was about to conduct the defeated Athenian fleet away from the harbor of Syracuse.<sup>3</sup> Under the existing apprehensions of Dion's band, the eclipse might well have induced them to renounce the enterprise; and so it probably would, under a general like Nikias. But Dion had learnt astrology; and what was of not less consequence, Miltas, the prophet of the expedition, besides his gift of prophecy, had received instruction in the Academy also. When the affrighted soldiers inquired what new resolution was to be adopted in consequence of so grave a sign from the gods, Miltas arose and assured them that they had mistaken the import of the sign, which promised them good fortune and victory. By the eclipse of the moon, the gods intimated that something very brilliant was about to be darkened over: now there was nothing in Greece so brilliant as the despotism of Dionysius at Syracuse; it was Dionysius who was about to suffer eclipse, to be brought on by the victory of Dion.<sup>4</sup> Reassured by such consoling words the soldiers got on board. They had good reason at first to believe that the favor of the gods waited upon them, for a gentle and steady Etesian breeze carried them across midsea without accident or suffering, in twelve days,

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 23. *ἀνὴρ παρηκμακῶς ἦδη*, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 22; Diodor. xvi. 10.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. vii. 50. See Volume VII of this History, Chap. lx. p. 314.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 24.

from Zakynthus to Cape Pachynus, the south-eastern corner of Sicily and nearest to Syracuse. The pilot Protus, who had steered the course so as exactly to hit the cape, urgently recommended immediate disembarkation, without going farther along the south-western coast of the island; since stormy weather was commencing, which might hinder the fleet from keeping near the shore. But Dion was afraid of landing so near to the main force of the enemy. Accordingly, the squadron proceeded onward, but were driven by a violent wind away from Sicily towards the coast of Africa, narrowly escaping shipwreck. It was not without considerable hardship and danger that they got back to Sicily, after five days; touching the island at Herakleia Minoa westward of Agrigentum, within the Carthaginian supremacy. The Carthaginian governor of Minoa, Synalus (perhaps a Greek in the service of Carthage), was a personal acquaintance of Dion, and received him with all possible kindness; though knowing nothing beforehand of his approach, and at first resisting his landing through ignorance.

Thus was Dion, after ten years of exile, once more on Sicilian ground. The favorable predictions of Miltas had been completely realized. But even that prophet could hardly have been prepared for the wonderful tidings now heard, which ensured the success of the expedition. Dionysius had recently sailed from Syracuse to Italy, with a fleet of eighty triremes.<sup>1</sup> What induced him to commit so capital a mistake, we cannot make out; for Philistus was already with a fleet in the Gulf of Tarentum, waiting to intercept Dion, and supposing that the invading squadron would naturally sail along the coast of Italy to Syracuse, according to the practice almost universal in that day.<sup>2</sup> Philistus did not commit the same mistake as Nikias had made in reference to Gylippus,<sup>3</sup> — that of despising Dion because of the smallness of his force. He watched in the usual waters, and was only disappointed because Dion, venturing on the bold and unusual straight course, was greatly favored by wind and weather. But while Philistus watched the coast of Italy, it was natural that Dionysius himself should keep guard with his main force at Syracuse. The

Plutarch, Dion, c. 26; Diodor. xvi. 10, 11.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 25.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. vi. 104.



despot was fully aware of the disaffection which reigned in the town, and of the hopes excited by Dion's project; which was generally well known, though no one could tell how or at what moment the deliverer might be expected. Suspicious now to a greater degree than ever, Dionysius had caused a fresh search to be made in the city for arms, and had taken away all that he could find.<sup>1</sup> We may be sure too that his regiment of habitual spies were more on the alert than ever, and that unusual rigor was the order of the day. Yet, at this critical juncture, he thought proper to quit Syracuse with a very large portion of his force, leaving the command to Timokrates, the husband of Dion's late wife; and at this same critical juncture Dion arrived at Minoa.

Nothing could exceed the joy of the Dionian soldiers on hearing of the departure of Dionysius, which left Syracuse open and easy of access. Eager to avail themselves of the favorable instant, they called upon their leader to march thither without delay, repudiating even that measure of rest which he recommended after the fatigues of the voyage. Accordingly, Dion, after a short refreshment provided by Synalus — with whom he deposited his spare arms, to be transmitted to him when required — set forward on his march towards Syracuse. On entering the Agrigentine territory, he was joined by two hundred horsemen near Eknomon.<sup>2</sup> Farther on, while passing through Gela and Kamarina, many inhabitants of these towns, together with some neighboring Sikans and Sikels, swelled his band. Lastly, when he approached the Syracusan border, a considerable proportion of the rural population came to him also, though without arms; making the reinforcements which joined him altogether about five thousand men.<sup>3</sup> Having armed these volunteers in the best manner he could, Dion continued his progress as far as Akraë, where he made a short evening halt. From thence, receiving good news from Syracuse, he recommenced his march during the latter half of the night, hastening forward to the passage over the river

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 26, 27; Diodor. xvi. 9.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, (Dion, c. 27) gives the numbers who joined him at about five thousand men, which is very credible. Diodorus gives the number exaggerated, at twenty thousand (xvi. 9).

Anapus; which he had the good fortune to occupy without any opposition, before daybreak.

Dion was now within no more than a mile and a quarter of the walls of Syracuse. The rising sun disclosed his army to the view of the Syracusan population, who were doubtless impatiently watching for him. He was seen offering sacrifice to the river Anapus, and putting up a solemn prayer to the god Helios, then just showing himself above the horizon. He wore the wreath habitual with those who were thus employed; while his soldiers, animated by the confident encouragement of the prophets, had taken wreaths also.<sup>1</sup> Elate and enthusiastic, they passed the Anapus (seemingly at the bridge which formed part of the Helorine way), advanced at a running pace across the low plain which divided the southern cliff of Epipolæ from the Great Harbor, and approached the gates of the quarter of Syracuse called Neapolis — the Temenitid Gates, near the chapel of Apollo Temenites.<sup>2</sup> Dion was at their head, in resplendent armor, with a body-guard near him composed of one hundred of his Peloponnesians. His brother Megaklês was on one side of him, his friend the Athenian Kallippus on the other; all three, and a large proportion of the soldiers also, still crowned with their sacri-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 27. These picturesque details about the march of Dion are the more worthy of notice, as Plutarch had before him the narrative of Timonides, a companion of Dion, and actually engaged in the expedition. Timonides wrote an account of what passed to Speusippus at Athens, doubtless for the information of Plato and their friends in the Academy (Plutarch, Dion, c. 31-35).

Diogenes Laertius mentions also a person named *Simonides* who wrote to Speusippus, τὰς ιστορίας ἐν αἷς κατατάχει τὰς πράξεις Διονύς τε καὶ Βίανος (iv. 1, 5). Probably *Simonides* may be a misnomer for *Timonides*.

Arrian, the author of the *Anabasis* of Alexander, had written narratives of the exploits both of Dion and Timoleon. Unfortunately these have not been preserved; indeed Photius himself seems never to have seen them (Photius, Codex, 92).

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 29. 'Επεὶ δ' εἰσῆλθεν ὁ Δίων κατὰ τὰς Μενιτίδας πύλας, etc.

Most of the best critics here concur in thinking, that the reading ought to be τὰς Τεμενιτίδας πύλας. The statue and sacred ground of Apollo Temenites was the most remarkable feature in this portion of Syracuse, and would naturally be selected to furnish a name for the gates. No meaning can be assigned for the phrase Μενιτίδας.



ficial wreaths, as if marching in a joyous festival procession, with victory already assured.<sup>1</sup>

As yet Dion had not met with the smallest resistance. Timokrates (left at Syracuse with the large mercenary force as vicegerent), while he sent an express to apprise Dionysius, kept his chief hold on the two military positions or horns of the city; the island of Ortygia at one extremity, and Epipolæ with Euryalus on the other. It has already been mentioned that Epipolæ was a triangle slope, with walls bordering both the northern and southern cliffs, and forming an angle on the western apex, where stood the strong fort of Euryalus. Between Ortygia and Epipolæ lay the populous quarters of Syracuse, wherein the great body of citizens resided. As the disaffection of the Syracusans was well known, Timokrates thought it unsafe to go out of the city, and meet Dion on the road, for fear of revolt within. But he perhaps might have occupied the important bridge over the Anapus, had not a report reached him that Dion was directing his attack first against Leontini. Many of the Campanian mercenaries under the command of Timokrates, having properties in Leontini, immediately quitted Epipolæ to go thither and defend them.<sup>2</sup> This rumor — false, and perhaps intentionally spread by the invaders — not only carried off much of the garrison elsewhere, but also misled Timokrates; insomuch that Dion was allowed to make his night march, to reach the Anapus, and to find it unoccupied.

It was too late for Timokrates to resist, when the rising sun had once exhibited the army of Dion crossing the Anapus. The effect produced upon the Syracusans in the populous quarters was electric. They rose like one man to welcome their deliverer, and to put down the dynasty which had hung about their necks for forty-eight years. Such of the mercenaries of Dionysius as were in these central portions of the city were forced to seek shelter in Epipolæ, while his police and spies were pursued and seized, to undergo the full terrors of a popular vengeance.<sup>3</sup> Far from being able to go forth against Dion, Timokrates could not

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 27, 28, 29. Diodorus (xvi. 10) also mentions the striking fact of the wreaths worn by this approaching army.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 27.

Plutarch, *De Curiositate*. D. 523 A.

even curb the internal insurrection. So thoroughly was he intimidated by the reports of his terrified police, and by the violent and unanimous burst of wrath among a people whom every Dionysian partisan had long been accustomed to treat as disarmed slaves — that he did not think himself safe even in Epipolæ. But he could not find means of getting to Ortygia, since the intermediate city was in the hands of his enemies, while Dion and his troops were crossing the low plain between Epipolæ and the Great Harbor. It only remained for him therefore to evacuate Syracuse altogether, and to escape from Epipolæ either by the northern or the western side. To justify his hasty flight, he spread the most terrific reports respecting the army of Dion, and thus contributed still farther to paralyze the discouraged partisans of Dionysius.<sup>1</sup>

Already had Dion reached the Temenitid gate, where the principal citizens, clothed in their best attire, and the multitude pouring forth loud and joyous acclamations, were assembled to meet him. Halting at the gate, he caused his trumpet to sound, and entreated silence; after which he formally proclaimed, that he and his brother Megakles were come for the purpose of putting down the Dionysian despotism, and of giving liberty both to the Syracusans and the other Sicilian Greeks. The acclamations redoubled as he and his soldiers entered the city, first through Neapolis, next by the ascent up to Achradina; the main street of which (broad, continuous, and straight, as was rare in a Grecian city<sup>2</sup>) was decorated as on a day of jubilee, with victims under sacrifice to the gods, tables, and bowls of wine ready prepared for festival. As Dion advanced at the head of his soldiers through a lane formed in the midst of this crowd, from each side wreaths were cast upon him as upon an Olympic victor, and grateful prayers addressed to him, as it were to a god.<sup>3</sup> Every house was a scene

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 28; Diodor. xvi. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero in Verr. iv. 53. "Altera autem est urbs Syracusis, cui nomen Achradina est: in qua forum maximum, pulcherrimæ porticus, ornatissimum prytaneum, amplissima est curia, templumque egregium Jovis Olympii; cæteræque urbis partes, una totâ viâ perpetuâ, multisque transversis, divisæ, privatis ædificiis continentur."

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 29; Diodor. xvi. 11. Compare the manifestations of the inhabitants of Skionê towards Brasidas (Thucyd. iv. 121).



of clamorous joy, in which men and women, freemen and slaves, took part alike; the outburst of feelings long compressed and relieved from the past despotism with its inquisitorial police and garrison.

It was not yet time for Dion to yield to these pleasing but passive impulses. Having infused courage into his soldiers as well as into the citizens by his triumphant procession through Achradina, he descended to the level ground in front of Ortygia. That strong hold was still occupied by the Dionysian garrison, whom he thus challenged to come forth and fight. But the flight of Timokrates had left them without orders, while the imposing demonstration and unanimous rising of the people in Achradina — which they must partly have witnessed from their walls, and partly learnt through fugitive spies and partisans — struck them with discouragement and terror; so that they were in no disposition to quit the shelter of their fortifications. Their backwardness was hailed as a confession of inferiority by the insurgent citizens, whom Dion now addressed as an assembly of freemen. Hard by, in front of the acropolis with its Pentapyla or five gates, there stood a lofty and magnificent sun-dial, erected by the elder Dionysius. Mounting on the top of this edifice, with the muniments of the despot on the one side and the now liberated Achradina on the other, Dion addressed<sup>1</sup> an animated harangue to the Syracu-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 29; Diodor. xvi. 10, 11. The description which Plutarch gives of the position of this sun-dial is distinct, and the harangue which Dion delivered, while standing upon it, is an impressive fact: — 'Ἦν δ' ὑπὸ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν καὶ τὰ πεντάπυλα, Διονυσίου κατασκευάσαντος, ἡλιοτρόπιον καταφανὲς καὶ ἡψηλόν. Ἐπὶ τούτῳ προσβὰς ἐδημηγόρησε, καὶ παρώρμησε τοὺς πολίτας ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς ἐλευθερίας.

The sun-dial was thus *under* the acropolis, that is, in the low ground immediately adjoining to Ortygia; near the place where the elder Dionysius is stated to have placed his large porticos and market-house (Diodor. xiv. 7), and where the younger Dionysius erected the funeral monument to his father (xv. 74). In order to arrive at the sun-dial, Dion must have descended from the height of Achradina. Now Plutarch mentions that Dion *went up* through Achradina (*ἀνέει διὰ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς*). It is plain that he must have come down again from Achradina, though Plutarch does not specially mention it. And if he brought his men close under the walls of the enemy's garrison, this can hardly have been for any other reason than that which I have assigned in the text.

Plutarch indicates the separate localities with tolerable clearness, but

ans around, exhorting them to strenuous efforts in defence of their newly acquired rights and liberties, and inviting them to elect generals for the command, in order to accomplish the total expulsion of the Dionysian garrison. The Syracusans, with unanimous acclamations, named Dion and his brother Megakles generals with full powers. But both the brothers insisted that colleagues should be elected along with them. Accordingly twenty other persons were chosen besides, ten of them being from that small band of Syracusan exiles who had joined at Zakynthus.

Such was the entry of Dion into Syracuse, on the third day<sup>1</sup> after his landing in Sicily; and such the first public act of renewed Syracusan freedom; the first after that fatal vote which, forty-eight years before, had elected the elder Dionysius general plenipotentiary, and placed in his hands the sword of state, without foresight of the consequences. In the hands of Dion, that sword was vigorously employed against the common enemy. He immediately attacked Epipolæ; and such was the consternation of the garrison left in it by the fugitive Timokrates, that they allowed him to acquire possession of it, together with the strong fort of Euryalus, which a little courage and devotion might long have defended. This acquisition, made suddenly in the tide of success on one side and discouragement on the other, was of supreme importance, and went far to determine the ultimate contest. It not only reduced the partisans of Dionysius within the limits of Ortygia, but also enabled Dion to set free many state prisoners,<sup>2</sup> who became ardent partisans of the revolution. Following up his success, he lost no time in taking measures against Ortygia. To shut it up completely on the land-side, he commenced

he does not give a perspicuous description of the whole march. Thus, he says that Dion, "wishing to harangue the people himself, *went up* through Achradina," (*Βουλόμενος δὲ καὶ δι' ἐαυτοῦ προσαγορεύσαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἀνέει διὰ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς*), while the place from which Dion did harangue the people, was *down under* the acropolis of Ortygia.

Diodorus is still less clear about the localities, nor does he say anything about the sun-dial or the exact spot from whence Dion spoke, though he mentions the march of Dion through Achradina.

It seems probable that what Plutarch calls τὰ πεντάπυλα are the same as what Diodorus (xv. 74) indicates in the words ταῖς βασιλικαῖς καλουμένας εὐλαῖς.

<sup>1</sup> Cornelius Nepos, Dion. c. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 29.



the erection of a wall of blockade, reaching from the Great Harbor at one extremity, to the sea on the eastern side of the Portus Lakkus, at the other.<sup>1</sup> He at the same time provided arms as well as he could for the citizens, sending for those spare arms which he had deposited with Synalus at Minoa. It does not appear that the garrison of Ortygia made any sally to impede him; so that in the course of seven days, he had not only received his arms from Synalus, but had completed, in a rough way, all or most of the blockading cross-wall.<sup>2</sup>

At the end of these seven days, but not before (having been prevented by accident from receiving the express sent to him), Dionysius returned with his fleet to Ortygia.<sup>3</sup> Fatally indeed was his position changed. The islet was the only portion of the city which he possessed, and that too was shut up on the land-side by a blockading wall nearly completed. All the rest of the city was occupied by bitter enemies instead of by subjects. Leontini also, and probably many of his other dependencies out of Syracuse, had taken the opportunity of revolting.<sup>4</sup> Even with the large fleet which he had brought home, Dionysius did not think himself strong enough to face his enemies in the field, but resorted to stratagem. He first tried to open a private intrigue with Dion; who, however, refused to receive any separate propositions, and desired him to address them publicly to the freemen, citizens of Syracuse. Accordingly, he sent envoys tendering to the Syracusans what in the present day would be called a constitution. He demanded only moderate taxation, and moderate fulfilments of military service, subject to their own vote of consent. But the Syracusans laughed the offer to scorn, and Dion returned in their name the peremptory reply,—that no proposition from Dionysius

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 29; Diodor. xvi. 12. Plutarch says, τὴν δὲ ἀκροπόλιν ἀπετείχισε — Diodorus is more specific — Τῶν δὲ Συρακουσίων κατεσκευασμένων ἐκ θαλάσσης εἰς θάλασσαν διατειχίσματα, etc. These are valuable words as indicating the line and the two terminations of Dion's blockading cross-wall.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 29.

<sup>3</sup> This return of Dionysius, seven days after the coming of Dion, is specified both by Plutarch and Diodorus (Plutarch, Dion, c. 26-29; Diodor. xvi. 11).

<sup>4</sup> Diodor. xvi. 16.

could be received, short of total abdication; adding in his own name, that he would himself, on the score of kindred, procure for Dionysius, if he did abdicate, both security and other reasonable concessions. These terms Dionysius affected to approve, desiring that envoys might be sent to him in Ortygia to settle the details. Both Dion and the Syracusans eagerly caught at his offer, without for a moment questioning his sincerity. Some of the most eminent Syracusans, approved by Dion, were despatched as envoys to Dionysius. A general confidence prevailed, that the retirement of the despot was now assured; and the soldiers and citizens employed against him, full of joy and mutual congratulations, became negligent of their guard on the cross-wall of blockade; many of them even retiring to their houses in the city.

This was what Dionysius expected. Contriving to prolong the discussion, so as to detain the envoys in Ortygia all night, he ordered at daybreak a sudden sally of all his soldiers, whom he had previously stimulated both by wine and by immense promises in case of victory.<sup>1</sup> The sally was well-timed and at first completely successful. One half of Dion's soldiers were encamped to guard the cross-wall (the other half being quartered in Achradina), together with a force of Syracusan citizens. But so little were they prepared for hostilities, that the assailants, rushing out with shouts and at a run, carried the wall at the first onset, slew the sentinels, and proceeded to demolish the wall (which was probably a rough and hasty structure) as well as to charge the troops on the outside of it. The Syracusans, surprised and terrified, fled with little or no resistance. Their flight partially disordered the stouter Dionian soldiers, who resisted bravely, but without having had time to form their regular array. Never was Dion more illustrious, both as an officer and as a soldier. He exerted himself to the utmost to form the troops, and to marshal them in ranks essential to the effective fighting of the Grecian hoplite. But his orders were unheard in the clamor, or disregarded in the confusion: his troops lost courage, the assailants gained ground, and the day seemed evidently going against him.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 30. ἐμπλήσας ἀκράτου. It is rare that we read of this proceeding with soldiers in antiquity. Diodor. xvi. 11, 12. τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν.



Seeing that there was no other resource, he put himself at the head of his best and most attached soldiers, and threw himself, though now an elderly man, into the thickest of the fray. The struggle was the more violent, as it took place in a narrow space between the new blockading wall on one side, and the outer wall of Neapolis on the other. Both the armor and the person of Dion being conspicuous, he was known to enemies as well as friends, and the battle around him was among the most obstinate in Grecian history.<sup>1</sup> Darts rattled against both his shield and his helmet, while his shield was also pierced through by several spears which were kept from his body only by the breastplate. At length he was wounded through the right arm or hand, thrown on the ground, and in imminent danger of being made prisoner. But this forwardness on his part so stimulated the courage of his own troops, that they both rescued him, and made redoubled efforts against the enemy. Having named Timonides commander in his place, Dion with his disabled hand mounted on horseback, rode into Achradina, and led forth to the battle that portion of his troops which were there in garrison. These men, fresh and good soldiers, restored the battle. The Syracusans came back to the field, all joined in strenuous conflict, and the Dionysian assailants were at length again driven within the walls of Ortygia. The loss on both sides was severe; that of Dionysius eight hundred men; all of whom he caused to be picked up from the field (under a truce granted on his request by Dion), and buried with magnificent obsequies, as a means of popularizing himself with the survivors.<sup>2</sup>

When we consider how doubtful the issue of this battle had proved, it seems evident that had Timokrates maintained himself in Epipolæ, so as to enable Dionysius to remain master of Epipolæ as well as of Ortygia, the success of Dion's whole enterprise in Syracuse would have been seriously endangered.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 12. 'Ο δὲ Δίων ἀνελπίστως παρεσπονδήμενος, μετὰ τῶν ἀρίστων στρατιωτῶν ἀπὸ τῶν τοῖς πολεμοῖς καὶ συναψας μάχην, πολλὸν ἐποίησε φόνον ἐν σταδίῳ. Ὀλίγῳ δὲ διαστήματι, τῆς διατευχίου ἔσω, μάχης οὖσης, συνέδομεν πλῆθος στρατιωτῶν εἰς στένον τόπον.

The text here is not quite clear (see Wesseling's note); but we gather from the passage information about the topography of Syracuse.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 30; Diodor. xvi. 12, 13.

Great was the joy excited at Syracuse by the victory. The Syracusan people testified their gratitude to the Dionysian soldiers by voting a golden wreath to the value of one hundred minæ; while these soldiers, charmed with the prowess of their general, voted a golden wreath to him. Dion immediately began the re-establishment of the damaged cross-wall, which he repaired, completed, and put under effective guard for the future.<sup>1</sup> Dionysius no longer tried to impede it by armed attack. But as he was still superior at sea, he transported parties across the harbor to ravage the country for provisions, and despatched vessels to bring in stores also by sea. His superiority at sea was presently lessened by the arrival of Herakleides from Peloponnesus,<sup>2</sup> with twenty triremes, three smaller vessels, and fifteen hundred soldiers. The Syracusans, now beginning to show themselves actively on ship-board, got together a tolerable naval force. All the docks and wharfs lay concentrated in and around Ortygia, within the grasp of Dionysius, who was master of the naval force belonging to the city. But it would seem that the crews of some of the ships (who were mostly native Syracusans,<sup>3</sup> with an intermixture of Athenians, doubtless of democratical sentiments) must have deserted from the despot to the people, carrying over their ships, since we presently find the Syracusans with a fleet of sixty triremes,<sup>4</sup> which they could hardly have acquired otherwise.

Dionysius was shortly afterwards reinforced by Philistus, who brought to Ortygia, not only his fleet from the Tarentine Gulf, but also a considerable regiment of cavalry. With these latter, and some other troops besides, Philistus undertook an expedition against the revolted Leontini. But though he made his way into

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 16. Plutarch states that Herakleides brought only seven triremes. But the force stated by Diodorus (given in my text) appears more probable. It is difficult otherwise to explain the number of ships which the Syracusans presently appear as possessing. Moreover the great importance, which Herakleides steps into, as opposed to Dion, is more easily accounted for.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 35. About the Athenian seamen in Ortygia, see a remarkable passage of Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 350 A. When Plato was at Syracuse, in danger from the mercenaries, the Athenian seamen, there employed, gave warning to him as their countryman.

<sup>4</sup> Diodor. xvi. 16.



the town by night, he was presently expelled by the defenders, seconded by reinforcements from Syracuse.<sup>1</sup>

To keep Ortygia provisioned, however, it was yet more indispensable for Philistus to maintain his superiority at sea against the growing naval power of the Syracusans, now commanded by Herakleides.<sup>2</sup> After several partial engagements, a final battle, desperate and decisive, at length took place between the two admirals. Both fleets were sixty triremes strong. At first Philistus, brave and forward, appeared likely to be victorious. But presently the fortune of the day turned against him. His ship was run ashore, and himself with most part of his fleet, overpowered by the enemy. To escape captivity, he stabbed himself. The wound however was not mortal; so that he fell alive, being now about seventy-eight years of age, into the hands of his enemies,—who stripped him naked, insulted him brutally, and at length cut off his head, after which they dragged his body by the leg through the streets of Syracuse.<sup>3</sup> Revolting as this treatment is, we must recollect that it was less horrible than that which the elder Dionysius had inflicted on the Rhegine general Phytos.

The last hopes of the Dionysian dynasty perished with Philistus, the ablest and most faithful of its servants. He had been an actor in its first day of usurpation — its eighteenth Brumaire: his timely, though miserable death, saved him from sharing in its last day of exile — its St. Helena.

Even after the previous victory of Dion, Dionysius had lost all chance of overcoming the Syracusans by force. But he had now farther lost, through the victory of Herakleides, his superiority at sea, and therefore his power even of maintaining himself permanently in Ortygia. The triumph of Dion seemed assured, and his enemy humbled in the dust. But though thus disarmed, Dionysius was still formidable by his means of raising intrigue and dissension in Syracuse. His ancient antipathy against Dion became more vehement than ever. Obligated to forego empire himself — yet resolved at any rate that Dion should be ruined

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 16.

<sup>2</sup> See a Fragment of the fortieth Book of the Philippica of Theopompus (Theopomp. Fragm. 212, ed. Didot), which seems to refer to this point of time.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 16; Plutarch, Dion, c. 35.

along with him — he set on foot a tissue of base manoeuvres availing himself of the fears and jealousies of the Syracusans, the rivalry of Herakleides, the defects of Dion, and what was more important than all — the relationship of Dion to the Dionysian dynasty.

Dion had displayed devoted courage, and merited the signal gratitude of the Syracusans. But he had been nursed in the despotism, of which his father had been one of the chief founders; he was attached by every tie of relationship to Dionysius, with whom his sister, his former wife, and his children, were still dwelling in the acropolis. The circumstances therefore were such as to suggest to the Syracusans apprehensions, noway unreasonable, that some private bargain might be made by Dion with the acropolis, and that the eminent services which he had just rendered might only be made the stepping-stone to a fresh despotism in his person. Such suspicions received much countenance from the infirmities of Dion, who combined, with a masculine and magnanimous character, manners so haughty as to be painfully felt even by his own companions. The friendly letters from Syracuse, written to Plato or to others at Athens (possibly those from Timonides to Speusippus) shortly after the victory, contained much complaint of the repulsive demeanor of Dion; which defect the philosopher exhorted his friend to amend.<sup>1</sup> All those, whom Dion's arrogance offended, were confirmed in their suspicion of his despotic designs, and induced to turn for protection to his rival Herakleides. This latter — formerly general in the service of Dionysius, from whose displeasure he had only saved his life by flight — had been unable or unwilling to cooperate with Dion in his expedition from Zakynthos, but had since brought to the aid of the Syracusans a considerable force, including several armed ships. Though not present at the first entry into Syracuse, nor arriving until Ortygia had already been placed under blockade, Herakleides was esteemed the equal of Dion in abilities and in military efficiency; while with regard to ulterior designs, he had

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Epist. iv. p. 321 B. . . . ἐνθυμού δὲ καὶ ὅτι δοκεῖς τισὶν ἐνδεστέρας τοῦ προσήκοντος θεραπευτικός εἶναι· μὴ οὖν λανθάνεω σε ὅτι διὰ τοῦ ἀρέσκειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὸ πράττειν ἐστίν, ἢ δ' αὐτάδεια ἐρημία εἶναι.



the prodigious advantage of being free from connection with the despotism and of raising no mistrust. Moreover his manners were not only popular, but according to Plutarch,<sup>1</sup> more than popular — smooth, insidious, and dexterous in criminatory speech, for the ruin of rivals and for his own exaltation.

As the contest presently came to be carried on rather at sea than on land, the equipment of a fleet became indispensable; so that Herakleides, who had brought the greatest number of triremes, naturally rose in importance. Shortly after his arrival, the Syracusan assembly passed a vote to appoint him admiral. But Dion, who seems only to have heard of this vote after it had passed, protested against it as derogating from the full powers which the Syracusans had by their former vote conferred upon himself. Accordingly the people, though with reluctance, cancelled their vote, and deposed Herakleides. Having then gently rebuked Herakleides for raising discord at a season when the common enemy was still dangerous, Dion convened another assembly; wherein he proposed, from himself, the appointment of Herakleides as admiral, with a guard equal to his own.<sup>2</sup> The right of nomination thus assumed displeased the Syracusans, humiliated Herakleides, and exasperated his partisans as well as the fleet which he commanded. It gave him power — together with provocation to employ that power for the ruin of Dion; who thus laid himself doubly open to genuine mistrust from some, and to intentional calumny from others.

It is necessary to understand this situation, in order to appreciate the means afforded to Dionysius for personal intrigue directed against Dion. Though the vast majority of Syracusans were

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 32.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 33. It would seem that this Herakleides is the person alluded to in the fragment from the fortieth Book of the Philippica of Theopompus (Theop. Fr. 212, ed. Didot): —

Προσάται δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἦσαν τῶν μὲν Συρακουσίων Ἀθηνίς καὶ Ἡρακλείδης, τῶν δὲ μισθοφόρων Ἀρχέλαος ὁ Δυμαῖος

Probably also, Athénis is the same person named as Athanis or Athanas by Diodorus and Plutarch, (Diodor. xv. 94; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23-37). He wrote a history of Syracusan affairs during the period of Dion and Timoleon, beginning from 362 B. C., and continuing the history of Philippos. See *Historicorum Græc. Fragm.* ed. Didot, vol. ii. p. 81.

hostile to Dionysius, yet there were among them many individuals connected with those serving under him in Ortygia, and capable of being put in motion to promote his views. Shortly after the complete defeat of his sally, he renewed his solicitations for peace; to which Dion returned the peremptory answer, that no peace could be concluded until Dionysius abdicated and retired. Next, Dionysius sent out heralds from Ortygia with letters addressed to Dion from his female relatives. All these letters were full of complaints of the misery endured by these poor women; together with prayers that he would relax in his hostility. To avert suspicion, Dion caused the letters to be opened and read publicly before the Syracusan assembly; but their tenor was such, that suspicion, whether expressed or not, unavoidably arose, as to the effect on Dion's sympathies. One letter there was, bearing on its superscription the words "Hipparinus (the son of Dion) to his father." At first many persons present refused to take cognizance of a communication so strictly private; but Dion insisted, and the letter was publicly read. It proved to come, not from the youthful Hipparinus, but from Dionysius himself, and was insidiously worded for the purpose of discrediting Dion in the minds of the Syracusans. It began by reminding him of the long service which he had rendered to the despotism. It implored him not to bury that great power, as well as his own relatives, in one common ruin, for the sake of a people who would turn round and sting him, so soon as he had given them freedom. It offered, on the part of Dionysius himself, immediate retirement, provided Dion would consent to take his place. But it threatened, if Dion refused, the sharpest tortures against his female relatives and his son.<sup>1</sup>

This letter, well-turned as a composition for its own purpose, was met by indignant refusal and protestation on the part of Dion. Without doubt his refusal would be received with cheers by the assembly; but the letter did not the less instil its intended poison into their minds. Plutarch displays<sup>2</sup> (in my judgment) no great knowledge of human nature, when he complains of the Syracusans for suffering the letter to impress them with suspicions of Dion, instead of admiring his magnanimous resistance to such touching appeals. It was precisely the magnanimity required for

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 31.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 32.



the situation, which made them mistrustful. Who could assure them that such a feeling, to the requisite pitch, was to be found in the bosom of Dion? or who could foretell which, among painfully conflicting sentiments, would determine his conduct? The position of Dion forbade the possibility of his obtaining full confidence. Moreover his enemies, not content with inflaming the real causes of mistrust, fabricated gross falsehoods against him as well as against the mercenaries under his command. A Syracusan named Sôsis, brother to one of the guards of Dionysius, made a violent speech in the Syracusan assembly, warning his countrymen to beware of Dion, lest they should find themselves saddled with a strict and sober despot in place of one who was always intoxicated. On the next day Sôsis appeared in the Assembly with a wound on the head, which he said that some of the soldiers of Dion had inflicted upon him in revenge for his speech. Many persons present, believing the story, warmly espoused his cause; while Dion had great difficulty in repelling the allegation, and in obtaining time for the investigation of its truth. On inquiry, it was discovered that the wound was a superficial cut inflicted by Sôsis himself with a razor, and that the whole tale was an infamous calumny which he had been bribed to propagate.<sup>1</sup> In this particular instance, it was found practicable to convict the delinquent of shameless falsehood. But there were numerous other attacks and perversions less tangible, generated by the same hostile interests and tending towards the same end. Every day the suspicion and unfriendly sentiment of the Syracusans, towards Dion and his soldiers, became more embittered.

The naval victory gained by Herakleides and the Syracusan fleet over Philistus, exalting both the spirit of the Syracusans and the glory of the admiral, still further lowered the influence of Dion. The belief gained ground that even without him and his soldiers, the Syracusans could defend themselves, and gain possession of Ortygia. It was now that the defeated Dionysius sent from thence a fresh embassy to Dion, offering to surrender to him the place with its garrison, magazine of arms, and treasure equivalent to five months' full pay — on condition of being allowed to retire to Italy, and enjoy the revenues of a large and productive

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 34.

portion (called Gyarta) of the Syracusan territory. Dion again refused to reply, desiring him to address the Syracusan public yet advising them to accept the terms.<sup>1</sup> Under the existing mistrust towards Dion, this advice was interpreted as concealing an intended collusion between him and Dionysius. Herakleides promised, that if the war were prosecuted, he would keep Ortygia blocked up until it was surrendered at discretion with all in it as prisoners. But in spite of his promise, Dionysius contrived to elude his vigilance and sail off to Lokri in Italy, with many companions and much property, leaving Ortygia in command of his eldest son Apollokrates.

Though the blockade was immediately resumed and rendered stricter than before, yet this escape of the despot brought considerable discredit on Herakleides. Probably the Dionian partisans were not sparing in their reproach. To create for himself fresh popularity, Herakleides warmly espoused the proposition of a citizen named Hippo, for a fresh division of landed property; a proposition, which, considering the sweeping alteration of landed property made by the Dionysian dynasty, we may well conceive to have been recommended upon specious grounds of retributive justice, as well as upon the necessity of providing for poor citizens. Dion opposed the motion strenuously, but was outvoted. Other suggestions also, yet more repugnant to him, and even pointed directly against him, were adopted. Lastly, Herakleides, enlarging upon his insupportable arrogance, prevailed upon the people to decree that new generals should be appointed, and that the pay due to the Dionian soldiers, now forming a large arrear, should not be liquidated out of the public purse.<sup>2</sup>

It was towards midsummer that Dion was thus divested of his command, about nine months after his arrival at Syracuse.<sup>3</sup> Twenty-five new generals were named, of whom Herakleides was one.

The measure, scandalously ungrateful and unjust, whereby the soldiers were deprived of the pay due to them, was dictated by pure antipathy against Dion: for it does not seem to have been

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 37; Diodor. xvi. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 37; Diodor. xvi. 17.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 38. *ἑτέροις μετέστροφας, etc.*



applied to those soldiers who had come with Herakleides; moreover the new generals sent private messages to the Dionian soldiers, inviting them to desert their leader and join the Syracusans, in which case the grant of citizenship was promised to them.<sup>1</sup> Had the soldiers complied, it is obvious, that either the pay due, or some equivalent, must have been assigned to satisfy them. But one and all of them scorned the invitation, adhering to Dion with unshaken fidelity. The purpose of Herakleides was, to expel him alone. This however was prevented by the temper of the soldiers; who, indignant at the treacherous ingratitude of the Syracusans, instigated Dion to take a legitimate revenge upon them, and demanded only to be led to the assault. Refusing to employ force, Dion calmed their excitement, and put himself at their head to conduct them out of the city; not without remonstrances addressed to the generals and the people of Syracuse upon their proceedings, imprudent as well as wicked, while the enemy were still masters of Ortygia. Nevertheless, the new generals, chosen as the most violent enemies of Dion, not only turned a deaf ear to his appeal, but inflamed the antipathies of the people, and spurred them on to attack the soldiers on their march out of Syracuse. Their attack, though repeated more than once, was vigorously repulsed by the soldiers — excellent troops, three thousand in number; while Dion, anxious to ensure their safety, and to avoid bloodshed on both sides, confined himself strictly to the defensive. He forbade all pursuit, giving up the prisoners without ransom as well as the bodies of the slain for burial.<sup>2</sup>

In this guise Dion arrived at Leontini, where he found the warmest sympathy towards himself, with indignant disgust at the behavior of the Syracusans. Allied with the newly-enfranchised Syracuse against the Dionysian dynasty, the Leontines not only received the soldiers of Dion into their citizenship, and voted to them a positive remuneration, but sent an embassy to Syracuse insisting that justice should be done to them. The Syracusans, on their side, sent envoys to Leontini, to accuse Dion before an assembly of all the allies there convoked. Who these allies were, our defective information does not enable us to say. Their sen-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 38.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 39; Diodor. xvi. 17

tence went in favor of Dion and against the Syracusans; who nevertheless stood out obstinately, refusing all justice or reparation,<sup>1</sup> and fancying themselves competent to reduce Ortygia without Dion's assistance — since the provisions therein were exhausted, and the garrison was already suffering from famine. Despairing of reinforcement, Apolokrates had already resolved to send envoys and propose a capitulation, when Nypsius, a Neapolitan officer, despatched by Dionysius from Lokri, had the good fortune to reach Ortygia at the head of a re-inforcing fleet, conveying numerous transports with an abundant stock of provisions. There was now no farther talk of surrender. The garrison of Ortygia was re-inforced to ten thousand mercenary troops of considerable merit, and well provisioned for some time.<sup>2</sup>

The Syracusan admirals, either from carelessness or ill-fortune, had not been able to prevent the entry of Nypsius. But they made a sudden attack upon him while his fleet were in the harbor, and while the crews, thinking themselves safe from an enemy, were interchanging salutations or aiding to disembark the stores. This attack was well-timed and successful. Several of the triremes of Nypsius were ruined — others were towed off as prizes, while the victory, gained by Herakleides without Dion, provoked extravagant joy throughout Syracuse. In the belief that Ortygia could not longer hold out, the citizens, the soldiers, and even the generals, gave loose to mad revelry and intoxication, continued into the ensuing night. Nypsius, an able officer, watched his opportunity, and made a vigorous night-sally. His troops, issuing forth in good order, planted their scaling-ladders, mounted the blockading wall, and slew the sleeping or drunken sentinels without any resistance. Master of this important work, Nypsius employed a part of his men to pull it down, while he pushed the rest forward against the city. At daybreak the affrighted Syracusans saw themselves vigorously attacked even in their own stronghold, when neither generals nor citizens were at all prepared to resist. The troops of Nypsius first forced their way into Neapolis, which lay the nearest to the wall of Ortygia; next into Tycha, the other fortified suburb. Over these they ranged

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 40.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 41; Diodor. xvi. 18, 19



victorious, vanquishing all the detached parties of Syracusans which could be opposed to them. The streets became a scene of bloodshed — the houses of plunder; for as Dionysius had now given up the idea of again permanently ruling at Syracuse, his troops thought of little else except satiating the revenge of their master and their own rapacity. The soldiers of Nysius stripped the private dwellings in the town, taking away not only the property, but also the women and children, as booty into Ortygia. At last (it appears) they got also into Archradina, the largest and most populous portion of Syracuse. Here the same scene of pillage, destruction, and bloodshed, was continued throughout the whole day, and on a still larger scale; with just enough resistance to pique the fury of the victors, without restraining their progress.

It soon became evident to Herakleides and his colleagues, as well as to the general body of citizens, that there was no hope of safety except in invoking the aid of Dion and his soldiers from Leontini. Yet the appeal to one whom they not only hated and feared, but had ignominiously maltreated, was something so intolerable, that for a long time no one would speak out to propose what every man had in his mind. At length some of the allies present, less concerned in the political parties of the city, ventured to broach the proposition, which ran from man to man, and was adopted under a press of mingled and opposite emotions. Accordingly two officers of the allies, and five Syracusan horsemen, set off at full speed to Leontini, to implore the instant presence of Dion. Reaching the place towards evening, they encountered Dion himself immediately on dismounting, and described to him the miserable scenes now going on at Syracuse. Their tears and distress brought around them a crowd of hearers, Leontines as well as Peloponnesians; and a general assembly was speedily convened, before which Dion exhorted them to tell their story. They described, in the tone of men whose all was at stake, the actual sufferings and the impending total ruin of the city; entreating oblivion for their past misdeeds, which were already but too cruelly expiated.

Their discourse, profoundly touching to the audience, was heard in silence. Every one waited for Dion to begin, and to determine the fate of Syracuse. He rose to speak; but for a time tears

checked his utterance, while his soldiers around cheered him with encouraging sympathy. At length he found voice to say. "I have convened you, Peloponnesians and allies, to deliberate about your own conduct. For me, deliberation would be a disgrace, while Syracuse is in the hands of the destroyer. If I cannot save my country, I shall go and bury myself in its flaming ruins. For you, if, in spite of what has happened, you still choose to assist us, misguided and unhappy Syracusans, we shall owe it to you that we still continue a city. But if, in disdainful sense of wrong endured, you shall leave us to our fate, I here thank you for all your past valor and attachment to me, praying that the gods may reward you for it. Remember Dion, as one who neither deserted you when you were wronged, nor his own fellow-citizens when they were in misery."

This address, so replete with pathos and dignity, went home to the hearts of the audience, filling them with passionate emotion and eagerness to follow him. Universal shouts called upon him to put himself at their head instantly and march to Syracuse; while the envoys present fell upon his neck, invoking blessings both upon him and upon the soldiers. As soon as the excitement had subsided, Dion gave orders that every man should take his evening meal forthwith, and return in arms to the spot, prepared for a night-march to Syracuse.

By daybreak, Dion and his band were within a few miles of the northern wall of Epipolæ. Messengers from Syracuse here met him, inducing him to slacken his march and proceed with caution. Herakleides and the other generals had sent a message forbidding his nearer approach, with notice that the gates would be closed against him; yet at the same time, counter-messages arrived from many eminent citizens, entreating him to persevere, and promising him both admittance and support. Nysius, having permitted his troops to pillage and destroy in Syracuse throughout the preceding day, had thought it prudent to withdraw them back into Ortygia for the night. His retreat raised the courage of Herakleides and his colleagues; who, fancying that the attack was now over, repented of the invitation which they had permitted to be sent to Dion. Under this impression they despatched to him the second message of exclusion; keeping guard at the gate in the northern wall to make their threat good.



But the events of the next morning speedily undeceived him. Nysius renewed his attack with greater ferocity than before, completed the demolition of the wall of blockade before Ortygia, and let loose his soldiers with merciless hand throughout all the streets of Syracuse. There was on this day less of pillage, but more of wholesale slaughter. Men, women, and children perished indiscriminately, and nothing was thought of by these barbarians except to make Syracuse a heap of ruins and dead bodies. To accelerate the process, and to forestall Dion's arrival, which they fully expected — they set fire to the city in several places, with torches and fire-bearing arrows. The miserable inhabitants knew not where to flee, to escape the flames within their houses, or the sword without. The streets were strewed with corpses, while the fire gained ground perpetually, threatening to spread over the greater part of the city. Under such terrible circumstances, neither Herakleides, himself wounded, nor the other generals, could hold out any longer against the admission of Dion; to whom even the brother and uncle of Herakleides were sent, with pressing entreaties to accelerate his march, since the smallest delay would occasion ruin to Syracuse.<sup>1</sup>

Dion was about seven miles from the gates when these last cries of distress reached him. Immediately hurrying forward his soldiers, whose ardor was not inferior to his own, at a running pace, he reached speedily the gates called Hexapyla, in the northern wall of Epipolæ. When once within these gates, he halted in an interior area called the Hekatompedon.<sup>2</sup> His light-armed were sent forward at once to arrest the destroying enemy, while he kept back the hoplites until he could form them into separate columns under proper captains, along with the citizens who crowded round him with demonstrations of great reverence. He distributed them so as to enter the interior portion of Syracuse, and attack the troops of Nysius, on several points at once.<sup>3</sup> Being now within the exterior fortification formed by the wall of Epipolæ,

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 45.

Diodor. xvi. 20. διανύσας ὁξέως τὴν εἰς Συρακούσας ὁδὸν, ἦκε πρὸς τὰ Ἐξιπύλα, etc. Plutarch, Dion, c. 45. εἰσέβαλε διὰ τῶν πυλῶν εἰς τὴν Ἑκατόμπεδον λεγομένην, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 45. ὀρθίους λόχους ποιῶν καὶ διαιρῶν τὰς ἡγεμονίας ἕως ὅπου πολλαχόθεν ἅμα προσφεροῖτο φοβερωτέρων.

there lay before him the tripartite interior city — Tycha, Neapolis, Achradina. Each of these parts had its separate fortification between Tycha and Neapolis lay an unfortified space, but each of them joined on to Achradina, the western wall of which formed their eastern wall. It is probable that these interior fortifications had been partially neglected since the construction of the outer walls along Epipolæ, which comprised them all within, and formed the principal defence against a foreign enemy. Moreover the troops of Nysius, having been masters of the three towns, and roving as destroyers around them, for several hours, had doubtless broken down the gates and in other ways weakened the defences. The scene was frightful, and the ways everywhere impeded by flame and smoke, by falling houses and fragments, and by the numbers who lay massacred around. It was amidst such horrors that Dion and his soldiers found themselves — while penetrating in different divisions at once into Neapolis, Tycha, and Achradina.

His task would probably have been difficult, had Nysius been able to control the troops under his command, in themselves brave and good. But these troops had been for some hours dispersed throughout the streets, satiating their licentious and murderous passions, and destroying a town which Dionysius now no longer expected to retain. Recalling as many soldiers as he could from this brutal disorder, Nysius marshalled them along the interior fortification, occupying the entrances and exposed points where Dion would seek to penetrate into the city.<sup>1</sup> The battle was thus not continuous, but fought between detached parties at separate openings, often very narrow, and on ground sometimes difficult to surmount, amidst the conflagration blazing everywhere around.<sup>2</sup> Disorganized by pillage, the troops of Nysius could

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 46. παρατεταγμένων παρὰ τὸ τεῖχος καλεσθὲν ἔχον καὶ δυσεκβίαστον τὴν πρόσδοον.

To a person who, after penetrating into the interior of the wall of Epipolæ, stood on the slope, and looked down eastward, the outer wall of Tycha, Achradina, and Neapolis, might be said to form one τεῖχος; not indeed in one and the same line or direction, yet continuous from the northern to the southern brink of Epipolæ.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 46. Ὡς δὲ προσέμειξαν τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἐν χερσὶ μὲν ὀλίγων πρὸς ὀλίγους ἐγένετο μάχη, διὰ τὴν στενότητα καὶ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν τοῦ τόπου, etc.



oppose no long resistance to the forward advance of Dion, with soldiers full of ardor and with the Syracusans around him stimulated by despair. Nysius was overpowered, compelled to abandon his line of defence, and to retreat with his troops into Ortygia, which the greater number of them reached in safety. Dion and his victorious troops, after having forced the entrance into the city did not attempt to pursue them. The first and most pressing necessity was to extinguish the flames; but no inconsiderable number of the soldiers of Nysius were found dispersed through the streets and houses, and slain while actually carrying off plunder on their shoulders. Long after the town was cleared of enemies, however, all hands within it were employed in stopping the conflagration; a task in which they hardly succeeded, even by unremitting efforts throughout the day and the following night.<sup>1</sup>

On the morrow Syracuse was another city; disfigured by the desolating trace of flame and of the hostile soldiery, yet still refreshed in the hearts of its citizens, who felt that they had escaped much worse; and above all, penetrated by a renewed political spirit, and a deep sense of repentant gratitude towards Dion. All those generals, who had been chosen at the last election from their intense opposition to him, fled forthwith; except Herakleides and Theodotes. These two men were his most violent and dangerous enemies; yet it appears that they knew his character better than their colleagues, and therefore did not hesitate to throw themselves upon his mercy. They surrendered, confessed their guilt, and implored his forgiveness. His magnanimity (they said) would derive a new lustre, if he now rose superior to his just resentment over misguided rivals, who stood before him humbled and ashamed of their former opposition, entreating him to deal with them better than they had dealt with him.

If Dion had put their request to the vote, it would have been refused by a large majority. His soldiers, recently defrauded of their pay, were yet burning with indignation against the authors of such an injustice. His friends, reminding him of the bitter and unscrupulous attacks which he as well as they had experienced from Herakleides, exhorted him to purge the city of one who abused the popular forms to purposes hardly less mischievous than

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 45, 46; Diodor. xvi. 20.

despotism itself. The life of Herakleides now hung upon a thread. Without pronouncing any decided opinion, Dion had only to maintain an equivocal silence, and suffer the popular sentiment to manifest itself in a verdict invoked by one party, expected even by the opposite. The more was every one astonished when he took upon himself the responsibility of pardoning Herakleides; adding, by way of explanation and satisfaction<sup>1</sup> to his disappointed friends —

“Other generals have gone through most of their training with a view to arms and war. My long training in the Academy has been devoted to aid me in conquering anger, envy, and all malignant jealousies. To show that I have profited by such lessons, it is not enough that I do my duty towards my friends and towards honest men. The true test is, if, after being wronged, I show myself placable and gentle towards the wrong-doer. My wish is to prove myself superior to Herakleides more in goodness and justice, than in power and intelligence. Successes in war, even when achieved single-handed, are half owing to fortune. If Herakleides has been treacherous and wicked through envy, it is not for Dion to dishonor a virtuous life in obedience to angry sentiment. Nor is human wickedness, great as it often is, ever pushed to such an excess of stubborn brutality, as not to be amended by gentle and gracious treatment, from steady benefactors.”<sup>2</sup>

We may reasonably accept this as something near the genuine speech of Dion, reported by his companion Timonides, and thus passing into the biography of Plutarch. It lends a peculiar interest, as an exposition of motives, to the act which it accompanies. The sincerity of the exposition admits of no doubt, for all the ordinary motives of the case counselled an opposite conduct; and had Dion been in like manner at the feet of his rival, his life would assuredly not have been spared. He took pride (with a sentiment something like that of Kallikratidas<sup>3</sup> on liberating the prisoners taken at Methymna) in realizing by conspicuous act the lofty morality which he had imbibed from the Academy; the rather, as the case presented every temptation to depart from it

Plutarch, Dion, c. 47. ‘Ο δὲ Δίων παραμυθούμενος αὐτοὺς ἔλεγεν, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 47.

<sup>3</sup> See Vol. VIII. Ch. lxiv. p. 165 of this History.



Persuading himself that he could by an illustrious example put to shame and soften the mutual cruelties so frequent in Grecian party-warfare, and regarding the amnesty towards Herakleides as a proper sequel to the generous impulse which had led him to march from Leontini to Syracuse,—he probably gloried in both, more than in the victory itself. We shall presently have the pain of discovering that his anticipations were totally disappointed. And we may be sure that at the time, the judgment passed on his proceeding towards Herakleides was very different from what it now receives. Among his friends and soldiers, the generosity of the act would be forgotten in its imprudence. Among his enemies, it would excite surprise, perhaps admiration—yet few of them would be conciliated or converted into friends. In the bosom of Herakleides himself, the mere fact of owing his life to Dion would be a new and intolerable humiliation, which the Erinnys within would goad him on to avenge. Dion would be warned, by the criticism of his friends, as well as by the instinct of his soldiers, that in yielding to a magnanimous sentiment, he overlooked the reasonable consequences; and that Herakleides continuing at Syracuse would only be more dangerous both to him and them, than he had been before. Without taking his life, Dion might have required him to depart from Syracuse; which sentence, having regard to the practice of the time, would have been accounted generosity.

It was Dion's next business to renew the wall of blockade constructed against Ortygia, and partially destroyed in the late sally of Nysius. Every Syracusan citizen was directed to cut a stake, and deposit it near the spot; after which, during the ensuing night, the soldiers planted a stockade so as to restore the broken parts of the line. Protection being thus ensured to the city against Nysius and his garrison, Dion proceeded to bury the numerous dead who had been slain in the sally, and to ransom the captives, no less than two thousand in number, who had been carried off into Ortygia.<sup>1</sup> A trophy, with sacrifice to the gods for the victory, was not forgotten.<sup>2</sup>

A public assembly was now held to elect new generals in place of those who had fled. Here a motion was made by Herakleides

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 48.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 20

himself, that Dion should be chosen general with full powers both by land and sea. The motion was received with great favor by the principal citizens; but the poorer men were attached to Herakleides, especially the seamen; who preferred serving under his command, and loudly required that he should be named admiral, along with Dion as general on land. Forced to acquiesce in this nomination, Dion contented himself with insisting and obtaining, that the resolution, which had been previously adopted for redistributing lands and houses, should be rescinded.<sup>1</sup>

The position of affairs at Syracuse was now pregnant with mischief and quarrel. On land, Dion enjoyed a dictatorial authority;—at sea, Herakleides, his enemy not less than ever, was admiral, by separate and independent nomination. The undefined authority of Dion—exercised by one self-willed, though magnanimous, in spirit, and extremely repulsive in manner—was sure to become odious after the feelings arising out of the recent rescue had worn off; and abundant opening would thus be made for the opposition of Herakleides, often on just grounds. That officer indeed was little disposed to wait for just pretences. Conducting the Syracusan fleet to Messênê in order to carry on war against Dionysius at Lokri, he not only tried to raise the seamen in arms against Dion, by charging him with despotic designs, but even entered into a secret treaty with the common enemy Dionysius; through the intervention of the Spartan Pharax, who commanded the Dionysian troops. His intrigues being discovered, a violent opposition was raised against them by the leading Syracusan citizens. It would seem (as far as we can make out from the scanty information of Plutarch) that the military operations were frustrated, and that the armament was forced to return to Syracuse. Here again the quarrel was renewed—the seamen apparently standing with Herakleides, the principal citizens with Dion—and carried so far, that the city suffered not only from disturbance, but even from irregular supply of provisions.<sup>2</sup> Among the mortifications of Dion, not the least was that which he experienced from his own friends or soldiers, who reminded him of their warnings

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 48

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 48. καὶ δι' αὐτὴν ἀπορία καὶ σπάνις ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις, etc.



and predictions when he consented to spare Herakleides. Meanwhile Dionysius had sent into Sicily a body of troops under Pharax, who were encamped at Neapolis in the Agrigentine territory. In what scheme of operations this movement forms a part, we cannot make out; for Plutarch tells us nothing except what bears immediately on the quarrel between Dion and Herakleides. To attack Pharax, the forces of Syracuse were brought out; the fleet under Herakleides, the soldiers on land under Dion. The latter, though he thought it imprudent to fight, was constrained to hazard a battle by the insinuations of Herakleides and the clamor of the seamen; who accused him of intentionally eking out the war for the purpose of prolonging his own dictatorship. Dion accordingly attacked Pharax, but was repulsed. Yet the repulse was not a serious defeat, so that he was preparing to renew the attack, when he was apprised that Herakleides with the fleet had departed and were returning at their best speed to Syracuse; with the intention of seizing the city, and barring out Dion with his troops. Nothing but a rapid and decisive movement could defeat this scheme. Leaving the camp immediately with his best horsemen, Dion rode back to Syracuse as fast as possible; completing a distance of seven hundred stadia (about eighty-two miles) in a very short time, and forestalling the arrival of Herakleides.<sup>1</sup>

Thus disappointed and exposed, Herakleides found means to direct another manœuvre against Dion, through the medium of a Spartan named Gæsylus; who had been sent by the Spartans, informed of the dissensions in Syracuse, to offer himself (like Gylippus) for the command. Herakleides eagerly took advantage of the arrival of this officer; pressing the Syracusans to accept a Spartan as their commander-in-chief. But Dion replied that there were plenty of native Syracusans qualified for command; moreover, if a Spartan was required, he was himself a Spartan, by public grant. Gæsylus, having ascertained the state of affairs, had the virtue and prudence not merely to desist from his own pretensions, but also to employ his best efforts in reconciling Dion and Herakleides. Sensible that the wrong had been on the side of the latter, Gæsylus constrained him to bind himself by the strongest oaths to better conduct in future. He engaged

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 49

his own guarantee for the observance of the covenant; but the better to ensure such observance, the greater part of the Syracusan fleet (the chief instrument of Herakleides) was disbanded, leaving only enough to keep Ortygia under blockade.<sup>1</sup>

The capture of that islet and fortress, now more strictly watched than ever, was approaching. What had become of Pharax, or why he did not advance, after the retreat of Dion, to harass the Syracusans and succor Ortygia — we know not. But no succor arrived; provisions grew scarce; and the garrison became so discontented, that Apollokrates the son of Dionysius could not hold out any longer. Accordingly, he capitulated with Dion; handing over to him Ortygia with its fort, arms, magazines and everything contained in it — except what he could carry away in five triremes. Aboard of these vessels, he placed his mother, his sisters, his immediate friends, and his chief valuables, leaving everything else behind for Dion and the Syracusans, who crowded to the beach in multitudes to see him depart. To them the moment was one of lively joy, and mutual self-congratulation — promising to commence a new era of freedom.<sup>2</sup>

On entering Ortygia, Dion saw for the first time after a separation of about twelve years, his sister Aristomachê, his wife Aretê, and family. The interview was one of the tenderest emotion and tears of delight to all. Aretê, having been made against her own consent the wife of Timokratês, was at first afraid to approach Dion. But he received and embraced her with unabated affection.<sup>3</sup> He conducted both her and his son away from the Dionysian acropolis, in which they had been living since his absence, into his own house; having himself resolved not to dwell in the acropolis, but to leave it as a public fort or edifice belonging to Syracuse. However, this renewal of his domestic happiness was shortly afterwards imbibed by the death of his son; who having imbibed from Dionysius drunken and dissolute habits, fell from the roof of the house, in a fit of intoxication or frenzy, and perished.<sup>4</sup>

Dion was now at the pinnacle of power as well as of glory. With means altogether disproportionate, he had achieved the ex-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 50.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 50

<sup>4</sup> Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 5.



pulsion of the greatest despot in Greece, even from an impregnable stronghold. He had combated danger and difficulty with conspicuous resolution, and had displayed almost chivalrous magnanimity. Had he "breathed out his soul!"<sup>1</sup> at the instant of triumphant entry in Ortygia, the Academy would have been glorified by a pupil of first-rate and unsullied merit. But that cup of prosperity, which poisoned so many other eminent Greeks, had now the fatal effect of exaggerating all the worst of Dion's qualities, and damping all the best.

Plutarch indeed boasts, and we may perfectly believe, that he maintained the simplicity of his table, his raiment, and his habits of life, completely unchanged — now that he had become master of Syracuse, and an object of admiration to all Greece. In this respect, Plato and the Academy had reason to be proud of their pupil.<sup>2</sup> But the public mistakes, now to be recounted, were not the less mischievous to his countrymen as well as to himself.

From the first moment of his entry into Syracuse from Peloponnesus, Dion had been suspected and accused of aiming at the expulsion of Dionysius, only in order to transfer the despotism to himself. His haughty and repulsive manners, raising against him personal antipathies everywhere, were cited as confirming the charge. Even at moments when Dion was laboring for the genuine good of the Syracusans, this suspicion had always more or less crossed his path; robbing him of well-merited gratitude — and at the same time discrediting his opponents, and the people of Syracuse, as guilty of mean jealousy towards a benefactor.

The time had now come when Dion was obliged to act in such a manner as either to confirm, or to belie, such unfavorable auguries. Unfortunately both his words and his deeds confirmed them in the strongest manner. The proud and repulsive external demeanor, for which he had always been notorious, was rather

<sup>1</sup> Juvenal, Satir. x. 381.

"Quid illo cive (Marius) tulisset  
Imperium in terris, quid Roma beatius unquam,  
Si circumducto captivorum agmine, et omni  
Bellorum pompâ, animam exhalasset opimam,  
Cum de Teutonico vellet descendere curru?"

Plutarch, Dion, c. 52.

aggravated than softened. He took pride in showing, more plainly than ever, that he despised everything which looked like courting popularity.<sup>1</sup>

If the words and manner of Dion were thus significant, both what he did, and what he left undone, was more significant still. Of that great boon of freedom, which he had so loudly promised to the Syracusans, and which he had directed his herald to proclaim on first entering their walls, he conferred absolutely nothing. He retained his dictatorial power unabated, and his military force certainly without reduction, if not actually reinforced; for as Apollokrates did not convey away with him the soldiers in Ortygia, we may reasonably presume that a part of them at least remained to embrace the service of Dion. He preserved the acropolis and fortifications of Ortygia just as they were, only garrisoned by troops obeying his command instead of that of Dionysius. His victory made itself felt in abundant presents to his own friends and soldiers;<sup>2</sup> but to the people of Syracuse, it produced nothing better than a change of masters.

It was not indeed the plan of Dion to constitute a permanent despotism. He intended to establish himself king, but to grant to the Syracusans what in modern times would be called a constitution. Having imbibed from Plato and the Academy as well as from his own convictions and tastes, aversion to a pure democracy, he had resolved to introduce a Lacedæmonian scheme of mixed government, combining king, aristocracy, and people, under certain provisions and limitations. Of this general tenor are the recommendations addressed both to him, and to the Syracusans after his death, by Plato; who however seems to contemplate, along with the political scheme, a Lykurgian reform of manners and practice. To aid in framing and realizing his scheme, Dion sent to Corinth to invite counsellors and auxiliaries; for Corinth was suitable to his views, not simply as mother city of Syracuse, but also as a city thoroughly oligarchical.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 52. Τοῦ μέντοι περὶ τῆς ὁμιλίας ὄγκον καὶ τοῦ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ὑπεροχῆς ἐφιλονεῖκει μηδὲν ὑφελεῖν μηδὲ χαλᾶσαι καίτοι τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῷ χάρις ἐνδεῶν ὄντων, καὶ Πλάτωνος ἐπιτιμῶντος, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 52.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 53; Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 334, 336; viii. p. 356.



That these intentions on the part of Dion were sincere, we need not question. They had been originally conceived without any views of acquiring the first place for himself, during the life of the elder Dionysius, and were substantially the same as those which he had exhorted the younger Dionysius to realize, immediately after the death of the father. They are the same as he had intended to further by calling in Plato, — with what success, has been already recounted. But Dion made the fatal mistake of not remarking, that the state of things, both as to himself and as to Syracuse, was totally altered during the interval between 367 B. C. and 354 B. C. If at the former period, when the Dionysian dynasty was at the zenith of power, and Syracuse completely prostrated, the younger Dionysius could have been persuaded spontaneously and without contest or constraint to merge his own despotism in a more liberal system, even dictated by himself — it is certain that such a free, though moderate concession, would at first have provoked unbounded gratitude, and would have had a chance (though that is more doubtful) of giving long-continued satisfaction. But the situation was totally different in 354 B. C., when Dion, after the expulsion of Apollokrates, had become master in Ortygia; and it was his mistake that he still insisted on applying the old plans when they had become not merely unsuitable, but mischievous. Dion was not in the position of an established despot, who consents to renounce, for the public good, powers which every one knows he can retain, if he chooses; nor were the Syracusans any longer passive, prostrate, and hopeless. They had received a solemn promise of liberty, and had been thereby inflamed into vehement action, by Dion himself; who had been armed by them with delegated powers, for the special purpose of putting down Dionysius. That under these circumstances Dion, instead of laying down his trust, should constitute himself king — even limited king — and determine how much liberty he would consent to allot to the Syracusans who had appointed him — this was a proceeding which they could not but resent as a flagrant usurpation, and which he could only hope to maintain by force.

The real conduct of Dion, however, was worse even than this. He manifested no visible evidence of realizing even that fraction of popular liberty which had entered into his original scheme.

What exact promises he made, we do not know. But he maintained his own power, the military force, and the despotic fortifications, provisionally undiminished. And who could tell how long he intended to maintain them? That he really had in his mind purposes such as Plato<sup>1</sup> gives him credit for, I believe to be true. But he took no practical step towards them. He had resolved to accomplish them, not through persuasion of the Syracusans, but through his own power. This was the excuse which he probably made to himself, and which pushed him down that inclined plane from whence there was afterwards no escape.

It was not likely that Dion's conduct would pass without a protest. That protest came loudest from Herakleides; who, so long as Dion had been acting in the real service of Syracuse, had opposed him in a culpable and traitorous manner — and who now again found himself in opposition to Dion, when opposition had become the side of patriotism as well as of danger. Invited by Dion to attend the council, he declined, saying that he was now nothing more than a private citizen, and would attend the public assembly along with the rest; a hint which implied, plainly as well as reasonably, that Dion also ought to lay down his power, now that the common enemy was put down.<sup>2</sup> The surrender of Ortygia had produced strong excitement among the Syracusans. They were impatient to demolish the dangerous stronghold erected in that islet by the elder Dionysius; they both hoped and expected, moreover, to see the destruction of that splendid funeral monument which his son had built in his honor, and the urn with its ashes cast out. Now of these two measures, the first was one of pressing and undeniable necessity, which Dion ought to have consummated without a moment's delay; the second was compliance with a popular antipathy at that time natural, which would have served as an evidence that the old despotism stood condemned. Yet Dion did neither. It was Herakleides who censured him, and moved for the demolition of the Dionysian Bastile; thus having the glory of attaching his name to the measure eagerly performed by Timoleon eleven years afterwards, the moment that he found himself master of Syracuse. Not only Dion

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 335 F. p. 351 A.; Epistol. viii. p. 357 A.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 53.



did not originate the overthrow of this dangerous stronghold, but when Herakleides proposed it, he resisted him and prevented it from being done.<sup>1</sup> We shall find the same den serving for successive despots—preserved by Dion for them as well as for himself, and only removed by the real liberator Timoleon.

Herakleides gained extraordinary popularity among the Syracusans by his courageous and patriotic conduct. But Dion saw plainly that he could not, consistently with his own designs, permit such free opposition any longer. Many of his adherents, looking upon Herakleides as one who ought not to have been spared on the previous occasion, were ready to put him to death at any moment; being restrained only by a special prohibition which Dion now thought it time to remove. Accordingly, with his privy, they made their way into the house of Herakleides, and slew him.<sup>2</sup>

This dark deed abolished all remaining hope of obtaining Syracusan freedom from the hands of Dion, and stamped him as the mere successor of the Dionysian despotism. It was in vain that he attended the obsequies of Herakleides with his full military force, excusing his well-known crime to the people, on the plea, that Syracuse could never be at peace while two such rivals were both in active political life. Under the circumstances of the case, the remark was an insulting derision; though it might have been advanced with pertinence as a reason for sending Herakleides away, at the moment when he before spared him. Dion had now conferred upon his rival the melancholy honor of dying as a martyr to Syracusan freedom; and in that light he was bitterly mourned by the people. No man after this murder could think himself secure. Having once employed the soldiers as executioners of his own political antipathies, Dion proceeded to lend himself more and more to their exigencies. He provided for them pay and largesses, great in amount, first at the cost of his opponents in the city, next at that of his friends, until at length discon-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 53. Ἐπειτα κατηγορεῖ τον Δίωνος ὅτι τὴν ἄκραν οὐ κατέσκαψε, καὶ τῷ δήμῳ τὸν Διονυσίου τάφον ὠρμημένῳ λύσαι καὶ τὸν ἑκὸς ἐμβαλεῖν οὐκ ἐπέτρεψε, etc.

Compare Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 22.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 53. Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 6.

tent became universal. Among the general body of the citizens, Dion became detested as a tyrant, and the more detested because he had presented himself as a liberator; while the soldiers also were in great part disaffected to him.<sup>1</sup>

The spies and police of the Dionysian dynasty not having been yet reestablished, there was ample liberty at least of speech and censure; so that Dion was soon furnished with full indications of the sentiment entertained towards him. He became disquieted and irritable at this change of public feeling;<sup>2</sup> angry with the people, yet at the same time ashamed of himself. The murder of Herakleides sat heavy on his soul. The same man whom he had spared before when in the wrong, he had now slain when in the right. The maxims of the Academy which had imparted to him so much self-satisfaction in the former act, could hardly fail to occasion a proportionate sickness of self-reproach in the latter. Dion was not a mere power-seeker, nor prepared for all that endless apparatus of mistrustful precaution, indispensable to a Grecian despot. When told that his life was in danger, he replied that he would rather perish at once by the hands of the first assassin, than live in perpetual diffidence, towards friends as well as enemies.<sup>3</sup>

One thus too good for a despot, and yet unfit for a popular leader, could not remain long in the precarious position occupied by Dion. His intimate friend, the Athenian Kallippus, seeing that the man who could destroy him would become popular with the Syracusans as well as with a large portion of the soldiery, formed a conspiracy accordingly. He stood high in the confidence of Dion, had been his companion during his exile at Athens, had accompanied him to Sicily, and entered Syracuse by his side. But Plato, anxious for the credit of the Academy, is careful to inform us, that this inauspicious friendship arose, not

<sup>1</sup> Cornel. Nepos, Dion, c. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 7. "Insuetus male audiendi," etc.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 56. Ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Δίων, ἐπὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὸν Ἡρακλείδην ἀχθόμενος, καὶ τὸν φόνον ἐκείνου, ὡς τινα τοῦ βίου καὶ τῶν πράξεων αὐτοῦ κηλὶδα προκειμένην, δυσχεραίνων αἶε καὶ βαρυνόμενος εἶπεν, ὅτι πολλάκις ἤδη θνήσκειν ἐτοιμός ἐστι καὶ παρέχειν τῷ βουλομένῳ σφάττειν αὐτόν, εἰ ἔφη δείσει μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φίλους φυλαττέμενον.

Compare Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 176 F.

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out of fellowship in philosophy, but out of common hospitalities and especially common initiation in the Eleusinian mysteries.<sup>1</sup> Brave and forward in battle, Kallippus enjoyed much credit with the soldiery. He was conveniently placed for tampering with them, and by a crafty stratagem, he even insured the unconscious connivance of Dion himself. Having learnt that plots were formed against his life, Dion talked about them to Kallippus, who offered himself to undertake the part of spy, and by simulated partnership to detect as well as to betray the conspirators. Under this confidence, Kallippus had full licence for carrying on his intrigues unimpeded, since Dion disregarded the many warnings which reached him.<sup>2</sup> Among the rumors raised out of Dion's new position, and industriously circulated by Kallippus — one was, that he was about to call back Apollokrates, son of Dionysius, as his partner and successor to the despotism — as a substitute for the youthful son who had recently perished. By these and other reports, Dion became more and more discredited, while Kallippus secretly organized a wider circle of adherents. His plot however did not escape the penetration of Aristomachê and Aretê; who having first addressed unavailing hints to Dion, at last took upon them to question Kallippus himself. The latter not only denied the charge, but even confirmed his denial, at their instance, by one of the most solemn and terrific oaths recognized in Grecian religion; going into the sacred grove of Demeter and Persephonê, touching the purple robe of the goddess, and taking in his hand a lighted torch.<sup>3</sup>

Inquiry being thus eluded, there came on presently the day of the Koreia: — the festival of these very Two goddesses in whose name and presence Kallippus had forsworn. This was the day which he had fixed for execution. The strong points of defence

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Epistol.* vii. p. 333 F.: compare Plutarch, *Dion*, c. 17, 28, 54.

Athenæus, on the contrary, states that Kallippus was a pupil of Plato, and fellow pupil with Dion in the school (*Athenæus*, xi. p. 508).

The statement of Plato hardly goes so far as to negative the supposition that Kallippus may have frequented his school and received instruction there, for a time greater or less. But it refutes the idea, that the friendship of Dion and Kallippus arose out of these philosophical tastes common to both; which Athenæus seems to have intended to convey.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, *Dion*, c. 54; Cornelius Nepos, *Dion*, c. 8.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, *Dion*, c. 56.

in Syracuse were confided beforehand to his principal adherents while his brother Philostrates<sup>1</sup> kept a trireme manned in the harbor ready for flight in case the scheme should miscarry. While Dion, taking no part in the festival, remained at home, Kallippus caused his house to be surrounded by confidential soldiers, and then sent into it a select company of Zakynthians, unarmed, as if for the purpose of addressing Dion on business. These men, young and of distinguished muscular strength, being admitted into the house, put aside or intimidated the slaves, none of whom manifested any zeal or attachment. They then made their way up to Dion's apartment, and attempted to throw him down and strangle him. So strenuously did he resist, however, that they found it impossible to kill him without arms; which they were perplexed how to procure, being afraid to open the doors, lest aid might be introduced against them. At length one of their number descended to a back-door, and procured from a Syracusan without, named Lykon, a short sword; of the Laconian sort, and of peculiar workmanship. With this weapon they put Dion to death.<sup>2</sup> They then seized Aristomachê and Aretê, the sister and wife of Dion. These unfortunate women were cast into prison, where they were long detained, and where the latter was delivered of a posthumous son.

Thus perished Dion, having lived only about a year after his expulsion of the Dionysian dynasty from Syracuse — but a year too long for his own fame. Notwithstanding the events of those last months, there is no doubt that he was a man essentially differing from the class of Grecian despots: a man, not of aspirations purely personal, nor thirsting merely for multitudes of submissive subjects and a victorious army — but with large public-minded purposes attached as coördinate to his own ambitious views. He wished to perpetuate his name as the founder of a polity, cast in something of the general features of Sparta; which, while it did

<sup>1</sup> Plato alludes to the two brothers whom Dion made his friends at Athens, and who ultimately slew him; but without mentioning the name of either (*Plato*, *Epistol.* vii. p. 333 F.).

The third Athenian — whose fidelity he emphatically contrasts with the falsehood of these two — appears to mean, himself — Plato. Compare pp. 333 and 334.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, *Dion*, c. 57; Cornelius Nepos, *Dion*, c. 9; Diodor. xvi. 31.



not shock Hellenic instincts, should reach farther than political institutions generally aim to do, so as to remodel the sentiments and habits of the citizens, on principles suited to philosophers like Plato. Brought up as Dion was from childhood at the court of the elder Dionysius, unused to that established legality, free speech, and habit of active citizenship, from whence a large portion of Hellenic virtue flowed — the wonder is how he acquired so much public conviction and true magnanimity of soul — not how he missed acquiring more. The influence of Plato during his youth stamped his mature character; but that influence (as Plato himself tells us) found a rare predisposition in the pupil. Still, Dion had no experience of the working of a free and popular government. The atmosphere in which his youth was passed was that of an energetic despotism; while the aspiration which he imbibed from Plato was, to restrain and regularize that despotism, and to administer to the people a certain dose of political liberty, yet reserving to himself the task of settling how much was good for them, and the power of preventing them from acquiring more.

How this project — the natural growth of Dion's mind, for which his tastes and capacities were suited — was violently thrust aside through the alienated feelings of the younger Dionysius — has been already recounted. The position of Dion was now completely altered. He became a banished, ill-used man, stung with contemptuous antipathy against Dionysius, and eager to put down his despotism over Syracuse. Here were new motives apparently falling in with the old project. But the conditions of the problem had altogether changed. Dion could not overthrow Dionysius without "taking the Syracusan people into partnership" (to use the phrase of Herodotus<sup>1</sup> respecting the Athenian Kleisthenes) — without promising them full freedom, as an inducement for their hearty coöperation — without giving them arms, and awakening in them the stirring impulses of Grecian citizenship, all the more violent because they had been so long trodden down.<sup>2</sup> With these new allies he knew not how to deal. He had

<sup>1</sup> Herodotus, v. 66. ἐσσοῦμενος δ' ὁ Κλεισθένης τὸν δῆμον προσεταιρίζεται.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero de Officiis, ii. "Acriores morsus intermissæ libertatis quam retentæ."

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no experience of a free and jealous popular mind in persuasion, he was utterly unpractised: his manners were haughty and displeasing. Moreover, his kindred with the Dionysian family exposed him to antipathy from two different quarters. Like the Duke of Orleans (Egalité) at the end of 1792, in the first French Revolution — he was hated both by the royalists, because, though related to the reigning dynasty, he had taken an active part against it — and by sincere democrats, because they suspected him of a design to put himself in its place. To Dion, such coalition of antipathies was a serious hinderance; presenting a strong basis of support for all his rivals, especially for the unscrupulous Herakleides. The bad treatment which he underwent both from the Syracusans and from Herakleides, during the time when the officers of Dionysius still remained masters in Ortygia, has been already related. Dion however behaved, though not always with prudence, yet with so much generous energy against the common enemy, that he put down his rival, and maintained his ascendancy unshaken, until the surrender of Ortygia.

That surrender brought his power to a maximum. It was the turning-point and crisis of his life. A splendid opportunity was now opened, of earning for himself fame and gratitude. He might have attached his name to an act as sublime and impressive as any in Grecian history, which, in an evil hour, he left to be performed in after days by Timoleon — the razing of the Dionysian stronghold, and the erection of courts of justice on its site. He might have taken the lead in organizing, under the discussion and consent of the people, a good and free government, which, more or less exempt from defect as it might have been, would at least have satisfied them, and would have spared Syracuse those ten years of suffering which intervened until Timoleon came to make the possibility a fact. Dion might have done all that Timoleon did — and might have done it more easily, since he was less embarrassed both by the other towns in Sicily and by the Carthaginians. Unfortunately he still thought himself strong enough to resume his original project. In spite of the spirit, kindled partly by himself, among the Syracusans — in spite of the repugnance, already unequivocally manifested, on the mere suspicion of his despotic designs — he fancied himself competent to treat the Syracusans as a tame and passive herd; to carve out for them just



as much liberty as he thought right, and to require them to be satisfied with it; nay, even worse, to defer giving them any liberty at all, on the plea, or pretence, of full consultation with advisers of his own choice.

Through this deplorable mistake, alike mischievous to Syracuse and to himself, Dion made his government one of pure force. He placed himself in a groove wherein he was fatally condemned to move on from bad to worse, without possibility of amendment. He had already made a martyr of Herakleides, and he would have been compelled to make other martyrs besides, had his life continued. It is fortunate for his reputation that his career was arrested so early, before he had become bad enough to forfeit that sympathy and esteem with which the philosopher Plato still mourns his death, appeasing his own disappointment by throwing the blame of Dion's failure on every one but Dion himself.

## CHAPTER LXXXV.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS DOWN TO THE CLOSE OF THE EXPEDITION OF TIMOLEON. B. C. 353-336.

THE assassination of Dion, as recounted in my last chapter, appears to have been skilfully planned and executed for the purpose of its contriver, the Athenian Kallippus. Succeeding at once to the command of the soldiers, among whom he had before been very popular, — and to the mastery of Ortygia, — he was practically supreme at Syracuse. We read in Cornelius Nepos, that after the assassination of Dion there was deep public sorrow, and a strong reaction in his favor, testified by splendid obsequies attended by the mass of the population.<sup>1</sup> But this statement is difficult to believe; not merely because Kallippus long remained undisturbed master, but because he also threw into prison the fe-

<sup>1</sup> Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 10

male relatives of Dion — his sister Aristomachê and his pregnant wife Aretê, avenging by such act of malignity the false oath which he had so lately been compelled to take, in order to satisfy their suspicions.<sup>1</sup> Aretê was delivered of a son in the prison. It would seem that these unhappy women were kept in confinement during all the time, more than a year, that Kallippus remained master. On his being deposed, they were released; when a Syracusan named Hiketas, a friend of the deceased Dion, affected to take them under his protection. After a short period of kind treatment, he put them on board a vessel to be sent to Peloponnesus, but caused them to be slain on the voyage, and their bodies to be sunk in the sea. To this cruel deed he is said to have been instigated by the enemies of Dion; and the act shows but too plainly how implacable those enemies were.<sup>2</sup>

How Kallippus maintained himself in Syracuse — by what support, or violences, or promises — and against what difficulties he had to contend — we are not permitted to know. He seems at first to have made promises of restoring liberty; and we are even told, that he addressed a public letter to his country, the city of Athens;<sup>3</sup> wherein he doubtless laid claim to the honors of tyrannicide; representing himself as the liberator of Syracuse. How this was received by the Athenian assembly, we are not informed. But to Plato and the frequenters of the Academy, the news of Dion's death occasioned the most profound sorrow, as may still be read in the philosopher's letters.

Kallippus maintained himself for a year in full splendor and dominion. Discontents had then grown up; and the friends of Dion — or perhaps the enemies of Kallippus assuming that name — showed themselves with force in Syracuse. However, Kallippus defeated them, and forced them to take refuge in Leontini;<sup>4</sup> of which town we presently find Hiketas despot. Encouraged probably by this success, Kallippus committed many enormities, and made himself so odious,<sup>5</sup> that the expelled Dionysian family be-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 56, 57.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 58.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 58.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, Dion, c. 58; Diodor. xvi. 31-36.

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 11; Plutarch, compar. Timoleon and Paul Emil. c. 2.



gan to conceive hopes of recovering their dominion. He had gone forth from Syracuse on an expedition against Katana; of which absence Hipparinus took advantage to effect his entry into Syracuse, at the head of a force sufficient, combined with popular discontent, to shut him out of the city. Kallippus speedily returned, but was defeated by Hipparinus, and compelled to content himself with the unprofitable exchange of Katana in place of Syracuse.<sup>1</sup>

Hipparinus and Nysæus were the two sons of Dionysius the elder, by Aristomachê, and were therefore nephews of Dion. Though Hipparinus probably became master of Ortygia, the strongest portion of Syracuse, yet it would appear that in the other portions of Syracuse there were opposing parties who contested his rule; first, the partisans of Dionysius the younger, and of his family — next, the mass who desired to get rid of both the families, and to establish a free popular constitution. Such is the state of facts which we gather from the letters of Plato.<sup>2</sup> But we are too destitute of memorials to make out anything distinct respecting the condition of Syracuse or of Sicily between 353 B. C. and 344 B. C. — from the death of Dion to the invitation sent to Corinth, which brought about the mission of Timoleon. We are assured generally that it was a period of intolerable conflicts, disorders, and suffering; that even the temples and tombs were neglected;<sup>3</sup> that the people were everywhere trampled down by despots and foreign mercenaries; that the despots were frequently overthrown by violence or treachery, yet only to be succeeded by others as bad or worse; that the multiplication of foreign soldiers, seldom regularly paid, spread pillage and violence everywhere.<sup>4</sup> The philosopher Plato — in a letter written about a year or more after the death of Dion (seemingly after the expulsion of Kallippus) and addressed to the surviving relatives and friends of the latter — draws a lamentable picture of the state both of Syracuse and Sicily. He goes so far as to say, that under the distraction

<sup>1</sup> This seems to result from Plutarch, Dion, c. 58, compared with Diodor xvi. 36.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 353, 355, 356.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, Epist. viii. 356 B. *ἐλεῶν δὲ πατρίδα καὶ ἱερῶν ἀθεραπευσίαν καὶ τάφους*, etc.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon. c. 1.

and desolation which prevailed, the Hellenic race and language were likely to perish in the island, and give place to the Punic or Oscan.<sup>1</sup> He adjures the contending parties at Syracuse to avert this miserable issue by coming to a compromise, and by constituting a moderate and popular government, — yet with some rights reserved to the ruling families, among whom he desires to see a fraternal partnership established, tripartite in its character; including Dionysius the younger (now at Lokri) — Hipparinus son of the elder Dionysius — and the son of Dion. On the absolute necessity of such compromise and concord, to preserve both people and despots from one common ruin, Plato delivers the most pathetic admonitions. He recommends a triple coordinate kingship, passing by hereditary transmission in the families of the three persons just named; and including the presidency of religious ceremonies with an ample measure of dignity and veneration, but very little active political power. Advising that impartial arbitrators, respected by all, should be invoked to settle terms for the compromise, he earnestly implores each of the combatants to acquiesce peaceably in their adjudication.<sup>2</sup>

To Plato, — who saw before him the line double of Spartan kings, the only hereditary kings in Greece, — the proposition of three coordinate kingly families did not appear at all impracticable; nor indeed was it so, considering the small extent of political power allotted to them. But amidst the angry passions which then raged, and the mass of evil which had been done and suffered on all sides, it was not likely that any pacific arbitrator, of whatever position or character, would find a hearing, or would be enabled to effect any such salutary adjustment as had emanated from the Mantinean Dêmônax at Kyrênê — between the discontented Kyreneans and the dynasty of the Battiad princes.<sup>3</sup> Plato's recommendation passed unheeded. He died in 348–347 B. C., without seeing any mitigation of those Sicilian calamities which

Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 353 F. . . . διαλέσθαι δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ κύκλου τούτου καὶ τὸ τυραννικὸν ἅπαν καὶ τὸ δημοτικὸν γένος, ἥξει δὲ, εἴαν περ τῶν εἰκότων γένηται τι καὶ ἀπενκτῶν, σχεδὸν εἰς ἐρημίαν τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς φωνῆς Σικελία πᾶσα, Φοινίκων ἢ Ὀπικῶν μεταβαλοῦσα εἰς τινὰ δυναστείαν καὶ κράτος. Τούτων δὲ χρὴ πᾶσιν προθυμῶς πάντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας τέμνειν φάρμακον.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 356.

<sup>3</sup> Herodot. iv. 161



saddened the last years of his long life. On the contrary, the condition of Syracuse grew worse instead of better. The younger Dionysius contrived to effect his return, expelling Hipparinus and Nysæus from Ortygia, and establishing himself there again as master. As he had a long train of past humiliation to avenge, his rule was of that oppressive character which the ancient proverb recognized as belonging to kings restored from exile.<sup>1</sup>

Of all these princes descended from the elder Dionysius, not one inherited the sobriety and temperance which had contributed so much to his success. All of them are said to have been of drunken and dissolute habits<sup>2</sup>—Dionysius the younger, and his son Apollokrates, as well as Hipparinus and Nysæus. Hipparinus was assassinated while in a fit of intoxication; so that Nysæus became the representative of this family, until he was expelled from Ortygia by the return of the younger Dionysius.

That prince, since his first expulsion from Syracuse, had chiefly resided at Lokri in Italy, of which city his mother Doris was a native. It has already been stated that the elder Dionysius had augmented and nursed up Lokri by every means in his power, as an appurtenance of his own dominion at Syracuse. He had added to its territory all the southernmost peninsula of Italy (comprehended within a line drawn from the Gulf of Terina to that of Skylletium,) once belonging to Rhegium, Kaulonia, and Hippo-  
nium. But though the power of Lokri was thus increased, it had ceased to be a free city, being converted into a dependency of the Dionysian family.<sup>3</sup> As such, it became the residence of the second Dionysius, when he could no longer maintain himself in Syracuse. We know little of what he did; though we are told that he revived a portion of the dismantled city of Rhegium under the name of Phœbia.<sup>4</sup> Rhegium itself reappears shortly afterwards as a community under its own name, and was probably reconstituted at the complete downfall of the second Dionysius.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 1.

..... Regnabit sanguine multo  
Ad regnum quisquis venit ab exilio.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle and Theopompus, ap. Athenæum, x. p. 435, 436; Theopompus Fragm. 146, 204, 213, ed. Didot.

<sup>3</sup> Aristotel. Politic. v. 6, 7.

<sup>4</sup> Strabo, vi. p. 258.

The season between 356–346 B. C., was one of great pressure and suffering for all the Italian Greeks, arising from the increased power of the inland Lucanians and Bruttians. These Bruttians, who occupied the southernmost Calabria, were a fraction detached from the general body of Lucanians and self-emancipated; having consisted chiefly of indigenous rural serfs in the mountain communities, who threw off the sway of their Lucanian masters, and formed an independent aggregate for themselves. These men, especially in the energetic effort which marked their early independence, were formidable enemies of the Greeks on the coast, from Tarentum to the Sicilian strait; and more than a match even for the Spartans and Epirots invited over by the Greeks as auxiliaries.

It appears that the second Dionysius, when he retired to Lokri after the first loss of his power at Syracuse, soon found his rule unacceptable and his person unpopular. He maintained himself, seemingly from the beginning, by means of two distinct citadels in the town, with a standing army under the command of the Spartan Pharax, a man of profligacy and violence.<sup>1</sup> The conduct of Dionysius became at last so odious, that nothing short of extreme force could keep down the resentment of the citizens. We read that he was in the habit of practising the most licentious outrage towards the marriageable maidens of good family in Lokri. The detestation thus raised against him was repressed by his superior force—not, we may be sure, without numerous cruelties perpetrated against individual persons who stood on their defence—until the moment arrived when he and his son Apollokrates effected their second return to Ortygia. To ensure so important an acquisition, Dionysius diminished his military force at Lokri, where he at the same time left his wife, his two daughters, and his youthful son. But after his departure, the Lokrians rose in insurrection, overpowered the reduced garrison, and took

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 11; Compar. Timoleon and Paul. Emil. c. 2; Theopompus ap. Athenæum, xii. p. 536; Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p. 821 D. About the two citadels in Lokri, see Livy, xxix. 6.

It may have been probably a predatory fleet in the service of the younger Dionysius, which Livy mentions to have been ravaging about this time the coast of Latium, cooperating with the Gauls against portions of the Roman territory (Livy, vii. 25, 26).



captive these unfortunate members of his family. Upon their guileless heads fell all the terrors of retaliation for the enormities of the despot. It was in vain that both Dionysius himself, and the Tarentines<sup>1</sup> supplicated permission to redeem the captives at the highest ransom. In vain was Lokri besieged, and its territory desolated. The Lokrians could neither be seduced by bribes, nor deterred by threats, from satiating the full extremity of vindictive fury. After multiplied cruelties and brutalities, the wife and family of Dionysius were at length relieved from farther suffering by being strangled.<sup>2</sup> With this revolting tragedy terminated the inauspicious marital connection begun between the elder Dionysius and the oligarchy of Lokri.

By the manner in which Dionysius exercised his power at Lokri, we may judge how he would behave at Syracuse. The Syracusans endured more evil than ever, without knowing where to look for help. Hiketas the Syracusan (once the friend of Dion, ultimately the murderer of the slain Dion's widow and sister), had now established himself as despot at Leontini. To him they turned as an auxiliary, hoping thus to obtain force sufficient for the expulsion of Dionysius. Hiketas gladly accepted the proposition, with full purpose of reaping the reward of such expulsion, when achieved, for himself. Moreover, a formidable cloud was now gathering from the side of Carthage. What causes had rendered Carthage inactive for the last few years, while Sicily was so weak and disunited — we do not know; but she had now become once more aggressive, extending her alliances among the despots of the island, and pouring in a large force and fleet, so as to menace the independence both of Sicily and of Southern Italy.<sup>3</sup> The appearance of this new enemy drove the Syracusans to despair, and left them no hope of safety except in assistance from Corinth. To that city they sent a pathetic and urgent appeal, setting forth both the actual suffering and the approaching peril

<sup>1</sup> It would appear that relations of amity, or amicable dependence, still subsisted between Dionysius the younger and the Tarentines. There was seen, in the prytaneum or government-house of Tarentum, a splendid chandelier with three hundred and sixty-five burners, a present from Dionysius (Euphorion, ap. Athenæum, xv. p. 700).

<sup>2</sup> Strabo, vi. p. 259, 260, Athenæus, xii. p. 541.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 67.

from without. And such indeed was the peril, that even to a calm observer, it might well seem as if the mournful prophecy of Plato was on the point of receiving fulfilment — Hellenism as well as freedom becoming extinct on the island.

To the invocation of Corinthian aid, Hiketas was a party; yet an unwilling party. He had made up his mind that for his purpose, it was better to join the Carthaginians, with whom he had already opened negotiations — and to employ their forces, first in expelling Dionysius, next in ruling Syracuse for himself. But these were schemes not to be yet divulged: accordingly, Hiketas affected to concur in the pressing entreaty sent by the Syracusans to Corinth, intending from the beginning to frustrate its success.<sup>1</sup> He expected indeed that the Corinthians would themselves decline compliance: for the enterprise proposed to them was full of difficulty; they had neither injury to avenge, nor profit to expect; while the force of sympathy, doubtless not inconsiderable, with a suffering colony, would probably be neutralized by the unsettled and degraded condition into which all Central Greece was now rapidly sinking, under the ambitious strides of Philip of Macedon.

The Syracusan envoys reached Corinth at a favorable moment. But it is melancholy to advert to the aggregate diminution of Grecian power, as compared with the time when (seventy years before) their forefathers had sent thither to solicit aid against the besieging armament of Athens; a time when Athens, Sparta, and Syracuse herself, were all in exuberant vigor as well as unimpaired freedom. However, the Corinthians happened at this juncture to have their hands as well as their minds tolerably free, so that the voice of genuine affliction, transmitted from the most esteemed of all their colonies, was heard with favor and sympathy. A decree was passed, heartily and unanimously, to grant the aid solicited.<sup>2</sup>

The next step was to choose a leader. But a leader was not easily found. The enterprise presented little temptation, with danger and difficulty abundant as well as certain. The hopeless discord of Syracuse for years past, was well known to all the leading Corinthian politicians or generals. Of all or most of these, the names were successively put up by the archons; but all

Plutarch, Timoleon. c. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon. c. 2.



with one accord declined. At length, while the archons hesitated whom to fix upon, an unknown voice in the crowd pronounced the name of Timoleon, son of Timodemus. The mover seemed prompted by divine inspiration;<sup>1</sup> so little obvious was the choice, and so preeminently excellent did it prove. Timoleon was named — without difficulty, and without much intention of doing him honor — to a post which all the other leading men declined.

Some points must be here noticed in the previous history of this remarkable man. He belonged to an illustrious family in Corinth, and was now of mature age — perhaps about fifty. He was distinguished no less for his courage than for the gentleness of his disposition. Little moved either by personal vanity or by ambition, he was devoted in his patriotism, and unreserved in his hatred of despots as well as of traitors.<sup>2</sup> The government of Corinth was, and always had been, oligarchical; but it was a regular, constitutional, oligarchy; while the Corinthian antipathy against despots was of old standing<sup>3</sup> — hardly less strong than that of democratical Athens. As a soldier in the ranks of Corinthian hoplites, the bravery of Timoleon, and his submission to discipline, were alike remarkable.

These points of his character stood out the more forcibly from contrast with his elder brother Timophanes; who possessed the soldierlike merits of bravery and energetic enterprise, but combined with them an unprincipled ambition, and an unscrupulous prosecution of selfish advancement at all cost to others. The military qualities of Timophanes, however, gained for him so much popularity, that he was placed high as an officer in the Corinthian service. Timoleon, animated with a full measure of brotherly attachment, not only tried to screen his defects as well as to set off his merits, but also incurred the greatest perils for the purpose of saving his life. In a battle against the Argeians and Kleonæans, Timophanes was commanding the cavalry, when his horse, being wounded, threw him on the ground, very near

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 3. ἀλλὰ θεοῦ τινας, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰς νοῦν ἐμβαλόντες τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 3. . . . φιλόπατρις δὲ καὶ πρᾶος διαφερόντως, ὅσα μὴ σφόδρα μισοτύραννος εἶναι καὶ μισοπόνηρος.

<sup>3</sup> Herodot. v. 92.

to the enemy. The remaining horsemen fled, leaving their commander to what seemed certain destruction; but Timoleon, who was serving among the hoplites, rushed singly forth from the ranks with his utmost speed, and covered Timophanes with his shield, when the enemy were just about to pierce him. He made head singlehanded against them, warding off numerous spears and darts, and successfully protected his fallen brother until succor arrived; though at the cost of several wounds to himself.<sup>1</sup>

This act of generous devotion raised great admiration towards Timoleon. But it also procured sympathy for Timophanes, who less deserved it. The Corinthians had recently incurred great risk of seeing their city fall into the hands of their Athenian allies, who had laid a plan to seize it, but were disappointed through timely notice given at Corinth.<sup>2</sup> To arm the people being regarded as dangerous to the existing oligarchy,<sup>3</sup> it was judged expedient to equip a standing force of four hundred paid foreign soldiers, and establish them as a permanent garrison in the strong and lofty citadel. The command of this garrison, with the mastery of the fort, was intrusted to Timophanes. A worse choice could not have been made. The new commander — seconded not only by his regiment and his strong position, but also by some violent partisans whom he took into his pay and armed, among the poorer citizens — speedily stood forth as despot, taking the whole government into his own hands. He seized numbers of the chief citizens, probably all the members of the oligarchical councils who resisted his orders, and put them to death without even form of trial.<sup>4</sup> Now, when it was too late, the Corin-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4. At what time this battle took place cannot be made out.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4. 'Επεὶ δ' οἱ Κορίνθιοι, δεδιώτες μὴ χάσασθαι αἰε καὶ πρότερον ὑπὸ τῶν συμμάχων ἀποβαλόντες τὴν πόλιν, etc.

The Corinthians were carrying on war, in conjunction with Athens and Sparta, against Thebes, when (in 366 B. C.) the Athenians laid their plan for seizing the city. The Corinthians, having heard of it in time, took measures to frustrate it. See Xenophon, Hellen. vii. 4, 4-5.

<sup>3</sup> Aristotle, Politic. v. 5, 9.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4. σὺντοδὲς ἀνελὼν ἀκρίτους τῶν πρώτων καὶ τῶν ἀνέδειξεν αὐτὸς βασιλὸν τύραννον.

Diodorus (xvi. 65) coincides in the main facts — but differs in several details.



thians repented of the mistaken vote which had raised up a new Periander among them. But to Timoleon, the crimes of his brother occasioned an agony of shame and sorrow. He first went up to the acropolis<sup>1</sup> to remonstrate with him; conjuring him emphatically, by the most sacred motives public as well as private, to renounce his disastrous projects. Timophanes repudiated the appeal with contempt. Timoleon had now to choose between his brother and his country. Again he went to the acropolis, accompanied by Æschylus, brother of the wife of Timophanes — by the prophet Orthagoras, his intimate friend — perhaps also by another friend named Telekleides. Admitted into the presence of Timophanes, they renewed their prayers and supplications; urging him even yet to recede from his tyrannical courses. But all their pleading was without effect. Timophanes first laughed them to scorn; presently, he became exasperated, and would hear no more. Finding words unavailing, they now drew their swords and put him to death. Timoleon lent no hand in the deed, but stood a little way off, with his face hidden, and in a flood of tears.<sup>2</sup>

With the life of Timophanes passed away the despotism which had already begun its crushing influence upon the Corinthians. The mercenary force was either dismissed, or placed in safe hands; the acropolis became again part of a free city; the Corinthian constitution was revived as before. In what manner this change was accomplished, or with what measure of violence it was accompanied, we are left in ignorance; for

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4. αὐτὸς ἀνέβη πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4; Cornelius Nepos, Timol. c. 1; Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p. 808 A. That Telekleides was present and took part in the deed — though Plutarch directly names only Æschylus and Orthagoras — seems to be implied in an indirect allusion afterwards (c. 7), where Telekleides says to Timoleon after his nomination to the Sicilian command, "Αν νῦν καλῶς ἀγωνίσῃς τύραννον ἀνηρηκέναι δόξομεν ἐν δὲ φανλῶς, ἀδελφόν.

The presence of the prophet seems to show, that they had just been offering sacrifice, to ascertain the will of the gods respecting what they were about to do.

Nepos says that Timoleon was not actually present at the moment of his brother's death, but stood out of the room to prevent assistance from arriving.

Diodorus (xvi. 65) states that Timoleon slew his brother in the market place. But the account of Plutarch appears preferable.

Plutarch tells us hardly anything except what personally concerns Timoleon. We learn however that the expressions of joy among the citizens, at the death of Timophanes and the restoration of the constitution, were vehement and universal. So strongly did this tide of sentiment run, as to carry along with it, in appearance, even those who really regretted the departed despotism. Afraid to say what they really felt about the deed, these men gave only the more abundant utterance to their hatred of the doer. Though it was good that Timophanes should be killed (they said), yet that he should be killed by his brother, and his brother-in-law, was a deed which tainted both the actors with inextinguishable guilt and abomination. The majority of the Corinthian public, however, as well as the most distinguished citizens, took a view completely opposite. They expressed the warmest admiration as well for the doer as for the deed. They extolled the combination of warm family affection with devoted magnanimity and patriotism, each in its right place and properly balanced, which marked the conduct of Timoleon. He had displayed his fraternal affection by encountering the greatest perils in the battle, in order to preserve the life of Timophanes. But when that brother, instead of an innocent citizen, became the worst enemy of Corinth, Timoleon had then obeyed the imperative call of patriotism, to the disregard not less of his own comfort and interest than of fraternal affection.<sup>1</sup>

Such was the decided verdict pronounced by the majority — a majority as well in value as in number — respecting the behavior of Timoleon. In his mind, however, the general strain of encomium was not sufficient to drown, or even to compensate, the language of reproach, in itself so much more pungent, which emanated from the minority. Among that minority too was found one person whose single voice told with profound impression — his mother Demaristê, mother also of the slain Timophanes. Demaristê not only thought of her murdered son with the keenest maternal sorrow, but felt intense horror and execration for the authors of the deed. She imprecated curses on the head of Timoleon, refused even to see him again, and shut her doors against his visits, in spite of earnest supplications.

There wanted nothing more to render Timoleon thoroughly

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 5.



miserable, amidst the almost universal gratitude of Corinth. Of his strong fraternal affection for Timophanes, his previous conduct leaves no doubt. Such affection had to be overcome before he accompanied his tyrannicidal friends to the acropolis, and doubtless flowed back with extreme bitterness upon his soul, after the deed was done. But when to this internal source of distress, was added the sight of persons who shrank from contact with him as a fratricide, together with the sting of the maternal Erinnys — he became agonized even to distraction. Life was odious to him; he refused for some time all food, and determined to starve himself to death. Nothing but the pressing solicitude of friends prevented him from executing the resolve. But no consoling voice could impart to him spirit for the duties of public life. He fled the city and the haunts of men, buried himself in solitude amidst his fields in the country, and refrained from seeing or speaking to any one. For several years he thus hid himself like a self-condemned criminal; and even when time had somewhat mitigated the intensity of his anguish, he still shunned every prominent position, performing nothing more than his indispensable duties as a citizen. An interval of twenty years<sup>1</sup> had now elapsed from the death of Timophanes, to the arrival of the Syracusan application for aid. During all this time, Timoleon, in spite of the sympathy and willingness of admiring fellow-citizens, had never once chosen to undertake any important command or office. At length the *vox Dei* is heard, unexpectedly, amidst the crowd; dispelling the tormenting nightmare which had so long oppressed his soul, and restoring him to healthy and honorable action.

There is no doubt that the conduct of Timoleon and Æschylus in killing Timophanes was in the highest degree tutelary to Corinth. The despot had already imbrued his hands in the blood of his countrymen, and would have been condemned, by fatal necessity, to go on from bad to worse, multiplying the number of victims, as a condition of preserving his own power. To say that the deed ought not to have been done by near relatives, was tantamount to saying, that it ought not to have been done at all; for none but near relatives could have obtained that easy access which enabled them to effect it. And even Timoleon and Æschy-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 7.

lus could not make the attempt without the greatest hazard to themselves. Nothing was more likely than that the death of Timophanes would be avenged on the spot; nor are we told how they escaped such vengeance from the soldiers at hand. It has been already stated that the contemporary sentiment towards Timoleon was divided between admiration of the heroic patriot, and abhorrence of the fratricide; yet with a large preponderance on the side of admiration, especially in the highest and best minds. In modern times the preponderance would be in the opposite scale. The sentiment of duty towards family covers a larger proportion of the field of morality, as compared with obligations towards country, than it did in ancient times; while that intense antipathy against a despot who overtops and overrides the laws, regarding him as the worst of criminals — which stood in the foreground of the ancient virtuous feeling — has now disappeared. Usurpation of the supreme authority is regarded generally among the European public as a crime, only where it displaces an established king already in possession; where there is no king, the successful usurper finds sympathy rather than censure: and few readers would have been displeased with Timoleon, had he even seconded his brother's attempt. But in the view of Timoleon and of his age generally, even neutrality appeared in the light of treason to his country, when no other man but him could rescue her from the despot. This sentiment is strikingly embodied in the comments of Plutarch; who admires the fraternal tyrannicide, as an act of sublime patriotism, and only complains that the internal emotions of Timoleon were not on a level with the sublimity of the act; that the great mental suffering which he endured afterwards, argued an unworthy weakness of character; that the conviction of imperative patriotic duty, having been once deliberately adopted, ought to have steeled him against scruples, and preserved him from that after-shame and repentance which spoiled half the glory of an heroic act. The antithesis, between Plutarch and the modern European point of view, is here pointed; though I think his criticism unwarranted. There is no reason to presume that Timoleon ever felt ashamed and repentant for having killed his brother. Placed in the mournful condition of a man agitated by conflicting sentiments, and obeying that which he deemed to carry the most sacred obligation, he of necessity suf-



ferred from the violation of the other. Probably the reflection that he had himself saved the life of Timophanes, only that the latter might destroy the liberties of his country — contributed materially to his ultimate resolution; a resolution, in which Æschylus, another near relative, took even a larger share than he.

It was in this state of mind that Timoleon was called upon to take the command of the auxiliaries for Syracuse. As soon as the vote had passed, Telekleides addressed to him a few words, emphatically exhorting him to strain every nerve, and to show what he was worth — with this remarkable point in conclusion — "If you now come off with success and glory, we shall pass for having slain a despot; if you fail, we shall be held as fratricides."<sup>1</sup>

He immediately commenced his preparation of ships and soldiers. But the Corinthians, though they had resolved on the expedition, were not prepared either to vote any considerable subsidy, or to serve in large numbers as volunteers. The means of Timoleon were so extremely limited, that he was unable to equip more than seven triremes, to which the Korkyæans (animated by common sympathy for Syracuse, as of old in the time of the despot Hippokrates<sup>2</sup>) added two more, and the Leukadians one. Nor could he muster more than one thousand soldiers, reinforced afterwards on the voyage to twelve hundred. A few of the principal Corinthians — Eukleides, Telemachus and Neon, among them — accompanied him. But the soldiers seem to have been chiefly miscellaneous mercenaries, — some of whom had served under the Phokians in the Sacred war (recently brought to a close), and had incurred so much odium as partners in the spolia-

Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 7. Diodorus (xvi. 65) states this striking anti thesis as if it was put by the senate to Timoleon, on conferring upon him the new command. He represents the application from Syracuse as having come to Corinth shortly after the death of Timophanes, and while the trial of Timoleon was yet pending. He says that the senate nominated Timoleon to the command, in order to escape the necessity of pronouncing sentence one way or the other.

I follow the account of Plutarch, as preferable, in recognizing a long interval between the death of Timophanes and the application from Syracuse an interval of much mental suffering to Timoleon.

<sup>2</sup> Herodot. vii. 155.

tion of the Delphian temple, that they were glad to take foreign service anywhere.<sup>1</sup>

Some enthusiasm was indeed required to determine volunteers in an enterprise of which the formidable difficulties, and the doubtful reward, were obvious from the beginning. But even before the preparations were completed, news came which seemed to render it all but hopeless. Hiketas sent a second mission, retracting all that he said in the first, and desiring that no expedition might be sent from Corinth. Not having received Corinthian aid in time (he said), he had been compelled to enter into alliance with the Carthaginians, who would not permit any Corinthian soldiers to set foot in Sicily. This communication, greatly exasperating the Corinthians against Hiketas, rendered them more hearty in votes to put him down. Yet their zeal for active service, far from being increased, was probably even abated by the aggravation of obstacles thus revealed. If Timoleon even reached Sicily, he would find numberless enemies, without a single friend of importance: — for without Hiketas, the Syracusan people were almost helpless. But it now seemed impossible that Timoleon with his small force could ever touch the Sicilian shore, in the face of a numerous and active Carthaginian fleet.<sup>2</sup>

While human circumstances thus seemed hostile, the gods held out to Timoleon the most favorable signs and omens. Not only did he receive an encouraging answer at Delphi, but while he was actually in the temple, a fillet with intertwined wreaths and symbols of victory fell from one of the statues upon his head. The priestesses of Persephonê learnt from the goddess in a dream, that she was about to sail with Timoleon for Sicily, her own favorite island. Accordingly he caused a new special trireme to be fitted out, sacred to the Two goddesses (Dêmêtêr and Persephonê) who were about to accompany him. And when, after leaving Korkyra, the squadron struck across for a night voyage to the Italian coast, this sacred trireme was seen illumined by a blaze of light from heaven; while a burning torch on high, similar to that

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 8, 11, 12, 30; Diodor. xvi. 66; Plutarch, Ser. Num. Vind. p. 552. In the Aristotelian treatise, *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, c. 9, Timoleon is said to have had nine ships.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 7.



which was usually carried in the Eleusinian mysteries, ran along with the ship and guided the pilot to the proper landing place at Metapontum. Such manifestations of divine presence and encouragement, properly certified and commented upon by the prophets, rendered the voyage one of universal hopefulness to the armament.<sup>1</sup>

These hopes, however, were sadly damped, when after disregarding a formal notice from a Carthaginian man-of-war, they sailed down the coast of Italy and at last reached Rhegium. This city, having been before partially revived under the name of Phœbia, by the younger Dionysius, appears now as reconstituted under its old name and with its full former autonomy, since the overthrow of his rule at Lokri and in Italy generally. Twenty Carthaginian triremes, double the force of Timoleon, were found at Rhegium awaiting his arrival — with envoys from Hiketas aboard. These envoys came with what they pretended to be good news. "Hiketas had recently gained a capital victory over Dionysius, whom he had expelled from most part of Syracuse, and was now blocking up in Ortygia; with hopes of soon starving him out, by the aid of a Carthaginian fleet. The common enemy being thus at the end of his resources, the war could not be prolonged. Hiketas therefore trusted that Timoleon would send back to Corinth his fleet and troops, now become superfluous. If Timoleon would do this, he (Hiketas) would be delighted to see him personally at Syracuse, and would gladly consult him in the resettlement of that unhappy city. But he could not admit the Corinthian armament into the island; moreover, even had he been willing, the Carthaginians peremptorily forbade it, and were prepared, in case of need, to repel it with their superior naval force now in the strait."<sup>2</sup>

The game which Hiketas was playing with the Carthaginians now stood plainly revealed, to the vehement indignation of the armament. Instead of being their friend, or even neutral, he was nothing less than a pronounced enemy, emancipating Syracuse from Dionysius only to divide it between himself and the Carthaginians. Yet with all the ardor of the armament, it was im-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 8; Diodor. xvi. 66.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 9; Diodor. xvi. 68.

possible to cross the strait in opposition to an enemy's fleet of double force. Accordingly Timoleon resorted to a stratagem, in which the leaders and people of Rhegium, eagerly sympathizing with his projects of Sicilian emancipation, cooperated. In an interview with the envoys of Hiketas as well as with the Carthaginian commanders, he affected to accept the conditions prescribed by Hiketas; admitting at once that it was useless to stand out. But he at the same time reminded them, that he had been intrusted with the command of the armament for Sicilian purposes, — and that he should be a disgraced man, if he now conducted it back without touching the island; except under the pressure of some necessity not merely real, but demonstrable to all and attested by unexceptionable witnesses. He therefore desired them to appear, along with him, before the public assembly of Rhegium, a neutral city and common friend of both parties. They would then publicly repeat the communication which they had already made to him, and they would enter into formal engagement for the good treatment of the Syracusans, as soon as Dionysius should be expelled. Such proceeding would make the people of Rhegium witnesses on both points. They would testify on his (Timoleon's) behalf, when he came to defend himself at Corinth, that he had turned his back only before invincible necessity, and that he had exacted everything in his power in the way of guarantee for Syracuse; they would testify also on behalf of the Syracusans, in case the guarantee now given should be hereafter evaded.<sup>1</sup>

Neither the envoys of Hiketas, nor the Carthaginian commanders, had any motive to decline what seemed to them an unmeaning ceremony. Both of them accordingly attended, along with Timoleon, before the public assembly of Rhegium formally convened. The gates of the city were closed (a practice usual during the time of a public assembly): the Carthaginian men-of-war lay as usual near at hand, but in no state for immediate movement, and perhaps with many of the crews ashore; since all chance of hostility seemed to be past. What had been already communicated to Timoleon from Hiketas and the Carthaginians, was now repeated in formal deposition before the assembly; the envoys of Hiketas probably going into the case more at length, with certain

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 10.



flourishes of speech prompted by their own vanity. Timoleon stood by as an attentive listener; but before he could rise to reply, various Rhegine speakers came forward with comments or questions, which called up the envoys again. A long time was thus insensibly wasted, Timoleon often trying to get an opportunity to speak, but being always apparently constrained to give way to some obtrusive Rhegine. During this long time, however, his triremes in the harbor were not idle. One by one, with as little noise as possible, they quitted their anchorage and rowed out to sea, directing their course towards Sicily. The Carthaginian fleet, though seeing this proceeding, neither knew what it meant, nor had any directions to prevent it. At length the other Grecian triremes were all afloat and in progress; that of Timoleon alone remaining in the harbor. Intimation being secretly given to him as he sat in the assembly, he slipped away from the crowd, his friends concealing his escape — and got aboard immediately. His absence was not discovered at first, the debate continuing as if he were still present, and intentionally prolonged by the Rhegine speakers. At length the truth could no longer be kept back. The envoys and the Carthaginians found out that the assembly and the debate were mere stratagems, and that their real enemy had disappeared. But they found it out too late. Timoleon with his triremes was already on the voyage to Tauromenium in Sicily, where all arrived safe and without opposition. Overreached and humiliated, his enemies left the assembly in vehement wrath against the Rhegines, who reminded them that Carthaginians ought to be the last to complain of deception in others.<sup>1</sup>

The well-managed stratagem, whereby Timoleon had overcome a difficulty to all appearance insurmountable, exalted both his own fame and the spirits of his soldiers. They were now safe in Sicily, at Tauromenium, a recent settlement near the site of the ancient Naxos: receiving hearty welcome from Andromachus, the leading citizen of the place — whose influence was so mildly exercised, and gave such complete satisfaction, that it continued through and after the reform of Timoleon, when the citizens might certainly have swept it away if they had desired. Andromachus, having been forward in inviting Timoleon to come, now prepared

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 10, 11.

to cooperate with him, and returned a spirited reply to the menaces sent over from Rhegium by the Carthaginians, after they had vainly pursued the Corinthian squadron to Tauromenium.

But Andromachus and Tauromenium were but petty auxiliaries compared with the enemies against whom Timoleon had to contend; enemies now more formidable than ever. For Hiketas, incensed with the stratagem practised at Rhegium, and apprehensive of interruption to the blockade which he was carrying on against Ortygia, sent for an additional squadron of Carthaginian men-of-war to Syracuse; the harbor of which place was presently completely beset.<sup>1</sup> A large Carthaginian land force was also acting under Hanno in the western regions of the island, with considerable success against the Campanians of Entella and others.<sup>2</sup> The Sicilian towns had their native despots, Mamerkus at Katane — Leptines at Apollonia<sup>3</sup> — Nikodemus at Kentoripa — Apolloniades at Agyrium<sup>4</sup> — from whom Timoleon could expect no aid, except in so far as they might feel predominant fear of the Carthaginians. And the Syracusans, even when they heard of his arrival at Tauromenium, scarcely ventured to indulge hopes of serious relief from such a handful of men, against the formidable array of Hiketas and the Carthaginians under their walls. Moreover, what guarantee had they that Timoleon would turn out better than Dion, Kallippus, and others before him? seductive promisers of emancipation, who, if they succeeded, forgot the words by which they had won men's hearts, and thought only of appropriating to themselves the sceptre of the previous despot, perhaps even aggravating all that was bad in his rule? Such was the question asked by many a suffering citizen of Syracuse, amidst that despair and sickness of heart which made the name of an armed liberator sound only like a new deceiver and a new scourge.<sup>5</sup>

It was by acts alone that Timoleon could refute such well-grounded suspicions. But at first, no one believed in him; nor could he escape the baneful effects of that mistrust which his predecessors had everywhere inspired. The messengers whom he

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 67.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13-24; Diodor. xvi. 72.

<sup>4</sup> Diodor. xvi. 82.

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 11.



sent round were so coldly received, that he seemed likely to find no allies beyond the walls of Tauromenium.

At length one invitation, of great importance, reached him — from the town of Adranum, about forty miles inland from Tauromenium; a native Sikel town, seemingly in part hellenized, inconsiderable in size, but venerated as sacred to the god Adranus, whose worship was diffused throughout all Sicily. The Adranites being politically divided, at the same time that one party sent the invitation to Timoleon, the other despatched a similar message to Hiketas. Either at Syracuse or Leontini, Hiketas was nearer to Adranum than Timoleon at Tauromenium; and lost no time in marching thither, with five thousand troops, to occupy so important a place. He arrived there in the evening, found no enemy, and established his camp without the walls, believing himself already master of the place. Timoleon, with his inferior numbers, knew that he had no chance of success except in surprise. Accordingly, on setting out from Tauromenium, he made no great progress the first day, in order that no report of his approach might reach Adranum; but on the next morning he marched with the greatest possible effort, taking the shortest, yet most rugged paths. On arriving within about three miles of Adranum, he was informed that the troops from Syracuse, having just finished their march, had encamped near the town, not aware of any enemy near. His officers were anxious that the men should be refreshed after their very fatiguing march, before they ventured to attack an army four times superior in number. But Timoleon earnestly protested against any such delay, entreating them to follow him at once against the enemy, as the only chance of finding them unprepared. To encourage them, he at once took up his shield and marched at their head, carrying it on his arm (the shield of the general was habitually carried for him by an orderly), in spite of the fatiguing march, which he had himself performed on foot as well as they. The soldiers obeyed, and the effort was crowned by complete success. The troops of Hiketas, unarmed and at their suppers, were taken so completely by surprise, that in spite of their superior number, they fled with scarce any resistance. From the rapidity of their flight, three hundred of them only were slain. But six hundred were made prisoners, and the whole camp, in

cluding its appurtenances, was taken, with scarcely the loss of a man. Hiketas escaped with the rest to Syracuse.<sup>1</sup>

This victory, so rapidly and skilfully won — and the acquisition of Adranum which followed it — produced the strongest sensation throughout Sicily. It counted even for more than a victory; it was a declaration of the gods in favor of Timoleon. The inhabitants of the holy town, opening their gates and approaching him with awe-stricken reverence, recounted the visible manifestations of the god Adranus in his favor. At the moment when the battle was commencing, they had seen the portals of their temple spontaneously burst open, and the god brandishing his spear, with profuse perspiration on his face.<sup>2</sup> Such facts, — verified and attested in a place of peculiar sanctity, and circulated from thence throughout the neighboring communities, — contributed hardly less than the victory to exalt the glory of Timoleon. He received offers of alliance from Tyndaris and several other towns, as well as from Mamerkus despot of Katana, one of the most warlike and powerful princes in the island.<sup>3</sup> So numerous were the reinforcements thus acquired, and so much was his confidence enhanced by recent success, that he now ventured to march even under the walls of Syracuse, and defy Hiketas; who did not think it prudent to hazard a second engagement with the victor of Adranum.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 12; Diodor. xvi. 68. Diodorus and Plutarch agree in the numbers both of killed and of prisoners on the side of Hiketas.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 12.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13; Diodor. xvi. 69.

<sup>4</sup> Diodor. xvi. 68, 69. That Timoleon marched up to Syracuse, is stated by Diodorus, though not by Plutarch. I follow Diodorus so far; because it makes the subsequent proceedings in regard to Dionysius more clear and intelligible.

But Diodorus adds two further matters, which cannot be correct. He affirms that Timoleon pursued Hiketas at a running pace (*δρομαίως*) immediately from the field of battle at Adranum to Syracuse; and that he then got possession of the portion of Syracuse called Epipolæ.

Now it was with some difficulty that Timoleon could get his troops even up to the field of battle at Adranum, without some previous repose: so long and fatiguing was the march which they had undergone from Tauromenium. It is therefore impossible that they can have been either inclined or competent to pursue (at a rapid pace) Hiketas immediately from the field of battle at Adranum to Syracuse.



Hiketas was still master of all Syracuse — except Ortygia, against which he had constructed lines of blockade, in conjunction with the Carthaginian fleet occupying the harbor. Timoleon was in no condition to attack the place, and would have been obliged speedily to retire, as his enemies did not choose to come out. But it was soon seen that the manifestations of the Two goddesses, and of the god Adranus, in his favor, were neither barren nor delusive. A real boon was now thrown into his lap, such as neither skill nor valor could have won. Dionysius, blocked up in Ortygia with a scanty supply of provisions, saw from his walls the approaching army of Timoleon, and heard of the victory of Adranum. He had already begun to despair of his own position of Ortygia;<sup>1</sup> where indeed he might perhaps hold out by bold effort and steady endurance, but without any reasonable chance of again becoming master of Syracuse; a chance which Timoleon and the Corinthian intervention cut off more decidedly than ever. Dionysius was a man not only without the energetic character and personal ascendancy of his father, which might have made head against such difficulties — but indolent and drunken in his habits, not relishing a sceptre when it could only be maintained by hard fighting, nor stubborn enough to stand out to the last merely as a cause of war.<sup>2</sup> Under these dispositions, the arrival of Timoleon both suggested to him the idea, and furnished him with the means, of making his resignation subservient to the purchase of a safe asylum and comfortable future maintenance: for to a Grecian despot, with the odium of past severities accumulated upon his head, abnegation of power was hardly ever possible, consistent with personal security.<sup>3</sup> But Dionysius felt assured that he might trust to the guarantee of Timoleon and the Corinthians for shel-

Next, it will appear from subsequent operations, that Timoleon did not, on this occasion, get possession of any other portion of Syracuse than the Islet Ortygia, surrendered to him by Dionysius. He did not enter Epipolæ until afterwards.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13. ἀπειρηκώς ἤδη ταῖς ἑλλήσι καὶ μικρὸν ἀπολιπὼν ἐκπολιορκεῖσθαι, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Tacitus, Histor. iii. 70. Respecting the last days of the Emperor Vespasian, "Ipse, neque jubendi neque vetandi potens, non jam Imperator, sed tantum belli causa erat."

<sup>3</sup> See, among other illustrations of this fact, the striking remark of Solon (Plutarch, Solon, c. 14).

ter and protection at Corinth, with as much property as he could carry away with him; since he had the means of purchasing such guarantee by the surrender of Ortygia — a treasure of inestimable worth. Accordingly he resolved to propose a capitulation, and sent envoys to Timoleon for the purpose.

There was little difficulty in arranging terms. Dionysius stipulated only for a safe transit with his movable property to Corinth, and for an undisturbed residence in that city; tendering in exchange the unconditional surrender of Ortygia with all its garrison, arms, and magazines. The convention was concluded forthwith, and three Corinthian officers — Telemachus, Eukleides and Neon — were sent in with four hundred men to take charge of the place. Their entrance was accomplished safely, though they were obliged to elude the blockade by stealing in at several times, and in small companies. Making over to them the possession of Ortygia with the command of its garrison, Dionysius passed, with some money and a small number of companions, into the camp of Timoleon; who conveyed him away, leaving at the same time the neighborhood of Syracuse.<sup>1</sup>

Conceive the position and feelings of Dionysius, a prisoner in the camp of Timoleon, traversing that island over which his father as well as himself had reigned all-powerful, and knowing himself to be the object of either hatred or contempt to every one, — except so far as the immense boon which he had conferred, by surrendering Ortygia, purchased for him an indulgent forbearance! He was doubtless eager for immediate departure to Corinth, while Timoleon was no less anxious to send him thither, as the living evidence of triumph accomplished. Although not fifty days<sup>2</sup> had yet elapsed, since Timoleon's landing in Sicily, he was enabled already to announce a decisive victory, a great confederacy grouped around him, and the possession of the inexpugnable position of Ortygia, with a garrison equal in number to his own army; the despatches being accompanied by the presence of that

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13; Diodor. xvi. 70. Diodorus appears to me to misdate these facts; placing the capitulation of Dionysius and the surrender of Ortygia to Timoleon, after the capture of the other portion of Syracuse by Timoleon. I follow Plutarch's chronology, which places the capitulation of Ortygia first.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 16.



Hiketas was still master of all Syracuse — except Ortygia, against which he had constructed lines of blockade, in conjunction with the Carthaginian fleet occupying the harbor. Timoleon was in no condition to attack the place, and would have been obliged speedily to retire, as his enemies did not choose to come out. But it was soon seen that the manifestations of the Two goddesses, and of the god Adranus, in his favor, were neither barren nor delusive. A real boon was now thrown into his lap, such as neither skill nor valor could have won. Dionysius, blocked up in Ortygia with a scanty supply of provisions, saw from his walls the approaching army of Timoleon, and heard of the victory of Adranum. He had already begun to despair of his own position of Ortygia;<sup>1</sup> where indeed he might perhaps hold out by bold effort and steady endurance, but without any reasonable chance of again becoming master of Syracuse; a chance which Timoleon and the Corinthian intervention cut off more decidedly than ever. Dionysius was a man not only without the energetic character and personal ascendancy of his father, which might have made head against such difficulties — but indolent and drunken in his habits, not relishing a sceptre when it could only be maintained by hard fighting, nor stubborn enough to stand out to the last merely as a cause of war.<sup>2</sup> Under these dispositions, the arrival of Timoleon both suggested to him the idea, and furnished him with the means, of making his resignation subservient to the purchase of a safe asylum and comfortable future maintenance: for to a Grecian despot, with the odium of past severities accumulated upon his head, abnegation of power was hardly ever possible, consistent with personal security.<sup>3</sup> But Dionysius felt assured that he might trust to the guarantee of Timoleon and the Corinthians for shel-

Next, it will appear from subsequent operations, that Timoleon did not, on this occasion, get possession of any other portion of Syracuse than the Islet Ortygia, surrendered to him by Dionysius. He did not enter Epipolæ until afterwards.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13. ἀπειρηκὼς ἤδη ταῖς ἐλπίσι καὶ μικρὸν ἀπολιπὼν ἐκπολιορκεῖσθαι, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Tacitus, Histor. iii. 70. Respecting the last days of the Emperor Vitellius, "Ipse, neque jubendi neque vetandi potens, non jam Imperator, sed tantum belli causa erat."

<sup>3</sup> See, among other illustrations of this fact, the striking remark of Solon (Plutarch, Solon, c. 14).

ter and protection at Corinth, with as much property as he could carry away with him; since he had the means of purchasing such guarantee by the surrender of Ortygia — a treasure of inestimable worth. Accordingly he resolved to propose a capitulation, and sent envoys to Timoleon for the purpose.

There was little difficulty in arranging terms. Dionysius stipulated only for a safe transit with his movable property to Corinth, and for an undisturbed residence in that city; tendering in exchange the unconditional surrender of Ortygia with all its garrison, arms, and magazines. The convention was concluded forthwith, and three Corinthian officers — Telemachus, Eukleides and Neon — were sent in with four hundred men to take charge of the place. Their entrance was accomplished safely, though they were obliged to elude the blockade by stealing in at several times, and in small companies. Making over to them the possession of Ortygia with the command of its garrison, Dionysius passed, with some money and a small number of companions, into the camp of Timoleon; who conveyed him away, leaving at the same time the neighborhood of Syracuse.<sup>1</sup>

Conceive the position and feelings of Dionysius, a prisoner in the camp of Timoleon, traversing that island over which his father as well as himself had reigned all-powerful, and knowing himself to be the object of either hatred or contempt to every one, — except so far as the immense boon which he had conferred, by surrendering Ortygia, purchased for him an indulgent forbearance! He was doubtless eager for immediate departure to Corinth, while Timoleon was no less anxious to send him thither, as the living evidence of triumph accomplished. Although not fifty days<sup>2</sup> had yet elapsed, since Timoleon's landing in Sicily, he was enabled already to announce a decisive victory, a great confederacy grouped around him, and the possession of the inexpugnable position of Ortygia, with a garrison equal in number to his own army; the despatches being accompanied by the presence of that

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13; Diodor. xvi. 79. Diodorus appears to me to misdate these facts; placing the capitulation of Dionysius and the surrender of Ortygia to Timoleon, after the capture of the other portion of Syracuse by Timoleon. I follow Plutarch's chronology, which places the capitulation of Ortygia first.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 16.



very despot, bearing the terrific name of Dionysius, against whom the expedition had been chiefly aimed! Timoleon sent a special trireme<sup>1</sup> to Corinth, carrying Dionysius, and communicating important events, together with the convention which guaranteed to the dethroned ruler an undisturbed residence in that city.

The impression produced at Corinth by the arrival of this trireme and its passengers was powerful beyond all parallel. Astonishment and admiration were universal; for the expedition of Timoleon had started as a desperate venture, in which scarce one among the leading Corinthians had been disposed to embark; nor had any man conceived the possibility of success so rapid as well as so complete. But the victorious prospect in Sicily, with service under the fortunate general, was now the general passion of the citizens. A reinforcement of two thousand hoplites and two hundred cavalry was immediately voted and equipped.<sup>2</sup>

If the triumph excited wonder and joy, the person of Dionysius himself appealed no less powerfully to other feelings. A fallen despot was a sight denied to Grecian eyes; whoever aspired to despotism, put his all to hazard, forfeiting his chance of retiring to a private station. By a remarkable concurrence of cir-

<sup>1</sup> Theopompus stated that Dionysius had gone from Sicily to Corinth in a merchant ship (*νῆλ στρογγύλη*). Timæus contradicted this assertion seemingly with his habitual asperity, and stated that Dionysius had been sent in a ship of war (*νῆλ μακρῇ*). See Timæus, Fragment 133; Theopompus, Fragm. 216, ed. Didot.

Diodorus (xvi. 70) copies Theopompus.

Polybius (xii. 4 a) censures Timæus for cavilling at such small inaccuracies, as if the difference between the two were not worth noticing. Probably the language of Timæus may have deserved blame as ill-mannered; but the matter of fact appears to me to have been perfectly worth correcting. To send Dionysius in a trireme, was treating him as prisoner in a respectful manner, which Timoleon was doubtless bound to do; and which he would be inclined to do on his own account — seeing that he had a strong interest in making the entry of Dionysius as a captive into Corinth, an impressive sight. Moreover the trireme would reach Corinth more speedily than the merchantman.

That Dionysius should go in a merchant-ship, was one additional evidence of fallen fortune; and this seems to have been the reason why it was taken up by Theopompus — from the passion, prevalent among so many Greek authors, for exaggerating contrasts.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon. c. 13, 14, 15.

cumstances, the exception to this rule was presented just where it was least likely to take place; in the case of the most formidable and odious despotism which had ever overridden the Grecian world. For nearly half a century prior to the expedition of Dion against Syracuse, every one had been accustomed to pronounce the name of Dionysius with a mixture of fear and hatred — the sentiment of prostration before irresistible force. How much difficulty Dion himself found, in overcoming this impression in the minds of his own soldiers, has been already related. Though dissipated by the success of Dion, the antecedent alarm became again revived, when Dionysius recovered his possession of Ortygia, and when the Syracusans made pathetic appeal to Corinth for aid against him. Now, on a sudden, the representative of this extinct greatness, himself bearing the awful name of Dionysius, enters Corinth under a convention, suing only for the humble domicile and unpretending security of a private citizen.<sup>1</sup> The Greek mind was keenly sensitive to such contrasts, which entered largely into every man's views of human affairs, and were reproduced in a thousand forms by writers and speakers. The affluence of visitors — who crowded to gaze upon and speak to Dionysius, not merely from Corinth, but from other cities of Greece — was immense; some in simple curiosity, others with compassion, a few even with insulting derision. The anecdotes which are recounted seem intended to convey a degrading impression of this last period of his career. But even the common offices of life — the purchase of unguents and condiments at the tavern<sup>2</sup> — the nicety of criticism displayed respecting robes and furniture<sup>3</sup> — looked degrading when performed by the ex-despot of Syracuse. His habit of drinking largely, already contracted, was not likely to become amended in these days of mortification;

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 14; Diodor. xvi. 70. The remarks of Tacitus upon the last hours of the Emperor Vitellius have their application to the Greek feeling on this occasion (Histor. iii. 68): — *Nec quisquam adeo rerum humanarum immemor, quem non commoveret illa facies; Romanum principem, et generis humani paulo ante dominum, relictâ fortunæ suæ sede, exire de imperio. Nihil tale viderant, nihil audierant,* etc.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 14; Theopomp. Fragm. 217, ed. Didot.; Justin, xxi. 5.

<sup>3</sup> Timæus, ap. Polybium. xii. 24.



yet on the whole his conduct seems to have had more dignity than could have been expected. His literary tastes, manifested during the time of his intercourse with Plato, are implied even in the anecdotes intended to disparage him. Thus he is said to have opened a school for teaching boys to read, and to have instructed the public singers in the art of singing or reciting poetry.<sup>1</sup> His name served to subsequent writers, both Greek and Roman, — as those of Croesus, Polykrates, and Xerxes, serve to Herodotus — for an instance to point a moral on the mutability of human events. Yet the anecdotes recorded about him can rarely be verified, nor can we distinguish real matters of fact from those suitable and impressive myths which so pregnant a situation was sure to bring forth.

Among those who visited him at Corinth was Aristoxenus of Tarentum: for the Tarentine leaders, first introduced by Plato, had maintained their correspondence with Dionysius even after his first expulsion from Syracuse to Lokri, and had vainly endeavored to preserve his unfortunate wife and daughters from the retributive vengeance of the Lokrians. During the palmy days of Dionysius, his envoy Polyarchus had been sent on a mission to Tarentum, where he came into conversation with the chief magistrate Archytas. This conversation Aristoxenus had recorded in writing; probably from the personal testimony of Archytas, whose biography he composed. Polyarchus dwelt upon wealth, power, and sensual enjoyments, as the sole objects worth living for; pronouncing those who possessed them in large masses, as the only beings deserving admiration. At the summit of all stood the Persian King, whom Polyarchus extolled as the most enviable and admirable of mortals. "Next to the Persian King (said he),

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timol. c. 14; Cicero, Tuscul. Disp. iii. 12, 7. His remark, that Dionysius opened the school from anxiety still to have the pleasure of exercising authority, can hardly be meant as serious.

We cannot suppose that Dionysius in his exile at Corinth suffered under any want of a comfortable income: for it is mentioned, that all his movable furniture (*ἐπισκευή*) was bought by his namesake Dionysius, the fortunate despot of the Pontic Herakleia; and this furniture was so magnificent, that the acquisition of it is counted among the peculiar marks of ornament and dignity to the Herakleotic dynasty: — see the Fragments of the historian Memnon of Herakleia, ch. iv. p. 10, ed. Orell. apud Photium Cod. 224.

though with a very long interval, comes our despot of Syracuse.<sup>1</sup> What had become of Polyarchus, we do not know; but Aristoxenus lived to see the envied Dionysius under the altered phase of his life at Corinth, and probably to witness the ruin of the Persian Kings also. On being asked, what had been the cause of his displeasure against Plato, Dionysius replied, in language widely differing from that of his former envoy Polyarchus, that amidst the many evils which surrounded a despot, none was so mischievous as the unwillingness of his so-called friends to tell him the truth. Such false friends had poisoned the good feeling between him and Plato.<sup>2</sup> This anecdote bears greater mark of being genuine, than others which we read more witty and pungent. The Cynic philosopher Diogenes treated Dionysius with haughty scorn for submitting to live in a private station after having enjoyed so overruling an ascendancy. Such was more or less the sentiment of every visitor who saw him; but the matter to be lamented is, that he had not been in a private station from the beginning. He was by nature unfit to tread, even with profit to himself, the perilous and thorny path of a Grecian despot.

The reinforcements decreed by the Corinthians, though equipped without delay and forwarded to Thurii in Italy, were prevented from proceeding farther on shipboard by the Carthaginian squadron at the strait, and were condemned to wait for a favorable opportunity.<sup>3</sup> But the greatest of all reinforcements to Timoleon was, the acquisition of Ortygia. It contained not merely a garrison of two thousand soldiers — who passed (probably much to their own satisfaction) from the declining cause of Dionysius to the victorious banner of Timoleon — but also every species of military stores. There were horses, engines for siege and batte-

<sup>1</sup> Aristoxenus, Fragm. 15, ed. Didot. ap. Athenæum, p. 545. *δεύτερον δὲ, φησί, τὸν ἡμέτερον τύραννον θεῖναι τις ἂν, καίπερ πολὺ λειπόμενον.*

One sees that the word *τύραννος* was used even by those who intended no unfriendly sense — applied by an admiring envoy to his master.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 15. Aristoxenus heard from Dionysius at Corinth the remarkable anecdote about the faithful attachment of the two Pythagorean friends, Damon and Phintias. Dionysius had been strongly impressed with the incident, and was fond of relating it *πολλάκις ἡμῖν ἀγγεῖτο*, Aristoxen. Fragm. 9, ed. Didot; apud Jamblichum Vit. Pythag. c. 233).

Plutarch, Timoleon. c. 16



ry, missiles of every sort, and above all, shields and spears to the amazing number of seventy thousand — if Plutarch's statement is exact.<sup>1</sup> Having dismissed Dionysius, Timoleon organized a service of small craft from Katana to convey provisions by sea to Ortygia, eluding the Carthaginian guard squadron. He found means to do this with tolerable success,<sup>2</sup> availing himself of winds or bad weather, when the ships of war could not obstruct the entrance of the lesser harbor. Meanwhile he himself returned to Adranum, a post convenient for watching both Leontini and Syracuse. Here two assassins, bribed by Hiketas, were on the point of taking his life, while sacrificing at a festival; and were only prevented by an accident so remarkable, that every one recognized the visible intervention of the gods to protect him.<sup>3</sup>

Meanwhile Hiketas, being resolved to acquire possession of Ortygia, invoked the aid of the full Carthaginian force under Magon. The great harbor of Syracuse was presently occupied by an overwhelming fleet of one hundred and fifty Carthaginian ships of war, while a land force, said to consist of sixty thousand men, came also to join Hiketas, and were quartered by him within the walls of Syracuse. Never before had any Carthaginian troops got footing within those walls. Syracusan liberty, perhaps Syracusan Hellenism, now appeared extinct. Even Ortygia, in spite of the bravery of its garrison under the Corinthian Neon, seemed not long tenable, against repeated attack and battery of the walls, combined with strict blockade to keep out supplies by sea. Still, however, though the garrison was distressed, some small craft with provisions from Katana contrived to slip in; a fact, which induced Hiketas and Magon to form the plan of attacking that town, thinking themselves strong enough to accomplish this by a part of their force, without discontinuing the siege of Ortygia. Accordingly they sailed forth from the harbor, and marched from the city of Syracuse, with the best part of their armament, to attack Katana, leaving Ortygia still under blockade. But the commanders left behind were so negligent in their watch, that Neon soon saw from the walls of Ortygia the opportunity of attacking them with advantage. Making a sudden and vigor-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 16.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 18.

ous sally, he fell upon the blockading army unawares, routed them at all points with serious loss, and pressed his pursuit so warmly, that he got possession of Achradina, expelling them from that important section of the city. The provisions and money, acquired herein at a critical moment, rendered this victory important. But what gave it the chief value was, the possession of Achradina which Neon immediately caused to be joined on to Ortygia by a new line of fortifications, and thus held the two in combination.<sup>1</sup> Ortygia had been before (as I have already remarked) completely distinct from Achradina. It is probable that the population of Achradina, delighted to be liberated from the Carthaginians, lent zealous aid to Neon both in the defence of their own walls, and in the construction of the new connecting lines towards Ortygia; for which the numerous intervening tombs would supply materials.

This gallant exploit of Neon permanently changed the position of the combatants at Syracuse. A horseman started instantly to convey the bad news to Hiketas and Magon near Katana. Both of them returned forthwith; but they returned only to occupy half of the city — Tycha, Neapolis, and Epipolæ. It became extremely difficult to prosecute a successful siege or blockade of Ortygia and Achradina united: besides that Neon had now obtained abundant supplies for the moment.

Meanwhile Timoleon too was approaching, reinforced by the new Corinthian division; who, having been at first detained at Thurii, and becoming sick of delay, had made their way inland, across the Bruttian territory, to Rhegium. They were fortunate enough to find the strait unguarded; for the Carthaginian admiral Hanno — having seen their ships laid up at Thurii, and not anticipating their advance by land — had first returned with his squad-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 18. . . . 'Ο δὲ Κορίνθιος Νέων, κατιδὼν ἀπὸ τῆς ἄκρας τοὺς ὑπολειμμένους τῶν πολεμίων ἀργῶς καὶ ἀμελῶς φυλάττοντας, ἐξαίφνης ἐνέπεσε δ' ἰσπαρμένους αὐτοῖς· καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀνελὼν, τοὺς δὲ τρεψάμενος, ἐκράτησε καὶ κάτεσχε τὴν λεγομένην Ἀχραδινὴν, ἧς κράτιστον ἐδόκει καὶ ἀθραυστότατον ὑπάρχειν τῆς Συρακοσίων μέρους πόλεως, τρόπον τινα συγκειμένης καὶ συνηρμοσμένης ἐκ πλείονων πόλεων. Εὐπορήσας δὲ καὶ σίτον καὶ χρημάτων οὐκ ἄφηκε τὸν τόπον, οὐδ' ἀνεχώρησε πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄκραν, ἀλλὰ φραζόμενος τὸν περίβολον τῆς Ἀχραδίνης καὶ συνάψας τοῖς ἐρύμασι πρὸς τὴν ἄκρόπολιν, διεφύλαττε



ron to the Strait of Messina, and next, hoping by a stratagem to frighten the garrison of Ortygia into surrender, had sailed to the harbor of Syracuse with his triremes decorated as if after a victory. His seamen with wreaths round their heads, shouted as they passed into the harbor under the walls of Ortygia, that the Corinthian squadron approaching the strait had been all captured, and exhibited as proofs of the victory certain Grecian shields hung up aboard. By this silly fabrication, Hanno probably produced a serious dismay among the garrison of Ortygia. But he purchased such temporary satisfaction at the cost of leaving the strait unguarded, and allowing the Corinthian division to cross unopposed from Italy into Sicily. On reaching Rhegium, they not only found the strait free, but also a complete and sudden calm, succeeding upon several days of stormy weather. Embarking immediately on such ferry boats and fishing craft as they could find, and swimming their horses alongside by the bridle, they reached the Sicilian coast without loss or difficulty.<sup>1</sup>

Thus did the gods again show their favor towards Timoleon by an unusual combination of circumstances, and by smiting the enemy with blindness. So much did the tide of success run along with him, that the important town of Messênê declared itself among his allies, admitting the new Corinthian soldiers immediately on their landing. With little delay, they proceeded forward to join Timoleon; who thought himself strong enough, notwithstanding that even with this reinforcement he could only command four thousand men, to march up to the vicinity of Syracuse, and there to confront the immeasurably superior force of his enemies.<sup>2</sup> He appears to have encamped near the Olympieion, and the bridge over the river Anapus.

Though Timoleon was sure of the cooperation of Neon and the Corinthian garrison in Ortygia and Achradina, yet he was separated from them by the numerous force of Hiketas and Magon, who occupied Epipolæ, Neapolis, and Tycha, together with the low ground between Epipolæ and the Great Harbor; while the large Carthaginian fleet filled the Harbor itself. On a reasonable calculation, Timoleon seemed to have little chance of success. But suspicion had already begun in the mind of Magon, sowing

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon. c. 19

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 20

the seeds of disunion between him and Hiketas. The alliance between Carthaginians and Greeks was one unnatural to both parties, and liable to be crossed, at every mischance, by mutual distrust, growing out of antipathy which each party felt in itself and knew to subsist in the other. The unfortunate scheme of marching to Katana, with the capital victory gained by Neon in consequence of that absence, made Magon believe that Hiketas was betraying him. Such apprehensions were strengthened, when he saw in his front the army of Timoleon, posted on the river Anapus — and when he felt that he was in a Greek city generally disaffected to him, while Neon was at his rear in Ortygia and Achradina. Under such circumstances, Magon conceived the whole safety of his Carthaginians as depending on the zealous and faithful cooperation of Hiketas, in whom he had now ceased to confide. And his mistrust, once suggested, was aggravated by the friendly communication which he saw going on between the soldiers of Timoleon and those of Hiketas. These soldiers, all Greeks and mercenaries fighting for a country not their own, encountered each other, on the field of battle, like enemies, — but conversed in a pacific and amicable way, during intervals, in their respective camps. Both were now engaged, without disturbing each other, in catching eels amidst the marshy and watery ground between Epipolæ and the Anapus. Interchanging remarks freely, they were admiring the splendor and magnitude of Syracuse with its great maritime convenience, — when one of Timoleon's soldiers observed to the opposite party — "And this magnificent city, you Greeks as you are, are striving to barbarise, planting these Carthaginian cut-throats nearer to us than they now are; though our first anxiety ought to be, to keep them as far off as possible from Greece. Do you really suppose that they have brought up this host from the Atlantic and the pillars of Herakles, all for the sake of Hiketas and his rule? Why, if Hiketas took measure of affairs like a true ruler, he would not thus turn out his brethren, and bring in an enemy to his country; he would ensure to himself an honorable sway, by coming to an understanding with the Corinthians and Timoleon." Such was the colloquy passing between the soldiers of Timoleon and those of Hiketas, and speedily made known to the Carthaginians. Having made apparently strong impression on those to whom it was addressed, it justified alarm



in Magon; who was led to believe that he could no longer trust his Sicilian allies. Without any delay, he put all his troops aboard the fleet, and in spite of the most strenuous remonstrances from Hiketas sailed away to Africa.<sup>1</sup>

On the next day, when Timoleon approached to the attack, he was amazed to find the Carthaginian army and fleet withdrawn. His soldiers, scarcely believing their eyes, laughed to scorn the cowardice of Magon. Still however Hiketas determined to defend Syracuse with his own troops, in spite of the severe blow inflicted by Magon's desertion. That desertion had laid open both the Harbor, and the lower ground near the Harbor; so that Timoleon was enabled to come into direct communication with his garrison in Ortygia and Achradina, and to lay plans for a triple simultaneous onset. He himself undertook to attack the southern front of Epipolæ towards the river Anapus, where the city was strongest; the Corinthian Isias was instructed to make a vigorous assault from Achradina, or the eastern side; while Deinarchus and Demaretus, the generals who had conducted the recent reinforcement from Corinth, were ordered to attack the northern wall of Epipolæ, or the Hexapylon;<sup>2</sup> they were probably sent round from Ortygia, by sea, to land at Trogilus. Hiketas, holding as he did the aggregate consisting of Epipolæ, Tychea, and Neapolis, was assailed on three sides at once. He had a most defensible position, which a good commander, with brave and faithful troops, might have maintained against forces more numerous than those of Timoleon. Yet in spite of such advantages, no effective resistance was made, nor even attempted. Timoleon not only took the place, but took it without the loss of a single man, killed or wounded. Hiketas and his followers fled to Leontini.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 20.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 21. The account given by Plutarch of Timoleon's attack is very intelligible. He states that the side of Epipolæ fronting southwards or towards the river Anapus was the strongest.

Saverio Cavallari (Zur Topographie von Syrakus, p. 22) confirms this, by remarking that the northern side of Epipolæ, towards Trogilus, is the weakest, and easiest for access or attack.

We thus see that Epipolæ was the *last* portion of Syracuse which Timoleon mastered — not the *first* portion, as Diodorus states (xvi. 69).

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 21.

The desertion of Magon explains of course a great deal of discouragement among the soldiers of Hiketas. But when we read the astonishing facility of the capture, it is evident that there must have been something more than discouragement. The soldiers on defence were really unwilling to use their arms for the purpose of repelling Timoleon, and keeping up the dominion of Hiketas in Syracuse. When we find this sentiment so powerfully manifested, we cannot but discern that the aversion of these men to serve, in what they looked upon as a Carthaginian cause, threw into the hands of Timoleon an easy victory, and that the mistrustful retreat of Magon was not so absurd and cowardly as Plutarch represents.<sup>1</sup>

The Grecian public, however, not minutely scrutinizing preliminary events, heard the easy capture as a fact, and heard it with unbounded enthusiasm. From Sicily and Italy the news rapidly spread to Corinth and other parts of Greece. Everywhere the sentiment was the same; astonishment and admiration, not merely at the magnitude of the conquest, but also at the ease and rapidity with which it had been achieved. The arrival of the captive Dionysius at Corinth had been in itself a most impressive event. But now the Corinthians learnt the disappearance of the large Carthaginian host and the total capture of Syracuse, without the loss of a man; and that too before they were even assured that their second reinforcement, which they knew to have been blocked up at Thurii, had been able to touch the Sicilian shore.

Such transcendent novelties excited even in Greece, and much more in Sicily itself, a sentiment towards Timoleon such as hardly any Greek had ever yet drawn to himself. His bravery, his skilful plans, his quickness of movement, were indeed deservedly admired. But in this respect, others had equaled him before; and we may remark that even the Corinthian Neon, in his capture of Achradina, had rivalled anything performed by his superior officer. But that which stood without like or second in Timoleon — that which set a peculiar stamp upon all his meritorious qualities — was, his superhuman good fortune; or — what in the

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 20, 21. Diodorus also implies the same verdict (xvi. 69), though his account is brief as well as obscure.



eyes of most Greeks was the same thing in other words — the unbounded favor with which the gods had cherished both his person and his enterprise. Though greatly praised as a brave and able man, Timoleon was still more affectionately hailed as an enviable man.<sup>1</sup> "Never had the gods been so manifest in their dispensations of kindness towards any mortal."<sup>2</sup> The issue, which Telekleides had announced as being upon trial when Timoleon was named, now stood triumphantly determined. After the capture of Syracuse, we may be sure that no one ever denounced Timoleon as a fratricide; — every one extolled him as a tyrannicide. The great exploits of other eminent men, such as Agesilaus and Epaminondas, had been achieved at the cost of hardship, severe fighting, wounds and death to those concerned, etc., all of which counted as so many deductions from the perfect mental satisfaction of the spectator. Like an oration or poem smelling of the lamp, they bore too clearly the marks of preliminary toil and fatigue. But Timoleon, as the immortal gods descending to combat on the plain of Troy, accomplished splendid feats, — overthrew what seemed insuperable obstacles — by a mere first appearance, and without an effort. He exhibited to view a magnificent result, executed with all that apparent facility belonging as a privilege to the inspirations of first-rate genius.<sup>3</sup> Such a spectacle of virtue and good fortune combined — glorious consummation with graceful facility — was new to the Grecian world.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 21. Τὸ μὲν ἄλῳναι τὴν πόλιν (Syracuse) κατ' ἄκρας καὶ γενέσθαι ταχέως ὑποχείριον ἐκπεσόντων τῶν πολεμίων, δίκαιον ἀναθεῖναι τῇ τῶν μαχομένων ἀνδραγαθίᾳ καὶ τῇ δεινότητι τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀποθανεῖν τινα μηδὲ τραθῆναι τῶν Κορινθίων, ἴδιον ἔργον αὐτῆς ἢ Τιμολέοντος ἐπεδείξατο τύχη, καθάπερ διαμιλλωμένη πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἵνα τῶν ἐπαινουμένων αὐτοῦ τὰ μακαριζόμενα μάλιστα οἱ πυνθανόμενοι θαυμάζωσιν.

<sup>2</sup> Homer, Odys. iii. 219 (Nestor addressing Telemachus).

Εἰ γάρ σ' ὥς ἐθέλοι φιλέειν γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη,  
'Ὡς τότε' Ὀδυσσεύς περικήδετο κυδαλίμοιο  
Δῆμῳ ἐνὶ Τρώων, ὅθι πάσχομεν ἄλγε' Ἀχαιοί —  
Οὐ γάρ πω ἶδον ὧδε θεοὺς ἀναφανδὰ φιλεῦντας,  
'Ὡς κείνῳ ἀναφανδὰ παρίστατο Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 36. μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ πολὺ τὸ βρόδιως ἔχουσα (ἢ Τιμολέοντος στρατηγία) φαίνεται, τοῖς ἐν καὶ δικαίως λογιζομένοις, οὐ τύχη ἔργον, ἀλλ' ἀρετῆς εὐτυνοῦσης.

For all that he had done, Timoleon took little credit to himself. In the despatch which announced to the Corinthians his *Veni, Vidi, Vici*, as well as in his discourses at Syracuse, he ascribed the whole achievement to fortune or to the gods, whom he thanked for having inscribed his name as nominal mover of their decree for liberating Sicily.<sup>1</sup> We need not doubt that he firmly believed himself to be a favored instrument of the divine will, and that he was even more astonished than others at the way in which locked gates flew open before him. But even if he had not believed it himself, there was great prudence in putting this coloring on the facts; not simply because he thereby deadened the attacks of envy, but because, under the pretence of modesty, he really exalted himself much higher. He purchased for himself a greater hold on men's minds towards his future achievements, as the beloved of the gods, than he would ever have possessed as only a highly endowed mortal. And though what he had already done was prodigious, there still remained much undone; new difficulties, not the same in kind, yet hardly less in magnitude, to be combated.

It was not only new difficulties, but also new temptations, which Timoleon had to combat. Now began for him that moment of trial, fatal to so many Greeks before him. Proof was to be shown, whether he could swallow, without intoxication or perversion, the cup of success administered to him in such overflowing fulness. He was now complete master of Syracuse; master of it too with the fortifications of Ortygia yet standing, — with all the gloomy means of despotic compression, material and moral, yet remaining in his hand. In respect of personal admiration and prestige of success, he stood greatly above Dion, and yet more above the elder Dionysius in the early part of his career. To set up for himself as despot at Syracuse, burying in oblivion all that he had said or promised before, was a step natural and feasible; not indeed without peril or difficulty, but carrying with it chances of success equal to those of other nascent despotisms, and more than sufficient to tempt a leading Greek politician of average morality. Probably most people in Sicily actually expected that he would avail himself of his unparalleled position

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 36; Cornelius Nepos, Timoleon, c. 4; Plutarch De Sui I aude, p. 542 F.



to stand forth as a new Dionysius. Many friends and partisans would strenuously recommend it. They would even deride him as an idiot (as Solon had been called in his time<sup>1</sup>) for not taking the boon which the gods set before him, and for not hauling up the net when the fish were already caught in it. There would not be wanting other advisers to insinuate the like recommendation under the pretence of patriotic disinterestedness, and regard for the people whom he had come to liberate. The Syracusans (it would be contended), unfit for a free constitution, must be supplied with liberty in small doses, of which Timoleon was the best judge: their best interests require that Timoleon should keep in his hands the anti-popular power with little present diminution, in order to restrain their follies, and ensure to them benefits which they would miss if left to their own free determination.

Considerations of this latter character had doubtless greatly weighed with Dion in the hour of his victory, over and above mere naked ambition, so as to plunge him into that fatal misjudgment and misconduct out of which he never recovered. But the lesson deducible from the last sad months of Dion's career was not lost upon Timoleon. He was found proof, not merely against seductions within his own bosom, but against provocations or plausibilities from without. Neither for self-regarding purposes, nor for beneficent purposes, would he be persuaded to grasp and perpetuate the anti-popular power. The moment of trial was that in which the genuine heroism and rectitude of judgment united in his character, first shone forth with its full brightness.

Master as he now was of all Syracuse, with its fivefold aggregate, Ortygia, Achradina, Tycha, Neapolis, and Epipolæ — he determined to strike down at once that great monument of servitude which the elder Dionysius had imposed upon his fellow citizens. Without a moment's delay, he laid his hand to the work. He invited by proclamation every Syracusan who chose, to come with iron instruments, and coöperate with him in demolishing the

<sup>1</sup> Solon, Fragm. 26, ed. Schneid.; Plutarch, Solon, c. 14.

Οὐκ ἔφν Σόλων βαθύφρων, οὐδὲ βουλήεις ἀνὴρ.  
'Εσθλὰ γὰρ θεοῦ διδόντος, αὐτὸς οὐκ ἔδεξατο.  
Περιβαλὼν δ' ἄγραν, ἀγασθεὶς οὐκ ἀνέσπασεν μέγα  
Δίκτυον, θηυσὶ δ' ἁμαρτὴ καὶ φρενῶν ἀποσφαλεῖς.

separate stronghold, fortification, and residence, constructed by the elder Dionysius in Ortygia; as well as the splendid funeral monument erected to the memory of that despot by his son and successor.<sup>1</sup> This was the first public act executed in Syracuse by his order; the first manifestation of the restored sovereignty of the people; the first outpouring of sentiment, at once free, hearty, and unanimous, among men trodden down by half a century of servitude; the first fraternizing coöperation of Timoleon and his soldiers with them, for the purpose of converting the promise of liberation into an assured fact. That the actual work of demolition was executed by the hands and crowbars of the Syracusans themselves, rendered the whole proceeding an impressive compact between them and Timoleon. It cleared away all mistake, all possibility of suspicion, as to his future designs. It showed that he had not merely forsworn despotism for himself, but that he was bent on rendering it impossible for any one else, when he began by overthrowing what was not only the conspicuous memento, but also the most potent instrument, of the past despots. It achieved the inestimable good of inspiring at once confidence in his future proceedings, and disposing the Syracusans to listen voluntarily to his advice. And it was beneficial, not merely in smoothing the way to farther measures of pacific reconstruction, but also in discharging the reactionary antipathies of the Syracusans, inevitable after so long an oppression, upon unconscious stones; and thus leaving less of it to be wreaked on the heads of political rivals, compromised in the former proceedings.

This important act of demolition was farther made subservient to a work of new construction, not less significant of the spirit in which Timoleon had determined to proceed. Having cleared

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 22. Γενόμενος δὲ τῆς ἀκρᾶς κύριος, οὐκ ἔπαθε Δίῳ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος, οὐδ' ἐφείσατο τοῦ τόπου διὰ τὸ καλλὸς καὶ τὴν πολυτέλειαν τῆς κατασκευῆς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνου διαβαλοῦσαν, εἰτ' ἀπολέσασαν ὑποψίαν φυλαξάμενος, ἐκήρυξε τῶν Συρακονσίων τὸν βουλόμενον παρῆναι μετὰ σιδήρον καὶ συνεφάπτεσθαι τῶν τυραννικῶν ἐργμάτων. Ὡς δὲ πάντες ἀνέβησαν, ἀρχὴν ἐλευθερίας ποιησάμενοι βεβαιωτάτην τὸ κήρυγμα καὶ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐκείνῃ, οὐ μόνον τὴν ἀκρὰν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς οἰκίας καὶ τὰ μνήματα τῶν τυράννων ἀνέτρεψαν καὶ κατέσκαψαν. Εὐθὺς δὲ τὸν τόπον συνομαλύνας, ἐνωκοδόμησε τὰ δικαστήρια, χαρίζομενος τοῖς πολίταις, καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος ὑπερτέραν ποιῶν τὴν δημοκρατίαν.

Compare Cornelius Nepos, Timoleon, c. 3.



away the obnoxious fortress, he erected upon the same site, and probably with the same materials, courts for future judicature. The most striking symbol and instrument of popular government thus met the eye as a local substitute for that of the past despotism.

Deep was the gratitude of the Syracusans for these proceedings — the first fruits of Timoleon's established ascendancy. And if we regard the intrinsic importance of the act itself — the manner in which an emphatic meaning was made to tell as well upon the Syracusan eye as upon the Syracusan mind — the proof evinced not merely of disinterested patriotism, but also of prudence in estimating the necessities of the actual situation — lastly, the foundation thus laid for accomplishing farther good — if we take all these matters together, we shall feel that Timoleon's demolition of the Dionysian Bastile, and erection in its place of a building for the administration of justice, was among the most impressive phenomena in Grecian history.

The work which remained to be done was indeed such as to require the best spirit, energy and discretion, both on his part and on that of the Syracusans. Through long oppression and suffering, the city was so impoverished and desolate, that the market place (if we were to believe what must be an exaggeration of Plutarch) served as pasture for horses, and as a place of soft repose for the grooms who attended them. Other cities of Sicily exhibited the like evidence of decay, desertion, and poverty. The manifestations of city life had almost ceased in Sicily. Men were afraid to come into the city, which they left to the despot and his mercenaries, retiring themselves to live on their fields and farms, and shrinking from all acts of citizenship. Even the fields were but half cultivated, so as to produce nothing beyond bare subsistence. It was the first anxiety of Timoleon to revive the once haughty spirit of Syracuse out of this depth of insecurity and abasement; to which revival no act could be more conducive than his first proceedings in Ortygia. His next step was to bring together, by invitations and proclamations everywhere circulated, those exiles who had been expelled, or forced to seek refuge elsewhere, during the recent oppression. Many of these, who had found shelter in various parts of Sicily and Italy, obeyed his sum-

mons with glad readiness.<sup>1</sup> But there were others, who had fled to Greece or the Ægean islands, and were out of the hearing of any proclamations from Timoleon. To reach persons thus remote, recourse was had, by him and by the Syracusans conjointly, to Corinthian intervention. The Syracusans felt so keenly how much was required to be done for the secure reorganization of their city as a free community, that they eagerly concurred with Timoleon in entreating the Corinthians to undertake, a second time, the honorable task of founders of Syracuse.<sup>2</sup>

Two esteemed citizens, Kephalus and Dionysius, were sent from Corinth to coöperate with Timoleon and the Syracusans, in constituting the community anew, on a free and popular basis, and in preparing an amended legislation.<sup>3</sup> These commissioners adopted, for their main text and theme, the democratical constitution and laws as established by Dioklês about seventy years before, which the usurpation of Dionysius had subverted when they were not more than seven years old. Kephalus professed to do nothing more than revive the laws of Dioklês, with such comments, modifications, and adaptations, as the change of times and circumstances had rendered necessary.<sup>4</sup> In the laws respecting inheritance and property, he is said to have made no change at all; but unfortunately we are left without any information what were the laws of Dioklês, or how they were now modified. It is certain, however, that the political constitution of Dioklês was a democracy, and that the constitution as now reestablished was democratical also.<sup>5</sup> Beyond this general fact we can assert nothing.

Though a free popular constitution, however, was absolutely indispensable, and a good constitution a great boon — it was not the only pressing necessity for Syracuse. There was required, no less an importation of new citizens; and not merely of poor men bringing with them their arms and their industry, but also of persons in affluent or easy circumstances, competent to purchase lands and houses. Besides much land ruined or gone out of cultivation, the general poverty of the residents was extreme; while at the

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23; Diodor. xvi. 83.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23.

<sup>4</sup> Diodor. xiii. 35; xvi. 81.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon c. 24.

<sup>5</sup> Diodor. xvi. 70.



same time the public exigencies were considerable, since it was essential, among other things, to provide pay for those very soldiers of Timoleon to whom they owed their liberation. The extent of poverty was painfully attested by the fact that they were constrained to sell those public statues which formed the ornaments of Syracuse and its temples: a cruel wound to the sentiments of every Grecian community. From this compulsory auction, however, they excepted by special vote the statue of Gelon, in testimony of gratitude for his capital victory at Himera over the Carthaginians.<sup>1</sup>

For the renovation of a community thus destitute, new funds as well as new men were wanted; and the Corinthians exerted themselves actively to procure both. Their first proclamation was indeed addressed specially to Syracusan exiles, whom they invited to resume their residence at Syracuse as free and autonomous citizens under a just allotment of lands. They caused such proclamation to be publicly made at all the Pan-hellenic and local festivals; prefaced by a certified assurance that the Corinthians had already overthrown both the despotism and the despot — a fact which the notorious presence of Dionysius himself at Corinth contributed to spread more widely than any formal announcement. They farther engaged, if the exiles would muster at Corinth, to provide transports, convoy, and leaders, to Syracuse, free of all cost. The number of exiles, who profited by the invitation and came to Corinth, though not inconsiderable, was still hardly strong enough to enter upon the proposed Sicilian renovation. They themselves therefore entreated the Corinthians to invite additional colonists from other Grecian cities. It was usually not difficult to find persons disposed to embark in a new settlement, if founded under promising circumstances, and effected under the positive management of a powerful presiding city.<sup>2</sup> There were many opulent persons anxious to exchange the condition of metics in an old city for that of full citizens in a new one. Hence the more general proclamation now issued by the Corinthians attracted

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23; Dion, Chrysostom, Orat. xxxvii. p. 460.

<sup>2</sup> Compare the case of the Corinthian proclamation respecting Epidamnus, Thucyd. i. 27; the Lacedæmonian foundation of Herakleia, Thucyd. iii. 88 the proclamation of the Battiad Arkesilaus at Samos, for a new body of settlers to Kyréné (Herodot. iv. 153).

numerous applicants, and a large force of colonists was presently assembled at Corinth; an aggregate of ten thousand persons, including the Syracusan exiles.<sup>1</sup>

When conveyed to Syracuse, by the fleet and under the formal sanction of the Corinthian government, these colonists round a still larger number there assembled, partly Syracusan exiles, yet principally emigrants from the different cities of Sicily and Italy. The Italian Greeks, at this time hard pressed by the constantly augmenting force of the Lucanians and Bruttians, were becoming so unable to defend themselves without foreign aid, that several were probably disposed to seek other homes. The invitation of Timoleon counted even more than that of the Corinthians as an allurements to new comers — from the unbounded admiration and confidence which he now inspired; more especially as he was actually present at Syracuse. Accordingly, the total of immigrants from all quarters (restored exiles as well as others) to Syracuse in its renovated freedom was not less than sixty thousand.<sup>2</sup>

Nothing can be more mortifying than to find ourselves without information as to the manner in which Timoleon and Kephalus dealt with this large influx. Such a state of things, as it produces many new embarrassments and conflicting interests, so it calls for a degree of resource and original judgment which furnishes good measure of the capacity of all persons concerned, rendering the juncture particularly interesting and instructive. Unfortunately we are not permitted to know the details. The land of Syracuse is said to have been distributed, and the houses to have been sold for one thousand talents — the large sum of 230,000*l*. A right of preemption was allowed to the Syracusan exiles for

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23. Diodorus states only five thousand (xvi. 82) as coming from Corinth.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23. To justify his statement of this large total, Plutarch here mentions (I wish he did so oftener) the author from whom he copied it — Athanis, or Athanas. That author was a native Syracusan, who wrote a history of Syracusan affairs from the termination of the history of Philistus in 363 or 362 B. C., down to the death of Timoleon in 337 B. C.; thus including all the proceedings of Dion and Timoleon. It is deeply to be lamented that nothing remains of his work (Diodor. xv. 94; Fragment. Historic. Græc. ed. Didot, vol. ii. p. 81). His name seems to be mentioned in Theopompus (Fr. 212, ed. Didot) as joint commander of the Syracusan troops, along with Herakleides



repurchasing the houses formerly their own. As the houses were sold, and that too for a considerable price — so we may presume that the lands were sold also, and that the incoming settlers did not receive their lots gratuitously. But how they were sold, or how much of the territory was sold, we are left in ignorance. It is certain, however, that the effect of the new immigration was not only to renew the force and population of Syracuse, but also to furnish relief to the extreme poverty of the antecedent residents. A great deal of new money must thus have been brought in.<sup>1</sup>

Such important changes doubtless occupied a considerable time, though we are not enabled to arrange them in months or years. In the meantime Timoleon continued to act in such a manner as to retain, and even to strengthen, the confidence and attachment of the Syracusans. He employed his forces actively in putting down and expelling the remaining despots throughout the island. He first attacked Hiketas, his old enemy, at Leontini; and compelled him to capitulate, on condition of demolishing the fortified citadel, abdicating his rule, and living as a private citizen in the town. Leptines, despot of Apollonia and of several other neighboring townships, was also constrained to submit, and to embrace the offer of a transport to Corinth.<sup>2</sup>

It appears that the submission of Hiketas was merely a feint, to obtain time for strengthening himself by urging the Carthaginians to try another invasion of Sicily.<sup>3</sup> They were the more dis-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23. καὶ γενομένοις αὐτοῖς ἑξακισμυριοῖς τὸ πλῆθος, ὡς Ἀθάνης εἴρηκε, τὴν μὲν χώραν διένειμε, τὰς δὲ οἰκίας ἀπέδοτο χιλίων ταλάντων, ἅμα μὲν ὑπολειπόμενος τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Συρακοσίοις ἐξωνεῖσθαι τὰς αὐτῶν, ἅμα δὲ χρημάτων εὐπορίαν τῷ δήμῳ μηχανώμενος οὕτως πενομένῳ καὶ πρὸς τὰλλα καὶ πρὸς πόλεμον, ὥστε, etc.

Diodorus (xvi. 82) affirms that forty thousand new settlers were admitted *εἰς τὴν Συρακουσίαν τὴν ἀδιαίρετον*, and that ten thousand were settled in the fine and fertile territory of Agyrium. This latter measure was taken certainly, after the despot of Agyrium had been put down by Timoleon. We should have been glad to have an explanation of *τὴν Συρακουσίαν τὴν ἀδιαίρετον*. in the absence of information, conjecture as to the meaning is vain.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 24.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 30. Diodor. (xvi. 72) does not mention that Hiketas submitted at all. He states that Timoleon was repulsed in attack

posed to this step as Timoleon, anxious to relieve the Syracusans, sent his soldiers under the Corinthian Deinarchus to find pay and plunder for themselves in the Carthaginian possessions near the western corner of Sicily. This invasion, while it abundantly supplied the wants of the soldiers, encouraged Entella and several other towns to revolt from Carthage. The indignation among the Carthaginians had been violent, when Magon returned after suddenly abandoning the harbor of Syracuse to Timoleon. Unable to make his defence satisfactory, Magon only escaped a worse death by suicide, after which his dead body was crucified by public order. And the Carthaginians now resolved on a fresh effort, to repair their honor as well as to defend their territory.<sup>1</sup>

The effort was made on a vast scale, and with long previous preparations. An army said to consist of seventy thousand men, under Hasdrubal and Hamilkar, was disembarked at Lilybaeum, on the western corner of the island; besides which there was a fleet of two hundred triremes, and one thousand attendant vessels carrying provisions, warlike stores, engines for sieges, war-chariots with four horses, etc.<sup>2</sup> But the most conspicuous proof of earnest effort, over and above numbers and expense, was furnished by the presence of no less than ten thousand native infantry from Carthage; men clothed with panoplies costly, complete, and far heavier than ordinary — carrying white shields and wearing elaborate breastplates besides. These men brought to the campaign ample private baggage; splendid goblets and other articles of gold and silver, such as becomed the rich families of that rich city. The *élite* of the division — twenty-five hundred in number, or one-fourth part — formed what was called the Sacred Band of Carthage.<sup>3</sup> It has been already stated, that in general, the Carthaginians caused their military service to be performed by hired foreigners, with few of their own citizens. Hence this army stood

ing Leontini; and that Hiketas afterwards attacked Syracuse, but was repulsed with loss, during the absence of Timoleon in his expedition against Leptines.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 24; Diodor. xvi. 73.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 25; Diodor. xvi. 77. They agree in the main about the numerical items, and seem to have copied from the same authority.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27; Diodor. xvi. 80.



particularly distinguished, and appeared the more formidable on their landing; carrying panic, by the mere report, all over Sicily not excepting even Syracuse. The Corinthian troops ravaging the Carthaginian province were obliged to retreat in haste, and sent to Timoleon for reinforcement.

The miscellaneous body of immigrants recently domiciliated at Syracuse, employed in the cares inseparable from new settlement had not come prepared to face so terrible a foe. Though Timoleon used every effort to stimulate their courage, and though his exhortations met with full apparent response, yet such was the panic prevailing, that comparatively few would follow him to the field. He could assemble no greater total than twelve thousand men; including about three thousand Syracusan citizens — the paid force which he had round him at Syracuse — that other paid force under Deinarchus, who had been just compelled by the invaders to evacuate the Carthaginian province — and finally such allies as would join.<sup>1</sup> His cavalry was about one thousand in number. Nevertheless, in spite of so great an inferiority, Timoleon determined to advance and meet the enemy in their own province, before they should have carried ravage over the territory of Syracuse and her allies. But when he approached near to the border, within the territory of Agrigentum, the alarm and mistrust of his army threatened to arrest his farther progress. An officer among his mercenaries, named Thrasius, took advantage of the prevailing feeling to raise a mutiny against him, persuading the soldiers that Timoleon was madly hurrying them on to certain ruin, against an enemy six times superior in number, and in a hostile country eight days' march from Syracuse; so that there would be neither salvation for them in case of reverse, nor inter-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 25; Diodor. xvi. 78. Diodorus gives the total of Timoleon's force at twelve thousand men; Plutarch at only six thousand. The larger total appears to me most probable, under the circumstances. Plutarch seems to have taken account only of the paid force who were with Timoleon at Syracuse, and not to have enumerated that other division, which, having been sent to ravage the Carthaginian province, had been compelled to retire and rejoin Timoleon when the great Carthaginian host landed.

Diodorus and Plutarch follow in the main the same authorities respecting this campaign.

ment if they were slain. Their pay being considerably in arrear Thrasius urged them to return to Syracuse for the purpose of extorting the money, instead of following a commander, who could not or would not requite them, upon such desperate service. Such was the success and plausibility of these recommendations, under the actual discouragement, that they could hardly be counterworked by all the efforts of Timoleon. Nor was there ever any conjuncture in which his influence, derived as well from unbounded personal esteem as from belief in his favor with the gods, was so near failing. As it was, though he succeeded in heartening up and retaining the large body of his army, yet Thrasius, with one thousand of the mercenaries, insisted upon returning, and actually did return, to Syracuse. Moreover Timoleon was obliged to send an order along with them to the authorities at home, that these men must immediately, and at all cost, receive their arrears of pay. The wonder is, that he succeeded in his efforts to retain the rest, after insuring to the mutineers a lot which seemed so much safer and more enviable. Thrasius, a brave man, having engaged in the service of the Phokians Philomélus and Onomarchus, had been concerned in the pillage of the Delphian temple, which drew upon him the aversion of the Grecian world.<sup>1</sup> How many of the one thousand seceding soldiers, who now followed him to Syracuse, had been partners in the same sacrilegious act, we cannot tell. But it is certain that they were men who had taken service with Timoleon in hopes of a period, not merely of fighting, but also of lucrative license, such as his generous regard for the settled inhabitants would not permit.

Having succeeded in keeping up the spirits of his remaining army, and affecting to treat the departure of so many cowards as a positive advantage, Timoleon marched on westward into the Carthaginian province, until he approached within a short distance of the river Krimêsus, a stream which rises in the mountainous region south of Panormus (Palermo), runs nearly southward, and falls into the sea near Selinus. Some mules, carrying loads of parsley, met him on the road; a fact which called forth again the half-suppressed alarm of the soldiers, since parsley was habitually

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 30.



employed for the wreaths deposited on tombstones. But Timoleon, taking a handful of it and weaving a wreath for his own head, exclaimed, "This is our Corinthian symbol of victory: it is the sacred herb with which we decorate our victors at the Isthmian festival. It comes to us here spontaneously, as an earnest of our approaching success." Insisting emphatically on this theme, and crowning himself as well as his officers with the parsley, he rekindled the spirits of the army, and conducted them forward to the top of the eminence, immediately above the course of the Krimêsus.<sup>1</sup>

It was just at that moment that the Carthaginian army were passing the river, on their march to meet him. The confused noise and clatter of their approach were plainly heard; though the mist of a May morning,<sup>2</sup> overhanging the valley, still concealed from the eye the army crossing. Presently the mist ascended from the lower ground to the hill tops around, leaving the river and the Carthaginians beneath in conspicuous view. Formidable was the aspect which they presented. The war-chariots-and-four,<sup>3</sup> which formed their front, had already crossed the river, and appear to have been halting a little way in advance. Next to them followed the native Carthaginians, ten thousand chosen hoplites with white shields, who had also in part crossed and were still crossing; while the main body of the host, the foreign mercenaries, were pressing behind in a disorderly mass to get to the bank, which appears to have been in part rugged. Seeing how favorable was the moment for attacking them, while thus disarrayed and bisected by the river, Timoleon, after a short exhorta-

<sup>1</sup> The anecdote about the parsley is given both in Plutarch (Timol. c. 26) and Diodorus (xvi. 79).

The upper portion of the river Krimêsus, near which this battle was fought, was in the mountainous region called by Diodorus ἡ Σελινουντία ὁσχωρία: through which lay the road between Selinus and Panormus (Diodor. xxiii. Frag. p. 333, ed. Wess.).

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27. ἱσταμένου θέρους ὥραν—λήγοντι μηνὶ θαρρηλίῳ, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Of these war-chariots they are said to have had not less than two thousand, in the unsuccessful battle which they fought against Agathokles in Africa, near Carthage (Diodor. xx. 10).

After the time of Pyrrhus, they came to employ tame elephants trained for war.

tion, gave orders immediately to charge down the hill.<sup>1</sup> His Sicilian allies, with some mercenaries intermingled, were on the two wings; while he himself, with the Syracusans and the best of the mercenaries, occupied the centre. Demaretus with his cavalry was ordered to assail the Carthaginians first, before they could form regularly. But the chariots in their front, protecting the greater part of the line, left him only the power of getting at them partially through the vacant intervals. Timoleon, soon perceiving that his cavalry accomplished little, recalled them and ordered them to charge on the flanks, while he himself, with all the force of his infantry, undertook to attack in front. Accordingly, seizing his shield from the attendant, he marched forward in advance, calling aloud to the infantry around to be of good cheer and follow. Never had his voice been heard so predominant and heart-stirring; the effect of it was powerfully felt on the spirits of all around, who even believed that they heard a god speaking along with him.<sup>2</sup> Reëchoing his shout emphatically, they marched forward to the charge with the utmost alacrity—in compact order, and under the sound of trumpets.

The infantry were probably able to evade or break through the bulwark of interposed chariots with greater ease than the cavalry, though Plutarch does not tell us how this was done. Timoleon and his soldiers then came into close and furious contest with the chosen Carthaginian infantry, who resisted with a courage worthy of their reputation. Their vast shields, iron breastplates, and brazen helmets (forming altogether armor heavier than was worn usually even by Grecian hoplites), enabled them to repel the spear-thrusts of the Grecian assailants, who were compelled to take to their swords, and thus to procure themselves admission within the line of Carthaginian spears, so as to break their ranks. Such use of swords is what we rarely read of in a Grecian battle.

<sup>1</sup> It appears from Polybius that Timæus ascribed to Timoleon, immediately before this battle, an harangue which Polybius pronounces to be absurd and unsuitable (Timæus, Fr. 134, ed. Didot; Polyb. xii. 26 a).

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27. Ἀναλαβὼν τὴν ὁπίδα καὶ βοήσας ἐπεισθαι καὶ θάρρειν τοῖς πέποις ἔδοξεν ὑπερφρεῖ φωνὴ καὶ μείζονι κεχοῆσθαι τοῦ συνήθους, εἴτε τῷ πάθει παρὰ τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ τὸν ἐνθουσιασμόν οὕτω διατεταμένους, εἴτε δαιμονίου τινός, ὥς τοῖς πολλοῖς τότε παρέστη συνεπιφθεγξαμένου.



Though the contest was bravely maintained by the Carthaginians, yet they were too much loaded with armor to admit of anything but fighting in a dense mass. They were already losing their front rank warriors, the picked men of the whole, and beginning to fight at a disadvantage — when the gods, yet farther befriending Timoleon, set the seal to their discomfiture by an intervention manifest and terrific.<sup>1</sup> A storm of the most violent character began. The hill-tops were shrouded in complete darkness; the wind blew a hurricane; rain and hail poured abundantly, with all the awful accompaniments of thunder and lightning. To the Greeks, this storm was of little inconvenience, because it came in their backs. But to the Carthaginians, pelting as it did directly in their faces, it occasioned both great suffering, and soul-subduing alarm. The rain and hail beat, and the lightning flashed, in their faces, so that they could not see to deal with hostile combatants: the noise of the wind, and of hail rattling against their armor, prevented the orders of their officers from being heard: the folds of their voluminous military tunics were surcharged with rain-water, so as to embarrass their movements: the ground presently became so muddy that they could not keep their footing; and when they once slipped, the weight of their equipment forbade all recovery. The Greeks, comparatively free from inconvenience, and encouraged by the evident disablement of their enemies, pressed them with redoubled energy. At length, when the four hundred front rank men of the Carthaginians had perished by a brave death in their places, the rest of the White-shields turned their backs and sought relief in flight. But flight, too, was all but impossible. They encountered their own troops in the rear advancing up, and trying to cross the Krimêsus; which river itself was becoming every minute fuller and more turbid, through the violent rain. The attempt to recross was one of such unspeakable confusion, that numbers perished in the torrent. Dispersing in total rout, the whole Carthaginian army thought only of escape, leaving their camp and baggage a prey to the victors, who pursued them across the river and over the hills on the other side, inflicting prodigious slaughter. In this pursuit the cavalry of

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 79. Περιεγένοντο γὰρ ἀνελπιδίως τῶν πολεμίων, οὐ μόνον δὲ ὡς ἰδίας ἀνδραγαθίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν θεῶν συνεργίαν.

Timoleon, not very effective during the battle, rendered excellent service; pressing the fugitive Carthaginians one over another in mass, and driving them, overloaded with their armor, into mud and water, from whence they could not get clear.<sup>1</sup>

No victory in Grecian history was ever more complete than that of Timoleon at the Krimêsus. Ten thousand Carthaginians are said to have been slain, and fifteen thousand made prisoners. Upon these numbers no stress is to be laid; but it is certain that the total of both must have been very great. Of the war-chariots, many were broken during the action, and all that remained, two hundred in number, fell into the hands of the victors. But that which rendered the loss most serious, and most painfully felt at Carthage, was, that it fell chiefly upon the native Carthaginian troops, and much less upon the foreign mercenaries. It is even said that the Sacred Battalion of Carthage, comprising twenty-five hundred soldiers belonging to the most considerable families in Carthage, were all slain to a man; a statement, doubtless, exaggerated, yet implying a fearful real destruction. Many of these soldiers purchased safe escape by throwing away their ornamented shields and costly breast-plates, which the victors picked up in great numbers — one thousand breast-plates, and not less than ten thousand shields. Altogether, the spoil collected was immense — in arms, in baggage, and in gold and silver from the plundered camp; occupying the Greeks so long in the work of pursuit and capture, that they did not find time to erect their trophy until the third day after the battle. Timoleon left the chief part of the plunder,<sup>2</sup> as well as most part of the prisoners, in the hands of the individual captors, who enriched themselves amply by the day's work. Yet there still remained a large total for the public Syracusan chest; five thousand prisoners, and a miscellaneous spoil of armor and precious articles, piled up in imposing magnificence around the general's tent.

The Carthaginian fugitives did not rest until they reached Lilybæum. And even there, such was their discouragement — so profound their conviction that the wrath of the gods was upon them — that they could scarcely be induced to go on shipboard

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27, 28; Diodor. xvi. 79, 80

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch Timoleon, c. 29; Diodor. xvi. 80, 81



for the purpose of returning to Carthage; persuaded as they were that if once caught out at sea, the gods in their present displeasure would never let them reach land.<sup>1</sup> At Carthage itself also, the sorrow and depression was unparalleled: sorrow private as well as public, from the loss of so great a number of principal citizens. It was even feared that the victorious Timoleon would instantly cross the sea and attack Carthage on her own soil. Immediate efforts were however made to furnish a fresh army for Sicily, composed of foreign mercenaries with few or no native citizens. Giskon, the son of Hanno, who passed for their most energetic citizen, was

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 81. *Τοσαύτη δ' αὐτοὺς κατάπληξις καὶ δέος κατείχεν, ὥστε μὴ τολμᾶν εἰς τὰς ναὺς ἐμβαλεῖν, μηδ' ἀποπλεῖν εἰς τὴν Λιβύην, ὡς δὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν ἀλλοτριότητα πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὑπὸ τοῦ Λιβυκοῦ πειλάγου καταποθησομένους.* Compare the account of the religious terror of the Carthaginians, after their defeat by Agathokles (Diodor. xx. 14).

So, in the argument between Andokides and his accusers, before the *Dikastery* at Athens — the accusers contend that Andokides clearly does not believe in the gods, because, after the great impiety which he has committed, he has still not been afraid afterwards to make sea voyages (Lysias, cont. Andokid. s. 19).

On the other hand, Andokides himself argues triumphantly, from the fact of his having passed safely through sea voyages in the winter, that he is not an object of displeasure to the gods.

"If the gods thought that I had wronged them, they would not have omitted to punish me, when they caught me in the greatest danger. For what danger can be greater than a sea voyage in winter-time? The gods had then both my life and my property in their power; and yet they preserved me. Was it not then open to them so to manage, as that I should not even obtain interment for my body? . . . Have the gods then preserved me from the dangers of sea and pirates, merely to let me perish at Athens by the act of my villanous accuser Kephisius? No, *Dikasts*; the dangers of accusation and trial are human; but the dangers encountered at sea are divine. If, therefore, we are to surmise about the sentiments of the gods, I think they will be extremely displeased and angry, if they see a man, whom they themselves have preserved, destroyed by others." (Andokides, *De Mysteriis*, s. 137-139). *ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἡγοῦμαι χρῆναι νομίζειν τοὺς τοιοῦτους κινδύνους ἐνθροπίνους, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ θάλασσαν θεῖους. Εἴπερ οὖν δεῖ τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὑπονοεῖν, πολὺ ἂν αὐτοὺς οἶμαι ἐγὼ ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν, αὐτοὺς ὅψ' ἐαυτῶν σωζομένους, ὑπ' ἄλλων ἀπολλυμένους ὀρῶεν.*

Compare Plutarch, Paul. Emil. c. 36. *μάλ' ὅσα κατὰ πλοῦν ἐβόηεν τὴν μεταβολὴν τοῦ δαίμονος, etc.*

recalled from exile, and directed to get together this new armament.

The subduing impression of the wrath of the gods, under which the Carthaginians labored, arose from the fact that their defeat had been owing not less to the terrific storm, than to the arms of Timoleon. Conversely, in regard to Timoleon himself, the very same fact produced an impression of awe-striking wonder and envy. If there were any sceptics who doubted before either the reality of special interventions by the gods, or the marked kindness which determined the gods to send such interventions to the service of Timoleon — the victory of the *Krimêsus* must have convinced them. The storm alike violent and opportune, coming at the back of the Greeks and in the faces of the Carthaginians, was a manifestation of divine favor scarcely less conspicuous than those vouchsafed to Diomedes or Æneas in the *Iliad*.<sup>1</sup> And the sentiment thus raised towards Timoleon — or, rather previously raised, and now yet farther confirmed — became blended with that genuine admiration which he had richly earned by his rapid and well-conducted movements, as well as by a force of character striking enough to uphold, under the most critical circumstances, the courage of a desponding army. His victory at the *Krimêsus*, like his victory at *Adranum*, was gained mainly by that extreme speed in advance, which brought him upon an unprepared enemy at a vulnerable moment. And the news of it which he despatched at once to Corinth, — accompanied with a cargo of showy Carthaginian shields to decorate the Corinthian temples, — diffused throughout Central Greece both joy for the event and increased honor to his name, commemorated by the inscription attached — "The Corinthians and the general Timoleon, after lib-

<sup>1</sup> Claudian, *De Tertio Consulatu Honorii*, v. 93.

"Te propter, gelidis Aquilo de monte procellis  
Obruit adversas acies, revolutaque tela  
Vertit in auctores, et turbine reppulit hastas.  
O nimium dilecte Deo, cui fundit ab antris  
Æolus armatas hyemes; cui militat æther,  
Et conjurati veniunt ad classica venti."

Compare a passage in the speech of *Thrasylbulus*, Xenoph. *Hellen.* ii. 4  
14.



erating the Sicilian Greeks from the Carthaginians, have dedicated these shields as offerings of gratitude to the gods."<sup>1</sup>

Leaving most of his paid troops to carry on war in the Carthaginian province, Timoleon conducted his Syracusans home. His first proceeding was, at once to dismiss Thrasius with the one thousand paid soldiers who had deserted him before the battle. He commanded them to quit Sicily, allowing them only twenty-four hours to depart from Syracuse itself. Probably under the circumstances, they were not less anxious to go away than he was to dismiss them. But they went away only to destruction; for having crossed the Strait of Messina and taken possession of a maritime site in Italy on the Southern sea, the Bruttians of the inland entrapped them by professions of simulated friendship, and slew them all.<sup>2</sup>

Timoleon had now to deal with two Grecian enemies — Hiketas and Mamerkus — the despots of Leontini and Katana. By the extraordinary rapidity of his movements, he had crushed the great invading host of Carthage, before it came into cooperation with these two allies. Both now wrote in terror to Carthage, soliciting a new armament, as indispensable for their security not less than for the Carthaginian interest in the island; Timoleon being the common enemy of both. Presently Giskon son of Hanno, having been recalled on purpose out of banishment, arrived from Carthage with a considerable force — seventy triremes, and a body of Grecian mercenaries. It was rare for the Carthaginians to employ Grecian mercenaries; but the battle of Krimêsus is said to have persuaded them that there were no soldiers to be compared to Greeks. The force of Giskon was apparently distributed partly in the Carthaginian province at the western angle of the island — partly in the neighborhood of Mylæ and Messênê on the north-east, where Mamerkus joined him with the troops of Katana. Messênê appears to have recently fallen under the power of a despot named Hippon, who acted as their ally. To both points Timoleon despatched a portion of his mercenary force, without going himself in command on both, his troops at first experienced partial defeats; two divisions of them, one com-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 29; Diodor. xvi. 80.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 30; Diodor. xvi. 82.

prising four hundred men, being cut to pieces. But such partial reverses were, in the religious appreciation of the time, proofs more conspicuous than ever of the peculiar favor shown by the gods towards Timoleon. For the soldiers thus slain had been concerned in the pillage of the Delphian temple, and were therefore marked out for the divine wrath; but the gods suspended the sentence during the time when the soldiers were serving under Timoleon in person, in order that he might not be the sufferer; and executed it now in his absence, when execution would occasion the least possible inconvenience to him.<sup>1</sup>

Mamerkus and Hiketas, however, not adopting this interpretation of their recent successes against Timoleon, were full of hope and confidence. The former dedicated the shields of the slain mercenaries to the gods, with an inscription of insolent triumph: the latter — taking advantage of the absence of Timoleon, who had made an expedition against a place not far off called Kalauria — undertook an inroad into the Syracusan territory. Not content with inflicting great damage and carrying off an ample booty, Hiketas, in returning home, insulted Timoleon and the small force along with him by passing immediately under the walls of Kalauria. Suffering him to pass by, Timoleon pursued, though his force consisted only of cavalry and light troops, with few or no hoplites. He found Hiketas posted on the farther side of the Damurias; a river with rugged banks and a ford of considerable difficulty. Yet notwithstanding this good defensive position, the troops of Timoleon were so impatient to attack, and each of his cavalry officers was so anxious to be first in the charge, that he was obliged to decide the priority by lot. The attack was then valiantly made, and the troops of Hiketas completely defeated. One thousand of them were slain in the action, while the remainder only escaped by flight and throwing away of their shields.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 30. Ἐξ ὧν καὶ μάλιστα τὴν Τιμολέοντος ἐντυχίαν συνέβη γενέσθαι δῶνυμον . . . . Τὴν μὲν οὖν πρὸς Τιμόλεοντα τῶν θεῶν εὐμένειαν, οὐχ ἦττον ἐν αἷς προσέκρουσε πράξεις ἢ περὶ αὐτῶν κατάρθουσαν εὐμένειαν συνέβαινεν.

Compare Plutarch, De Serâ Num. Vind. p. 552 F.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 31.



It was now the turn of Timoleon to attack Hiketas in his own domain of Leontini. Here his usual good fortune followed him. The soldiers in garrison — either discontented with the behavior of Hiketas at the battle of the Damurias, or awe-struck with that divine favor which waited on Timoleon — mutinied and surrendered the place into his hands; and not merely the place, but also Hiketas himself in chains, with his son Eupolemus, and his general Euthymus, a man of singular bravery as well as a victorious athlete at the games. All three were put to death; Hiketas and his son as despots and traitors; and Euthymus, chiefly in consequence of insulting sarcasms against the Corinthians, publicly uttered at Leontini. The wife and daughters of Hiketas were conveyed as prisoners to Syracuse, where they were condemned to death by public vote of the Syracusan assembly. This vote was passed in express revenge for the previous crime of Hiketas, in putting to death the widow, sister, and son, of Dion. Though Timoleon might probably have saved the unfortunate women by a strong exertion of influence, he did not interfere. The general feeling of the people accounted this cruel, but special, retaliation right under the circumstances; and Timoleon, as he could not have convinced them of the contrary, so he did not think it right to urge them to put their feeling aside as a simple satisfaction to him. Yet the act leaves a deserved stain upon a reputation such as his.<sup>1</sup> The women were treated on both sides as adjective beings, through whose lives revenge was to be taken against a political enemy.

Next came the turn of Mamerkus, who had assembled near Katana a considerable force, strengthened by a body of Carthaginian allies under Giskon. He was attacked and defeated by Timoleon near the river Abolus, with a loss of two thousand men, many of them belonging to the Carthaginian division. We know nothing but the simple fact of this battle; which probably made serious impression upon the Carthaginians, since they speedily afterwards sent earnest propositions for peace, deserting their Sicilian allies. Peace was accordingly concluded; on terms however which left the Carthaginian dominion in Sicily much the same as it had been at the end of the reign of the elder Dionysius, as well

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 33.

as at the landing of Dion in Sicily.<sup>1</sup> The line of separation was fixed at the river Halykus, or Lykus, which flows into the southern sea near Herakleia Minoa, and formed the western boundary of the territory of Agrigentum. All westward of the Halykus was recognized as Carthaginian; but it was stipulated that if any Greeks within that territory desired to emigrate and become inmates of Syracuse, they should be allowed freely to come with their families and their property. It was farther covenanted that all the territory eastward of the Halykus should be considered not only as Greek, but as free Greek, distributed among so many free cities, and exempt from despots. And the Carthaginians formally covenanted that they would neither aid, nor adopt as ally, any Grecian despot in Sicily.<sup>2</sup> In the first treaty concluded by the elder Dionysius with the Carthaginians, it had been stipulated by an express article that the Syracusans should be subject to him.<sup>3</sup> Here is one of the many contrasts between Dionysius and Timoleon.

Having thus relieved himself from his most formidable enemy, Timoleon put a speedy end to the war in other parts of the island. Mamerkus in fact despaired of farther defence without foreign aid. He crossed over with a squadron into Italy to ask for the introduction of a Lucanian army into Sicily;<sup>4</sup> which he might perhaps have obtained, since that warlike nation were now very powerful — had not his own seamen abandoned him, and carried back their vessels to Katana, surrendering both the city and themselves to Timoleon. The same thing, and even more, had been done a little before by the troops of Hiketas at Leontini, who had even delivered up Hiketas himself as prisoner; so powerful, seemingly, was the ascendancy exercised by the name of Timoleon, with the

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv. 17. Minoa (Herakleia) was a Carthaginian possession when Dion landed (Plutarch, Dion, c. 25).

Cornelius Nepos (Timoleon, c. 2) states erroneously, that the Carthaginians were completely expelled from Sicily by Timoleon.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 34; Diodor. xvi. 82.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xiii. 114.

<sup>4</sup> Cornelius Nepos (Timoleon, c. 2) calls Mamerkus an Italian general who had come into Sicily to aid the despots. It is possible enough that he may have been an Italian Greek; for he must have been a Greek, from the manner in which Plutarch sneaks of his poetical compositions.



prestige of his perpetual success. Mamerkus could now find no refuge except at Messênê, where he was welcomed by the despot Hippon. But Timoleon speedily came thither with a force ample enough to besiege Messênê by land and by sea. After a certain length of resistance,<sup>1</sup> the town was surrendered to him, while Hippon tried to make his escape secretly on shipboard. But he was captured and brought back into the midst of the Messenian population, who, under a sentiment of bitter hatred and vengeance, planted him in the midst of the crowded theatre and there put him to death with insult, summoning all the boys from school into the theatre to witness what was considered an elevating scene. Mamerkus, without attempting to escape, surrendered himself prisoner to Timoleon; only stipulating that his fate should be determined by the Syracusan assembly after a fair hearing, but that Timoleon himself should say nothing to his disfavor. He was accordingly brought to Syracuse, and placed on his trial before the assembled people, whom he addressed in an elaborate discourse; probably skilfully composed, since he is said to have possessed considerable talent as a poet.<sup>2</sup> But no eloquence could surmount the rooted aversion entertained by the Syracusans for his person and character. Being heard with murmurs, and seeing that he had no chance of obtaining a favorable verdict, he suddenly threw aside his garment and rushed with violent despair against one of the stone seats, head foremost, in hopes of giving himself a fatal blow. But not succeeding in this attempted suicide, he was led out of the theatre and executed like a robber.<sup>3</sup>

Timoleon had now nearly accomplished his confirmed purpose of extirpating every despotism in Sicily. There remained yet Nikodemus as despot at Kentoripa, and Apolloniades at Agyrium. Both of these he speedily dethroned or expelled, restoring the two cities to the condition of free communities. He also expelled from the town of Ætna those Campanian mercenaries who had been planted there by the elder Dionysius.<sup>4</sup> In this way did he proceed until there remained only free communities, without a single despot, in the Grecian portion of Sicily.

Of the details of his proceedings our scanty information per

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 37.  
Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 34.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 31.  
<sup>4</sup> Diodor, xvi. 82

mits us to say but little. But the great purpose with which he had started from Corinth was now achieved. After having put down all the other despotisms in Sicily, there remained for him but one farther triumph — the noblest and rarest of all — to lay down his own. This he performed without any delay, immediately on returning to Syracuse from his military proceedings. Congratulating the Syracusans on the triumphant consummation already attained, he entreated them to dispense with his farther services as sole commander; the rather as his eyesight was now failing.<sup>1</sup> It is probable enough that this demand was at first refused, and that he was warmly requested to retain his functions but if such was the fact, he did not the less persist, and the people, willing or not, acceded. We ought farther to note, that not only did he resign his generalship, but he resigned it at once and immediately, after the complete execution of his proclaimed purpose, to emancipate the Sicilian Greeks from foreign enemies as well as from despot-enemies; just as, on first acquiring possession of Syracuse, he had begun his authoritative career, without a moment's delay, by ordering the demolition of the Dionysian stronghold, and the construction of a court of justice in its place.<sup>2</sup> By this instantaneous proceeding he forestalled the growth of that suspicion which delay would assuredly have raised, and for which the free communities of Greece had in general such ample reason. And it is not the least of his many merits, that while conscious of good intentions himself, he had also the good sense to see that others could not look into his bosom; that all their presumptions, except what were created by his own conduct, would be derived from men worse than him — and therefore unfavorable. Hence it was necessary for him to be prompt and forward even to a sort of ostentation, in exhibiting the amplest positive proof of his real purposes, so as to stifle beforehand the growth of suspicion.

He was now a private citizen of Syracuse, having neither paid soldiers under his command nor any other public function. As a

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 37. Ὡς δὲ ἐπληθύνοντο εἰς Συρακοῦσας, εὐχόμενος ἀποδέσσειν τὴν μοναρχίαν καὶ παρατεῖσθαι τοῖς παλῆταις, τῶν πραγμάτων εὖ τὸ κάλλιστον ἡκόντων τέλος.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, l. c. εὐθὺς ἀποδέσσει τὴν μοναρχίαν: compare c. 28.



reward for his splendid services, the Syracusans voted to him a house in the city, and a landed property among the best in the neighborhood. Here he fixed his residence, sending for his wife and family to Corinth.<sup>1</sup>

Yet though Timoleon had renounced every species of official authority, and all means of constraint, his influence as an adviser over the judgment, feelings and actions, not only of Syracusans, but of Sicilians generally, was as great as ever; perhaps greater — because the fact of his spontaneous resignation gave him one title more to confidence. Rarely is it allowed to mortal man, to establish so transcendent a claim to confidence and esteem as Timoleon now presented; upon so many different grounds, and with so little of alloy or abatement. To possess a counsellor whom every one revered, without suspicions or fears of any kind — who had not only given conspicuous proofs of uncommon energy combined with skilful management, but enjoyed besides, in a peculiar degree, the favor of the gods — was a benefit unspeakably precious to the Sicilians at this juncture. For it was now the time when not merely Syracuse, but other cities of Sicily also, were aiming to strengthen their reconstituted free communities by a fresh supply of citizens from abroad. During the sixty years which had elapsed since the first formidable invasion wherein the Carthaginian Hannibal had conquered Selinus, there had been a series of causes all tending to cripple and diminish, and none to renovate, the Grecian population of Sicily. The Carthaginian attacks, the successful despotism of the first Dionysius, and the disturbed reign of the second, — all contributed to the same result. About the year 352–351 B. C., Plato (as has been already mentioned) expresses his fear of an extinction of Hellenism in Sicily giving place before Phenician or Campanian force.<sup>2</sup> And what was a sad possibility, even in 352–351 B. C. — had become nearer to a probability in 344 B. C., before Timoleon landed, in the then miserable condition of the island.

His unparalleled success and matchless personal behavior combined with the active countenance of Corinth without — had completely turned the tide. In the belief of all Greeks, Sicily

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 36.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 353 F.

was now a land restored to Hellenism and freedom, but requiring new colonists as well to partake, as to guard, these capital privileges. The example of colonization, under the auspices of Corinth, had been set at Syracuse, and was speedily followed elsewhere, especially at Agrigentum, Gela, and Kamarina. All these three cities had suffered cruelly during those formidable Carthaginian invasions which immediately preceded the despotism of Dionysius at Syracuse. They had had no opportunity, during the continuance of the Dionysian dynasty, even to make up what they had then lost; far less to acquire accessions from without. At the same time, all three (especially Agrigentum) recollected their former scale of opulence and power, as it had stood prior to 407 B. C. It was with eagerness therefore that they availed themselves of the new life and security imparted to Sicily by the career of Timoleon, to replenish their exhausted numbers; by recalling those whom former suffering had driven away, and by inviting fresh colonists besides. Megellus and Pheristus, citizens of Elea on the southern coast of Italy (which was probably at this time distressed by the pressure of Lucanians from the interior), conducted a colony to Agrigentum: Gorgus, from Keos, went with another band to Gela: in both cases, a proportion of expatriated citizens returned among them. Kamarina, too, and Agrigentum received large accessions of inhabitants. The inhabitants of Leontini are said to have removed their habitations to Syracuse; a statement difficult to understand, and probably only partially true, as the city and its name still continued to exist.<sup>1</sup>

Unfortunately the proceedings of Timoleon come before us (through Diodorus and Plutarch) in a manner so vague and confused, that we can rarely trace the sequence or assign the date of particular facts.<sup>2</sup> But about the general circumstances, with their character and bearing, there is no room either for mistake or

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 65, 82; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 35.

<sup>2</sup> Eight years elapsed from the time when Timoleon departed with his expedition from Corinth to the time of his death; from 345–344 B. C. to 337–336 B. C. (Diodorus, xvi. 90; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 37).

The battle of the Krimêsus is assigned by Diodorus to 340 B. C. But as to the other military achievements of Timoleon in Sicily, Diodorus and Plutarch are neither precise, nor in accordance with each other.



doubt. That which rhetors and sophists like Lysias had preached in their panegyric harangues<sup>1</sup> — that for which Plato sighed, in the epistles of his old age — commending it, after Dion's death, to the surviving partisans of Dion, as having been the unexecuted purpose of their departed leader — the renewal of freedom and Hellenism throughout the island — was now made a reality under the auspices of Timoleon. The houses, the temples, the walls, were rescued from decay; the lands from comparative barrenness. For it was not merely his personal reputation and achievements which constituted the main allurements to new colonists, but also his superintending advice which regulated their destination when they arrived. Without the least power of constraint, or even official dignity, he was consulted as a sort of general Cæstus or Patron-Founder, by the affectionate regard of the settlers in every part of Sicily. The distribution or sale of lands, the modification required in existing laws and customs, the new political constitutions, etc., were all submitted to his review. No settlement gave satisfaction, except such as he had pronounced or approved; none which he had approved was contested.<sup>2</sup>

In the situation in which Sicily was now placed, it is clear that numberless matters of doubt and difficulty would inevitably arise; that the claims and interests of pre-existing residents, returning exiles and new immigrants, would often be conflicting; that the rites and customs of different fractions composing the new whole, might have to be modified for the sake of mutual harmony; that the settlers, coming from oligarchies as well as democracies might bring with them different ideas as to the proper features of a political constitution; that the apportionment or sale of lands,

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 37. *μόνος, ἐφ' ᾧ οἱ σοφισταὶ διὰ τῶν λόγων τῶν πανηγυρικῶν αἰὲν παρεκάλουν πράξεις τοῦ Ἑλλήνας, ἐν αὐταῖς ἀριστεύσας, οἷοι.*

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 35. *Οἷς οὐ μόνον ἀσφάλειαν ἐκ πολέμου τοσούτου καὶ γαλήνην ἰδρυμένοις παρείχεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰλλα παρασκευάσας καὶ συμπροθυμηθεὶς ὥσπερ οἰκιστὴς ἡγαπάτο. Καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ διακειμένων ὁμοίως πρὸς αὐτὸν, οὐ πολέμου τις λύσις, οὐ νόμων θέσις, οὐ χώρας κατοικισμός, οὐ πολιτείας διάταξις, ἐδόκει καλῶς ἔχειν, ἥς ἐκεῖνος μὴ προσάψαιτο μηδὲ κατακοσμήσειεν, ὥσπερ ἐργῶ συντελουμένῳ δημευογὰς ἐπιθεῖς τινα χάριν θεοφιλῆ καὶ πρέπουσαν.*

Compare Cornelius Nepos, Timoleon, c. 3.

and the adjustment of old debts, presented but too many chances of angry dispute; that there were, in fact, a thousand novelties in the situation, which could not be determined either by precedent, or by any peremptory rule, but must be left to the equity of a supreme arbitrator. Here then the advantages were unspeakable of having a man like Timoleon to appeal to; a man not only really without sinister bias, but recognized by every one as being so; a man whom every one loved, trusted, and was grieved to offend; a man who sought not to impose his own will upon free communities, but addressed them as freemen, building only upon their reason and sentiments, and carrying out in all his recommendations of detail those instincts of free speech, universal vote, and equal laws, which formed the germ of political obligation in the minds of Greeks generally. It would have been gratifying to know how Timoleon settled the many new and difficult questions which must have been submitted to him as referee. There is no situation in human society so valuable to study, as that in which routine is of necessity broken through, and the constructive faculties called into active exertion. Nor was there ever perhaps throughout Grecian history, a simultaneous colonization, and simultaneous recasting of political institutions, more extensive than that which now took place in Sicily. Unfortunately we are permitted to know only the general fact, without either the charm or the instruction which would have been presented by the details. Timoleon was, in Sicily, that which Epaminondas had been at the foundation of Messênê and Megalopolis, though with far greater power: and we have to deplore the like ignorance respecting the detail proceedings of both these great men.

But though the sphere of Timoleon's activity was coextensive with Sicily, his residence, his citizenship, and his peculiar interests and duties were at Syracuse. That city, like most of the other Sicilian towns, had been born anew, with a numerous body of settlers and altered political institutions. I have already mentioned that Kephalus and others, invited from Corinth by express vote of the Syracusans, had reestablished the democratical institution of Dioklês, with suitable modifications. The new era of liberty was marked by the establishment of a new sacred office, that of Amphipolus or Attendant Priest of Zeus Olympius; an office changed annually, appointed by lot (doubtless under some condi-



tions of qualification which are not made known to us,<sup>1</sup>) and intended, like the Archon Eponymus at Athens, as the recognized name to distinguish each Syracusan year. In this work of constitutional reform, as well as in all the labors and adjustments connected with the new settlers, Timoleon took a prominent part. But so soon as the new constitution was consummated and set at work, he declined undertaking any specific duties or exercising any powers under it. Enjoying the highest measure of public esteem, and loaded with honorary and grateful votes from the people, he had the wisdom as well as the virtue to prefer living as a private citizen; a resolution doubtless promoted by his increasing failure of eyesight, which presently became total blindness.<sup>2</sup> He dwelt in the house assigned to him by public vote of the people, which he had consecrated to the Holy God, and within which he had set apart a chapel to the goddess Automatia,—the goddess under whose auspices blessings and glory came as it were of themselves.<sup>3</sup> To this goddess he offered sacrifice, as the great and constant patroness who had accompanied him from Corinth through all his proceedings in Sicily.

By refusing the official prominence tendered to him, and by keeping away from the details of public life, Timoleon escaped the jealousy sure to attend upon influence so prodigious as his. But in truth, for all great and important matters, this very modesty increased instead of diminishing his real ascendancy. Here as elsewhere, the goddess Automatia worked for him, and brought to him docile listeners without his own seeking. Though the Syracusans transacted their ordinary business through others, yet when any matter of serious difficulty occurred, the presence of Timoleon was specially invoked in the discussion. During the later months of his life, when he had become blind, his arrival in the

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 70; Cicero in Verrem, ii. 51.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 38.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 38. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς οἰκίας ἑρὸν ἰδρυσάμενος Ἀυτοματίας ἐθύσεν, αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν οἰκίαν ἑρῶ Δαίμονι καθιέρωσεν.

Cornelius Nepos, Timoleon, c. 4; Plutarch, Reip. Gerend. Præcept. p. 16 D.

The idea of Ἀυτοματία is not the same as that of Τύχη, though the word is sometimes translated as if it were. It is more nearly the same as Ἀγαθὴ Τύχη—though still, as it seems to me, not exactly the same.

assembly was a solemn scene. Having been brought in his car drawn by mules across the market-place to the door of the theatre wherein the assembly was held, attendants then led or drew the car into the theatre amidst the assembled people, who testified their affection by the warmest shouts and congratulations. As soon as he had returned their welcome, and silence was restored, the discussion to which he had been invited took place, Timoleon sitting on his car and listening. Having heard the matter thus debated, he delivered his own opinion, which was usually ratified at once by the show of hands of the assembly. He then took leave of the people and retired, the attendants again leading the car out of the theatre, and the same cheers of attachment accompanying his departure; while the assembly proceeded with its other and more ordinary business.<sup>1</sup>

Such is the impressive and picturesque description given (doubtless by Athanis or some other eye-witness<sup>2</sup>) of the relations between the Syracusan people and the blind Timoleon, after his power had been abdicated, and when there remained to him nothing except his character and moral ascendancy. It is easy to see that the solemnities of interposition, here recounted, must have been reserved for those cases in which the assembly had been disturbed by some unusual violence or collision of parties. For such critical junctures, where numbers were perhaps nearly balanced, and where the disappointment of an angry minority threatened to beget some permanent feud, the benefit was inestimable, of an umpire whom both parties revered, and before whom neither thought it a dishonor to yield. Keeping aloof from the details and embarrassments of daily political life, and preserving himself (like the Salaminian trireme, to use a phrase which Plutarch applies to Perikles at Athens) for occasions at once momentous and difficult, Timoleon filled up a gap occasionally dangerous to all free societies; but which even at Athens had always remained a gap, because there was no Athenian at once actually worthy, and known to be worthy, to fill it. We may even wonder how he continued worthy, when the intense popular sentiment in

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 38; Cornel. Nepos, Timoleon, c. 4.

<sup>2</sup> It occurs in Cornelius Nepos prior to Plutarch, and was probably copied by both from the same authority.



his favor tended so strongly to turn his head, and when no contradiction or censure against him was tolerated.

Two persons, Laphystius and Demænetus, called by the obnoxious names of sycophants and demagogues, were bold enough to try the experiment. The former required him to give bail in a lawsuit; the latter, in a public discourse, censured various parts of his military campaigns. The public indignation against both these men was vehement; yet there can be little doubt that Laphystius applied to Timoleon a legal process applicable universally to every citizen: what may have been the pertinence of the censures of Demænetus, we are unable to say. However, Timoleon availed himself of the well-meant impatience of the people to protect him either from legal process or from censure, only to administer to them a serious and valuable lesson. Protesting against all interruption to the legal process of Laphystius, he proclaimed emphatically that this was the precise purpose for which he had so long labored, and combated — in order that every Syracusan citizen might be enabled to appeal to the laws and exercise freely his legal rights. And while he thought it unnecessary to rebut in detail the objections taken against his previous generalship, he publicly declared his gratitude to the gods, for having granted his prayer that he might witness all Syracusans in possession of full liberty of speech.<sup>1</sup>

We obtain little from the biographers of Timoleon, except a few incidents, striking, impressive, and somewhat theatrical, like those just recounted. But what is really important is, the tone and temper which these incidents reveal, both in Timoleon and in the Syracusan people. To see him unperturbed by a career of superhuman success, retaining the same hearty convictions with which he had started from Corinth; renouncing power, the most ardent of all aspirations with a Greek politician, and descending to a private station, in spite of every external inducement to the contrary; resisting the temptation to impose his own will upon the people, and respecting their free speech and public vote in a manner which made it imperatively necessary for every one else to follow his example; foregoing command, and contenting himself with advice when his opinion was asked — all this

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, 1. 37; Cornelius Nepos, Timoleon, c. 3.

presents a model of genuine and intelligent public spirit, such as is associated with few other names except that of Timoleon. That the Syracusan people should have yielded to such conduct and obedience not merely voluntary, but heartfelt and almost reverential, is no matter of wonder. And we may be quite sure that the opinion of Timoleon, tranquilly and unostentatiously consulted, was the guiding star which they followed on most points of moment or difficulty; over and above those of exceptional cases of aggravated dissent where he was called in with such imposing ceremony as an umpire. On the value of such an oracle close at hand it is needless to insist; especially in a city which for the last half century had known nothing but the domination of force, and amidst a new miscellaneous aggregate composed of Greek settlers from many different quarters.

Timoleon now enjoyed, as he had amply earned, what Xenophon calls "that good, not human, but divine — command over willing men — given manifestly to persons of genuine and highly trained temperance of character." In him the condition indicated by Xenophon was found completely realized — temperance in the largest and most comprehensive sense of the word — not simply sobriety and continence (which had belonged to the elder Dionysius also), but an absence of that fatal thirst for coercive power at all price, which in Greece was the fruitful parent of the greater crimes and enormities.

Timoleon lived to see his great work of Sicilian enfranchisement consummated, to carry it through all its incipient difficulties, and to see it prosperously moving on. Not Syracuse alone, but the other Grecian cities in the island also, enjoyed under their revived free institutions a state of security, comfort, and affluence, to which they had been long strangers. The lands became again industriously tilled; the fertile soil yielded anew abundant exports; the temples were restored from their previous decay, and adorned with the votive offerings of pious munificence.<sup>2</sup> The same

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. *Æconomic*. xxi. 12. Οὐ γὰρ πᾶν μοι δοκεῖ ὅλον τοῦτ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπινον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ θεῖον, τὸ ἐθέλοντων ἄρχειν· σαφῶς δὲ δίδεται τοῖς ἀληθινῶς σωφροσύνῃ τετελεσμένοις. Τὸ δὲ ἀκόντων τυραννεῖν διδάσκειν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ ἂν ἡγῶνται ἀξίους εἶναι βιοτεύειν, ὥσπερ ὁ Τάνταλος ἐν ἄδου λέγεται τὸν αἰὲ χρόνον διατρίβειν, φοβούμενος μὴ δις ἀποθάνῃ.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 83.



state of prosperous and active freedom, which had followed on the expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty a hundred and twenty years before, and lasted about fifty years, without either despots within or invaders from without — was now again made prevalent throughout Sicily under the auspices of Timoleon. It did not indeed last so long. It was broken up in the year 316 B. C., twenty-four years after the battle of the Krimêsus, by the despot Agathokles, whose father was among the immigrants to Syracuse under the settlement of Timoleon. But the interval of security and freedom with which Sicily was blessed between these two epochs she owed to the generous patriotism and intelligent council of Timoleon. There are few other names among the Grecian annals, with which we can connect so large an amount of pre-terminated and beneficent result.

Endeared to the Syracusans as a common father and benefactor,<sup>1</sup> and exhibited as their hero to all visitors from Greece, he passed the remainder of his life amidst the fulness of affectionate honor. Unfortunately for the Syracusans, that remainder was but too short; for he died of an illness apparently slight, in the year 337–336 B. C. — three or four years after the battle of the Krimêsus. Profound and unfeigned was the sorrow which his death excited, universally, throughout Sicily. Not merely the Syracusans, but crowds from all other parts of the island, attended to do honor to his funeral, which was splendidly celebrated at the public cost. Some of the chosen youths of the city carried the bier whereon his body was deposited: a countless procession of men and women followed, in their festival attire, crowned with wreaths, and mingling with their tears admiration and envy for their departed liberator. The procession was made to pass over that ground which presented the most honorable memento of Timoleon; where the demolished Dionysian stronghold had once reared its head, and where the court of justice was now placed, at the entrance of Ortygia. At length it reached the Nekropolis, between Ortygia and Achradina, where a massive funeral pile

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 39. Ἐν τοιαύτῃ δὲ γηροτροφούμενος τιμῇ μετ' ἐλπίδας, ὥσπερ πατὴρ κοινός, ἐκ μικρᾶς προφάσεως τῷ χρόνῳ συνεφαπταμένην ἐτελεύτησεν.

had been prepared. As soon as the bier had been placed on this pile, and fire was about to be applied, the herald Demetrius, distinguished for the powers of his voice, proclaimed with loud announcement as follows:—

“The Syracusan people solemnize, at the cost of two hundred minæ, the funeral of this man, the Corinthian Timoleon, son of Timodemus. They have passed a vote to honor him for all future time with festival matches in music, horse and chariot race, and gymnastics, — because, after having put down the despots, subdued the foreign enemy, and re-colonized the greatest among the ruined cities, he restored to the Sicilian Greeks their constitution and laws.”

A sepulchral monument, seemingly with this inscription recorded on it, was erected to the memory of Timoleon in the agora of Syracuse. To this monument other buildings were presently annexed; porticos, for the assembling of persons in business or conversation — and palæstræ, for the exercises of youths. The aggregate of buildings all taken together was called the Timoleonion.<sup>1</sup>

When we reflect that the fatal battle of Chæroneia had taken place the year before Timoleon's decease, and that his native city Corinth as well as all her neighbors were sinking deeper and deeper into the degradation of subject towns of Macedonia, we shall not regret, for his sake, that a timely death relieved him from so mournful a spectacle. It was owing to him that the Sicilian Greeks were rescued, for nearly one generation, from the like fate. He had the rare glory of maintaining to the end, and executing to the full, the promise of liberation with which he had gone forth from Corinth. His early years had been years of acute suffering — and that, too, incurred in the cause of freedom — arising out of the death of his brother; his later period, manifesting the like sense of duty under happier auspices, had richly repaid him, by successes overpassing all reasonable expectation, and by the ample flow of gratitude and attachment poured forth to him amidst the liberated Sicilians. His character appears most noble, and most instructive, if we contrast him with Dion. Timoleon had been brought up as the citizen of a free, though oligar-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 39; Diodor. xvi. 90.



chical community in Greece, surrounded by other free communities, and amidst universal hatred of despots. The politicians whom he had learnt to esteem were men trained in this school, maintaining a qualified ascendancy against more or less of open competition from rivals, and obliged to look for the means of carrying their views apart from simple dictation. Moreover, the person whom Timoleon had selected for his peculiar model, was Epaminondas, the noblest model that Greece afforded.<sup>1</sup> It was to this example that Timoleon owed in part his energetic patriotism combined with freedom from personal ambition — his gentleness of political antipathy — and the perfect habits of conciliatory and popular dealing — which he manifested amidst so many new and trying scenes to the end of his career.

Now the education of Dion (as I have recounted in the preceding chapter) had been something totally different. He was the member of a despotic family, and had learnt his experience under the energetic, but perfectly self-willed, march of the elder Dionysius. Of the temper or exigencies of a community of freemen, he had never learnt to take account. Plunged in this corrupting atmosphere, he had nevertheless imbibed generous and public-spirited aspirations: he had come to hold in abhorrence a government of will, and to look for glory in contributing to replace it by a qualified freedom and a government of laws. But the source from whence he drank was, the Academy and its illustrious teacher Plato; not from practical life, nor from the best practical politicians like Epaminondas. Accordingly, he had imbibed at the same time the idea, that though despotism was a bad thing, government thoroughly popular was a bad thing also; that, in other words, as soon as he had put down the despotism, it lay with him to determine how much liberty he would allow, or what laws he would sanction, for the community; that instead of a despot, he was to become a despotic lawgiver.

Here then lay the main difference between the two conquerors

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 36. 'Ο μάλιστα ζηλωθεὶς ὑπὸ Τιμολεοντος Ἐπαμεινώνδας, etc.

Polybius reckons Hermocrates, Timoleon, and Pyrrhus, to be the most complete men of action (πραγματικωτάτους) of all those who had played a conspicuous part in Sicilian affairs (Polyb. xii. 25. o. ed. Didot).

of Dionysius. The mournful letters written by Plato after the death of Dion contrast strikingly with the enviable end of Timoleon, and with the grateful inscription of the Syracusans on his tomb.

## CHAPTER LXXXVI.

CENTRAL GREECE: THE ACCESSION OF PHILIP OF MACEDON TO THE BIRTH OF ALEXANDER. 359–356 B. C.

My last preceding chapters have followed the history of the Sicilian Greeks through long years of despotism, suffering, and impoverishment, into a period of renovated freedom and comparative happiness, accomplished under the beneficent auspices of Timoleon, between 344–336 B. C. It will now be proper to resume the thread of events in Central Greece, at the point where they were left at the close of the preceding volume — the accession of Philip of Macedon in 360–359 B. C. The death of Philip took place in 336 B. C.; and the closing years of his life will bring before us the last struggles of full Hellenic freedom; a result standing in mournful contrast with the achievements of the contemporary liberator Timoleon in Sicily.

No such struggles could have appeared within the limits of possibility, even to the most far-sighted politician either of Greece or of Macedon — at the time when Philip mounted the throne. Among the hopes and fears of most Grecian cities, Macedonia then passed wholly unnoticed; in Athens, Olynthus, Thasus, Thessaly, and a few others, it formed an item not without moment, yet by no means of first-rate magnitude.

The Hellenic world was now in a state different from anything which had been seen since the repulse of Xerxes in 480–479 B. C. The defeat and degradation of Sparta had set free the inland states from the only presiding city whom they had ever learned to look up to. Her imperial ascendancy, long possessed and grievously abused, had been put down by the successes of Epaminon



das and the Thebans. She was no longer the head of a numerous body of subordinate allies, sending deputies to her periodical synods—submitting their external politics to her influence—placing their military contingents under command of her officers (xenagi)—and even administering their internal government through oligarchies devoted to her purposes, with the reinforcement, wherever needed, of a Spartan harmost and garrison. She no longer found on her northern frontier a number of detached Arcadian villages, each separately manageable under leaders devoted to her, and furnishing her with hardy soldiers; nor had she the friendly city of Tegea, tied to her by a long-standing philo-Laconian oligarchy and tradition. Under the strong revolution of feeling which followed on the defeat of the Spartans at Leuktra, the small Arcadian communities, encouraged and guided by Epaminondas, had consolidated themselves into the great fortified city of Megalopolis, now the centre of a Pan-Arcadian confederacy, with a synod (called the Ten thousand) frequently assembled there to decide upon matters of interest and policy common to the various sections of the Arcadian name. Tegea too had undergone a political revolution; so that these two cities, conterminous with each other and forming together the northern frontier of Sparta, converted her Arcadian neighbors from valuable instruments into formidable enemies.

But this loss of foreign auxiliary force and dignity was not the worst which Sparta had suffered. On her north-western frontier (conterminous also with Megalopolis) stood the newly-constituted city of Messênê, representing an amputation of nearly one-half of Spartan territory and substance. The western and more fertile half of Laconia had been severed from Sparta, and was divided between Messênê and various other independent cities; being tilled chiefly by those who had once been Perioeci and Helots of Sparta.

In the phase of Grecian history on which we are now about to enter—when the collective Hellenic world, for the first time since the invasion of Xerxes, was about to be thrown upon its defence against a foreign enemy from Macedonia—this altered position of Sparta was a circumstance of grave moment. Not only were the Peloponnesians disunited, and deprived of their common chief; but Megalopolis and Messênê, knowing the intense hostili-

ty of Sparta against them—and her great superiority of force even reduced as she was, to all that they could muster—lived in perpetual dread of her attack. Their neighbors the Argeians, standing enemies of Sparta, were well-disposed to protect them; but such aid was insufficient for their defence, without extra-Peloponnesian alliance. Accordingly we shall find them leaning upon the support either of Thebes or of Athens, whichever could be had; and ultimately even welcoming the arms of Philip of Macedon, as protector against the inexorable hostility of Sparta. Elis—placed in the same situation with reference to Triphylia, as Sparta with reference to Messênê—complained that the Triphyliaus, whom she looked upon as subjects, had been admitted as freemen into the Arcadian federation. We shall find Sparta endeavoring to engage Elis in political combinations, intended to ensure, to both, the recovery of lost dominion.<sup>1</sup> Of these combinations more will be said hereafter; at present I merely notice the general fact that the degradation of Sparta, combined with her perpetually menaced aggression against Messênê and Arcadia, disorganized Peloponnesus, and destroyed its powers of Pan-hellenic defence against the new foreign enemy now slowly arising.

The once powerful Peloponnesian system was in fact completely broken up. Corinth, Sikyon, Phlius, Trœzen, and Epidaurus, valuable as secondary states and as allies of Sparta, were now detached from all political combination, aiming only to keep clear, each for itself, of an share in collision between Sparta and Thebes.<sup>2</sup> It would appear also that Corinth had recently been oppressed and disturbed by the temporary despotism of Timophanes, described in my last chapter; though the date of that event cannot be precisely made out.

But the grand and preponderating forces of Hellas now resided, for the first time in our history, without, and not within, Peloponnesus; at Athens and Thebes. Both these cities were in full vigor and efficiency. Athens had a numerous fleet, a flourishing commerce, a considerable body of maritime and insular allies,

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes, *Orat. pro Megalopolit.* p. 203, 204, s. 6-10; p. 206. s. 18—and indeed the whole Oration, which is an instructive exposition of policy.

<sup>2</sup> *Xen. Hellen.* vii. 4, 6, 10.



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But this loss of foreign auxiliary force and dignity was not the worst which Sparta had suffered. On her north-western frontier (conterminous also with Megalopolis) stood the newly-constituted city of Messênê, representing an amputation of nearly one-half of Spartan territory and substance. The western and more fertile half of Laconia had been severed from Sparta, and was divided between Messênê and various other independent cities; being tilled chiefly by those who had once been Perioeci and Helots of Sparta.

In the phase of Grecian history on which we are now about to enter — when the collective Hellenic world, for the first time since the invasion of Xerxes, was about to be thrown upon its defence against a foreign enemy from Macedonia — this altered position of Sparta was a circumstance of grave moment. Not only were the Peloponnesians disunited, and deprived of their common chief; but Megalopolis and Messênê, knowing the intense hostili-

ty of Sparta against them — and her great superiority of force even reduced as she was, to all that they could muster — lived in perpetual dread of her attack. Their neighbors the Argeians, standing enemies of Sparta, were well-disposed to protect them; but such aid was insufficient for their defence, without extra-Peloponnesian alliance. Accordingly we shall find them leaning upon the support either of Thebes or of Athens, whichever could be had; and ultimately even welcoming the arms of Philip of Macedon, as protector against the inexorable hostility of Sparta. Elis — placed in the same situation with reference to Triphylia, as Sparta with reference to Messênê — complained that the Triphylians, whom she looked upon as subjects, had been admitted as freemen into the Arcadian federation. We shall find Sparta endeavoring to engage Elis in political combinations, intended to ensure, to both, the recovery of lost dominion.<sup>1</sup> Of these combinations more will be said hereafter; at present I merely notice the general fact that the degradation of Sparta, combined with her perpetually menaced aggression against Messênê and Arcadia, disorganized Peloponnesus, and destroyed its powers of Pan-hellenic defence against the new foreign enemy now slowly arising.

The once powerful Peloponnesian system was in fact completely broken up. Corinth, Sikyon, Phlius, Trœzen, and Epidaurus, valuable as secondary states and as allies of Sparta, were now detached from all political combination, aiming only to keep clear, each for itself, of an share in collision between Sparta and Thebes.<sup>2</sup> It would appear also that Corinth had recently been oppressed and disturbed by the temporary despotism of Timophanes, described in my last chapter; though the date of that event cannot be precisely made out.

But the grand and preponderating forces of Hellas now resided, for the first time in our history, without, and not within, Peloponnesus; at Athens and Thebes. Both these cities were in full vigor and efficiency. Athens had a numerous fleet, a flourishing commerce, a considerable body of maritime and insular allies,

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes, *Orat. pro Megalopolit.* p. 203, 204, s. 6-10; p. 206. s. 10 — and indeed the whole Oration, which is an instructive exposition of policy.

<sup>2</sup> *Xen. Hellen.* vii. 4, 6, 10.



sending deputies to her synod and contributing to a common fund for the maintenance of the joint security. She was by far the greatest maritime power of Greece. I have recounted in my last preceding volume, how her general Timotheus had acquired for her the important island of Samos, together with Pydna, Methônê, and Potidæa, in the Thermaic Gulf; how he failed (as Iphikrates had failed before him) in more than one attempt upon Amphipolis; how he planted Athenian conquest and settlers in the Thracian Chersonese, which territory, after having been attacked and endangered by the Thracian prince Kotys, was regained by the continued efforts of Athens in the year 358 B. C. Athens had sustained no considerable loss, during the struggles which ended in the pacification after the battle of Mantinea; and her condition appears on the whole to have been better than it had ever been since her disasters at the close of the Peloponnesian war.

The power of Thebes also was imposing and formidable. She had indeed lost many of those Peloponnesian allies who formed the overwhelming array of Epaminondas when he first invaded Laconia, under the fresh anti-Spartan impulse immediately succeeding the battle of Leuktra. She retained only Argos, together with Tegea, Megalopolis, and Messênê. The last three added little to her strength, and needed her watchful support; a price which Epaminondas had been perfectly willing to pay for the establishment of a strong frontier against Sparta. But the body of extra Peloponnesian allies grouped round Thebes was still considerable: the Phokians and Lokrians, the Malians, the Herakleots, most of the Thessalians, and most (if not all) of the inhabitants of Eubœa; perhaps also the Akarnanians. The Phokians were indeed reluctant allies, disposed to circumscribe their obligations within the narrowest limits of mutual defence in case of invasion and we shall presently find the relations between the two becom-

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 5 23; vii. 5, 4. Diodor. xv. 62. The Akarnanians had been allies of Thebes at the time of the first expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus; whether they remained so at the time of his last expedition, is not certain. But as the Theban ascendancy over Thessaly was much greater at the last of those two periods than at the first, we may be sure that they had not lost their hold upon the Lokrians and Malians who (as well as the Phokians) lay between Bœotia and Thessaly.

ing positively hostile. Besides these allies, the Thebans possessed the valuable position of Oropus, on the north-eastern frontier of Attica; a town which had been wrested from Athens six years before, to the profound mortification of the Athenians.

But over and above allies without Bœotia, Thebes had prodigiously increased the power of her city within Bœotia. She had appropriated to herself the territories of Plataea and Thespiæ on her southern frontier, and of Koroneia and Orchomenus near upon her northern; by conquest and partial expulsion of their prior inhabitants. How and when these acquisitions had been brought about, has been explained in my preceding volume: here I merely recall the fact, to appreciate the position of Thebes in 359 B. C. — that these four towns, having been in 372 B. C. autonomous — joined with her only by the definite obligations of the Bœotian confederacy — and partly even in actual hostility against her — had now lost their autonomy with their free citizens, and had become absorbed into her property and sovereignty. The domain of Thebes thus extended across Bœotia from the frontiers of Phokis<sup>2</sup> on the north-west to the frontiers of Attica on the south.

The new position thus acquired by Thebes in Bœotia, purchased at the cost of extinguishing three or four autonomous cities, is a fact of much moment in reference to the period now before us; not simply because it swelled the power and pride of the Thebans themselves; but also because it raised a strong body of unfavorable sentiment against them in the Hellenic mind. Just at the time when the Spartans had lost nearly one-half of Laconia, the Thebans had annexed to their own city one-third of the free Bœotian territory. The revival of free Messenian citizenship, after a suspended existence of more than two centuries, had recently been welcomed with universal satisfaction. How much would that same feeling be shocked when Thebes extinguished, for her own aggrandizement, four autonomous communities, all of her own Bœotian kindred — one of these communities too being Orchomenus, respected both for its antiquity and its traditionary

<sup>1</sup> Vol. X. Ch. lxxvii. p. 161; Ch. lxxviii. p. 195; Ch. lxxx. p. 312.

<sup>2</sup> Orchomenus was conterminous with the Phokian territory (Pausanias ix. 39, 1.)



legends! Little pains was taken to canvass the circumstances of the case, and to inquire whether Thebes had exceeded the measure of rigor warranted by the war-code of the time. In the patriotic and national conceptions of every Greek, Hellas consisted of an aggregate of autonomous, fraternal, city-communities. The extinction of any one of these was like the amputation of a limb from the organized body. Repugnance towards Thebes, arising out of these proceedings, affected strongly the public opinion of the time, and manifests itself especially in the language of Athenian orators, exaggerated by mortification on account of the loss of Oropus.<sup>1</sup>

The great body of Thessalians, as well as the Magnes and the Phthiot Achæans, were among those subject to the ascendancy of Thebes. Even the powerful and cruel despot, Alexander of Pheræ, was numbered in this catalogue.<sup>2</sup> The cities of fertile Thessaly, possessed by powerful oligarchies with numerous dependent serfs, were generally a prey to intestine conflict and municipal rivalry with each other; disorderly as well as faithless.<sup>3</sup> The Aleuadae, chiefs at Larissa — and the Skopadae, at Krannon — had been once the ascendent families in the country. But in the hands of Lykophron and the energetic Jason, Pheræ had been exalted to the first rank. Under Jason as tagus (federal general), the whole force of Thessaly was united, together with a large number of circumjacent tributaries, Macedonian, Epirotic, Dolopian, etc., and a well-organized standing army of mercen-

<sup>1</sup> Isokrates, Or. viii. De Pace, s. 21; Demosthenes adv. Leptinem, p. 490. s. 121; pro Megalopol. p. 208. s. 29; Philippic ii. p. 69 s. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 5, 4, Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 35. Wachsmuth states, in my judgment, erroneously, that Thebes was disappointed in her attempt to establish ascendancy in Thessaly (Hellenisch. Alterthümer, vol. ii. x. p. 338).

<sup>3</sup> Plato, Kriton, p. 53 D; Xenoph. Memorab. i. 2, 24; Demosthenes Olynth. i. p. 15. s. 23, Demosth. cont. Aristokratem, p. 658 s. 133.

"Pergit ire (the Roman consul Quinctius Flaminius) in Thessaliam. ubi non liberandæ modo civitates erant, sed ex omni colluvione et confusione in aliquam tolerabilem formam redigendæ. Nec enim temporum modo vitii, ac violentiâ et licentiâ regiâ (i. e. the Macedonian) turbati erant: sed inquieto etiam ingenio gentis, nec comitia, nec conventum nec concilium ullum, non per seditionem et tumultum, jam inde a principio ad nostram usque ætatem, traducuntur." (Livy, xxxiv. 51).

aries besides. He could muster eight thousand cavalry, twenty thousand hoplites, and peltasts or light infantry in numbers far more considerable.<sup>1</sup> A military power of such magnitude, in the hands of one alike able and aspiring, raised universal alarm, and would doubtless have been employed in some great scheme of conquest, either within or without Greece, had not Jason been suddenly cut off by assassination in 370 B. C., in the year succeeding the battle of Leuktra.<sup>2</sup> His brothers Polyphron and Polydorus succeeded to his position as tagus, but not to his abilities or influence. The latter a brutal tyrant, put to death the former, and was in his turn slain, after a short interval, by a successor yet worse, his nephew Alexander, who lived and retained power at Pheræ, for about ten years (368–358 B. C.).

During a portion of that time Alexander contended with success against the Thebans, and maintained his ascendancy in Thessaly. But before the battle of Mantinea in 362 B. C., he had been reduced into the condition of a dependent ally of Thebes, and had furnished a contingent to the army which marched under Epaminondas into Peloponnesus. During the year 362–361 B. C. he even turned his hostilities against Athens, the enemy of Thebes; carrying on a naval war against her, not without partial success, and damage to her commerce.<sup>3</sup> And as the foreign ascendancy of Thebes everywhere was probably impaired by the death of her great leader Epaminondas, Alexander of Pheræ recovered strength; continuing to be the greatest potentate in Thessaly, as well as the most sanguinary tyrant, until the time of his death in the beginning of 359 B. C.<sup>4</sup> He then perished, in the vigor of age

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 19.

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4, 32.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenes adv. Polyklem, p. 1207. s. 5, 6; Diodor. xv. 61–95. See my previous Volume X. Ch. lxxx. p. 370.

<sup>4</sup> I concur with Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hellen. ad. ann. 359 B. C., and Appendix, c. 15) in thinking that this is the probable date of the assassination of Alexander of Pheræ; which event is mentioned by Diodorus (xvi. 14) under the year 357–356 B. C., yet in conjunction with a series of subsequent events, and in a manner scarcely constraining us to believe that he meant to affirm the assassination itself as having actually taken place in that year.

To the arguments adduced by Mr. Clinton, another may be added borrowed from the expression of Plutarch (Pelopidas, c. 35) *δαιμον ὄντα*



and in the fulness of power. Against oppressed subjects or neighbors he could take security by means of mercenary guards; but he was slain by the contrivance of his wife Thêbê and the act of her brothers:—a memorable illustration of the general position laid down by Xenophon, that the Grecian despot could calculate neither on security nor on affection anywhere, and that his most dangerous enemies were to be found among his own household or kindred.<sup>1</sup> The brutal life of Alexander, and the cruelty of his proceedings, had inspired his wife with mingled hatred and fear. Moreover she had learnt from words dropped in a fit of intoxication, that he was intending to put to death her brothers Tisiphonus, Pytholaus, and Lykophron—and along with them herself; partly because she was childless, and he had formed the design of re-marrying with the widow of the late despot Jason, who resided at Thebes. Accordingly Thêbê, apprising her brothers of their peril, concerted with them the means of assassinating Alexander. The bed-chamber which she shared with him was in an upper story, accessible only by a removable staircase or ladder; at the foot of which there lay every night a fierce mastiff in chains, and a Thracian soldier tattooed after the fashion of his country. The whole house moreover was regularly occupied by a company of guards; and it is even said that the wardrobe and closets of Thêbê were searched every evening for concealed weapons. These numerous precautions of mistrust, however, were baffled by her artifice. She concealed her brothers during all the day in a safe adjacent hiding-place. At night Alexander, coming to bed intoxicated, soon fell fast asleep; upon which Thêbê stole out of the room—directed the dog to be removed from the foot of the stairs, under pretence that the despot wished to enjoy undisturbed repose—and then called her armed brothers. After spreading wool upon the stairs, in order that their tread might be noiseless,

*por.* He states that the assassination of Alexander occurred "a little while" after the period when the Thebans, avenging the death of Pelopidas, reduced that despot to submission. Now this reduction cannot be placed later than 363 B. C. That interval therefore which Plutarch calls "a little while," will be three years, if we place the assassination in 359 B. C., six years, if we place it in 357–356 B. C. Three years is a more suitable interpretation of the words than six years.

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hiero, i. 38; ii. 10; iii. 8.

she went again up into the bed-room, and brought away the sword of Alexander, which always hung near him. Notwithstanding this encouragement, however, the three young men, still trembling at the magnitude of the risk, hesitated to mount the stair; nor could they be prevailed upon to do so, except by her distinct threat, that if they flinched, she would awaken Alexander and expose them. At length they mounted, and entered the bed-chamber, wherein a lamp was burning; while Thêbê, having opened the door for them, again closed it, and posted herself to hold the bar. The brothers then approached the bed: one seized the sleeping despot by the feet, another by the hair of his head, and the third with a sword thrust him through.<sup>1</sup>

After successfully and securely consummating this deed, popular on account of the odious character of the slain despot, Thêbê contrived to win over the mercenary troops, and to insure the sceptre to herself and her eldest brother Tisiphonus. After this change, it would appear that the power of the new princes was not so great as that of Alexander had been, so that additional elements of weakness and discord were introduced into Thessaly. This is to be noted as one of the material circumstances paving the way for Philip of Macedon to acquire ascendancy in Greece—as will hereafter appear.

It was in the year 360–359 B. C., that Perdikkas, elder brother and predecessor of Philip on the throne of Macedonia, was slain, in the flower of his age. He perished, according to one account, in a bloody battle with the Illyrians, wherein four thousand Macedonians fell also; according to another statement, by the hands of assassins and the treacherous subornation of his mother Eurydikê.<sup>2</sup> Of the exploits of Perdikkas during the five years of his reign we know little. He had assisted the Athenian general Timotheus in war against the Olynthian confederacy, and in

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4, 36, 37; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 35; Conon, ap. Photium, Narr. 50. Codex, 186; Cicero, de Offic. ii. 7. The details of the assassination, given in these authors, differ. I have principally followed Xenophon, and have admitted nothing positively inconsistent with his statements.

<sup>2</sup> Justin, vii. 5; Diodor. xvi. 2. The allusion in the speech of Philotas immediately prior to his execution (Curtius, vi. 43. p. 591, Mutzel) supports the affirmation of Justin—that Perdikkas was assassinated.



the capture of Pydna, Potidæa, Torônê, and other neighboring places; while on the other hand he had opposed the Athenians in their attempt against Amphipolis, securing that important place by a Macedonian garrison, both against them and for himself. He was engaged in serious conflicts with the Illyrians.<sup>1</sup> It appears too that he was not without some literary inclinations — was an admirer of intellectual men, and in correspondence with Plato at Athens. Distinguished philosophers or sophists, like Plato and Isokrates, enjoyed renown, combined with a certain measure of influence, throughout the whole range of the Grecian world. Forty years before, Archelaus king of Macedonia had shown favour to Plato,<sup>2</sup> then a young man, as well as to his master Sokrates. Amyntas, the father both of Perdikkas and of Philip, had throughout his reign cultivated the friendship of leading Athenians, especially Iphikrates and Timotheus; the former of whom he had even adopted as his son; Aristotle, afterwards so eminent as a philosopher (son of Nikomachus the confidential physician of Amyntas<sup>3</sup>), had been for some time studying at Athens as a pupil of Plato; moreover Perdikkas during his reign had resident with him a friend of the philosopher — Euphræus of Oreus. Perdikkas lent himself much to the guidance of Euphræus, who directed him in the choice of his associates, and permitted none to be his guests except persons of studious habits; thus exciting much disgust among the military Macedonians.<sup>4</sup> It is a signal testimony to the reputation of Plato, that we find his advice courted, at one and the same time, by Dionysius the younger at Syracuse, and by Perdikkas in Macedonia.

On the suggestion of Plato, conveyed through Euphræus, Per

<sup>1</sup> Antipater (the general of Philip and viceroy of his son Alexander in Macedonia) is said to have left an historical work, *Περδίκκων πράξεις Ἰλλυρικῆς* (Suidas, v. Ἀντίπατρος), which can hardly refer to any other Perdikkas than the one now before us.

<sup>2</sup> Athenæus, xi. p. 506 E. Πλάτων, ὃν Σπένσιππος φησι φίλτατον ὕπαρχον ἄρχελάω, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Diogenes Laert. v. 1, 1.

Athenæus, xi. p. 506 E. p. 508 E. The fourth among the letters of Plato (alluded to by Diogenes Laert. iii. 62) is addressed to Perdikkas partly in recommendation and praise of Euphræus. There appears nothing to prove it to be spurious; but whether it be spurious or genuine the fact that Plato corresponded with Perdikkas is sufficiently probable.

dikkas was induced to bestow upon his own brother Philip a portion of territory or an appanage in Macedonia. In 368 B. C. (during the reign of Alexander elder brother of Perdikkas and Philip), Pelopidas had reduced Macedonia to partial submission, and had taken hostages for its fidelity; among which hostages was the youthful Philip, then about fifteen years of age. In this character Philip remained about two or three years at Thebes.<sup>1</sup> How or when he left that city, we cannot clearly make out. He seems to have returned to Macedonia after the murder of Alexander by Ptolemy Alorites; probably without opposition from the Thebans, since his value as a hostage was then diminished. The fact that he was confided (together with his brother Perdikkas) by his mother Eurydikê to the protection of the Athenian general Iphikrates, then on the coast of Macedonia — has been recounted in a previous chapter. How Philip fared during the regency of

<sup>1</sup> Justin, vi. 9; vii. 5. "Philippus obses triennio Thebis habitus," etc.

Compare Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 26; Diodor. xv. 67; xvi. 2; and the copious note of Wesseling upon the latter passage. The two passages of Diodorus are not very consistent; in the latter, he states that Philip had been deposited at Thebes by the Illyrians, to whom he had been made over as a hostage by his father Amyntas. This is highly improbable; as well for other reasons (assigned by Wesseling), as because the Illyrians, if they ever received him as a hostage, would not send him to Thebes, but keep him in their own possession. The memorable interview described by Æschines — between the Athenian general Iphikrates and the Macedonian queen Eurydikê with her two youthful sons Perdikkas and Philip — must have taken place some time before the death of Ptolemy Alorites, and before the accession of Perdikkas. The expressions of Æschines do not, perhaps, necessarily compel us to suppose the interview to have taken place immediately after the death of Alexander (Æschines, Fal. Leg. p. 31, 32): yet it is difficult to reconcile the statement of the orator with the recognition of three years' continuous residence at Thebes. Flathe (Geschichte Makedoniens, vol. i. p. 39-47) supposes Æschines to have allowed himself an oratorical misrepresentation, when he states that Philip was present in Macedonia at the interview with Iphikrates. This is an unsatisfactory mode of escaping from the difficulty; but the chronological statements, as they now stand, can hardly be all correct. It is possible that Philip may have gone again back to Thebes, or may have been sent back, after the interview with Iphikrates; we might thus obtain a space of three years for his stay, at two several times, in that city. We are not to suppose that his condition at Thebes was one of duress and ill-treatment. See Mr. Clinton, Fast. Hell. App. iv. p. 229.



Ptolemy Alorites in Macedonia, we do not know; we might ever suspect that he would return back to Thebes as a safer residence. But when his brother Perdikkas, having slain Ptolemy Alorites, became king, Philip resided in Macedonia, and even obtained from Perdikkas (as already stated), through the persuasion of Plato, a separate district to govern as subordinate. Here he remained until the death of Perdikkas in 360–359 B. C.; organizing a separate military force of his own (like Derdas in 382 B. C., when the Lacedæmonians made war upon Olynthus;<sup>1</sup>) and probably serving at its head in the wars carried on by his brother.

The time passed by Philip at Thebes, however, from fifteen to eighteen years of age, was an event of much importance in determining his future character.<sup>2</sup> Though detained at Thebes, Philip was treated with courtesy and respect. He resided with Pammenes, one of the principal citizens; he probably enjoyed good literary and rhetorical teaching, since as a speaker, in after life, he possessed considerable talent;<sup>3</sup> and he may also have received some instruction in philosophy, though he never subsequently manifested any taste for it, and though the assertion of his having been taught by Pythagoreans merits little credence. But the lesson, most indelible of all, which he imbibed at Thebes, was derived from the society and from the living example of men like Epaminondas and Pelopidas. These were leading citizens, manifesting those qualities which insured for them the steady admiration of a free community — and of a Theban community, more given to action than to speech; moreover they were both of them distinguished military leaders — one of them the ablest organizer

<sup>1</sup> Athenæus, xi. p. 506. διατρέφων δ' ἐν ταῦθα δυνάμιν (Philippus), etc. About Derdas, see Xenoph. Hellen. v. 2, 38.

<sup>2</sup> It was in after times a frequent practice with the Roman Senate, when imposing terms of peace on kings half-conquered, to require hostages for fidelity, with a young prince of the royal blood among the number; and it commonly happened that the latter, after a few years' residence at Rome, returned home an altered man on many points.

See the case of Demetrius, younger son of the last Philip of Macedon, and younger brother of Perseus (Livy, xxxiii. 13; xxxix. 53; xl. 5), of the young Parthian princes, Vonones (Tacitus, Annal. ii. 1, 2), Phraates (Tacit. Annal. vi. 32), Meherdates (Tacit. Ann. xii. 10, 11).

<sup>3</sup> Even in the opinion of very competent judges: see Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 18. p. 253.

and the most scientific tactician of his day. The spectacle of the Theban military force, excellent both as cavalry and as infantry under the training of such a man as Epaminondas, was eminently suggestive to a young Macedonian prince; and became still more efficacious when combined with the personal conversation of the victor of Leuktra — the first man whom Philip learnt to admire, and whom he strove to imitate in his military career.<sup>1</sup> His mind was early stored with the most advanced strategic ideas of the day, and thrown into the track of reflection, comparison, and invention, on the art of war.

When transferred from Thebes to the subordinate government of a district in Macedonia under his elder brother Perdikkas, Philip organized a military force; and in so doing had the opportunity of applying to practice, though at first on a limited scale, the lessons learnt from the illustrious Thebans. He was thus at the head of troops belonging to and organized by himself — when the unexpected death of Perdikkas opened to him the prospect of succeeding to the throne. But it was a prospect full of doubt and hazard. Perdikkas had left an infant son; there existed, moreover, three princes, Archelaus, Aridæus, and Menelaus,<sup>2</sup> sons of Amyntas by another wife or mistress Gygea, and therefore half-brothers of Perdikkas and Philip: there were also two other pretenders to the crown — Pausanias (who had before aspired to the throne after the death of Amyntas), seconded by a Thracian prince — and Argæus, aided by the Athenians. To these dangers was to be added, attack from the neighboring barbaric nations, Illyrians, Pæonians, and Thracians — always ready<sup>3</sup> to assail and plunder Macedonia at every moment of intestine weak-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 26. ζηλωτὴς γεγονέναι ἔδοξεν Ἐπαμεινώνδου, τὸ περὶ τοὺς πολέμους καὶ τὰς στρατηγίας δραστήριον ἴσως κατανοήσας, ὁ μικρὸν ἦν τῆς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀρετῆς μόριον, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Justin, vii. 4. Menelaus, the father of Amyntas and grandfather of Philip, is stated to have been an illegitimate son; while Amyntas himself is said to have been originally an attendant or slave of Æropus (Ælian, V. H. xii. 43). Our information respecting the relations of the successive kings and pretenders to the throne, in Macedonia, is obscure and unsatisfactory. Justin (l. c.) agrees with Ælian in calling the father of Amyntas Menelaus; but Dexippus (ap. Syncellum, p. 263) calls him Aridæus; while Diodorus (xiv. 92) calls him Tharraleus.

<sup>3</sup> Justin, xxix. 1.



ness. It would appear that Perdikkas, shortly before his death, had sustained a severe defeat, with the loss of four thousand men, from the Illyrians: his death followed, either from a wound then received, or by the machinations of his mother Eurydikê. Perhaps both the wound in battle and the assassination, may be real facts.<sup>1</sup>

Philip at first assumed the government of the country as guardian of his young nephew Amyntas the son of Perdikkas. But the difficulties of the conjuncture were so formidable, that the Macedonians around constrained him to assume the crown.<sup>2</sup> Of his three half-brothers he put to death one, and was only prevented from killing the other two by their flight into exile; we shall find them hereafter at Olynthus. They had either found, or were thought likely to find, a party in Macedonia to sustain their pretensions to the crown.<sup>3</sup>

The succession to the throne in Macedonia, though descending in a particular family, was open to frequent and bloody dispute between the individual members of that family, and usually fell to the most daring and unscrupulous among them. None but an energetic man, indeed, could well maintain himself there, especially under the circumstances of Philip's accession. The Macedonian monarchy has been called a limited monarchy; and in a large sense of the word, this proposition is true. But what the limitations were, or how they were made operative, we do not know. That there were some ancient forms and customs, which the king habitually respected, we cannot doubt;<sup>4</sup> as there probably were also among the Illyrian tribes, the Epirots, and others of the neighboring warlike nations. A general assembly was occasionally convened, for the purpose of consenting to some important proposition, or trying some conspicuous accused person. But

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 2; Justin, vii. 5, Quint. Curt. vi. 48, 26.

<sup>2</sup> Justin, vii. 5. Amyntas lived through the reign of Philip, and was afterwards put to death by Alexander, on the charge of conspiracy. See Justin, xii. 6; Quintus Curtius, vi. 34, 17; with the note of Müntzel.

<sup>3</sup> Justin, vii. 3. "Post hæc Olynthios aggreditur (Philip): receperant enim per misericordiam, post cædem unius, duos fratres ejus, quos Philipus, ex novercâ genitos, velut participes regni, interficere gestiebat."

<sup>4</sup> Arrian, Exp. Alex. iv. 11. οὐ βία, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ Μακεδόνων ἀρχόντες ἀπετελέσαν (Alexander and his ancestors before him).

though such ceremonies were recognized and sometimes occurred, the occasions were rare in which they interposed any serious constitutional check upon the regal authority.<sup>1</sup> The facts of Macedonian history, as far as they come before us, exhibit the kings acting on their own feelings and carrying out their own schemes — consulting whom they please and when they please — subject only to the necessity of not offending too violently the sentiments of that military population whom they commanded. Philip and Alexander, combining regal station with personal ability and unexampled success, were more powerful than any of their predecessors. Each of them required extraordinary efforts from their soldiers, whom they were therefore obliged to keep in willing obe-

<sup>1</sup> The trial of Philotas, who is accused by Alexander for conspiracy before an assembly of the Macedonian soldiers near to head-quarters, is the example most insisted on of the prevalence of this custom, of public trial in criminal accusations. Quintus Curtius says (vi. 32, 25), "De capitalibus rebus vetusto Macedonum more inquirebat exercitus; in pace erat vulgi: et nihil potestas regum valebat, nisi prius valuisset auctoritas." Compare Arrian, iii. 26; Diodor. xvii. 79, 80.

That this was an ancient Macedonian custom, in reference to conspicuous persons accused of treason, we may readily believe; and that an officer of the great rank and military reputation of Philotas, if suspected of treason, could hardly be dealt with in any other way. If he was condemned, all his relatives and kinsmen, whether implicated or not, became involved in the same condemnation. Several among the kinsmen of Philotas either fled or killed themselves; and Alexander then issued an edict pardoning them all, except Parmenio; who was in Media, and whom he sent secret orders instantly to despatch. If the proceedings against Philotas, as described by Curtius, are to be taken as correct, it is rather an appeal made by Alexander to the soldiery, for their consent to his killing a dangerous enemy, than an investigation of guilt or innocence.

Olympias, during the intestine contests which followed after the death of Alexander, seems to have put to death as many illustrious Macedonians as she chose, without any form of trial. But when her enemy Kassander got the upper hand, subdued and captured her, he did not venture to put her to death without obtaining the consent of a Macedonian assembly (Diodor. xix. 11, 51; Justin, xiv. 6; Pausanias, i. 11, 2). These Macedonian assemblies, insofar as we read of them, appear to be summoned chiefly as mere instruments to sanction some predetermined purpose of the king or the military leader predominant at the time. Flathe (Geschicht. Makedon. p. 43-45) greatly overrates, in my judgment, the rights and powers enjoyed by the Macedonian people.



dience and attachment; just as Jason of Pheræ had done before with his standing army of mercenaries.<sup>1</sup> During the reign of Alexander the army manifests itself as the only power by his side, to which even he is constrained occasionally to bow; after his death, its power becomes for a time still more ascendent. But so far as the history of Macedonia is known to us, I perceive no evidence of coördinate political bodies, or standing apparatus (either aristocratical or popular) to check the power of the king — such as to justify in any way the comparison drawn by a modern historian between the Macedonian and English constitutions.

The first proceeding of Philip, in dealing with his numerous enemies, was to buy off the Thracians by seasonable presents and promises; so that the competition of Pausanias for the throne became no longer dangerous. There remained as assailants the Athenians with Argæus from seaward, and the Illyrians from landward.

But Philip showed dexterity and energy sufficient to make head against all. While he hastened to reorganize the force of the country, to extend the application of those improved military arrangements which he had already been attempting in his own province, and to encourage his friends and soldiers by collective harangues,<sup>2</sup> in a style and spirit such as the Macedonians had never before heard from regal lips — he contrived to fence off the attack of the Athenians until a more convenient moment.

He knew that the possession of Amphipolis was the great purpose for which they had been carrying on war against Macedonia for some years, and for which they now espoused the cause of Argæus. Accordingly he professed his readiness at once to give up to them this important place, withdrawing the Macedonian garrison whereby Perdikkas had held it against them, and leaving the town to its own citizens. This act was probably construed by the Athenians as tantamount to an actual cession; for even if Amphipolis should still hold out against them, they doubted not of their power to reduce it when unaided. Philip farther despatched letters to Athens, expressing an anxious desire to be received into her alliance, on the same friendly terms as his father

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 6, 16.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 2, 3.

Amyntas before him.<sup>1</sup> These proceedings seem to have had the effect of making the Athenians lukewarm in the cause of Argæus. For Mantias the Athenian admiral, though he conveyed that prince by sea to Methônê, yet stayed in the seaport himself, while Argæus marched inland — with some returning exiles, a body of mercenaries, and a few Athenian volunteers — to Ægæ or Edessa;<sup>2</sup> hoping to procure admission into that ancient capital of the Macedonian kings. But the inhabitants refused to receive him; and in his march back to Methônê, he was attacked and completely defeated by Philip. His fugitive troops found shelter on a neighboring eminence, but were speedily obliged to surrender. Philip suffered the greater part of them to depart on terms, requiring only that Argæus and the Macedonian exiles should be delivered up to him. He treated the Athenian citizens with especial courtesy, preserved to them all their property, and sent them home full of gratitude, with conciliatory messages to the people of Athens. The exiles, Argæus among them, having become his prisoners, were probably put to death.<sup>3</sup>

The prudent lenity exhibited by Philip towards the Athenian prisoners, combined with his evacuation of Amphipolis, produced the most favorable effect upon the temper of the Athenian public, and disposed them to accept his pacific offers. Peace was accordingly concluded. Philip renounced all claim to Amphipolis, acknowledging that town as a possession rightfully belonging to Athens.<sup>4</sup> By such renunciation he really abandoned no rightful possession; for Amphipolis had never belonged to the Macedonian kings; nor had any Macedonian soldiers ever entered it until three or four years before, when the citizens had invoked aid from Perdikkas to share in the defence against Athens. But the Athenians appeared to have gained the chief prize for which they had been so long struggling. They congratulated themselves in the hope, probably set forth with confidence by the speakers who supported the peace, that the Amphipolitans alone would never think of resisting the acknowledged claims of Athens.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 660. s. 144.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 3; Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 660 *ut sup.* τῶν ἡμετέρων τινὰς πολιτῶν, etc. Justin. vii. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 3.

Diodor. xvi. 4.



Philip was thus relieved from enemies on the coast, and had his hands free to deal with the Illyrians and Pæonians of the interior. He marched into the territory of the Pæonians (seemingly along the upper course of the river Axios), whom he found weakened by the recent death of their king Agis. He defeated their troops, and reduced them to submit to Macedonian supremacy. From thence he proceeded to attack the Illyrians — a more serious and formidable undertaking. The names *Illyrians*, *Pæonians*, *Thracians*, etc., did not designate any united national masses, but were applied to a great number of kindred tribes or clans, each distinct, separately governed, and having its particular name and customs. The Illyrian and Pæonian tribes occupied a wide space of territory to the north and north-west of Macedonia, over the modern Bosnia nearly to the Julian Alps and the river Save. But during the middle of the fourth century before Christ, it seems that a large immigration of Gallic tribes from the westward was taking place, invading the territory of the more northerly Illyrians and Pæonians, circumscribing their occupancy and security, and driving them farther southward: sometimes impelling them to find subsistence and plunder by invasions of Macedonia or by maritime piracies against Grecian commerce in the Adriatic.<sup>1</sup> The Illyrians had become more dangerous neighbors to Macedonia than they were in the time of Thucydides; and it seems that a recent coalition of their warriors, for purposes of invasion and plunder, was now in the zenith of its force. It was under a chief named Bardylis, who had raised himself to command from the humble occupation of a charcoal burner; a man renowned for his bravery, but yet more renowned for dealings rigidly just towards his soldiers, especially in the distribution of plunder.<sup>2</sup> Bardylis and his Illyrians had possessed themselves of a considerable portion of Western Macedonia (west of Mount Bermius),

<sup>1</sup> See the remarks of Niebuhr, on these migrations of Gallic tribes from the west, and their effect upon the prior population established between the Danube and the Ægean Sea (Niebuhr, *Vorträge über alte Geschichte*, vol. iii. p. 225, 281; also the earlier work of the same author — *Kleine Schriften*, *Untersuchungen über die Geschichte der Skythen*, p. 375).

<sup>2</sup> Theopompus, *Fragm.* 35, ed. Didot; Cicero *de Officiis*, ii. 11; Diodor. xvi. 4.

occupying for the most part the towns, villages, and plains,<sup>1</sup> and restricting the native Macedonians to the defensible, yet barren hills. Philip marched to attack them, at the head of a force which he had now contrived to increase to the number of ten thousand foot and six hundred horse. The numbers of Bardylis were about equal; yet on hearing of Philip's approach, he sent a proposition tendering peace, on the condition that each party should retain what it actually possessed. His proposition being rejected, the two armies speedily met. Philip had collected around him on the right wing his chosen Macedonian troops, with whom he made his most vigorous onset: manœuvring at the same time with a body of cavalry so as to attack the left flank of the Illyrians. The battle, contested with the utmost obstinacy on both sides, was for some time undecided; nor could the king of Macedon break the oblong square into which his enemies had formed themselves. But at length his cavalry were enabled to charge them so effectively in flank and rear, that victory declared in his favor. The Illyrians fled, were vigorously pursued with the loss of seven thousand men, and never again rallied. Bardylis presently sued for peace, and consented to purchase it by renouncing all his conquests in Macedonia; while Philip pushed his victory so strenuously, as to reduce to subjection all the tribes eastward of Lake Lychnidus.<sup>2</sup>

These operations against the inland neighbors of Macedonia must have occupied a year or two. During that interval, Philip left Amphipolis to itself, having withdrawn from it the Macedonian garrison as a means of conciliating the Athenians. We might have expected that they would forthwith have availed themselves of the opening and taken active measures for regaining

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, vii. 9, 2, 3.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 4-8. Frontinus (*Strategem.* ii. 3, 2) mentions a battle gained by Philip against the Illyrians; wherein, observing that their chosen troops were in the centre, he placed his own greatest strength in his right wing, attacked and beat their left wing; then came upon their centre in flank and defeated their whole army. Whether this be the battle alluded to, we cannot say. The tactics employed are the same as those of Epaminondas at Leuktra and Mantinea; strengthening one wing peculiarly for the offensive, and keeping back the rest of the army upon the defensive.



**Amphipolis.** They knew the value of that city: they considered it as of right theirs; they had long been anxious for its repossession, and had even besieged it five years before, though seemingly only with a mercenary force, which was repelled mainly by the aid of Philip's predecessor Perdikkas. Amphipolis was not likely to surrender to them voluntarily; but when thrown upon its own resources, it might perhaps have been assailed with success. Yet they remained without making any attempt on the region at the mouth of the river Strymon. We must recollect (as has been narrated in my last preceding volume<sup>1</sup>), that during 359 B. C., and the first part of 358 B. C., they were carrying on operations in the Thracian Chersonese, against Charidemus and Kersobleptes, with small success and disgraceful embarrassment. These vexatious operations in the Chersonese—in which peninsula many Athenians were interested as private proprietors, besides the public claims of the city—may perhaps have absorbed wholly the attention of Athens, so as to induce her to postpone the acquisition of Amphipolis until they were concluded; a conclusion which did not arrive (as we shall presently see) until immediately before she became plunged in the dangerous crisis of the Social War. I know no better explanation of the singular circumstance, that Athens, though so anxious, both before and after, for the possession of Amphipolis, made no attempt to acquire it during more than a year after its evacuation by Philip; unless indeed we are to rank this opportunity among the many which she lost (according to Demosthenes<sup>2</sup>) from pure negligence; little suspecting how speedily such opportunity would disappear.

In 358 B. C., an opening was afforded to the Athenians for regaining their influence in Eubœa; and for this island, so near their own shores, they struck a more vigorous blow than for the distant possessions of Amphipolis. At the revival of the maritime confederacy under Athens (immediately after 378 B. C.), most of the cities in Eubœa had joined it voluntarily; but after the battle of Leuktra (in 371 B. C.), the island passed under Theban suprema-

<sup>1</sup> See Vol. X. Ch. lxxx. p. 379 seq.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes, Orat. de Chersoneso, τ. 98, s. 34. φέρε γὰρ, πρὸς Διὸς, αἱ λόγον ἡμᾶς ἀπαιτήσεων οὐ ἔλληνες ὡς νυνὶ παρείκατε καιρὸν διὰ ῥηθην, etc.

cy. Accordingly Eubœans from all the cities served in the army of Epaminondas, both in his first and his last expedition into Peloponnesus (369–362 B. C.).<sup>1</sup> Moreover, Orôpus, the frontier town of Attica and Bœotia—immediately opposite to Eubœa, having been wrested from Athens<sup>2</sup> in 366 B. C. by a body of exiles crossing the strait from Eretria, through the management of the Eretrian despot Themison—had been placed in the keeping of the Thebans, with whom it still remained. But in the year 358 B. C., discontent began in the Eubœan cities, from what cause we know not, against the supremacy of Thebes; whereupon a powerful Theban force was sent into the island to keep them down. A severe contest ensued, in which if Thebes had succeeded, Chalkis and Eretria might possibly have shared the fate of Orchomenus.<sup>3</sup> These cities sent urgent messages entreating aid from the Athenians, who were powerfully moved by the apprehension of seeing their hated neighbor Thebes reinforced by so large an acquisition close to their borders. The public assembly, already disposed to sympathize with the petitioners, was kindled into enthusiasm by the abrupt and emphatic appeal of Timotheus son of Konon.<sup>4</sup> “How! Athenians (said he), when you have the Thebans actually in the island, are you still here debating what is to be done, or how you shall deal with the case? Will you not fill the sea

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 5, 23. Εὐβοεῖς ἀπὸ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων: also vii. 5, 4. Βοιωτοὶς ἔχων πάντας καὶ Εὐβοέας (Epaminondas), etc.

Winiewski, in his instructive commentary upon the historical facts of the Oration of Demosthenes de Coronâ, states erroneously that Eubœa continued in the dependence of Athens without interruption from 377 to 358 B. C. (Winiewski, Commentarii Historici et Chronologici in Demosthenis Orationem de Coronâ, p. 30).

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 4, 1; Diodor. xv. 76; Demosthen. de Coronâ, p. 259, s. 123.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenes, Orat. de Chersoneso, p. 108, s. 80. τοὺς Εὐβοέας σώζειν, ὅτε Θηβαῖοι καταδουλοῦντ' αὐτοὺς, etc.: compare Demosthen. de Coronâ, p. 259, s. 123. Θηβαίων σφετεριζομένων τὴν Εὐβοίαν, etc.; and Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. p. 397, c. 31. ἐπειδὴ διέβησαν εἰς Εὐβοίαν Θηβαῖοι, καταδουλώσασθαι τὰς πόλεις πειρώμενοι, etc.

<sup>4</sup> Demosthen. Orat. de Chersoneso, p. 108, s. 80. Εἰπέ μοι, βουλευέσθε, ἔφη (Timotheus), Θηβαίους ἔχοντες ἐν νήσῳ, τί χρήσεσθε, καὶ τί δεῖ ποιεῖν; Οὐκ ἐμπλήσετε τὴν θάλασσαν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τριηρών; Οὐκ ἀναστάντες νόη πηρέεσθε εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ; Οὐ κατέλεξετε τὰς ναῦς;



with triremes? Will you not start up at once, hasten down to Peiræus, and haul the triremes down to the water?" This animated apostrophe, reported and doubtless heard by Demosthenes himself, was cordially responded to by the people. The force of Athens, military as well as naval, was equipped with an eagerness, and sent forth with a celerity, seldom paralleled. Such was the general enthusiasm, that the costly office of trierarchy was for the first time undertaken by volunteers, instead of awaiting the more tardy process of singling out those rich men whose turn it was to serve, with the chance of still farther delay from the legal process called Antidosis or Exchange of property,<sup>1</sup> instituted by any one of the persons so chosen who might think himself hardly used by the requisition. Demosthenes himself was among the volunteer trierarchs; he and a person named Philinus being co-trierarchs of the same ship. We are told that in three or in five days the Athenian fleet and army, under the command of Timotheus,<sup>2</sup> were landed in full force on Eubœa; and that in the course of thirty days the Thebans were so completely worsted, as to be forced to

<sup>1</sup> See, in illustration of these delays, Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 50 s. 42.

Any citizen who thought that he had been called upon out of his fair turn to serve a trierarchy or other expensive duty, and that another citizen had been unduly spared, might tender to this latter an exchange of properties, offering to undertake the duty if the other's property were made over to him. The person, to whom tender was made, was compelled to do one of three things; either, 1. to show, at legal process, that it was not his turn, and that he was not liable; 2. or to relieve the citizen tendering from the trierarchy just imposed upon him; 3. or to accept the exchange, receiving the other's property, and making over his own property in return; in which case the citizen tendering undertook the trierarchy.

This obligatory exchange of properties, with the legal process attached to it, was called Antidosis.

That Timotheus was commander, is not distinctly stated by Demosthenes, but may be inferred from Plutarch, *De Gloria Athen.* p. 350 F *ἐν τῷ Τιμόθεος Εὐβοίαν ἤλενθέρον*, which, in the case of a military man like Timotheus, can hardly allude merely to the speech which he made in the assembly. Diokles is mentioned by Demosthenes as having concluded the convention with the Thebans; but this does not necessarily imply that he was commander: see Demosth. cont. Meidiam, p. 570 s. 219.

About Philinus as colleague of Demosthenes in the trierarchy, see Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 566 s. 204.

evacuate it under capitulation. A body of mercenaries under Chares contributed to the Athenian success. Yet it seems not clear that the success was so easy and rapid as the orators are fond of asserting.<sup>1</sup> However, their boast, often afterwards repeated, is so far well-founded, that Athens fully accomplished her object, rescued the Eubœans from Thebes, and received the testimonial of their gratitude in the form of a golden wreath dedicated in the Athenian acropolis.<sup>2</sup> The Eubœan cities, while acknowledged as autonomous, continued at the same time to be enrolled as members of the Athenian confederacy, sending deputies to the synod at Athens; towards the general purposes of which they paid an annual tribute, assessed at five talents each for Oreus (or Histiaea) and Eretria.<sup>3</sup>

On the conclusion of this Eubœan enterprise, Chares with his mercenaries was sent forward to the Chersonese, where he at length extorted from Charidemus and Kersobleptes the evacuation of that peninsula and its cession to Athens, after a long train of dilatory manœuvres and bad faith on their part. I have in my last preceding volume, described these events, remarking at the same time that Athens attained at this moment the maximum of her renewed foreign power and second confederacy, which had begun in 378 B. C.<sup>4</sup> But this period of exaltation was very short. It was speedily overthrown by two important events — the Social war and the conquests of Philip in Thrace.

The Athenian confederacy, recently strengthened by the rescue of Eubœa, numbered among its members a large proportion of the islands in the Ægean as well as the Grecian seaports in Thrace.

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus (xvi. 7) states that the contest in Eubœa lasted for some considerable time.

Demosthenes talks of the expedition as having reached its destination in three days, Æschines in five days; the latter states also that within thirty days the Thebans were vanquished and expelled (Demosthenes cont. Androtion. p. 597. s. 17; Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. p. 397 c. 31).

About Chares and the mercenaries, see Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat p. 678 s. 206.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes cont. Androtion. p. 616 s. 89 cont. Timokrat p. 756 s. 205.

<sup>3</sup> Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. p. 401, 403, 404. c. 32, 33, Demosthenes pro Megalopolitan. p. 204. s. 16.

<sup>4</sup> See Vol. X. Ch. lxxx. p. 381, 382.




The list included the islands Lesbos, Chios, Samos, (this last now partially occupied by a body of Athenian Kleruchs or settlers), Kos and Rhodes; together with the important city of Byzantium. It was shortly after the recent success in Eubœa, that Chios, Kos, Rhodes, and Byzantium revolted from Athens by concert, raising a serious war against her, known by the name of the Social War.

Respecting the proximate causes of this outbreak, we find, unfortunately, little information. There was now, and had always been since 378 B. C., a synod of deputies from all the confederate cities habitually assembling at Athens; such as had not subsisted under the first Athenian empire in its full maturity. How far the Synod worked efficiently, we do not know. At least it must have afforded to the allies, if aggrieved, a full opportunity of making their complaints heard; and of criticising the application of the common fund, to which each of them contributed. But I have remarked in the preceding volume, that the Athenian confederacy, which had begun (378 B. C.) in a generous and equal spirit of common maritime defence,<sup>1</sup> had gradually become perverted, since the humiliation of the great enemy Sparta at Leuktra, towards purposes and interests more exclusively Athenian. Athens had been conquering the island of Samos — Pydna, Potidæa, and Methônê, on the coast of Macedonia and Thrace — and the Thracian Chersonese; all of them acquisitions made for herself alone, without any advantage to the confederate synod — and made, too, in great part, to become the private property of her own citizens as kleruchs, in direct breach of her public resolution, passed in 378 B. C., not to permit any appropriation of lands by Athenian citizens out of Attica.

In proportion as Athens came to act more for her own separate aggrandizement, and less for interests common to the whole confederacy, the adherence of the larger confederate states grew more and more reluctant. But what contributed yet farther to detach them from Athens, was, the behavior of her armaments on service, consisting in great proportion of mercenaries, scantily and irregularly paid; whose disorderly and rapacious exaction, especially

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes, *De Rhodior. Libertat.* p. 194 s. 17 *παρὸν αὐτοῖς* (the Rhodians) *Ἕλλησι καὶ βελτιστοῖν αὐτῶν ὑμῖν ἐξ ἴσου συμμετεῖν*, etc.



DEMOSTHENES

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at the cost of the confederates of Athens, are characterized in strong terms by all the contemporary orators — Demosthenes, Æschines, Isokrates, etc. The commander, having no means of paying his soldiers, was often compelled to obey their predatory impulses, and conduct them to the easiest place from whence money could be obtained; indeed, some of the commanders, especially Chares, were themselves not less ready than their soldiers to profit by such depredations.<sup>1</sup> Hence the armaments sent out by Athens sometimes saw little of the enemy whom they were sent to combat, preferring the easier and more lucrative proceeding of levying contributions from friends, and of plundering the trading-vessels met with at sea. Nor was it practicable for Athens to prevent such misconduct, when her own citizens refused to serve personally, and when she employed foreigners, hired for the occasion, but seldom regularly paid.<sup>2</sup> The suffering, alarm, and alienation arising from hence among the confederates, was not less mischievous than discreditable to Athens. We cannot doubt that complaints in abundance were raised in the confederate synod; but they must have been unavailing, since the abuse continued until the period shortly preceding the battle of Cheroneia.

Amidst such apparent dispositions on the part of Athens to

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv. 95.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes, Philip. i. 46 s. 28. ἐξ οὗ δ' αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ ξενικά ἡμῖν στρατεύεται, τοὺς φίλους νικᾷ καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους, οἱ δ' ἐχθροὶ μείζους τοῦ δεόντος γέγονασιν. Καὶ παρακύναντα ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς πόλεως πόλεμον, πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον ἢ πανταχοῦ μᾶλλον οἴχεται πλεοντα· ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς ἀκολουθεῖ· εἰκοτως· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀρχειν μὴ δίδοντα μισθόν.

Ibid. p. 53. s. 51. Ὅποι δ' ἂν στρατηγὸν καὶ ψήφισμα κενὸν καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος ἐλπίδας ἐκπέμψῃτε, οὐδὲν ἡμῖν τῶν δεόντων γίγνεται, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἐχθροὶ καταγιγνώσκουσιν, οἱ δὲ σύμμαχοι τεθνᾶσι τῷ δέει τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἀπεστόλους.

Ibid. p. 53. s. 53. Νῦν δ' εἰς τοῦθ' ἤκει τὰ πράγματα αἰσχύνῃς, ὥστε τῶν στρατηγῶν ἕκαστος δις καὶ τρίς κρίνεται παρ' ἡμῖν περὶ θανάτου, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς οὐδεὶς οὐδ' ἀπαξ αὐτῶν ἀγωνισσάσθαι περὶ θανάτου τολμᾷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῶν ἀνδραποδιστῶν καὶ λωποδυντῶν θάνατον μᾶλλον αἰροῦνται τοῦ προσέκοντος.

Compare Olynthiac ii. p. 26. s. 28; De Chersoneso, p. 95. s. 24-27, com. Aristokrat. p. 639. s. 69; De Republ. Ordinand. περὶ Συντάξεως, p. 167. s. 7. Also Æschines de Fals. Legat. p. 264. c. 24; Isokrates, De Pace, s. 57 160.



neglect the interests of the confederacy for purposes of her own and to tolerate or encourage the continued positive depredations of unpaid armaments — discontent naturally grew up, manifesting itself most powerfully among some of the larger dependencies near the Asiatic coast. The islands of Chios, Kos, and Rhodes, together with the important city of Byzantium on the Thracian Bosphorus, took counsel together, and declared themselves detached from Athens and her confederacy. According to the spirit of the convention, sworn at Sparta, immediately before the battle of Leuktra, and of the subsequent alliance, sworn at Athens, a few months afterwards<sup>1</sup> — obligatory and indefeasible confederacies stood generally condemned among the Greeks, so that these islands were justified in simply seceding when they thought fit. But their secession, which probably Athens would, under all circumstances, have resisted, was proclaimed in a hostile manner, accompanied with accusations of treacherous purposes on her part against them. It was moreover fomented by the intrigues, as well as aided by the arms, of the Karian prince Mausólus.<sup>2</sup> Since the peace of Antalkidas, the whole Asiatic coast had been under the unresisted dominion either of satraps or subordinate princes dependent upon Persia, who were watching for opportunities of extending their conquests in the neighboring islands. Mausólus appears to have occupied both Rhodes and Kos; provoking in the former island a revolution which placed it under an oligarchy, not only devoted to him, but farther sustained by the presence of a considerable force of his mercenary troops.<sup>3</sup> The government of Chios appears to have been always oligarchical; which fact was one ground for want of sympathy between the Chians and Athens. Lastly, the Byzantines had also a special ground for discontent; since they assumed the privilege of detaining and taxing the corn-

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 3, 18; vi. 5, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes, De Rhodior. Libertat. p. 191. s. 3. ἡγιάσαντο γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ βουλευεῖν αὐτοῖς Χίοι καὶ Βυζάντιοι καὶ Ῥόδιοι καὶ διὰ ταῦτα συνέστησαν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς τὸν τελευταῖον τουτονὶ πόλεμον· φανήσεται δ' ὁ μὲν ποντανεύσας ταῦτα καὶ πείσας Μάυσωλος, φίλος εἶναι φάσκων Ῥοδίων, τὴν ἐλευθερίαν αὐτῶν ἀφηρεύμενος.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthen. de Rhodior. Libert. p. 195. s. 17. p. 198 s. 34; de Pace, p. 63. s. 25, Diodor. xvi. 7.

ships from the Euxine in their passage through the Bosphorus<sup>1</sup> — while Athens, as chief of the insular confederacy, claimed that right for herself, and at any rate protested against the use of such power by any other city for its own separate profit.

This revolt, the beginning of what is termed the Social War, was a formidable shock to the foreign ascendancy of Athens. Among all her confederates, Chios was the largest and most powerful, the entire island being under one single government. Old men, like Plato and Isokrates, might perhaps recollect the affright occasioned at Athens fifty-four years before (B. C. 412) by the news of the former revolt of Chios,<sup>2</sup> shortly after the great disaster before Syracuse. And probably the alarm was not much less, when the Athenians were now apprised of the quadruple defection among their confederates near the Asiatic coast. The joint armament of all four was mustered at Chios, whither Mausólus also sent a reinforcement. The Athenians equipped a fleet with land-forces on board, to attack the island; and on this critical occasion we may presume that their citizens would overcome the reluctance to serve in person. Chabrias was placed in command of the fleet, Chares of the land-force; the latter was disembarked on the island, and a joint attack upon the town of Chios, by sea and land at the same moment, was concerted. When Chares marched up to the walls, the Chians and their allies felt strong enough to come forth and hazard a battle, with no decisive result; while Chabrias at the same time attempted with the fleet to force his way into the harbor. But the precautions for defence had been effectively taken, and the Chian seamen were resolute. Chabrias, leading the attack with his characteristic impetuosity, became entangled among the enemy's vessels, was attacked on all sides, and fell gallantly fighting. The other Athenian ships either were not forward in following him, or could make no impression. Their attack completely failed, and the fleet was obliged to retire, with little loss apparently, except that of the brave admiral. Chares with his

Demosthen. de Pace, p. 63. s. 25. (ἐώμεν) τὸν Κάρα τὰς νήσους καταλαμβάνειν, Χίον καὶ Κῶν καὶ Ῥόδον, καὶ Βυζαντίους κατάγειν τὰ πλοῖα, etc.

Compare Demosthenes adv. Polykl. p. 1207 s. 6. p. 1211. s. 23; adv. Leptinem, p. 475. s. 68.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. viii. 15.



land-force having been again taken aboard, the Athenians forthwith sailed away from Chios.<sup>1</sup>

This repulse at Chios was a serious misfortune to Athens. Such was the dearth of military men and the decline of the military spirit, in that city, that the loss of a warlike citizen, daring as a soldier and tried as a commander, like Chabrias, was never afterwards repaired. To the Chians and their allies, on the other hand, the event was highly encouraging. They were enabled, not merely to maintain their revolt, but even to obtain fresh support, and to draw into the like defection other allies of Athens, — among them, seemingly, Sestos, and other cities on the Hellespont. For some months they appear to have remained masters of the sea, with a fleet of one hundred triremes, disembarking and inflicting devastation on the Athenian islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samos, and elsewhere, so as to collect a sum for defraying their expenses. They were even strong enough to press the town of Samos, by close siege, until at length the Athenians, not without delay and difficulty, got together a fleet of one hundred and twenty triremes, under the joint command of Chares, Iphikrates with his son Menestheus, and Timotheus. Notwithstanding that Samos was under siege, the Athenian admirals thought it prudent to direct their first efforts to the reduction of Byzantium; probably from the paramount importance of keeping open the two straits between the Euxine and the Ægean, in order that the corn-ships out of the former, might come through in safety.<sup>2</sup> To protect Byzantium, the Chians and their allies raised the siege of Samos,

<sup>1</sup> The account of this event comes to us in a meagre and defective manner, Diodorus xvi. 7; Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c. 4; Plutarch, Phokion c. 6.

Demosthenes, in an harangue delivered three years afterwards, mentions the death of Chabrias, and eulogizes his conduct at Chios among his other glorious deeds; but gives no particulars (Demosth. cont. Leptin. f. 481, 482).

Cornelius Nepos says that Chabrias was not commander, but only serving as a private soldier on shipboard. I think this less probable than the statement of Diodorus, that he was joint-commander with Chares.

<sup>2</sup> It appears that there was a great and general scarcity of corn during this year 357 B. C. Demosthenes adv. Leptinem, p. 467. s. 38. *προπέρυσσι σιτοδείας παρὰ πάντων ἀνθρώπων γενομένης*, etc. That oration was delivered in 355 B. C.

and sailed forthwith to the Hellespont, in which narrow strait both fleets were collected, — as the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had been during the closing years of the Peloponnesian war. A plan of naval action had been concerted by the three Athenian commanders, and was on the point of taking place, when there supervened a sudden storm, which in the judgment both of Iphikrates and Timotheus, rendered it rash and perilous to persist in the execution. They therefore held off, while Chares, judging differently, called upon the trierachs and seamen to follow him, and rushed into the fight without his colleagues. He was defeated, or at least was obliged to retire without accomplishing anything. But so incensed was he against his two colleagues, that he wrote a despatch to Athens accusing them of corruption and culpable backwardness against the enemy.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I follow chiefly the account given of these transactions by Diodorus, meagre and unsatisfactory as it is (xvi. 21). Nepos (Timotheus, c. 3) differs from Diodorus on several points. He states that both Samos and the Hellespont had revolted from Athens; and that the locality in which Chares made his attack, contrary to the judgment of his two colleagues, was near Samos — not in the Hellespont. He affirms farther that Menestheus, son of Iphikrates, was named as colleague of Chares; and that Iphikrates and Timotheus were appointed as advisers of Menestheus.

As to the last assertion — that Timotheus only served as adviser to his junior relative and not as a general formally named — this is not probable in itself; nor seemingly consistent with Isokrates (Or. xv. De Permutat. s. 137), who represents Timotheus as afterwards passing through the usual trial of accountability. Nor can Nepos be correct in saying that Samos had now revolted: for we find it still in possession of Athens after the Social War, and we know that a fresh batch of Athenian Kleruchs were afterwards sent there.

On the other hand, I think Nepos is probably right in his assertion, that the Hellespont now revolted ("descierat Hellespontus"). This is a fact in itself noway improbable, and helping us to understand how it happened that Chares conquered Sestos afterwards in 353 B. C. (Diodor. xvi. 34), and that the Athenians are said to have then recovered the Chersonesus from Kersobleptes.

Polyænus (iii. 9, 29) has a story representing the reluctance of Iphikrates to fight, as having been manifested near Embata; a locality not agreeing either with Nepos or with Diodorus. Embata was on the continent of Asia, in the territory of Erythræ.

See respecting the relations of Athens with Sestos, my last preceding volume, Vol. X. Ch. lxxx. p. 380 note.



The three joint admirals were thus placed not merely in opposition, but in bitter conflict, among themselves. At the trial of accountability, undergone by all of them not long afterwards at Athens, Chares stood forward as the formal accuser of his two colleagues, who in their turn also accused him. He was seconded in his attack by Aristophon, one of the most practised orators of the day. Both of them charged Iphikrates and Timotheus with having received bribes from the Chians and Rhodians,<sup>1</sup> and betrayed their trust; by deserting Chares at the critical moment when it had been determined beforehand to fight, and when an important success might have been gained.

How the justice of the case stood, we cannot decide. The characters of Iphikrates and Timotheus raise strong presumption that they were in the right and their accuser in the wrong. Yet it must be recollected that the Athenian public, (and probably every other public, — ancient or modern, — Roman, English, or French), would naturally sympathize with the forward and daring admiral, who led the way into action, fearing neither the storm nor the enemy, and calling upon his colleagues to follow. Iphikrates and Timotheus doubtless insisted upon the rashness of his proceedings, and set forth the violence of the gale. But this again would be denied by Chares, and would stand as a point where the evidence was contradictory; captains and seamen being produced as witnesses on both sides, and the fleet being probably divided into two opposing parties. The feelings of the Athenian Dikasts might naturally be, that Iphikrates and Timotheus ought never to have let their colleague go into action unassisted, even though they disapproved of the proceeding. Iphikrates defended himself partly by impeaching the behavior of Chares, partly by bitter retort upon his other accuser Aristophon. "Would *you* (he asked), betray the fleet for money?" "No," was the reply. "Well, then,

Our evidence respecting this period is so very defective, that nothing like certainty is attainable.

<sup>1</sup> Deinarchus cont. Philokl. s. 17. ἑκατον ταλάντων τιμήσαντες (Τιμόθεον), ὅτι χρήματ' αὐτὸν Ἀριστοφῶν ἔφη παρὰ Χίων εἰληφέναι καὶ Ῥοδίων: compare Deinarch. cont. Demosthen. s. 15, where the same charge of bribery is alluded to, though αὐτὸς ἔφη is put in place of αὐτὸν Ἀριστοφῶν ἔφη, seemingly by mistake of the transcriber.

you, Aristophon, would not betray the fleet; shall I, Iphikrates do so?"<sup>2</sup>

The issue of this important cause was, that Iphikrates was acquitted, while Timotheus was found guilty and condemned to the large fine of one hundred talents. Upon what causes such difference of sentence turned, we make out imperfectly. And it appears that Iphikrates, far from exonerating himself by throwing blame on Timotheus, emphatically assumed the responsibility of the whole proceeding; while his son, Menestheus tendered an accurate account within his own knowledge, of all the funds received and disbursed by the army.<sup>3</sup>

The cause assigned by Isokrates, the personal friend of Timotheus, is, the extreme unpopularity of the latter in the city. Though as a general and on foreign service, Timotheus conducted himself not only with scrupulous justice to every one, but with rare forbearance towards the maritime allies whom other generals vexed and plundered, — yet at home his demeanor was intolerably arrogant and offensive, especially towards the leading speakers who took part in public affairs. While recognized as a man of ability and as a general who had rendered valuable service, he had thus incurred personal unpopularity and made numerous enemies; chiefly among those most able to do him harm. Isokrates tells us that he had himself frequently remonstrated with Timotheus (as Plato admonished Dion), on this serious fault, which overclouded his real ability, caused him to be totally misunderstood, and laid up against him a fund of popular dislike sure to take melancholy effect on some suitable occasion. Timotheus (according to Isokrates), though admitting the justice of the reproof, was unable to conquer his own natural disposition.<sup>3</sup> If such

<sup>2</sup> See Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii. 24; iii. 10. Quintilian, Inst. Or. v. 12, 10.

<sup>3</sup> Isokrates, Or. xv. (Permutat.) s. 137. εἰ τοσαύτας μὲν πόλεις ἐλόντα, μηδεμίαν δ' ἀπολέσαντα, περὶ προδοσίας ἔκρινε (ἡ πόλις Τιμόθεον), καὶ πάλιν εἰ δίδοντας εὐθύνας αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὰς μὲν πράξεις Ἰφικράτους ἀναδεχομένου, τὸν δ' ὑπὲρ τῶν χρημάτων λόγον Μενέσθεως, τούτους μὲν ἀπέλυσε, Τιμόθεον δὲ τοσαύτοις ἐξημῶσε χρήμασιν, ὅσοις οὐδένα πώποτε τῶν προγεγενημένων.

<sup>4</sup> Isokrates, Or. xv. (Permutat.) s. 146. Ταῦτα δ' ἀκούων ὀρθῶς μὲν ἔφασκε με λέγειν, οὐ μὴν αὖτις ἦν τὴν φύσιν μεταβαλεῖν, etc.



was the bearing of this eminent man, as described by his intimate friend, we may judge how it would incense unfriendly politicians and even indifferent persons who knew him only from his obvious exterior. Iphikrates, though by nature a proud man, was more discreet and conciliatory in his demeanor, and more alive to the mischief of political odium.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, he seems to have been an effective speaker<sup>2</sup> in public, and his popularity among the military men in Athens was so marked, that on this very trial many of them manifested their sympathy by appearing in arms near the Dikastery.<sup>3</sup> Under these circumstances, we may easily understand that Chares and Aristophon might find it convenient to press their charge more pointedly against Timotheus than against Iphikrates; and that the Dikastery, while condemning the former, may have been less convinced of the guilt of the latter, and better satisfied in every way to acquit him.<sup>4</sup>

Isokrates goes at some length into the subject from s. 137 to s. 147. The discourse was composed seemingly in 353 B. C., about one year after the death of Timotheus, and four years after the trial here described.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes cont. Meidiam, p. 534, 535; Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 2. 39.

<sup>2</sup> Dionysius Halikarnass., Judicium de Lysiâ, p. 481; Justin, vi. 5. Aris totle in his Rhetorica borrows several illustrations on rhetorical points from the speeches of Iphikrates; but none from any speeches of Timotheus.

<sup>3</sup> Polyænus, iii. 9, 29. That this may have been done with the privity and even by the contrivance of Iphikrates, is probable enough. But it seems to me that any obvious purpose of intimidating the Dikastery would have been likely to do him more harm than good.

<sup>4</sup> Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabrie, et Timothei, p. 224 seqq.), while collecting and discussing instructively all the facts respecting these two commanders, places the date of this memorable trial in the year 354 B. C.; three years after the events to which it relates, and two years after the peace which concluded the Social War. Mr. Clinton (Fast. Hellenici, E. C. 354) gives the same statement. I dissent from their opinion on the date and think that the trial must have occurred very soon after the abortive battle in the Hellespont—that is in 357 B. C. (or 356 B. C.), while the Social War was still going on.

Rehdantz and Mr. Clinton rely on the statement of Dionysius Halikarnass. (De Dinarcho Judicium, p. 667). Speaking of an oration falsely ascribed to Deinarchus, Dionysius says, that it was spoken before the maturity of that orator—*εἰρηται γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ Τιμοθέου ζώντος, κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῆς μετὰ Μενεσθεως στρατηγίας, ἐφ' ἣ τὰς εὐθύνας ὑπόσχωμαι, ἐάλω. Τιμόθεος δὲ τὰς εὐθύνας ὑπέσχετο ἐπὶ Διοτίμου, τοῦ μετὰ Καλλίου τῆτον, ὅτε καὶ...* These are the last words in the MS., so that the sen-

A fine of one hundred talents is said to have been imposed upon Timotheus, the largest fine (according to Isokrates), ever imposed at Athens. Upon his condemnation he retired to Chalkia, where he died three years afterwards, in 354 B. C. In the year succeeding his death, his memory was still very unpopular; yet it appears that the fine was remitted to his family, and that his son Konon was allowed to compromise the demand by a disbursement of the smaller sum of ten talents for the repairs of the city walls. It seems evident that Timotheus by his retirement evaded

tence stands defective; Mr. Clinton supplies *τελεύτησεν*, which is very probable.

The archonship of Diotimus is in 354–353 B. C.; so that Dionysius here states the trial to have taken place in 354 B. C. But on the other hand, the same Dionysius, in another passage, states the same trial to have taken place while the Social War was yet going on; that is, some time between 358 and 355 B. C. De Lysiâ Judicium, p. 480. *ἐν γὰρ τῷ συμμαχικῷ πολέμῳ τὴν εἰσαγγελίαν Ἰφικράτης ἡγώνισται, καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας ὑπέσχετο τῆς στρατηγίας, ὡς ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου γίγνεται καταφανές· οὗτος δὲ ὁ πόλεμος πίπτει κατὰ Ἀγαθοκλέα καὶ Ἐλπίην ἀρχοντας.* The archonships of Agathokles and Elpines cover the interval between Midsummer 357 B. C. and Midsummer 355 B. C.

It is plain that these two passages of Dionysius contradict each other. Rehdantz and Mr. Clinton notice the contradiction, but treat the passage first cited as containing the truth, and the other as erroneous. I cannot but think that the passage last cited is entitled to most credit, and that the true date of the trial was 357–356 B. C., not 354 B. C. When Dionysius asserts that the trial took place while the Social War was yet going on, he adds, “as is evident from the speech itself—*ὡς ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίγνεται τοῦ λόγου καταφανές.*” Here therefore there was no possibility of being misled by erroneous tables; the evidence is direct and complete; whereas he does not tell us on what authority he made the other assertion, about the archonship of Diotimus. Next, it is surely improbable that the abortive combat in the Hellespont, and the fierce quarrel between Chares and his colleagues, probably accompanied with great excitement in the fleet, could have remained without judicial settlement for three years. Lastly, assuming the statement about the archonship of Diotimus to be a mistake, we can easily see how the mistake arose. Dionysius has confounded the year in which Timotheus died, with the year of his trial. He seems to have died in 354 B. C. I will add that the text in this passage is not to be trusted as a picture.



payment of the full fine; so that his son Konon appears after him as one of the richest citizens in Athens.<sup>1</sup>

The loss of such a citizen as Timotheus was a fresh misfortune to her. He had conducted her armies with signal success, maintained the honor of her name throughout the eastern and western seas, and greatly extended the list of her foreign allies. She had recently lost Chabrias in battle; a second general, Timotheus, was now taken from her; and the third, Iphikrates, though acquitted at the last trial, seems, as far as we can make out, never to have been subsequently employed on military command. These three were the last eminent military citizens at Athens; for Phokion, though brave and deserving, was not to be compared with either of them. On the other hand, Chares, a man of great personal courage, but of no other merit, was now in the full swing of reputation. The recent judicial feud between the three Athenian admirals had been doubly injurious to Athens, first as discrediting Iphikrates and Timotheus, next as exalting Chares, to whom the sole command was now confided.

In the succeeding year, 356 B. C., Chares conducted another powerful fleet to attack the revolted allies. Being however not furnished with adequate funds from home to pay his troops, chiefly foreign mercenaries, he thought it expedient, on his own responsibility, to accept an offer from Artabazus (satrap of Daskylium and the region south of the Propontis), then in revolt against the Persian king.<sup>2</sup> Chares joined Artabazus with his own army,

<sup>1</sup> Cornelius Nepos, Timoth. c. 4; Rehdantz, Vit. Iph. Ch. et. Timoth. p. 235; Isokrates, Or. xv. (Permutat.) s. 108, 110, 137.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 22. Demosthenes (Philippic. i. p. 46. s. 28) has an emphatic passage, alluding to this proceeding on the part of Chares; which he represents as a necessary result of the remissness of the Athenians, who would neither serve personally themselves, nor supply their general with money to pay his foreign troops — and as a measure which the general could not avoid.

... ἐξ οὗ δ' αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ ξενικὰ ὑμῖν στρατεύεται, τοὺς φίλους νικᾷ καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους, οἱ δ' ἐχθροὶ μείζους τοῦ δεόντος γέγονασιν, καὶ παρακύναντα ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς πόλεως πόλεμον, πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον καὶ πανταχοῦ μάλλον οἴχεται πλέοντα· ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς ἀκολουθεῖ· εἰκότως — οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀρχεῖν, μὴ δίδόντα μισθόν. Compare the Scholia on the same oration, a passage which occurs somewhat earlier, p. 44. s. 22.

It seems evident, from this passage, that the Athenians were at first dis-

reinforced by additional bodies of mercenaries recently disbanded by the Persian satraps. With this entire force he gave battle to the king's troops under the command of Tithraustes, and gained a splendid victory; upon which Artabazus remunerated him so liberally, as to place the whole Athenian army in temporary affluence. The Athenians at home were at first much displeased with their general, for violating his instructions, and withdrawing his army from its prescribed and legitimate task. The news of his victory, however, and of the lucrative recompense following it, somewhat mollified them. But presently they learned that the Persian king, indignant at such a gratuitous aggression on their part, was equipping a large fleet to second the operations of their enemies. Intimidated by the prospect of Persian attack, they became anxious to conclude a peace with the revolted allies; who, on their part, were not less anxious to terminate the war. Embassies being exchanged, and negotiations opened, in the ensuing year (355 B. C., the third of the war), a peace was sworn, whereby the Athenians recognized the complete autonomy, and severance from their confederacy, of the revolted cities, Chios, Rhodes, Kos, and Byzantium.<sup>1</sup>

Such was the termination of the Social War, which fatally impaired the power, and lowered the dignity, of Athens. Imper-

pleased with such diversion from the regular purpose of the war, though the payment from Artabazus afterwards partially reconciled them to it; which is somewhat different from the statement of Diodorus.

From an inscription (cited in Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabria, etc., p. 58) we make out that Chares, Charidemus, and Phokion, were about this time in joint-command of the Athenian fleet near Lesbos, and that they were in some negotiation as to pecuniary supplies with the Persian Orontes on the mainland. But the inscription is so mutilated, that no distinct matter of fact can be ascertained.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 22. I place little reliance on the Argument prefixed to the Oration of Isokrates De Pace. As far as I am able to understand the facts of this obscure period, it appears to me that the author of that Argument has joined them together erroneously, and misconceived the situation.

The assertion of Demosthenes, in the Oration against Leptines (p. 481. s. 90), respecting the behavior of the Chians towards the memory of Chabrias, seems rather to imply that the peace with Chios had been concluded before that oration was delivered. It was delivered in the very year of the peace 355 B. C.



fectly as we know the events, it seems clear that her efforts to meet this formidable revolt were feeble and inadequate; evincing a sad downfall of energy since the year 412 B. C., when she had contended with transcendent vigor against similar and even greater calamities, only a year after her irreparable disaster before Syracuse. Inglorious as the result of the Social War was, it had nevertheless been costly, and left Athens poor. The annual revenues of her confederacy were greatly lessened by the secession of so many important cities, and her public treasury was exhausted. It is just at this time that the activity of Demosthenes as a public adviser begins. In a speech delivered this year (355 B. C.), he notes the poverty of the treasury; and refers back to it in discourses of after time as a fact but too notorious.<sup>1</sup>

But the misfortunes arising to Athens from the Social War did not come alone. It had the farther effect of rendering her less competent for defence against the early aggressions of Philip of Macedon.

That prince, during the first year of his accession (359 B. C.), had sought to conciliate Athens by various measures, but especially by withdrawing his garrison from Amphipolis, while he was establishing his military strength in the interior against the Illyrians and Pæonians. He had employed in this manner a period apparently somewhat less than two years; and employed it with such success, as to humble his enemies in the interior, and get together a force competent for aggressive operations against the cities on the coast. During this interval, Amphipolis remained a free and independent city; formally renounced by Philip, and not assailed by the Athenians. Why they let slip this favorable opportunity of again enforcing by arms pretensions on which they laid so much stress — I have before partially (though not very satisfactorily) explained. Philip was not the man to let them enjoy the opportunity longer than he could help, or to defer the moment of active operations as they did. Towards the close of 358 B. C., finding his hands free from impediments in the interior, he forthwith commenced the siege of Amphipolis. The inhabitants are said to have been unfavorably disposed towards him, and to

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes adv. Leptinem, p. 464. s. 26, 27; and De Coronâ, p. 305 s. 293.

have given him many causes for war.<sup>1</sup> It is not easy to understand what these causes could have been, seeing that so short a time before, the town had been garrisoned by Macedonians invoked as protectors against Athens; nor were the inhabitants in any condition to act aggressively against Philip.

Having in vain summoned Amphipolis to surrender, Philip commenced a strenuous siege, assailing the walls with battering-rams and other military engines. The weak points of the fortification must have been well known to him, from his own soldiers who had been recently in garrison. The inhabitants defended themselves with vigor; but such was now the change of circumstances, that they were forced to solicit their ancient enemy Athens for aid against the Macedonian prince. Their envoys Hierax and Stratokles, reaching Athens shortly after the successful close of the Athenian expedition to Eubœa, presented themselves before the public assembly, urgently inviting the Athenians to come forthwith and occupy Amphipolis, as the only chance of rescue from Macedonian dominion.<sup>2</sup> We are not certain whether the Social War had yet broken out; if it had, Athens would be too much pressed with anxieties arising out of so formidable a revolt, to have means disposable even for the tempting recovery of the long-lost Amphipolis. But at any rate Philip had foreseen and counterworked the prayers of the Amphipolitans. He sent a courteous letter to the Athenians, acquainting them that he was besieging the town, yet recognizing it as belonging of right to them, and promising to restore it to them when he should have succeeded in the capture.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 8.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 11. s. 8. ....εἰ γὰρ, ὅθ' ἤκομεν Εὐβοεῖται βεβοηθηκότες καὶ παρήσαν Ἀμφιπολιτῶν ἱέραξ καὶ στρατοκλῆς ἐπὶ τοῦτ' ἐβῆμα, κελεύοντες ἡμᾶς πλεῖν καὶ παραλαμβάνειν τὴν πόλιν, τὴν αὐτὴν παρ' ἐχόμεθ' ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν προθυμίαν ἦν περὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς Εὐβοέων σωτηρίας, εἶχετ' ἐν Ἀμφίπολιν τότε καὶ πάντων τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα ἂν ἦτε ἀπαλλαγμένοι πραγμάτων.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 659. s. 138. ... κάκεινο εἰδότες, ὅτι Φίλιππος, ὅτε μὲν Ἀμφίπολιν ἐπολιόρκει, ἔν' ὑμῖν παραδῶ, πολιορκεῖν ἐφη· ἐπειδὴ δ' ἔλαβε, καὶ Ποτίδαιαν προσαφείλετο.

Also the Oration De Halonneso, p. 83. s. 28. ....τῆς δ' ἐπιστολῆς, ἣν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐπεμψεν (Philip) ὅτ' Ἀμφίπολιν ἐπολιόρκει, ἐκίλετο, ἐν ᾧ 20\*



Much of the future history of Greece turned upon the manner in which Athens dealt with these two conflicting messages. The situation of Amphipolis, commanding the passage over the Strymon, was not only all-important — as shutting up Macedonia to the eastward and as opening the gold regions around Mount Pangæus — but was also easily defensible by the Athenians from seaward, if once acquired. Had they been clear-sighted in the appreciation of chances, and vigilant in respect to future defence, they might now have acquired this important place, and might have held it against the utmost efforts of Philip. But that fatal inaction which had become their general besetting sin, was on the present occasion encouraged by some plausible, yet delusive, pleas. The news of the danger of the Amphipolitans would be not unwelcome at Athens — where strong aversion was entertained towards them, as refractory occupants of a territory not their own, and as having occasioned repeated loss and humiliation to the Athenian arms. Nor could the Athenians at once shift their point of view, so as to contemplate the question on the ground of policy alone, and to recognize these old enemies as persons whose interests had now come into harmony with their own. On the other hand, the present temper of the Athenians towards Philip was highly favorable. Not only had they made peace with him during the preceding year, but they also felt that he had treated them well both in evacuating Amphipolis and in dismissing honorably their citizens who had been taken prisoners in the army of his competitor Argæus.<sup>1</sup> Hence they were predisposed to credit his positive assurance, that he only wished to take the place in order to expel a troublesome population who had wronged and annoyed him, and that he would readily hand it over to its rightful owners the Athenians. To grant the application of the Amphipolitans for aid, would thus appear, at Athens, to be courting a new war and breaking with a valuable friend, in order to protect an odious enemy, and to secure an acquisition which would at all events come to them, even if they remained still, through the cession of Philip. It is necessary to dwell upon the motives which deter-

ἐμολόγεον ὅτι Ἀμφίπολιν ὑμετέραν εἶναι· ἐφ' ἣν γὰρ ἐκπολιτοκρήσας ὑμῖν ἀποδύσαντες ἐκείνην ὑμετέραν, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν ἐχόντων.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 660 s. 144.

mined Athens on this occasion to refrain from interference; since there were probably few of her resolutions which she afterwards more bitterly regretted. The letter of assurance from Philip was received and trusted; the envoys from Amphipolis were dismissed with a refusal.

Deprived of all hope of aid from Athens, the Amphipolitans still held out as long as they could. But a party in the town entered into correspondence with Philip to betray it, and the defence thus gradually became feebler. At length he made a breach in the walls, sufficient, with the aid of partisans within, to carry the city by assault, not without a brave resistance from those who still remained faithful. All the citizens unfriendly to him were expelled or fled, the rest were treated with lenity; but we are told that little favor was shown by Philip towards those who had helped in the betrayal.<sup>1</sup>

Amphipolis was to Philip an acquisition of unspeakable importance, not less for defence than for offence. It was not only the most convenient maritime station in Thrace, but it also threw open to him all the country east of the Strymon, and especially the gold region near Mount Pangæus. He established himself firmly in his new position, which continued from henceforward one of the bulwarks of Macedonia, until the conquest of that kingdom by the Romans. He took no steps to fulfil his promise of handing over the place to the Athenians, who doubtless sent embassies to demand it. The Social War, indeed, which just now broke out, absorbed all their care and all their forces, so that they were unable, amidst their disastrous reverses at Chios and elsewhere, to take energetic measures in reference to Philip and Amphipolis. Nevertheless he still did not peremptorily refuse the surrender, but continued to amuse the Athenians with delusive hopes, suggested through his partisans, paid or voluntary, in the public assembly.

It was the more necessary for him to postpone any open breach

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 8, with the passage from Libanius cited in Wesseling's note. Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 10. s. 5.

Hierax and Stratokles were the Amphipolitan envoys despatched to Athens to ask for aid against Philip. An Inscription yet remains, recording the sentence of perpetual banishment of Philo and Stratokles. See Boeckh, Corp. Inscr. No. 2008.



with Athens, because the Olynthians had conceived serious alarm from his conquest of Amphipolis, and had sent to negotiate a treaty of amity and alliance with the Athenians. Such an alliance, had it been concluded, would have impeded the farther schemes of Philip. But his partisans at Athens procured the dismissal of the Olynthian envoys, by renewed assurances that the Macedonian prince was still the friend of Athens, and still disposed to cede Amphipolis as her legitimate possession. They represented, however, that he had good ground for complaining that Athens continued to retain Pydna, an ancient Macedonian seaport.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly they proposed to open negotiations with him for the exchange of Pydna against Amphipolis. But as the Pydnæans were known to be adverse to the transfer, secrecy was indispensable in the preliminary proceedings, so that Antiphon and Charidemus, the two envoys named, took their instructions from the Senate and made their reports only to the Senate. The public assembly being informed that negotiations, unavoidably secret, were proceeding, to ensure the acquisition of Amphipolis — was persuaded to repel the advances of Olynthus, as well as to look upon Philip still as a friend.<sup>2</sup>

The proffered alliance of the Olynthians was thus rejected, as the entreaty of the Amphipolitans for aid had previously been. Athens had good reason to repent of both. The secret negotiation brought her no nearer to the possession of Amphipolis. It ended in nothing, or in worse than nothing, as it amused her with delusive expectations, while Philip opened a treaty with the Olynthians, irritated, of course, by their recent repulse at Athens. As yet he had maintained pacific relations with the Athenians, even while holding Amphipolis contrary to his engagement. But he now altered his policy, and contracted alliance with the Olynthians; whose friendship he purchased not only by ceding to them the district of Anthemus (lying between Olynthus and Therma, and disputed by the Olynthians with former Macedonian kings), but also by

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i. 61, 137; Diodor. xiii. 49. Pydna had been acquired to Athens by Timotheus.

<sup>2</sup> This secret negotiation, about the exchange of Pydna for Amphipolis, is alluded to briefly by Demosthenes, and appears to have been fully noticed by Theopompus (Demosthenes, Olynth. ii. p. 19. s. 6. with the comments of Ulpian; Theopompus, Fr. 189, ed. Didot).

conquering and handing over to them the important Athenian possession of Potidæa.<sup>1</sup> We know no particulars of these important transactions. Our scanty authorities merely inform us, that during the first two years (358–356 B. C.), while Athens was absorbed by her disastrous Social War, Philip began to act as her avowed enemy. He conquered from her not only Pydna and other places for himself, but also Potidæa for the Olynthians. We are told that Pydna was betrayed to Philip by a party of traitors in the town;<sup>2</sup> and he probably availed himself of the secret propositions made by Athens respecting the exchange of Pydna for Amphipolis, to exasperate the Pydnæans against her bad faith; since they would have good ground for resenting the project of transferring them underhand, contrary to their own inclination. Pydna was the first place besieged and captured. Several of its inhabitants, on the ground of prior offence towards Macedonia,<sup>3</sup> are said to have been slain, while even those who had betrayed the town were contemptuously treated. The siege lasted long enough to transmit news to Athens, and to receive aid, had the Athenians acted with proper celerity in despatching forces. But either the pressure of the Social War — or the impatience of personal service as well as of pecuniary payment — or both causes operating together — made them behindhand with the exigency. Several Athenian citizens were taken in Pydna and sold into slavery, some being ransomed by Demosthenes out of his own funds; yet

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes, Philipp. ii. p. 71. s. 22.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. adv. Leptinem, p. 476. s. 71. . . . φέρε δὴ κάκεινο ἐξετασόμεν, οἱ προδόντες τὴν Πύδναν καὶ τὰλλα χωρία τῷ Φιλίππῳ τῷ ποτ' ἐπαρθέντες ὑμᾶς ἠδίκουν; ἢ πᾶσι πρόδηλον τοῦτο, ὅτι ταῖς παρ' ἐκείνου δωρεαῖς, ὡς διὰ ταῦτα ἐσεσθαι σφίσιν ἡγούντο;

Compare Olynthiac i. p. 10. s. 5.

This discourse was pronounced in 355 B. C., thus affording confirmatory evidence of the date assigned to the surrender of Pydna and Potidæa.

What the "other places" here alluded to by Demosthenes are (besides Pydna and Potidæa), we do not know. It appears by Diodorus (xvi. 31) that Methônê was not taken till 354–353 B. C.

<sup>3</sup> The conquests of Philip are always enumerated by Demosthenes in this order, Amphipolis, Pydna, Potidæa, Methônê, etc., Olynthiac i. p. 11. s. 9. p. 12. s. 13; Philippic i. p. 41. s. 6; De Coronâ, p. 248. s. 85.

See Ulpian ad Demosthenem, Olynth. i. p. 10. s. 5; also Diodor. xvi. 8 and Wesseling's note.



we cannot make out clearly that any relief at all was sent from Athens.<sup>1</sup> If any was sent, it came too late.

Equal tardiness was shown in the relief sent to Potidæa<sup>2</sup>—though the siege, carried on jointly by Philip and the Olynthians, was both long and costly<sup>3</sup>—and though there were a body of Athenian settlers (Kleruchs) resident there, whom the capture of the place expelled from their houses and properties.<sup>4</sup> Even for the rescue of these fellow-citizens, it does not appear that any native Athenians would undertake the burden of personal service: the relieving force despatched seems to have consisted of a general with mercenary foreigners; who, as no pay was provided for them, postponed the enterprise on which they were sent to the temptation of plundering elsewhere for their own profit.<sup>5</sup> It was

<sup>1</sup> In the public vote of gratitude passed many years afterwards by the Athenian assembly towards Demosthenes, his merits are recited; and among them we find this contribution towards the relief of captives at Pydna, Methônê, and Olynthus (Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator p. 851).

<sup>2</sup> Compare Demosthenes, Olynthiac i. p. 11. s. 9; Philippic i. p. 50 s. 40 (where he mentions the expedition to Potidæa as having come too late, but does not mention any expedition for relief of Pydna.)

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 656 s. 128. πρὸς ὑμᾶς πολεμῶν, χρήματα πολλὰ ἀναλώσας (Philip, in the siege of Potidæa). In this oration (delivered B. C. 352) Demosthenes treats the capture of Potidæa as mainly the work of Philip; in the second Olynthiac, he speaks as if Philip had been a secondary agent, a useful adjunct to the Olynthians in the siege, πάλιν αὖ πρὸς Ποτιδαίαν Ὀλυνθίους ἐφανή τι τοῦτο συναμφοτερον—i. e. the Macedonian power was προσθήκη τις οὐ σμικρά... The first representation, delivered two or three years before the second, is doubtless the more correct.

<sup>4</sup> Demosthenes, Philipp ii. p. 71 s. 22. Ποτιδαίαν δ' ἐδίδον, τοὺς Ἀθηναίων ἀποίκους ἐκβαλλῶν (Philip gave it to the Olynthians), καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐχθρὰν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀνηρῆτο, τὴν χώραν δ' ἐκείνοις ἐδεδωκεῖ καρπούσθαι. The passage in the Oratio de Halonneso (p. 79. s. 10) alludes to this same extrusion and expropriation of the Athenian Kleruchs, though Voemel and Franke (erroneously, I think) suppose it to allude to the treatment of these Kleruchs by Philip some years afterwards, when he took Potidæa for himself. We may be sure that no Athenian Kleruchs were permitted to stay at Potidæa even after the first capture.

<sup>5</sup> The general description given in the first Philippic of Demosthenes, of the ἀπόστολοι from Athens, may doubtless be applied to the expedition for the relief of Potidæa—Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 46. s. 28. p. 53, s. 52. and the general tenor of the harangue.

thus that Philip, without any express declaration of war, commenced a series of hostile measures against Athens, and deprived her of several valuable maritime possessions on the coast of Macedonia and Thrace, besides his breach of faith respecting the cession of Amphipolis.<sup>1</sup> After her losses from the Social War, and her disappointment about Amphipolis, she was yet farther mortified by seeing Pydna pass into his hands, and Potidæa (the most important possession in Thrace next to Amphipolis) into those of Olynthus. Her impoverished settlers returned home, doubtless with bitter complaint against the aggression, but also with just vexation against the tardiness of their countrymen in sending relief.

These two years had been so employed by Philip as to advance prodigiously his power and ascendancy. He had deprived Athens of her hold upon the Thermaic gulf, in which she now seems only to have retained the town of Methônê, instead of the series of ports round the gulf acquired for her by Timotheus.<sup>2</sup> He had conciliated the good-will of the Olynthians by his cession of Anthemus and Potidæa; the latter place, from its commanding situation on the isthmus of Pallênê, giving them the mastery of that peninsula,<sup>3</sup> and ensuring (what to Philip was of great importance) their enmity with Athens. He not only improved the maritime conveniences of Amphipolis, but also extended his acquisitions into the auriferous regions of Mount Pangæus eastward of the Strymon. He possessed himself of that productive country immediately facing the island of Thasos; where both Thasians and Athenians had once contended for the rights of mining, and

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus (xvi. 8), in mentioning the capture of Potidæa, considers it an evidence of the kind disposition of Philip, and of his great respect for the dignity of Athens (φιλανθρώπως προσεγγεκάμενος) that he spared the persons of these Athenians in the place, and permitted them to depart. But it was a great wrong, under the circumstances, that he should expel and expropriate them, when no offence had been given to him, and when there was no formal war (Demosth. Or. de Halonneso, p. 79. s. 10).

Diodorus states also that Philip gave Pydna, as well as Potidæa, to the Olynthians; which is not correct.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 41. s. 6. ... εἰχομέν ποτε ἡμεῖς Πύδναν καὶ Ποτιδαίαν καὶ Μεθώνην, καὶ πάντα τὰς τοποὺς τοῦτον οἰκεῖον ἐκ λφ., etc.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenes, Philippic ii. p. 70. s. 22.



from whence, apparently, both had extracted valuable produce. In the interior of this region he founded a new city called Philippi, enlarged from a previous town called Krenides, recently founded by the Thasians; and he took such effective measures for increasing the metallic works in the neighborhood, that they presently yielded to him a large revenue; according to Diodorus, not less than one thousand talents per annum.<sup>1</sup> He caused a new gold coin to be struck, bearing a name derived from his own. The fresh source of wealth thus opened was of the greatest moment to him, as furnishing means to meet the constantly increasing expense of his military force. He had full employment to keep his soldiers in training: for the nations of the interior — Illyrians, Pæonians, and Thracians — humbled but not subdued, rose again in arms, and tried again jointly to reclaim their independence. The army of Philip — under his general Parmenio, of whom we now hear for the first time — defeated them, and again reduced them to submission.<sup>2</sup>

It was during this interval too that Philip married Olympias, daughter of Neoptolemus prince of the Molossi,<sup>3</sup> and descended from the ancient Molossian kings, who boasted of an heroic Æakid genealogy. Philip had seen her at the religious mysteries in the island of Samothrace, where both were initiated at the same time. In violence of temper — in jealous, cruel, and vindictive disposition — she forms almost a parallel to the Persian queens Amestris and Parysatis. The Epirotic women, as well as the Thracian, were much given to the Bacchanalian religious rites, celebrated with fierce ecstasy amid the mountain solitudes in honor of Dionysius.<sup>4</sup> To this species of religious excitement Olympias was peculiarly susceptible. She is said to have been fond of tame snakes playing around her, and to have indulged in ceremonies of magic and incantation.<sup>5</sup> Her temper and character be-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 4-8; Harpokration v. Δάτον. Herodot. ix. 74.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 22; Plutarch, Alexand. c. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Justin, vii. 6.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, Alexand. c. 2. 3. The Bacchæ of Euripides contains a powerful description of these exciting ceremonies.

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch, Alexand. c. 2. *ἡ δὲ Ὀλυμπιάς μᾶλλον ἐτέρων ζηλώσασα τὰς ἱεροχῆς, καὶ τοὺς ἐνθουσιασμοὺς ἐξάγουσα βαρβαρικώτερον, ὄφει μὲν χεῖρ' ἔχειν ἐφείλετο τοῖς θιάσοις, etc.*

Compare Duris apud Athenæum, xiii. p. 560.

came, after no long time, repulsive and even alarming to Philip. But in the year 356 B. C. she bore to him a son, afterwards renowned as Alexander the Great. It was in the summer of this year, not long after the taking of Potidæa, that Philip received nearly at the same time, three messages with good news — the birth of his son; the defeat of the Illyrians by Parmenio; and the success of one of his running horses at the Olympic games.<sup>1</sup>

## CHAPTER LXXXVII.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SACRED WAR TO THAT OF THE OLYNTHIAN WAR.

It has been recounted in the preceding chapter, how Philip during the continuance of the Social War, aggrandized himself Macedonia and Thrace at the expense of Athens, by the acquisition of Amphipolis, Pydna, and Potidæa — the two last actually taken from her, the first captured only under false assurances held out to her while he was besieging it: how he had farther strengthened himself by enlisting Olynthus both as an ally of his own, and as an enemy of the Athenians. He had thus begun the war against Athens, usually spoken of as the war about Amphipolis, which lasted without any formal peace for twelve years. The resistance opposed by Athens to these his first aggressions had been faint and ineffective — partly owing to embarrassments. But the Social War had not yet terminated, when new embarrassments and complications, of a far more formidable nature, sprang up elsewhere — known by the name of the Sacred War, rending the very entrails of the Hellenic world, and profitable only to the indefatigable aggressor in Macedonia.

The Amphiktyonic assembly, which we shall now find exalted into an inauspicious notoriety, was an Hellenic institution ancient

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Alexand. c. 3; Justin, xii. 19.



and venerable, but rarely invested with practical efficiency. Though political by occasion, it was religious in its main purpose, associated with the worship of Apollo at Delphi and of *Dēmētēr* at Thermopylæ. Its assemblies were held twice annually — in spring at Delphi, in autumn at Thermopylæ; while in every fourth year it presided at the celebration of the great Pythian festival near Delphi, or appointed persons to preside in its name. It consisted of deputies called Hieromnemones and Pylagoræ, sent by the twelve ancient nations or fractions of the Hellenic name, who were recognized as its constituent body: Thessalians, Bœotians, Dorians, Ionians, Perrhæbians, Magnètes, Lokrians, Ceteans or Ænians, Achæans, Malians, Phokians, Dolopes. These were the twelve nations, sole partners in the Amphiktyonic sacred rites and meetings: each nation, small and great alike, having two votes in the decision and no more; and each city, small and great alike, contributing equally to make up the two votes of that nation to which it belonged. Thus Sparta counted only as one of the various communities forming the Dorian nation: Athens, in like manner in the Ionian, not superior in rank to Erythræ or Priênê.<sup>1</sup>

That during the preceding century, the Amphiktyonic assembly had meddled rarely, and had never meddled to any important purpose, in the political affairs of Greece — is proved by the fact that it is not once mentioned either in the history of Thucydides, or in the Hellenica of Xenophon. But after the humiliation of Sparta at Leuktra, this great religious convocation of the Hellenic world, after long torpor, began to meet for the despatch of business. Unfortunately its manifestations of activity were for the most part abusive and mischievous. Probably not long after the battle of Leuktra, though we do not know the precise year — the Thebans exhibited before the Amphiktyons an accusation against Sparta, for having treacherously seized the Kadmeia (the citadel of Thebes) in a period of profound peace. Sentence of condemnation was pronounced against her,<sup>2</sup> together with a fine of five hundred talents, doubled after a certain interval of non-payment.

<sup>1</sup> Æschines, *De Fals. Legat* p. 280 c. 36. For particulars respecting the Amphiktyonic assembly, see the treatise of Tittman, *Ueber den Amphiktyonischen Bund*, p. 37, 45, *seqq.*

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 23–29, Justin, viii. 1.

The act here put in accusation was indisputably a gross political wrong; and a pretence, though a very slight pretence, for bringing political wrong under cognizance of the Amphiktyons, might be found in the tenor of the old oath taken by each included city.<sup>1</sup> Still, every one knew that for generations past, the assembly had taken no actual cognizance of political wrong; so that both trial and sentence were alike glaring departures from understood Grecian custom — proving only the humiliation of Sparta and the insolence of Thebes. The Spartans of course did not submit to pay, nor were there any means of enforcement against them. No practical effect followed therefore, except (probably) the exclusion of Sparta from the Amphiktyonic assembly — as well as from the Delphian temple and the Pythian games. Indirectly, however, the example was most pernicious, as demonstrating that the authority of a Pan-hellenic convocation, venerable from its religious antipathy; could be abused to satisfy the political antipathies of a single leading state.

In the year 357 B. C., a second attempt was made by Thebes to employ the authority of the Amphiktyonic assembly as a means of crushing her neighbors the Phokians. The latter had been, from old time, border-enemies of the Thebans, Lokrians, and Thessalians. Until the battle of Leuktra, they had fought as allies of Sparta against Thebes, but had submitted to Thebes after that battle, and had continued to be her allies, though less and less cordial, until the battle of Mantinea and the death of Epaminondas.<sup>2</sup> Since that time, the old antipathy appears to have been rekindled, especially on the part of Thebes. Irritated against the Phokians probably as having broken off from a sworn alliance, she determined to raise against them an accusation in the Amphiktyonic assembly. As to the substantive ground of accusation, we find different statements. According to one witness, they were accused of having cultivated some portion of the Kirrhæan plain, consecrated from of old to Apollo; according to another, they

<sup>1</sup> Æschines, *De Fals. Leg.* p. 279. c. 35.

<sup>2</sup> Compare Xenoph. *Hellen.* vi. 5, 23, and vii. 5, 4. About the feud of the Thessalians and Phokians, see Herodot. vii. 176, viii. 27, Æschines, *De Fals. Leg.* p. 289. c. 43 — of the Lokrians and Phokians, Xenoph. *Hellen.* ii. 5, 3, Pausanias, iii. 9. <sup>4</sup>



were charged with an aggressive invasion of Boeotia; while, according to a third, the war was caused by their having carried off Theano, a married Theban woman. Pausanias confesses that he cannot distinctly make out what was the allegation against them.<sup>1</sup> Assisted by the antipathy of the Thessalians and Lokrians, not less vehement than her own. Thebes had no difficulty in obtaining sentence of condemnation against the Phokians. A fine was imposed upon them; of what amount we are not told, but so heavy as to be far beyond their means of payment.

It was thus that the Thebans, who had never been able to attach to themselves a powerful confederacy such as that which formerly held its meetings at Sparta, supplied the deficiency by abusing their ascendancy in the Amphiktyonic assembly to procure vengeance upon political enemies. A certain time was allowed for liquidating the fine, which the Phokians had neither means nor inclination to do. Complaint of the fact was then made at the next meeting of the Amphiktyons, when a decisive resolution was adopted, and engraven along with the rest on a column in the Delphian temple, to expropriate the recusant Phokians, and consecrate all their territory to Apollo — as Kirrha with its fertile plain had been treated two centuries before. It became necessary, at the same time, for the maintenance of consistency and equal dealing, to revive the mention of the previous fine still remaining unpaid by the Lacedæmonians; against whom it was proposed to pass a vote of something like excommunication.

Such impending dangers, likely to be soon realized under the instigation of Thebes, excited a resolute spirit of resistance among the Phokians. A wealthy and leading citizen of the Phokian town Ledon, named Philomelus son of Theotimus, stood forward as the head of this sentiment, setting himself energetically to organize means for the preservation of Phokian liberty as well as property.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 23; Justin, viii. 1; Pausanias, x. 2. 1; Duris ap. Athenæum, xiii. p. 560. Justin says, "Causa et origo hujus mali, Thebani fuere; qui cum rerum potirentur, secundam fortunam imbecillo animo ferentes, victos armis Lacedæmonios et Phocenses, quasi parva supplicia cædibus et rapinis luissent, apud commune Græciæ concilium superbe accusaverunt. Lacedæmoniis crimini datum, quod arcem Thebanam induciarum tempore occupassent; Phocensibus, quod Boeotiam depopulati essent; prorsus quasi post arma et bellum locum legibus reliquissent."

Among his assembled countrymen, he protested against the gross injustice of the recent sentence, amercing them in an enormous sum exceeding their means; when the strip of land, where they were alleged to have trespassed on the property of the god, was at best narrow and insignificant. Nothing was left, now, to avert from them utter ruin, except a bold front and an obstinate resistance, which he (Philomelus) would pledge himself to conduct with success, if they would intrust him with full powers. The Phokians (he contended) were the original and legitimate administrators of the Delphian temple — a privilege of which they had been wrongfully dispossessed by the Amphiktyonic assembly and the Delphians. "Let us reply to our enemies (he urged) by re-asserting our lost rights and seizing the temple; we shall obtain support and countenance from many Grecian states, whose interest is the same as our own, to resist the unjust decrees of the Amphiktyons."<sup>1</sup>

Our enemies the Thebans (he added) are plotting the seizure of the temple for themselves, through the corrupt connivance of an Amphiktyonic majority: let us anticipate and prevent their injustice."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 23, 24; Pausanias, x. 2, 1.

<sup>2</sup> That this design, imputed to the Thebans, was a part of the case made out by the Phokians for themselves, we may feel assured from the passage in Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 347. s. 22. Demosthenes charges Æschines with having made false promises and statements to the Athenian assembly, on returning from his embassy in 346 B. C. Æschines told the Athenians (so Demosthenes affirms) that he had persuaded Philip to act altogether in the interest and policy of Athens; that the Athenians would very presently see Thebes besieged by Philip, and the Boeotian towns restored; and furthermore, τῷ θεῷ δὲ τὰ χρήματα εἰσπραττόμενα, οὐ παρὰ Φωκίων, ἀλλὰ παρὰ Θηβαίων τῶν βουλευσάντων τὴν κατάληψιν τοῦ ἱεροῦ διδάσκειν γὰρ αὐτὸς ἔφη τὸν Φίλιππον οὐδὲν ἔττον ἡσεβήκασιν οἱ βουλευκότες τῶν ταῖς χερσὶ πράξαντων, καὶ διὰ τὰυτὰ χρῆμαθ' ἐαντὶ τοῖς Θηβαίοις ἐπικεκηρυγμέναι.

How far Æschines really promised to the Athenians that which Demosthenes here alleges him to have promised — is a matter to be investigated when we arrive at the transactions of the year 346 B. C. But it seems to me clear that the imputation (true or false) against the Thebans, of having been themselves in conspiracy to seize the temple, must have emanated first from the Phokians, as part of the justification of their own proceedings. If the Thebans ever conceived such an idea, it must have been before the actual occupation of the temple by the Phokians, if they were



Here a new question was raised, respecting the right of presidency over the most venerated sanctuary in Greece; a question fraught with ruin to the peace of the Hellenic world. The claim of the Phokians was not a mere fiction, but founded on an ancient reality, and doubtless believed by themselves to be just. Delphi and its inhabitants were originally a portion of the Phokian name. In the Homeric Catalogue, which Philomelus emphatically cited, it stands enumerated among the Phokians commanded by Schedius and Epistrophus, under the name of the "rocky Pytho,"—a name still applied to it by Herodotus.<sup>1</sup> The Delphians had acquired sufficient force to sever themselves from their Phokian brethren—to stand out as a community by themselves—and to assume the lucrative privilege of administering the temple as their own peculiar. Their severance had been first brought about, and their pretensions as administrators espoused by Sparta,<sup>2</sup> upon whose powerful interest they mainly depended. But the Phokians had never ceased to press their claim, and so far was the dispute from being settled against them, even in 450 B. C., that they then had in their hands the actual administration. The Spartans despatched an army for the express purpose of taking it away from them and transferring it to the Delphians; but very shortly afterwards, when the Spartan forces had retired, the Athenians marched thither, and dispossessed the Delphians,<sup>3</sup> restoring the temple to the Phokians. This contest went by the name of the Sacred War. At that time the Athenians were masters of most parts of Bœotia, as well as of Megara and Pegæ; and had they continued so, the Phokians would probably have been sustained in their administration of the holy place; the rights of the Delphians on one side, against those of the Phokians on the other, being then obviously dependent on the comparative strength of Athens and Sparta. But presently evil days came upon Athens, so that she lost all her inland possessions north of Attica, and could no longer uphold her allies in Phokis. The Phokians now in fact passed into allies of Sparta, and were forced to relinquish their

falsely charged with conceiving it, the false charge would also be preferred at the time. Demosthenes would hardly invent it twelve years after the Phokian occupation.

<sup>1</sup> Herodot. i. 54.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. i. 12.

<sup>3</sup> Strabo, ix. p. 423.

temple-management to the Delphians; who were confirmed in it by a formal article of the peace of Nikias in 421 B. C.,<sup>1</sup> and retained it without question, under the recognized Hellenic supremacy of Sparta, down to the battle of Leuktra. Even then, too, it continued undisturbed; since Thebes was nowise inclined to favor the claim of her enemies the Phokians, but was on the contrary glad to be assisted in crushing them by their rivals the Delphians, who, as managers of the temple, could materially contribute to a severe sentence of the Amphiktyonic assembly.

We see thus that the claim now advanced by Philomelus was not fictitious, but genuine, and felt by himself as well as by other Phokians to be the recovery of an ancient privilege, lost only through superior force.<sup>2</sup> His views being heartily embraced by his countrymen, he was nominated general with full powers. It was his first measure to go to Sparta, upon whose aid he counted, in consequence of the heavy fine which still stood imposed upon her by the Amphiktyonic sentence. He explained his views privately to king Archidamus, engaging, if the Phokians should become masters of the temple, to erase the sentence and fine from the column of record. Archidamus did not dare to promise him public countenance or support; the rather, as Sparta had always been the chief supporter of the Delphian presidency (as against the Phokian) over the temple. But in secret he warmly encouraged the scheme; furnishing a sum of fifteen talents, besides a few mercenary soldiers, towards its execution. With this aid Philomelus returned home, provided an equal sum of fifteen talents from his own purse, and collected a body of peltasts, Phokians as well as strangers. He then executed his design against Delphi, attacking suddenly both the town and the temple, and capturing them, as it would appear, with little opposition. To the alarmed Delphians, generally, he promised security and good treatment; but he put to death the members of the Gens (or Clan) called Thrakidæ, and seized their property: these men constituted one among several holy Gentes, leading conductors of the political

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v. 18.

Justin (viii 1) takes no notice of this first position of the Phokians in regard to the temple of Delphi. He treats them as if they had been despoilers of the temple even at first; "velut deo irascentes."



and religious agency of the place.<sup>1</sup> It is probable, that when it was suddenly assailed, they had sent to solicit aid from their neighbors, the Lokrians of Amphissa; for Philomelus was scarcely in possession of Delphi, when these latter marched up to the rescue. He defeated them however with serious loss, and compelled them to return home.

Thus completely successful in his first attempt, Philomelus lost no time in announcing solemnly and formally his real purpose. He proclaimed that he had come only to resume for the Phokians their ancient rights as administrators; that the treasures of the temple should be safe and respected as before; that no impiety or illegality of any kind should be tolerated; and that the temple and its oracle would be opened, as heretofore, for visitors, sacrificers, and inquirers. At the same time, well aware that his Lokrian enemies at Amphissa were very near, he erected a wall to protect the town and temple, which appears to have been hitherto undefended,—especially its western side. He further increased his levies of troops. While the Phokians, inspirited with this first advantage, obeyed his call in considerable numbers, he also attracted new mercenaries from abroad by the offer of higher pay. He was presently at the head of five thousand men, strong enough to hold a difficult post like Delphi against all immediate attack. But being still anxious to appease Grecian sentiment and avert hostility, he despatched envoys to all the principal states,—not merely to Sparta and Athens, but also to his enemy Thebes. His envoys were instructed to offer solemn assurances, that the Phokians had taken Delphi simply to reclaim their paternal right of

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 24. Hesychius (v. *Λαφριάδαι*) mentions another phratry or gens at Delphi, called Laphriadæ. See Wilhelm Götze, *Das Delphische Orakel*, p. 83. Leipsic, 1839.

It is stated by Pausanias, that the Phokians were bent upon dealing with Delphi and its inhabitants in the harshest manner; intending to kill all the men of military age, to sell the remaining population as slaves, and to raze the whole town to the ground. Archidamus, king of Sparta, (according to Pausanias) induced the Phokians to abandon this resolution (Pausan. iii. 10, 4).

At what moment the Phokians ever determined on this step—or, indeed, whether they ever really determined on it—we cannot feel any certainty. Nor can we decide confidently, whether Pausanias borrowed the statement from Theopompus, whom he quotes a little before.

presidency, against past wrongful usurpation; that they were prepared to give any security required by the Hellenic body, for strict preservation of the valuables in the temple, and to exhibit and verify all, by weight and number, before examiners; that conscious of their own rectitude of purpose, they did not hesitate to entreat positive support against their enemies, or at any rate, neutrality.<sup>1</sup> The answers sent to Philomelus were not all of the same tenor. On this memorable event, the sentiments of the Grecian world were painfully divided. While Athens, Sparta, the Peloponnesian Achæans and some other states in Peloponnesus, recognized the possession of the Phokians, and agreed to assist them in retaining it,—the Thebans and Thessalians de-

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus xvi. 27. 'Ομοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας τὰς ἐπισημοτάτας τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πόλεων ἀπέστειλεν, ἀπολογούμενος, ὅτι κατεῖληπται τοὺς Δελφοὺς, οὐ τοῖς ἱεροῖς χρήμασιν ἐπιβουλεύων, ἀλλὰ τῆς τοῦ ἱεροῦ προστασίας ἀμφισβητῶν· εἶναι γὰρ Φωκίων αὐτὴν ἰδίαν ἐν τοῖς παλαιοῖς χρόνοις ἀποδεδειγμένην. Τῶν δὲ χρημάτων τὸν λόγον ἔφη πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἀποδῶσκειν, καὶ τὸν τε σταθμὸν καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀναθημάτων ἑτοίμος εἶναι παραδιδόναι τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐξετάζειν. Ἡξίου δὲ, ἂν τις οὐ ἐχθρὰν ἢ φθόνον πολέμῃ Φωκεῦσι, μάλιστα μὲν ξυμμαχεῖν, εἰ δὲ μὴ γὰρ, τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν.

In reference to the engagement taken by Philomelus, that he would exhibit and verify, before any general Hellenic examiners, all the valuable property in the Delphian temple, by weight and number of articles—the reader will find interesting matter of comparison in the Attic Inscriptions, No. 137–142, vol. i. of Boeckh's *Corpus Inscriptt. Græcarum*—with Boeckh's valuable commentary. These are the records of the numerous gold and silver donatives, preserved in the Parthenon, handed over by the treasurers of the goddess annually appointed, to their successors at the end of the year, from one Panathenaic festival to the next. The weight of each article is formally recorded, and the new articles received each year (*ἐπέτεια*) are specified. Where an article is transferred without being weighed (*ἀσταθμον*), the fact is noticed. That the precious donatives in the Delphian temple also, were carefully weighed, we may judge by the statement of Herodotus, that the golden lion dedicated by Kroesus had lost a fraction of its weight in the conflagration of the building (Herodot. i. 50).

Pausanias (x. 2, 1) does not advert to the difference between the first and the second part of the proceedings of Philomelus; first, the seizure of the temple, without any spoliation of the treasure, but simply upon the plea that the Phokians had the best right to administer its affairs; next, the seizure of the treasure and donatives of the temple—which he came to afterwards, when he found it necessary for defence.



clared strenuously against them, supported by all the states north of Boeotia, Lokrians, Dorians, Ænians, Phthiot-Achæans, Magnètes, Perrhæbians, Athamânes, and Dolopes. Several of these last were dependents of the Thessalians, and followed their example; many of them moreover belonging to the Amphiktyonic constituency, must have taken part in the votes of condemnation just rescinded by the Phokians.

We may clearly see that it was not at first the intention of Philomelus or his Phokian comrades to lay hands on the property of the Delphian temple; and Philomelus, while taking pains to set himself right in the eyes of Greece, tried to keep the prophetic agency of the temple in its ordinary working, so as to meet the exigencies of sacrificers and inquirers as before. He required the Pythian priestess to mount the tripod, submit herself to the prophetic inspiration, and pronounce the word thus put into her mouth, as usual. But the priestess, — chosen by the Delphians, and probably herself a member of one among the sacred Delphian Gentes, — obstinately refused to obey him; especially as the first question which he addressed concerned his own usurpation, and his chances of success against enemies. On his injunctions, that she should prophesy according to the traditional rites, — she replied that these rites were precisely what he had just overthrown, upon which he laid hold of her, and attempted to place her on the tripod by force. Subdued and frightened for her own personal safety, the priestess exclaimed involuntarily, that he might do what he chose. Philomelus gladly took this as an answer, favorable to his purpose. He caused it to be put in writing and proclaimed, as an oracle from the god, sanctioning and licensing his designs. He convened a special meeting of his partisans and the Delphians generally, wherein appeal was made to this encouraging answer, as warranting full confidence with reference to the impending war. So it was construed by all around, and confirmatory evidence was derived from farther signs and omens occurring at the moment.<sup>1</sup> It is probable, however, that Philomelus took care for the future to name a new priestess, more favorable to his interest, and disposed to deliver oracular answers under the new administrators in the same manner as under the old.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 25, 26, 27.

Though so large a portion of the Grecian name had thus declared war against the Phokians, yet none at first appear to have made hostile movements, except the Lokrians, with whom Philomelus was fully competent to deal. He found himself strong enough to overrun and plunder their territory, engaging in some indecisive skirmishes. At first the Lokrians would not even give up the bodies of his slain soldiers for burial, alleging that sacrilegious men were condemned by the general custom of Greece to be cast out without sepulture. Nor did they desist from their refusal until he threatened retaliation towards the bodies of their own slain.<sup>1</sup> So bitter was the exasperation arising out of this deplorable war throughout the Hellenic world! Even against the Lokrians alone, however, Philomelus soon found himself in want of money, for the payment of his soldiers, — native Phokians as well as mercenary strangers. Accordingly, while he still adhered to his pledge to respect the temple property, he did not think himself precluded from levying a forced contribution on the properties of his enemies, the wealthy Delphian citizens; and his arms were soon crowned with a brilliant success against the Lokrians, in a battle fought near the Rocks called Phædriades; a craggy and difficult locality so close to Delphi, that the Lokrians must evidently have been the aggressors, marching up with a view to relieve the town. They were defeated with great loss, both in slain and in prisoners; several of them only escaping the spear of the enemy by casting themselves to certain death down the precipitous cliffs.<sup>2</sup>

This victory, while imparting courage to the Phokians, proved the signal for fresh exertions among their numerous enemies. The loud complaints of the defeated Lokrians raised universal sympathy; and the Thebans, now pressed by fear, as well as animated by hatred, of the Phokians, put themselves at the head of the movement. Sending round envoys to the Thessalians and the other Amphiktyonic states, they invoked aid and urged the necessity of mustering a common force, — “to assist the god,” — to vindicate the judicial dignity of the Amphiktyonic assembly, — and to put down the sacrilegious Phokians.<sup>3</sup> It appears that a

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 25.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 28.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 28. *ψεφισαμένων δὲ τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων τὸν πρὸς Φωκίαις*



special meeting of the assembly itself was convened; probably at Thermopylae, since Delphi was in possession of the enemy. Decided resolutions were here taken to form an Amphiktyonic army of execution; accompanied by severe sentences of fine and other punishments, against the Phokian leaders, by name Philomelus and Onomarchus, — perhaps brothers, but at least joint commanders, together with others.<sup>1</sup>

The perils of the Phokians now became imminent. Their own unaided strength was nowise sufficient to resist the confederacy about to arm in defence of the Amphiktyonic assembly;<sup>2</sup> nor does it appear that either Athens or Sparta had as yet given them anything more than promises and encouragement. Their only chance of effective resistance lay in the levy of a large mercenary force; for which purpose neither their own funds, nor any farther aid derivable from private confiscation, could be made adequate. There remained no other resource except to employ the treasures and valuables in the Delphian temple, upon which accordingly Philomelus now laid hands. He did so, however, as his previous conduct evinced, with sincere reluctance, probably with various professions at first of borrowing only a given sum, destined to meet the actual emergency, and intended to be repaid as soon as safety should be provided for.<sup>3</sup> But whatever may have been

πόλεμον, πολλή ταραχή καὶ διάστασις ἦν καθ' ὅλην τὴν Ἑλλάδα. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔκριναν βοηθεῖν τῷ θεῷ, καὶ τοὺς Φωκεῖς, ὡς ἱεροσύλους, καλᾶν· οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τῶν Φωκέων βοήθειαν ἀπέκλιναν.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 32. about Onomarchus — πολλαῖς γὰρ καὶ μεγάλας δίκαις ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων ἦν καταδικασμένος ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις, etc.

Onomarchus is denominated the colleague of Philomelus, cap. 31, and his brother, cap. 61.

<sup>2</sup> Even in 374 B. C., three years before the battle of Leuktra, the Phokians had been unable to defend themselves against Thebes without aid from Sparta (Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 1).

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 30. ἡναγκάζετο (Philomelus) τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἀναθήμασιν ἐμβαλεῖν τὰς χεῖρας καὶ συλᾶν τὸ μαντεῖον. A similar proposition had been started by the Corinthian envoys in the congress at Sparta, shortly before the Peloponnesian war; they suggested as one of their ways and means the borrowing from the treasures of Delphi and Olympia, to be afterwards repaid (Thucyd. i. 121). Perikles made the like proposition in the Athenian assembly; "for purposes of security," the property of the temples might be employed to defray the cost of war, subject to the obligation of replacing the whole afterwards (χρησαμένους τε ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ ἔφη χρῆναι μὴ ἔλασ-

his intentions at the outset, all such reserves or limits, or obligations to repay, were speedily forgotten in practice. When the feeling which protected the fund was broken through, it was as easy to take much as little, and the claimants became more numerous and importunate; besides which the exigencies of the war never ceased, and the implacable repugnance raised by the spoliation amidst half of the Grecian world, left to the Phokians no security except under the protection of a continued mercenary force.<sup>1</sup> Nor were Philomelus and his successors satisfied without also enriching their friends and adorning their wives or favorites.

Availing himself of the large resources of the temple, Philomelus raised the pay of his troops to a sum half as large again as before, and issued proclamations inviting new levies at the same rate. Through such tempting offers he was speedily enabled to muster a force, horse and foot together, said to amount to 10,000

σω ἀντικαταστήσαι πάλιν, Thucyd. ii. 13). After the disaster before Syracuse, and during the years of struggle intervening before the close of the war, the Athenians were driven by financial distress to appropriate to public purposes many of the rich donatives in the Parthenon, which they were never afterwards able to replace. Of this abstraction, proof is found in the Inscriptions published by Boeckh, Corp. Inscript. No. 137-142, which contain the official records of the successive Boards of Treasurers of Athênê. It is stated in an instructive recent Dissertation, by J. L. Ussing (De Parthenone ejusque partibus Disputatio, p. 3. Copenhagen, 1849), "Multæ in arce Athenarum inventæ sunt tabulæ Quæstorum Minervæ, in quibus quotannis inscribebant, quænam vasa aurea aliæque res pretiosæ in æde Minervæ dedicata extarent. Harum longe maxima pars ante Euclidem archontem scripta est.....: Nec tamen una tabula templi dona continebat universa, sed separatim quæ in Pronao, quæ in Hecatompædo, quæ in Parthenone (the part of the temple specially so called), servabantur, separatim suis quæque lapidibus consignata erant. Singulari quadam fortuna contigit, ut inde ab anno 434 B. C., ad 407 B. C., tam multa fragmenta tabularum servata sint, ut hos donorum catalogos aliquatenus restituere possimus. In quo etiam ad historiam illius temporis pertinet, quod florentibus Athenarum rebus opes Deæ semper augeri, fractis autem bello Siculo, inde ab anno 412 B. C., eas paulatim deminui videmus..... Urgente pecuniæ inopia Athenienses ad Deam confugiebant, et jam ante annum 406 B. C., pleraque Pronai dona ablata esse videmus. Proximis annis sine dubio nec Hecatompædo nec Parthenoni pepercerunt; nec mirum est, post bellum Peloponnesiacum ex antiquis illis donis fere nulla comparere."

<sup>1</sup> Theopompus, Frag. 182, ed. Didot. Athenæ. xiii. p. 605, vi. p. 232. Ephorus, Frag. 155, ed. Didot; Diodor. xvi. 64.



men; chiefly, as we are told, men of peculiarly wicked and reckless character, since no pious Greek would enlist in such a service. With these he attacked the Lokrians, who were however now assisted by the Thebans from one side, and by the Thessalians with their circumjacent allies from the other. Philomelus gained successive advantages against both of them, and conceived increased hopes from a reinforcement of 1500 Achæans who came to him from Peloponnesus. The war assumed a peculiarly ferocious character; for the Thebans,<sup>1</sup> confident in their superior force and chance of success, even though the Delphian treasure was employed against them, began by putting to death all their prisoners, as sacrilegious men standing condemned by the Amphiktyonic assembly. This so exasperated the troops of Philomelus, that they constrained him to retaliate upon the Bœotian prisoners. For some time such rigorous inflictions were continued on both sides, until at length the Thebans felt compelled to desist, and Philomelus followed their example. The war lasted a while with indecisive results, the Thebans and their allies being greatly superior in number. But presently Philomelus incautiously exposed himself to attack in an unfavorable position, near the town of Neon, amidst embarrassing woods and rocks. He was here defeated with severe loss, and his army dispersed; himself receiving several wounds, and fighting with desperate bravery, until farther resistance became impossible. He then tried to escape, but found himself driven to the brink of a precipice, where he could only avoid the tortures of captivity by leaping down and perishing. The remnant of his vanquished army was rallied at some distance by Onomarchus.<sup>2</sup>

The Thebans and their allies, instead of pressing the important victory recently gained over Philomelus, seem to have supposed that the Phokians would now disperse or submit of their own accord, and accordingly returned home. Their remissness gave time

<sup>1</sup> Isokrates, Orat. v. (ad Philippum) s. 60. *τελευτώντες δὲ πρὸς Φωκέας πόλεμον ἐξήνεγκαν* (the Thebans), *ὡς τῶν τε πόλεων ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ κρατήσαντες, τῶν τε τόπων ἅπαντα τὸν περιέχοντα κατασχέοντες, τῶν τε χρημάτων τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς περιγενησόμενοι ταῖς ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων δαπαναῖς*.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 31; Pausan. x. 2, 1. The dates and duration of these events are only known to us in a loose and superficial manner from the narrative of Diodorus.

to Onomarchus to reorganize his dispirited countrymen. Convening at Delphi a general assembly of Phokians and allies, he strenuously exhorted them to persevere in the projects, and avenge the death, of their late general. He found, however, no inconsiderable amount of opposition; for many of the Phokians — noway prepared for the struggle in which they now found themselves embarked, and themselves ashamed of the spoliation of the temple — were anxious by some accommodation to put themselves again within the pale of Hellenic religious sentiment. Onomarchus doubtless replied, and with too good reason, that peace was unattainable upon any terms short of absolute ruin; and that there was no course open except to maintain their ground as they stood, by renewed efforts of force. But even if the necessities of the case had been less imperative, he would have been able to overbear all opposition of his own countrymen through the numerous mercenary strangers, now in Phokis and present at the assembly under the name of allies.<sup>1</sup> In fact, so irresistible was his ascendancy by means of this large paid force under his command, that both Demosthenes and Æschines<sup>2</sup> denominate him (as well as his predecessor and his successor) not general, but despot, of the Phokians. The soldiers were not less anxious than Onomarchus to prosecute the war, and to employ the yet unexhausted wealth of the temple in every way conducive to ultimate success. In this sense the assembly decreed, naming Onomarchus general with full powers for carrying the decree into effect.

His energetic measures presently retrieved the Phokian cause. Employing the temple-funds still more profusely than Philomelus, he invited fresh soldiers from all quarters, and found himself, after some time, at the head of a larger army than before. The temple exhibited many donatives, not only of gold and silver, but also of brass and iron. While Onomarchus melted the precious metals and coined them into money, he at the same time turned

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 32. *Οἱ δὲ Φωκεῖς — ἐπανήλθον εἰς Δελφοὺς καὶ συνελθόντες μετὰ τῶν συμμάχων εἰς κοινὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐβουλευόντο περὶ τοῦ πολέμου*.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 286. c. 41. *τῶν ἐν Φωκεύσιν τυράννων, etc.* Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 661. s. 147. *Φαῦλλος ὁ Φωκεὺς ἢ τις ἄλλος δευαστής, etc.*



the brass and iron into arms;<sup>1</sup> so that he was enabled to equip both his own soldiers disarmed in the recent defeat, and a class of volunteers poorer than the ordinary self-armed mercenaries. Besides paying soldiers, he scattered everywhere presents or bribes to gain influential partisans in the cities favorable to his cause; probably Athens and Sparta first of all. We are told that the Spartan king Archidamus, with his wife Deinicha, were among the recipients; indeed the same corrupt participation was imputed, by the statement of the hostile-minded Messenians,<sup>2</sup> to the Spartan ephors and senate. Even among enemies, Onomarchus employed his gold with effect, contriving thus to gain or neutralize a portion of the Thessalians; among them the powerful despots of Pheræ, whom we afterwards find allied to him. Thus was the great Delphian treasure turned to account in every way; and the unscrupulous Phokian despot strengthened his hands yet farther, by seizing such of his fellow-countrymen as had been prominent in opposition to his views, putting them to death, and confiscating their property.<sup>3</sup>

Through such combination of profuse allurements, corruption, and violence, the tide began to turn again in favor of the Phokians. Onomarchus found himself shortly at the head of a formidable army, which he marched forth from Delphi, and subdued successively the Lokrians of Amphissa, the Epiknemidian Lokrians, and the neighboring territory of Doris. He carried his conquests even as far as the vicinity of Thermopylæ; capturing Thronium, one of the towns which commanded that important pass, and reducing its inhabitants to slavery. It is probable that he also took Nikæa and Alpônus—two other valuable positions near Thermopylæ, which we know to have been in the power of the Phokians until

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 33. The numerous iron spits, dedicated by the courtesan Rhodôpis at Delphi, may probably have been applied to this military purpose. Herodotus (ii. 135) saw them at Delphi; in the time of Plutarch, the guide of the Temple only showed the place in which they had once stood (Plutarch, *De Pythiæ Oraculis*, p. 400).

<sup>2</sup> Theopompus, *Frag.* 255, ed. Didot; Pausanias, iii. 10, 2; iv. 5, 1. As Archidamus is said to have furnished fifteen talents privately to Philomeles (Diodor. xvi. 24), he may, perhaps, have received now repayment out of the temple property.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 33.

the moment immediately preceding their ruin—since we find him henceforward master of Thermopylæ, and speedily opening his communications with Thessaly.<sup>1</sup> Besides this extension of dominion to the north and east of Phokis, Onomarchus also invaded Boeotia. The Thebans, now deprived of their northern allies, did not at first meet him in the field, so that he was enabled to capture Orchomenus. But when he proceeded to attack Chæroneia, they made an effective effort to relieve the place. They brought out their forces, and defeated him, in an action not very decisive, yet sufficient to constrain him to retire into Phokis.

Probably the Thebans were at this time much pressed, and prevented from acting effectively against the Phokians, by want of money. We know at least that in the midst of the Phokian war they hired out a force of 5000 hoplites commanded by Pammenes, to Artabazus the revolted Phrygian satrap. Here Pammenes with his soldiers acquired some renown, gaining two important victories over the Persians.<sup>2</sup> The Thebans, it would seem, having no fleet and no maritime dependencies, were less afraid of giving offence to the Great King than Athens had been, when she interdicted Chares from aiding Artabazus, and acquiesced in the unfavorable pacification which terminated the Social War. How long Pammenes and the Thebans remained in Asia, we are not informed. But in spite of the victories gained by them, Artabazus was not

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 33. His account of the operations of Onomarchus is, as usual, very meagre—*εἰς δὲ τὴν πολέμιαν ἐμβαλὼν, Θρόνιον μὲν ἐκπολιορκήσας, Ἐξηνδραποδισατο, Ἀμφισσεῖς δὲ καταπληξάμενος, τὰς δ' ἐν Δωριεὺσι πόλεις ποσῆσας, τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν ἐδήλωσεν.*

That Thronium, with Alpônus and Nikæa, were the three places which commanded the pass of Thermopylæ—and that all the three were in possession of the Phokians immediately before they were conquered by Philip of Macedon in 346 B. C.—we know from Æschines, *Fals. Leg.* p. 286. c. 41.

... πρέσβεις πρὸς ὑμᾶς (the Athenians) ἦλθον ἐκ Φωκείων, βοηθεῖν αὐτοῖς κελεύοντες, καὶ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι παραδωκεῖν Ἀλπιωνὸν καὶ Θρόνιον καὶ Νικαίαν, τὰ τῶν παρόδων τῶν εἰς Πύλας χωρία κύρια.

In order to conquer Thronium, Onomarchus must have marched through and mastered the Epiknemidian Lokrians; and though no place except Thronium is specified by Diodorus, it seems plain that Onomarchus cannot have conquered Thronium alone.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 34.



long able to maintain himself against the Persian arms. Three years afterwards, we hear of him and his brother-in-law Memnon as expelled from Asia, and as exiles residing with Philip of Macedon.<sup>1</sup>

While Pammenes was serving under Artabazus, the Athenian general Chares recaptured Sestos in the Hellespont, which appears to have revolted from Athens during the Social War. He treated the captive Sestians with rigor; putting to death the men of military age, and selling the remainder as slaves.<sup>2</sup> This was an important acquisition for Athens, as a condition of security in the Chersonese as well as of preponderance in the Hellespont.

Alarmed at the successes of Chares in the Hellespont, the Thracian prince Kersobleptes now entered on an intrigue with Pammenes in Asia, and with Philip of Macedon (who was on the coast of Thrace, attacking Abdëra and Maroneia), for the purpose of checking the progress of the Athenian arms. Philip appears to have made a forward movement, and to have menaced the possessions of Athens in the Chersonese; but his access thither was forbidden by Amadokus, another prince of Thrace, master of the intermediate territory, as well as by the presence of Chares with his fleet off the Thracian coast.<sup>3</sup> Apollonides of Kardias was the agent of Kersobleptes; who however finding his schemes abortive, and intimidated by the presence of Chares, came to terms with Athens, and surrendered to her the portion of the Chersonese which still remained to him, with the exception of Kardias. The Athenians sent to the Chersonese a farther detachment of Kle-ruchs or out-settlers, for whom considerable room must have been made as well by the depopulation of Sestos, as by the recent cession from Kersobleptes.<sup>4</sup> It was in the ensuing year (352 B. C.)

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 52.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 34.

<sup>3</sup> Polyænus, iv. 2, 22, seems to belong to this juncture.

<sup>4</sup> We derive what is here stated from the comparison of two passages, put together as well as the uncertainty of their tenor admits, Diodor. xvi. 34, with Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 681 s. 219 (s. 183, in Weber's edition, whose note ought to be consulted). Demosthenes says, *Φιλίππου γὰρ εἰς Μαρωνεῖαν ἐλθόντος ἐπέμψεν* (Kersobleptes) *πρὸς αὐτὸν Ἀπολλωνιδὴν, πῶς εἰς οὐδὲν ἐκείνῳ καὶ Παμμένει· καὶ εἰ μὴ κρατῶν τῆς χώρας Ἀμάδοκος ἀπέπεισε Φιλίππῳ μὴ ἐπιβαίνειν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ἐν μέσῳ πολεμεῖν ἡμᾶς πρὸς Καρδιανούς τε καὶ Κερσοβλήπτην. Καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸν ἀληθῶς λέγω, λαβὲν τὴν Χάρητος ἐπιστολὴν*

that the Athenians also despatched a fresh batch of 2000 citizens as settlers to Samos, in addition to those who had been sent thither thirteen years before.<sup>1</sup>

The mention of Philip as attacking Maroneia and menacing the Thracian Chersonese, shows the indefatigable activity of that prince and the steady enlargement of his power. In 358 B. C., he had taken Amphipolis; before 355 B. C., he had captured Pydna and Potidæa, founded the new town of Philippi, and opened for himself the resource of the adjoining auriferous region; he had established relations with Thessaly, assisting the great family of the Aleuadæ at Larissa in their struggle against Lykophron and Peitholaus, the despots of Pheræ; he had farther again chastised the interior tribes bordering on Macedonia, Thra-

The mention of Pammenes, as being within reach of communication with Kersobleptes — the mention of Chares as being at the Chersonese, and sending home despatches — and the notice of Philip as being at Maroneia — all conspire to connect this passage with the year 353–352 B. C., and with the facts referred to that year by Diodorus, xvi. 34. There is an interval of five years between the presence of Chares here alluded to, and the presence of Chares noticed before in the same oration, p. 678. s. 206, immediately after the successful expedition to Eubœa in 358 B. C. During these five years, Kersobleptes had acted in a hostile manner towards Athens in the neighborhood of the Chersonese (p. 680. s. 214), and also towards the two rival Thracian princes, friends of Athens. At the same time Sestos had again revolted; the forces of Athens being engaged in the Social War, from 353 to 355 B. C. In 353 B. C. Chares is at the Hellespont, recovers Sestos, and again defeats the intrigues of Kersobleptes, who makes cession to Athens of a portion of territory which he still held in the Chersonese. Diodorus ascribes this cession of Kersobleptes to the motive of aversion towards Philip and goodwill towards the Athenians. Possibly these may have been the motives pretended by Kersobleptes, to whom a certain party at Athens gave credit for more favorable dispositions than the Demosthenic oration against Aristokrates recognizes — as we may see from that oration itself. But I rather apprehend that Diodorus, in describing Kersobleptes as hostile to Philip, and friendly to Athens, has applied to the year 353 B. C. a state of relations which did not become true until a later date, nearer to the time when peace was made between Philip and the Athenians in 346 B. C.

<sup>1</sup> Dionysius, Hal. Judic. de Dinarcho, p. 664; Strabo, xiv. p. 638.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 14. This passage relates to the year 357–356 B. C., and possibly Philip may have begun to meddle in the Thessalian party-disputes, even as early as that year; but his effective interference comes two or three years later. See the general order of Philip's aggressions indicated by Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 12. s. 13.



cians, Pæonians, and Illyrians, who were never long at rest, and who had combined to regain their independence.<sup>1</sup> It appears to have been in 354–353 B. C., that he attacked Methônê, the last remaining possession of Athens on the Macedonian coast. Situated on the Thermaic Gulf, Methônê was doubtless a convenient station for Athenian privateers to intercept trading vessels, not merely to and from Macedonian ports, but also from Olynthus and Potidæ; so that the Olynthians, then in alliance with Philip against Athens, would be glad to see it pass into his power, and may perhaps have lent him their aid. He pressed the siege of the place with his usual vigor, employing all the engines and means of assault then known; while the besieged on their side were not less resolute in the defence. They repelled his attacks for so long a time, that news of the danger of the place reached Athens, and ample time was afforded for sending relief, had the Athenians been ready and vigorous in their movement. But unfortunately they had not even now learnt experience from the loss of Pydna and Potidæa. Either the Etesian winds usual in summer, or the storms of winter, both which circumstances were taken into account by Philip in adjusting the season of his enterprises<sup>2</sup>—or (which is more probable) the aversion of the Athenian respectable citizens to personal service on ship-board, and their slackness even in pecuniary payment—caused so much delay in preparations, that the expedition sent out did not reach Methônê until too late.<sup>3</sup> The Methonæans, having gallantly held out until all their means were exhausted, were at length compelled to surrender. Diodorus tells us that Philip granted terms so far lenient as to allow them to depart with the clothes on their backs.<sup>4</sup> But this can

Diodor. xvi. 22.

<sup>2</sup> See a striking passage in Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 48. s. 35. There was another place called Methônê—the Thracian Methônê—situated in the Chalkidic or Thracian peninsula, near Olynthus and Apollonia—of which we shall hear presently.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 50. s. 40; Olynth. i. p. 11. s. 9.

<sup>4</sup> Diodorus (xvi. 31–34) mentions the capture of Methônê by Philip twice, in two successive years: first, in 354–353 B. C.; again, more copiously, in 353–352 B. C. In my judgment, the earlier of the two dates is the more probable. In 353–352 B. C., Philip carried on his war in Thrace, near Abdera and Maroneia—and also his war against Onomarchus in Thessaly; which transactions seem enough to fill up the time. From the language

hardly be accurate, since we know that there were Athenian citizens among them sold as slaves, some of whom were ransomed by Demosthenes with his own money.<sup>1</sup>

Being now master of the last port possessed by Athens in the Thermaic Gulf—an acquisition of great importance, which had never before<sup>2</sup> belonged to the Macedonian kings—Philip was enabled to extend his military operations to the neighborhood of the Thracian Chersonese on the one side, and to that of Thermopylæ on the other. How he threatened the Chersonese, has been already related; and his campaign in Thessaly was yet more important. That country was, as usual, torn by intestine disputes. Lykophron the despot of Pheræ possessed the greatest sway; while the Aleuadae of Larissa, too weak to contend against him with their own forces, invited assistance from Philip; who entered Thessaly with a powerful army. Such a reinforcement so completely altered the balance of Thessalian power, that Lykophron in his turn was compelled to entreat aid from Onomarchus and the Phokians.

So strong were the Phokians now, that they were more than a match for the Thebans with their other hostile neighbors, and had means to spare for combating Philip in Thessaly. As their force

of Demosthenes (Olynth. i. p. 12. s. 13), we see that Philip did not attack Thessaly until after the capture of Methônê. Diodorus as well as Strabo (vii. p. 330), and Justin (vii. 6) state that Philip was wounded and lost the sight of one eye in this siege. But this seems to have happened afterwards, near the Thracian Methônê.

Compare Justin, vii. 6; Polyænus, iv. 2. 15. Under the year 354–353 B. C., Diodorus mentions not only the capture of Methônê by Philip, but also the capture of Pagæ. Παγὰς δὲ χειρωσάμενος, ἠνάγκασεν ὑποταγῆναι. Pagæ is unknown, anywhere near Macedonia and Thessaly. Wesseling and Mr. Clinton suppose Pagasæ in Thessaly to be meant. But it seems to me impossible that Philip, who had no considerable power at sea, can have taken Pagasæ, before his wars in Thessaly, and before he had become master of Pheræ, which events did not occur until one year or two years afterwards. Pagasæ is the port of Pheræ, and Lykophron the despot of Pheræ was still powerful and unconquered. If, therefore, the word intended by Diodorus be Παγασαὶς instead of Παγὰς, I think the matter of fact asserted cannot be correct.

<sup>1</sup> This fact is mentioned in the public vote of gratitude passed by the Athenian people to Demosthenes (Plutarch, Vitæ X. Orat. p. 851).

Thucy. i. vi. 7. Μεθ' ὧν τὴν δημοῖον Μακεδονίαν, etc.



consisted of a large body of mercenaries, whom they were constrained for security to retain in pay — to keep them employed beyond the border was a point not undesirable. Hence they readily entered upon the Thessalian campaign. At this moment they counted, in the comparative assessment of Hellenic forces, as an item of first-rate magnitude. They were hailed both by Athenians and Spartans as the natural enemy and counterpoise of Thebes, alike odious to both. While the Phokians maintained their actual power, Athens could manage her foreign policy abroad, and Sparta her designs in Peloponnesus, with diminished apprehensions of being counterworked by Thebes. Both Athens and Sparta had at first supported the Phokians against unjust persecution by Thebes and abuse of Amphiktyonic jurisdiction, before the spoliation of the Delphian temple was consummated or even anticipated. And though, when that spoliation actually occurred, it was doubtless viewed with reprobation among Athenians, accustomed to unlimited freedom of public discussion — as well as at Sparta, in so far as it became known amidst the habitual secrecy of public affairs — nevertheless political interests so far prevailed, that the Phokians (perhaps in part by aid of bribery) were still countenanced, though not much assisted, as useful rivals to Thebes.<sup>1</sup> To restrain "the Leuktric insolence of the Thebans,"<sup>2</sup> and to set the Bœotian towns Orchomenus, Thespiæ, Plataea, restored to their pristine autonomy, was an object of paramount desire with each of the two ancient heads of Greece. So far both Athens and Sparta felt in unison. But Sparta cherished a farther hope — in which Athens by no means concurred — to avail herself of the embarrassments of Thebes for the purpose of breaking up

<sup>1</sup> Such is the description of Athenian feeling, as it then stood, given by Demosthenes twenty-four years afterwards in the Oration *De Coronâ*, p. 230. s. 21.

Τοῦ γὰρ Φωκικοῦ συστάτος πολέμου, πρῶτον μὲν ἡμεῖς οὕτω διέκεισθε, ὥστε Φωκίας μὲν βούλεσθαι σωθῆναι, καίπερ οὐ δίκαια ποιοῦντας ὁρῶντες, Θηβαίους δ' ὅτιον ἂν ἐφησθῆναι παθοῦσιν, οὐκ ἀλόγως οὐδ' ἀδίκως αὐτοὺς ἐργιζόμενοι, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 58. Βουλόμενος τὰ Λευκτρικὰ φρονήματα συστῆλαι τῶν Βουωτῶν, etc., an expression used in reference to Philip a few years afterwards, but more animated and emphatic than we usually find in Diodorus who, perhaps, borrowed it from Theopompus.

Megalopolis and Messênê, and recovering her former Peloponnesian dominion. These two new Peloponnesian cities, erected by Epaminondas on the frontier of Laconia, had been hitherto upheld against Sparta by the certainty of Theban interference if they were menaced. But so little did Thebes seem in a condition to interfere, while Onomarchus and the Phokians were triumphant in 353–352 B. C., that the Megalopolitans despatched envoys to Athens to entreat protection and alliance, while the Spartans on their side sent to oppose the petition.

It is on occasion of the political debates in Athens during the years 354 and 353 B. C., that we first have before us the Athenian Demosthenes, as adviser of his countrymen in the public assembly. His first discourse of public advice was delivered in 354–353 B. C., on an alarm of approaching war with Persia; his second, in 353–352 B. C., was intended to point out the policy proper for Athens in dealing with the Spartan and Megalopolitan envoys.

A few words must here be said about this eminent man, who forms the principal ornament of the declining Hellenic world. He was about twenty-seven years old; being born, according to what seems the most probable among contradictory accounts, in 382–381 B. C.<sup>1</sup> His father, named also Demosthenes, was a citizen of considerable property, and of a character so unimpeachable that even Æschines says nothing against him; his mother

<sup>1</sup> The birth-year of Demosthenes is matter of notorious controversy. No one of the statements respecting it rests upon evidence thoroughly convincing.

The question has been examined with much care and ability both by Mr. Clinton (*Fasti Hellen.* Appen. xx.) and by Dr. Thirlwall (*Histor. G.* vol. v. Appen. i. p. 485 seq.); by Böhnecke (*Forschungen*, p. 1–94) more copiously than cautiously, but still with much instruction; also by K. F. Hermann (*De Anno Natali Demosthenis*), and many other critics.

In adopting the year Olymp. 99. 3 (the archonship of Evander, 382–381 B. C.), I agree with the conclusion of Mr. Clinton and of K. F. Hermann differing from Dr. Thirlwall, who prefers the previous year (Olymp. 99. 2) — and from Böhnecke, who vindicates the year affirmed by Dionysius (Olymp. 99. 4).

Mr. Clinton fixes the *first month* of Olymp. 99. 3, as the month in which Demosthenes was born. This appears to me greater precision than the evidence warrants.



Kleobulê was one of the two daughters and coheiresses of a citizen named Gylon,<sup>1</sup> an Athenian exile, who, having become rich

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Demosth. c. 4; Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 78. c. 57; Demosth. cont. Aphob. B. p. 835. According to Æschines, Gylon was put on his trial for having betrayed Nymphæum to the enemy; but not appearing, was sentenced to death in his absence, and became an exile. He then went to Bosphorus (Pantikapæum), obtained the favor of the king (probably Satyrus — see Mr. Clinton's Appendix on the kings of Bosphorus — Fasti Hellenic. Append. xiii, p. 282), together with the grant of a district called Kepi, and married the daughter of a rich man there; by whom he had two daughters. In after-days, he sent these two daughters to Athens, where one of them, Kleobulê, was married to the elder Demosthenes. Æschines has probably exaggerated the gravity of the sentence against Gylon, who seems only to have been fined. The guardians of Demosthenes assert no more than that Gylon was fined, and died with the fine unpaid, while Demosthenes asserts that the fine was paid.

Upon the facts here stated by Æschines, a few explanatory remarks will be useful. Demosthenes being born 382–381 B. C., this would probably throw the birth of his mother Kleobulê to some period near the close of the Peloponnesian war, 405–404 B. C. We see, therefore, that the establishment of Gylon in the kingdom of Bosphorus, and his nuptial connection there formed, must have taken place during the closing years of the Peloponnesian war; between 412 B. C. (the year after the Athenian catastrophe at Syracuse) and 405 B. C.

These were years of great misfortune to Athens. After the disaster at Syracuse, she could no longer maintain ascendancy over, or grant protection to, a distant tributary like Nymphæum in the Tauric Chersonese. It was therefore natural that the Athenian citizens there settled, engaged probably in the export trade of corn to Athens, should seek security by making the best bargain they could with the neighboring kings of Bosphorus. In this transaction Gylon seems to have stood conspicuously forward, gaining both favor and profit to himself. And when, after the close of the war, the corn-trade again became comparatively unimpeded, he was in a situation to carry it on upon a large and lucrative scale. Another example of Greeks who gained favor, held office, and made fortunes, under Satyrus in the Bosphorus, is given in the Oratio (xvii.) Trapezitica of Isokrates, s. 3, 14. Compare also the case of Mantitheus the Athenian (Lysias pro Mantitheo, Or. xvi. s. 4), who was sent by his father to reside with Satyrus for some time, before the close of the Peloponnesian war; which shows that Satyrus was at that time, when Nymphæum was probably placed under his protection, in friendly relations with Athens.

I may remark that the woman whom Gylon married, though Æschines calls her a Scythian woman, may be supposed more probably to have been the daughter of some Greek (not an Athenian) resident in Bosphorus.

as a proprietor of land and exporter of corn in Bosphorus, sent his two daughters to Athens; where, possessing handsome dowries, they married two Athenian citizens — Demochares and the elder Demosthenes. The latter was a man of considerable wealth, and carried on two distinct manufactories; one of swords or knives, employing thirty-two slaves — the other, of couches or beds, employing twenty. In the new schedule of citizens and of taxable property, introduced in the archonship of Nausinikus (378 B. C.), the elder Demosthenes was enrolled among the richest class, the leaders of Symmories. But he died about 375 B. C., leaving his son Demosthenes seven years old, with a younger daughter about five years of age. The boy and his large paternal property were confided to the care of three guardians named under his father's will. These guardians — though the father, in hopes of ensuring their fidelity, had bequeathed to them considerable legacies, away from his own son, and though all of them were rich men as well as family connections and friends — administered the property with such negligence and dishonesty, that only a sum comparatively small was left, when they came to render account to their ward. At the age of sixteen years complete, Demosthenes attained his civil majority, and became entitled by the Athenian law to the administration of his own property. During his minority, his guardians had continued to enrol him among the wealthiest class (as his father had ranked before), and to pay the increased rate of direct taxation chargeable upon that class; but the real sum handed over to him by his guardians was too small to justify such a position. Though his father had died worth fourteen talents, — which would be diminished by the sums bequeathed as legacies, but ought to have been increased in greater proportion by the interest on the property for the ten years of minority, had it been properly administered — the sum paid to young Demosthenes on his majority was less than two talents, while the guardians not only gave in dishonest accounts, but professed not to be able to produce the father's will. After repeated complaints and remonstrances, he brought a judicial action against one of them — Aphobus, and obtained a verdict carrying damages to the amount of ten talents. Payment however was still evaded by the debtor. Five speeches remain delivered by Demosthenes, three against Aphobus, two against Onêtôr, brother-in-law of Aphobus. At the date



of the latest oration, Demosthenes had still received nothing; nor do we know how much he ultimately realized, though it would seem that the difficulties thrown in his way were such as to compel him to forego the greater part of the claim. Nor is it certain whether he ever brought the actions, of which he speaks as intended, against the other two guardians Demophon and Theripides.<sup>1</sup>

Demosthenes received during his youth the ordinary grammatical and rhetorical education of a wealthy Athenian. Even as a boy, he is said to have manifested extraordinary appetite and interest for rhetorical exercise. By earnest entreaty, he prevailed on his tutors to conduct him to hear Kallistratus, one of the ablest speakers in Athens, delivering an harangue in the Dikastery on the matter of Oropus.<sup>2</sup> This harangue, producing a profound impression upon Demosthenes, stimulated his fondness for rhetorical studies. Still more was the passion excited, when on attaining his majority, he found himself cheated of most of his paternal property, and constrained to claim his rights by a suit at law against his guardians. Being obliged, according to Athenian prac-

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. cont. Onetor. ii. p. 880. *κεκομισμένον μηδ' ὅτι οὐν. καὶ ταῦτ' ἐθέλοντα ποιεῖν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς, εἴ τι τῶν δεόντων ἐβούλεσθε πράττειν.*

That he ultimately got much less than he was entitled to, appears from his own statement in the oration against Meidias, p. 540.

See Westermann, De Litibus quas Demosthenes oravit ipse, cap. i. p. 15, 16.

Plutarch (Vit. X Oratt. p. 844) says that he voluntarily refrained from enforcing the judgment obtained. I do not clearly understand what is meant by Æschines (cont. Ktesiph. p. 78), when he designates Demosthenes as τὰ πατρῶα καταγελαστικῶς προέμενος.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Demosth. c. 5; Vit. X Orator. p. 844; Hermippus ap. Arl. Gell. iii. 13. Nothing positive can be made out respecting this famous trial; neither the date, nor the exact point in question, nor the manner in which Kallistratus was concerned in it — nor who were his opponents. Many conjectures have been proposed, differing materially one from the other, and all uncertain.

These conjectures are brought together and examined in Rehdantz, Vita Iphicratis, Chabrie, et Timothei, p. 111-114.

In the month of November, 361 B. C., Kallistratus was in exile at Methonē in the Thermaic Gulf. He had been twice condemned to death by the Athenians (Demosth. cont. Polykl. p. 1221). But when these condemnations took place, we do not know

tice, to plead his own cause personally, he was made to feel keenly the helpless condition of an incompetent speaker, and the necessity of acquiring oratorical power, not simply as an instrument of ambition, but even as a means of individual defence and safety.<sup>1</sup> It appears also that he was, from childhood, of sickly constitution and feeble muscular frame; so that partly from his own disinclination, partly from the solicitude of his mother, he took little part either as boy or youth in the exercises of the palaestra. His delicate clothing, and somewhat effeminate habits, procured for him as a boy the nickname of Batalus, which remained attached to him most part of his life, and which his enemies tried to connect with degrading imputations.<sup>2</sup> Such comparative bodily disability probably contributed to incite his thirst for mental and rhetorical acquisitions, as the only road to celebrity open. But it at the same time disqualified him from appropriating to himself the full range of a comprehensive Grecian education, as conceived by Plato, Isokrates, and Aristotle; an education applying alike to thought, word, and action — combining bodily strength, endurance, and fearlessness, with an enlarged

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Demosth. c. 4. Such a view of the necessity of a power of public speaking, is put forward by Kallikles in the Gorgias of Plato, p. 486, 511. c. 90, 142 *τὴν ῥητορικὴν τὴν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις διασώζουσιν, etc.* Compare Aristot. Rhetoric. i. 1, 3. *Ἀποπον, εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχρὸν μὴ δύνασθαι βοῇ θείν ἐαυτῷ, λόγῳ δὲ, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ὁ μᾶλλον ἰδίῳ ἐστίν ἄνθρωπον τῆς τοῦ σώματος χρείας.*

The comparison of Aristotle is instructive as to the point of view of a free Greek: "If it be disgraceful not to be able to protect yourself by your bodily force, it is equally so not to be able to protect yourself by your powers of speaking; which is in a more peculiar manner the privilege of man." See also Tacitus, Dialog. de Orator. c. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Demosth. c. 4, Æschines cont. Timarch. p. 17, 18. c. 27, with Scholia, De Fal. Leg. p. 41. c. 31. *εἰ γὰρ τις σοῦ τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα χλανισκία περικλώμενος καὶ τοὺς μαλακοὺς χιτωνίσκους, ἐν οἷς τοὺς κατὰ τῶν φίλων λόγους γράφεις, περιενέγκας, δοίη εἰς τὰς χεῖρας τῶν δικαστῶν, οἶμαι ἂν αὐτοὺς εἴ τις μὴ προειπὼν ταῦτα ποιήσειεν, ἀπορήσειεν εἴτε γυναικὶς εἴτε ἀνδρὶ εἰλήφασιν ἐσθῆτα.* Compare Æsch. Fal. Leg. p. 45.

The foundation of the nickname Batalus is not clear, and was differently understood by different persons; compare also Libanius, Vita Demosth. p. 294, ap. Westermann, Scriptores Biographici. But it can hardly have been a very discreditable foundation, since Demosthenes takes the name to himself, De Coronâ, p. 289.



mental capacity and a power of making it felt by speech. The disproportion between the physical energy, and the mental force, of Demosthenes, beginning in childhood, is recorded and lamented in the inscription placed on his statue after his death.<sup>1</sup>

As a youth of eighteen years of age, Demosthenes found himself with a known and good family position at Athens, being ranked in the class of richest citizens and liable to the performance of liturgies and trierarchy as his father had been before him;<sup>2</sup> yet with a real fortune very inadequate to the outlay expected from him—embarrassed by a legal proceeding against guardians wealthy as well as unscrupulous—and an object of dislike and annoyance from other wealthy men, such as Meidias and his brother Thrasylochus,<sup>3</sup> friends of those guardians. His family position gave him a good introduction to public affairs, for which he proceeded to train himself carefully; first as a writer of speeches for others, next as a speaker in his own person. Plato and Isokrates were both at this moment in full celebrity, visited at Athens by pupils from every part of Greece; Isæus also, who had studied under Isokrates, was in great reputation as a composer of judicial harangues for plaintiffs or defendants in civil causes. Demosthenes put himself under the teaching of Isæus (who is said to have assisted him in composing the speeches against his guardians), and also profited largely by the discourse of Plato, of Isokrates, and others. As an ardent aspirant he would seek instruction from most of the best sources, theoretical as well as

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Demosth. c. 30.

Εἶπερ ἴσῃν βώμην γνώμῃ, Δημόσθενες, εἶχες.  
Οὐποτ' ἂν Ἑλλήνων ἤρξεν Ἀρης Μακεδῶν.

<sup>2</sup> Position of Demosthenes, πατὴρ τριηραρχικός—χρυσέα κρηλὶς, κατὰ Πίνδαρον, etc. (Lucian, Encomium Demosth. vol. iii. p. 499, ed. Reitz.)

<sup>3</sup> See the account given by Demosthenes (cont. Meidiam, p. 539, 540) of the manner in which Meidias and Thrasylochus first began their persecution of him, while the suit against his guardians was still going on. These guardians attempted to get rid of the suit by inducing Thrasylochus to force upon him an exchange of properties (Antidosis), tendered by Thrasylochus, who had just been put down for a trierarchy. If the exchange had been effected, Thrasylochus would have given the guardians a release. Demosthenes could only avoid it by consenting to incur the cost of the trierarchy—20 minæ

practical—writers as well as lecturers.<sup>1</sup> But besides living teachers, there was one of the past generation who contributed largely to his improvement. He studied Thucydides with indefatigable labor and attention; according to one account, he copied the whole history eight times over with his own hand; according to another, he learnt it all by heart, so as to be able to rewrite it from memory when the manuscript was accidentally destroyed. Without minutely criticising these details, we ascertain at least that Thucydides was the object of his peculiar study and imitation. How much the composition of Demosthenes was fashioned by the reading of Thucydides—reproducing the daring, majestic and impressive phraseology, yet without the overstrained brevity and involutions of that great historian—and contriving to blend with it a perspicuity and grace not inferior to Lysias—may be seen illustrated in the elaborate criticism of the rhetor Dionysius.<sup>2</sup>

While thus striking out for himself a bold and original style, Demosthenes had still greater difficulties to overcome in regard to the external requisites of an orator. He was not endowed by nature, like Æschines, with a magnificent voice; nor, like Demades, with a ready flow of vehement improvisation. His thoughts required to be put together by careful preparation; his voice was bad and even lisping—his breath short—his gesticulation ungraceful; moreover he was overawed and embarrassed by the manifestation of the multitude. Such an accumulation of natural impediments were at least equal to those of which Isokrates complains, as having debarred him all his life from addressing the public assembly, and restrained him to a select audience of friends or pupils. The energy and success with which Demosthenes overcame his defects, in such manner as to satisfy a critical assembly like the Athenian, is one of the most memorable circumstances in the general history of self-education. Repeated humiliation and repulse only spurred him on to fresh solitary efforts for improvement. He corrected his defective elocution by speaking with pebbles in his mouth; he prepared himself to overcome

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes both studied attentively the dialogues, and heard the discourse, of Plato (Cicero, Brutus, 31, 121; Orator. 4, 15; Plutarch, Vit. X Orator. p. 844). Tacitus, Dialog. de Orator. c. 32.

<sup>2</sup> Dionys. Hal. De Thucydide Judicium, p. 944; De Admirab. Vi Dicend. Demosthen. p. 982, 983.



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the noise of the assembly by declaiming in stormy weather on the sea-shore of Phalerum; he opened his lungs by running, and extended his powers of holding breath by pronouncing sentences in marching up-hill; he sometimes passed two or three months without interruption in a subterranean chamber, practising night and day either in composition or declamation, and shaving one half of his head in order to disqualify himself from going abroad. After several trials without success before the assembly, his courage was on the point of giving way, when Eunomus and other old citizens reassured him by comparing the matter of his speeches to those of Perikles, and exhorting him to persevere a little longer in the correction of his external defects. On another occasion, he was pouring forth his disappointment to Satyrus the actor, who undertook to explain to him the cause, desiring him to repeat in his own way a speech out of Sophokles, which he (Satyrus) proceeded to repeat after him, with suitable accent and delivery. Demosthenes, profoundly struck with the difference, began anew the task of self-improvement; probably taking constant lessons from good models. In his unremitting private practice, he devoted himself especially to acquiring a graceful action, keeping watch on all his movements while declaiming before a tall looking-glass.<sup>1</sup> After pertinacious efforts for several years, he was rewarded at length with complete success. His delivery became full of decision and vehemence, highly popular with the general body of the assembly; though some critics censured his modulation as artificial and out of nature, and savoring of low stage-effect; while others, in the same spirit, condemned his speeches as over-labored and smelling of the lamp.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> These and other details are given in Plutarch's *Life of Demosthenes*, c. 4, 9. They depend upon good evidence; for he cites Demetrius the Phalerean, who heard them himself from Demosthenes in the latter years of his life. The subterranean chamber where Demosthenes practised, was shown at Athens even in the time of Plutarch.

Cicero (who also refers to Demetrius Phalereus), *De Divinat.* ii. 46, 96. Libanius, Zosimus, and Photius, give generally the same statements, with some variations.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, *Demosth.* c. 9. 'Ἐπεὶ τόλμαν γε καὶ θάρσος οἱ λεχθέντες ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λόγοι τῶν γραφέντων μάλλον εἶχον· εἰ τι δεῖ πιστεῦναι Ἐρατοσθένη καὶ Δημητρίῳ τῷ Φαληρεῖ καὶ τοῖς κωμικοῖς. Ὡν Ἐρατοσθένης μὲν φησιν αὐ-

So great was the importance assigned by Demosthenes himself to these external means of effect, that he is said to have pronounced "Action" to be the first, second, and third requisite for an orator. If we grant this estimate to be correct, with reference to actual hearers, we must recollect that his speeches are, (not less truly than the history of Thucydides), "an everlasting possession rather than a display for momentary effect." Even among his contemporaries, the effect of the speeches, when read apart from the speaker, was very powerful. There were some who thought that their full excellence could only be thus appreciated;<sup>1</sup> while to the after-world, who know them only by reading, they have been and still are the objects of an admiration reaching its highest pitch in the enthusiastic sentiment of the fastidious rhetor Dionysius.<sup>2</sup> The action of Demosthenes, — consummate as it doubtless was, and highly as he may himself have prized an accomplishment so laboriously

τὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις πολλαχοῦ γεγονέναι παράβακχον, ὁ δὲ Φαληρεὺς τὸν ἔμμετρον ἐκείνον ὀρκον ὁμοῖαι ποτὶ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ὥσπερ ἐν-θουσιῶντα. Again, c. 11. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς ὑποκρινομενος ἤρεσκε θαυμαστῶς, οἱ δὲ χαριέντες ταπεινὸν ἡγοῦντο καὶ ἀγέννητες αὐτοῦ τὸ πλάσμα καὶ μαλακὸν, ὡν καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς ἐστίν.

This sentence is illustrated by a passage in Quintilian, i. 8. 2. "Sit autem in primis lectio virilis, et cum suavitate quadam gravis: et non quidem prosæ similis — quia carmen est, et se poetæ canere testantur — non tamen in canticum dissoluta, nec plasmate (ut nunc a plerisque fit) effeminata.

The meaning of *plasma*, in the technical language of rhetoricians contemporary with Quintilian, seems different from that which it bears in Dionysius, p. 1069-1061. But whether Plutarch has exactly rendered to us what Demetrius Phalereus said of Demosthenes — whether Demetrius spoke of the modulation of Demosthenes as being *low* and *vulgar* — I cannot but doubt. Æschines urges very different reproaches against him — overmuch labor and affectation, but combined with bitterness and malignity (*adv. Ktesiph.* p. 78-86). He denounces the *character* of Demosthenes as low and vulgar — but not his oratorical delivery. The expression ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιῶν, which Plutarch cites from Demetrius Phalereus, hardly suits well with *ταπεινὸν* καὶ ἀγέννητες.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, *Demosth.* c. 11. Αἰσίωνα δὲ φησιν Ἑρμῆπος, ἐρωτηθέντα περὶ τῶν πάλαι ρητόρων καὶ τῶν καθ' αὐτὸν, εἰπεῖν, ὡς ἀκούων μὲν ἂν τις ἐθαύμασεν ἐκείνους ἐνκόσμως καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς τῷ δῆμῳ διαλεγομένους, ἀναγινωσκόμενοι δὲ οἱ Δημοσθένους λόγοι πολλὰ τῇ κατασκευῇ καὶ δυνάμει διαφέρουσιν.

<sup>2</sup> Dionys. Hal. *De Adm. Vi D'icend.* *Demosth.* p. 1022, a very remarkable passage.



earned, — produced its effect only in conjunction with the matter of Demosthenes; his thoughts, sentiments, words, and above all his sagacity in appreciating and advising on the actual situation. His political wisdom, and his lofty patriotic *idéal*, are in truth quite as remarkable as his oratory. By what training he attained either the one or the other of these qualities, we are unfortunately not permitted to know. Our informants have little interest in him except as a speaker; they tell us neither what he learned, nor from whom, nor by what companions, or party-associates, his political point of view was formed. But we shall hardly err in supposing that his attentive meditation of Thucydides supplied him, not merely with force and majesty of expression, but also with that conception of Athens in her foretime which he is perpetually impressing on his countrymen, — Athens at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, in days of exuberant energy, and under the advice of her noblest statesman.

In other respects, we are left in ignorance as to the mental history of Demosthenes. Before he acquired reputation as a public adviser, he was already known as a logographer, or composer of discourses to be delivered either by speakers in the public assembly or by litigants in the *Dikastery*; for which compositions he was paid, according to usual practice at Athens. He had also pleaded in person before the *Dikastery*; in support of an accusation preferred by others against a law, proposed by Leptines, for abrogating votes of immunity passed by the city in favor of individuals, and restraining such grants in future. Nothing can be more remarkable, in this speech against Leptines, than the intensity with which the young speaker enforces the necessity of strict and faithful adherence to engagements on the part of the people, in spite of great occasional inconvenience in so doing. It would appear that he was in habitual association with some wealthy youths, — among others, with Apollodorus son of the wealthy banker, Pasion, whom he undertook to instruct in the art of speaking. This we learn from the denunciations of his rival, Æschines;<sup>1</sup> who accuses him of having thus made his way into various wealthy families, — especially where there was an orphan youth and a widowed mother, — using unworthy artifices to defraud and

<sup>1</sup> Æschines cont. Timarch, p. 16, 24.

ruin them. How much truth there may be in such imputations, we cannot tell. But Æschines was not unwarranted in applying to his rival the obnoxious appellations of logographer and sophist; appellations all the more disparaging, because Demosthenes belonged to a trierarchic family, of the highest class in point of wealth.<sup>1</sup>

It will be proper here to notice another contemporary adviser, who stands in marked antithesis and rivalry to Demosthenes. Phokion was a citizen of small means, son of a pestle-maker. Born about the year 402 B. C., he was about twenty years older than Demosthenes. At what precise time his political importance commenced, we do not know; but he lived to the great age of eighty-four, and was a conspicuous man throughout the last half-century of his life. He becomes known first as a military officer, having served in subordinate command under Chabrias, to whom he was greatly attached, at the battle of Naxos in 376 B. C. He was a man of thorough personal bravery, and considerable talents for command; of hardy and enduring temperament, insensible to cold or fatigue; strictly simple in his habits, and above all, superior to every kind of personal corruption. His abstinence from plunder and peculation, when on naval expeditions, formed an honorable contrast with other Athenian admirals, and procured for him much esteem on the part of the maritime allies. Hence, probably, his surname of Phokion the Good.<sup>2</sup>

I have already remarked how deep and strong was the hold acquired on the Athenian people, by any public man who once established for himself a character above suspicion on the score of personal corruption. Among Athenian politicians, but too many were not innocent on this point; moreover, even when a

<sup>1</sup> Æschines cont. Timarchum, p. 13, 17, 25, cont. Ktesiphont. p. 78. *Περὶ δὲ τὴν καθ' ἡμέραν διαίταν τίς ἐστίν; Ἐκ τριηράρχου λογόγραφος ἀνεφανη, τὰ πατρῷα καταγέλᾳστος προέμενος*, etc.

See also Demosthenes, *De Fals. Legat.* p. 417-420.

Compare the shame of the rich youth Hippokrates, in the Platonic dialogue called *Protagoras*, when the idea is broached that he is about to visit Protagoras for the purpose of becoming himself a sophist (Plato, *Protagor.* p. 154 F, 163 A, cap. 8-19).

<sup>2</sup> Ælian, *V. H.* iii. 47; Plutarch, *Phokion*, c. 10; Cornelius Nepos, *Phokion*, c. 1.



man was really innocent, there were often circumstances in his life which rendered more or less of doubt admissible against him; thus Demosthenes, — being known not only as a person of somewhat costly habits, but also as frequenting wealthy houses, and receiving money for speeches composed or rhetoric communicated, — was sure to be accused, justly or unjustly, by his enemies, of having cheated rich clients, and would never obtain unquestioned credit for a high pecuniary independence, even in regard to the public affairs; although he certainly was not corrupt, nor generally believed to be corrupt, — at least during the period which this volume embraces, down to the death of Philip.<sup>1</sup> But Phokion would receive neither money nor gifts from any one, — was notoriously and obviously poor, — went barefoot and without an upper garment even in very cold weather, — had only one female slave to attend on his wife; while he had enjoyed commands sufficient to enrich him if he had chosen. His personal incorruptibility thus stood forth prominently to the public eye; and combined as it was with bravery and fair generalship, procured for him testimonies of confidence greater than those accorded even to Perikles. He was elected no less than forty-five times to the annual office of Stratêgus or General of the city, — that is, one of the Board of Ten so denominated, the greatest executive function at Athens, — and elected too, without having ever on any occasion solicited the office, or even been present at the choice.<sup>2</sup> In all Athenian

I introduce here this reservation as to time, not as meaning to affirm the contrary with regard to the period after Philip's death, but as wishing to postpone for the present the consideration of the later charges against Demosthenes — the receipt of money from Persia, and the abstraction from the treasures of Harpalus. I shall examine these points at the proper time.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 8. Ὁμολογείται γὰρ, ὅτι πέντε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα στρατηγίας ἔλαβεν οὐδ' ἀπαξ ἀρχαιρεσίαις παρατυχὼν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸντα μεταπεπομένων αὐτὸν αἰεὶ καὶ χειροτονούντων, ὥστε θαυμάζειν τοὺς οὐκ εὖ φρονούντας τὸν δῆμον, ὅτι πλείστα τοῦ Φωκίωνος ἀντικρούοντος αὐτῷ καὶ μηδὲν εἰπόντος πώποτε μηδὲ πράξαντος πρὸς χάριν, ὥστερ' ἀξιουσι τοὺς βασιλεῖς τοῖς κόλαξι χρῆσθαι μετὰ τὸ κατὰ χειρὸς ὑπόμεινον, ἔχρητο οὗτος τοῖς μὲν κομποτέρους καὶ ἱλαροῖς ἐν παιδίᾳ μέρει δημαγωγοῖς, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰεὶ νήφων καὶ σπουδάζων τὸν αὐστηρότατον καὶ φρονιμώτατον ἐκάλει τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ μόνον ἢ μᾶλλον τῶν βουλευσέων αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁρμαῖς ἀντίτασσόμενον.

history, we read of no similar multiplication of distinct appointments and honors to the same individual.

According to the picture of Athens and her democracy, as usually presented by historians, we are taught to believe that the only road open to honors or political influence, was, by a seductive address, and by courting the people with fine speeches, unworthy flattery, or unmeasured promises. Those who take this view of the Athenian character, will find it difficult to explain the career of Phokion. He was no orator, — from disdain rather than incompetence.<sup>1</sup> Besides receiving a good education, he had profited by the conversation of Plato, as well as of Xenokrates, in the Academy;<sup>2</sup> and we are not surprised that in their school he contracted a contempt for popular oratory, as well as a love for brief, concentrated, pungent reply. Once, when about to speak in public, he was observed to be particularly absorbed in thought. "You seem meditative, Phokion," said a friend. "Ay, by Zeus," was the reply; "I am meditating whether I cannot in some way abridge the speech which I am just about to address to the Athenians." He knew so well, however, on what points to strike, that his telling brevity, strengthened by the weight of character and position, cut through the fine oratory of Demosthenes more effectively than any counter-oratory from men like Æschines. Demosthenes himself greatly feared Phokion as an opponent, and was heard to observe, on seeing him rise to speak, "Here comes the cleaver of my harangues."<sup>3</sup> Polyeuktus, — himself an orator and a friend of Demosthenes, — drew a distinction highly complimentary to Phokion, by saying, that "Demosthenes was the finest orator, but Phokion the most formidable in speech."<sup>4</sup> In public policy, in means of political effect, and in personal character, — Phokion was the direct antithesis of Demosthenes; whose warlike eloquence, unwarlike disposition, paid speech-writing, and delicate habits of life, he doubtless alike despised.

As Phokion had in his nature little of the professed orator, so

<sup>1</sup> Tacit. Dialog. de Clar. Orator. c. 2. "Aper, communi eruditione imbutus, contemnebat potius literas quam nesciebat."

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 4, 14.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 5. ἡ τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων κοπίς παρεστίν.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 5. εἰπεῖν — ὅτι ῥήτωρ μὲν ἀριστος εἶη Δημοσθένης, εἰπεῖν δὲ δεινότατος ὁ Φωκίων.



he had still less of the flatterer. He affected and sustained the character of a blunt soldier, who speaks out his full mind without suppression or ornament, careless whether it be acceptable to hearers or not.<sup>1</sup> His estimate of his countrymen was thoroughly and undisguisedly contemptuous. This is manifest in his whole proceedings; and appears especially in the memorable remark ascribed to him, on an occasion when something that he had said in the public assembly met with peculiar applause. Turning round to a friend, he asked, "Have I not, unconsciously, said something bad?" His manners, moreover, were surly and repulsive, though his disposition is said to have been kind. He had learnt, in the Academy, a sort of Spartan self-suppression and rigor of life.<sup>2</sup> No one ever saw him either laughing, or weeping, or bathing in the public baths.

If, then, Phokion attained the unparalleled honor of being chosen forty-five times general, we may be sure that there were other means of reaching it besides the arts of oratory and demagoguery. We may indeed ask with surprise, how it was possible for him to attain it, in the face of so many repulsive circumstances, by the mere force of bravery and honesty; especially as he never performed any supereminent service,<sup>3</sup> though on various occasions he conducted himself with credit and ability. The answer to this question may be found in the fact that Phokion, though not a flatterer of the people, went decidedly along with the capital weakness of the people. While despising their judgment, he manifested no greater foresight, as to the public interests and security of Athens, than they did. The Athenian people had doubtless many infirmities and committed many errors; but the worst error of all, during the interval between 360–336 B. C., was their unconquerable repugnance to the efforts, personal and pecuniary, required for prosecuting a hearty war against Philip. Of this aversion to a

So Tacitus, after reporting the exact reply of the tribune Subrius Flavius, when examined as an accomplice in the conspiracy against Nero—*"Ipsa retuli verba: quia non, ut Senecæ, vulgata erant; nec minus nocet decebat sensus militaris viri incompertos sed validos."*

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 4, 5.

<sup>2</sup> Cornelius Nepos (Phocion, c. 1) found in his authors no account of the military exploits of Phokion but much about his personal integrity.

strenuous foreign policy, Phokion made himself the champion;<sup>1</sup> addressing, in his own vein, sarcastic taunts against those who called for action against Philip, as if they were mere brawlers and cowards, watching for opportunities to enrich themselves at the public expense. Eubulus the orator was among the leading statesmen who formed what may be called the peace-party at Athens, and who continually resisted or discouraged energetic warlike efforts, striving to keep out of sight the idea of Philip as a dangerous enemy. Of this peace-party, there were doubtless some who acted corruptly, in the direct pay of Philip. But many others of them, without any taint of personal corruption, espoused the same policy merely because they found it easier, for the time, to administer the city under peace than under war—because war was burdensome and disagreeable, to themselves as well as to their fellow-citizens—and because they either did not, or would not, look forward to the consequences of inaction. Now it was a great advantage to this peace-party, who wanted a military leader as partner to their civil and rhetorical leaders, to strengthen themselves by a colleague like Phokion; a man not only of unsuspected probity, but peculiarly disinterested in advising peace, since his importance would have been exalted by war.<sup>2</sup> Moreover most of the eminent military leaders had now come to love only the license of war, and to disdain the details of the war-office at home; while Phokion,<sup>3</sup> and he almost alone among them, was content to stay at Athens, and keep up that combination of civil with military efficiency which had been, formerly, habitual. Hence he was sustained, by the peace-party and by the aversion to warlike effort prevalent among the public, in a sort of perpetuity of the strategic functions, without any solicitation or care for personal popularity on his own part.

The influence of Phokion as a public adviser, during the period embraced in this volume, down to the battle of Charoneia, was eminently mischievous to Athens: all the more mischievous, partly (like that of Nikias) from the respectability of his personal

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 8. Οὕτω δὲ συντάξας ἑαυτὸν ἐπολιτεύετο μὲν αἰετὶ πρὸς εἰρήνην καὶ ἡσυχίαν, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch Phokion, c. 16. See the first repartee there ascribed to Phokion.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7.



qualities — partly because he espoused and sanctioned the most dangerous infirmity of the Athenian mind. His biographers mislead our judgment by pointing our attention chiefly to the last twenty years of his long life, after the battle of Chæroneia. At that time, when the victorious military force of Macedonia had been fully organized, and that of Greece comparatively prostrated, it might be argued plausibly (I do not say decisively, even then) that submission to Macedonia had become a fatal necessity; and that attempt to resist could only end by converting bad into worse. But the peace-policy of Phokion — which might be called prudence after the accession of Alexander — was ruinously imprudent as well as dishonorable during the reign of Philip. The odds were all against Philip in his early years; they shifted and became more and more in his favor, only because his game was played well, and that of his opponents badly. The superiority of force was at first so much on the side of Athens, that if she had been willing to employ it, she might have made sure of keeping Philip at least within the limits of Macedonia. All depended upon her will; upon the question, whether her citizens were prepared in their own minds to incur the expense and fatigue of a vigorous foreign policy — whether they would handle their pikes, open their purses, and forego the comforts of home, for the maintenance of Grecian and Athenian liberty against a growing, but not as yet irresistible destroyer. To such a sacrifice the Athenians could not bring themselves to submit; and in consequence of that reluctance, they were driven in the end to a much graver and more irreparable sacrifice — the loss of liberty, dignity, and security. Now it was precisely at such a moment, and when such a question was pending, that the influence of the peace-loving Phokion was most ruinous. His anxiety that the citizens should be buried at home in their own sepulchres — his despair, mingled with contempt, of his countrymen and their refined habits — his hatred of the orators who might profit by an increased war-expenditure<sup>1</sup> — all contributed to make him discourage public effort, and await passively the preponderance of the Macedonian arms; thus playing the game of Philip, and siding, though himself incorruptible, with the orators in Philip's pay.

<sup>1</sup> See the replies of Phokion in Plutarch, Phokion, c. 23.

the love of peace, either in a community or in an individual, usually commands sympathy without farther inquiry, though there are times of growing danger from without, in which the adviser of peace is the worst guide that can be followed. Since the Peloponnesian war, a revolution had been silently going on in Greece, whereby the duties of soldiership had passed to a great degree from citizen militia into the hands of paid mercenaries. The resident citizens generally had become averse to the burden of military service; while on the other hand the miscellaneous aggregate of Greeks willing to carry arms anywhere and looking merely for pay, had greatly augmented. Very differently had the case once stood. The Athenian citizen of 432 B. C. — by concurrent testimony of the eulogist Perikles and of the unfriendly Corinthians — was ever ready to brave the danger, fatigue, and privation, of foreign expeditions, for the glory of Athens. "He accounted it holidaywork to do duty in her service (it is an enemy who speaks<sup>1</sup>); he wasted his body for her as though it had been the body of another." Embracing with passion the idea of imperial Athens, he knew that she could only be upheld by the energetic efforts of her individual citizens, and that the talk in her public

<sup>1</sup> I have more than once referred to the memorable picture of the Athenian character, in contrast with the Spartan, drawn by the Corinthian envoy at Sparta in 432 B. C. (Thucyd. i. 70, 71). Among the many attributes, indicative of exuberant energy and activity, I select those which were most required, and most found wanting, as the means of keeping back Philip.

1. Παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταί, καὶ παρὰ γνώμην κινδυνευταί, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες.

2. Ἀσκνοὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μελλήτᾳς, καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους (in opposition to you, Spartans).

3. Τοῖς μὲν σωμασὶν ἀλλοτριωτάτοις ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως χρώνται, τῇ γνώμῃ δὲ οἰκειοτάτῃ ἐς τὸ πράσσειν τι ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς, etc.

4. Καὶ ταῦτα μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων δι' ὅλου τοῦ αἵματος μοχθοῦσι, καὶ ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα τῶν ὑπαρξάντων, διὰ τὸ αἰετᾶσθαι καὶ μήτε ἐορτὴν ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τὰ δέοντα πράξει, ξυμφορὰν τε οὐχ ἥσσον ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα ἢ ἀσχολίαν ἐπίπονον, etc.

To the same purpose Perikles expresses himself in his funeral oration of the ensuing year; extolling the vigor and courage of his countrymen, as alike forward and indefatigable — yet as combined also with a love of public discussion, and a taste for all the refinements of peaceful and intellectual life (Thucyd. ii. 40, 41).



assemblies, though useful as a preliminary to action, was mischievous if allowed as a substitute for action.<sup>1</sup> Such was the Periklean Athenian of 431 B. C. But this energy had been crushed in the disasters closing the Peloponnesian war, and had never again revived. The Demosthenic Athenian of 360 B. C. had as it were grown old. Pugnacity, Pan-hellenic championship, and the love of enterprise, had died within him. He was a quiet, home-keeping, refined citizen, attached to the democratic constitution, and executing with cheerful pride his ordinary city-duties under it; but immersed in industrial or professional pursuits, in domestic comforts, in the impressive manifestations of the public religion, in the atmosphere of discussion and thought, intellectual as well as political. To renounce all this for foreign and continued military service, he considered as a hardship not to be endured, except under the pressure of danger near and immediate. Precautionary exigencies against distant perils, however real, could not be brought home to his feelings; even to pay others for serving in his place, was a duty which he could scarcely be induced to perform.

Not merely in Athens, but also among the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta, the resident citizens had contracted the like indisposition to military service. In the year 431 B. C., these Peloponnesians (here too we have the concurrent testimony of Perikles and Archidamus<sup>2</sup>) had been forward for service with their persons, and only backward when asked for money. In 383 B. C., Sparta found them so reluctant to join her standard, especially for operations beyond sea, that she was forced to admit into her confederacy the principle of pecuniary commutation;<sup>3</sup> just as Athens had done (about 460-450 B. C.) with the unwarlike islanders enrolled in her confederacy of Delos.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 40, 41, 43. τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καθ' ἡμέραν ἔργῳ θεωμένους καὶ ἐραστὰς γιγνομένους αὐτῆς, καὶ ὅταν ὑμῖν μεγάλη δόξα εἶναι, ἐνθυμούμενοι ὅτι τολμῶντες καὶ γινώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυρόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτίσαντο, etc.

Compare ii. 63 — the last speech of Perikles.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. i. 80, 81, 141.

<sup>3</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. v. 2, 21. The allied cities furnished money instead of men in the expedition of Mnasiippus to Korkyra (Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 2, 16).

<sup>4</sup> Thucyd. i. 99.

Amidst this increasing indisposition to citizen military service, the floating, miscellaneous bands who made soldiership a livelihood under any one who would pay them, increased in number from year to year. In 402-401 B. C., when the Cyreian army (the Ten Thousand Greeks) were levied, it had been found difficult to bring so many together; large premiums were given to the chiefs or enlisting agents; the recruits consisted, in great part, of settled men tempted by lucrative promises away from their homes.<sup>1</sup> But active men ready for paid foreign service were perpetually multiplying, from poverty, exile, or love of enterprise<sup>2</sup>; they were put under constant training and greatly improved, by Iphikrates and others, as peltasts or light infantry to serve in conjunction with the citizen force of hoplites. Jason of Pheræ brought together a greater and better trained mercenary force than had ever been seen since the Cyreians in their upward march<sup>3</sup>; the Phokians also in the Sacred War, having command over the Delphian treasures, surrounded themselves with a formidable array of mercenary soldiers. There arose (as in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in modern Europe) Condottieri like Charidemus and others — generals having mercenary bands under their command, and hiring themselves out to any prince or potentate who would employ and pay them. Of these armed rovers — poor, brave, desperate, and held by no civic ties — Isokrates makes repeated complaint, as one of the most serious misfortunes of Greece.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Isokrates, Orat. v. (Philipp.) s. 112. . . . ἐν ἐκείνοις δὲ τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἦν ξενικὸν οὐδὲν, ὥστ' ἀναγκαζόμενοι ξενολογεῖν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, πλεόν ἀπὸ γλίσκον εἰς τὰς διδομένας τοῖς συλλέγουσι δαρεῖας, ἢ τὴν εἰς τοὺς στρατιώτας μισθοφορὰν.

About the liberal rewards of Cyrus to the generals Klearchus, Proxenus, and others, for getting together the army, and to the soldiers themselves also, see Xenoph. Anab. i. 1, 9; i. 3, 4; iii. 1, 4; vi. 8, 48.

<sup>2</sup> See the mention of the mercenary Greeks in the service of the satraps Mania in Æolis — of the satraps, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, and of the Spartan Agesilaus — Iphikrates and others, Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 1, 13; iii. 3, 15; iv. 2, 5; iv. 3, 15; iv. 4, 14; iv. 8, 35; vii. 5, 10.

Compare Harpokration — ξενικὸν ἐν Κορινθίῳ — and Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 46.

<sup>3</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 5.

<sup>4</sup> Isokrates pours forth this complaint in many places: in the fourth or Panegyric Oration (B. C. 380); in the eighth or Oratio de Pace (356 B. C.); in the fifth or Oratio ad Philipum (346 B. C.). The latest of these dis-



Such wanderers, indeed, usually formed the natural emigrants in new colonial enterprises. But it so happened that few Hellenic colonies were formed during the interval between 400–350 B. C.; in fact, the space open to Hellenic colonization was becoming more circumscribed by the peace of Antalkidas — by the despotism of Dionysius — and by the increase of Lucanians, Bruttians, and the inland powers generally. Isokrates, while extolling the great service formerly rendered to the Hellenic world by Athens, in setting on foot the Ionic emigration, and thus providing new homes for so many unsettled Greeks — insists on the absolute necessity of similar means of emigration in his own day. He urges on Philip to put himself at the head of an Hellenic conquest of Asia Minor, and thus to acquire territory which might furnish settlement to the multitudes of homeless, roving, exiles, who lived by the sword, and disturbed the peace of Greece.<sup>1</sup>

This decline of the citizen militia, and growing aversion to personal service, or military exercises — together with the contemporaneous increase of the professional soldiery unmoved by civic obligations — is one of the capital facts of the Demosthenic age. Though not peculiar to Athens, it strikes us more forcibly at Athens, where the spirit of self-imposed individual effort had once been so high wrought — but where also the charm and stim-

courses is delivered in the strongest language. See Orat. Panegy. s. 195 τὸς δ' ἐπὶ ξένης μετὰ παιδῶν καὶ γυναικῶν ἀλᾶσθαι, πολλοὺς δὲ δι' ἐνδοίαν τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπικουρεῖν (i. e. to become an ἐπικούρος, or paid soldier in foreign service) ἀναγκαζομένους ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τοῖς φίλοις μαχομένους ἱποθυήσκειν. See also Orat. De Pace (viii.) s. 53, 56, 58; Orat. ad. Philipp. (v.) s. 112. οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει τὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ὥστε βῶον εἶναι συστήσαι στρατόπεδον μείζον καὶ κρείττον ἐκ τῶν πλανωμένων ἢ τῶν πολιτευομένων, etc. .... also s. 142, 149; Orat. de Permutat. (xv.) s. 122. ἐν τοῖς στρατοπέδοις πλανωμένοις κατατετριμμένος, etc. A melancholy picture of the like evils is also presented in the ninth Epistle of Isokrates, to Archidamus, s. 9, 12. Compare Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 665. s. 162.

For an example of a disappointed lover who seeks distraction by taking foreign military service, see Theokritus, xiv. 58.

<sup>1</sup> Isokrates ad Philipp. (v.) s. 142–144. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κτίσαι πόλεις ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ, καὶ κατοικίσαι τοὺς νῦν μὲν πλανωμένους δι' ἐνδοίαν τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν καὶ λυμαινομένων οἷς ἂν ἐντυχῶσιν. Οὐς εἰ μὴ πάσομεν ἀθροίζομένους, βίον αὐτοῖς ἱκανὸν πορίσαντες, λήσουσιν ἡμᾶς τοσοῦτοι γενόμενοι τὸ πλῆθος, ὥστε μηδὲν ἦττον αὐτοὺς εἶναι φοβεροὺς τοῖς Ἕλλησι ἢ τοῖς βαβάρους, etc.

ulus<sup>1</sup> of peaceful existence was most diversified, and the activity of industrial pursuit most continuous. It was a fatal severance of the active force of society from political freedom and intelligence breaking up that many-sided combination, of cultivated thought with vigorous deed, which formed the Hellenic ideal — and throwing the defence of Greece upon armed men looking up only to their general or their paymaster. But what made it irreparably fatal, was that just at this moment the Grecian world was thrown upon its defence against Macedonia led by a young prince of indefatigable enterprise; who had imbibed, and was capable even of improving, the best ideas of military organization<sup>2</sup> started by Epaminondas and Iphikrates. Philip (as described by his enemy Demosthenes) possessed all that forward and unconquerable love of action which the Athenians had manifested in 431 B. C., as we know from enemies as well as from friends; while the Macedonian population also retained, amidst rudeness and poverty, that military aptitude and readiness which had dwindled away within the walls of the Grecian cities.

Though as yet neither disciplined nor formidable, they were an excellent raw material for soldiers, in the hands of an organizing genius like Philip. They were still (as their predecessors had been in the time of the first Perdikkas,<sup>3</sup> when the king's wife baked cakes with her own hand on the hearth), mountain shepherds ill-clothed and ill-housed — eating and drinking from wooden platters and cups — destitute to a great degree, not mere-

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 41 (the funeral harangue of Perikles) — ξυνελών τε λέγει τὴν τε πόλιν πᾶσαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παίδευσιν εἶναι, καὶ καθ' ἑκαστον δοκεῖν ἂν μοι τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνδρα παρ' ἡμῶν ἐπὶ πλείστ' ἂν εἶδη καὶ μετὰ χαρίτων μάλιστα ἂν εὐτραπέλως τὸ σῶμα αὐταρκὲς παρέχεσθαι.

<sup>2</sup> The remarkable organization of the Macedonian army, with its systematic combination of different arms and sorts of troops — was the work of Philip. Alexander found it ready made to his hands, in the very first months of his reign. It must doubtless have been gradually formed; year after year improved by Philip, and we should be glad to be enabled to trace the steps of his progress. But unfortunately we are left without any information about the military measures of Philip, beyond bare facts and results. Accordingly I am compelled to postpone what is to be said about the Macedonian military organization until the reign of Alexander, about whose operations we have valuable details.

<sup>3</sup> Herodot. viii. 137.



ly of cities, but of fixed residences.<sup>1</sup> The men of substance were armed with breastplates and made good cavalry; but the infantry were a rabble destitute of order,<sup>2</sup> armed with wicker shields and rusty swords, and contending at disadvantage, though constantly kept on the alert, to repel the inroads of their Illyrian or Thracian neighbors. Among some Macedonian tribes, the man who had never slain an enemy was marked by a degrading badge.<sup>3</sup> These were the men whom Philip on becoming king found under his rule; not good soldiers, but excellent recruits to be formed into soldiers. Poverty, endurance, and bodies inured to toil, were the natural attributes, well appreciated by ancient politicians, of a military population destined to make conquests. Such had been the native Persians, at their first outburst under Cyrus the Great; such were even the Greeks at the invasion of Xerxes, when the Spartan King Demaratus reckoned poverty both as an inmate of Greece, and as a guarantee of Grecian courage.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This poor condition of the Macedonian population at the accession of Philip, is set forth in the striking speech made thirty-six years afterwards by Alexander the Great (in 323 B. C., a few months before his death) to his soldiers, satiated with conquest and plunder, but discontented with his increasing insolence and Orientalism.

Arrian, Exp. Alex. vii. 9. Φίλιππος γὰρ παραλαβὼν ὑμᾶς πλανήτας καὶ ἀπόρους, ἐν διφθέραις τοὺς πολλοὺς νέμοντας ἀνὰ τὰ ὄρη πρόβατα κατὰ ὀλίγα, καὶ περὶ τούτων κακῶς μαχομένους Ἰλλυρίους καὶ Τριβαλλοὺς καὶ τοῖς ὁμόροις Θραξί, χλαμύδας μὲν ὑμῖν ἀντὶ τῶν διφθερῶν φορεῖν ἔδωκε, κατήγαγε δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὁρῶν ἐς τὰ πέδια, etc.

Other points are added in the version given by Quintus Curtius of the same speech (x. 10) — "En tandem! Illyriorum paulo ante et Persarum tributariis, Asia et tot gentium spolia fastidio sunt. Modo sub Philippo seminudis, amacula ex purpura sordent: aurum et argentum oculi ferre non possunt; lignea enim vasa desiderant, et ex cratibus scuta et rubiginem gladiatorum."

<sup>2</sup> Thucydides (ii. 100) recognizes the goodness of the Macedonian cavalry: so also Xenophon, in the Spartan expedition against Olynthus (Hellen. v. 2, 40).

That the infantry were of little military efficiency, we see from the judgment of Brasidas — Thucyd. iv. 26: compare also ii. 100.

See O. Müller's short tract on the Macedonians, annexed to his History of the Dorians, s. 33.

<sup>3</sup> Aristot. Polit. vii. 2, 6.

<sup>4</sup> Herodot. vii. 102. τῇ Ἑλλάδι πενίη μὲν αἰεὶ κοτε συντυχέει ἔσται, etc. About the Persians, Herodot. i. 71; Arrian, v. 4, 13.

Now it was against these rude Macedonians, to whom camp-life presented chances of plunder without any sacrifice, that the industrious and refined Athenian citizen had to go forth and fight, renouncing his trade, family, and festivals; a task the more severe, as the perpetual aggressions and systematized warfare of his new enemies could only be countervailed by an equal continuity of effort on his part. For such personal devotion, combined with the anxieties of preventive vigilance, the Athenians of the Periklean age would have been prepared, but those of the Demosthenic age were not; though their whole freedom and security were in the end found to be at stake.

Without this brief sketch of the great military change in Greece since the Peloponnesian war — the decline of the citizen force and the increase of mercenaries — the reader would scarcely understand either the proceedings of Athens in reference to Philip, or the career of Demosthenes on which we are now about to enter.

Having by assiduous labor acquired for himself these high powers both of speech and of composition, Demosthenes stood forward in 354 B. C. to devote them to the service of the public. His first address to the assembly is not less interesting, objectively, as a memorial of the actual Hellenic political world in that year — than subjectively, as an evidence of his own manner of appreciating its exigencies.<sup>1</sup> At that moment, the predominant apprehension at Athens arose from reports respecting the Great King, who was said to be contemplating measures of hostility against Greece, and against Athens in particular, in consequence of the aid recently lent by the Athenian general Chares to the revolted Persian satrap Artabazus. By this apprehension — which had already, in part, determined the Athenians (a year before) to make

<sup>1</sup> The oration De Symmoriis is placed by Dionysius of Halikarnassus in the archonship of Diotimus, 354-353 B. C. (Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum. p. 724). And it is plainly composed prior to the expedition sent by the Thebans under Pammenês to assist the revolted Artabazus against the Great King; which expedition is placed by Diodorus (xvi. 34) in the ensuing year 353-352 B. C. Whoever will examine the way in which Demosthenes argues, in the Oration De Symmoriis (p. 187. s. 40-42), as to the relations of the Thebans with Persia — will see that he cannot have known anything about assistance given by the Thebans to Artabazus against Persia.



peace with their revolted insular allies, and close the Social War — the public mind still continued agitated. A Persian armament of three hundred sail, with a large force of Grecian mercenaries — and an invasion of Greece — was talked of as probable.<sup>1</sup> It appears that Mausólus, prince or satrap of Karia, who had been the principal agent in inflaming the Social War, still prosecuted hostilities against the islands even after the peace, announcing that he acted in execution of the king's designs; so that the Athenians sent envoys to remonstrate with him.<sup>2</sup> The Persians seem also to have been collecting inland forces, which were employed some years afterwards in reconquering Egypt, but of which the destination was not at this moment declared. Hence the alarm now prevalent at Athens. It is material to note — as a mark in the tide of events — that few persons as yet entertained apprehensions about Philip of Macedon, though that prince was augmenting steadily his military force as well as his conquests. Nay, Philip afterwards asserted that during this alarm of Persian invasion, he was himself one of the parties invited to assist in the defence of Greece.<sup>3</sup>

Though the Macedonian power had not yet become obviously formidable, we trace in the present speech of Demosthenes that same Pan-hellenic patriotism which afterwards rendered him so strenuous in blowing the trumpet against Philip. The obligation incumbent upon all Greeks, but upon Athens especially, on account of her traditions and her station, to uphold Hellenic liberty against the foreigner at all cost, is insisted on with an emphasis and dignity worthy of Perikles.<sup>4</sup> But while Demosthenes thus impresses upon his countrymen noble and Pan-hellenic purposes, he does not rest content with eloquent declamation, or negative

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 21.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes cont. Timokratem, s. 15; see also the second Argument prefixed to that Oration.

<sup>3</sup> See Epistola Philipp. ap. Demosthen. p. 160. s. 6.

<sup>4</sup> Demosthenes, De Symmoriis, p. 179. s. 7. Οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' ἀπ' ἰσῆς ὁσὺ τοῖς τ' ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι καὶ ὑμῖν περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα τὴν βουλὴν οὖσαν — ἀλλ' ἐκείνων μὲν πολλοῖς ἐνδέχεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ τῶν ἰδία τι συμφερόντως διοικουμένων τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ἀμελεῖν, ὑμῖν δ' οὐδ' ἀδιοικουμένοις παρὰ τῶν ἀδικούντων καλὸν ἐστὶ λαβεῖν ταύτην τὴν οἰκὴν, εἰσαί τινας αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τῷ βαρβάρῳ γενέσθαι

criticism on the past. His recommendations as to means are positive and explicit; implying an attentive survey and a sagacious appreciation of the surrounding circumstances. While keeping before his countrymen a favorable view of their position, he never promises them success except on condition of earnest and persevering individual efforts, with arms and with money: and he exhausts all his invention in the unpopular task of shaming them, by direct reproach as well as by oblique insinuation, out of that aversion to personal military service, which, for the misfortune of Athens, had become a confirmed habit. Such positive and practical character as to means, always contemplating the full exigencies of a given situation — combined with the constant presentation of Athens as the pledged champion of Grecian freedom, and with appeals to Athenian foretime, not as a patrimony to rest upon, but as an example to imitate — constitute the imperishable charm of these harangues of Demosthenes, not less memorable than their excellence as rhetorical compositions. In the latter merit, indeed, his rival Æschines is less inferior to him than in the former.

In no one of the speeches of Demosthenes is the spirit of practical wisdom more predominant than in this his earliest known discourse to the public assembly — on the Symmories — delivered by a young man of twenty-seven years of age, who could have had little other teaching except from the decried classes of sophists, rhetors, and actors. While proclaiming the king of Persia as the common and dangerous enemy of the Grecian name, he contends that no evidence of impending Persian attack had yet transpired, sufficiently obvious and glaring to warrant Athens in sending round<sup>1</sup> to invoke a general league of Greeks, as previous speakers had suggested. He deprecates on the one hand any step calculated to provoke the Persian king or bring on a war — and on the other hand, any premature appeal to the Greeks for combination, before they themselves were impressed with a feeling of common danger. Nothing but such common terror could bring about union among the different Hellenic cities; nothing else could silence those standing jealousies and antipathies, which rendered intestine war so frequent, and would probably enable the

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. De Symmor p. 181. s. 14



Persian king to purchase several Greeks for his own allies against the rest.

"Let us neither be immoderately afraid of the Great King, nor on the other hand be ourselves the first to begin the war and wrong him — as well on our own account as from the bad feeling and mistrust prevalent among the Greeks around us. If indeed we, with the full and unanimous force of Greece, could attack him unassisted, I should have held that even wrong, done towards him, was no wrong at all. But since this is impossible, I contend that we must take care not to give the king a pretence for enforcing claims of right on behalf of the other Greeks. While we remain quiet, he cannot do any such thing without being mistrusted; but if we have been the first to begin war, he will naturally seem to mean sincere friendship to the others, on account of their aversion to us. Do not, therefore, expose to light the sad distempers of the Hellenic world, by calling together its members when you will not persuade them, and by going to war when you will have no adequate force; but keep the peace, confiding in yourselves, and making full preparation."<sup>1</sup>

It is this necessity of making preparation, which constitutes the special purpose of Demosthenes in his harangue. He produces an elaborate plan, matured by careful reflection,<sup>2</sup> for improving and extending the classification by Symmories; proposing a more convenient and systematic distribution of the leading

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. De Symmor. p. 188. s. 42-46. . . . . "Ὅστ' οὐτε φοβεῖσθαι φημι δεῖν πέρα τοῦ μετρίου, οὐδ' ὑπαχθῆναι προτέρους ἐκφέρειν τὸν πόλεμον . . . . ."

. . . . . Τούτων ἡμεῖς φοβώμεθα; μηδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ μὴδ' ἀδικῶμεν, αὐτῶν ἡμῶν ἐνεκα καὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπιστίας· ἐπεὶ εἰ γ' ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἦν μετὰ πάντων ἐπιθέσθαι μόνῳ, οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐκείνῳ ἀδίκημ' ἂν ἐθῆκα. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, φυλάττεσθαι φημι δεῖν μὴ πρόφασιν δώμεν βασιλεῖ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ζητεῖν· ἡσυχίαν μὲν γὰρ ἐχόντων ὑμῶν, ὑποπτος ἂν εἴη τοιοῦτό τι πράττων — πόλεμον δὲ ποιησαμένων προτέρων εἰκότως ἂν δοκοίη διὰ τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐχθρὰν τοῖς ἄλλοις φίλος εἶναι βούλεσθαι. Μὴ οὖν ἐξελέγξῃτε ὥς κακῶς ἔχει τὰ Ἑλληνικά, συγκαλοῦντες ὅτ' οὐ πείσετε, καὶ πολεμοῦντες ὅτ' οὐ δυνήσεσθε· ἀλλ' ἔχετε ἡσυχίαν θαρρόντες καὶ παρασκευαζόμενοι.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. De Symmor. p. 181. s. 17. Τὴν μὲν παρασκευὴν ὅπως ἔς ἑρίστα καὶ τάχιστα γενήσεται, παννὸς πολλὰ πράγματα ἔσχον σκεπῶν.

citizens as well as of the total financial and nautical means — such as to ensure both the ready equipment of armed force whenever required, and a fair apportionment both of effort and of expense among the citizens. Into the details of this plan of economical reform, which are explained with the precision of an administrator and not with the vagueness of a rhetor, I do not here enter; especially as we do not know that it was actually adopted. But the spirit in which it was proposed deserves all attention, as proclaiming, even at this early day, the home-truth which the orator reiterates in so many subsequent harangues. "In the preparation which I propose to you, Athenians (he says), the first and most important point is, that your minds shall be so set, as that each man individually will be willing and forward in doing his duty. For you see plainly, that of all those matters on which you have determined collectively, and on which each man individually has looked upon the duty of execution as devolving upon himself — not one has ever slipped through your hands; while, on the contrary, whenever, after determination has been taken, you have stood looking at one another, no man intending to do anything himself, but every one throwing the burthen of action upon his neighbor — nothing has ever succeeded. Assuming you, therefore, to be thus disposed and wound up to the proper pitch, I recommend,"<sup>1</sup> etc.

This is the true Demosthenic vein of exhortation, running with unabated force through the Philippics and Olynthiacs, and striving to revive that conjunction — of which Perikles had boasted as an established fact in the Athenian character<sup>2</sup> — energetic individual action following upon full public debate and collective resolution. How often here, and elsewhere, does the orator denounce

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes, De Symmoriis, p. 182. s. 18. Ἔστι τοίνυν πρῶτον μὲν τῆς παρασκευῆς, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ μέγιστον, οὕτω διακείσθαι τὰς γνώμας ὑμᾶς, ὥς ἕκαστον ἔκοντα προθύμως ὅ,τι ἂν δέη ποιήσονται. Ὅρατε γὰρ, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι, ὅσα μὲν πρόποθ' ἀπαντες ὑμεῖς ἡβουλήθητε, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τὸ πράττειν αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἐαυτῷ προσήκειν ἡγήσατο, οὐδὲν πρόποθ' ὑμᾶς ἐξέφυγεν· ὅσα δ' ἡβουλήθητε μὲν, μετὰ ταῦτα δ' ἀπεβλέψατε πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὥς αὐτὸς μὲν ἕκαστος οὐ ποιήσων, τὸν δὲ πλῆσιον πράξοντα, οὐδὲν πρόποθ' ὑμῖν ἐγένετο. Ἐχόντων δ' ὑμῶν οὕτω καὶ παρωξυμένων, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 39, 40.



the uselessness of voters in the public assembly, even after such votes had been passed — if the citizens individually hung back, and shrunk from the fatigue or the pecuniary burthen indispensable for execution! Demus in the Pnyx (to use, in an altered sense, an Aristophanic comparison)<sup>1</sup> still remained Pan-hellenic and patriotic, when Demus at home had come to think that the city would march safely by itself without any sacrifice on his part, and that he was at liberty to become absorbed in his property, family, religion, and recreations. And so Athens might really have proceeded, in her enjoyment of liberty, wealth, refinement, and individual security — could the Grecian world have been guaranteed against the formidable Macedonian enemy from without.

It was in the ensuing year, when the alarm respecting Persia had worn off, that the Athenians were called on to discuss the conflicting applications of Sparta and of Megalopolis. The success of the Phokians appeared to be such as to prevent Thebes, especially while her troops, under Pammenes, were absent in Asia, from interfering in Peloponnesus for the protection of Megalopolis. There were even at Athens politicians who confidently predicted the approaching humiliation of Thebes,<sup>2</sup> together with the emancipation and reconstitution of those Boeotian towns which she now held in dependence — Orchomenus, Thespiæ, and Plataea; predictions cordially welcomed by the Miso-Theban sentiment at Athens. To the Spartans, the moment appeared favorable for breaking up Megalopolis and recovering Messênê; in which scheme they hoped to interest not only Athens, but also Elis, Phlius, and some other Peloponnesian states. To Athens they offered aid for the recovery of Orôpus, now and for about twelve years past in the hands of the Thebans; to Elis and Phlius they also tendered assistance for regaining respectively Triphylia and the

<sup>1</sup> Aristophanes, *Equit.* 750.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes, *Orat. pro Megalopolitanis*, p. 203. s. 5. p. 210. s. 36. Ἔστι τοιῶν ἐν τινὶ τοιοῦτῳ καιρῷ τὰ πρᾶγματα νῦν, εἰ τι δεῖ τοῖς εἰρημένοισι πολλάκις παρ' ὑμῖν λόγοις τεκμήρασθαι, ὥστε Θεβαίους μὲν Ὀρχομενοῦ καὶ Θεσπιῶν καὶ Πλαταιῶν οἰκισθεῖων ἀσθενεῖς γενέσθαι, etc. Ἄν μὲν τοῖς καταπολεμηθῶσιν οἱ Θεβαῖοι, ὥσπερ αὐτοὺς δεῖ, etc.

Compare Demosthenes *cont. Aristokrat.* p. 654. s. 120.

*Trikaranum*, from the Arcadians and Argeians.<sup>1</sup> This political combination was warmly espoused by a considerable party at Athens; being recommended not less by aversion to Thebes than by the anxious desire for repossessing the border town of Orôpus. But it was combated by others, and by Demosthenes among the number, who could not be tempted by any bait to acquiesce in the reconstitution of Lacedæmonian power as it had stood before the battle of Leuktra. In the Athenian assembly, the discussion was animated and even angry; the envoys from Megalopolis, as well as those from Sparta on the other side, finding strenuous partisans.<sup>2</sup>

Demosthenes strikes a course professedly middle between the two, yet really in favor of defending Megalopolis against Spartan reconquest. We remark in this oration (as in the oration *De Symmoriis*, a year before) that there is no allusion to Philip; a point to be noticed as evidence of the gradual changes in the Demosthenic point of view. All the arguments urged turn upon Hellenic and Athenian interests, without reference to the likelihood of hostilities from without. In fact, Demosthenes lays down as a position not to be disputed by any one, that for the interest of Athens, both Sparta and Thebes ought to be weak; neither of them in condition to disturb her security;<sup>3</sup> — a position, unfortunately, but too well recognized among all the leading Grecian states in their reciprocal dealings with each other, rendering the Pan-hellenic aggregate comparatively defenceless against Philip or any skilful aggressor from without. While, however, affirming a general maxim, in itself questionable and perilous, Demosthenes deduces from it nothing but judicious consequences. In regard to Sparta, he insists only on keeping her *in statu quo*, and maintaining inviolate against her the independence of Megalopolis and Messênê. He will not be prevailed upon to surrender to her these two cities, even by the seductive prospect of assistance to Athens in recovering Orôpus, and in reviving the autonomy of

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes *pro Megalopol.* p. 206. s. 18; compare Xenoph. *Hellen.* vii. 2, 1-5.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes *pro Megalopolit.* p. 202. s. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthen. *pro Megalop.* p. 203. s. 5, 6. Compare a similar sentiment, Demosthenes *cont. Aristokrat.* p. 654. s. 120.



the Boeotian cities. At that moment the prevalent disposition among the Athenian public was antipathy against Thebes, combined with a certain sympathy in favor of Sparta, whom they had aided at the battle of Mantinea against the Megalopolitans.<sup>1</sup> Though himself sharing this sentiment,<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes will not suffer his countrymen to be misled by it. He recommends that Athens shall herself take up the Theban policy in regard to Megalopolis and Messênê, so as to protect these two cities against Sparta; the rather, as by such a proceeding the Thebans will be excluded from Peloponnesus, and their general influence narrowed. He even goes so far as to say, that if Sparta should succeed in reconquering Megalopolis and Messênê, Athens must again become the ally of the Thebans to restrain her farther aggrandizement.<sup>3</sup>

As far as we make out from imperfect information, it seems that the views of Demosthenes did not prevail, and that the Athenians declined to undertake the protection of Megalopolis against Sparta; since we presently find the Thebans continuing to afford that protection, as they had done before. The aggressive schemes of Sparta appear to have been broached at the moment when the Phokians under Onomarchus were so decidedly superior to Thebes as to place that city in some embarrassment. But the superiority of the Phokians was soon lessened by their collision with a more formidable enemy — Philip of Macedon.

That prince had been already partially interfering in Thessalian affairs,<sup>4</sup> at the instigation of Eudikus and Simus, chiefs of the Aleuadae of Larissa, against Lykophron the despot of Pheræ. But his recent acquisition of Methônê left him more at liberty to extend his conquests southward, and to bring a larger force to bear on the dissensions of Thessaly. In that country, the great cities were,<sup>5</sup> as usual, contending for supremacy, and holding in subjection the smaller by means of garrisons; while Lykophron of Pheræ

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. pro Megalop. p. 203. s. 7, 9. p. 207. s. 22.

<sup>2</sup> See Demosthen. cont. Leptinem, p. 489. s. 172 (delivered 355 B. C.) and Olynthiac i. p. 16. s. 27.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenes pro Megalopol. p. 207. s. 24.

<sup>4</sup> Diodor. xvi. 14; Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 241. s. 60. Harpokration v. Σίμος.

<sup>5</sup> Isokrates, Orat. viii. (De Pace) s. 143, 144.

was exerting himself to regain that ascendancy over the whole, which had once been possessed by Jason and Alexander. Philip now marched into the country and attacked him so vigorously as to constrain him to invoke aid from the Phokians. Onomarchus, at that time victorious over the Thebans and master as far as Thermopylæ, was interested in checking the farther progress of Philip southward and extending his own ascendancy. He sent into Thessaly a force of seven thousand men, under his brother Phayllus, to sustain Lykophron. But Phayllus failed altogether; being defeated and driven out of Thessaly by Philip, so that Lykophron of Pheræ was in greater danger than ever. Upon this, Onomarchus went himself thither with the full force of Phokians and foreign mercenaries. An obstinate, and seemingly a protracted contest now took place, in the course of which he was at first decidedly victorious. He defeated Philip in two battles, with such severe loss that the Macedonian army was withdrawn from Thessaly, while Lykophron with his Phokian allies remained masters of the country.<sup>1</sup>

This great success of the Phokian arms was followed up by farther victory in Boeotia. Onomarchus renewed his invasion of that territory, defeated the Thebans in battle, and made himself master of Koroneia, in addition to Orchomenus, which he held before.<sup>2</sup> It would seem that the Thebans were at this time deprived of much of their force, which was serving in Asia under Artabazus, and which, perhaps from these very reverses, they presently recalled. The Phokians, on the other hand, were at the height of their power. At this juncture falls, probably, the aggressive combination of the Spartans against Megalopolis, and the debate, before noticed, in the Athenian assembly.

Philip was for some time in embarrassment from his defeats in Thessaly. His soldiers, discouraged and even mutinous, would hardly consent to remain under his standard. By great pains, and animated exhortation, he at last succeeded in reanimating them. After a certain interval for restoration and reinforcement, he advanced with a fresh army into Thessaly, and resumed his operations against Lykophron; who was obliged again to solicit aid from Onomarchus, and to promise that all Thessaly should hence

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 35.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 35.



forward be held under his dependence. Onomarchus accordingly joined him in Thessaly with a large army, said to consist of twenty thousand foot and five hundred cavalry. But he found on this occasion, within the country, more obstinate resistance than before; for the cruel dynasty of Pheræ had probably abused their previous victory by aggravated violence and rapacity, so as to throw into the arms of their enemy a multitude of exiles. On Philip's coming into Thessaly with a new army, the Thessalians embraced his cause so warmly, that he soon found himself at the head of an army of twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse. Onomarchus met him in the field, somewhere near the southern coast of Thessaly; not diffident of success, as well from his recent victories, as from the neighborhood of an Athenian fleet under Chares, cooperating with him. Here a battle was joined, and obstinately contested between the two armies, nearly equal in numbers of infantry. Philip exalted the courage of his soldiers by decorating them with laurel wreaths,<sup>1</sup> as crusaders in the service of the god against the despoilers of the Delphian temple; while the Thessalians also, forming the best cavalry in Greece and fighting with earnest valor, gave decisive advantage to his cause. The defeat of the forces of Onomarchus and Lykophron was complete. Six thousand of them are said to have been slain, and three thousand to have been taken prisoners; the remainder escaped either by flight, or by throwing away their arms, and swimming off to the Athenian ships. Onomarchus himself perished. According to one account, he was slain by his own mercenaries, provoked by his cowardice: according to another account, he was drowned — being carried into the sea by an unruly horse, and trying to escape to the ships. Philip caused his dead body to be crucified, and drowned all the prisoners as men guilty of sacrilege.<sup>2</sup>

This fact is mentioned by Justin (vii. 2), and seems likely to be true, from the severity with which Philip, after his victory, treated the Phokian prisoners. But the farther statement of Justin is not likely to be true — that the Phokians, on beholding the insignia of the god, threw away their arms and fled without resistance.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 55; Pausan. x. 2, 3; Philo Judæus apud Eusebium Præp. Evang. viii. p. 392. Diodorus states that Chares with the Athenian fleet was sailing by, *accidentally*. But this seems highly improbable. It cannot be supposed that he was destined to coöperate with the Phokians.

This victory procured for Philip great renown as the avenger of the Delphian god — and became an important step in his career of aggrandizement. It not only terminated the power of the Phokians north of Thermopylæ, but also finally crushed the powerful dynasty of Pheræ in Thessaly. Philip laid siege to that city upon which Lykophron and Peitholaus, surrounded by an adverse population and unable to make any long defence, capitulated, and surrendered it to him; retiring with their mercenaries, two thousand in number, into Phokis.<sup>1</sup> Having obtained possession of Pheræ and proclaimed it a free city, Philip proceeded to besiege the neighboring town of Pagasæ, the most valuable maritime station in Thessaly. How long Pagasæ resisted, we do not know; but long enough to send intimation to Athens, with entreaties for succor. The Athenians, alarmed at the successive conquests of Philip, were well-disposed to keep this important post out of his hands, which their naval power fully enabled them to do. But here again (as in the previous examples of Pydna, Potidæ, and Methônê), the aversion to personal service among the citizens individually — and the impediments as to apportionment of duty or cost, whenever actual outgoing was called for — produced the untoward result, that though an expedition was voted and despatched, it did not arrive in time.<sup>2</sup> Pagasæ surrendered

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 37.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 50 s. 40. Καίτοι, τί δήποτε νομίζετε.... τοὺς ἀποστόλους πάντας ὑμῖν ὑστερίζειν τῶν καιρῶν, τὸν εἰς Μεθώνην, τὸν εἰς Παγασαί, τὸν εἰς Ποτίδαιαν, etc.

Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 11 s. 9. Καὶ πάλιν ἦνικα Πύδνα, Ποτίδαια, Μεθώνη, Παγασαί — πολιορκούμενα ἀπηγγέλλετο, εἰ τότε τοῖς τῶν ἐνὶ τῷ πρώτῳ προθύμῳ καὶ ὡς προσήκειν ἐβοηθήσαμεν αὐτοῖς, etc.

The first Philippic was delivered in 352–351 B. C., which proves that Philip's capture of Pagasæ cannot have been later than that year. Nor can it have been earlier than his capture of Pheræ — as I have before remarked in reference to the passage of Diodorus (xvi. 31), where it seems to be placed in 354–353 B. C.; if Παγὰς is to be taken for Παγασαί.

I apprehend that the first campaign of Philip in Thessaly against the Phokians, wherein he was beaten and driven out by Onomarchus, may be placed in the summer of 353 B. C. The second entrance into Thessaly, with the defeat and death of Onomarchus, belongs to the early spring of 352 B. C. The capture of Pheræ and Pagasæ comes immediately afterwards when the expedition of Philip to Thermopylæ, where his progress was arrested by the Athenians comes about Midsummer 352 B. C.



and came into the power of Philip; who fortified and garrisoned it for himself, thus becoming master of the Pagasæan gulf, the great maritime inlet of Thessaly.

Philip was probably occupied for a certain time in making good his dominion over Thessaly. But as soon as sufficient precautions had been taken for this purpose, he sought to push his advantage over the Phokians by invading them in their own territory. He marched to Thermopylæ, still proclaiming as his aim the liberation of the Delphian temple and the punishment of its sacrilegious robbers; while he at the same time conciliated the favor of the Thesalians by promising to restore to them the Pylæa, or half-yearly Amphiktyonic festival at Thermopylæ, which the Phokians had discontinued.<sup>1</sup> The Phokians, though masters of this almost inexpugnable pass, seemed to have been so much disheartened by their recent defeat, and the death of Onomarchus, that they felt unable to maintain it long. The news of such a danger, transmitted to Athens, excited extraordinary agitation. The importance of defending Thermopylæ — and of prohibiting the victorious king of Macedon from coming to cooperate with the Thebans on the southern side of it,<sup>2</sup> not merely against the Phokians, but probably also against Attica — were so powerfully felt, that the usual hesitations and delay of the Athenians in respect to military expeditions were overcome. Chiefly from this cause — but partly also, we may suppose, from the vexatious disappointment recently incurred in the attempt to relieve Pagasæ — an Athenian armament under Nausikles (not less than five thousand foot and four hundred horse, according to Diodorus<sup>3</sup>) was fitted out with not less vigor and celerity than had been displayed against the Thebans in Eubœa, seven years before. Athenian citizens shook off their lethargy, and promptly volunteered. They reached Thermopylæ in good time, placing the pass in such a condition of defence that Philip did not attack it at all. Often afterwards does

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes, De Pace, p. 62 s. 23; Philippic ii. p. 71 s. 24; De Fals. Legat. p. 443. s. 365.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. p. 367. s. 94. p. 446. s. 375. *Τις γὰρ οὐκ ᾔδειν ὅτι τῷ Φωκίων πολέμῳ καὶ τῷ κυρίῳ εἶναι Πυλῶν Φωκίας, ἢ ἡ ἀπὸ Θηβαίων ἄδεια ἐπὶ ἤμιν, καὶ τὸ μηδεποτ' ἐλθεῖν ἂν εἰς Πελοπόννησον μὴδ' εἰς Εὐβοίαν Φιλισπον μὴδὲ Θηβαίους;*

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 37, 38.

Demosthenes,<sup>1</sup> in combating the general remissness of his countrymen when military exigencies arose, remind them of this unwonted act of energetic movement, crowned with complete effect. With little or no loss, the Athenians succeeded in guarding both themselves and their allies against a very menacing contingency, simply by the promptitude of their action. The cost of the armament altogether was more than two hundred talents; and from the stress which Demosthenes lays on that portion of the expense which was defrayed by the soldiers privately and individually,<sup>2</sup> we may gather that these soldiers (as in the Sicilian expedition under Nikias<sup>3</sup>) were in considerable proportion opulent citizens. Among a portion of the Grecian public, however, the Athenians incurred obloquy as accomplices in the Phokian sacrilege, and enemies of the Delphian god.<sup>4</sup>

But though Philip was thus kept out of Southern Greece, and the Phokians enabled to reorganize themselves against Thebes, yet in Thessaly and without the straits of Thermopylæ, Macedonian ascendancy was henceforward an uncontested fact. Before we follow his subsequent proceedings, however, it will be convenient to turn to events both in Phokis and in Peloponnesus.

In the depressed condition of the Phokians after the defeat of Onomarchus, they obtained reinforcement not only from Athens, but also from Sparta (one thousand men), and from the Peloponnesian Achæans (two thousand men<sup>5</sup>). Phayllus, the successor

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 44. s. 20, De Coronâ, p. 236. s. 40; De Fals. Leg. p. 444. s. 366.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. p. 367 s. 95.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. vi. 31.

<sup>4</sup> Justin, vii. 2. His rhetorical exaggerations ought not to make us reject the expression of this opinion against Athens, as a real fact.

<sup>5</sup> Demosthenes (Fals. Leg. p. 443) affirms that no one else except Athens assisted or rescued the Phokians in this emergency. But Diodorus (xvi. 37) mentions succors from the other allies also; and there seems no ground for disbelieving him. The boast of Demosthenes, however, that Athens singlehanded saved the Phokians, is not incorrect as to the main fact, though overstated in the expression. For the Athenians, commanding a naval force, and on this rare occasion rapid in their movements, reached Thermopylæ in time to arrest the progress of Philip, and before the Peloponnesian troops could arrive. The Athenian expedition to Thermopylæ seems to have occurred about May 352 B. C. — as far as we can make out the chronology of the time.



(by some called brother) of Onomarchus, put himself again in a condition of defence. He had recourse a third time to that yet unexhausted store—the Delphian treasures and valuables. He despoiled the temple to a greater extent than Philomelus, and not less than Onomarchus; incurring aggravated odium from the fact, that he could not now supply himself without laying hands on offerings of conspicuous magnificence and antiquity, which his two predecessors had spared. It was thus that the splendid golden donatives of the Lydian king Kræsus were now melted down and turned into money; one hundred and seventeen bricks or ingots of gold, most of them weighing two talents each; three hundred and sixty golden goblets, together with a female statue three cubits high, and a lion, of the same metal—said to have weighed in the aggregate thirty talents.<sup>1</sup> The abstraction of such ornaments, striking and venerable in the eyes of the numerous visitors of the temple, was doubtless deeply felt among the Grecian public. And the indignation was aggravated by the fact that beautiful youths or women, favorites of Onomarchus or Phayllus, received some of the most precious gifts, and wore the most noted ornaments, which had decorated the temple—even the necklaces of Helen and Eriphylê. One woman, a flute-player named Bromias, not only received from Phayllus a silver cup and a golden wreath (the former dedicated in the temple by the Phokæans, the latter by the Peparethians), but was also introduced by him, in his capacity of superintendent of the Pythian festival, to contend for the prize in playing the sacred Hymn. As the competitors for such prize had always been men, the assembled crowd so loudly resented the novelty, that Bromias was obliged to withdraw.<sup>2</sup> Moreover profuse largesses, and flagrant malversation, became more notorious than ever.<sup>3</sup> The Phokian leaders displayed with

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 56. The account of these donatives of Kræsus may be read in Herodotus (i. 50, 51), who saw them at Delphi. As to the exact weight and number, there is some discrepancy between him and Diodorus; moreover the text of Herodotus himself is not free from obscurity.

<sup>2</sup> Theopomp. Fragm. 182, 183; Phylarchus, Frag. 60, ed. Didot; Anaximenes and Ephorus ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 231, 232. The Pythian games here alluded to must have been those celebrated in August or September 350 B. C. It would seem therefore that Phayllus survived over that period.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 56, 57. The story annexed about Iphikrates and the ships

ostentation their newly-acquired wealth, and either imported for the first time bought slaves, or at least greatly multiplied the pre-existing number. It had before been the practice in Phokis, we are told, for the wealthy men to be served by the poor youthful freemen of the country; and complaints arose among the latter class that their daily bread was thus taken away.<sup>1</sup>

Notwithstanding the indignation excited by these proceedings not only throughout Greece, but even in Phokis itself,—Phayllus carried his point of levying a fresh army of mercenaries, and of purchasing new alliances among the smaller cities. Both Athens and Sparta profited more or less by the distribution; though the cost of the Athenian expedition to Thermopylæ, which rescued the Phokians from destruction, seems clearly to have been paid by the Athenians themselves.<sup>2</sup> Phayllus carried on war for some time against both the Bœotians and Lokrians. He is represented by Diodorus to have lost several battles. But it is certain that the general result was not unfavorable to him; that he kept possession of Orchomenus in Bœotia; and that his power remained without substantial diminution.<sup>3</sup>

The stress of war seems, for the time, to have been transferred to Peloponnesus, whither a portion both of the Phokian and Theban troops went to coöperate. The Lacedæmonians had at length opened their campaign against Megalopolis, of which I have

of Dionysius of Syracuse—a story which, at all events, comes quite out of its chronological place—appears to me not worthy of credit, in the manner in which Diodorus here gives it. The squadron of Dionysius, which Iphikrates captured on the coast of Korkyra, was coming to the aid and at the request of the Lacedæmonians, then at war with Athens (Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 2, 33). It was therefore a fair capture for an Athenian general, together with all on board. If, amidst the cargo, there happened to be presents intended for Olympia and Delphi, these, as being on board of ships of war, would follow the fate of the other persons and things along with them. They would not be considered as the property of the god until they had been actually dedicated in his temple. Nor would the person sending them be entitled to invoke the privilege of a consecrated cargo unless he divested it of hostile accompaniment. The letter of complaint to the Athenians, which Diodorus gives as having been sent by Dionysius, seems to me neither genuine nor even plausible.

<sup>1</sup> Timæus, Fragm. 67, ed. Didot; ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 264–272.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 57: compare Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 367.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 37, 38.



already spoken as having been debated before the Athenian public assembly. Their plan seems to have been formed some months before, when Onomarchus was at the maximum of his power, and when Thebes was supposed to be in danger; but it was not executed until after his defeat and death, when the Phokians, depressed for the time, were rescued only by the prompt interference of Athens, — and when the Thebans had their hands comparatively free. Moreover, the Theban division which had been sent into Asia under Pammenes a year or two before, to assist Artabazus, may now be presumed to have returned; especially as we know that no very long time afterwards, Artabazus appears as completely defeated by the Persian troops, — expelled from Asia, and constrained to take refuge, together with his brother-in-law Memnon, under the protection of Philip.<sup>1</sup> The Megalopolitans had sent envoys to entreat aid from Athens, under the apprehension that Thebes would not be in a condition to assist them. It may be doubted whether Athens would have granted their prayer, in spite of the advice of Demosthenes, — but the Thebans had now again become strong enough to uphold with their own force their natural allies in Peloponnesus.

Accordingly, when the Lacedæmonian army under king Archidamus invaded the Megalopolitan territory, a competent force was soon brought together to oppose them; furnished partly by the Argeians, — who had been engaged during the preceding year in a border warfare with Sparta, and had experienced a partial defeat at Orneæ,<sup>2</sup> — partly by the Sikyonians and Messenians, who came in full muster. Besides this, the forces on both sides from Bœotia and Phokis were transferred to Peloponnesus. The Thebans sent four thousand foot, and five hundred horse, under Kephision, to the aid of Megalopolis; while the Spartans not only recalled their own troops from Phokis, but also procured three thousand of the mercenaries in the service of Phayllus, and one hundred and fifty Thessalian horse from Likophron, the expelled despot of Pheræ. Archidamus received his reinforcements, and got together his aggregate forces earlier than the enemy. He advanced first into Arcadia, where he posted himself near Mantinea, thus cutting off the Argeians from Megalopolis; he next invaded

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 52.<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 34.

the territory of Argos, attacked Orneæ, and defeated the Argeians in a partial action. Presently the Thebans arrived, and effected a junction with their Argeian and Arcadian allies. The united force was greatly superior in number to the Lacedæmonians; but such superiority was counterbalanced by the bad discipline of the Thebans, who had sadly declined on this point during the interval of ten years since the death of Epaminondas. A battle ensued, partially advantageous to the Lacedæmonians; while the Argeians and Arcadians chose to go home to their neighboring cities. The Lacedæmonians also, having ravaged a portion of Arcadia, and stormed the Arcadian town of Helissus, presently recrossed their own frontier and returned to Sparta. They left, however, a division in Arcadia under Anaxander, who, engaging with the Thebans near Telphusa, was worsted with great loss and made prisoner. In two other battles, also, the Thebans were successively victorious; in a third, they were vanquished by the Lacedæmonians. With such balanced and undecided success was the war carried on until, at length, the Lacedæmonians proposed and concluded peace with Megalopolis. Either formally, or by implication, they were forced to recognize the autonomy of that city; thus abandoning, for the time at least, their aggressive purposes, which Demosthenes had combated and sought to frustrate before the Athenian assembly. The Thebans on their side returned home, having accomplished their object of protecting Megalopolis and Messênê; and we may presume that the Phokian allies of Sparta were sent home also.<sup>1</sup>

The war between the Bœotians and Phokians had doubtless slackened during this episode in Peloponnesus; but it still went on in a series of partial actions, on the river Kephissus, at Koroneia, at Abæ in Phokis, and near the Lokrian town of Naryx. For the most part, the Phokians are said to have been worsted; and their commander, Phayllus, presently died of a painful disease, — the suitable punishment (in the point of view of a Grecian historian<sup>2</sup>) for his sacrilegious deeds. He left as his successor Phalækus, a young man, son of Onomarchus, under the guardianship and advice of an experienced friend named Mnaseas. But Mnaseas was soon surprised at night, defeated, and slain, by the Thebans

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 39.<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 39.



while Phalaekus, left to his own resources, was defeated in two battles near Cheroneia, and was unable to hinder his enemies from ravaging a large part of the Phokian territory.<sup>1</sup>

We know the successive incidents of this ten years' Sacred War only from the meagre annals of Diodorus, — whose warm sympathy in favor of the religious side of the question seems to betray him into exaggeration of the victories of the Thebans, or at least into some omission of counterbalancing reverses. For in spite of these successive victories, the Phokians were noway put down, but remained in possession of the Boeotian town of Orchomenus; moreover, the Thebans became so tired out and impoverished by the war, that they confined themselves presently to desultory incursions and skirmishes.<sup>2</sup> Their losses fell wholly upon their own citizens and their own funds: while the Phokians fought with foreign mercenaries and with the treasures of the temple.<sup>3</sup> The increasing poverty of the Thebans even induced them to send an embassy to the Persian king, entreating pecuniary aid; which drew from him a present of three hundred talents. As he was at this time organizing a fresh expedition on an immense scale, for the reconquest of Phenicia and Egypt, after more than one preceding failure, he required Grecian soldiers as much as the Greeks required his money. Hence we shall see presently that the Thebans were able to send him an equivalent.

In the war just recounted, on the Laconian and Arcadian frontier, the Athenians had taken no part. Their struggle with Philip had been becoming from month to month more serious and embarrassing. By occupying in time the defensible pass of Thermopylae, they had indeed prevented him both from crushing the Phokians and from meddling with the Southern states of Greece. But the final battle wherein he had defeated Onomarchus, had materially increased both his power and his military reputation. The numbers on both sides were very great; the result was de-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 38, 39.

Diodor. xvi. 40. ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων, Θηβαῖοι κάμνοντες τῷ πρὸς Φωκεῖς πολέμῳ, καὶ χρημάτων ἀπυροῦμενοι, πρέσβεις ἐξέπεμψαν πρὸς τὸν τῶν Περσῶν βασιλέα.... Τοῖς δὲ Βοιωτοῖς καὶ τοῖς Φωκεῦσιν ἀκροβολισμοὶ μὲν καὶ χώρας καταδρομαὶ συνέστησαν, πρῆξεις δὲ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν (351-350 B. C. — according to the chronology of Diodorus) οὐ συνετελέσθησαν

<sup>2</sup> Isokrates, Orat. v. (ad Philipp.) s. 61.

cisive, and ruinous to the vanquished; moreover, we cannot doubt that the Macedonian phalanx, with the other military improvements and manœuvres which Philip had been gradually organizing since his accession, was now exhibited in formidable efficiency. The King of Macedon had become the ascendent soldier and potentate, hanging on the skirts of the Grecian world, exciting fears or hopes, or both at once, in every city throughout its limits. In the first Philippic of Demosthenes, and in his oration against Aristokrates, (delivered between midsummer 352 B. C. and midsummer 351 B. C.), we discern evident marks of the terrors which Philip had come to inspire, within a year after his repulse from Thermopylae, to reflecting Grecian politicians. "It is impossible for Athens (says the orator<sup>1</sup>) to provide any land-force competent to contend in the field against that of Philip."

The reputation of his generalship and his indefatigable activity was already everywhere felt; as well as that of the officers and soldiers, partly native Macedonians, partly chosen Greeks, whom he had assembled round him,<sup>2</sup> — especially the lochages or front-rank men of the phalanx and the hypaspistæ. Moreover, the excellent cavalry of Thessaly became embodied from henceforward as an element in the Macedonian army; since Philip had acquired unbounded ascendancy in that country, from his expulsion of the Pheræan despots and their auxiliaries the Phokians. The philo-Macedonian party in the Thessalian cities had constituted him federal chief (or in some sort Tagus) of the country, not only enrolling their cavalry in his armies, but also placing at his disposal the customs and market-dues, which formed a standing common fund for supporting the Thessalian collective administration.<sup>3</sup> The financial means of Philip, for payment of his foreign troops,

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 46. s. 26. (352-351 B. C.)

Compare Philippic iii. p. 124. s. 63.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes, Olynth. ii. p. 23. s. 17 (delivered in 350 B. C.) .....Οἱ δὲ ἢ περὶ αὐτὸν ὄντες ξένοι καὶ πεζέταιροι δόξαν μὲν καὶ ἔχουσιν ὥς εἰσι θαυμαστοὶ καὶ συγκεκροτημένοι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 657. s. 133 (352-351 B. C.); also Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 15. s. 23. (349 B. C.) ἤκουον δ' ἐγωγέ τινων ὥς οὐδὲ τῆς λίμενας καὶ τὰς ἀγορὰς ἔτι δώσοιεν αὐτῷ καρποῦσθαι· τὰ γὰρ κοινὰ τὰ Θετταλῶν ἀπὸ τούτων δέοι διοικεῖν, οὐ Φίλιππον λαμβάνειν· εἰ δὲ τούτων ἀποστερηθῇσεται τῶν χρημάτων, εἰς στενὸν κομιδὴ τὰ τῆς τροφῆς τοῖς ξένοις σὺν ᾧ καταστήσεται.



and prosecution of his military enterprises, were thus materially increased.

But besides his irresistible land-force, Philip had now become master of no inconsiderable naval power also. During the early years of the war, though he had taken not only Amphipolis, but also all the Athenian possessions on the Macedonian coast, yet the exports from his territory had been interrupted by the naval force of Athens, so as to lessen seriously the produce of his export duties.<sup>1</sup> But he had now contrived to get together a sufficient number of armed ships and privateers, if not to ward off such damage from himself, at least to retaliate it upon Athens. Her navy, indeed, was still incomparably superior, but the languor and remissness of her citizens refused to bring it out with efficiency; while Philip had opened for himself a new avenue to maritime power by his acquisition of Pheræ and Pagasæ, and by establishing his ascendancy over the Magnètes and their territory, round the eastern border of the Pagasæan Gulf. That gulf (now known by the name of Volo), is still the great inlet and outlet for Thessalian trade; the eastern coast of Thessaly, along the line of Mount Pelion, being craggy and harborless.<sup>2</sup> The naval force belonging to Pheræ and its seaport Pagasæ, was very considerable, and had been so even from the times of the despots, Jason and Alexander;<sup>3</sup> at one moment painfully felt even by Athens. All these ships now passed into the service of Philip, together with the dues on export and import levied round the Pagasæan Gulf; the command of which he farther secured by erecting suitable fortifications on the Magnesian shore, and by placing a garrison in Pagasæ.<sup>4</sup> Such additional naval means, combined

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 657. s. 131-133 (352-351 B. C.); compare Isokrates, Orat. v. (ad Philipp. s. 5.)

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. v. 4, 56; Hermippus ap. Athenæum, i. p. 27. About the lucrative commerce in the Gulf, in reference to Demetrias and Thebæ Phthiotides, see Livy, xxxix. 25.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenes cont. Polykl. p. 1207; De Coronâ Trierarchicâ, p. 1230; Diodor. xv. 95; Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 11.

<sup>4</sup> Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 15. s. 23. Καὶ γὰρ Παγασᾶς ἀπαιτεῖν οὐτὸν εἰσὶν ἐψηφισμένοι (the Thessalians re-demand the place from Philip), καὶ Μαγνησίαν κεκωλύκασιν τεχίζειν. In Olynth. ii. p. 21. s. 11. it stands — καὶ γὰρ οὖν εἰσὶν ἐψηφισμένοι Παγασᾶς ἱπαιτεῖν, καὶ περὶ Μαγνησίας λόγους ποιεῖν. I take the latter expression to state the fact with more strict pre-

with what he already possessed at Amphipolis and elsewhere, made him speedily annoying, if not formidable, to Athens, even at sea. His triremes showed themselves everywhere, probably in small and rapidly moving squadrons. He levied large contributions on the insular allies of Athens, and paid the costs of war greatly out of the capture of merchant vessels in the Ægean. His squadrons made incursions on the Athenian islands of Lemnos and Imbros, carrying off several Athenian citizens as prisoners. They even stretched southward as far as Geræstus, the southern promontory of Eubœa, where they not only fell in with and captured a lucrative squadron of corn-ships, but also insulted the coast of Attica itself in the opposite bay of Marathon, towing off as a prize one of the sacred triremes.<sup>1</sup> Such was the mischief

cision; the Thessalians passed a vote to remonstrate with Philip; it is not probable that they actually hindered him. And if he afterwards "gave to them Magnesia," as we are told in a later oration delivered 344 B. C. (Philippic ii. p. 71. s. 24), he probably gave it with reserve of the fortified posts to himself; since we know that his ascendancy over Thessaly was not only not relaxed, but became more violent and compressive.

The value which the Macedonian kings always continued to set, from this time forward, upon Magnesia and the recess of the Pagasæan Gulf, is shown in the foundation of the city of Demetrias in that important position, by Demetrius Poliorketes, about sixty years afterwards. Demetrias, Chalkis, and Corinth came to be considered the most commanding positions in Greece.

This fine bay, with the fertile territory lying on its shores under Mount Pelion, are well described by colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iv. ch. 41. p. 373 seqq. I doubt whether either Ulpian (ad Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 24) or colonel Leake (p. 381) are borne out in supposing that there was any town called *Magnesia* on the shores of the Gulf. None such is mentioned either by Strabo or by Skylax; and I apprehend that the passages above cited from Demosthenes mean *Magnesia* the region inhabited by the Magnetes; as in Demosthenes cont. Neæram. p. 1382. s. 141.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 46. s. 25. δὲ γὰρ, ἔχοντας ἐκεῖνον ναυτικὸν, καὶ ταχειῶν τριηρῶν ἡμῖν, ὅπως ἀσφαλὲς ἡ δύναμις πλέη. — p. 49. s. 38. Πρὸς τὸν μὲν, τὸν μέγιστον τῶν ἐκείνου πόρων ἀφαιρήσεσθε· ἐστὶ δ' αὖτος τις, ἐπὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἡμῖν πολεμῇ συμμάχων, ἄγων καὶ φέρων τοὺς πλείονας τῇ θάλασσᾳ. Ἐπειτα, τί πρὸς τοῦτο; τοῦ πάσχειν αὐτοὶ κακῶς ἐξω γενήσεσθε οὐχ ὥσπερ τὸν παρελθόντα χρόνον εἰς Λήμνον καὶ Ἰμβρον ἐμβαλὼν αἰχμαλώτους πολίτας ὑμετέρους ὥχετ' ἄγων, πρὸς τῷ Γεραίστῳ τὰ πλοῖα συλλαβὼν ἀμύθητα χρήματ' ἐξέλεξε, τὰ τελευταῖα εἰ; Μαραθῶνα ἀπέβη, καὶ τὴν ἱερὰν ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας ὥχετ' ἔχων τριήρη, etc.

We can hardly be certain that the Sacred Trireme thus taken was citæ



successfully inflicted by the flying squadrons of Philip, though Athens had probably a considerable number of cruisers at sea, and certainly a far superior number of ships at home in Peiræus. Her commerce, and even her coasts, were disturbed and endangered; her insular allies suffered yet more. Eubœa especially, the nearest and most important of all her allies, separated only by a narrow strait from the Pagasæan Gulf and the southern coast of Phthiotis, was now within the immediate reach not only of Philip's marauding vessels, but also of his political intrigues.

It was thus that the war against Philip turned more and more to the disgrace and disadvantage of the Athenians. Though they had begun it in the hope of punishing him for his duplicity in appropriating Amphipolis, they had been themselves the losers by the capture of Pydna, Potidæa, Methônê, etc.; and they were now thrown upon the defensive, without security for their maritime allies, their commerce, or their coasts.<sup>1</sup> The intelligence of these various losses and insults endured at sea, in spite of indisputable maritime preponderance, called forth at Athens acrimonious complaints against the generals of the state, and exaggerated outbursts of enmity against Philip.<sup>2</sup> That prince, having spent a few months, after his repulse from Thermopylæ, in Thessaly, and having so far established his ascendancy over that country that he could leave the completion of the task to his officers, pushed with his characteristic activity into Thrace. He there took part in the disputes between various native princes, expelling some, confirming or installing others, and extending his own dominion at the cost of all.<sup>3</sup> Among these princes were probably Kersobleptes, and Amadokus; for Philip carried his aggressions to the immediate neighborhood of the Thracian Chersonese.

In November, 352 B. C., intelligence reached Athens, that he the Paralus or the Salaminia; there may have been other sacred triremes besides these two.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 52. s. 49. ὁρῶν τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν τοῦ πολέμου γεγενημένην ὑπὲρ τοῦ τιμωρῆσθαι Φίλιππον, τὴν δὲ τελευτὴν οὖσαν ἤδη σπέρ του μὴ παθεῖν κακῶς ὑπὸ Φιλίππου. (Between Midsummer 352 and Midsummer 351 B. C.)

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 660. s. 144. p. 656. s. 130. Ἄλλ' ὁ μάλιστα δοκῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ἐχθρὸς εἶναι Φίλιππος οὕτως, etc. (this harangue was between Midsummer 352 and Midsummer 251 B. C.)

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13.

was in Thrace besieging Heræon Teichos; a place so near to the Chersonese,<sup>1</sup> that the Athenian possessions and colonists in that peninsula were threatened with considerable danger. So great was the alarm and excitement caused by this news, that a vote was immediately passed in the public assembly to equip a fleet of forty triremes, — to man it with Athenian citizens, all persons up to the age of forty-five being made liable to serve on the expedition, — and to raise sixty talents by a direct property tax. At first active steps were taken to accelerate the armament. But before the difficulties of detail could be surmounted, — before it could be determined, amidst the general aversion to personal service, what citizens should go abroad, and how the burthen of trierarchy should be distributed, — fresh messengers arrived from the Chersonese, reporting first that Philip had fallen sick, next that he was actually dead.<sup>2</sup> The last-mentioned report proved false; but the sickness of Philip was an actual fact, and seems to have been severe enough to cause a temporary suspension of his military operations. Though the opportunity became thus only the more

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes, Olynth. iii. p. 29. s. 5 (delivered in the latter half of 350 B. C.)

ἀπηγγέλθη Φίλιππος ἡμῖν ἐν Θράκη, τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ἔτος τοῦτ', Ἡραίων τεῖχος πολιορκῶν, τότε τοίνυν μὴ μὲν ἦν Μαίμακτηριῶν, etc.

This Thracian expedition of Philip (alluded to also in Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13) stands fixed to the date of November 352 B. C., on reasonably good grounds.

That the town or fortress called Ἡραίων Τεῖχος was near to the Chersonese, cannot be doubted. The commentators identify it with Ἡραῖον, mentioned by Herodotus (iv. 90) as being near Perinthus. But this hypothesis is open to much doubt. Ἡραῖον Τεῖχος is not quite the same as Ἡραῖον; nor was the latter place very near to the Chersonese; nor would Philip be yet in a condition to provoke or menace so powerful a city as Perinthus — though he did so ten years afterwards. (Diodor. xvi. 74).

I cannot think that we know where Ἡραῖον Τεῖχος was situated; except that it was in Thrace, and near the Chersonese.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes, Olynth. iii. p. 29, 30. ὡς γὰρ ἡγγέλθη Φίλιππος ἀσθενῶν ἢ τεθνεῶς (ἤλθε γὰρ ἀμφοτέρω), etc. These reports of the sickness and death of Philip in Thrace are alluded to in the first Philippic, p. 43. s. 14. The expedition of Philip threatening the Chersonese, and the vote passed by the Athenians when they first heard of this expedition, are also alluded to in the first Philippic, p. 44. s. 20. p. 51. s. 46. καὶ ὑμεῖς, ἂν ἐν Χερρόνησῳ πύθησθε Φίλιππον, ἐκείσε βοηθεῖν ψηφίζεσθε, etc. When Philip was besieging Ἡραῖον Τεῖχος, he was said to be ἐν Χερρόνησῳ.



favorable for attacking Philip, yet the Athenians, no longer spurred on by the fear of farther immediate danger, relapsed into their former languor, and renounced or postponed their intended armament. After passing the whole ensuing summer in inaction, they could only be prevailed upon, in the month of September 351, to despatch to Thrace a feeble force under the mercenary chief Charidemus; ten triremes, without any soldiers aboard, and with no more than five talents in money.<sup>1</sup>

At this time Charidemus was at the height of his popularity. It was supposed that he could raise and maintain a mercenary band by his own ingenuity and valor. His friends confidently averred, before the Athenian assembly, that he was the only man capable of putting down Philip, and conquering Amphipolis.<sup>2</sup> One of these partisans, Aristokrates, even went so far as to propose that a vote should be passed ensuring inviolability to his person, and enacting that any one who killed him should be seized wherever found in the territory of Athens or her allies. This proposition was attacked judicially by an accuser named Euthykses, who borrowed a memorable discourse from the pen of Demosthenes.

It was thus that the real sickness, and reported death, of Philip, which ought to have operated as a stimulus to the Athenians by exposing to them their enemy during a moment of peculiar weakness, proved rather an opiate exaggerating their chronic lethargy, and cheating them into a belief that no farther efforts were needed. That belief appears to have been proclaimed by the leading, best-known, and senior speakers, those who gave the tone to the public assembly, and who were principally relied upon for advice. These men, — probably Eubulus at their head, and Phokion, so constantly named as general, along with him, — either did not feel, or could not bring themselves to proclaim, the painful necessity of personal military service and increased taxation. Though repeated debates took place on the insults offered to Athens in her maritime dignity, and on the sufferings of those

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes, Olynth. iii. p. 30. s. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 625. s. 14. p. 682, 683. This oration, delivered between Midsummer 352 and Midsummer 351 B. C., seems to have been prior to November 352 B. C., when the news reached Athens that Philip was besieging Ἡράκλειον.

allies to whom she owed protection, — combined with accusations against the generals, and complaints of the inefficiency of such mercenary foreigners as Athens took into commission but never paid, — still, the recognized public advisers shrank from appeal to the dormant patriotism or personal endurance of the citizens. The serious, but indispensable, duty which they thus omitted, was performed for them by a younger competitor, far beneath them in established footing and influence, — Demosthenes, now about thirty years old, — in an harangue, known as the first Philippic.

We have already had before us this aspiring man, as a public adviser in the assembly. In his first parliamentary harangue two years before,<sup>1</sup> he had begun to inculcate on his countrymen the

<sup>1</sup> I adopt the date accepted by most critics, on the authority of Dionysius of Halikarnassus, to the first Philippic; the archonship of Aristodemus 352–351 B. C. It belongs, I think, to the latter half of that year.

The statements of Dionysius bearing on this oration have been much called in question; to a certain extent, with good reason, in what he states about the *sixth* Philippic (ad Ammæum, p. 736). What he calls the *sixth*, is in reality the *fifth* in his own enumeration, coming next after the first Philippic and the three Olynthiacs. To the Oratio De Pace, which is properly the *sixth* in his enumeration, he assigns no ordinal number whatever. What is still more perplexing — he gives as the initial words of what he calls the *sixth* Philippic, certain words which occur in the middle of the first Philippic, immediately after the financial scheme read by Demosthenes to the people, the words, Ἄ μὲν ἡμεῖς, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δεδυνήμεθα εἰπεῖν, ταῦτ' ἐστίν (Philipp. i. p. 48). If this were correct, we should have to divide the first Philippic into two parts, and recognize the latter part (after the words Ἄ μὲν ἡμεῖς) as a separate and later oration. Some critics, among them Dr. Thirlwall, agree so far with Dionysius as to separate the latter part from the former, and to view it as a portion of some later oration. I follow the more common opinion, accepting the oration as one. There is a confusion, either in the text or the affirmations, of Dionysius, which has never yet been, perhaps cannot be, satisfactorily cleared up.

Böhnecke (in his *Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Attischen Redner*, p. 222 seq.) has gone into a full and elaborate examination of the first Philippic and all the controversy respecting it. He rejects the statement of Dionysius altogether. He considers that the oration as it stands now is one whole, but delivered three years later than Dionysius asserts: not in 351 B. C., but in the Spring of 348 B. C., after the three Olynthiacs, and a little before the fall of Olynthus. He notices various chronological points (in my judgment none of them proving his point) tending to show that the harangue cannot have been delivered so early as 351 B. C. But I think the difficulty of supposing that the oration was spoken at so late a period of the



general lesson of energy and self-reliance, and to remind them of that which the comfort, activity, and peaceful refinement of Athenian life, had a constant tendency to put out of sight:— That the City, as a whole, could not maintain her security and dignity against enemies, unless each citizen individually, besides his home-duties, were prepared to take his fair share, readily and without evasion, of the hardship and cost of personal service abroad. But he had then been called upon to deal (in his discourse *De Symmoriis*) only with the contingency of Persian hostilities — possible indeed, yet neither near nor declared; he now renews the same exhortation under more pressing exigencies. He has to protect interests already suffering, and to repel dishonorable insults, becoming from month to month more frequent, from an indefatigable enemy. Successive assemblies have been occupied with complaints from sufferers, amidst a sentiment of unwonted chagrin and helplessness among the public — yet with no material comfort from the leading and established speakers; who content themselves with inveighing against the negligence of the mercenaries — taken into service by Athens but never paid — and with threatening to impeach the generals. The assembly, wearied by repetition of topics promising no improvement for the future, is convoked, probably to hear some farther instance of damage committed by the Macedonian cruisers, when Demosthenes, breaking through the common formalities of precedence, rises first to address them.

It had once been the practice at Athens, that the herald formally proclaimed, when a public assembly was opened — “Who among the citizens above fifty years old wishes to speak? and after them, which of the other citizens in his turn?”<sup>2</sup> Though this old proclamation had fallen into disuse, the habit still remained, that speakers of advanced age and experience rose first after the debate had been opened by the presiding magistrates. But the relations of Athens with Philip had been so often discussed, that all these men had already delivered their sentiments and exhausted

Olynthian war, and yet that nothing is said in it about that war, and next to nothing about Olynthus itself — is greater than any of those difficulties which Bohncke tries to make good against the earlier date.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes, *De Symmor* p. 182. s. 18.

*Æschines cont. Ktesiphont.* p. 366.

their recommendations. “Had their recommendations been good, you need not have been now debating the same topic over again”<sup>1</sup> — says Demosthenes, as an apology for standing forward out of his turn to produce his own views.

His views indeed were so new, so independent of party-sympathies or antipathies, and so plain-spoken in comments on the past as well as in demands for the future — that they would hardly have been proposed except by a speaker instinct with the ideal of the Periclean foretime, familiar to him from his study of Thucydides. In explicit language, Demosthenes throws the blame of the public misfortunes, not simply on the past advisers and generals of the people, but also on the people themselves.<sup>2</sup> It is from this proclaimed fact that he starts, as his main ground of hope for future improvement. Athens contended formerly with honor against the Lacedæmonians; and now also, she will exchange disgrace for victory in her war against Philip, if her citizens individually will shake off their past inertness and negligence, each of them henceforward becoming ready to undertake his full share of personal duty in the common cause. Athens had undergone enough humiliation, and more than enough, to teach her this lesson. She might learn it farther from her enemy Philip himself, who had raised himself from small beginnings, and heaped losses as well as shame upon her, mainly by his own personal energy, perseverance, and ability; while the Athenian citizens had been hitherto so backward as individuals, and so unprepared as a public, that even if a lucky turn of fortune were to hand over to them Amphipolis, they would be in no condition to

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. *Philipp.* i. init. . . . *Εἰ μὲν περὶ καινοῦ τινὸς πράγματος προτίθετο λέγειν, ἐπισχὼν ἂν ἔως οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν εἰωθότων γνώμην ἀπεφύγαντο. . . . Ἐπειδὴ δὲ περὶ ὧν πολλάκις εἰρήκασιν οὗτοι πρότερον συμβαίνει καὶ νυνὶ σκοπεῖν, ἡγοῦμαι καὶ πρῶτος ἀναστὰς εἰκότως ἂν συγγνώμης τυγχάνειν. εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου τὰ δέοντα οὐτοὶ συνεβούλευσαν, οὐδὲν ἂν ὑμᾶς νῦν ἔδει βουλευέσθαι.*

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes, *Philippic* i. p. 40, 41. *Ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν δέοντων ποιοῦντων ὑμῶν κακῶς τὰ πράγματα ἔχει. ἐπεὶ τοι, εἰ πάνθ' ἃ προσήκε πραττόντων οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδ' ἂν ἔλπις ἦν αὐτὰ βελτίω γενέσθαι. etc.* Again, p. 42. *Ἄν τοίνυν καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐπὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐθελήσητε γενέσθαι γνώμης νῦν, ἐπειδὴ περ οὐ πρότερον, . . . καὶ παύσησθε αὐτὸς μὲν οὐδέ τις ἑκαστος ποιήσειν ἐλπίζων, τὸν δὲ πᾶσιον πάνθ' ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ πράξειν. etc.*

Compare the previous harangue, *De Symmoriis*, p. 182. s. 18.



seize it.<sup>1</sup> Should the rumor prove true, that this Philip were dead, they would soon make for themselves another Philip equally troublesome.

After thus severely commenting on the past apathy of the citizens, and insisting upon a change of disposition as indispensable, Demosthenes proceeds to specify the particular acts whereby such change ought to be manifested. He entreats them not to be startled by the novelty of his plan, but to hear him patiently to the end. It is the result of his own meditations; other citizens may have better to propose; if they have, he shall not be found to stand in their way. What is past, cannot be helped; nor is extemporaneous speech the best way of providing remedies for a difficult future.<sup>2</sup>

He advises first, that a fleet of fifty triremes shall be immediately put in readiness; that the citizens shall firmly resolve to serve in person on board, whenever the occasion may require, and that triremes and other vessels shall be specially fitted out for half of the horsemen of the city, who shall serve personally also. This force is to be kept ready to sail at a moment's notice, and to meet Philip in any of his sudden out-marches — to Chersonesus, to Thermopylae, to Olynthus, etc.<sup>3</sup>

Secondly, that a farther permanent force shall be set on foot immediately, to take the aggressive, and carry on active continuous warfare against Philip, by harassing him in various points of his own country. Two thousand infantry, and two hundred horse, will be sufficient; but it is essential that one-fourth part — five hundred of the former and fifty of the latter — shall be citizens of Athens. The remainder are to be foreign mercenaries; ten

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 43. s. 15. ὥς δὲ νῦν ἔχετε, οὐδὲ διδόντων τῶν καιρῶν Ἀμφίπολιν δέξασθαι δύνασθ' ἂν, ἀπηρτημένοι καὶ ταῖς παρὰ κεναῖς καὶ ταῖς γνώμας.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes, Philip. i. p. 44. . . . ἐπειδὴν ἅπαντα ἀκούσητε, κρίνατε — μὴ πρότερον προλαμβάνετε· μὴδ' ἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς δοκῶ τινὶ καὶ νῦν παρασκευὴν λέγειν, ἀναβάλλειν με τὰ πράγματα ἡγεῖσθω· σὺ γὰρ οἱ ταχὺ καὶ τήμερον εἰπόντες μάλιστα εἰς δεῖν λέγουσιν, etc.

. . . Οἶμαι τοίνυν ἐγὼ ταῦτα λέγειν ἔχειν, μὴ κωλύων εἰ τις ἄλλος ἐπαγγέλλεται τι.

This deprecatory tone deserves notice, and the difficulty which the speaker anticipates in obtaining a hearing.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 44, 45.

swift sailing war triremes are also to be provided to protect the transports against the naval force of Philip. The citizens are to serve by relays, relieving each other; every one for a time fixed beforehand, yet none for a very long time.<sup>1</sup> The orator then proceeds to calculate the cost of such a standing force for one year. He assigns to each seaman, and to each foot soldier, ten drachmæ per month, or two oboli per day; to each horseman, thirty drachmæ per month, or one drachma (six oboli) per day. No difference is made between the Athenian citizen and the foreigner. The sum here assigned is not full pay, but simply the cost of each man's maintenance. At the same time, Demosthenes pledges himself, that if thus much be furnished by the state, the remainder of a full pay (or as much again) will be made up by what the soldiers will themselves acquire in the war; and that too, without wrong done to allies or neutral Greeks. The total annual cost thus incurred will be ninety-two talents (=about £22,000.) He does not give any estimate of the probable cost of his other armament, of fifty triremes: which are to be equipped and ready at a moment's notice for emergencies, but not sent out on permanent service.

His next task is, to provide ways and means for meeting such additional cost of ninety-two talents. Here he produces and reads to the assembly, a special financial scheme, drawn up in writing. Not being actually embodied in the speech, the scheme has been unfortunately lost; though its contents would help us materially to appreciate the views of Demosthenes.<sup>2</sup> It must have been more or less complicated in its details; not a simple proposition for an *eisphora* or property-tax, which would have been announced in a sentence of the orator's speech.

Assuming the money, the ships, and the armament for permanent service, to be provided, Demosthenes proposes that a formal law be passed, making such permanent service peremptory; the general in command being held responsible for the efficient employment of the force.<sup>3</sup> The islands, the maritime allies, and the commerce of the Ægean would then become secure; while the

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 45, 46.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 48, 49. Ἄ δ' ὑπάρξαι δεῖ παρ' ὑμῶν, ταῦτα ἴσθιν ἀγὼ γέγραφα.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 49. s. 37.



profits of Philip from his captures at sea would be arrested.<sup>1</sup> The quarters of the armament might be established, during winter or bad weather, in Skiathos, Thasos, Lemnos, or other adjoining islands, from whence they could act at all times against Philip on his own coast; while from Athens it was difficult to arrive thither either during the prevalence of the Etesian winds or during winter—the seasons usually selected by Philip for his aggressions.<sup>2</sup>

The aggregate means of Athens (Demosthenes affirmed) in men, money, ships, hoplites, horsemen, were greater than could be found anywhere else. But hitherto they had never been properly employed. The Athenians, like awkward pugilists, waited for Philip to strike, and then put up their hand to follow his blow. They never sought to look him in the face—nor to be ready with a good defensive system beforehand—nor to anticipate him in offensive operations.<sup>3</sup> While their religious festivals, the Panathenaic, Dionysiac, and others, were not only celebrated with costly splendor, but prearranged with the most careful pains, so that nothing was ever wanting in detail at the moment of execution—their military force was left without organization or predetermined system. Whenever any new encroachment of Philip was made known, nothing was found ready to meet it; fresh decrees were to be voted, modified, and put in execution, for each special occasion; the time for action was wasted in preparation, and before a force could be placed on shipboard, the moment for execution had passed.<sup>4</sup> This practice of waiting for Philip to act offensively,

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 49. s. 38, 39.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 48, 49. "The obstinacy and violence of the Etesian winds, in July and August, are well known to those who have had to struggle with them in the Ægean during that season" (Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iv. ch. 42. p. 426).

The Etesian winds, blowing from the north, made it difficult to reach Macedonia from Athens.

Compare Demosthenes, De Rebus Chersonesi, p. 93. s. 14.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 51. s. 46. "... ἡμεῖς δὲ, πλειστον δύναμιν ἅπαντων ἔχοντες, τριηρεῖς, ὀπλίτας, ἱππέας, χρημάτων πρόσδοτον, τούτων μὲν μέχρι τῆς τήμερον ἡμέρας οὐδενὶ πώπο. εἰς δέον τι κέχρησθε.

<sup>4</sup> Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 50. ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ τοῦ πολέμου ἀτακτα, ἀδιόδοῦσιν, ἀόριστα, ἅπαντα. Τοιγαροῦν ἅμα ἀκηκόαμεν τι καὶ τριηράρχους καθΐς

and then sending aid to the point attacked, was ruinous; the war must be carried on by a standing force put in motion beforehand.<sup>1</sup>

To provide and pay such a standing force, is one of the main points in the project of Demosthenes. The absolute necessity that it shall consist, in large proportion at least, of citizens, is another. To this latter point he reverts again and again, insisting that the foreign mercenaries—sent out to make their pay where or how they could, and unaccompanied by Athenian citizens—were at best useless and untrustworthy. They did more mischief to friends and allies, who were terrified at the very tidings of their approach—than to the enemy.<sup>2</sup> The general, unprovided with funds to pay them, was compelled to follow them wheresoever they chose to go, disregarding his orders received from the city. To try him afterwards for that which he could not help, was unprofitable disgrace. But if the troops were regularly paid; if, besides, a considerable proportion of them were Athenian citizens, themselves interested in success, and inspectors of all that was done; then the general would be found willing and able to attack the enemy with vigor—and might be held to a rigorous accountability, if he did not. Such was the only way in which the formidable and ever-growing force of their enemy Philip could be successfully combated. As matters now stood, the inefficiency of Athenian operations was so ridiculous, that men might be tempted to doubt whether Athens was really in earnest. Her chief military

ταμεν, καὶ τούτοις ἀντιδόσεις ποιούμεθα καὶ περὶ χρημάτων πορὸν σκοπούμεν, etc.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 48, 49. δεῖ—μὴ βοηθείαις πολεμεῖν (ὕστερσι μὲν γὰρ ἅπαντων) ἀλλὰ παρασκευῇ συνεχεῖ καὶ δυνάμει.

Compare his Oration De Rebus Chersonesi, p. 92. s. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 46. s. 28. ἐξ οὗ δ' αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ ξενικὰ ὄμιν στρατεύεται, τοὺς φίλους νικᾷ καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους, οἱ δ' ἐχθροὶ μείζονες τοῦ δέοντος γέγονασι· καὶ παρακύναντα ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς πόλεως πόλεμον, πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον καὶ πανταχοῖ μάλλον οἴχεται πλέοντα, ὃ δὲ στρατηγὸς ἀκολουθεῖ εἰκότως· οὗ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄρχειν μὴ δίδόντα μισθόν. Τί οὖν κελεύω; τὰς προφάσεις ἀφελεῖν καὶ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν, μισθὸν πορίσαντας καὶ στρατιώτας οἰκίους ὥσπερ ἐπόπτας τῶν στρατηγουμένων παρακαταστήσαντας, etc.

..... p. 53. s. 51. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐχθροὶ καταγελώσιν, οἱ δὲ σύμμαχοι τεθνήσκει τῷ ἄδει τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἀποστόλους, etc.



officers — her ten generals, ten taxiarchs, ten phylarchs, and two hipparchs, annually chosen — were busied only in the affairs of the city and in the showy religious processions. They left the real business of war to a foreign general named Menelaus.<sup>1</sup> Such a system was disgraceful. The honor of Athens ought to be maintained by her own citizens, both as generals and as soldiers.

Such are the principal features in the discourse called the First Philippic; the earliest public harangue delivered by Demosthenes to the Athenian assembly, in reference to the war with Philip. It is not merely a splendid piece of oratory, emphatic and forcible in its appeal to the emotions; bringing the audience by many different roads, to the main conviction which the orator seeks to impress; profoundly animated with genuine Pan-hellenic patriotism, and with the dignity of that free Grecian world now threatened by a monarch from without. It has other merits besides, not less important in themselves, and lying more immediately within the scope of the historian. We find Demosthenes, yet only thirty years old — young in political life — and thirteen years before the battle of Chæroneia — taking accurate measure of the political relations between Athens and Philip; examining those relations during the past, pointing out how they had become every year more unfavorable, and foretelling the dangerous contingencies of the future, unless better precautions were taken; exposing with courageous frankness not only the past mismanagement of public men, but also those defective dispositions of the people themselves wherein such management had its root; lastly, after fault found, adventuring on his own responsibility to propose specific measures of correction, and urging upon reluctant citizens a painful imposition of personal hardship as well as of taxation. We shall find him insisting on the same obligation, irksome alike to the leading politicians and to the people,<sup>2</sup> throughout all the Olynthiacs and

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 47. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε λέλωσ' ἐσθ' ὡς χρώμεθα τοῖς πράγμασι.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 54 s. 58. 'Εγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐτ' ἄλλοτε πώποτε πρὸς χάριν εἰλόμην λέγειν, ὅτι ἂν μὴ καὶ συνοίσειν ὑμῖν πεπεισμένος ὦ, νῦν τε ἂ γινώσκω πάντ' ἀπλῶς, οὐδὲν ὑποστειλάμενος, πεπαθήρησάμην. 'Εβουλόμην δ' ἂν, ὥσπερ ὅτι ὑμῖν συμφέρει τὰ βέλτιστα ἀκούειν οἶδα, οὕτως εἰδέναι συνοίσειν καὶ τῷ τὰ βέλτιστα εἰπόντι: πολλῶν γὰρ ἂν ἡδίων εἴπον. Νῦν δ' ἐπ'

Philippics. We note his warnings given at this early day, when timely prevention would have been easily practicable; and his superiority to elder politicians like Eubulus and Phokion, in prudent appreciation, in foresight, and in courage of speaking out unpalatable truths. More than twenty years after this period, when Athens had lost the game and was in her phase of humiliation, Demosthenes (in repelling the charges of those who imputed her misfortune to his bad advice) measures the real extent to which a political statesman is properly responsible. The first of all things is — "To see events in their beginnings — to discern tendencies beforehand, and proclaim them beforehand to others — to abridge as much as possible the rubs, impediments, jealousies, and tardy movements, inseparable from the march of a free city — and to infuse among the citizens harmony, friendly feelings, and zeal for the performance of their duties."<sup>1</sup> The first Philippic is alone sufficient to prove, how justly Demosthenes lays claim to the merit of having "seen events in their beginnings" and given timely warning to his countrymen. It will also go to show, along with other proofs hereafter to be seen, that he was not less honest and judicious in his attempts to fulfil the remaining portion of the statesman's duty — that of working up his countrymen to unanimous and resolute enterprise; to the pitch requisite not merely for speaking and voting, but for acting and suffering, against the public enemy.

We know neither the actual course, nor the concluding vote, of this debate, wherein Demosthenes took a part so unexpectedly prominent. But we know that neither of the two positive measures which he recommends was carried into effect. The working armament was not sent out, nor was the home-force, destined to be held in reserve for instant movement in case of emergency.

ἀσέλοισι οὐσι τοῖς ἀπὸ τούτων ἐμάντῳ γενησομένοις, ὁμῶς ἐπὶ τῷ συνοίσειν ὑμῖν, ἂν πράξητε, ταῦτα πεπεισθαι λέγειν αἰρούμαι.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 308. s. 306. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὃν γ' ἂν ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐπειθύνος εἴη, πᾶσιν ἐξέτασιν λαμβάνει· οὐ παραιτοῦμαι. Τίνα οὖν ἐστὶ ταῦτα; 'Ιδεῖν τὰ πράγματα ἀρχόμενα, καὶ προαισθῆσθαι καὶ προειπεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις. Ταῦτα πέπρακται μοι. Καὶ ἐτι τὰς ἐκασταχὸν βραδυτήτας, ὀκνοῦς, ἀγνοίας, φιλονεικίας, ἃ πολιτικὰ ταῖς πόλεσι προσέστιν ἀπάσαις καὶ ἀναγκαῖα ἀμαρτήματα, ταῦθ' ὡς εἰς ἐλάχιστα συστεῖλαι, καὶ τουνάντιον εἰς ὁμόνοιας καὶ φιλίας καὶ τῶν τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν ὁρμὴν προτρέφει.



ever got ready. It was not until the following month of September (the oration being delivered some time in the first half of 351 B. C.), that any actual force was sent against Philip; and even then nothing more was done than to send the mercenary chief Charidemus to the Chersonese, with ten triremes, and five talents in money, but no soldiers.<sup>1</sup> Nor is there any probability that Demosthenes even obtained a favorable vote of the assembly; though strong votes against Philip were often passed without being ever put in execution afterwards.<sup>2</sup>

Demosthenes was doubtless opposed by those senior statesmen whose duty it would have been to come forward themselves with the same propositions assuming the necessity to be undeniable. But what ground was taken in opposing him, we do not know. There existed at that time in Athens a certain party or section who undervalued Philip as an enemy not really formidable — far less formidable than the Persian king.<sup>3</sup> The reports of Persian force and preparation, prevalent two years before when Demosthenes delivered his harangue on the Symmories, seem still to have continued, and may partly explain the inaction against Philip. Such reports would be magnified, or fabricated, by another Athenian party much more dangerous; in communication with, and probably paid by, Philip himself. To this party Demosthenes makes his earliest allusion in the first Philippic,<sup>4</sup> and reverts to them on many occasions afterwards. We may be very certain that there were Athenian citizens serving as Philip's secret agents, though we cannot assign their names. It would be not less his interest

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes Olynth. iii. p. 29. s. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 48. s. 34; Olynth. ii. p. 21. s. 12; Olynth. iii. p. 29. s. 5. p. 32. s. 16; De Rhodiorum Libertate, p. 190. s. 1. And not merely votes against Philip, but against others also, remained either unexecuted or inadequately executed (Demosthenes, De Republicâ Ordinandâ, p. 175, 176).

<sup>3</sup> Demosthen. De Rhodior. Libertat. p. 197. s. 31. ὁρῶ δ' ὑμῶν ἐνίοις Φιλίππου μὲν ὡς ἄρ' οὐδενὸς ἀξίου πολλάκις ὀλιγωροῦντας, βασιλέα δ' ὡς ἰσχυρὸν ἐχθρὸν οἷς ἂν προέλῃται φοβουμένους. Εἰ δὲ τὸν μὲν ὡς φαῦλον οὐκ ἄμυνον ὑμεῖς, τῷ δὲ ὡς φοβερώ πανθ' ὑπείχομεν, πρὸς ἑναὶς παρατάμεθα;

This oration was delivered in 351–350 B. C.; a few months after the first Philippic.

<sup>4</sup> Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 45. s. 21; Olynthiac ii. p. 19. s. 4.

to purchase such auxiliaries, than to employ paid spies in his operations of war: while the prevalent political antipathies at Athens, coupled with the laxity of public morality in individuals, would render it perfectly practicable to obtain suitable instruments. That not only at Athens, but also at Amphipolis, Potidaea, Olynthus and elsewhere, Philip achieved his successes, partly by purchasing corrupt partisans among the leaders of his enemies — is an assertion so intrinsically probable, that we may readily believe it, though advanced chiefly by unfriendly witnesses. Such corruption alone, indeed, would not have availed him, but it was eminently useful when combined with well-employed force and military genius.

## CHAPTER LXXXVIII.

### EUBOIC AND OLYNTHIAN WARS.

IF even in Athens, at the date of the first Philippic of Demosthenes, the uneasiness about Philip was considerable, much more serious had it become among his neighbors the Olynthians. He had gained them over, four years before, by transferring to them the territory of Anthemus — and the still more important town of Potidaea, captured by his own arms from Athens. Grateful for these cessions, they had become his allies in his war with Athens, whom they hated on every ground. But a material change had since taken place. Since the loss of Methônê, Athens, expelled from the coast of Thrace and Macedonia, had ceased to be a hostile neighbor, or to inspire alarm to the Olynthians; while the immense increase in the power of Philip, combined with his ability and ambition alike manifest, had overlaid their gratitude for the past by a sentiment of fear for the future. It was but too

<sup>1</sup> Compare the advice of the Thebans to Mardonius in 479 B. C. — during the Persian invasion of Greece (Herodot. ix. 2).



clear that a prince who stretched his encroaching arms in all directions—to Thermopylæ, to Illyria, and to Thrace—would not long suffer the fertile peninsula between the Thermaic and Strymonic gulfs to remain occupied by free Grecian communities. Accordingly, it seems that after the great victory of Philip in Thessaly over the Phokians (in the first half of 352 B. C.), the Olynthians manifested their uneasiness by seceding from alliance with him against Athens. They concluded peace with that city, and manifested such friendly sentiments that an alliance began to be thought possible. This peace seems to have been concluded before November 352 B. C.<sup>1</sup>

Here was an important change of policy on the part of the Olynthians. Though they probably intended it, not as a measure of hostility against Philip, but simply as a precaution to ensure to themselves recourse elsewhere in case of becoming exposed to his attack, it was not likely that he would either draw or recognize any such distinction. He would probably consider that by the cession of Potidæa, he had purchased their coöperation against Athens, and would treat their secession as at least making an end to all amicable relations.

A few months afterwards (at the date of the first Philippic<sup>2</sup>) we find that he, or his soldiers, had attacked, and made sudden excursions into their territory, close adjoining to his own.

In this state of partial hostility, yet without proclaimed or vigorous war, matters seem to have remained throughout the year 351 B. C. Philip was engaged during that year in his Thracian expedition, where he fell sick, so that aggressive enterprise was

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 656. p. 129. ἐκεῖνοι (Olynthians) ἔωξ μὲν ἑώρων αὐτὸν (Philip) τηλικούτον ἡλικὸς ὡς πιστὸς ὑπῆρχε, σύμμαχοί τε ἦσαν, καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνον ἡμῖν ἐπολέμουν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἶδον μείζω τῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς πίστεως γιγνόμενον . . . ὑμᾶς, οὓς ἴσασιν ἀπαντῶν ἀνθρώπων ἥδιστ' ἂν καὶ τοὺς ἐκεῖνου φίλους καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Φίλιππον ἀποκτείναντας, φίλους πεποιήνται, φασὶ δὲ καὶ συμμάχους ποιήσεσθαι.

We know from Dionysius that this oration was delivered between Midsummer 352 B. C. and Midsummer 351 B. C. I have already remarked that it must have been delivered, in my judgment, before the month Mæmakte-  
rion (November) 352 B. C.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 44. s. 20. . . . ἐπὶ τὰς ἐξαίφνης ταύτας ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας χώρας αὐτοῦ στρατείας, εἰς Πύλας καὶ Χερρόνησον καὶ Ὀλυνθον καὶ ὅποι βούλεται.

for the time suspended. Meanwhile the Athenians seem to have proposed to Olynthus a scheme of decided alliance against Philip.<sup>1</sup> But the Olynthians had too much to fear from him, to become themselves the aggressors. They still probably hoped that he might find sufficient enemies and occupation elsewhere, among Thracians, Illyrians, Pæonians, Arymbas and the Epirots, and Athenians;<sup>2</sup> at any rate, they would not be the first to provoke a contest. This state of reciprocal mistrust<sup>3</sup> continued for several months, until at length Philip began serious operations against them; not very long after his recovery from the sickness in Thrace, and seemingly towards the middle of 350 B. C.;<sup>4</sup> a little before the beginning of Olympiad 107, 3.

It was probably during the continuance of such semi-hostile relations that two half-brothers of Philip, sons of his father Amyntas by another mother, sought and obtained shelter at Olynthus. They came as his enemies; for he had put to death already one of their brothers, and they themselves only escaped the same fate by flight. Whether they had committed any positive act to pro-

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes, Olynthiac i. p. 11. s. 7. . . . νυνὶ γὰρ, ὃ πάντες ἐθρόλ-  
λουν τέως, Ὀλυνθίους ἐκπολεμήσαι δεῖν Φιλίππῳ, γέγονεν  
αὐτόματον, καὶ ταῦθ' ὥς ἂν ὑμῖν μάλιστα σύμφοροι. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὑφ' ὑμῶν  
πεισθέντες ἀνείλοντο τὸν πόλεμον, σφαλεροὶ σύμμαχοι καὶ μέχρι τοῦ ταῦτ' ἂν  
ἐγνωκότες ἦσαν ἰσως, etc.

Compare Olynth. iii. p. 30. s. 9. and p. 32. s. 18. οὐχ οὗτος, εἰ πολεμήσαιεν,  
ἐτοίμως σώσειν ὑπισχνούμεθα, οὗτοι νῦν πολεμοῦνται;

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthen. Olynth. iii. p. 30. s. 8. οὔτε Φίλιππος ἐθάρρει τούτους, οὐθ' οὗτοι Φίλιππον, etc.

<sup>4</sup> Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13. . . . ἡσθένησε· πάλιν ῥαίσας οὐκ ἐπ' τὸ ραθυμεῖν ἀπέκλινεν, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς Ὀλυνθίοις ἐπεχείρησεν.

What length of time is denoted by the adverb εὐθὺς, must of course be matter of conjecture. If the expression had been found in the Oration De Coronâ, delivered twenty years afterwards, we might have construed εὐθὺς, very loosely. But it occurs here in an oration delivered probably in the latter half of 350 B. C., but certainly not later than the first half of 348 B. C. Accordingly, it is hardly reasonable to assign to the interval here designated by εὐθὺς (that between Philip's recovery and his serious attack upon the Olynthians) a longer time than six months. We should then suppose this attack to have been commenced about the last quarter of Olymp. 107, 2; or in the first half of 350 B. C. This is the view of Böhnecke, and, I think very probable (Forschungen, p. 211).



voke his wrath, we are not informed; but such tragedies were not unfrequent in the Macedonian regal family. While Olynthus was friendly and grateful to Philip, these exiles would not have resorted thither; but they were now favorably received, and may perhaps have held out hopes that in case of war they could raise a Macedonian party against Philip. To that prince, the reception of his fugitive enemies served as a plausible pretence for war — which he doubtless would under all circumstances have prosecuted — against Olynthus; and it seems to have been so put forward in his public declarations.<sup>1</sup>

But Philip, in accomplishing his conquests, knew well how to blend the influences of deceit and seduction with those of arms, and to divide or corrupt those whom he intended to subdue. To such insidious approaches Olynthus was in many ways open. The power of that city consisted, in great part, in her position as chief of a numerous confederacy, including a large proportion, though probably not all, of the Grecian cities in the peninsula of Chalkidikê. Among the different members of such a confederacy, there was more or less of dissentient interest or sentiment, which accidental circumstances might inflame so as to induce a wish for separation. In each city moreover, and in Olynthus itself, there were ambitious citizens competing for power, and not scrupulous as to the means whereby it was to be acquired or retained. In each of them, Philip could open intrigues, and enlist partisans; in some, he would probably receive invitations to do so; for the greatness of his exploits, while it inspired alarm in some quarters, raised hopes among disappointed and jealous minorities. If, through such predisposing circumstances, he either made or found partisans and traitors in the distant cities of Peloponnesus, much more was this practicable for him in the neighboring peninsula of Chalkidikê. Olynthus and the other cities were nearly all conterminous with the Macedonian territory, some probably with boundaries not clearly settled. Perdikkas II. had given to the Olynthians

<sup>1</sup> Justin, viii. 3; Orosius, iii. 12. Justin states this as the cause of the attack made by Philip on Olynthus — which I do not believe. But I see no ground for doubting the fact itself — or for doubting that Philip laid hold of it as a pretext. He found the half-brothers in Olynthus when the city was taken, and put both of them to death.

(at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war<sup>1</sup>) a portion of his territory near the Lake Bolbê: Philip himself had given to them the district of Anthemus. Possessed of so much neighboring land, he had the means, with little loss to himself, of materially favoring or enriching such individual citizens, of Olynthus or other cities, as chose to promote his designs. Besides direct bribes, where that mode of proceeding was most effective, he could grant the right of gratuitous pasture to the flocks and herds of one, and furnish abundant supplies of timber to another. Master as he now was of Amphipolis and Philippi, he could at pleasure open or close to them the speculations of the gold mines of Mount Pangæus, for which they had always hankered.<sup>2</sup> If his privateers harassed even the powerful Athens, and the islands under her protection, much more vexatious would they be to his neighbors in the Chalkidic peninsula, which they as it were encircled, from the Thermaic Gulf on one side to the Strymonic Gulf on the other. Lastly, we cannot doubt that some individuals in these cities had found it profitable to take service, civil or military, under Philip, which would supply him with correspondents and adherents among their friends and relatives.

It will thus be easily seen, that with reference to Olynthus and her confederate cities, Philip had at his command means of private benefit and annoyance to such an extent, as would ensure to him the cooperation of a venal and traitorous minority in each; such minority of course blending its proceedings, and concealing its purposes, among the standing political feuds of the place. These means however were only preliminary to the direct use of the sword. His seductions and presents commenced the work, but his excellent generalship and soldiers — the phalanx, the hypaspistæ, and the cavalry, all now brought into admirable training during the ten years of his reign — completed it.

Though Demosthenes in one passage goes so far as to say that Philip rated his established influence so high as to expect to incorporate the Chalkidic confederacy in his empire without serious difficulty and without even real war<sup>3</sup> — there is ground for be-

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i. 58.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 425, 426; Xenophon, Hellen. v. 2. 17

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 15. s. 22. οὐτ' ἂν ἐξήνεγκε τὸν πόλεμον ποτε



lieving that he encountered strenuous resistance, avenged by unmeasured rigors after the victory. The two years and a half between Midsummer 350 B. C., and the commencement of 347 B. C. (the two last years of Olympiad 107 and the nine first months of Olympiad 108), were productive of phenomena more terror-striking than anything in the recent annals of Greece. No less than thirty-two free Grecian cities in Chalkidikê were taken and destroyed, the inhabitants being reduced to slavery, by Philip. Among them was Olynthus, one of the most powerful, flourishing, and energetic members of the Hellenic brotherhood; Apollonia, whose inhabitants would now repent the untoward obstinacy of their fathers (thirty-two years before) in repudiating a generous and equal confederacy with Olynthus, and invoking Spartan aid to revive the falling power of Philip's father, Amyntas; and Stageira, the birth-place of Aristotle. The destruction of thirty-two free Hellenic communities in two years by a foreign prince, was a calamity the like of which had never occurred since the suppression of the Ionic revolt and the invasion of Xerxes. I have already recounted in a previous chapter<sup>1</sup> the manifestation of wrath at the festival of the ninety-ninth Olympiad (394 B. C.) against the envoys of the elder Dionysius of Syracuse, who had captured and subverted five or six free Hellenic communities in Italy and Sicily. Far more vehement would be the sentiment of awe and terror, after the Olynthian war, against the Macedonian destroyer of thirty-two Chalkidic cities. We shall find this plainly indicated in the phenomena immediately succeeding. We shall see Athens terrified into a peace alike dishonorable and improvident, which even Demosthenes does not venture to oppose; we shall see Æschines passing out of a free spoken Athenian citizen into a servile worshipper, if not a paid agent, of Philip: we shall observe Isokrates, once the champion of Pan-hellenic freedom and integrity, ostentatiously proclaiming Philip as the master and arbiter of Greece, while persuading him at the same time to use his power well for the purpose of conquer-

τοῦ οὐ κεῖνος, εἰ πολεμεῖν ᾤκηθῃ δεήσειν αὐτὸν, ἀλλ' ὥς ἐπὶ οὐκ ἅπαντα τότε ἤλπιζε τὰ πράγματα ἀναρῆσθαι, κατὰ διέψευσαι. Τοῦτο δὲ πρῶτον αὐτὸς παρατρέπει παρὰ γνώμην γεγονὸς, etc.

<sup>1</sup> See ch. lxxxiii. p. 35 of this Volume

ing Persia. These were terrible times; suitably illustrated in their cruel details by the gangs of enslaved Chalkidic Greeks of both sexes, seen passing even into Peloponnesus<sup>1</sup> as the property of new grantees who extolled the munificence of the donor Philip; and suitably ushered in by awful celestial signs, showers of fire and blood falling from the heavens to the earth, in testimony of the wrath of the gods.<sup>2</sup>

While, however, we make out with tolerable clearness the general result of Philip's Olynthian war, and the terror which it struck into the Grecian mind — we are not only left without information as to its details, but are even perplexed by its chronology. I have already remarked, that though the Olynthians had contracted such suspicions of Philip, even before the beginning of

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 439. Æschines himself met a person named Atrestidas followed by one of these sorrowful troops. We may be sure that this case was only one among many.

<sup>2</sup> Pliny, H. N. ii. 27. "Fit et coeli ipsius hiatus, quod vocant chasma. Fit et sanguinea specie (quo nihil terribilius mortalium timori est) incendium ad terras cadens inde; sicut Olympiadis centesimæ septimæ anno tertio, cum rex Philippus Græciam quateret. Atque ego hæc statis temporibus naturæ, ut cetera, arbitror existere; non (ut plerique) variis de causis, quas ingeniorum acumen excogitat. Quippe ingentium malorum fuere prænuntia; sed ea accidisse non quia hæc facta sunt arbitror, verum hæc ideo facta, quia incursura erant illa: raritate autem occultam eorum esse rationem, ideoque non sicut exortus supra dictos defectusque et multa alia nosci."

The precision of this chronological note makes it valuable. Olymp. 107, 3 — corresponds to the year between Midsummer 350 and Midsummer 349 B. C.

Taylor, who cites this passage in his Prolegomena ad Demosthenem (ap. Reiske Oratt. Gr. vol. viii. p. 756), takes the liberty, without any manuscript authority, of altering *tertio* into *quarto*; which Böhnecke justly pronounces to be unreasonable (Forschungen, p. 212). The passage as it stands is an evidence, not merely to authenticate the terrific character of the time, but also to prove, among other evidences, that the attack of Philip on the Olynthians and Chalkidians began in 350–349 B. C. — not in the following Olympic year, or in the time after Midsummer 349 B. C.

Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 201–221) has gone into an examination of the dates and events of this Olynthian war, and has arranged them in a manner different from any preceding critic. His examination is acute and instructive, including however some reasonings of little force or pertinence. I follow him generally, in placing the beginning of the Olynthian war, and the Olynthiacs of Demosthenes, before Olymp. 107, 4. This is the best opinion which I can form, on matters lamentably unattested and uncertain.



351 B. C., as to induce them to make peace with his enemy Athens — they had nevertheless, declined the overtures of Athens for a closer alliance, not wishing to bring upon themselves decided hostility from so powerful a neighbor, until his aggressions should become such as to leave them no choice. We have no precise information as to Philip's movements after his operations in Thrace and his sickness in 351 B. C. But we know that it was not in his nature to remain inactive; that he was incessantly pushing his conquests; and that no conquest could be so important to him as that of Olynthus and the Chalkidic peninsula. Accordingly, we are not surprised to find, that the Olynthian and Chalkidian confederates became the object of his direct hostility in 350 B. C. He raised pretences for attack against one or other of these cities separately; avoiding to deal with the confederacy as a whole, and disclaiming, by special envoys,<sup>1</sup> all purposes injurious to Olynthus.

Probably the philippizing party in that city may have dwelt upon this disclaimer as satisfactory, and given as many false assurances about the purposes of Philip, as we shall find Æschines hereafter uttering at Athens. But the general body of citizens were not so deceived. Feeling that the time had come when it was prudent to close with the previous Athenian overtures, they sent envoys to Athens to propose alliance and invite coöperation against Philip. Their first propositions were doubtless not couched in the language of urgency and distress. They were not as yet in any actual danger; their power was great in reality, and estimated at its full value abroad; moreover, as prudent diplomatists, they would naturally overstate their own dignity and the magnitude of what they were offering. Of course they would ask for Athenian aid to be sent to Chalkidikê — since it was there that the war was being carried on; but they would ask for aid in order to act energetically against the common enemy, and repress

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 113. That Philip not only attacked, but even subdued, the thirty-two Chalkidic cities, before he marched directly and finally to assail Olynthus — is stated in the Fragment of Kallisthenes ap. Strabon, Eclog. Tit. vii. p. 92.

Kallisthenes, whose history is lost, was a native of Olynthus, born a few years before the capture of the city.

the growth of his power — not to avert immediate danger menacing Olynthus.

There needed no discussion to induce the Athenians to accept this alliance. It was what they had long been seeking, and they willingly closed with the proposition. Of course they also promised — what indeed was almost involved in the acceptance — to send a force to coöperate against Philip in Chalkidikê. On this first recognition of Olynthus as an ally — or perhaps shortly afterwards, but before circumstances had at all changed — Demosthenes delivered his earliest Olynthiac harangue. Of the three memorable compositions so denominated, the earliest is, in my judgment, that which stands *second* in the edited order. Their true chronological order has long been, and still is, matter of controversy; the best conclusion which I can form, is that the *first* and the *second* are erroneously placed, but that the *third* is really the latest; <sup>1</sup> all of them being delivered during the six or seven last months of 350 B. C.

In this his earliest advocacy (the speech which stands printed as the second Olynthiac,) Demosthenes insists upon the advantageous contingency which has just turned up for Athens, through the blessing of the gods, in the spontaneous tender of so valuable an ally. He recommends that aid be despatched to the new ally; the most prompt and effective aid will please him the best. But this recommendation is contained in a single sentence, in the middle of the speech; it is neither repeated a second time, nor emphatically insisted upon, nor enlarged by specification of quantity or quality of aid to be sent. No allusion is made to necessities or danger of Olynthus, nor to the chance that Philip might conquer the town; still less to ulterior contingencies, that Philip, if he did conquer it, might carry the seat of war from his own coasts to those of Attica. On the contrary, Demosthenes adverts to the power of the Olynthians — to the situation of their territory, close on Philip's flanks — to their fixed resolution that they will never again enter into amity or compromise with him — as evidences how

<sup>1</sup> Some remarks will be found on the order of the Olynthiacs, in an Appendix to the present chapter.

It must be understood that I always speak of the Olynthiacs as *first*, *second*, and *third*, according to the common and edited order, though I cannot adopt that order as correct.



valuable their alliance will prove to Athens; enabling her to prosecute with improved success the war against Philip, and to retrieve the disgraceful losses brought upon her by previous remissness. The main purpose of the orator is to inflame his countrymen into more hearty and vigorous efforts for the prosecution of this general war; while to furnish aid to the Olynthians, is only a secondary purpose, and a part of the larger scheme. "I shall not (says the orator) expatiate on the formidable power of Philip as an argument to urge you to the performance of your public duty. That would be too much both of compliment to him and of disparagement to you. I should, indeed, myself have thought him truly formidable, if he had achieved his present eminence by means consistent with justice. But he has aggrandized himself, partly through your negligence and improvidence, partly by treacherous means — by taking into pay corrupt partisans at Athens, and by cheating successively Olynthians, Thessalians, and all his other allies. These allies, having now detected his treachery, are deserting him; without them, his power will crumble away. Moreover, the Macedonians themselves have no sympathy with his personal ambition; they are fatigued with the labor imposed upon them by his endless military movements, and impoverished by the closing of their ports through the war. His vaunted officers are men of worthless and dissolute habits; his personal companions are thieves, vile ministers of amusement, outcasts from our cities. His past good fortune imparts to all this real weakness a fallacious air of strength; and doubtless his good fortune has been very great. But the fortune of Athens, and her title to the benevolent aid of the gods is still greater — if only you, Athenians, will do your duty. Yet here you are, sitting still, doing nothing. The sluggard cannot even command his friends to work for him — much less the gods. I do not wonder, that Philip, always in the field, always in movement, doing everything for himself, never letting slip an opportunity — prevails over you who merely talk, inquire, and vote, without action. Nay — the contrary would be wonderful — if under such circumstances, he had not been the conqueror. But what I do wonder at is, that you Athenians — who in former days contended for Pan-hellenic freedom against the Lacedæmonians — who, scorning unjust aggrandizement for yourselves, fought in person and lavished your sub-

stance to protect the rights of other Greeks — that you now shrink from personal service and payment of money for the defence of your own possessions. You, who have so often rescued others, can now sit still after having lost so much of your own! I wonder you do not look back to that conduct of yours which has brought your affairs into this state of ruin, and ask yourselves how they can ever mend, while such conduct remains unchanged. It was much easier at first to preserve what we once had, than to recover it now that it is lost; we have nothing now left to lose — we have everything to recover. This must be done by ourselves, and at once; we must furnish money, we must serve in person by turns; we must give our generals means to do their work well, and then exact from them a severe account afterwards — which we cannot do so long as we ourselves will neither pay nor serve. We must correct that abuse which has grown up, whereby particular symmories in the state combine to exempt themselves from burdensome duties, and to cast them all unjustly upon others. We must not only come forward vigorously and heartily, with person and with money, but each man must embrace faithfully his fair share of patriotic obligation."

Such are the main points of the earliest discourse delivered by Demosthenes on the subject of Olynthus. In the mind of modern readers, as in that of the rhetor Dionysius,<sup>1</sup> there is an unconscious tendency to imagine that these memorable pleadings must have worked persuasion, and to magnify the efficiency of their author as an historical and directing person. But there are no facts to bear out such an impression. Demosthenes was still comparatively a young man — thirty-one years of age; admired indeed for his speeches and his compositions written to be spoken by others;<sup>2</sup> but as yet not enjoying much practical influence. It

Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæ. p. 736. μετὰ γὰρ ἀρχόντα Καλλιμαχόν, ἐφ' ὅς τας εἰς Ὀλυνθὸν βοηθείας ἀπέστειλαν Ἀθηναῖοι, πεισθέντες ὑπὸ Δημ. τοῦ νέου, etc.

He connects the three Olynthiacs of Demosthenes, with the three Athenian armaments sent to Olynthus in the year following Midsummer 349 B. C. for which armaments he had just before cited Philochorus.

<sup>1</sup> This is evident from the sneers of Meidias. see the oration of Demosthenes cont. Meidiam, p. 575, 576. (spoken in the year following — 349-348 B. C.)

I observe, not without regret, that Demosthenes himself is not ashamed



is moreover certain — to his honor — that he described and measured foreign dangers before they were recognized by ordinary politicians; that he advised a course, energetic and salutary indeed, but painful for the people to act upon, and disagreeable for recognized leaders to propose; that these leaders, such as Eubulus and others, were accordingly adverse to him. The tone of Demosthenes in these speeches is that of one who feels that he is contending against heavy odds — combating an habitual and deep-seated reluctance. He is an earnest remonstrant — an opposition speaker — contributing to raise up gradually a body of public sentiment and conviction which ultimately may pass into act. His rival Eubulus is the ministerial spokesman, whom the majority, both rich and poor, followed; a man not at all corrupt (so far as we know), but of simple conservative routine, evading all painful necessities and extraordinary precautions; conciliating the rich by resisting a property-tax, and the general body of citizens by refusing to meddle with the Theoric expenditure.

The Athenians did not follow the counsel of Demosthenes. They accepted the Olynthian alliance, but took no active step to cooperate with Olynthus in the war against Philip.<sup>1</sup> Such unhappily was their usual habit. The habit of Philip was the opposite. We need no witness to satisfy us, that he would not slacken in his attack — and that in the course of a month or two, he would master more than one of the Chalkidic cities, perhaps defeating the Olynthian forces also. The Olynthians would discover that they had gained nothing by their new allies; while the

so put the like sneers into the mouth of a client speaking before the Dikastery — against Lakritus — “this very clever man, who has paid ten minæ to Isokrates for a course of rhetoric, and thinks himself able to talk you over as he pleases,” etc. (Demosth. adv. Lakrit. p. 938)

<sup>1</sup> An orator of the next generation (Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. p. 102. s. 99) taunts Demosthenes as a mere opposition-talker, in contrast with the excellent administration of the finances and marine under Eubulus — *ποῖαι γὰρ τριήρεις εἰσὶ κατεσκευασμέναι διὰ τοῦτον* (Demosthenes) *ὥσπερ ἐπὶ Εὐβούλου, τῇ πόλει; ἢ ποῖοι νεώσοικοι τοῦτον πολιτευομένου γεγوناσι*. The administration of Eubulus must have left a creditable remembrance, to be thus cited afterwards.

See Theopompus ap. Harpocr. v. Εὐβούλος; Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. p. 812. Compare also Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 435, and Æschines adv. Ktesiph. s. 57. c. 11.

Philippizing party among themselves would take advantage of the remissness of Athens to depreciate her promises as worthless or insincere, and to press for accommodation with the enemy.<sup>1</sup> Complaints would presently reach Athens, brought by fresh envoys from the Olynthians, and probably also from the Chalkidians, who were the greatest sufferers by Philip's arms. They would naturally justify this renewed application by expatiating on the victorious progress of Philip; they would now call for aid more urgently, and might even glance at the possibility of Philip's conquest of Chalkidikê. It was in this advanced stage of the proceedings that Demosthenes again exerted himself in the cause, delivering that speech which stands first in the printed order of the Olynthiacs.

Here we have, not a Philippic, but a true Olynthiac. Olynthus is no longer part and parcel of a larger theme, upon the whole of which Demosthenes intends to discourse; but stands out as the prominent feature and specialty of his pleading. It is now pronounced to be in danger and in pressing need of succor; moreover its preservation is strenuously pressed upon the Athenians, as essential to their own safety. While it stands with its confederacy around it, the Athenians can fight Philip on his own coast; if it falls, there is nothing to prevent him from transferring the war into Attica, and assailing them on their own soil.<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes is wound up to a higher pitch of emphasis, complaining of the lukewarmness of his countrymen on a crisis which calls aloud for instant action.<sup>3</sup> He again urges that a vote be at once passed to assist Olynthus, and two armaments despatched as quickly as possible; one to preserve to Olynthus her confederate cities — the other, to make a diversion by simultaneous attack on Philip at

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 9. *ὥς ἐστι μάλιστα τοῦτο δέος, μὴ πανούργος ὢν καὶ δεινὸς ἄνθρωπος* (Philip) *πραγμασι χρῆσθαι τὰ μὲν εἰκὼν ἡνικ' ἂν τύχῃ, τὰ δ' ἀπειλῶν, τὰ δ' ἡμᾶς διαβαλλὼν καὶ τὴν ἀπουσίαν τὴν ἡμετέραν τρέψῃ τε καὶ παρασπᾶσθαι τε τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων*.

This occurs in the next subsequent speech of Demosthenes, intimating what Philip and his partisans had already deduced as inference from the past neglect of the Athenians to send any aid to Olynthus. Of course, no such inference could be started until some time had been allowed for expectation and disappointment; which is one among many reasons for believing the first Olynthiac to be posterior in time to the second.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 12, 13.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 9.



home. Without such two-fold aid (he says) the cities cannot be preserved.<sup>1</sup> Advice of aid generally he had already given, though less emphatically, in his previous harangue; but he now superadds a new suggestion — that Athenian envoys shall be sent thither, not merely to announce the coming of the force, but also to remain at Olynthus and watch over the course of events. For he is afraid, that unless such immediate encouragement be sent, Philip may, even without the tedious process of a siege, frighten or cajole the Olynthian confederacy into submission; partly by reminding them that Athens had done nothing for them, and by denouncing her as a treacherous and worthless ally.<sup>2</sup> Philip would be glad to entrap them into some plausible capitulation; and though they knew that they could have no security for his keeping the terms of it afterwards, still he might succeed, if Athens remained idle. Now, if ever, was the time for Athenians to come forward and do their duty without default; to serve in person and submit to the necessary amount of direct taxation. They had no longer the smallest pretence for continued inaction; the very conjuncture which they had so long desired, had turned up of itself — war between Olynthus and Philip, and that too upon grounds special to Olynthus — not at the instigation of Athens.<sup>3</sup> The Olynthian alliance had been thrown in the way of Athens by the peculiar goodness of the gods, to enable her to repair her numerous past errors and short-comings. She ought to look well and deal rightly with these last remaining opportunities, in order to wipe off the shame of the past; but if she now let slip Olynthus, and suffer Philip to conquer it, there was nothing else to hinder him from marching whithersoever he chose. His ambition was so insatiable, his activity so incessant, that, assuming Athens to persist in her careless inaction, he would carry the war forward

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 14. Φημί δὲ διχῇ βοηθητέον εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασιν ὑμῖν· τῷ τε τὰς πόλεις Ὀλυνθίοις σώζειν, καὶ τοὺς τοῦτο ποιήσοντας στρατιώτας ἐκπέμπειν — καὶ τῷ τὴν ἐκείνου χώραν κακῶς ποιεῖν καὶ τριηρέσι καὶ στρατιώταις ἐτέροις· εἰ δὲ θατέρου τούτων ὀλιγοῦσθε, ὁκνῶ μάλιστα ὑμῶν ἢ στρατεία γένηται.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 9, 10.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 11.

from Thrace into Attica — of which the ruinous consequences were but too clear.<sup>1</sup>

“I maintain (continued the orator) that you ought to lend aid at the present crisis in two ways; by preserving for the Olynthians their confederated cities, through a body of troops sent out for that express purpose — and by employing at the same time other troops and other triremes to act aggressively against Philip’s own coast. If you neglect either of these measures, I fear that the expedition will fail. As to the pecuniary provision, you have already more money than any other city, available for purposes of war; if you will pay that money to soldiers on service, no need exists for farther provision — if not, then need exists; but above all things, money *must* be found. What then! I shall be asked — are you moving that the Theoric fund shall be devoted to war purposes? Not I, by Zeus. I merely express my conviction, that soldiers *must* be equipped, and that receipt of public money, and performance of public service, ought to go hand in hand; but your practice is to take the public money, without any such condition, for the festivals. Accordingly, nothing remains except that all should directly contribute; much, if much is wanted — little, if little will suffice. Money must be had; without it, not a single essential step can be taken. There are moreover different ways and means suggested by others. Choose any one of these which you think advantageous; and lay a vigorous grasp on events while the opportunity still lasts.”<sup>2</sup>

It was thus that Demosthenes addressed his countrymen some time after the Olynthians had been received as allies, but before any auxiliary force had been either sent to them or even positively decreed — yet when such postponement of action had inspired them with mistrust, threatening to throw them, even without resistance, into the hands of Philip and their own philippizing party. We observe in Demosthenes the same sagacious appreciation, both of the present and the future, as we have already remarked

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 12, 13, 16. ....εἰ δὲ προσησόμεθα καὶ τούτους τοὺς ἄνθρώπους, εἴτ’ Ὀλυνθον ἐκεῖνος καταστρέψεται, φρασάτω τις ἐμοί, τί τὸ κωλύον ἐστ’ αὐτὸν ἔσται βαδίζειν ὅποι βούλεται.

.....τίς οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐστὶν ὑμῶν δότις ἀγνοεῖ τὸν ἐκεῖθεν πόλεμον δεῦρο ἔξεντα, ἂν ἀμελήσωμεν;

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 15.



in the first Philippic—foresight of the terrible consequences of this Olynthian war, while as yet distant and unobserved by others. We perceive the same good sense and courage in invoking the right remedies; though his propositions of personal military service, direct taxation, or the diversion of the Theoric fund—were all of them the most unpopular which could be made. The last of the three, indeed, he does not embody in a substantive motion; nor could he move it without positive illegality, which would have rendered him liable to the indictment called *Graphé Paranomon*. But he approaches it near enough to raise in the public mind the question as it really stood—that money must be had; that there were only two ways of getting it—direct taxation, and appropriation of the festival fund; and that the latter of these ought to be restored as well as the former. We shall find this question about the Theoric Fund coming forward again more than once, and shall have presently to notice it more at large.

At some time after this new harangue of Demosthenes—how long after it, or how far in consequence of it, we cannot say—the Athenians commissioned and sent a body of foreign mercenaries to the aid of the Olynthians and Chalkidians. The outfit and transport of these troops was in part defrayed by voluntary subscriptions from rich Athenian citizens. But no Athenian citizen-soldiers were sent; nor was any money assigned for the pay of the mercenaries. The expedition appears to have been sent towards the autumn of 350 B. C., as far as we can pretend to affirm anything respecting the obscure chronology of this period.<sup>1</sup> It

<sup>1</sup> In my view, it is necessary to separate entirely the proceedings alluded to in the Demosthenic Olynthiacs, from the three expeditions to Olynthus mentioned by Philochorus during the following year—349–348 B. C., the archonship of Kallimachus. I see no reason to controvert the statement of Philochorus, that there were three expeditions during that year, such as he describes. But he must be mistaken (or Dionysius must have copied him erroneously) in setting forth those three expeditions as the whole Olynthian war, and the first of the three as being the beginning of the war. The Olynthian war began in 350 B. C., and the three Olynthiacs of Demosthenes refer, in my judgment, to the first months of the war. But it lasted until the early spring of 347 B. C., so that the armaments mentioned by Philochorus may have occurred during the last half of the war. I cannot but think that Dionysius, being satisfied with finding three expeditions to Olynthus which might be attached as results to the three orations of Demosthenes, has too

presently gained some victory over Philip or Philip's generals, and was enabled to transmit good news to Athens, which excited much exultation there, and led the people to fancy that they were in a fair way of taking revenge on Philip for past miscarriages. According to some speakers, not only were the Olynthians beyond all reach of danger, but Philip was in a fair way of being punished and humbled. It is indeed possible that the success may really have been something considerable, such as to check Philip's progress for the time. Though victorious on the whole, he must have experienced partial and temporary reverses, otherwise he would have concluded the war before the early spring of 347 B. C. Whether this success coincided with that of the Athenian general Chares over Philip's general Adæus,<sup>1</sup> we cannot say.

But Demosthenes had sagacity enough to perceive, and frankness to proclaim, that it was a success noway decisive of the war

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hastily copied out the three from Philochorus, and has assigned the date of 349–348 B. C. to the three orations, simply because he found that date given to the three expeditions by Philochorus.

The revolt in Eubœa, the expedition of Phokion with the battle of Tamyræ and the prolonged war in that island, began about January or February 349 B. C., and continued throughout that year and the next. Mr. Clinton even places these events a year earlier; in which I do not concur, but which, if adopted, would throw back the beginning of the Olynthian war one year farther still. It is certain that there was one Athenian expedition at least sent to Olynthus before the Eubœan war, (Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 566–578)—an expedition so considerable that voluntary donations from the rich citizens were obtained towards the cost. Here is good proof (better than Philochorus, if indeed it be inconsistent with what he really said) that the Athenians not only contracted the alliance of Olynthus, but actually assisted Olynthus, during the year 350 B. C. Now the Olynthiacs of Demosthenes present to my mind strong evidence of belonging to the earliest months of the Olynthian war. I think it reasonable, therefore, to suppose that the expedition of foreign mercenaries to Olynthus, which the third Olynthiac implies as having been sent, is the same as that for which the *ἐπιδόσεις* mentioned in the Meidiana were required. See Bönecke, *Forschungen*, p. 202; and K. F. Hermann, *De Anno Natali Demosthenis*, p. 9.

<sup>1</sup> Theopompus ap. Athenæ, xii. p. 532. This victory would seem to belong more naturally (as Dr. Thirlwall remarks) to the operations of Chares and Onomarchus against Philip in Thessaly, in 353–352 B. C. But the point cannot be determined.



generally; worse than nothing, if it induced the Athenians to fancy that they had carried their point.

To correct the delusive fancy, that enough had been done — to combat that chronic malady under which the Athenians so readily found encouragement and excuses for inaction — to revive in them the conviction, that they had contracted a debt, yet unpaid, towards their Olynthian allies and towards their own ultimate security — is the scope of Demosthenes in his third Olynthiac harangue; third in the printed order, and third also, according to my judgment, in order of time; delivered towards the close of the year 350 B. C.<sup>1</sup> Like Perikles, he was not less watchful to abate extravagant and unseasonable illusions of triumph in his countrymen, than to raise their spirits in moments of undue alarm and despondency.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 29. μέμνησθε, ὅτ' ἀπηγγέλθη Φίλιππος ἔμεινεν ἐν Θράκῃ τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ἔτος τοῦτ', 'Ηραίων τεῖχος πολιορκῶν· τότε τοίνυν μὴν μὲν ἦν Μαμακτηριῶν, etc. This was the month Mæmakte- rion or November 352 B. C. Calculating forward from that date, τρίτον ἔτος means the next year but one; that is the Attic year Olymp. 107. 3, or the year between Midsummer 350 and Midsummer 349 B. C. Dionysius of Halikarnassus says (p. 726) — Καλλιμάχου τοῦ τρίτου μετὰ Θέσσαλον ἄρξαν- τος — though there was only one archon between Thessalus and Kallima- chus. When Demosthenes says τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ἔτος — it is clear that both cannot be accurate; we must choose one or the other; and τρίτον ἔτος brings us to the year 350–349 B. C.

To show that the oration was probably spoken during the first half of that year, or before February 349 B. C., another point of evidence may be noticed.

At the time when the third Olynthiac was spoken, no expedition of Athe- nian citizens had yet been sent to the help of Olynthus. But we shall see, presently, that Athenian citizens were sent thither during the first half of 349 B. C.

Indeed, it would be singular, if the Olynthiacs had been spoken after the expedition to Eubœa, that Demosthenes should make no allusion in any one of them to that expedition, an affair of so much moment and interest, which kept Athens in serious agitation during much of the year, and was followed by prolonged war in that neighboring island. In the third Olynthiac, De- mosthenes alludes to taking arms against Corinth and Megara (p. 34). Would he be likely to leave the far more important proceedings in Eubœa unnoticed? Would he say nothing about the grave crisis in which the de- cree of Apollodorus was proposed? This difficulty disappears when we re- cognize the Olynthiacs as anterior to the Euboic war

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 65. Ὅποτε γοῦν αἰσθαιτό τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ καιρὸν ὑβρίν θάπ

“The talk which I hear about punishing Philip (says Demos- thenes, in substance) is founded on a false basis. The real facts of the case teach us a very different lesson.<sup>1</sup> They bid us look well to our own security, that we be not ourselves the sufferers, and that we preserve our allies. There *was* indeed a time — and that too within my remembrance not long ago — when we might have held our own and punished Philip besides; but now, our first care must be to preserve our own allies. After we have made this sure, then it will be time to think of punishing others. The present juncture calls for anxious deliberation. Do not again commit the same error as you committed three years ago. When Philip was besieging Heræum in Thrace, you passed an energetic decree to send an expedition against him: presently came reports that he was sick, and that he was dead: this good news made you fancy that the expedition was unnecessary, and you let it drop. If you had executed promptly what you resolved, Philip would have been put down *then*, and would have given you no further trouble.<sup>2</sup>

“Those matters indeed are past, and cannot be mended. But I advert to them now, because the present war-crisis is very sim- ilar, and I trust you will not make the like mistake again. If you do not send aid to Olynthus with all your force and means, you will play Philip's game for him now, exactly as you did then. You have been long anxious and working to get the Olynthians into war with Philip. This has now happened: what choice re- mains, except to aid them heartily and vigorously? You will be covered with shame, if you do not. But this is not all. Your own security at home requires it of you also; for there is noth- ing to hinder Philip, if he conquers Olynthus, from invading At- tica. The Phokians are exhausted in funds — and the Thebans are your enemies.

σοῦντας, λέγων κατέπλησεν (Perikles) εἰς τὸ φοβεῖσθαι· καὶ δεδιότας αὐ- τὸν ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν.

Compare the Argument of the third Olynthiac by Libanius.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 28, 29. Τοὺς μὲν γὰρ λόγους περὶ τοῦ τιμωρή- σασθαι Φίλιππον ὁρῶ γι- νομένους, τὰ δὲ πράγματα εἰς τοῦτο προήκοντα, ὥστε ὅπως μὴ πεισόμεθα αὐτοὶ πρότερον κακῶς σκέψασθαι δεόν.

..... τοῦδ' ἱκανὸν προλαβεῖν ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν πρῶτην, ὅπως τοὺς συμμάχους σώσωμεν.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 30.



"All this is superfluous, I shall be told. We have already resolved unanimously to succor Olynthus, and we will succor it. We only want you to tell us how. You will be surprised, perhaps, at my answer. Appoint Nomothetæ at once.<sup>1</sup> Do not submit to them any propositions for new laws, for you have laws enough already — but only repeal such of the existing laws as are hurtful at the present juncture — I mean, those which regard the Theoric fund (I speak out thus plainly), and some which bear on the citizens in military service. By the former, you hand over money, which ought to go to soldiers on service, in Theoric distribution among those who stay at home. By the latter, you let off without penalty those who evade service, and discourage those who wish to do their duty. When you have repealed these mischievous laws, and rendered it safe to proclaim salutary truths, then expect some one to come forward with a formal motion such as you all know to be required. But until you do this, expect not that any one will make these indispensable propositions on your behalf, with the certainty of ruin at your hands. You will find no such man; especially as he would only incur unjust punishment for himself, without any benefit to the city — while his punishment would make it yet more formidable to speak out upon that subject in future, than it is even now. Moreover, the same men who proposed these laws should also take upon them to propose the repeal; for it is not right that these men should continue to enjoy a popularity which is working mischief to the whole city, while the unpopularity of a reform beneficial to us all, falls on the head of the reforming mover. But while you retain this prohibition, you can neither tolerate that any one among you shall be powerful enough to infringe a law with impunity — nor expect that any one will be fool enough to run with his eyes open into punishment."

I lament that my space confines me to this brief and meagre abstract of one of the most splendid harangues ever delivered — the third Olynthiac of Demosthenes. The partial advantage gained over Philip being prodigiously over-rated, the Athenians seemed to fancy that they had done enough, and were receding from their resolution to assist Olynthus energetically. As on so many

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 31, 32.

other occasions, so on this — Demosthenes undertook to combat a prevalent sentiment which he deemed unfounded and unseasonable. With what courage, wisdom, and dexterity — so superior to the insulting sarcasms of Phokion — does he execute this self-imposed duty, well knowing its unpopularity!

Whether any movement was made by the Athenians in consequence of the third Olynthiac of Demosthenes, we cannot determine. We have no ground for believing the affirmative; while we are certain that the specific measure which he recommended — the sending of an armament of citizens personally serving — was not at that time (before the end of 350 B. C.) carried into effect. At or before the commencement of 349 B. C., the foreign relations of Athens began to be disturbed by another supervening embarrassment — the revolt of Eubœa.

After the successful expedition of 358 B. C., whereby the Athenians had expelled the Thebans from Eubœa, that island remained for some years in undisturbed connection with Athens. Chalkia, Eretria, and Oreus, its three principal cities, sent each a member to the synod of allies holding session at Athens, and paid their annual quota (seemingly five talents each) to the confederate fund.<sup>1</sup> During the third quarter of 352 B. C., Menestratus the despot or principal citizen of Eretria is cited as a particularly devoted friend of Athens.<sup>2</sup> But this state of things changed shortly after Philip conquered Thessaly and made himself master of the Pagasæan Gulf (in 353 and the first half of 352 B. C.). His power was then established immediately over against Oreus and the northern coast of Eubœa, with which island his means of communication became easy and frequent. Before the date of the first Philippic of Demosthenes (seemingly towards the summer of 351 B. C.) Philip had opened correspondences in Eubœa, and had despatched thither various letters, some of which the orator reads in the course of that speech to the Athenian assembly. The actual words of the letters are not given; but from the criticism of the orator himself, we discern that they were highly offensive to Athenian feel-

<sup>1</sup> Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. p. 67, 68.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 661. φέρ', εἰν δὲ δὴ καὶ Μενέστρατος ἡμᾶς ὁ Ἐρετριεὺς ἀξιοὶ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ αὐτῷ ψηφίσασθαι, ἢ Φάβλλος ὁ Φωκεὺς etc



ings; instigating the Eubœans probably to sever themselves from Athens, with offers of Macedonian aid towards that object.<sup>1</sup> Philip's naval warfare also brought his cruisers to Geræstus in Eubœa, where they captured several Athenian corn-ships;<sup>2</sup> insulting even the opposite coast of Attica at Marathon, so as to lower the reputation of Athens among her allies. Accordingly, in each of the Eubœan cities, parties were soon formed aiming at the acquisition of dominion through the support of Philip; while for the same purpose detachments of mercenaries could also be procured across the western Eubœan strait, out of the large numbers now under arms in Phokis.

About the beginning of 349 B. C. — while the war of Philip, unknown to us in its details, against the Olynthians and Chalkidians, was still going on, with more or less of help from mercenaries sent by Athens — hostilities, probably raised by the intrigues of Philip, broke out at Eretria in Eubœa. An Eretrian named Plutarch (we do not know what had become of Menestratus), with a certain number of soldiers at his disposal, but opposed by enemies yet more powerful, professed to represent Athenian interests in his city, and sent to Athens to ask for aid. Demosthenes, suspecting this man to be a traitor, dissuaded compliance with the application.<sup>3</sup> But Plutarch had powerful friends at Athens, seemingly among the party of Eubulus; one of whom, Meidias, a violent personal enemy of Demosthenes, while advocating the grant of aid, tried even to get up a charge against Demosthenes, of having himself fomented these troubles in Eubœa against the reputed philo-Athenian Plutarch.<sup>4</sup> The Athenian assembly determined to despatch a force under Phokion; who accordingly crossed into the island, somewhat before the time of the festival Anthesteria (February) with a body of hoplites.<sup>5</sup> The cost of

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 51.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 49.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenes, De Pace, p. 58.

<sup>4</sup> Demosthenes cont. Meidiam, p. 550. . . . καὶ τῶν ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ πραγμάτων, ὃ Πλούταρχος ὁ τούτου ξένος καὶ φίλος διεπράξατο, ὡς ἐγὼ αἰτιῶς εἰμι κατασκευάζει, πρὸ τοῦ τὸ πρᾶγμα γενέσθαι φανερόν διὰ Πλουτάρχου γεγονός.

<sup>5</sup> Demosth. cont. Meidiam, p. 558; cont. Boeotum de Nomine, p. 999. The mention of the *χόες* in the latter passage, being the second day of the festival called Anthesteria, identifies the month.

fitting out triremes for this transport, was in part defrayed by voluntary contributions from rich Athenians; several of whom, Nikêratus, Euktêmon, Euthydemus, contributed each the outfit of one vessel.<sup>1</sup> A certain proportion of the horsemen of the city were sent also; yet the entire force was not very large, as it was supposed that the partisans there to be found would make up the deficiency.

This hope however turned out fallacious. After an apparently friendly reception and a certain stay at or near Eretria, Phokion found himself betrayed. Kallias, an ambitious leader of Chalkia, collected as much Eubœan force as he could, declared openly against Athens, and called in Macedonian aid (probably from Philip's commanders in the neighboring Pagasæan Gulf); while his brother Taurosthenes hired a detachment of mercenaries out of Phokis.<sup>2</sup> The anti-Athenian force thus became more formidable than Phokion could fairly cope with; while the support yielded to him in the island was less than he expected. Crossing the eminence named Kotylæum, he took a position near the town and hippodrome of Tamynæ, on high ground bordered by a ravine; Plutarch still professing friendship, and encamping with his mercenaries along with him. Phokion's position was strong; yet the Athenians were outnumbered and beleaguered so as to occasion great alarm.<sup>3</sup> Many of the slack and disorderly soldiers deserted; a loss which Phokion affected to despise — though he at the same time sent to Athens to make known his difficulties and press for reinforcement. Meanwhile he kept on the defensive in his camp, which the enemy marched up to attack. Disregarding his order, and acting with a deliberate treason which was accounted

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 566, 567.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. p. 399. . . . Ταυροσθένους, τοῦ Φωκικοῦ γενέου διαβιβᾶσας, etc. There is no ground for inferring from this passage (with Böhnecke, p. 20, and others), that the Phokians themselves seconded Philip in organizing Eubœan parties against Athens. The Phokians were then in alliance with Athens, and would not be likely to concur in a step alike injurious and offensive to her, without any good to themselves. But some of the mercenaries on service in Phokis might easily be tempted to change their service and cross to Eubœa, by the promise of a handsome gratuity.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. cont. Meidiam, p. 567. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁλιορκεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐν Γαμύναις στρατιώτας ἐξηγγέλλετο, etc.



at Athens unparalleled — Plutarch advanced forward out of the camp to meet them; but presently fled, drawing along with his flight the Athenian horse, who had also advanced in some disorder. Phokion with the infantry was now in the greatest danger. The enemy, attacking vigorously, were plucking up the palisade, and on the point of forcing his camp. But his measures were so well taken, and his hoplites behaved with so much intrepidity and steadiness in this trying emergency, that he repelled the assailants with loss, and gained a complete victory. Thallus and Kineas distinguished themselves by his side; Kleophanes also was conspicuous in partially rallying the broken horsemen; while Æschines the orator, serving among the hoplites, was complimented for his bravery, and sent to Athens to carry the first news of the victory.<sup>1</sup> Phokion pursued his success, expelled Plutarch from Eretria, and captured a strong fort called Zaretra, near the narrowest part of the island. He released all his Greek captives, fearing that the Athenians, incensed at the recent treachery, should resolve upon treating them with extreme harshness.<sup>2</sup> Kallias seems to have left the island and found shelter with Philip.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 300. c. 53; cont. Ktesiphont. p. 399. c. 32. Plutarch, Phokion, c. 13. Plutarch has no clear idea of the different contests carried on in the island of Eubœa. He passes on, without a note of transition, from this war in the island (in 349–348 B. C.) to the subsequent war in 341 B. C.

Nothing indeed can be more obscure and difficult to disentangle than the sequence of Eubœan transactions.

It is to be observed that Æschines lays the blame of the treachery, whereby the Athenian army was entrapped and endangered, on Kallias of Chalkis; while Demosthenes throws it on Plutarch of Eretria. Probably both Plutarch and Kallias deserved the stigma. But Demosthenes is on this occasion more worthy of credit than Æschines, since the harangue against Meidias, in which the assertion occurs, was delivered only a few months after the battle of Tamynæ; while the allegation of Æschines is contained in his harangue against Ktesiphon, which was not spoken till many years afterwards.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 13.

Æschines indeed says, that Kallias, having been forgiven by Athens on this occasion, afterwards, gratuitously and from pure hostility and ingratitude to Athens, went to Philip. But I think this is probably an exaggeration. The orator is making a strong point against Kallias, who afterwards became connected with Demosthenes, and rendered considerable service to Athens in Eubœa.

The news brought by Æschines (before the Dionysiac festival) of the victory of Tamynæ, relieved the Athenians from great anxiety. On the former despatch from Phokion, the Senate had resolved to send to Eubœa another armament, including the remaining half of the cavalry, a reinforcement of hoplites, and a fresh squadron of triremes. But the victory enabled them to dispense<sup>1</sup> with any immediate reinforcement, and to celebrate the Dionysiac festival with cheerfulness. The festival was on this year of more than usual notoriety. Demosthenes, serving in it as chorêgus for his tribe the Pandionis, was brutally insulted, in the theatre and amid the full pomp of the ceremony, by his enemy the wealthy Meidias; who, besides other outrages, struck him several times with his fist on the head. The insult was the more poignant, because Meidias at this time held the high office of Hipparch, or one of the commanders of the horse. It was the practice at Athens to convene a public assembly immediately after the Dionysiac festival, for the special purpose of receiving notifications and hearing complaints about matters which had occurred at the festival itself. At this special assembly Demosthenes preferred a complaint against Meidias for the unwarrantable outrage offered, and found warm sympathy among the people, who passed a unanimous vote of censure. This procedure (called Probolê, did not by itself carry any punishment, but served as a sort of *præjudicium*, or finding of a true bill; enabling Demosthenes to quote the public as a witness to the main fact of insult, and encouraging him to pursue Meidias before the regular tribunals; which he did a few months afterwards, but was induced to accept from Meidias the self-imposed fine of thirty minæ before the final passing of sentence by the Dikasts.<sup>2</sup>

The treason of Kallias and Taurosthenes is alluded to by Deinarchus in his harangue against Demosthenes, s. 45.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes cont. Meidiam, p. 567.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines cont. Ktesiph. p. 61; Plutarch, Demosth. c. 12. Westermann and many other critics (*De Litibus quas Demosthenes oravit ipse*, p. 25–28) maintain that the discourse against Meidias can never have been really spoken by Demosthenes to the Dikastery, since if it had been spoken, he could not afterwards have entered into the compromise. But it is surely possible, that he may have delivered the discourse and obtained judgment in his favor; and then afterwards — when the second vote of the Dikasts was about to come on, for estimation of the penalty — may have accepted



From the despatches of Phokion, the treason of Plutarch of Eretria had become manifest; so that Demosthenes gained credit for his previous remarks on the impolicy of granting the armament; while the friends of Plutarch — Hegesilaus and others of the party of Eubulus — incurred displeasure; and some, as it appears, were afterwards tried.<sup>1</sup> But he was reproached by his enemies for having been absent from the battle of Tamynæ; and a citizen named Euktêmon, at the instigation of Meidias, threatened an indictment against him for desertion of his post. Whether Demosthenes had actually gone over to Eubœa as a hoplite in the army of Phokion, and obtained leave of absence to come back for the Dionysia — or whether he did not go at all — we are unable to say. In either case, his duties as chorêgus for this year furnished a conclusive excuse; so that Euktêmon, though he formally hung up before the statues of the Eponymous Heroes public proclamation of his intended indictment, never thought fit to take even the first step for bringing it to actual trial, and incurred legal disgrace for such non-performance of his engagement.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless the opprobrious and undeserved epithet of deserter was ever afterwards applied to Demosthenes by Æschines and his other enemies; and Meidias even heaped the like vituperation upon most of those who took part in that assembly<sup>3</sup> wherein the Probolê or vote of censure against him had been passed. Not long after the Dionysiac festival, however, it was found necessary to send fresh troops, both horsemen and hoplites, to Eubœa; probably to relieve either some or all of those already serving there.

the offer of the defendant to pay a moderate fine (compare Demosth. cont. Neæram, p. 1348) in fear of exasperating too far the powerful friends around Meidias. The action of Demosthenes against Meidias was certainly an *ἀγὼν τιμητός*. About *προβολή*, see Meier and Schömann, *Der Attische Prozess*, p. 271.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes, *De Pace*, p. 58; *De Fals. Leg.* p. 434 — with the Scholion.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 548. . . . . ἐφ' ἣ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος (Euktêmon) ἠτίμωκεν αὐτὸν οὐ ἐπεξελθὼν, οὐδεμιᾶς ἔγωγ' ἐτι προσδέομαι δίκης, ἀλλ' ἱκανὴν ἔχω.

Æschines says that Nikodemus entered an indictment against Demosthenes for deserting his place in the ranks; but that he was bought off by Demosthenes, and refrained from bringing it before the Dikastery (*Æsch. Fals. Leg.* p. 292).

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. cont. Meid. p. 577.

Demosthenes on this occasion put on his armor and served as a hoplite in the island. Meidias also went to Argura in Eubœa, as commander of the horsemen: yet, when the horsemen were summoned to join the Athenian army, he did not join along with them, but remained as trierarch of a trireme the outfit of which he had himself defrayed.<sup>1</sup> How long the army stayed in Eubœa, we do not know. It appears that Demosthenes had returned to Athens by the time when the annual Senate was chosen in the last month of the Attic year (Skirrophorion — June); having probably by that time been relieved. He was named (by the lot) among the Five Hundred Senators for the coming Attic year (beginning Midsummer 349 B. C. = Olymp. 107, 4);<sup>2</sup> his old enemy Meidias in vain impugning his qualification as he passed through the Dokimasy or preliminary examination previous to entering office.

What the Athenian army did farther in Eubœa, we cannot make out. Phokion was recalled — we do not know when — and replaced by a general named Molossus; who is said to have managed the war very unsuccessfully, and even to have been made prisoner himself by the enemy.<sup>3</sup> The hostile parties in the island, sided by Philip, were not subdued, nor was it until the summer of 348 B. C. that they applied for peace. Even then, it appears, none was concluded, so that the Eubœans remained unfriendly to Athens until the peace with Philip in 346 B. C.

But while the Athenians were thus tasked for the maintenance of Eubœa, they found it necessary to undertake more effective measures for the relief of Olynthus, and they thus had upon their hands at the same time the burthen of two wars. We know that they had to provide force for both Eubœa and Olynthus at once;<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. cont. Meid. p. 558–567.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. cont. Meid. p. 551.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 14; Pausanias, i. 36, 3.

<sup>4</sup> Demosthen. cont. Neæram, p. 1346. . . . . συμβάντος τῇ πόλει καιροῦ τοιούτου καὶ πολέμου, ἐν ᾧ ἦν ἡ κρατήσασιν ὑμῖν μεγίστοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἶναι, καὶ ἀναμφισβητήτως τὰ τε ὑμέτερα αὐτῶν κεκομίσθαι καὶ καταπεπολεμηκέναι Φίλιππον — ἡ ὑστερήσασι τῇ βοηθείᾳ καὶ προεμένοις τοὺς συμμάχους, δι' ἀπορίαν χρημάτων καταλυθέντος τοῦ στρατοπέδου, τούτους τ' ἀπολέσαι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἑλλήσιν ἀπίστον εἶναι δοκεῖν, καὶ κινδυνεύειν περὶ τῶν ὑπολοίπων, περὶ τε Λήμνου καὶ Ἰμβροῦ καὶ Σκύρου καὶ Χερρόνησου — καὶ μελλόντων στρατεύεσθαι ὑμῶν.



and that the occasion which called for these simultaneous efforts was one of stringent urgency. The Olynthian requisition and communications made themselves so strongly felt, as to induce Athens to do, what Demosthenes in his three Olynthiacs had vainly insisted on during the preceding summer and autumn—to send thither a force of native Athenians, in the first half of 349 B. C. Of the horsemen who had gone from Athens to Eubœa, under Meidias, to serve under Phokion, either all, or a part, crossed by sea from Eubœa to Olynthus, during that half-year.<sup>1</sup> Meidias did not cross with them, but came back as trierarch in his trireme to Athens. Now the Athenian horsemen were not merely citizens, but citizens of wealth and consequence; moreover the

πανόημελ εἰς τε Εὐβοίαν καὶ Ὀλυνθον—ἐγραψε ψήφισμα ἐν τῇ βουλῇ Ἀπολλόδαρος βουλευών, etc.

This speech was delivered before the Dikastery by a person named Theomnestus, in support of an indictment against Neæra—perhaps six or eight years after 349 B. C. Whether Demosthenes was the author of the speech or not, its value as evidence will not be materially altered.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 578. . . . οὗτος τῶν μεθ' ἐαυτοῦ στρατευσαμένων ἱππέων, ὅτε εἰς Ὀλυνθον διέβησαν, ἐλθὼν πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν κατηγορεῖ. Compare the same oration, p. 558—περὶ δὲ τῶν συστρατευσαμένων εἰς Ἀργουραν (in Eubœa) ἵστε ὅπου πάντες οἱ ἀδημηγόρησε παρ' ἡμῖν, ὅτ' ἦκεν ἐκ Χαλκίδος, κατηγορῶν καὶ φάσκων δνειδος ἐξελθεῖν τὴν στρατιὰν ταύτην τῇ πόλει.

This transit of the Athenian horsemen to Olynthus, which took place after the battle of Tamynæ, is a distinct occurrence from the voluntary contributions at Athens towards an Olynthian expedition (ἐπιδόσεις εἰς Ὀλυνθον—Demosth. cont. Meidiam, p. 566); which contributions took place before the battle of Tamynæ, and before the expedition to Eubœa of which that battle made part.

These horsemen went from Eubœa to Olynthus before Meidias returned to Athens. But we know that he returned to Athens before the beginning of the new Attic or Olympic year (Olymp. 107, 4, 349–348 B. C.); that is, speaking approximatively, before the 1st of July 349 B. C. For he was present at Athens and accused Demosthenes in the senatorial Dokimasy, or preliminary examination, which all senators underwent before they took their seats with the beginning of the new year (Demosth. cont. Meid. p. 551).

It seems, therefore, clear that the Athenian expedition—certainly horsemen, and probably hoplites also—went to Olynthus before July 1, 349 B. C. I alluded to this expedition of Athenian citizens to Olynthus in a previous note—as connected with the date of the third Olynthiac of Demosthenes.

transport of them by sea was troublesome as well as costly. The sending of such troops implies a strenuous effort and sense of urgency on the part of Athens. We may farther conclude that a more numerous body of hoplites were sent along with the horsemen at the same time; for horsemen would hardly under any circumstances be sent across sea alone; moreover Olynthus stood most in need of auxiliary hoplites, since her native force consisted chiefly of horsemen and peltasts.<sup>1</sup>

The evidence derived from the speech against Neæra being thus corroborated by the still better evidence of the speech against Meidias, we are made certain of the important fact, that the first half of the year 349 B. C. was one in which Athens was driven to great public exertions—even to armaments of native citizens—for the support of Olynthus as well as for the maintenance of Eubœa. What the Athenians achieved, indeed, or helped to achieve, by these expeditions to Olynthus—or how long they stayed there—we have no information. But we may reasonably presume—though Philip during this year 339 B. C., probably conquered a certain number of the thirty-two Chalkidic towns—that the allied forces, Olynthian, Chalkidic and Athenian, contended against him with no inconsiderable effect, and threw back his conquest of Chalkidikê into the following year. After a summer's campaign in that peninsula, the Athenian citizens would probably come home. We learn that the Olynthians made prisoner a Macedonian of rank named Derdas, with other Macedonians attached to him.<sup>2</sup>

So extraordinary a military effort, however, made by the Athenians in the first half of 349 B. C.—to recover Eubœa and to protect Olynthus at once—naturally placed them in a state of financial embarrassment. Of this, one proof is to be found in the fact, that for some time there was not sufficient money to pay the Dikasteries, which accordingly sat little; so that few causes were tried for some time—for how long we do not know.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. v. 2, 41; v. 3, 3–6.

<sup>2</sup> Theopompus, Fragm. 155; ap. Athenæum, x. p. 436; Ælian, V. H. ii. 41.

<sup>3</sup> See Demosthenes adv. Boeotum De Nomine, p. 999. . . καὶ εἰ μισθὰ ἐπορίσθη τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, εἰσῆγαν ἂν δῆλον ὅτι. This oration was spoken shortly after the battle of Tamynæ, p. 999.



To meet in part the pecuniary wants of the moment, a courageous effort was made by the senator Apollodorus. He moved a decree in the Senate, that it should be submitted to the vote of the public assembly, whether the surplus of revenue, over and above the ordinary and permanent peace establishment of the city, should be paid to the Theoric Fund for the various religious festivals — or should be devoted to the pay, outfit, and transport of soldiers for the actual war. The Senate approved the motion of Apollodorus, and adopted a (*probouleuma*) preliminary resolution authorizing him to submit it to the public assembly. Under such authority, Apollodorus made the motion in the assembly, where also he was fully successful. The assembly (without a single dissentient voice, we are told) passed a decree enjoining that the surplus of revenue should under the actual pressure of war be devoted to the pay and other wants of soldiers. Notwithstanding such unanimity, however, a citizen named Stephanus impeached both the decree and its mover on the score of illegality, under the *Graphê Paranomon*. Apollodorus was brought before the *Dikastery*, and there found guilty; mainly (according to his friend and relative the prosecutor of Neæra) through suborned witnesses and false allegations foreign to the substance of the impeachment. When the verdict of guilty had been pronounced, Stephanus as accuser assessed the measure of punishment at the large fine of fifteen talents, refusing to listen to any supplications from the friends of Apollodorus, when they entreated him to name a lower sum. The *Dikasts* however, more lenient than Stephanus, were satisfied to adopt the measure of fine assessed by Apollodorus upon himself — one talent — which he actually paid.<sup>1</sup>

There can hardly be a stronger evidence both of the urgency and poverty of the moment, than the fact, that both Senate and people passed this decree of Apollodorus. That fact there is no room for doubting. But the additional statement — that there was not a single dissentient, and that every one, both at the time and afterwards, always pronounced the motion to have been an excellent one<sup>2</sup> — is probably an exaggeration. For it is not to be

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. cont. Neær. p 1346, 1347.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. cont. Neær. p 1346. ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν ἐτι, ἂν ποὺ λόγος γένηται, ὁμολογεῖται παρὰ πάντων, ὡς τὰ βέλτιστα εἶπας ἔδωκε πάντοι.

imagined that the powerful party, who habitually resisted the diversion of money from the Theoric Fund to war purposes, should have been wholly silent or actually concurrent on this occasion, though they may have been out-voted. The motion of Apollodorus was one which could not be made without distinctly breaking the law, and rendering the mover liable to those penal consequences which afterwards actually fell upon him. Now, that even a majority, both of senate and assembly, should have overleaped this illegality, is a proof sufficiently remarkable how strongly the crisis pressed upon their minds.

The expedition of Athenian citizens, sent to Olynthus before Midsummer 349 B. C., would probably return after a campaign of two or three months, and after having rendered some service against the Macedonian army. The warlike operations of Philip against the Chalkidians and Olynthians were noway relaxed. He pressed the Chalkidians more and more closely throughout all the ensuing eighteen months (from Midsummer 349 B. C. to the early spring of 347 B. C.). During the year Olymp. 407, 4, if the citation from Philochorus<sup>1</sup> is to be trusted, the Athenians despatched to their aid three expeditions; one, at the request of the Olynthians, who sent envoys to pray for it — consisting of two thousand peltasts under Chares, in thirty ships partly manned by Athenian seamen. A second under Charidemus, at the earnest entreaty of the suffering Chalkidians; consisting of eighteen triremes, four thousand peltasts and one hundred and fifty horsemen. Charidemus, in conjunction with the Olynthians, marched over Bottiaea and the peninsula of Pallênê, laying waste the country; whether he achieved any important success, we do not know. Respecting both Chares and Charidemus, the anecdotes descending to us are of insolence, extortion, and amorous indulgences, rather than of military exploits.<sup>2</sup> It is clear that neither the one nor the other achieved anything effectual against Philip, whose arms and corruption made terrible progress in Chalkidikê. So grievously did

<sup>1</sup> Philochorus ap. Dionys. Hal. ad Amm. p. 734, 735. Philochorus tells us that the Athenians *now* contracted the alliance with Olynthus; which certainly is not accurate. The alliance had been contracted in the preceding year.

<sup>2</sup> Theopomp. Fragm. 183-238; Athenæus, xii. p 532.



the strength of the Olynthians fail, that they transmitted a last and most urgent appeal to Athens; imploring the Athenians not to abandon them to ruin, but to send them a force of citizens in addition to the mercenaries already there. The Athenians complied, despatching thither seventeen triremes, two thousand hoplites, and three hundred horsemen, all under the command of Chares.

To make out anything of the successive steps of this important war is impossible; but we discern that during this latter portion of the Olynthian war, the efforts made by Athens were considerable. Demosthenes (in a speech six years afterwards) affirms that the Athenians had sent to the aid of Olynthus four thousand citizens, ten thousand mercenaries, and fifty triremes.<sup>1</sup> He represents the Chalkidic cities as having been betrayed successively to Philip by corrupt and traitorous citizens. That the conquest was achieved greatly by the aid of corruption, we cannot doubt; but the orator's language carries no accurate information. *Me-kyberna* and *Torônê* are said to have been among the towns betrayed without resistance.<sup>2</sup> After Philip had captured the thirty-two Chalkidic cities, he marched against Olynthus itself, with its confederate neighbors, — the Thracian *Methônê* and *Apollonia*. In forcing the passage of the river *Sardon*, he encountered such resistance that his troops were at first repulsed; and he was himself obliged to seek safety by swimming back across the river. He was moreover wounded in the eye by an Olynthian archer, named *Aster*, and lost the sight of that eye completely, notwithstanding the skill of his Greek surgeon, *Kritobulus*.<sup>3</sup> On arriving within forty furlongs of Olynthus, he sent to the inhabitants a peremptory summons, intimating that either they must evacuate the city, or he must leave Macedonia.<sup>4</sup> Rejecting this notice, they determined to defend their town to the last. A considerable portion of the last Athenian citizen-armament was still

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. *Fals. Leg.* p. 426.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 52.

<sup>3</sup> Kallisthenes ap. Stobæum, t. vii. p. 92; Plutarch, *Parallel.* c. 8; Demosth. *Philipp.* iii. p. 117. *Kritobulus* could not save the sight of the eye, but he is said to have prevented any visible disfigurement. "*Magna et Critobulo fama est, extracta Philippi regis oculo sagitta et citra deformitatem oris curata, orbitate luminis*" (Pliny, *H. N.* vii. 37).

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. *Philipp.* iii. p. 113.

in the town to aid in the defence;<sup>1</sup> so that the Olynthians might reasonably calculate that Athens would strain every nerve to guard her own citizens against captivity. But their hopes were disappointed. How long the siege lasted, — or whether there was time for Athens to send farther reinforcement, we cannot say. The Olynthinians are said to have repulsed several assaults of Philip with loss; but according to Demosthenes, the philippizing party, headed by the venal *Euthykrates* and *Lasthenes*, brought about the banishment of their chief opponent *Apollonides*, nullified all measures for energetic defence, and treasonably surrendered the city. Two defeats were sustained near its walls, and one of the generals of this party, having five hundred cavalry under his command, betrayed them designedly into the hands of the invader.<sup>2</sup> Olynthus, with all its inhabitants and property, at length fell into the hands of Philip. His mastery of the Chalkidic peninsula thus became complete towards the end of winter, 348–347 B. C.

Miserable was the ruin which fell upon this flourishing peninsula. The persons of the Olynthians, — men, women and children, — were sold into slavery. The wealth of the city gave to Philip the means of recompensing his soldiers for the toils of the war; the city itself he is said to have destroyed, together with *Apollonia*, *Methônê*, *Stageira*, etc., — in all, thirty-two Chalkidic cities. Demosthenes, speaking about five years afterwards, says that they were so thoroughly and cruelly ruined as to leave their very sites scarcely discernible.<sup>3</sup> Making every allowance for exaggeration, we may fairly believe that they were dismantled, and bereft of all citizen proprietors; that the buildings and visible marks of Hellenic city-life were broken up or left to decay; that the remaining houses, as well as the villages around, were tenanted by dependent cultivators or slaves, — now working for the benefit of new Macedonian proprietors, in great part non-resident, and probably of favored Grecian grantees also.<sup>4</sup> Though

<sup>1</sup> *Æschines*, *Fals. Leg.* p. 30.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. *Philipp.* iii. p. 125–128, *Fals. Leg.* p. 426; Diodor. xvi. 53.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. *Philipp.* iii. p. 117; Justin, viii. 3.

<sup>4</sup> Demosthenes, (*Fals. Leg.* p. 386) says, that both *Philokrates* and *Æschines* received from Philip, not only presents of timber and corn, but also grants of productive and valuable farms in the Olynthian territory. He



various Greeks thus received their recompense for services rendered to Philip, yet Demosthenes affirms that Euthykrates and Lasthenes, the traitors who had sold Olynthus, were not among the number; or at least that, not long afterwards, they were dismissed with dishonor and contempt.<sup>1</sup>

In this Olynthian war, — ruinous to the Chalkidic Greeks, terrific to all other Greeks, and doubling the power of Philip, — Athens too must have incurred a serious amount of expense. We find it stated loosely, that in her entire war against Philip, — from the time of his capture of Amphipolis in 358–357 B. C. down to the peace of 346 B. C. or shortly afterwards, — she had expended not less than fifteen hundred talents.<sup>2</sup> On these computations no great stress is to be laid; but we may well believe that her outlay was considerable. In spite of all reluctance, she was obliged to do something; what she did was both too little, and too intermittent, — done behind time so as to produce no satisfactory result; but nevertheless, the aggregate cost, in a series of years, was a large one. During the latter portion of the Olynthian war, as far as we can judge, she really seems to have made efforts, though she had done little in the beginning. We may presume that the cost must have been defrayed, in part at least, by a direct property-tax; for the condemnation of Apollodorus put an end to the proposition of taking from the Theoric Fund.<sup>3</sup> Means

calls some Olynthian witnesses to prove his assertion; but their testimony is not given at length.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Chersones. p. 99. The existence of these Olynthian traitors, sold to Philip, proves that he could not have needed the aid of the Stageirite philosopher Aristotle to indicate to him who were the richest Olynthian citizens, at the time when the prisoners were put up for sale as slaves. The Athenian Demochares, about thirty years afterwards, in his virulent speech against the philosophers, alleged that Aristotle had rendered this disgraceful service to Philip (Aristokles ap. Eusebium, Præp. Ev. p. 792) Wesseling (ad Diodor. xvi. 53) refutes the charge by saying that Aristotle was at that time, along with Hermeias, at Atarneus; a refutation not very conclusive, which I am glad to be able to strengthen.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 37. c. 24. Demosthenes (Olynth. iii. p. 36) mentions the same amount of public money as having been wasted *εἰς οὐδὲν δέου* — even in the early part of the Olynthiac war and before the Eubœan war. As evidences of actual amount, such statements are of no value.

<sup>3</sup> Ulpian, in his Commentary on the first Olynthiac, tells us that after the fine imposed upon Apollodorus, Eubulus moved and carried a law, enacting

may also have been found of economizing from the other expenses of the state.

Though the appropriation of the Theoric Fund to other purposes continued to be thus interdicted to any formal motion, yet, in the way of suggestion and insinuation it was from time to time glanced at by Demosthenes, and others; — and whenever money was wanted for war, the question whether it should be taken from this source or from direct property-tax, was indirectly revived. The appropriation of the Theoric Fund, however, remained unchanged until the very eve of the battle of Chæroneia. Just before that Dies Iræ, when Philip was actually fortifying Elateia, the fund was made applicable to war-purposes; the views of Demosthenes were realized, — twelve years after he had begun to enforce them.

This question about the Theoric expenditure is rarely presented by modern authors in the real way that it affected the Athenian mind. It has been sometimes treated as a sort of almsgiving to the poor, — and sometimes as an expenditure by the Athenians upon their pleasures. Neither the one nor the other gives a full or correct view of the case; each only brings out a part of the truth.

Doubtless, the Athenian democracy cared much for the pleasures of the citizens. It provided for them the largest amount of refined and imaginative pleasures ever tasted by any community known to history; pleasures essentially social and multitudinous, attaching the citizens to each other, rich and poor, by the strong tie of community of enjoyment.

But pleasure, though an usual accessory, was not the primary idea or predominant purpose of the Theoric expenditure. That expenditure was essentially religious in its character, incurred only for various festivals, and devoted exclusively to the honor of the gods. The ancient religion, not simply at Athens, but throughout Greece and the contemporary world, — very different in this

that any future motion to encroach on the Theoric Fund should be punished with death.

The authority of Ulpian is not sufficient to accredit this statement. The fine inflicted by the Dikastery upon Apollodorus was lenient; we may therefore reasonably doubt whether the popular sentiment would go along with the speaker in making the like offence capital in future.



respect from the modern, — included within itself and its manifestations nearly the whole range of social pleasures.<sup>1</sup> Now the Theoric Fund was essentially the Church-Fund at Athens; that upon which were charged all the expenses incurred by the state in the festivals and the worship of the gods. The Diobely, or distribution of two oboli to each present citizen, was one part of this expenditure; given in order to ensure that every citizen should have the opportunity of attending the festival, and doing honor to the god; never given to any one who was out of Attica because, of course, he could not attend;<sup>2</sup> but given to all alike within the country, rich or poor.<sup>3</sup> It was essential to that universal communion which formed a prominent feature of the festival, not less in regard to the god, than in regard to the city;<sup>4</sup> but it was only one portion of the total disbursements covered by the Theoric Fund. To this general religious fund it was provided by law that the surplus of ordinary revenue should be paid over, after all the cost of the peace establishment had been defrayed. There was no appropriation more thoroughly coming home to the

<sup>1</sup> Among the many passages which illustrate this association in the Greek mind, between the idea of a religious festival, and that of enjoyment — we may take the expressions of Herodotus about the great festival at Sparta Hyakinthia. In the summer of 479 B. C., the Spartans were tardy in bringing out their military force for the defence of Attica — being engaged in that festival. Οἱ γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὀρτάζον τε τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον, καὶ σφι ἦν Ὑακίνθια· περὶ πλείστον δ' ἤγον τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πορσύνειν (Herod. ix. 7). Presently the Athenian envoys come to Sparta to complain of the delay in the following language: Ὑμεῖς μὲν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, αὐτοῦ τῆδε αἰνούντες, Ὑακίνθιά τε ἀγεγε καὶ παίζετε, καταπροδόντες τοὺς συμμάχους.

Here the expressions "to fulfil the requirements of the god," and "to amuse themselves," are used in description of the same festival, and almost as equivalents.

<sup>2</sup> Harpokration, v. Θεωρικά... διένειμεν Εὐβούλος εἰς τὴν θυσίαν, ἵνα πάντες ἐορτάζωσι, καὶ μηδεὶς τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπολίπηται δι' ἀσθένειαν τῶν ἰδίων... Ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἐξήν τοις ἀποδημοῦσι θεωρικὸν λαμβάνειν, Ὑπερίδης δεδήλωκεν ἐν τῷ κατ' Ἀρχεστρατίδου.

<sup>3</sup> See Demosth. adv. Leocharem, p. 1091, 1092; Philipp. iv. p. 141. Compare also Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Att. s. 69.

<sup>4</sup> See the directions of the old oracles quoted by Demosthenes cont. Mel. ii. p. 531. ἵσταναι ὥραιον βρομίῳ χάριν ἀμειγα πάντας, etc. σταθφίην ἐλευθέρους καὶ δούλους, etc.

common sentiment, more conducive as a binding force to the unity of the city, or more productive of satisfaction to each individual citizen.

We neither know the amount of the Theoric Fund, nor of the distributions connected with it. We cannot, therefore, say what proportion it formed of the whole peace-expenditure, — itself unknown also. But we cannot doubt that it was large. To be sparing of expenditure in manifestations for the honor of the gods, was accounted the reverse of virtue by Greeks generally; and the Athenians especially, whose eyes were every day contemplating the glories of their acropolis, would learn a different lesson, — moreover, magnificent religious display was believed to conciliate the protection and favor of the gods.<sup>1</sup> We may affirm, however, upon the strongest presumptions, that this religious expenditure did not absorb any funds required for the other branches of a peace-establishment. Neither naval, nor military, nor administrative exigencies, were starved in order to augment the Theoric surplus. Eubulus was distinguished for his excellent keeping of the docks and arsenals, and for his care in replacing the decayed triremes by new ones. And after all the wants of a well-mounted peace-establishment were satisfied, no Athenian had scruple in appropriating what remained under the conspiring impulses of piety, pleasure and social brotherhood.

It is true that the Athenians might have laid up that surplus annually in the acropolis, to form an accumulating war-fund. Such provision had been made half a century before, under the full energy and imperial power of Athens, when she had a larger revenue, with numerous tribute-paying allies, and when Perikles presided over her councils. It might have been better if she had done something of the same kind in the age after the Peloponnesian war. Perhaps, if men like Perikles, or even like Demosthenes, had enjoyed marked ascendancy, she would have been advised and prevailed on to continue such a precaution. But before we can measure the extent of improvidence with which

<sup>1</sup> See the boast of Isokrates, Orat. iv. (Panegy.) s. 40; Plato, Alkibiad. ii. p. 148. Xenophon (Vectigal. vi. 1.), in proposing some schemes for the improvement of the Athenian revenue, sets forth as one of the advantages, that "the religious festivals will be celebrated then with still greater magnificence than they are now."



Athens is here fairly chargeable, we ought to know what was the sum thus expended on the festivals. What amount of money could have been stored up for the contingency of war, even if all the festivals and all the distributions had been suppressed? How far would it have been possible, in any other case than that of obvious present necessity, to carry economy into the festival-expenditure, — truly denominated by Demades the cement of the political system,<sup>1</sup> — without impairing in the bosom of each individual that sentiment of communion, religious, social and patriotic, which made the Athenians a City, and not a simple multiplication of units? These are points on which we ought to have information, before we can fairly graduate our censure upon Athens for not converting her Theoric Fund into an accumulated capital to meet the contingency of war. We ought also to ask, as matter for impartial comparison, how many governments, ancient or modern, have ever thought it requisite to lay up during peace a stock of money available for war?

The Athenian peace-establishment maintained more ships of war, larger docks, and better-stored arsenals, than any city in Greece, besides expending forty talents annually upon the Horsemen of the state, and doubtless something farther (though we know not how much) upon the other descriptions of military force. All this, let it be observed, and the Theoric expenditure besides, was defrayed without direct taxation, which was reserved for the extraordinary cost incident to a state of war, and was held to be sufficient to meet it, without any accumulated war-fund. When the war against Philip became serious, the proprietary classes at Athens, those included in the schedule of assessment, were called upon to defray the expense by a direct tax, from which they had been quite free in time of peace. They tried to evade this burthen by requiring that the festival-fund should be appropriated instead;<sup>2</sup> thus menacing what was dearest to the feelings

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, *Quæstion. Platonie.* p. 1011. *ὡς ἔλεγε Δημάδης, κόλλαν δνομάζον τὰ θεωρικὰ τοῦ πολιτεύματος* (erroneously written *θεωρητικὰ*).

<sup>2</sup> According to the author of the oration against *Neæra*, the law did actually provide, that in time of war, the surplus revenue should be devoted to warlike purposes — *κελευόντων τῶν νόμων, ὅταν πόλεμος ᾖ, τὰ περιόντα χρημάτων τῆς διοικήσεως στρατιωτικὰ εἶναι* (p. 1346). But it seems to me that

of the majority of the citizens. The ground which they took was the same in principle, as if the proprietors in France or Belgium claimed to exempt themselves from direct taxation for the cost of a war, by first taking either all or half of the annual sum voted out of the budget for the maintenance of religion.<sup>1</sup> We may judge how strong a feeling would be raised among the Athenian public generally, by the proposal of impoverishing the festival expenditure in order to save a property-tax. Doubtless, after the proprietary class had borne a certain burthen of direct taxation, their complaints would become legitimate. The cost of the festivals could not be kept up undiminished, under severe and continued pressure of war. As a second and subsidiary resource, it would become essential to apply the whole or a part of the fund in alleviation of the burthens of the war. But even if all had been so applied, the fund could not have been large enough to dispense with the necessity of a property-tax besides.

We see this conflict of interests, — between direct taxation on one side, and the festival-fund on the other as a means of paying for war, — running through the Demosthenic orations, and especially marked in the fourth Philippic.<sup>2</sup> Unhappily, the conflict served as an excuse to both parties for throwing the blame on each other, and starving the war; as well as for giving effect to the repugnance, shared by both rich and poor, against personal military service abroad. Demosthenes sides with neither, tries to mediate between them, and calls for patriotic sacrifice from both alike. Having before him an active and living enemy, with the liberties of Greece as well as of Athens at stake, — he urges every species of sacrifice at once — personal service, direct-tax

this must be a misstatement, got up to suit the speaker's case. If the law had been so, Apollodorus would have committed no illegality in his motion; moreover, all the fencing and manœuvring of Demosthenes in his first and third Olynthiacs would have been to no purpose.

<sup>1</sup> The case here put, though analogous in principle, makes against the Athenian proprietors, in degree; for, even in time of peace, one half of the French revenue is raised by direct taxation.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Philipp. iv. p. 141-143; *De Republicâ Ordinandâ*, p. 167. Whether these two orations were actually delivered in their present form may perhaps be doubted. But I allude to them with confidence as Demosthenic compositions; put together cut of Demosthenic fragments and thoughts.



payments, abnegation of the festivals. Sometimes the one demand stands most prominent, sometimes the other; but oftenest of all, comes his appeal for personal service. Under such military necessities, in fact the Theoric expenditure became mischievous, not merely because it absorbed the public money, but also because it chained the citizens to their home and disinclined them to active service abroad. The great charm and body of sentiment connected with the festival, essentially connected as it was with presence in Attica, operated as a bane; at an exigency when one-third or one-fourth of the citizens ought to have been doing hard duty as soldiers on the coasts of Macedonia or Thrace, against an enemy who never slept. Unfortunately for the Athenians, they could not be convinced, by all the patriotic eloquence of Demosthenes, that the festivals which fed their piety and brightened their home-existence during peace, were unmaintainable during such a war, and must be renounced for a time, if the liberty and security of Athens were to be preserved. The same want of energy which made them shrink from the hardship of personal service, also rendered them indisposed to so great a sacrifice as that of their festivals; nor indeed would it have availed them to spare all the cost of their festivals, had their remissness as soldiers still continued. Nothing less could have saved them, than simultaneous compliance with all the three requisitions urged by Demosthenes in 350 B.C.; which compliance ultimately came, but came too late, in 339-338 B.C.

# APPENDIX TO CHAPTER LXXXVIII

## ON THE ORDER OF THE OLYNTHIAC ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.

RESPECTING the true chronological order of these three harangues, dissentient opinions have been transmitted from ancient times, and still continue among modern critics.

Dionysius of Halikarnassus cites the three speeches by their initial

words, but places them in a different chronological order from that in which they stand edited. He gives the second as being first in the series; the third, as second; and the first, as third.

It will be understood that I always speak of and describe these speeches by the order in which they stand edited; though, as far as I can judge, that order is not the true one.

Edited Order . . . . .	I.	II.	III.
Order of Dionysius . . . . .	II.	III.	I.

The greater number of modern critics defend the edited order; the main arguments for which have been ably stated in a dissertation published by Petrenz in 1833. Dindorf, in his edition of Demosthenes, places this Dissertation in front of his notes to the Olynthiacs; affirming that it is conclusive, and sets the question at rest. Böhnecke also. (Forschungen, p. 151.) treats the question as no longer open to doubt.

On the other hand, Flathe (Geschichte Makedoniens, p. 183-187) expresses himself with equal confidence in favor of the order stated by Dionysius. A much higher authority, Dr. Thirlwall, agrees in the same opinion; though with less confidence, and with a juster appreciation of our inadequate means for settling the question. See the Appendix iii. to the 5th volume of his History of Greece, p. 512.

Though I have not come to the same conclusion as Dr. Thirlwall, I agree with him, that unqualified confidence, in any conclusion as to the order of these harangues, is unsuitable and not warranted by the amount of evidence. We have nothing to proceed upon except the internal evidence of the speeches, taken in conjunction with the contemporaneous history; of which we know little or nothing from information in detail.

On the best judgment that I can form, I cannot adopt wholly either the edited order or that of Dionysius, though agreeing in part with both. I concur with Dionysius and Dr. Thirlwall in placing the second Olynthiac first of the three. I concur with the edited order in placing the third last. I observe, in Dr. Thirlwall's Appendix, that this arrangement has been vindicated in a Dissertation by Stueve. I have not seen this Dissertation; and my own conclusion was deduced (even before I knew that it had ever been advocated elsewhere) only from an attentive study of the speeches.

Edited Order . . . . .	I.	II.	III.
Order of Dionysius . . . . .	II.	III.	I.
Order of Stueve (which I think the most probable) . . . . .	II.	I.	III.

To consider, first, the proper place of the second Olynthiac (I mean that which stands second in the edited order).

The most remarkable characteristic of this oration is, that scarcely anything is said in it about Olynthus. It is, in fact, a Philippic rather than an Olynthiac. This characteristic is not merely admitted, but strong



ly put forward, by Petrenz, p. 11: — "Quid! quod ipsorum Olynthiorum hac quidem in causâ tantum uno loco facta mentio est — ut uno illo versiculo sublato, vix ex ipsâ oratione, quâ in causâ ~~es~~ et habitâ, certis rationibus evinci posset." How are we to explain the absence of all reference to Olynthus? According to Petrenz, it is because the orator had already, in his former harangue, said all that could be necessary in respect to the wants of Olynthus, and the necessity of upholding that city even for the safety of Athens; he might now therefore calculate that his first discourse remained impressed on his countrymen, and that all that was required was, to combat the extraordinary fear of Philip which hindered them from giving effect to a resolution already taken to assist the Olynthians.

In this hypothesis I am unable to acquiesce. It may appear natural to a reader of Demosthenes, who passes from the first printed discourse to the second without any intervening time to forget what he has just read. But it will hardly fit the case of a real speaker in busy Athens. Neither Demosthenes in the fluctuating Athenian assembly — nor even any orator in the more fixed English Parliament or American Congress — could be rash enough to calculate that a discourse delivered some time before had remained engraven on the minds of his audience. If Demosthenes had previously addressed the Athenians with so strong a conviction of the distress of Olynthus, and of the motives for Athens to assist Olynthus, as is embodied in the first discourse — if his speech, however well received, was not acted upon, so that in the course of a certain time he had to address them again for the same purpose — I cannot believe that he would allude to Olynthus only once by the by, and that he would merely dilate upon the general chances and conditions of the war between Athens and Philip. However well calculated the second Olynthiac may be "ad concitandos exacerbandosque civium animos" (to use the words of Petrenz), it is not peculiarly calculated to procure aid to Olynthus. If the orator had failed to procure such aid by a discourse like the first Olynthiac, he would never resort to a discourse like the second Olynthiac to make good the deficiency; would repeat anew, and more impressively than before, the danger of Olynthus, and the danger to Athens herself if she suffered Olynthus to fall. This would be the way to accomplish his object, and at the same time to combat the fear of Philip in the minds of the Athenians.

According to my view of the subject, the omission (or mere single passing notice of Olynthus clearly shows that the wants of that city, and the urgency of assisting it, were *not* the main drift of Demosthenes in the second Olynthiac. His main drift is, to encourage and stimulate his countrymen in their general war against Philip; taking in, thankfully, the new ally Olynthus, whom they have just acquired — but taking her only as a valuable auxiliary (*ἐν προσθήκῃς μέλει*), to co-operate with Athens against Philip as well as to receive aid from Athens

— not presenting her either as peculiarly needing succor, or as likely, if allowed to perish, to expose the vitals of Athens.

Now a speech of this character is what I cannot satisfactorily explain, as following after the totally different spirit of the first Olynthiac; but it is natural and explicable, if we suppose it to precede the first Olynthiac. Olynthus does not approach Athens at first in *formâ pauperis*, as if she were in danger and requiring aid against an overwhelming enemy. She presents herself as an equal, offering to co-operate against a common enemy, and tendering an alliance which the Athenians had hitherto sought in vain. She will, of course, want aid, — but she can give coöperation of equal value. Demosthenes advises to assist her; this comes of course, when her alliance is accepted: — but he dwells more forcibly upon the value of what she will *give* to the Athenians, in the way of coöperation against Philip. Nay, it is remarkable that the territorial vicinity of Olynthus to Philip is exhibited, not as a peril to *her* which the Athenians must assist her in averting, but as a godsend to enable them the better to attack Philip in conjunction with her. Moreover Olynthus is represented, not as apprehending any danger from Philip's arms, but as having recently discovered how dangerous it is to be in alliance with him. Let us thank the gods (says Demosthenes at the opening of the second Olynthiac) — *τὸ τοῖς πολέμοις Φιλίππῳ γεγενῆσθαι καὶ χάραν ὁμοῖον καὶ δύναμιν τινα κεκτημένους, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀπάντων, τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ πολέμου γνώμην τοιαύτην ἔχοντας, ὥστε τὰς πρὸς ἐκείνον διαλλαγὰς, πρῶτον μὲν ἀπίστους, εἰτα τῆς ἐαυτῶν πατρίδος νομίζειν ἀναστῆσαι εἶναι, δαίμονι τι καὶ θεῷ παντάπασιν εἰσὶν ἐνεργείῃ* (p. 18).

The general tenor of the second Olynthiac is in harmony with this opening. Demosthenes looks forward to a vigorous aggressive war carried on by Athens and Olynthus jointly against Philip, and he enters at large into the general chances of such war, noticing the vulnerable as well as odious points of Philip, and striving (as Petrenz justly remarks) to "excite and exasperate the minds of the citizens."

Such is the first bright promise of the Olynthian alliance with Athens. But Athens, as usual, makes no exertions; leaving the Olynthians and Chalkidians to contend against Philip by themselves. It is presently found that he gains advantages over them; bad news comes from Thrace, and probably complaining envoys to announce them. It is then that Demosthenes delivers his first Olynthiac, so much more urgent in its tone respecting Olynthus. The main topic is now — "Protect the Olynthians; save their confederate cities; think what will happen if they are ruined; there is nothing to hinder Philip, in that case, from marching into Attica." The views of Demosthenes have changed from the offensive to the defensive.

I cannot but think, therefore, that all the internal evidence of the Olynthiacs indicates the second as prior in point of time both to the



first and to the third. Stueve (as cited by Dr. Thirlwall) mentions another reason tending to the same conclusion. Nothing is said in the second Olynthiac about meddling with the Theoric Fund; whereas in the first, that subject is distinctly adverted to — and in the third, forcibly and repeatedly pressed, though with sufficient artifice to save the illegality. This is difficult to explain, assuming the second to be posterior to the first; but noway difficult, if we suppose the second to be the earliest of the three, and to be delivered with the purpose which I have pointed out.

On the other hand, this manner of handling the Theoric Fund in the third oration, as compared with the first, is one strong reason for believing (as Petrenz justly contends) that the third is posterior to the first — and not prior, as Dionysius places it.

As to the third Olynthiac, its drift and purpose appear to me correctly stated in the argument prefixed by Libanius. It was delivered after Athens had sent some succor to Olynthus; whereas, both the first and the second were spoken before anything at all had yet been done. I think there is good ground for following Libanius (as Petrenz and others do (in his statement that the third oration recognizes Athens as having done *something*, which the two first do not; though Dr. Thirlwall (p. 509) agrees with Jacobs in doubting such a distinction. The successes of mercenaries, reported at Athens (p. 38), must surely have been successes of mercenaries commissioned by her; and the triumphant hopes, noticed by Demosthenes as actually prevalent, are most naturally explained by supposing such news to have arrived. Demosthenes says no more than he can help about the success actually gained, because he thinks it of no serious importance. He wishes to set before the people, as a corrective to the undue confidence prevalent, that all the real danger yet remained to be dealt with.

Though Athens had done something, she had done little — sent no citizens — provided no pay. This Demosthenes urges her to do without delay, and dwells upon the Theoric Fund as one means of obtaining money along with personal service. Dr. Thirlwall indeed argues that the first Olynthiac is more urgent than the third, in setting forth the crisis; from whence he infers that it is posterior in time. His argument is partly founded upon a sentence near the beginning of the first Olynthiac, wherein the safety of Athens herself is mentioned as involved — τῶν πραγμάτων ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἀντιληπτέον ἐστίν, ἔπειρ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας αὐτῶν φροντίζετε: upon which I may remark, that the reading αὐτῶν is not universally admitted. Dindorf, in his edition, reads αὐτῶν, referring it to πραγμάτων: and stating in his note that αὐτῶν is the reading of the vulgate, first changed by Reiske into αὐτῶν on the authority of the Codex Bavaricus. But even if we grant that the first Olynthiac depicts the crisis as more dangerous and urgent than the third, we cannot infer that the first is posterior

to the third. The third was delivered immediately after news received of success near Olynthus; Olynthian affairs did really prosper for the moment and to a certain extent — though the amount of prosperity was greatly exaggerated by the public. Demosthenes sets himself to combat this exaggeration; he passes as lightly as he can over the recent good news, but he cannot avoid allowing something for them, and throwing the danger of Olynthus a little back into more distant contingency. At the same time he states it in the strongest manner, both section 2 and sections 9, 10.

Without being insensible, therefore, to the fallibility of all opinions founded upon such imperfect evidence, I think that the true chronological order of the Olynthiacs is that proposed by Stueve, II. I. III. With Dionysius I agree so far as to put the second first; and with the common order, in putting the third last.



## CHAPTER LXXXIX.

FROM THE CAPTURE OF OLYNTHUS TO THE TERMINATION OF  
THE SACRED WAR BY PHILIP.

It was during the early spring of 347 B. C., as far as we can make out, that Olynthus, after having previously seen the thirty Chalkidic cities conquered, underwent herself the like fate from the arms of Philip. Exile and poverty became the lot of such Olynthians and Chalkidians as could make their escape; while the greater number of both sexes were sold into slavery. A few painful traces present themselves of the diversities of suffering which befel these unhappy victims. Atrestidas, an Arcadian who had probably served in the Macedonian army, received from Philip a grant of thirty Olynthian slaves, chiefly women and children, who were seen following him in a string as he travelled homeward through the Grecian cities. Many young Olynthian women were bought for the purpose of having their persons turned to account by their new proprietors. Of these purchasers, one, an Athenian citizen who had exposed his new purchase at Athens, was tried and condemned for the proceeding by the Dikastery.<sup>1</sup> Other anecdotes come before us, inaccurate probably as to names and details,<sup>2</sup> yet illustrating the general hardships brought upon this once free Chalkidic population. Meanwhile the victor Philip was at the maximum of his glory. In commemoration of his conquests, he celebrated a splendid festival to the Olympian Zeus in

<sup>1</sup> Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 93; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 439, 440. Demosthenes asserts also that Olynthian women were given, as a present, by Philip to Philokrates (p. 386-440). The outrage which he imputes (p. 401) to Æschines and Phrynon in Macedonia, against the Olynthian woman — is not to be received as a fact, since it is indignantly denied by Æschines (Fals. Leg. init. and p. 48). Yet it is probably but too faithful a picture of real deeds, committed by others, if not by Æschines.

<sup>2</sup> The story of the old man of Olynthus (Seneca, Controv. v. 10) bought by Parrhasius the painter and tortured in order to form a subject for a painting of the suffering Prometheus — is more than doubtful; since Parrhasius, already in high repute as a painter before 400 B. C. (see Xenoph. Mem. iii. 10), can hardly have been still flourishing in 347 B. C. It discloses, however, at least, one of the many forms of slave-suffering occasionally realized





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Macedonia, with unbounded hospitality, and prizes of every sort, for matches and exhibitions, both gymnastic and poetical. His donations were munificent, as well to the Grecian and Macedonian officers who had served him, as to the eminent poets or actors who pleased his taste. Satyrus the comic actor, refusing all presents for himself, asked and obtained from him the release of two young women taken in Olynthus, daughters of his friend the Pydnaean Apollophanes, who had been one of the persons concerned in the death of Philip's elder brother Alexander. Satyrus announced his intention not only of ensuring freedom to these young women, but likewise of providing portions for them and giving them out in marriage.<sup>1</sup> Philip also found at Olynthus his two exile half-brothers, who had served as pretexts for the war — and put both of them to death.<sup>2</sup>

It has already been stated that Athens had sent to Olynthus more than one considerable reinforcement, especially during the last year of the war. Though we are ignorant what these expeditions achieved, or even how much was their exact force, we find reason to suspect that they were employed by Chares and other generals to no good purpose. The opponents of Chares accused him, as well as Deiares and other mercenary chiefs, of having wasted the naval and military strength of the city in idle enterprises or rapacious extortions upon the traders of the Ægean. They summed up 1500 talents and 150 triremes thus lost to Athens, besides wide-spread odium incurred among the islanders by the unjust contributions levied upon them to enrich the general.<sup>3</sup> In addition to this disgraceful ill-success, came now the fearful ruin in Olynthus and Chalkidikê, and the great aggrandizement of their enemy Philip. The loss of Olynthus, with the miserable captivity of its population, would have been sufficient of themselves to excite powerful sentiment among the Athenians. But there was a farther circumstance which came yet more home to their feelings. Many of their own citizens were serving in Olynthus as an auxiliary garrison, and had now become captives along with the rest.<sup>4</sup> No such calamity as this had befallen Athens for a cen-

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 384-401; Diodor. xv. 55.

<sup>2</sup> Justin, viii. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 37. c. 24.

<sup>4</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 38.



tury past, since the defeat of Tolmides at Koroneia in Boeotia. The whole Athenian people, and especially the relations of the captives, were full of agitation and anxiety, increased by alarming news from other quarters. The conquest threatened the security of all the Athenian possessions in Lemnos, Imbros, and the Chersonese. This last peninsula, especially, was altogether unprotected against Philip, who was even reported to be on his march thither; insomuch that the Athenian settlers within it began to forsake their properties and transfer their families to Athens. Amidst the grief and apprehension which disturbed the Athenian mind, many special assemblies were held to discuss suitable remedies. What was done, we are not exactly informed. But it seems that no one knew where the general Chares, with his armament, was; so that it became necessary even for his friends in the assembly to echo the strong expressions of displeasure among the people, and to send a light vessel immediately in search of him.<sup>1</sup>

The gravity of the crisis forced even Eubulus and others among the statesmen hitherto languid in the war, to hold a more energetic language than before against Philip. Denouncing him now as the common enemy of Greece,<sup>2</sup> they proposed missions into Peloponnesus and elsewhere for the purpose of animating the Grecian states into confederacy against him. Æschines assisted strenuously in procuring the adoption of this proposition, and was himself named as one of the envoys into Peloponnesus.<sup>3</sup>

This able orator, immortalized as the rival of Demosthenes, has come before us hitherto only as a soldier in various Athenian expeditions—to Phlius in Peloponnesus (368)—to the battle of Mantinea (362)—and to Eubœa under Phokion (349 B. C.); in which last he had earned the favorable notice of the general, and had been sent to Athens with the news of the victory at Tamynæ. Æschines was about six years older than Demosthenes, but born in a much humbler and poorer station. His father Atromêtus taught to boys the elements of letters; his mother

<sup>1</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 37.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 434. *καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ δήμῳ κατηγορῶ (you, Eubulus) Φιλίππῳ, καὶ κατὰ τῶν παίδων ὥμνεις ἢ μὴν ἀπολωλέναι Φιλίππου ἂν βοῦλεσθαι, etc.*

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 438, 439.

Glaukothea made a living by presiding over certain religious assemblies and rites of initiation, intended chiefly for poor communicants; the boy Æschines assisting both one and the other in a mental capacity. Such at least is the statement which comes to us, enriched with various degrading details, on the doubtful authority of his rival Demosthenes;<sup>1</sup> who also affirms, what we may accept as generally true, that Æschines had passed his early manhood partly as an actor, partly as a scribe or reader to the official boards. For both functions he possessed some natural advantages—an athletic frame, a powerful voice, a ready flow of unpremeditated speech. After some years passed as scribe, in which he made himself useful to Eubulus and others, he was chosen public scribe to the assembly—acquired familiarity with the administrative and parliamentary business of the city—and thus elevated himself by degrees to influence as a speaker. In rhetorical power, he seems to have been surpassed only by Demosthenes.<sup>2</sup>

As envoy of Athens despatched under the motion of Eubulus, Æschines proceeded into Peloponnesus in the spring of 347; others being sent at the same time to other Grecian cities. Among other places, he visited Megalopolis, where he was heard before the Arcadian collective assembly called the Ten Thousand. He addressed them in a strain of animated exhortation, adjuring them to combine with Athens for the defence of the liberties of Greece against Philip, and inveighing strenuously against those traitors who, in Arcadia as well as in other parts of Greece, sold themselves to the aggressor and paralyzed all resistance. He encountered however much opposition from a speaker named Hieronymus, who espoused the interest of Philip in the assembly: and though he professed to bring back some flattering hopes, it is certain that neither in Arcadia, nor elsewhere in Peloponnesus, was his influence of any real efficacy.<sup>3</sup> The strongest feeling among

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes affirms this at two distinct times—Fals. Leg. p. 415–431; De Coronâ, p. 313.

Stechow (Vita Æschinis, p. 1–10) brings together the little which can be made out respecting Æschines.

<sup>2</sup> Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dicend. Demosth. p. 1063; Cicero, Orator, 2, 29.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 344–438; Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 38. The conduct of Æschines at this juncture is much the same, as described by his rival.



the Arcadians was fear and dislike of Sparta, which rendered them in the main indifferent, if not favorable, to the Macedonian successes. In returning from Arcadia to Athens, Æschines met the Arcadian Atrestidas, with the unhappy troop of Olynthian slaves following; a sight which so deeply affected the Athenian orator, that he dwelt upon it afterwards in his speech before the assembly, with indignant sympathy; deploring the sad effects of Grecian dissension, and the ruin produced by Philip's combined employment of arms and corruption.

Æschines returned probably about the middle of the summer of 347 B. C. Other envoys, sent to more distant cities, remained out longer; some indeed even until the ensuing winter. Though it appears that some envoys from other cities were induced in return to visit Athens, yet no sincere or hearty coöperation against Philip could be obtained in any part of Greece. While Philip, in the fulness of triumph, was celebrating his magnificent Olympic festival in Macedonia, the Athenians were disheartened by finding that they could expect little support from independent Greeks, and were left to act only with their own narrow synod of allies. Hence Eubulus and Æschines became earnest partisans of peace, and Demosthenes also seems to have been driven by the general despondency into a willingness to negotiate. The two orators, though they afterwards became bitter rivals, were at this juncture not very discordant in sentiment. On the other hand, the philippizing speakers at Athens held a bolder tone than ever. As Philip found his ports greatly blocked up by the Athenian cruisers, he was likely to profit by his existing ascendancy for the purpose of strengthening his naval equipments. Now there was no place so abundantly supplied as Athens, with marine stores and muniments for armed ships. Probably there were agents or speculators taking measures to supply Philip with these articles, and it was against them that a decree of the assembly was now directed, adopted on the motion of a senator named Timarchus — to punish with death all who should export from Athens to Philip either arms or stores for ships of war.<sup>1</sup> This severe decree, how-

and as admitted by himself. It was, in truth, among the most honorable epochs of his life.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 433 This decree must have been proposed by

ever, was passed at the same time that the disposition towards peace, if peace were attainable, was on the increase at Athens.

Some months before the capture of Olynthus, ideas of peace had already been started, partly through the indirect overtures of Philip himself. During the summer of 348 B. C., the Eubœans had tried to negotiate an accommodation with Athens; the contest in Eubœa, though we know no particulars of it, having never wholly ceased for the last year and a half. Nor does it appear that any peace was even now concluded; for Eubœa is spoken of as under the dependence of Philip during the ensuing year.<sup>1</sup> The Eubœan envoys, however, intimated that Philip had desired them to communicate from him a wish to finish the war and conclude peace with Athens.<sup>2</sup> Though Philip had at this time conquered the larger portion of Chalkidikê, and was proceeding successfully

Timarchus either towards the close of Olymp. 108, 1 — or towards the beginning of the following year, Olymp. 108, 2; that is, not long before, or not long after, Midsummer 347 B. C. But which of these two dates is to be preferred, is matter of controversy. Franke (Prolegom. ad Æschin. cont. Timarchum, p. xxxviii.—xli. thinks that Timarchus was senator in Olymp. 108, 1 — and proposed the decree then; he supposes the oration of Æschines to have been delivered in the beginning of Olymp. 108, 3 — and that the expression (p. 11) announcing Timarchus as having been senator "the year before" (πέρναν), is to be construed loosely as signifying "the year but one before."

Mr. Clinton, Boeckh, and Westermann, suppose the oration of Æschines against Timarchus to have been delivered in Olymp. 108, 4 — not in Olymp. 108, 3. On that supposition, if we take the word πέρναν in its usual sense, Timarchus was senator in 108, 3. Now it is certain that he did not propose the decree forbidding the export of naval stores to Philip, at a date so late as 108, 3; because the peace with Philip was concluded in Elaphebolion Olymp. 108, 2. (March, 346 B. C.) But the supposition might be admissible, that Timarchus was senator in two different years, — both in Olymp. 108, 1 and in Olymp. 108, 3. (not in two consecutive years). In that case, the senatorial year of Timarchus, to which Æschines alludes (cont. Timarch. p. 11), would be Olymp. 108, 3, while the other senatorial year, in which Timarchus moved the decree prohibiting export, would be Olymp. 108, 1.

Nevertheless, I agree with the views of Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 294) who thinks that the oration was delivered Olymp. 108, 3 — and that Timarchus had been senator and had proposed the decree prohibiting export of stores to Philip, in the year preceding, — that is, Olymp. 108, 2; at the beginning of the year, — Midsummer 347 B. C.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 348-445

<sup>2</sup> Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 29



against the remainder, it was still his interest to detach Athens from the war, if he could. Her manner of carrying on war was indeed faint and slack; yet she did him much harm at sea, and she was the only city competent to organize an extensive Grecian confederacy against him; which, though it had not yet been brought about, was at least a possible contingency under her presidency.

An Athenian of influence named Phrynon had been captured by Philip's cruisers, during the truce of the Olympic festival in 348 B. C.: after a certain detention, he procured from home the required ransom and obtained his release. On returning to Athens, he had sufficient credit to prevail on the public assembly to send another citizen along with him, as public envoy from the city to Philip; in order to aid him in getting back his ransom, which he alleged to have been wrongfully demanded from one captured during the holy truce. Though this seems a strange proceeding during mid-war,<sup>1</sup> yet the Athenian people took up the case with sympathy; Ktesiphon was named envoy, and went with Phrynon to Philip, whom they must have found engaged in the war against Olynthus. Being received in the most courteous manner, they not only obtained restitution of the ransom, but were completely won over by Philip. With his usual good policy, he had seized the opportunity of gaining (we may properly say, of bribing, since the restoration of ransom was substantially a bribe) two powerful Athenian citizens, whom he now sent back to Athens as his pronounced partisans.

<sup>1</sup> There is more than one singularity in the narrative given by Æschines about Phrynon. The complaint of Phrynon implies an assumption, that the Olympic truce suspended the operations of war everywhere throughout Greece between belligerent Greeks. But such was not the maxim recognized or acted on; so far as we know the operations of warfare. Voemel (Proleg. ad Demosth. De Pace, p. 246) feeling this difficulty, understands the Olympic truce, here mentioned, to refer to the Olympic festival celebrated by Philip himself in Macedonia, in the spring or summer of 347 B. C. This would remove the difficulty about the effect of the truce; for Philip of course would respect his own proclaimed truce. But it is liable to another objection: that Æschines plainly indicates the capture of Phrynon to have been anterior to the fall of Olynthus. Besides, Æschines would hardly use the words *ἐν ταῖς Ὀλυμπικαῖς σπονδαῖς*, without any special addition, to signify the Macedonian games.

Phrynon and Ktesiphon, on their return, expatiated warmly on the generosity of Philip, and reported much about his flattering expressions towards Athens, and his reluctance to continue the war against her. The public assembly being favorably disposed, a citizen named Philokrates, who now comes before us for the first time, proposed a decree, granting to Philip leave to send a herald and envoys, if he chose, to treat for peace; which was what Philip was anxious to do, according to the allegation of Ktesiphon. The decree was passed unanimously in the assembly, but the mover Philokrates was impeached some time afterwards before the Dikastery, as for an illegal proposition, by a citizen named Lykinus. On the cause coming to trial, the Dikastery pronounced an acquittal so triumphant, that Lykinus did not even obtain the fifth part of the suffrages. Philokrates being so sick as to be unable to do justice to his own case, Demosthenes stood forward as his supporter, and made a long speech in his favor.<sup>1</sup>

The motion of Philokrates determined nothing positive, and only made an opening; of which, however, it did not suit Philip's purpose to avail himself. But we see that ideas of peace had been thrown out by some persons at Athens, even during the last months of the Olynthian war, and while a body of Athenian citizens were actually assisting Olynthus against the besieging force

<sup>1</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 30. c. 7; cont. Ktesiph. p. 63. Our knowledge of these events is derived almost wholly from one, or other, or both, of the two rival orators, in their speeches delivered four or five years afterwards, in the trial *De Falsâ Legatione*. Demosthenes seeks to prove that before the embassy to Macedonia, in which he and Æschines were jointly concerned, Æschines was eager for continued war against Philip, and only became the partisan of Philip during and after the embassy. Æschines does not deny that he made efforts at that juncture to get up more effective war against Philip; nor is the fact at all dishonorable to him. On the other hand, he seeks to prove against Demosthenes, that he (Demosthenes) was at that time both a partisan of peace with Philip, and a friend of Philokrates to whom he afterwards became so bitterly opposed. For this purpose Æschines adverts to the motion of Philokrates about permitting Philip to send envoys to Athens — and the speech of Demosthenes in the Dikastery in favor of Philokrates.

It would prove nothing discreditable to Demosthenes if both these allegations were held to be correct. The motion of Philokrates was altogether indefinite, pledging Athens to nothing; and Demosthenes might well think it unreasonable to impeach a statesman for such a motion.



of Philip. Presently arrived the terrible news of the fall of Olynthus, and of the captivity of the Athenian citizens in garrison there. While this great alarm (as has been already stated) gave birth to new missions for anti-Macedonian alliances, it enlisted on the side of peace all the friends of those captives whose lives were now in Philip's hands. The sorrow thus directly inflicted on many private families, together with the force of individual sympathy widely diffused among the citizens, operated powerfully upon the decisions of the public assembly. A century before, the Athenians had relinquished all their acquisitions in Boeotia, in order to recover their captives taken in the defeat of Tolmides at Koroneia; and during the Peloponnesian war, the policy of the Spartans had been chiefly guided for three or four years by the anxiety to ensure the restoration of the captives of Sphakteria. Moreover, several Athenians of personal consequence were taken at Olynthus; among them, Eukratus and Iatrokles. Shortly after the news arrived, the relatives of these two men, presenting themselves before the assembly in the solemn guise of suppliants, deposited an olive branch on the altar hard by, and entreated that care might be had for the safety of their captive kinsmen.<sup>1</sup> This appeal, echoed as it would be by the cries of so many other citizens in the like distress, called forth unanimous sympathy in the assembly. Both Philokrates and Demosthenes spoke in favor of it; Demosthenes probably, as having been a strenuous advocate of the war, was the more anxious to shew that he was keenly alive to so much individual suffering. It was resolved to open indirect negotiations with Philip for the release of the captives,

<sup>1</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 30. c. 8. Ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χρόνου Ὀλυνθοῦς ἦλθον, καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἐγκατελήφθησαν πολιτῶν, ὧν ἦν Ἰατροκλῆς καὶ Εὐκράτης. Ὑπὲρ δὲ τούτων ἱκετηρίαν θέντες οἱ οἰκεῖοι, ἐδέοντο ἑμῶν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιήσασθαι· παρελθόντες δ' αὐτοῖς συνηγόρου Φιλοκράτης καὶ Δημοσθένους, ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἀισχίνους.

To illustrate the effect of this impressive ceremony upon the Athenian assembly, we may recall the memorable scene mentioned by Xenophon and Diodorus (Xen. Hell. i. 7, 8; Diodor. xiii. 101) after the battle of Arginusæ, when the relatives of the warriors who had perished on board of the foundered ships, presented themselves before the assembly with shaven heads and in mourning garb. Compare also, about presentments of solemn supplication to the assembly, Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 262—with the note of Dissen, and Æschines contra Timarchum p. 1 c. 13.

through some of the great tragic and comic actors; who, travelling in the exercise of their profession to every city in Greece, were everywhere regarded in some sort as privileged persons. One of these, Neoptolemus,<sup>1</sup> had already availed himself of his favored profession and liberty of transit to assist in Philip's intrigues and correspondences at Athens; another, Aristodemus, was also in good esteem with Philip; both were probably going to Macedonia to take part in the splendid Olympic festival there preparing. They were charged to make application, and take the best steps in their power, for the safety or release of the captives.<sup>2</sup>

It would appear that these actors were by no means expeditious in the performance of their mission. They probably spent some time in their professional avocations in Macedonia; and Aristodemus, not being a responsible envoy, delayed some time even after his return, before he made any report. That his mission had not been wholly fruitless, however, became presently evident from the arrival of the captive Iatrokles, whom Philip had released without ransom. The Senate then summoned Aristodemus before them, inviting him to make a general report of his proceedings, which he did; first before the Senate,—next, before the public assembly. He affirmed that Philip had entertained his propositions kindly, and that he was in the best dispositions towards Athens; desirous not only to be at peace with her, but even to be admitted as her ally. Demosthenes, then a senator, moved a vote of thanks and a wreath to Aristodemus.<sup>3</sup>

This report, as far as we can make out, appears to have been made about September or October 347 B. C.; Æschines, and the

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Pace, p. 58.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 30. c. 8) mentions only Aristodemus. But from various passages in the oration of Demosthenes (De Fals. Leg. p. 344, 346, 371, 443), we gather that the actor Neoptolemus must have been conjoined with him; perhaps also the Athenian Ktesiphon, though this is less certain. Demosthenes mentions Aristodemus again, in the speech De Coronâ (p. 232), as the first originator of the peace.

Demosthenes (De Pace, p. 58) had, even before this, denounced Neoptolemus as playing a corrupt game, for the purposes of Philip, at Athens. Soon after the peace, Neoptolemus sold up all his property at Athens, and went to reside in Macedonia.

<sup>3</sup> Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 30. c. 8.



other roving commissioners sent out by Athens to raise up anti-Macedonian combinations, had returned with nothing but disheartening announcement of refusal or lukewarmness. And there occurred also about the same time in Phokis and Thermopylæ, other events of grave augury to Athens, showing that the Sacred War and the contest between the Phokians and Thebans was turning,—as all events had turned for the last ten years,—to the farther aggrandizement of Philip.

During the preceding two years, the Phokians, now under the command of Phalækus, in place of Phayllus, had maintained their position against Thebes; had kept possession of the Boeotian towns, Orchomenus, Koroneia, and Korsia, and were still masters of Alponus, Thronium, and Nikæa, as well as of the important pass of Thermopylæ adjoining.<sup>1</sup> But though on the whole successful in regard to Thebes, they had fallen into dissension among themselves. The mercenary force, necessary to their defence, could only be maintained by continued appropriation of the Delphian treasures; an appropriation becoming from year to year both less lucrative and more odious. By successive spoliation of gold and silver ornaments, the temple is said to have been stripped of ten thousand talents (about two million three hundred thousand pounds), all its available wealth; so that the Phokian leaders were now reduced to dig for an unauthenticated treasure, supposed (on the faith of a verse in the Iliad, as well as on other grounds of surmise), to lie concealed beneath its stone floor. Their search, however, was not only unsuccessful, but arrested, as we are told, by violent earthquakes, significant of the anger of Apollo.<sup>2</sup>

As the Delphian treasure became less and less, so the means of Phalækus to pay troops and maintain ascendancy declined. While the foreign mercenaries relaxed in their obedience, his opponents in Phokis manifested increased animosity against his continued sacrilege. So greatly did these opponents increase in power, that they deposed Phalækus, elected Deinokrates with two others in his place, and instituted a strict inquiry into the antecedent ap-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 58; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 385-387; Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 45. c. 41.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 56.

propriation of the Delphian treasure. Gross peculation was found to have been committed for the profit of individual leaders, especially one named Philon; who, on being seized and put to the torture, disclosed the names of several accomplices. These men were tried, compelled to refund, and ultimately put to death.<sup>1</sup> Phalækus however still retained his ascendancy over the mercenaries, about eight thousand in number, so as to hold Thermopylæ and the places adjacent, and even presently to be re-appointed general.<sup>2</sup>

Such intestine dispute, combined with the gradual exhaustion of the temple-funds, sensibly diminished the power of the Phokians. Yet they still remained too strong for their enemies the Thebans; who, deprived of Orchomenus and Koroneia, impoverished by military efforts of nine years, and unable to terminate the contest by their own force, resolved to invoke foreign aid. An opportunity might perhaps have been obtained for closing the war by some compromise, if it had been possible now to bring about an accommodation between Thebes and Athens; which some of the philo-Theban orators, (Demosthenes seemingly among them), attempted, under the prevalent uneasiness about Philip.<sup>3</sup> But the adverse sentiments in both cities, especially in Thebes, were found invincible; and the Thebans, little anticipating consequences, determined to invoke the ruinous intervention of the conqueror of Olynthus. The Thessalians, already valuable allies of Philip, joined them in soliciting him to crush the Phokians, and to restore the ancient Thessalian privilege of the Pylæa, (or regular yearly Amphiktyonic meeting at Thermopylæ), which the Phokians had suppressed during the last ten years. This joint prayer for intervention was preferred in the name of the Delphian god, investing Philip with the august character of champion

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 56, 57.

<sup>2</sup> Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 62. c. 41; Diodor. xvi. 59. Φάλακρον, πάλιν τῆς στρατηγίας ἡξιωμένον, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Æschines cont. Ktesiph. p. 73. c. 44; Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 231. Demosthenes, in his oration De Coronâ, spoken many years after the facts, affirms the contingency of alliance between Athens and Thebes at this juncture, as having been much more probable than he ventures to state it in the earlier speech De Falsâ Legatione.



of the Amphiktyonic assembly, to rescue the Delphian temple from its sacrilegious plunderers.

The King of Macedon, with his past conquests and his well-known spirit of aggressive enterprise, was now a sort of present deity, ready to lend force to all the selfish ambition, or blind fear and antipathy, prevalent among the discontented fractions of the Hellenic world. While his intrigues had procured numerous partisans even in the centre of Peloponnesus, — as Æschines, on return from his mission, had denounced, not having yet himself enlisted in the number, — he was now furnished with a pious pretence, and invited by powerful cities, to penetrate into the heart of Greece, within its last line of common defence, Thermopylæ.

The application of the Thebans to Philip excited much alarm in Phokis. A Macedonian army under Parmenio did actually enter Thessaly, — where we find them, three months later, besieging Halus.<sup>1</sup> Reports seem to have been spread, about September 347 B. C., that the Macedonians were about to march to Thermopylæ; upon which the Phokians took alarm, and sent envoys to Athens as well as to Sparta, entreating aid to enable them to hold the pass, and offering to deliver up the three important towns near it, — Alpônus, Thronium, and Nikæa. So much were the Athenians alarmed by the message, that they not only ordered Proxenus, their general at Oreus, to take immediate possession of the pass, but also passed a decree to equip fifty triremes, and to send forth their military citizens under thirty years of age, with an energy like that displayed when they checked Philip before at the same place. — But it appears that the application had been made by the party in Phokis opposed to Phalækus. So vehemently did that chief resent the proceeding, that he threw the Phokian envoys into prison on their return; refusing to admit either Proxenus or Archidamus into possession of Thermopylæ, and even dismissing without recognition the Athenian heralds, who came in their regular rounds to proclaim the solemn truce of the Eleusinian mysteries.<sup>2</sup> This proceeding on the part of Phalækus was

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 392.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41. It is this notice of the *μυστηριαρχίας σπονδαί* which serves as indication of time for the event. The Eleusinian mysteries were celebrated in the month Boëdromion (September). These events took place in September, 347 B. C., Olymp. 108, 2 — the archonship of

dictated seemingly by jealousy of Athens and Sparta, and by fear that they would support the party opposed to him in Phokis. It could not have originated (as Æschines alleges) in superior confidence and liking towards Philip; for if Phalækus had entertained such sentiments, he might have admitted the Macedonian troops at once; which he did not do until ten months later, under the greatest pressure of circumstances.

Such insulting repudiation of the aid tendered by Proxenus at Thermopylæ, combined with the distracted state of parties in Phokis, Menaced Athens with a new embarrassment. Though Phalækus still held the pass, his conduct had been such as to raise doubts whether he might not treat separately with Philip. Here was another circumstance operating on Athens, — besides the refusal of coöperation from other Greeks and the danger of her captives at Olynthus, — to dishearten her in the prosecution of the war, and to strengthen the case of those who advocated peace. It was a circumstance the more weighty, because it really involved the question of safety or exposure to her own territory, through the opening of the pass of Thermopylæ. It was here that she was now under the necessity of keeping watch; being thrown on the defensive for her own security at home, — not, as before, stretching out a long arm for the protection of distant possessions such as the Chersonese, or distant allies such as the Olynthians. So speedily had the predictions of Demosthenes been realized, that if the Athenians refused to carry on strenuous war against Philip on his coast, they would bring upon themselves the graver evil of having to resist him on or near their own frontier.

Themistokles at Athens. There is also a farther indication of time given by Æschines: that the event happened before he was nominated envoy, — *πρὶν ἐμὲ χειροτονηθῆναι πρεσβευτήν* (p. 46. c. 41). This refutes the supposition of Voemel (Proleg. ad Demosth. de Pace, p. 255), who refers the proceeding to the following month Elaphebolion (March), on the ground of some other words of Æschines, intimating "that the news reached Athens while the Athenians were deliberating about the peace." Böhnecke, too, supposes that the mysteries here alluded to are the lesser mysteries, celebrated in Anthesterion; not the greater, which belong to Boëdromion. This supposition appears to me improbable and unnecessary. We may reasonably believe that there were many discussions on the peace at Athens, before the envoys were actually nominated. Some of these debates may well have taken place in the month Boëdromion.



The maintenance of freedom in the Hellenic world against the extra-Hellenic invader, now turned once more upon the pass of Thermopylæ; as it had turned one hundred and thirty-three years before, during the onward march of the Persian Xerxes.

To Philip, that pass was of incalculable importance. It was his only road into Greece; it could not be forced by any land-army; while at sea the Athenian fleet was stronger than his. In spite of the general remissness of Athens in warlike undertakings, she had now twice manifested her readiness for a vigorous effort to maintain Thermopylæ against him. To become master of the position, it was necessary that he should disarm Athens by concluding peace, — keep her in ignorance or delusion as to his real purposes, — prevent her from conceiving alarm or sending aid to Thermopylæ, — and then overawe or buy off the isolated Phokians. How ably and cunningly his diplomacy was managed for this purpose, will presently appear.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It is at this juncture, in trying to make out the diplomatic transactions between Athens and Philip, from the summer of 347 to that of 346 B. C., that we find ourselves plunged amidst the contradictory assertions of the two rival orators, — Demosthenes and Æschines; with very little of genuine historical authority to control them. In 343–342 B. C., Demosthenes impeached Æschines for corrupt betrayal of the interest of Athens in the second of his three embassies to Philip (in 346 B. C.). The long harangue (*De Falsâ Legatione*), still remaining, wherein his charge stands embodied, enters into copious details respecting the peace with its immediate antecedents and consequents. We possess also the speech delivered by Æschines in his own defence, and in counter-accusation of Demosthenes; a speech going over the same ground, suitably to his own purpose and point of view. Lastly, we have the two speeches, delivered several years later (in 330 B. C.), of Æschines in prosecuting Ktesiphon, and of Demosthenes in defending him; wherein the conduct of Demosthenes as to the peace of 346 B. C. again becomes matter of controversy. All these harangues are interesting, not merely as eloquent compositions, but also from the striking conception which they impart of the living sentiment and controversy of the time. But when we try to extract from them real and authentic matter of history, they become painfully embarrassing; so glaring are the contradictions not only between the two rivals, but also between the earlier and later discourses of the same orator himself, especially Æschines; so evident is the spirit of perversion, so unscrupulous are the manifestations of hostile feeling, on both sides. We can place little faith in the allegations of either orator against the other, except where some collateral grounds of fact or probability can be adduced in confirmation. But the allegations of each

On the other hand, to Athens, to Sparta, and to the general cause of Pan-Hellenic independence, it was of capital moment that Philip should be kept on the outside of Thermopylæ. And here Athens had more at stake than the rest; since not merely her influence abroad, but the safety of her own city and territory against invasion, was involved in the question. The Thebans had already invited the presence of Philip, himself always ready even without invitation, to come within the pass; it was the first interest, as well as the first duty, of Athens, to counterwork them, and to keep him out. With tolerable prudence, her guarantee of the past might have been made effective; but we shall find her measures ending only in shame and disappointment, through the flagrant improvidence, and apparent corruption, of her own negotiators.

The increasing discouragement as to war, and yearning for peace, which prevailed at Athens during the summer and autumn of 347 B. C., has been already described. We may be sure that the friends of the captives taken at Olynthus would be importunate in demanding peace, because there was no other way of procuring their release; since Philip did not choose to exchange them for money, reserving them as an item in political negotiation. At length, about the month of November, the public assembly decreed that envoys should be sent to Philip to ascertain on what conditions peace could be made; ten Athenian envoys, and one from the synod of confederate allies, sitting at Athens. The mover of the decree was Philokrates, the same who had moved the previous decree permitting Philip to send envoys if he chose. Of this permission Philip had not availed himself, in spite of all that the philippizers at Athens had alleged about his anxiety for peace and alliance with the city. It suited his purpose to have

as to matters which do not make against the other, are valuable; even the misrepresentations, since we have them on both sides, will sometimes afford mutual correction: and we shall often find it practicable to detect a basis of real matter of fact which one or both may seek to pervert, but which neither can venture to set aside, or can keep wholly out of sight. It is indeed deeply to be lamented that we know little of the history except so much as it suits the one or the other of these rival orators, each animated by purposes totally at variance with that of the historian, to make known either by direct notice or oblique allusion.



the negotiations carried on in Macedonia, where he could act better upon the individual negotiators of Athens.

The decree having been passed in the assembly, ten envoys were chosen: Philokrates, Demosthenes, Æschines, Ktesiphon, Phrynon, Iatroklês, Derkyllus, Kimon, Nausiklês, and Aristodemus the actor. Aglaokreon of Tenedos was selected to accompany them as representative of the allied synod. Of these envoys, Ktesiphon, Phrynon, and Iatroklês, had already been gained over as partisans by Philip while in Macedonia; moreover, Aristodemus was a person to whom, in his histrionic profession, the favor of Philip was more valuable than the interests of Athens. Æschines was proposed by Nausiklês; Demosthenes, by Philokrates the mover.<sup>1</sup> Though Demosthenes had been before so earnest in advocating vigorous prosecution of the war, it does not appear that he was now adverse to the opening of negotiations. Had he been ever so adverse, he would probably have failed in obtaining even a hearing, in the existing temper of the public mind. He thought indeed that Athens inflicted so much damage on her enemy by ruining the Macedonian maritime commerce, that she was not under the necessity of submitting to peace on bad or humiliating terms.<sup>2</sup> But still he did not oppose the overtures, nor did his opposition begin until afterwards, when he saw the turn which the negotiations were taking. Nor, on the other hand, was Æschines as yet suspected of a leaning towards Philip. Both he and Demosthenes obeyed, at this moment, the impulse of opinion generally prevalent at Athens. Their subsequent discordant views and bitter rivalry grew out of the embassy itself; out of its result and the behavior of Æschines.

The eleven envoys were appointed to visit Philip, not with any power of concluding peace, but simply to discuss with him and ascertain on what terms peace could be had. So much is certain; though we do not possess the original decree under which they were nominated. Having sent before them a herald to obtain a safe-conduct from Philip, they left Athens about December 347 B. C., and proceeded by sea to Oreus, on the northern coast of Eu-

<sup>1</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 30. s. 9. p. 31. c. 10. p. 34. c. 20; Argumentum ad Demosth. Fals. Leg.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 442. Compare p. 369, 387, 391.

bea, where they expected to meet the returning herald. Finding that he had not yet come back, they crossed the strait at once, without waiting for him, into the Pagasæan Gulf, where Parmenio with a Macedonian army was then besieging Halus. To him they notified their arrival, and received permission to pass on, first to Pagasæ, next to Larissa. Here they met their own returning herald, under whose safeguard they pursued their journey to Pella.<sup>1</sup>

Our information respecting this (first) embassy proceeds almost wholly from Æschines. He tells us that Demosthenes was, from the very day of setting out, intolerably troublesome both to him and to his brother envoys; malignant, faithless, and watching for such matters as might be turned against them in the way of accusation afterwards; lastly, boastful even to absurd excess, of his own powers of eloquence. In Greece, it was the usual habit to transact diplomatic business, like other political matters, publicly before the governing number — the council, if the constitution happened to be oligarchical — the general assembly, if democratical. Pursuant to this habit, the envoys were called upon to appear before Philip in his full pomp and state, and there address to him formal harangues (either by one or more of their number as they chose), setting forth the case of Athens; after which Philip would deliver his reply in the like publicity, either with his own lips or by those of a chosen minister. The Athenian envoys resolved among themselves, that when introduced, each of them should address Philip, in the order of seniority; Demosthenes being the youngest of the Ten, and Æschines next above him. Accordingly, when summoned before Philip, Ktesiphon, the oldest envoy, began with a short address the other seven followed with equal brevity, while the stress of the business was left to Æschines and Demosthenes.<sup>2</sup>

Æschines recounts in abridgment to the Athenians, with much satisfaction, his own elaborate harangue, establishing the right of Athens to Amphipolis, the wrong done by Philip in taking it and holding it against her, and his paramount obligation to make res-

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 392.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 31. c. 10, 11.



titution — but touching upon no other subject whatever.<sup>1</sup> He then proceeds to state — probably with yet greater satisfaction — that Demosthenes, who followed next, becoming terrified and confused, utterly broke down, forgot his prepared speech, and was obliged to stop short, in spite of courteous encouragements from Philip.<sup>2</sup> Gross failure, after full preparation, on the part of the greatest orator of ancient or modern times, appears at first hearing so incredible, that we are disposed to treat it as a pure fabrication of his opponent. Yet I incline to believe that the fact was substantially as Æschines states it; and that Demosthenes was partially divested of his oratorical powers by finding himself not only speaking before the enemy whom he had so bitterly denounced, but surrounded by all the evidences of Macedonian power, and doubtless exposed to unequivocal marks of well-earned hatred, from those Macedonians who took less pains than Philip to disguise their real feelings.<sup>3</sup>

Having dismissed the envoys after their harangues, and taken a short time for consideration, Philip recalled them into his presence. He then delivered his reply with his own lips, combating especially the arguments of Æschines, and according to that orator, with such pertinence and presence of mind, as to excite the admiration of all the envoys, Demosthenes among the rest. What Philip said, we do not learn from Æschines; who expatiates only on the shuffling, artifice, and false pretences of Demosthenes, to conceal his failure as an orator, and to put himself on a point of advantage above his colleagues. Of these personalities it is impossible to say how much is true; and even were they true, they are scarcely matter of general history.

It was about the beginning of March when the envoys returned to Athens. Some were completely fascinated by the hospitable treatment and engaging manners of Philip,<sup>4</sup> especially when en-

<sup>1</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 31. c. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 32. c. 13, 14.

<sup>3</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 32, 33. c. 15. Demosthenes himself says little or nothing about this first embassy, and nothing at all either about his own speech or that of Æschines.

<sup>4</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 33. c. 17, 18. The effect of the manner and behavior of Philip upon Ktesiphon the envoy, is forcibly stated here by Æschines.

tertaining them at the banquet: with others, he had come to an understanding at once more intimate and more corrupt. They brought back a letter from Philip, which was read both in the Senate and the assembly; while Demosthenes, senator of that year, not only praised them all in the Senate, but also became himself the mover of a resolution that they should be crowned with a wreath of honor, and invited to dine next day in the *prytaneum*.<sup>1</sup>

We have hardly any means of appreciating the real proceedings of this embassy, or the matters treated in discussion with Philip. Æschines tells us nothing, except the formalities of the interview, and the speeches about Amphipolis. But we shall at any rate do him no injustice, if we judge him upon his own account; which, if it does not represent what he actually did, represents what he wished to be thought to have done. His own account certainly shows a strange misconception of the actual situation of affairs. In order to justify himself for being desirous of peace, he lays considerable stress on the losing game which Athens had been playing during the war, and on the probability of yet farther loss if she persisted. He completes the cheerless picture by adding — what was doubtless but too familiar to his Athenian audience — that Philip on his side, marching from one success to another, had raised the Macedonian kingdom to an elevation truly formidable, by the recent extinction of Olynthus. Yet under this state of comparative force between the two contending parties, Æschines presents himself before Philip with a demand of exorbitant magnitude, — for the cession of Amphipolis. He says not a word about anything else. He delivers an eloquent harangue to convince Philip of the incontestible right of Athens to Amphipolis, and to

<sup>1</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 34. c. 19; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 414. This vote of thanks, and invitation to dinner, appears to have been so uniform a custom, that Demosthenes (Fals. Leg. p. 350) comments upon the withholding of the compliment, when the second embassy returned, as a disgrace without parallel. That Demosthenes should have proposed a motion of such customary formality, is a fact of little moment any way. It rather proves that the relations of Demosthenes with his colleagues during the embassy, cannot have been so ill-tempered as Æschines had affirmed. Demosthenes himself admits that he did not begin to suspect his colleagues until the debates at Athens after the return of this first embassy.



prove to him that he was in the wrong for taking and keeping it. He affects to think, that by this process he should induce Philip to part with a town, the most capital and unparalleled position in all his dominions; which he had now possessed for twelve years, and which placed him in communication with his new foundation Philippi and the auriferous region around it. The arguments of Æschines would have been much to the purpose, in an action tried between two litigants before an impartial Dikastery at Athens. But here were two belligerent parties, in a given ratio of strength and position as to the future, debating terms of peace. That an envoy on the part of Athens, the losing party, should now stand forward to demand from a victorious enemy the very place which formed the original cause of the war, and which had become far more valuable to Philip than when he first took it — was a pretension altogether preposterous. When Æschines reproduces his eloquent speech reclaiming Amphipolis, as having been the principal necessity and most honorable achievement of his diplomatic mission, he only shows how little qualified he was to render real service to Athens in that capacity — to say nothing as yet about corruption. The Athenian people, extremely retentive of past convictions, had it deeply impressed on their minds that Amphipolis was theirs by right; and probably the first envoys to Macedonia, — Aristodemus, Neoptolemus, Ktesiphon, Phrynon,<sup>1</sup> etc. — had been so cajoled by the courteous phrases, deceptions, and presents of Philip, that they represented him on their return as not unwilling to purchase friendship with Athens by the restoration of Amphipolis. To this delusive expectation in the Athenian mind Æschines addressed himself, when he took credit for his earnest pleading before Philip on behalf of Athenian right to the place, as if it were the sole purpose of his mission.<sup>2</sup> We shall see him

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 344. Compare p. 371. τοὺς περὶ τῆς ἐρήνης πρόβεις πέμπειν ὡς Φίλιππον ἐπείσθητε ὑπ' Ἀριστοδήμου καὶ Νεοπτολέμου καὶ Κτησιφώντος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπαγγελλόντων οὐδ' ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔγχεζ, etc.

<sup>2</sup> There is great contradiction between the two orators, Æschines and Demosthenes, as to this speech of Æschines before Philip respecting Amphipolis. Demosthenes represents Æschines as having said in this report to the people on his return, "I (Æschines) said nothing about Amphipolis, in order that I might leave that subject fresh for Demosthenes," etc.

throughout, in his character of envoy, not only fostering the actual delusions of the public at Athens, but even circulating gross fictions and impostures of his own, respecting the proceedings and purposes of Philip.

It was on or about the first day of the month Elaphebolion<sup>1</sup> (March) when the envoys reached Athens on returning from the court of Philip. They brought a letter from him couched in the most friendly terms; expressing great anxiety not only to be at peace with Athens, but also to become her ally; stating moreover that he was prepared to render her valuable service, and that he would have specified more particularly what the service would be, if he could have felt certain that he should be received as her ally.<sup>2</sup> But in spite of such amenities of language, affording an occasion for his partisans in the assembly, Æschines, Philokrates, Ktesiphon, Phrynon, Iatroklês and others, to expatiate upon his excellent dispositions, Philip would grant no better terms of peace than that each party should retain what they already possessed. Pursuant to this general principle, the Chersonesus was assured to Athens, of which Æschines appears to have made some boast.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, at the moment when the envoys were quitting Pella to return home, Philip was also leaving it at the head of his army on an expedition against Kersobleptes in Thrace. He gave a special pledge to the envoys that he would not attack the Chersonese, until the Athenians should have had an opportu-

Compare Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 421; Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 33, 34. c. 18, 19, 21.

As to this particular matter of fact, I incline to believe Æschines rather than his rival. He probably did make an eloquent speech about Amphipolis before Philip.

<sup>1</sup> The eighth day of Elaphebolion fell some little time after their arrival, so that possibly they may have even reached Athens on the last days of the month Anthesterion (Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 63. c. 24). The reader will understand that the Grecian lunar months do not correspond precisely, but only approximatively, with ours.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 353, 354. . . ὁ γὰρ εἰς τὴν προτέραν γράψας ἐπιστολὴν, ἣν ἠνέγκαμεν ἡμεῖς, ὅτι "ἐγραφόν τ' ἂν καὶ διαφύκην, ἡλικὰ ὑμῶς εὖ ποιήσω, εἰ εὖ ᾔδειν καὶ τὴν συμμαχίαν μοι γενησομένην," etc. Compare Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 85. Æschines alludes to this letter, Fals. Leg. p. 34. c. 21.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 365



nity of debating,—accepting or rejecting the propositions of peace. His envoys, Antipater and Parmenio, received orders to visit Athens with little delay; and a Macedonian herald accompanied the Athenian envoys on their return.<sup>1</sup>

Having ascertained on what terms peace could be had, the envoys were competent to advise the Athenian people, and prepare them for a definite conclusion, as soon as this Macedonian mission should arrive. They first gave an account of their proceedings to the public assembly. Ktesiphon, the oldest, who spake first, expatiated on the graceful presence and manners of Philip, as well as upon the charm of his company in wine-drinking.<sup>2</sup> Æschines dwelt upon his powerful and pertinent oratory; after which he recounted the principal occurrences of the journey, and the debate with Philip, intimating that in the previous understanding of the envoys among themselves, the duty of speaking about Amphipolis had been confided to Demosthenes, in case any point should have been omitted by the previous speakers. Demosthenes then made his own statement, in language (according to Æschines) censorious and even insulting towards his colleagues; especially affirming that Æschines, in his vanity, chose to preoccupy all the best points in his own speech, leaving none open for any one else.<sup>3</sup> Demosthenes next proceeded to move

<sup>1</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 39. c. 26; Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. p. 63. c. 23. *παρηγγέλλετο δ' ἐπ' αὐτὸν* (Kersobleptes) *ἡδὴ σφράττεια*, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 34. c. 20. *τῆς ἐν τοῖς πότοις ἐπιδειξιότητος — συμπεῖν δεινὸς ἦν* (c. 21).

<sup>3</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 34, 35. c. 21; Dem. Fals. Leg. p. 421. Yet Æschines, when describing the same facts in his oration against Ktesiphon (p. 62. c. 23), simply says that Demosthenes gave to the assembly an account of the proceedings of the first embassy, similar to that given by the other envoys — *τὰντὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις πρέσβεσιν ἀπήγγειλε*, etc.

The point noticed in the text (that Demosthenes charged Æschines with reluctance to let any one else have anything to say) is one which appears both in Æschines and Demosthenes, De Fals. Legat., and may therefore in the main be regarded as having really occurred. But probably the statement made by Demosthenes to the people as to the proceedings of the embassy, was substantially the same as that of his colleagues. For though the later oration of Æschines is, in itself, less trustworthy evidence than the earlier — yet when we find two different statements of Æschines respecting Demosthenes, we may reasonably presume that the one which is least unfavorable is the most credible of the two.

various decrees; one, to greet by libation the herald who had accompanied them from Philip, — and the Macedonian envoys who were expected; another, providing that the prytanes should convene a special assembly on the eighth day of Elaphebolion, (a day sacred to Æsculapius, on which generally no public business was ever transacted), in order that if the envoys from Macedonia had then arrived, the people might discuss without delay their political relations with Philip; a third, to commend the behavior of the Athenian envoys (his colleagues and himself), and to invite them to dinner in the prytaneium. Demosthenes farther moved in the Senate, that when Philip's envoys came, they should be accommodated with seats of honor at the Dionysiac festival.<sup>1</sup>

Presently, these Macedonian envoys, Antipater, Parmenio and Eurylochus, arrived; yet not early enough to allow the full debate to take place on the assembly of the eighth of Elaphebolion. Accordingly, (as it would seem, in that very assembly,) Demosthenes proposed and carried a fresh decree, fixing two later days for the special assemblies to discuss peace and alliance with Macedonia. The days named were the eighteenth and nineteenth days of the current month Elaphebolion (March); immediately after the Dionysiac festival, and the assembly in the temple of Dionysius which followed upon it.<sup>2</sup> At the same time Demosthenes showed great personal civility to the Macedonian envoys, inviting them to a splendid entertainment, and not only conducting them to their place of honor at the Dionysiac festival, but also providing for them comfortable seats and cushions.<sup>3</sup>

Besides the public assembly held by the Athenians themselves,

<sup>1</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 34, 35, 42. c. 20, 21, 34; Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. p. 62, 63. c. 23, 24. In the first of the two speeches, Æschines makes no mention of the decree proposed by Demosthenes relative to the assembly on the eighth of Elaphebolion. He mentions it in the speech against Ktesiphon, with considerable specification.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 36. c. 22. *ἕτερον ψήφισμα*, Æsch. adv. Ktesiph. p. 63. c. 24. This last decree, fixing the two special days of the month, could scarcely have been proposed until after Philip's envoys had actually reached Athens.

<sup>3</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 42. c. 34; adv. Ktesiphont. p. 62. c. 22; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 414; De Coronâ, p. 234. This courtesy and politeness towards the Macedonian envoys is admitted by Demosthenes himself. It was not a circumstance of which he had any reason to be ashamed.



to receive report from their ten envoys returned out of Macedonia, the synod of Athenian confederates was also assembled to hear the report of Aglaokreon, who had gone as their representative along with the Ten. This synod agreed to a resolution, important in reference to the approaching debate in the Athenian assembly, yet unfortunately nowhere given to us entire, but only in partial and indirect notice from the two rival orators. It has been already mentioned that since the capture of Olynthus, the Athenians had sent forth envoys throughout a large portion of Greece, urging the various cities to unite with them either in conjoint war against Philip, or in conjoint peace to obtain some mutual guarantee against his farther encroachments. Of these missions, the greater number had altogether failed, demonstrating the hopelessness of the Athenian project. But some had been so far successful, that deputies, more or fewer, were actually present in Athens, pursuant to the invitation; while a certain number were still absent and expected to return, — the same individuals having perhaps been sent to different places at some distance from each other. The resolution of the synod (noway binding upon the Athenian people, but merely recommendatory), was adapted to this state of affairs, and to the dispositions recently manifested at Athens towards conjoint action with other Greeks against Philip. The synod advised, that immediately on the return of the envoys still absent on mission (when probably all such Greeks, as were willing even to talk over the proposition, would send their deputies also), the Athenian prytanes should convene two public assemblies, according to the laws, for the purpose of debating and deciding the question of peace. Whatever decision might be here taken, the synod adopted it beforehand as their own. They farther recommended that an article should be annexed, reserving an interval of three months for any Grecian city not a party to the peace, to declare its adhesion, to inscribe its name on the column of record, and to be included under the same conditions as the rest. Apparently this resolution of the synod was adopted before the arrival of the Macedonian deputies in Athens, and before the last-mentioned decree proposed by Demosthenes in the public assembly; which decree, fixing two days, (the 18th and 19th of Elaphebolion), for decision of the question of peace and

alliance with Philip, coincided in part with the resolution of the synod.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I insert in the text what appears to me the probable truth about this resolution of the confederate synod. The point is obscure, and has been differently viewed by different commentators.

Demosthenes affirms, in his earlier speech (*De Fals. Leg.* p. 346), that Æschines held disgraceful language in his speech before the public assembly on the 19th Elaphebolion (to the effect that Athens ought to act for herself alone, and to take no thought for any other Greeks except such as had assisted her); and that, too, in the presence and hearing of those envoys from other Grecian cities, whom the Athenians had sent for at the instigation of Æschines himself. The presence of these envoys in the assembly, here implied, is not the main charge, but a collateral aggravation; nevertheless, Æschines (as is often the case throughout his defence) bestows nearly all his care upon the aggravation, taking comparatively little notice of the main charge. He asserts with great emphasis (*Fals. Leg.* p. 35), that the envoys sent out from Athens on mission had *not returned*, and that there were *no envoys present* from any Grecian cities.

It seems to me reasonable here to believe the assertion of Demosthenes, that there *were* envoys from other Grecian cities present; although he himself in his later oration (*De Coronâ*, p. 232, 233) speaks as if such were *not* the fact, as if all the Greeks had been long found out as recreants in the cause of liberty, and as if no envoys from Athens were then absent on mission. I accept the *positive* assertion of Æschines as true — that there were Athenian envoys then absent on mission, who might possibly, on their return, bring in with them deputies from other Greeks; but I do not admit his *negative* assertion — that no Athenian envoys had returned from their mission, and that no deputies had come in from other Greeks. That among many Athenian envoys sent out, *all* should fail — appears to me very improbable.

If we follow the argument of Æschines (in the speech *De Fals. Leg.*), we shall see that it is quite enough if we suppose *some* of the envoys sent out on mission, and not *all* of them, to be absent. To prove this fact, he adduces (p. 35, 36) the resolution of the confederate synod, alluding to the absent envoys, and recommending a certain course to be taken after their return. This does not necessarily imply that *all* were absent. Stechow remarks justly, that some of the envoys would necessarily be out a long time, having to visit more than one city, and perhaps cities distant from each other (*Vita Æschinis*, p. 41).

I also accept what Æschines says about the resolution of the confederate synod, as being substantially true. About the actual import of this resolution, he is consistent with himself, both in the earlier and in the later oration. Winiewski (*Comment. Historic. in Demosth. De Coronâ*, p. 74-77) and Westermann (*De Litibus quas Demosthenes oravit ipse*, p. 38-42) affirm, I think without reason, that the import of this resolution is differ



Accordingly, after the great Dionysiac festival, these two prescribed assemblies were held, — on the 18th and 19th of Elaphebolion. The three ambassadors from Philip, Parmenio, Antipater, and Eurylochus were present, both at the festival and the assemblies.<sup>1</sup> The general question of the relations between Athens and Philip being here submitted for discussion, the resolution of the confederate synod was at the same time communicated. Of this resolution the most significant article was, that the synod accepted beforehand the decree of the Athenian assembly, whatever that might be; the other articles were recommendations, doubtless heard with respect, and constituting a theme for speakers to insist on, yet carrying no positive authority. But in the pleadings of the two rival orators some years afterwards, (from which alone we know the facts), the entire resolution of the synod appears invested with a factitious importance; because each of them had an interest in professing to have supported it, — each accuses the other of having opposed it; both wished to disconnect themselves from Philokrates, then a disgraced exile, and from the peace moved by him, which had become discredited. It was Philokrates who stood forward in the assembly as the prominent mover of peace and alliance with Philip. His motion did not embrace either of the recommendations of the synod, respecting

ently represented by Æschines in the earlier and in the later orations. What is really different in the two orations, is the way in which Æschines perverts the import of the resolution to inculpate Demosthenes; affirming in the later oration, that if Athens had waited for the return of her envoys on mission, she might have made peace with Philip jointly with a large body of Grecian allies; and that it was Demosthenes who hindered her from doing this, by hurrying on the discussions about the peace (Æsch. adv. Ktesiph. p. 61–63), etc. Westermann thinks that the synod would not take upon them to prescribe how many assemblies the Athenians should convene for the purpose of debating about peace. But it seems to have been a common practice with the Athenians, about peace or other special and important matters, to convene two assemblies on two days immediately succeeding: all that the synod here recommended was, that the Athenians should follow the usual custom — προγράψαι τοὺς πριτάνεις ἐκκλησίαι δύο κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, etc. That two assemblies, neither less nor more should be convened for the purpose, was a point of no material importance except that it indicated a determination to decide the question at once — *ans desemparer*.

<sup>1</sup> Æschines, adv. Ktesiph. p. 64.

absent envoys, and interval to be left for adhesions from other Greeks; nor did he confine himself, as the synod had done, to the proposition of peace with Philip. He proposed that not only peace, but alliance, should be concluded between the Athenians and Philip; who had expressed by letter his great anxiety both for one and for the other. He included in his proposition, Philip with all his allies, on one side, — and Athens, with all her allies, on the other; making special exception, however, of two among the allies of Athens, the Phokians, and the town of Halus near the Pagasæan Gulf, recently under siege by Parmenio.<sup>1</sup>

What part Æschines and Demosthenes took in reference to this motion, it is not easy to determine. In their speeches, delivered three years afterwards, both denounce Philokrates; each accuses the other of having supported him; each affirms himself to have advocated the recommendations of the synod. The contradictions between the two, and between Æschines in his earlier and Æschines in his later speech, are here very glaring. Thus, Demosthenes accuses his rival of having, on the 18th of the month or on the first of the two assemblies, delivered a speech strongly opposed to Philokrates;<sup>2</sup> but of having changed his politics during the night and spoken on the 19th in support of the latter, so warmly as to convert the hearers when they were predisposed the other way. Æschines altogether denies such sudden change of opinion; alleging that he made but one speech, and that in favor of the recommendation of the synod; and averring moreover that to speak on the second assembly-day was impossible, since that day was exclusively consecrated to putting questions and voting, so that no oratory was allowed.<sup>3</sup> Yet Æschines, though in his earlier harangue (De Fals. Leg.) he insists so strenuously on this impossibility of speaking on the 19th, — in his later harangue (against Ktesiphon) accuses Demosthenes of having spoken at great length on that very day, the 19th, and of having

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 391. *την τε γὰρ εἰρήνην οὐχὶ δυνήθέντων ὡς ἐπεχείρησαν οὗτοι, "πλὴν Ἀλέων καὶ Φωκίων," γράψαι — ἀλλ' ἀναγκασθέντες ὑπὸ ἰμῶν τοῦ Φιλοκράτους ταῦτα μὲν ἀπαλείψαι, γράψαι δ' ἀντικρὺς "Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίων συμμάχους," etc.*

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 345, 346.

<sup>3</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 36.



thereby altered the temper of the assembly.<sup>1</sup> In spite, however, of the discredit thus thrown by Æschines upon his own denial, I do not believe the sudden change of speech in the assembly, ascribed to him by Demosthenes. It is too unexplained, and in itself too improbable, to be credited on the mere assertion of a rival. But I think it certain that neither he, nor Demosthenes, can have advocated the recommendations of the synod, though both profess to have done so,—if we are to believe the statement of Æschines (we have no statement from Demosthenes), as to the tenor of those recommendations. For the synod (according to Æschines had recommended to await the return of the absent envoys before the question of peace was debated. Now this proposition was impracticable under the circumstances; since it amounted to nothing less than an indefinite postponement of the question. But the Macedonian envoys, Antipater and Parmenio, were now in Athens, and actually present in the assembly; having come, by special invitation, for the purpose either of concluding peace or of breaking off the negotiation; and Philip had agreed (as Æschines<sup>2</sup> himself states), to refrain from all attack on the Chersonese, while the Athenians were debating about peace. Under these conditions, it was imperatively necessary to give some decisive and immediate answer to the Macedonian envoys. To tell them — “We can say nothing positive at present; you must wait until our absent envoys return, and until we ascertain how many Greeks we can get into our alliance,” would have been not only in itself preposterous, but would have been construed by able men like Antipater and Parmenio as a mere dilatory manoeuvre for breaking off the peace altogether. Neither Demosthenes nor Æschines can have really supported such a proposition, whatever both may pretend three years afterwards. For at that time of the actual discussion, not only Æschines himself, but the general public of Athens were strongly anxious for peace; while Demosthenes, though less anxious, was favorable to it.<sup>3</sup> Neither

<sup>1</sup> Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 63, 64.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 39.

<sup>3</sup> From the considerations here stated, we can appreciate the charges of Æschines against Demosthenes, even on his own showing; though the precise course of either is not very clear.

He accuses Demosthenes of having sold himself to Philip (adv. Ktes. p.

of them were at all disposed to frustrate the negotiations by insidious delay; nor, if they had been so disposed, would the Athenian public have tolerated the attempt.

On the best conclusion which I can form, Demosthenes supported the motion of Philokrates (enacting both peace and alliance with Philip), except only that special clause which excluded both the Phokians and the town of Halus, and which was ulti-

63, 64); a charge utterly futile and incredible, refuted by the whole conduct of Demosthenes, both before and after. Whether Demosthenes received bribes from Harpalus — or from the Persian court — will be matter of future inquiry. But the allegation that he had been bribed by Philip is absurd. Æschines himself confesses that it was quite at variance with the received opinion at Athens (adv. Ktes. p. 62. c. 22).

He accuses Demosthenes of having, under the influence of these bribes, opposed and frustrated the recommendation of the confederate synod — of having hurried on the debate about peace at once — and of having thus prevented Athens from waiting for the return of her absent envoys, which would have enabled her to make peace in conjunction with a powerful body of coöperating Greeks. This charge is advanced by Æschines, first in the speech *De Fals. Leg.* p. 36 — next, with greater length and emphasis, in the later speech, adv. Ktesiph. p. 63, 64. From what has been said in the text, it will be seen that such indefinite postponement, when Antipater and Parmenio were present in Athens by invitation, was altogether impossible, without breaking off the negotiation. Not to mention, that Æschines himself affirms, in the strongest language, the ascertained impossibility of prevailing upon any other Greeks to join Athens, and complains bitterly of their backward dispositions (*Fals. Leg.* p. 38. c. 25). In this point Demosthenes perfectly concurs with him (*De Coronâ*, p. 231, 232). So that even if postponement could have been had, it would have been productive of no benefit, nor of any increase of force, to Athens, since the Greeks were not inclined to coöperate with her.

The charge of Æschines against Demosthenes is thus untenable, and suggests its own refutation, even from the mouth of the accuser himself. Demosthenes indeed replies to it in a different manner. When Æschines says — “You hurried on the discussion about peace, without allowing Athens to await the return of her envoys, then absent on mission” — Demosthenes answers — “There were no Athenian envoys then absent on mission. All the Greeks had been long ago detected as incurably apathetic.” (*De Coronâ*, p. 233). This is a slashing and decisive reply, which it might perhaps be safe for Demosthenes to hazard, at an interval of thirteen years after the events. But it is fortunate that another answer can be provided for I conceive the assertion to be neither correct in point of fact, nor consistent with the statements of Demosthenes himself in the speech *De Falsâ Legatione*.



mately negated by the assembly.<sup>1</sup> That Æschines supported the same motion entire, and in a still more unqualified manner, we may infer from his remarkable admission in the oration against Timarchus<sup>2</sup> (delivered in the year after the peace, and three years before his own trial), wherein he acknowledges himself as joint author of the peace along with Philokrates, and avows his hearty approbation of the conduct and language of Philip, even after the ruin of the Phokians. Eubulus, the friend and partisan of Æschines, told the Athenians<sup>3</sup> the plain alternative: "You must either march forthwith to Peiræus, serve on shipboard, pay direct taxes, and convert the Theoric Fund to military purposes, — or else you must vote the terms of peace moved by Philokrates." Our inference respecting the conduct of Æschines is strengthened by what is here affirmed respecting Eubulus. Demosthenes had been vainly urging upon his countrymen, for the last five years, at a time when Philip was less formidable, the real adoption of these energetic measures; Eubulus, his opponent, now holds them out *in terrorem*, as an irksome and intolerable necessity, constraining the people to vote for the terms of peace proposed. And however painful it might be to acquiesce in the *statu quo*, which recognized

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 391-430. Æschines affirms strongly, in his later oration against Ktesiphon (p. 63), that Demosthenes warmly advocated the motion of Philokrates for alliance as well as peace with Philip. He professes to give the precise phrase used by Demosthenes — which he censures as an inelegant phrase — *οὐ δεῖν ἀπορρῆξαι τῆς εἰρήνης τὴν συμμαχίαν*, etc. He adds that Demosthenes called up the Macedonian ambassador Antipater to the rostrum, put a question to him, and obtained an answer concerted beforehand. How much of this is true, I cannot say. The version given by Æschines in his later speech, is, as usual, different from that in his earlier.

The accusation against Demosthenes, of corrupt collusion with Antipater, is incredible and absurd.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines. adv. Timarch. p. 24, §. c. 34. *παρεμβάλλον* (Demosthenes) *τὰς ἐμὰς δημηγορίας, καὶ ψέγων τὴν εἰρήνην τὴν δι' ἐμοῦ καὶ Φιλοκράτους γεγενημένην, ὥστε οὐδὲ ἀπαντήσεσθαι με ἐπὶ τῷ δικασθῆναι ἀπολογησόμενον, ὅταν τὰς τῆς πρεσβείας ἐθύναις δίδω, etc.* . . . *Φίλιππον δὲ νῦν μὲν διὰ τὴν τῶν λόγων εὐφημίαν ἐπαινῶ, etc.*

Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 434. *φῆσας* (Eubulus) *καταβαίνειν εἰς Πειραιᾶ δαίν ἡδὲ καὶ χρήματ' εἰσφέρειν καὶ τὰ θεωρικὰ στρατιωτικὰ ποιεῖν — ὃ χειροτερεῖν ἢ συνεῖπε μὲν οὗτος* (Æschines) *ἔγραψε δ' ὁ βδελυρὸς Φιλοκρᾶτης.*

Philip as master of Amphipolis and of so many other possessions once belonging to Athens, — I do not believe that even Demosthenes, at the time when the peace was actually under debate, would put the conclusion of it to hazard, by denouncing the shame of such unavoidable cession, though he professes three years afterwards to have vehemently opposed it.<sup>1</sup>

I suspect therefore that the terms of peace proposed by Philokrates met with unqualified support from one of our two rival orators, and with only partial opposition, to one special clause, from the other. However this may be, the proposition passed, with no other modification (so far as we know) except the omission of that clause which specially excepted Halus and the Phokians. Philokrates provided, that all the possessions actually in the hands of each of the belligerent parties, should remain to each, without disturbance from the other;<sup>2</sup> that on these principles, there should be both peace and alliance between Athens with all her allies on the one side, and Philip with all his allies on the other. These were the only parties included in the treaty. Nothing was said about other Greeks, not allies either of Philip or of Athens.<sup>3</sup> Nor was any special mention made about Ker sobleptes.<sup>4</sup>

Such was the decree of peace and alliance, enacted on the second of the two assembly-days, — the nineteenth of the month Elaphebolion. Of course, without the fault of any one, it was all to the advantage of Philip. He was in the superior position; and it sanctioned his retention of all his conquests. For Athens, the inferior party, the benefit to be expected was, that she would

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 385.

<sup>2</sup> Pseudo-Demosthen. De Halonneso, p. 81-83. Demosthenes, in one passage, (Fals. Leg. p. 385,) speaks as if it were a part of the Athenian oath — that they would oppose and treat as enemies all who should try to save from Philip and to restore to Athens the places now recognized as Philip's possession for the future. Though Vœmel (Proleg. ad Demosth. De Pace, p. 265) and Böhnecke (p. 303) insert these words as a part of the actual formula, I doubt whether they are anything more than a constructive expansion, given by Demosthenes himself, of the import of the formula.

<sup>3</sup> This fact we learn from the subsequent discussions about amending the peace, mentioned in Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 84.

<sup>4</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 39. c. 26.



prevent these conquests from being yet farther multiplied, and protect herself against being driven from bad to worse.

But it presently appeared that even thus much was not realized. On the twenty-fifth day of the same month<sup>1</sup> (six days after the previous assembly), a fresh assembly was held, for the purpose of providing ratification by solemn oath for the treaty which had been just decreed. It was now moved and enacted, that the same ten citizens, who had been before accredited to Philip, should again be sent to Macedonia for the purpose of receiving the oaths from him and from his allies.<sup>2</sup> Next, it was resolved that the Athenians, together with the deputies of their allies then present in Athens, should take the oath forthwith, in the presence of Philip's envoys.

But now arose the critical question, Who were to be included as allies of Athens? Were the Phokians and Kersobleptes to be included? The one and the other represented those two capital positions,<sup>3</sup> Thermopylae and the Hellespont, which Philip was

<sup>1</sup> This date is preserved by Æschines *adv. Ktesiph.* p. 64. c. 27. ἐκτὴν φθίνοντος τοῦ Ἐλαφεβολίωνος μηνός, etc. In the earlier oration (*De Fals. Leg.* p. 40. c. 29) Æschines states that Demosthenes was among the Προεδρί or presiding senators of a public assembly held ἐβδόμῃ φθίνοντος — the day before. It is possible that there might have been two public assemblies held, on two successive days (the 23d and 24th, or the 24th and 25th, according as the month Elaphebolion happened in that year to have 30 days or 29 days), and that Demosthenes may have been among the Προεδρί in both. But the transaction described (in the oration against Ktesiphon as having happened on the latter of the two days — must have preceded that which is mentioned (in the Oration *De Fals. Leg.*) as having happened on the earlier of the two days; or at least cannot have followed it; so that there seems to be an inaccuracy in one or in the other. If the word ἐκτὴν in the oration against Ktesiphon, and ἐβδόμῃ in the speech on the *Fals. Legation*, are both correct, the transactions mentioned in the one cannot be reconciled chronologically with those narrated in the other. Various conjectural alterations have been proposed. See Vœmel, *Prolegg. ad Demosth. Orat. De Pace*, p. 257; Böhmcke, *Forschungen*, p. 399.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, *Fals. Leg.* p. 39. ἤδη δὲ ἡμῶν κεχειροτονημένων εἰς τοὺς ἀρκύνους, οὕτω δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑστέραν πρεσβειάν, ἐκκλησία γίνεται, etc.

This ἐκκλησία seems to be the same as that which is named by Æschines in the speech against Ktesiphon, as having been held on the 25th Elaphebolion.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. *Fals. Leg.* p. 397. καίτοι δύο χρησιμωτέρους τόπους τῆς οἰκουμένης οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ἐπιδείξαι τῇ πάλαι κατὰ μὲν γῆν, Πυλῶν — ἐκ θαλάττης δὲ

sure to covet, and which it most behooved Athens to ensure against him. The assembly, by its recent vote, had struck out the special exclusion of the Phokians proposed by Philokrates, thus by implication admitting them as allies along with the rest. They were in truth allies of old standing and valuable; they had probably envoys present in Athens, but no deputies sitting in the synod. Nor had Kersobleptes any such deputy in that body; but a citizen of Lampsakus, named Kritobulus, claimed on this occasion to act for him, and to take the oaths in his name.

As to the manner of dealing with Kersobleptes, Æschines tells us two stories (one in the earlier oration, the other in the later) quite different from each other; and agreeing only in this — that in both Demosthenes is described as one of the presiding magistrates of the public assembly, as having done all that he could to prevent the envoy of Kersobleptes from being admitted to take the oaths as an ally of Athens. Amidst such discrepancies, to state in detail what passed is impossible. But it seems clear, — both from Æschines (in his earliest speech) and Demosthenes, — first, that the envoy from Kersobleptes, not having a seat in the confederate synod, but presenting himself and claiming to be sworn as an ally of Athens, found his claim disputed; secondly, that upon this dispute arising, the question was submitted to the vote of the public assembly, who decided that Kersobleptes was an ally, and should be admitted to take the oath as such.<sup>1</sup>

Antipater and Parmenio, on the part of Philip, did not refuse

τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου· ἂ συναμφοτέρα οὗτοι πεπράκασιν αἰσχροῦς καὶ καθ' ἡμῶν ἐγκεχειρίκασιν Φιλίππου.

<sup>1</sup> Compare Æschines, *Fals. Leg.* p. 39. c. 26, with Æschines *cont. Ktesiphont.* p. 64. c. 27.

Franke (*Proleg. ad Demosth. Fals. Leg.* p. 30, 31) has some severe comments on the discrepancy between the two statements.

That the question was put, and affirmed by vote, to admit Kersobleptes appears from the statement of Æschines in the speech *De Fals. Leg.* — τὸ ψήφισμα ἐπεψηφίσθη — ἐψηφισμένου δὲ τοῦ δήμου. Compare Demosth. *De Fals. Leg.* p. 398, and Demosthen. *Philipp.* iv. p. 133.

Philip, in his letter some years afterwards to the Athenians, affirmed that Kersobleptes wished to be admitted to take the oaths, but was excluded by the Athenian generals, who declared him to be an enemy of Athens (*Epist. Phil. ap. Demosth.* p. 160). If it be true that the generals tried to exclude him, their exclusion must have been overruled by the vote of the assembly



to recognize Kersobleptes as an ally of Athens, and to receive his oath. But in regard to the Phokians, they announced a determination distinctly opposite. They gave notice, at or after the assembly of the 25th Elaphebolion, that Philip positively refused to admit the Phokians as parties to the convention.

This determination, formally announced by Antipater at Athens, must probably have been made known by Philip himself to Philokrates and Æschines, when on mission in Macedonia. Hence Philokrates, in his motion about the terms of peace, had proposed that the Phokians and Halus should be specially excluded (as I have already related). Now, however, when the Athenian assembly, by expressly repudiating such exclusion, had determined that the Phokians should be received as parties, while the envoys of Philip were not less express in rejecting them, — the leaders of the peace, Æschines and Philokrates, were in great embarrassment. They had no other way of surmounting the difficulty, except by holding out mendacious promises, and unauthorized assurances of future intention in the name of Philip. Accordingly, they confidently announced that the King of Macedon, though precluded by his relations with the Thebans and Thessalians (necessary to him while he remained at war with Athens), from openly receiving the Phokians as allies, was nevertheless in his heart decidedly adverse to the Thebans; and that, if his hands were once set free by concluding peace with Athens, he would interfere in the quarrel just in the manner that the Athenians would desire; that he would uphold the Phokians, put down the insolence of Thebes, and even break up the integrity of the city; restoring also the autonomy of Thespiæ, Plataea and the other Boeotian towns, now in Theban dependence. The general assurances, — previously circulated by Aristodemus, Ktesiphon, and others, — of Philip's anxiety to win favorable opinions from the Athenians, were now still farther magnified into a supposed community of antipathy against Thebes; and even into a disposition to compensate Athens for the loss of Amphipolis, by making her complete mistress of Eubœa as well as by recovering for her Orôpus.]

By such glowing fabrications and falsehoods, confidently asseverated, Philokrates, Æschines, and the other partisans of Philip present, completely deluded the assembly; and induced them, not

indeed to decree the special exclusion of the Phokians, as Philokrates had at first proposed, — but to swear the convention with Antipater and Parmenio without the Phokians.<sup>1</sup> These latter were thus shut out in fact, though by the general words of the peace, Athens had recognized their right to be included. Their deputies were probably present, claimed to be admitted, and were refused by Antipater, without any peremptory protest on the part of Athens.

This tissue, not of mere exaggerations, but of impudent and monstrous falsehood, respecting the purposes of Philip, — will be seen to continue until he had carried his point of penetrating within the pass of Thermopylæ, and even afterwards. We can hardly wonder that the people believed it, when proclaimed and guaranteed to them by Philokrates, Æschines, and the other envoys, who had been sent into Macedonia for the express purpose of examining on the spot and reporting, and whose assurance was

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 444. ἐντεῦθεν οἱ μὲν παρ' ἐκείνου πρέσβεις προῦλεγον ταῖν δτι Φωκέας οὐ προσδέχεται Φίλιππος συμμάχους, οὗτοι δ' ἐκδεχόμενοι οἰαὐτ' ἐδήμηγόρου, ὡς φανερώς μὲν οὐχὶ καλῶς ἔχει τῷ Φιλίππῳ προσδέξασθαι τοὺς Φωκέας συμμάχους, διὰ τοὺς Θηβαίους καὶ τοὺς Θετταλοὺς, ἂν δὲ γένηται τῶν πραγμάτων κύριος καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης τύχη, ἅπερ ἂν συνθέσθαι νῦν ἀξιώσαιμεν αὐτὸν, ταῦτα ποιήσει τότε. Τῇ μὲν τοίνυν εἰρήνῃ ταύταις ταῖς ἐλπίσι καὶ ταῖς ἐπαγαγαῖς ἐδρόντο παρ' ἡμῶν ἀνευ Φωκέων.

Ibid. p. 409. Εἰ δὲ πάντα τὰνάντια τούτων καὶ πολλὰ καὶ φιλάνθρωπα εἰόντες Φίλιππον, φιλεῖν τὴν πόλιν, Φωκέας σώσειν, Θηβαίους παύσειν τῆς βρεως, ἐτι πρὸς τούτοις μείζονα ἢ κατ' Ἀμφίπολιν εὐ ποιήσιν ἡμᾶς, ἐὰν τύχη τῆς εἰρήνης, Εὐβοίαν, Ὠρωπὸν ἀποδώσειν — εἰ ταῦτ' εἰπόντες καὶ ὑποσχόμενοι πάντ' ἐξηπατήκασιν καὶ πεφνακίκασι, etc.

Compare also, p. 346, 388, 391, about the false promises under which the Athenians were induced to consent to the peace — τῶν ὑποσχέσεων, ἐφ' αἷς εὕρισκετο (Philip) τὴν εἰρήνην. The same false promises put forward before the peace and determining the Athenians to conclude it, are also noticed by Demosthenes in the second Philippic (p. 69), τὰς ὑποσχέσεις, ἐφ' αἷς τῆς εἰρήνης ἐτυχεν (Philip) — p. 72. τοὺς ἐνεγκόντας τὰς ὑποσχέσεις, ἐφ' αἷς ἐπέσθητε ποιήσασθαι τὴν εἰρήνην. This second Philippic is one year earlier in date than the oration de Falsâ Legatione, and is better authority than that oration, not merely on account of its earlier date, but because it is a parliamentary harangue, not tainted with an accusatory purpose nor mentioning Æschines by name.



the natural authority for the people to rely upon. In this case the deceptions found easier credence and welcome because they were in complete harmony with the wishes and hopes of Athens, and with the prevalent thirst for peace. To betray allies like the Phokians appeared of little consequence, when once it became a settled conviction that the Phokians themselves would be no losers by it. But this plea, though sufficient as a tolerable excuse for the Athenian people, will not serve for a statesman like Demosthenes; who, on this occasion (as far as we can make out even from his own language), did not enter any emphatic protest against the tacit omission of the Phokians, though he had opposed the clause (in the motion of Philokrates) which formally omitted them by name. Three months afterwards, when the ruin of the isolated Phokians was about to be consummated as a fact, we shall find Demosthenes earnest in warning and denunciation; but there is reason to presume that his opposition<sup>1</sup> was at best only faint, when the positive refusal of Antipater was first proclaimed against that acquiescence on the part of Athens, whereby the Phokians were really surrendered to Philip. Yet in truth this was the great diplomatic turning-point, from whence the sin of Athens, against duty to allies as well as against her own security, took its rise. It was a false step of serious magnitude, difficult, if not impossible, to retrieve afterwards. Probably the temper of the Athenians, then eager for peace, trembling for the lives of their captives, and prepossessed with the positive assurances of Æschines and Philokrates, — would have heard with repugnance any

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes speaks of the omission of the Phokians, in taking the oaths at Athens, as if it were a matter of small importance (Fals. Leg. p. 387, 388; compare p. 372); that is, on the supposition that the promises made by Æschines turned out to be realized.

In his speech *De Pace* (p. 59), he takes credit for his protests on behalf of the Phokians; but only for protests made *after* his return from the second embassy — not for protests made when Antipater refused to admit the Phokians to the oaths.

Westermann (*De Litibus quas Demosthenes oravit ipse*, p. 48) suspects that Demosthenes did not see through the deception of Æschines until the Phokians were utterly ruined. This, perhaps, goes beyond the truth; but at the time when the oaths were exchanged at Athens, he either had not clearly detected the consequences of that miserable shuffle into which Athens was tricked by Philokrates, etc. — or he was afraid to proclaim them emphatically.

strong protest against abandoning the Phokians, which threatened to send Antipater home in disgust and intercept the coming peace, — the more so as Demosthenes, if he called in question the assurances of Æschines as to the projects of Philip, would have no positive facts to produce in refuting them, and would be constrained to take the ground of mere scepticism and negation;<sup>1</sup> of which a public, charmed with hopeful auguries and already disarmed through the mere comfortable anticipations of peace, would be very impatient. Nevertheless, we might have expected from a statesman like Demosthenes, that he would have begun his energetic opposition to the disastrous treaty of 346 B. C., at that moment when the most disastrous and disgraceful portion of it, — the abandonment of the Phokians, — was first shuffled in.

After the assembly of the 25th Elaphebolion, Antipater administered the oaths of peace and alliance to Athens and to all her other allies (seemingly including the envoy of Kersobleptes) in the Board-room of the Generals.<sup>2</sup> It now became the duty of the ten Athenian envoys, with one more from the confederate synod, — the same persons who had been employed in the first embassy, — to go and receive the oaths from Philip. Let us see how this duty was performed.

The decree of the assembly, under which these envoys held their trust, was large and comprehensive. They were to receive an oath, of amity and alliance with Athens and her allies, from Philip as well as from the chief magistrate in each city allied with him. They were forbidden (by a curious restriction) to hold any

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 355. *τραχέως δ' ἑμῶν τῷ "μηδὲ προσδοκᾶν" σκόνην*, etc. (the Athenian public were displeased with Demosthenes when he told them that he did not expect the promises of Æschines to be realized; this was after the second embassy, but it illustrates the temper of the assembly even before the second embassy) — *ibid.* p. 349. *τίς γὰρ ἂν ἠνέσχετο, τήλικα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἐσεσθαι προσδοκῶν ἀγαθὰ, ἢ γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶ λέγοντός τινος, ἢ κατηγοροῦντος τῶν πεπραγμένων τούτοις;*

How unpopular it was to set up mere negative mistrust against glowing promises of benefits to come, is here strongly urged by Demosthenes.

Respecting the premature disarming of the Athenians, see Demosth. *De Corona*, p. 234.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 39. c. 27.



intercourse singly and individually with Philip;<sup>1</sup> but they were farther enjoined, by a comprehensive general clause, "to do anything else which might be within their power for the advantage of Athens." — "It was our duty as prudent envoys (says Æschines to the Athenian people) to take a right measure of the whole state of affairs, as they concerned either you or Philip."<sup>2</sup> Upon these rational views of the duties of the envoys, however, Æschines unfortunately did not act. It was Demosthenes who acted upon them, and who insisted, immediately after the departure of Antipater and Parmenio, on going straight to the place where Philip actually was; in order that they might administer the oath to him with as little delay as possible. It was not only certain that the King of Macedon, the most active of living men, would push his conquests up to the last moment; but it was farther known to Æschines and the envoys, that he had left Pella to make war against Kersobleptes in Thrace, at the time when they returned from their first embassy.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, on the day of, or the day after, the public assembly last described (that is, on the 25th or 26th of the month Elaphebolion), a despatch had reached Athens from Chares, the Athenian commander at the Hellespont, intimating that Philip had gained important advantages in Thrace, had taken the important place called the Sacred Mountain, and deprived Kersobleptes of great part of his kingdom.<sup>4</sup> Such successive conquests on the part of Philip strengthened the reasons for despatch on the part of the envoys, and for going straight to Thrace to arrest his progress. As the peace concluded was based

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 430. οὐ τὸ μὲν ψήφισμα, "οὐδαμοῦ μόνον ἐν-  
τυγχάνειν Φιλίππῳ," οὗτοι δ' οὐκ ἐπαύσαντο ἰδίᾳ χρηματίζοντες;

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 41. c. 32. Τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν δῶν ὁρθῶς  
βουλευσασθαι, ὅσα, καθ' ἑμᾶς ἐστὶν ἡ Φιλίππου, τοῦτο ἤδη ἐρ-  
γόν ἐστι πρεσβέων φρονίμων.....'Αφίγμεθα δ' ἡμεῖς ἔχοντες τοῦ δήμου ψήφισμα,  
ἐν ᾧ γέγραπται, Πράττειν δὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις, καὶ ἀλλ' ὅ, τι  
δύναται ἀγαθόν.

<sup>3</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 39. c. 26.

<sup>4</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 40. c. 29. ὅτι Κερσοβλέπτης ἀπολώλεκε τὴν ἀρ-  
χὴν, καὶ τὸ ἱερὸν ὄρος κατέληψε Φίλιππος.

There is no fair ground for supposing that the words ἀπολώλεκε τὴν ἀρχὴν  
are the actual words used by Chares, or that Kersobleptes was affirmed by  
Chares to have lost everything that he had. It suited the argument of Æs-  
chines to give the statement in a sweeping and exaggerated form.

on the *uti possidetis*, dating from the day on which the Macedonian envoys had administered the oaths at Athens, — Philip was bound to restore all conquests made after that day. But it did not escape Demosthenes, that this was an obligation which Philip was likely to evade; and which the Athenian people, bent as they were on peace, were very unlikely to enforce.<sup>1</sup> The more quickly the envoys reached him, the fewer would be the places in dispute, the sooner would he be reduced to inaction, — or at least, if he still continued to act, the more speedily would his insincerity be exposed.

Impressed with this necessity for an immediate interview with Philip, Demosthenes urged his colleagues to set out at once. But they resisted his remonstrances, and chose to remain at Athens; which, we may remark, was probably in a state of rejoicing and festivity in consequence of the recent peace. So reckless was their procrastination and reluctance to depart, that on the 3d of the month Munychion (April — nine days after the solemnity of oath-taking before Antipater and Parmenio) Demosthenes made complaint and moved a resolution in the Senate, peremptorily ordering them to begin their journey forthwith, and enjoining Proxenus the Athenian commander at Oreus in Eubœa, to transport them without delay to the place where Philip was, wherever that might be.<sup>2</sup> But though the envoys were forced to leave Athens and repair to Oreus, nothing was gained in respect to the main object; for they, as well as Proxenus, took upon them to disobey the express order of the Senate, and never went to find Philip. After a certain stay at Oreus, they moved forward by leisurely journeys to Macedonia; where they remained inactive at Pella until the

<sup>1</sup> See the just and prudent reasoning of Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 388, and De Coronâ, p. 234.

Compare also Pseudo-Demosthenes, De Halonneseo, p. 85, 86.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 389; De Coronâ, p. 234. Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 40. c. 29, 30) recognizes the fact that this decree was passed by the Senate on the 3d of Munychion, and that the envoys left Athens in consequence of it. He does not mention that it was proposed by Demosthenes. Æschines here confirms, in a very important manner, the fact of the delay, as alleged by Demosthenes, while the explanation which he gives, why the envoys did not go to Thrace, is altogether without value.

A document, purporting to be this decree, is given in Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 234 but the authenticity is too doubtful to admit of citing it.



return of Philip from Thrace, fifty days after they had left Athens.<sup>1</sup>

Had the envoys done their duty as Demosthenes recommended, they might have reached the camp of Philip in Thrace within five or six days after the conclusion of the peace at Athens; had they been even content to obey the express orders of the Senate, they might have reached it within the same interval after the 3d of Munychion; so that from pure neglect, or deliberate collusion, on their part, Philip was allowed more than a month to prosecute his conquests in Thrace, after the Athenians on their side had sworn to peace. During this interval, he captured Doriskus with several other Thracian towns; some of them garrisoned by Athenian soldiers; and completely reduced Kersobleptes, whose son he brought back as prisoner and hostage.<sup>2</sup> The manner in which these envoys, employed in an important mission at the public expense, wasted six weeks of a critical juncture in doing nothing — and that too in defiance of an express order from the Senate — confirms the supposition before stated, and would even of itself raise a strong presumption, that the leaders among them were lending themselves corruptly to the schemes of Philip.

The protests and remonstrances addressed by Demosthenes to his colleagues, became warmer and more unmeasured as the delay was prolonged.<sup>3</sup> His colleagues doubtless grew angry on their side, so that the harmony of the embassy was overthrown. Æschines affirms that none of the other envoys would associate with Demosthenes, either in the road or at the resting-places.<sup>4</sup>

Pella was now the centre of hope, fear, and intrigue, for the

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 390.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 38. c. 26; Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 85; Fals. Leg. p. 390-448: compare Philippic iii. p. 114. Among the Thracian places captured by Philip during this interval, Demosthenes enumerates the Sacred Mountain. But this is said to have been captured before the end of Elaphebolion, if Æschines quotes correctly from the letter of Chares, Fals. Leg. p. 40. c. 29.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 390.

<sup>4</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 41. c. 30. Demosthenes (and doubtless the other envoys also) walked on the journey, with two slaves to carry his clothes and bedding. In the pack carried by one slave, was a talent in money destined to aid some of the poor prisoners towards their ransom.

entire Grecian world. Ambassadors were already there from Thebes, Sparta, Eubœa, and Phokis; moreover a large Macedonian army was assembled around, ready for immediate action.

At length the Athenian envoys, after so long a delay of their own making, found themselves in the presence of Philip. And we should have expected that they would forthwith perform their special commission by administering the oaths. But they still went on postponing this ceremony, and saying nothing about the obligation incumbent on him, to restore all the places captured since the day of taking the oaths to Antipater at Athens;<sup>1</sup> places, which had now indeed become so numerous, through waste of time on the part of the envoys themselves, that Philip was not likely to yield the point even if demanded. In a conference held with his colleagues, Æschines — assuming credit to himself for a view larger than that taken by them, of the ambassadorial duties — treated the administration of the oath as merely secondary; he insisted on the propriety of addressing Philip on the subject of the intended expedition to Thermopylæ (which he was on the point of undertaking, as was plain from the large force mustered near Pella), and exhorting him to employ it so as to humble Thebes and reconstitute the Bœotian cities. The envoys (he said) ought not to be afraid of braving any ill-will that might be manifested by the Thebans. Demosthenes (according to the statement of Æschines) opposed this recommendation — insisting that the envoys ought not to mingle in disputes belonging to other parts of Greece, but to confine themselves to their special mission — and declared that he should take no notice of Philip's march to Thermopylæ.<sup>2</sup> At length, after much discussion, it was agreed among the envoys, that each of them, when called before Philip, should say what he thought fit, and that the youngest should speak first.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 388. ἡ γὰρ παρόντων (we the envoys) καὶ κατὰ τὸ ψήφισμα αὐτὸν (Philip) ἐξορκωσάντων, ἃ μὲν εἰλήφει τῆς πόλεως, ἀποδώσειν, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀφέξεσθαι — ἢ μὴ ποιούντος ταῦτα ἀπαγ γελεινῆμας ἐν δέῳ δεῦρο, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 42. c. 33. πορεύεται Φίλιππος εἰς Πύλας· ἐγὼ δ' ἐγκαλύπτομαι, etc. This is the language which Æschines affirms to have been held by Demosthenes during the embassy. It is totally at variance with all that Demosthenes affirms, over and over again, respecting his own proceedings; and (in my judgment) with all the probabilities of the case.



According to this rule, Demosthenes was first heard, and delivered a speech (if we are to believe Æschines) not only leaving out all useful comment upon the actual situation, but so spiteful towards his colleagues, and so full of extravagant flattery to Philip, as to put the hearers to shame.<sup>1</sup> The turn now came to Æschines, who repeats in abridgment his own long oration delivered to Philip. We can reason upon it with some confidence, in our estimate of Æschines, though we cannot trust his reports about Demosthenes. Æschines addressed himself exclusively to the subject of Philip's intended expedition to Thermopylæ. He exhorted Philip to settle the controversy, pending with respect to the Amphiktyons and the Delphian temple, by peaceful arbitration and not by arms. But if armed interference was inevitable, Philip ought carefully to inform himself of the ancient and holy bond whereby the Amphiktyonic synod was held together. That synod consisted of twelve different nations or sections of the Hellenic name, each including many cities small as well as great; each holding two votes and no more; each binding itself by an impressive oath, to uphold and protect every other Amphiktyonic city. Under this venerable sanction, the Bœotian cities, being Amphiktyonic like the rest, were entitled to protection against the Thebans their destroyers. The purpose of Philip's expedition, to restore the Amphiktyonic council, was (Æschines admitted) holy and just.<sup>2</sup> He ought to carry it through in the same spirit; punishing the individuals originally concerned in the seizure of the Delphian temple, but not the cities to which they belonged, provided those cities were willing to give up the wrong-doers. But if Philip should go beyond this point, and confirm the unjust dominion of Thebes over the other Bœotian towns, he would do wrong on his own side, add to the number of his enemies, and reap no gratitude from those whom he favored.<sup>3</sup>

Demosthenes, in his comments upon this second embassy,

<sup>1</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 42. c. 34.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 43. c. 36. Τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴν τῆς στρατείας ταύτης ὅσῃαν καὶ δικαίαν ἀπεφηνάμην εἶναι, etc.

... Ἀπεφηνάμην ὅτι ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι, μὴ περιορᾶν κατεσκαμένους τὰς ἐν Βοιωτοῖς πόλεις, ὅτι δὴ ἦσαν Ἀμφικτυονίδες καὶ ἑταῖροι.

<sup>3</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 43. c. 37; compare Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 347

touches little on what either Æschines or himself said to Philip. He professes to have gone on the second embassy with much reluctance, having detected the treacherous purposes of Æschines and Philokrates. Nay, he would have positively refused to go (he tells us) had he not bound himself by a promise made during the first embassy, to some of the poor Athenian prisoners in Macedonia, to provide for them the means of release. He dwells much upon his disbursements for their ransom during the second embassy, and his efforts to obtain the consent of Philip.<sup>1</sup> This (he says) was all that lay in his power to do, as an individual; in regard to the collective proceedings of the embassy, he was constantly outvoted. He affirms that he detected the foul play of Æschines and the rest with Philip; that he had written a despatch to send home for the purpose of exposing it; that his colleagues not only prevented him from forwarding it, but sent another despatch of their own with false information.<sup>2</sup> Then, he had resolved to come home personally, for the same purpose, sooner than his colleagues, and had actually hired a merchant-vessel — but was hindered by Philip from sailing out of Macedonia.<sup>3</sup>

The general description here given by Demosthenes, of his own conduct during the second embassy, is probably true. Indeed, it coincided substantially with the statement of Æschines, who complains of him as in a state of constant and vexatious opposition to his colleagues. We must recollect that Demosthenes had no means of knowing what the particular projects of Philip really were. This was a secret to every one except Philip himself, with his confidential agents or partisans. Whatever Demosthenes might suspect, he had no public evidence by which to impress his suspicions upon others, or to countervail confident assertions on the favorable side transmitted home by his colleagues.

The army of Philip was now ready, and he was on the point

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 393, 394, 395.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 396. καὶ τὴν μὲν γραφεῖσαν ἐπιστολὴν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπεψηφίσαντο μὴ πέμπειν, αὐτοὶ δ' οὐδ' ὅτι οὖν ὑγιᾶς γράψαντες ἐπέμψαν. Compare p. 419.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 445. ἐγὼ δ' ὥσπερ ἀκηκόατ' ἤδη πολλάκις, οὐχὶ δυνήθεϊς προαπελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μισθωσάμενος πλοῖον κατακωλύουσιν ἐκπλεῦσαι. Compare p. 357. — οὐδ' ἂν ἐμὲ, ἥνίκα δεῦρο ἀποπλεῖν ἐβουλόμην, κατεκώλυεν (Philip) etc.



of marching southward towards Thessaly and Thermopylae. That pass was still held by the Phokians, with a body of Lacedæmonian auxiliaries;<sup>1</sup> a force quite sufficient to maintain it against Philip's open attack, and likely to be strengthened by Athens from seaward, if the Athenians came to penetrate his real purposes. It was therefore essential to Philip to keep alive a certain belief in the minds of others, that he was marching southward with intentions favorable to the Phokians,—though not to proclaim it in any such authentic manner as to alienate his actual allies the Thebans and Thessalians. And the Athenian envoys were his most useful agents in circulating the imposture.

Some of the Macedonian officers round Philip gave explicit assurance, that the purpose of his march was to conquer Thebes, and reconstitute the Boeotian cities. So far, indeed, was this deception carried, that (according to Æschines) the Theban envoys in Macedonia, and the Thebans themselves, became seriously alarmed.<sup>2</sup> The movements of Philip were now the pivot on which Grecian affairs turned, and Pella the scene wherein the greatest cities in Greece were bidding for his favor. While the Thebans and Thessalians were calling upon him to proclaim himself openly Amphiktyonic champion against the Phokians,—the Phokian envoys,<sup>3</sup> together with those from Sparta and Athens,

<sup>1</sup> The Lacedæmonian troops remained at Thermopylae until a little time before Philip reached it (Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 365).

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41. αὐτοὶ δὲ οὐκ ἠπόρουν καὶ φοβοῦντο οἱ τῶν Θεβαίων πρέσβεις; . . . τῶν δ' ἐταίρων τινες τῶν Φιλίππου οὐ διαβρήδην πρὸς τινὰς ὑμῶν ἔλεγον, ὅτι τὰς ἐν Βοιωτίᾳ πόλεις κατοικεῖ Φίλιππος; Θεβαῖοι δ' οὐκ ἐξεληλύθεισαν πανόημι, ἀπιστοῦντες τοῖς πράγμασιν;

Demosthenes greatly eulogizes the incorruptibility and hearty efforts of the Theban envoys (Fals. Leg. p. 384); which assertion is probably nothing better at bottom, than a rhetorical contrast, to discredit Æschines—fit to be inserted in the numerous list of oratorical exaggerations and perversions of history, collected in the interesting Treatise of Weiske, *De Hyperbolâ errorum in Historiâ Philippi commissorum genitrice* (Meissen, 1819).

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 113; Justin, viii. 4. "Contra Phocensium legati, adhibitis Lacedæmoniis et Atheniensibus, bellum deprecabantur, cujus ab eo dilationem ter jam emerant." I do not understand to what facts Justin refers, when he states, that the Phokians "had already purchased truce from Philip a postponement of war."

were endeavoring to enlist him in their cause against Thebes. Wishing to isolate the Phokians from such support, Philip made many tempting promises to the Lacedæmonian envoys; who, on their side, came to open quarrel, and indulged in open menace, against those of Thebes.<sup>1</sup> Such was the disgraceful auction, wherein these once great states, in prosecution of their mutual antipathies, bartered away to a foreign prince the dignity of the Hellenic name and the independence of the Hellenic world;<sup>2</sup> following the example set by Sparta in her applications to the Great King, during the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, and at the peace of Antalkidas. Amidst such a crowd of humble petitioners and expectants, all trembling to offend him,—with the aid too of Æschines, Philokrates, and the other Athenian envoys who consented to play his game,—Philip had little difficulty in keeping alive the hopes of all, and preventing the formation of any common force or decisive resolution to resist him.<sup>3</sup>

After completing his march southward through Thessaly, he reached Pheræ near the Pagasæan Gulf, at the head of a powerful army of Macedonians and allies. The Phokian envoys accompanied his march, and were treated, if not as friends, at least in such manner as to make it appear doubtful whether Philip was going to attack the Phokians or the Thebans.<sup>4</sup> It was at Pheræ

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 365. τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μετεπέμπετο, πάντα τὰ πράγματα ὑποσχόμενος πράξειν ἐκείνοις, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41. Λακεδαιμονίοι δὲ οὐ μὲν ἡμῶν τάναντια Θεβαίοις ἐπρέσβενον, καὶ τελευτῶντες προσέκρουον φανερώς ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ, καὶ διηπείλουν τοῖς τῶν Θεβαίων πρέσβεσιν;

<sup>3</sup> This thought is strikingly presented by Justin (viii. 4), probably from Theopompus—"Fœdum prorsus miserandumque spectaculum, Græciam, etiam nunc et viribus et dignitate orbis terrarum principem, regum certo gentiumque semper victricem et multarum adhuc urbium dominam, alienis exubare sedibus, aut rogantem bellum aut deprecantem: in alterius ope omnem spem posuisse orbis terrarum vindices; eoque discordia sua civilibusque bellis redactos, ut adulentur ultro sordidam paulo ante clientelæ suæ partem: et hæc potissimum facere Thebanos Lacedæmoniosque, antea inter se imperii, nunc gratiæ imperantis, æmulos."

<sup>4</sup> Justin, viii. 4.

<sup>5</sup> Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 113. τοῦτο δ' εἰς Φωκέας ὡς πρὸς συμμάχους ἐπορεύετο, καὶ πρέσβεις Φωκέων ἦσαν οἱ παρηκολούθουν αὐτῷ πορευομένῳ· καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν ἤρξον πολλοὶ, Θεβαίοις οὐ λυσitelῆσαι τὴν ἐκείνων πάροδον. The words παρ' ἡμῖν denote the Athenian envoys (of whom Demosthenes



that the Athenian envoys at length administered the oath both to Philip and to his allies.<sup>1</sup> This was done the last thing before they returned to Athens; which city they reached on the 13th of the month Skirrophorion;<sup>2</sup> after an absence of seventy days, comprising all the intervening month Thargelion, and the remnant (from the third day) of the month Munychion. They accepted, as representatives of the allied cities, all whom Philip sent to them; though Demosthenes remarks that their instructions directed them to administer the oath to the chief magistrate in each city respectively.<sup>3</sup> And among the cities whom they admitted to take the oath as Philip's allies, was comprised Kardia, on the borders of the Thracian Chersonese. The Athenians considered Kardia as within the limits of the Chersonese, and therefore as belonging to them.<sup>4</sup>

It was thus that the envoys postponed both the execution of their special mission, and their return, until the last moment, when Philip was within three days' march of Thermopylæ. That they so postponed it, in corrupt connivance with him, is the allegation of Demosthenes, sustained by all the probabilities of the case. Philip was anxious to come upon Thermopylæ by surprise,<sup>5</sup> and

was one) and the persons around them, marching along with Philip; the oaths not having been yet taken.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 390. The oath was administered in the inn in front of the chapel of the Dioskuri, near Pheræ.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 359. In more than one passage, he states their absence from Athens to have lasted three entire months (p. 390; also De Coronâ, p. 235). But this is an exaggeration of the time. The decree of the Senate, which constrained them to depart, was passed on the third of Munychion. Assuming that they set out on that very day (though it is more probable that they did not set out until the ensuing day), their absence would only have lasted seventy days.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 430. The Magnesians and Achæan cities round the Pagasæan Gulf, all except Halus, were included in the oath as allies of Philip (Epistola Philippi ap. Demosthen. p. 159).

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 395. Compare Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 87.

<sup>5</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 351. *ἦν γὰρ τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀπάντων τῶν ἀδικημάτων, τὸ τὸν Φίλιππον ἐπιστῆσαι τοῖς πράγμασι τούτοις, καὶ δεῖν ὑμᾶς ἀκούσαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, εἴτα βουλευσασθαι, μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ πράττειν ὅ,τι δοξάι, αὐτοὶ ἀκούειν καὶ κείνους παρῆναι, καὶ μὴδ' ὅ,τι χρὴ ποιεῖν βλάβος αὐτοῖς εἶναι.* Compare Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 236. *πάλιν ὁνομασθεὶς*

so leave as little time as possible either to the Phokians or to Athens for organizing defence. The oath, which ought to have been administered in Thrace, — but at any rate at Pella, — was not taken until Philip had got as near as possible to the important pass; nor had the envoys visited one single city among his allies in execution of their mandate. And as Æschines was well aware that this would provoke inquiry, he took the precaution of bringing with him a letter from Philip to the Athenian people, couched in the most friendly terms; wherein Philip took upon himself any blame which might fall upon the envoys, affirming that they themselves had been anxious to go and visit the allied cities, but that he had detained them in order that they might assist him in accommodating the difference between the cities of Halus and Pharsalus. This letter, affording farther presumption of the connivance between the envoys and Philip, was besides founded on a false pretence; for Halus was (either at that very time or shortly afterwards) conquered by his arms, given up to the Pharsalians, and its population sold or expelled.<sup>1</sup>

In administering the oaths at Pheræ to Philip and his allies, Æschines and the majority of the Athenian envoys had formally and publicly pronounced the Phokians to be excluded and out of the treaty, and had said nothing about Kersobleptes. This was, if not a departure from their mandate, at least a step beyond it; for the Athenian people had expressly rejected the same exclusion when proposed by Philokrates at Athens; though when the Macedonian envoy declared that he could not admit the Phokians, the Athenians had consented to swear the treaty without them.

*αὐτῶν ὅπως μὴ ἀπίωμεν ἐκ Μακεδονίας ἕως τὰ τῆς στρατείας τῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ Φωκίας ἐντροπῇ ποιήσαιο, etc.*

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 352, 353; ad Philipp. Epistol. p. 152. Demosthenes affirms farther that Æschines himself wrote the letter in Philip's name. Æschines denies that he wrote it, and sustains his denial upon sufficient grounds. But he does not deny that he brought it (Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 44. c. 40, 41).

The inhabitants of Pharsalus were attached to Philip; while those of Pheræ were opposed to him as much as they dared, and even refused (according to Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 444) to join his army on this expedition. The old rivalry between the two cities here again appears.



Probably Philip and his allies would not consent to take the oath, to Athens and her allies, without an express declaration that the Phokians were out of the pale.<sup>1</sup> But though Philokrates and Æschines thus openly repudiated the Phokians, they still persisted in affirming that the intentions of Philip towards that people were highly favorable. They affirmed this probably to the Phokians themselves, as an excuse for having pronounced the special exclusion; they repeated it loudly and emphatically at Athens, immediately on their return. It was then that Demosthenes also, after having been outvoted and silenced during the mission, obtained an opportunity for making his own protest public. Being among the senators of that year, he made his report to the Senate forthwith, seemingly on the day, or the day next but one, after his arrival, before a large audience of private citizens standing by to witness so important a proceeding. He recounted all the proceedings of the embassy, — recalling the hopes and promises under which Æschines and others had persuaded the Athenians to agree to the peace, — arraigning these envoys as fabricators, in collusion with Philip, of falsehoods and delusive assurances, — and accusing them of having already by their unwarrantable delays betrayed Kersobleptes to ruin. Demosthenes at the same time made known to the Senate the near approach and rapid march of Philip; entreating them to interpose even now at the eleventh hour, for the purpose of preventing what yet remained, the Phokians and Thermopylæ, from being given up under the like treacherous fallacies.<sup>2</sup> A fleet of fifty triremes had been voted, and were ready at a moment's notice to be employed on sudden occasion.<sup>3</sup> The majority of the Senate went decidedly along with Demosthenes, and passed a resolution<sup>4</sup> in that sense to be sub

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 355. ἐκ τοῦ, ὅτε τοὺς ὄρκους ἡμέλλε Φίλιππος ἐμνύναι τοὺς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, ἐκσπόνδους ἀποφανθῆναι τοὺς Φωκέας ὑπὸ τούτων, ὁ σιωπᾶν καὶ ἐὰν εἰκὸς ἦν, εἴπερ ἡμέλλον σώζεσθαι. Compare p. 395. Πρώτον μὲν τοίνυν Φωκεῖς ἐκσπόνδους καὶ Ἀλεῖ ἀπέφηναν καὶ Κερσοβλέπτην, παρὰ τὸ ψήφισμα καὶ τὰ πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρημένα, etc.; also p. 430.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 346.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 444. ἐφ' ἣν αἱ πεντήκοντα τριήρεις ὁμῶς ἐφώρουν, etc. Compare Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 33.

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 350, 351. Demosthenes causes this resolution of the Senate (προβούλευμα) to be read to the Dikasts, together with the

mitted to the public assembly. So adverse was this resolution to the envoys, that it neither commended them nor invited them to dinner in the prytaneium; an insult (according to Demosthenes) without any former precedent.

On the 16th of the month Skirrophorion, three days after the return of the envoys, the first public assembly was held: where, according to usual form, the resolution just passed by the Senate ought to have been discussed. But it was not even read to the assembly; for immediately on the opening of business (so Demosthenes tells us), Æschines rose and proceeded to address the people, who were naturally impatient to hear him before any one else, speaking as he did in the name of his colleagues generally.<sup>1</sup> He said nothing either about the recent statements of Demosthenes before the Senate, or the senatorial resolution following, or even the past history of the embassy — but passed at once to the actual state of affairs, and the coming future. He acquainted the people that Philip, having sworn the oaths at Pheræ, had by this time reached Thermopylæ with his army. “But he comes there (said Æschines) as the friend and ally of Athens, the protector of the Phokians, the restorer of the enslaved Boeotian cities, and the enemy of Thebes alone. We your envoys have satisfied him that the Thebans are the real wrong-doers, not only in their oppression towards the Boeotian cities, but also in regard to the spoliation of the temple, which they had conspired to perpetrate earlier than the Phokians. I (Æschines) exposed in an emphatic speech before Philip the iniquities of the Thebans, for which proceeding they have set a price on my life. You Athenians will hear, in two or three days, without any trouble of your

testimony of the senator who moved it. The document is not found *verbatim*, but Demosthenes comments upon it before the Dikasts after it has been read, and especially points out that it contains neither praise nor invitation, which the Senate was always in the habit of voting to returning envoys. This is sufficient to refute the allegation of Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 44. c. 38), that Demosthenes himself moved a resolution to praise the envoys and invite them to a banquet in the Prytaneium. Æschines does not produce such resolution, nor cause it to be read before the Dikasts.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 347, 351, 352. τοῦτο μὲν οὐδεὶς ἀνέγνω τῷ δήμῳ τὸ προβούλευμα, οὐδ' ἤκουσεν ὁ δῆμος, ἀναστὰς δ' οὗτος ἐδημηγόρησε. The date of the 16th Skirrophorion is specified, p. 359.



own, that Philip is vigorously prosecuting the siege of Thebes. You will find that he will capture and break up that city — that he will exact from the Thebans compensation for the treasure ravished from Delphi — and that he will restore the subjugated communities of Plataea and Thespiæ. Nay more — you will hear of benefits still more direct, which we have determined Philip to confer upon you, but which it would not be prudent as yet to particularize. Eubœa will be restored to you as a compensation for Amphipolis: the Eubœans have already expressed the greatest alarm at the confidential relations between Athens and Philip, and the probability of his ceding to you their island. There are other matters too, on which I do not wish to speak out fully, because I have false friends even among my own colleagues." These last ambiguous allusions were generally understood, and proclaimed by the persons round the orator, to refer to Oropus, the ancient possession of Athens, now in the hands of Thebes.<sup>1</sup> Such glowing promises, of benefits to come, were probably crowned by the announcement, more worthy of credit, that Philip had engaged to send back all the Athenian prisoners by the coming Panathenaic festival,<sup>2</sup> which fell during the next month Hekatombeon.

<sup>1</sup> I have here condensed the substance of what is stated by Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 347, 348, 351, 352, 364, 411, etc. Another statement, to the same effect, made by Demosthenes in the Oration De Pace (delivered only a few months after the assembly here described, and not a judicial accusation against Æschines, but a deliberative harangue before the public assembly), is even better evidence than the accusatory speech De Falsâ Legatione — *ἡνίκα τοὺς ὄρκους τοὺς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης ἀπειληφότες ἤκομεν οἱ πρέσβεις, τότε Θεσπιῶν τινῶν καὶ Πλαταιῶν ὑπισχνουμένων οικισθῆσθαι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν Φωκέας τὸν Φίλιππον, ἂν γένηται κύριος, σώσειν, τὴν δὲ Θηβαίων πόλιν διοικεῖν, καὶ τὸν Ὀρωπὸν ὑμῖν ὑπάρξειν, καὶ τὴν Εὐβοίαν ἀντ' Ἀμφιπόλεως ἀποδοθῆσθαι, καὶ τοιαύτας ἐλπίδας καὶ φευκισμούς, οἷς ἐπαχθέντες ὑμεῖς οὔτε συμφώρως οὐτ' ἰσως οὔτε καλῶς προεῖσθε Φωκέας . . . οὐδὲν τούτων οὐτ' ἐξαπατήσας οὔτε σιγήσας ἐγὼ φανήσομαι, ἀλλὰ προειπὼν ὑμῖν ὥς οἶδ' ὅτι μνημονεύετε, ὅτι ταῦτα οὔτε οἶδα οὔτε προσδοκῶ, νομίζω δὲ τοὺς λέγοντα ληρεῖν* (De Pace, p. 59).

Compare also Philippic ii. p. 72, 73, where Demosthenes repeats the like assertion; also De Chersoneso, p. 105; De Coronâ, p. 236, 237.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes states (Fals. Leg. p. 394. *εἰς τὰ Παναθήναια φῆσαι ἀποπέμψειν*) that he received this assurance from Philip, while he was busy during the mission in efforts to procure the ransom or libera-

The first impression of the Athenians, on hearing Æschines, was that of surprise, alarm, and displeasure, at the unforeseen vicinity of Philip;<sup>1</sup> which left no time for deliberation, and scarcely the minimum of time for instant precautionary occupation of Thermopylae, if such a step were deemed necessary. But the sequel of the speech — proclaiming to them the speedy accomplishment of such favorable results, together with the gratification of their antipathy against Thebes — effaced this sentiment, and filled them with agreeable prospects. It was in vain that Demosthenes rose to reply, arraigned the assurances as fallacious, and tried to bring forward the same statement as had already prevailed with the Senate. The people refused to hear him; Philokrates with the other friends of Æschines hooted him off; and the majority were so full of the satisfactory prospect opened to them, that all mistrust or impeachment of its truth appeared spiteful and vexatious.<sup>2</sup> It is to be remembered that these were the same promises previously made to them by Philokrates and others, nearly three months before, when the peace with Philip was first voted. The immediate accomplishment of them was now again promised on the same authority — by envoys who had communicated a second time with Philip, and thus had farther means of information — so that the comfortable anticipation previously raised was confirmed and strengthened. No one thought of the danger of admitting Philip within Thermopylae, when the purpose of his coming was understood to be, the protection of the Phokians, and the punishment of the hated Thebans. Demosthenes was scarcely allowed even to make a protest, or to disclaim responsibility as to the result. Æschines triumphantly assumed the responsibility to himself; while Philokrates amused the people by saying: "No wonder, Athenians, that Demosthenes and I should

tion of the prisoners. But we may be sure that Æschines, so much more in the favor of Philip, must have received it also, since it would form so admirable a point for his first speech at Athens, in this critical juncture.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 352. *ὥσθ' ὑμᾶς ἐκπεπληγμένους τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῦ Φιλίππου, καὶ τούτοις ὀργιζομένους ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ προηγγελκέναι, προτέρως γενέσθαι τινός, πάνθ' ὅσ' ἐβούλεσθ' ὑμῖν ἐσεσθαι προσδοκήσαντας, etc.*

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 348, 349, 352. *οἱ δ' ἀντιλέγοντες ὅλως, ὅλως καὶ βασκανία κατεφαίνετο, etc.*



not think alike; as is an ungenial water-drinker; I am fond of wine."<sup>1</sup>

It was during this temper of the assembly that the letter of Philip, brought by the envoys, was produced and read. His abundant expressions of regard, and promises of future benefit, to Athens, were warmly applauded; while, prepossessed as the hearers were, none of them discerned, nor was any speaker permitted to point out, that these expressions were thoroughly vague and general, and that not a word was said about the Thebans or the Phokians.<sup>2</sup> Philokrates next proposed a decree, extolling Philip for his just and beneficent promises — providing that the peace and alliance with him should be extended, not merely to the existing Athenians, but also to their posterity — and enacting that if the Phokians should still refuse to yield possession of the Delphian temple to the Amphiktyons, the people of Athens would compel them to do so by armed intervention.<sup>3</sup>

During the few days immediately succeeding the return of the envoys to Athens (on the 13th of Skirrophorion), Philip wrote two successive letters, inviting the Athenian troops to join him forthwith at Thermopylæ.<sup>4</sup> Probably these were sent at the moment when Phalækus, the Phokian leader at that pass, an-

<sup>1</sup> Dem. Fals. Leg. p. 355; Phil. ii. p. 73.

<sup>2</sup> Dem. Fals. Leg. p. 353.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 356. Οὗτος (Æschines) ἦν ὁ λέγων ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑπισχνούμενος· πρὸς δὲ τοὺς παρὰ τούτου λόγους ὠρμηκώτας λαβὼν ὁ Φιλοκράτης, ἐγγράφει τοῦτ' εἰς τὸ ψήφισμα, ἐὰν μὴ ποιῶσι Φωκεῖς ἃ δεῖ, καὶ παραδίδωσι τοῖς Ἀμφικτύοις τὸ ἱερὸν, ὅτι βοηθήσει ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ τοῖς διακλύοντας ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι.

The fact, that by this motion of Philokrates the peace was extended to "the posterity" of the Athenians — is dwelt upon by Demosthenes as "the greatest disgrace of all;" with an intensity of emphasis which it is difficult to enter into (Philippic ii. p. 73).

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 357. Demosthenes causes the two letters to be read, and proceeds—Αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἐπιστολαὶ καλοῦσιν αὐταί, καὶ νῦν Δὲ ἴα ἤδη γε.

So also Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 4. ὑμῖν δὲ ταῦθ' ὁρῶν οὐκ ἐγράψεν ἐπιστολὴν ὁ Φίλιππος, ἐξίέναι πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει, β' ἡγήσοντας τοῖς δικαίως, Æschines only notices one of the two letters. Böhmcke (Forschungen, p. 412) conceives the letters as having been written and sent between the 16th and 23d of the month Skirrophorion.

swered his first summons by a negative reply.<sup>1</sup> The two letters must have been despatched one immediately after the other, betraying considerable anxiety on the part of Philip; which it is not difficult to understand. He could not be at first certain what effect would be produced by his unforeseen arrival at Thermopylæ on the public mind at Athens. In spite of all the persuasions of Æschines and Philokrates, the Athenians might conceive so much alarm as to obstruct his admission within that important barrier; while Phalækus and the Phokians — having a powerful mercenary force, competent, even unaided, to a resistance of some length — were sure to attempt resistance, if any hope of aid were held out to them from Athens. Moreover it would be difficult for Philip to carry on prolonged military operations in the neighborhood, from the want of provisions; the lands having been unsown through the continued antecedent war, and the Athenian triremes being at hand to intercept his supplies by sea.<sup>2</sup> Hence it was important to him to keep the Athenians in illusion and quiescence for the moment; to which purpose his letters were well adapted, in whichever way they were taken. If the Athenians came to Thermopylæ, they would come as his allies — not as allies of the Phokians. Not only would they be in the midst of his superior force and therefore as it were hostages;<sup>3</sup> but they would be removed from contact with the Phokians, and would bring to bear upon the latter an additional force of intimidation. If, on the contrary, the Athenians determined not to come, they would at any rate interpret his desire for their presence as a proof that he contemplated no purposes at variance with their wishes and interests; and would trust the assurances, given by Æschines and his other partisans at Athens, that he secretly meant well towards the Phokians. This last alternative was what Philip both desired and anticipated. He wished only to deprive the Phokians of all chance of aid from Athens, and to be left to deal with them himself.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 359.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 379.

This was among the grounds of objection, taken by Demosthenes and his friends, against the despatch of forces to Thermopylæ in compliance with the letter of Philip — according to the assertion of Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41); who treats the objection with contempt, though it seems well-grounded and reasonable.



His letters served to blind the Athenian public, but his partisans took care not to move the assembly<sup>1</sup> to a direct compliance with their invitation. Indeed the proposal of such an expedition (besides the standing dislike of the citizens towards military service) would have been singularly repulsive, seeing that the Athenians would have had to appear, ostensibly at least, in arms against their Phokian allies. The conditional menace of the Athenian assembly against the Phokians (in case of refusal to surrender the temple to the Amphiktyons), decreed on the motion of Philokrates, was in itself sufficiently harsh, against allies of ten years' standing; and was tantamount at least to a declaration that Athens would not interfere on their behalf—which was all that Philip wanted.

Among the hearers of these debates at Athens, were deputies from these very Phokians, whose fate now hung in suspense. It has already been stated that during the preceding September, while the Phokians were torn by intestine dissensions, Phalækus, the chief of the mercenaries, had repudiated aid (invited by his Phokian opponents), both from Athens and Sparta;<sup>2</sup> feeling strong enough to hold Thermopylæ by his own force. During the intervening months, however, both his strength and his pride had declined. Though he still occupied Thermopylæ with eight thousand or ten thousand mercenaries, and still retained superiority over Thebes, with possession of Orchomenus, Koroneia, and other places taken from the Thebans,<sup>3</sup>—yet his financial resources had become so insufficient for a numerous force, and the soldiers had grown so disorderly from want of regular pay,<sup>4</sup> that he thought it prudent to invite aid from Sparta during the spring,—while Athens was deserting the Phokians to make terms with Philip. Archidamus accordingly came to Thermopylæ with one

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 356, 357.

<sup>2</sup> Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 387.

<sup>4</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41. This statement of Æschines—about the declining strength of the Phokians and the causes thereof—has every appearance of being correct in point of fact; though it will not sustain the conclusions which he builds upon it.

Compare Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 30 (delivered four years earlier) ἀπειροκροτων δὲ χρήμασι Φωκίων, etc.

thousand Lacedæmonian auxiliaries.<sup>1</sup> The defensive force thus assembled was amply sufficient against Philip by land; but that important pass could not be held without the coöperation of a superior fleet at sea.<sup>2</sup> Now the Phokians had powerful enemies even within the pass—the Thebans; and there was no obstacle, except the Athenian fleet under Proxenus at Oreus,<sup>3</sup> to prevent Philip from landing troops in the rear of Thermopylæ, joining the Thebans, and making himself master of Phokis from the side towards Boeotia.

To the safety of the Phokians, therefore, the continued maritime protection of Athens was indispensable; and they doubtless watched with trembling anxiety the deceitful phases of Athenian diplomacy during the winter and spring of 347–346 B. C. Their deputies must have been present at Athens when the treaty was concluded and sworn in March 346 B. C. Though compelled to endure not only the refusal of Antipater excluding them from the oath, but also the consent of their Athenian allies, tacitly acted upon without being formally announced, to take the oath without them,—they nevertheless heard the assurances, confidently addressed by Philokrates and Æschines to the people, that this refusal was a mere feint to deceive the Thessalians and Thebans,—that Philip would stand forward as the protector of the Phokians, and that all his real hostile purposes were directed against Thebes. How the Phokians interpreted such tortuous and contradictory policy, we are not told. But their fate hung upon the determination of Athens; and during the time when the Ten

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 365; Diodor. xvi. 59.

<sup>2</sup> For the defence of Thermopylæ, at the period of the invasion of Xerxes, the Grecian fleet at Artemisium was not less essential than the land force of Leonidas encamped in the pass itself.

<sup>3</sup> That the Phokians could not maintain Thermopylæ without the aid of Athens—and that Philip could march to the frontier of Attica, without any intermediate obstacle to prevent him, if Olynthus were suffered to fall into his hand—is laid down emphatically by Demosthenes in the first Olynthiac, nearly four years before the month of Skirrophorion, 346 B. C.

Ἄν δ' ἐκεῖνα Φίλιππος λάβῃ, τίς αὐτὸν κωλύσει δεῦρο βαδίζειν; Θεβαῖοι; οἱ, εἰ μὴ λίαν πικρὸν εἰπεῖν, καὶ συνεισβαλοῦσιν ἐτοίμως. Ἀλλὰ Φωκεῖς; οἱ τὴν οἰκίαν οὐχ οἱοὶ τε ὄντες φυλάττειν, ἐὰν μὴ βοηθήσῃ ὑμεῖς (Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 16)



Athenian envoys were negotiating or intriguing with Philip at Pella, Phokian envoys were there also, trying to establish some understanding with Philip, through Lacedæmonian and Athenian support. Both Philip and Æschines probably amused them with favorable promises. And though, when the oaths were at last administered to Philip at Pheræ, the Phokians were formally pronounced to be excluded, — still the fair words of Æschines, and his assurances of Philip's good intentions towards them, were not discontinued.

While Philip marched straight from Pheræ to Thermopylæ, — and while the Athenian envoys returned to Athens, — Phokian deputies visited Athens also, to learn the last determination of the Athenian people, upon which their own destiny turned. Though Philip, on reaching the neighborhood of Thermopylæ, summoned the Phokian leader, Phalækus to surrender the pass, and offered him terms, — Phalækus would make no reply until his deputies returned to Athens.<sup>1</sup> These deputies, present at the public assembly of the 16th Skirrophorion, heard the same fallacious assurances as before respecting Philip's designs, repeated by Philokrates and Æschines with unabated impudence, and still accepted by the people. But they also heard, in the very same assembly, the decree proposed by Philokrates and adopted, that unless the Phokians restored the Delphian temple forthwith to the Amphiktyons, the Athenian people would compel them to do so by armed force. If the Phokians still cherished hopes, this conditional declaration of war, from a city which still continued by name to be their ally, opened their eyes, and satisfied them that no hope was left except to make the best terms they could with Philip.<sup>2</sup> To defend

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 359. ἤκομεν δὲ δεῦρο ἀπὸ τῆς πρεσβείας τῆς ἐπὶ τοῖς ὄρκους τρίτῃ ἐπὶ δέκα τοῦ Σκιρροφοριῶνος μηνός, καὶ παρὴν ὁ Φίλιππος ἐν Πύλαις ἤδη καὶ τοῖς Φωκεῦσιν ἐπηγγέλλετο ὡς οὐδὲν ἐπίστευον ἐκείνοι. Σημεῖον δὲ — οὐ γὰρ ἂν δεῦρ' ἦκον ὡς ὑμᾶς . . . παρῆσαν γὰρ οἱ τῶν Φωκῶν πρέσβεις ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ τί ἀπαγγελοῦσιν οὗτοι (Æschines, Philokrates, etc.) καὶ τί ψηφισθέντες, ἐπιμελὲς εἶδεναι.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 357. οἱ μὲν τοίνυν Φωκεῖς, ὡς τὰ παρ' ὑμῶν ἐπύθοντο ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας καὶ τό τε ψήφισμα τοῦτ' ἔλαβον τὸ τοῦ Φιλοκράτους, καὶ τὴν ἀπαγγελίαν ἠπύθοντο τὴν τούτου καὶ τὰς ὑποσχέσεις — κατὰ πάντας τοὺς τρόπους ἀπώλυντο.

Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 45. c. 41) touches upon the statements made by Demosthenes respecting the envoys of Phalækus at Athens, and the effect

Thermopylæ successfully without Athens, much more against Athens, was impracticable.

Leaving Athens after the assembly of the 16th Skirrophorion, the Phokian deputies carried back the tidings of what had passed to Phalækus, whom they reached at Nikæa, near Thermopylæ, about the 20th of the same month.<sup>1</sup> Three days afterwards, Phalækus, with his powerful army of eight thousand or ten thousand mercenary infantry and one thousand cavalry, had concluded a convention with Philip. The Lacedæmonian auxiliaries, perceiving the insincere policy of Athens, and the certain ruin of the Phokians, had gone away a little before.<sup>2</sup> It was stipulated in the convention that Phalækus should evacuate the territory, and retire wherever else he pleased, with his entire mercenary force and with all such Phokians as chose to accompany him. The remaining natives threw themselves upon the mercy of the conqueror.

All the towns in Phokis, twenty-two in number, together with the pass of Thermopylæ, were placed in the hands of Philip; all surrendering at discretion; all without resistance. The moment Philip was thus master of the country, he joined his forces with those of the Thebans, and proclaimed his purpose of acting thoroughly upon their policy; of transferring to them a considerable portion of Phokis; of restoring to them Orchomenus, Korsia, and Koroneia, Bœotian towns which the Phokians had taken from them; and of keeping the rest of Bœotia in their dependence, just as he found it.<sup>3</sup>

of the news which they carried back in determining the capitulation. He complains of them generally as being "got up against him" (ὁ κατήγορος μεμηχάνηται), but he does not contradict them upon any specific point. Nor does he at all succeed in repelling the main argument, brought home with great precision of date by Demosthenes.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 359: compare Diodor. xvi. 59. In this passage, Demosthenes reckons up seven days between the final assembly at Athens, and the capitulation concluded by the Phokians. In another passage, he states the same interval at only five days (p. 365); which is doubtless inaccurate. In a third passage, the same interval, seemingly, stands at five or six days, p. 379.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 356-365. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἦκεν (Philip) εἰς Πύλας, λακεδαιμόνιοι δ' αἰσθόμενοι τὴν ἐνέδραν ὑπεχώρησαν, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 359, 365, 379, 413. ὁ δὲ (Æschines)



In the meantime, the Athenians, after having passed the decree abovementioned, reappointed (in the very same assembly of the 16th Skirrophorion, June), the same ten envoys to carry intelligence of it to Philip, and to be witnesses of the accomplishment of the splendid promises made in his name. But Demosthenes immediately swore off, and refused to serve; while Æschines, though he did not swear off, was nevertheless so much indisposed, as to be unable to go. This at least is his own statement; though Demosthenes affirms that the illness was a mere concerted pretence, in order that Æschines might remain at home to counterwork any reaction of public feeling at Athens, likely to arise on the arrival of the bad news, which Æschines knew to be at hand, from Phokis.<sup>1</sup> Others having been chosen in place of Æschines and Demosthenes,<sup>2</sup> the ten envoys set out, and proceeded as far as Chalkis in Eubœa. It was there that they learned the fatal intelligence from the main land on the other side of the Eubœan strait. On the 23d of Skirrophorion, Phalækus and all the Phokian towns had surrendered; Philip was master of Thermopylæ, had joined his forces with the Thebans, and proclaimed an unqualified philo-Theban policy; on the 27th of Skirrophorion, Derkyllus, one of the envoys, arrived in haste back at Athens, having stopped short in his mission on hearing the facts.

ποσούτων δὲ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τινα αἰχμάλωτον σώσαι, ὥσθ' ὅλον τόπον καὶ πλεῖν ἢ μυρίου μὲν ὀπλίτας, ὁμοῦ δὲ χιλίους ἱππέας τῶν ὑπαρχόντων συμμάχων, ὅπως αἰχμάλωτοι γίνωνται Φιλίππῳ συμπαρασκευάσειν.

Diodorus (xvi. 59) states the mercenaries of Phalækus at eight thousand men.

Because the Phokians capitulated to Philip and not to the Thebans (p. 360) — because not one of their towns made any resistance — Demosthenes argues that this proves their confidence in the favorable dispositions of Philip, as testified by Æschines. But he overstrains this argument against Æschines. The Phokians had no choice but to surrender, as soon as all chance of Athenian aid was manifestly shut out. The belief of favorable dispositions on the part of Philip, was doubtless an auxiliary motive, but not the primary or predominant.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 378; Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 40. c. 30. It appears that the ten envoys were not all the same — τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς πλείστους τοὺς αὐτοὺς, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 380. οὐθ' οὐκ πρεσβευτῆς ἄλλος ἤρητο ἀντὶ αὐτοῦ, etc.

Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 43) does not seem to deny this distinctly.

At the moment when he arrived, the people were holding an assembly in the Peiræus, on matters connected with the docks and arsenal; and to this assembly, actually sitting, Derkyllus made his unexpected report.<sup>1</sup> The shock to the public of Athens was prodigious. Not only were all their splendid anticipations of anti-Theban policy from Philip (hitherto believed and welcomed by the people on the positive assurances of Philokrates and Æschines) now dashed to the ground — not only were the Athenians smitten with the consciousness that they had been overreached by Philip, that they had played into the hands of their enemies the Thebans, and that they had betrayed their allies the Phokians to ruin — but they felt also that they had yielded up Thermopylæ, the defence at once of Attica and of Greece, and that the road to Athens lay open to their worst enemies the Thebans, now aided by Macedonian force. Under this pressure of surprise, sorrow, and terror, the Athenians, on the motion of Kallisthenes, passed these votes: — To put the Peiræus, as well as the fortresses throughout Attica, in immediate defence — To bring within these walls, for safety, all the women and children, and all the movable property, now spread abroad in Attica — To celebrate the approaching festival of the Herakleia, not in the country, as was usual, but in the interior of Athens.<sup>2</sup>

Such were the significant votes, the like of which had not been passed at Athens since the Peloponnesian war, attesting the terrible reaction of feeling occasioned at Athens by the disastrous

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 359, 360, 365, 379.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 368–379. Æschines also acknowledges the passing of this vote, for bringing in the movable property of Athens into a place of safety; though he naturally says very little about it (Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 42).

In the oration of Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 238, this decree, moved by Kallisthenes, is not only alluded to, but purports to be given *verbatim*. The date as we there read it — the 21st of the month Mæmakterion — is unquestionably wrong; for the real decree must have been passed in the concluding days of the month Skirrophorion, immediately after hearing the report of Derkyllus. This manifest error of date will not permit us to believe in the authenticity of the document. Of these supposed original documents, inserted in the oration De Coronâ, Droysen and other critics have shown some to be decidedly spurious; and all are so doubtful that I forbear to cite them as authority.



news from Phokis. Æschines had now recovered from his indisposition; or (if we are to believe Demosthenes) found it convenient to lay aside the pretence. He set out as self-appointed envoy, without any new nomination by the people — probably with such of the Ten as were favorable to his views — to Philip and to the joint Macedonian and Theban army in Phokis. And what is yet more remarkable, he took his journey thither through Thebes itself;<sup>1</sup> though his speeches and his policy had been for months past (according to his own statement) violently anti-Theban;<sup>2</sup> and though he had affirmed (this, however, rests upon the testimony of his rival) that the Thebans had set a price upon his head. Having joined Philip, Æschines took part in the festive sacrifices and solemn pæans celebrated by the Macedonians, Thebans and Thessalians,<sup>3</sup> in commemoration and thanksgiving for their easy, though long-deferred, triumph over the Phokians, and for the conclusion of the Ten-Years Sacred War.

Shortly after Philip had become master of Thermopylæ and Phokis, he communicated his success in a letter to the Athenians. His letter betokened a full consciousness of the fear and repugnance which his recent unexpected proceedings had excited at Athens;<sup>4</sup> but in other respects, it was conciliatory and even seductive; expressing great regard for them as his sworn allies, and promising again that they should reap solid fruits from the alliance. It allayed that keen apprehension of Macedonian and Theban attack, which had induced the Athenians recently to sanction the precautionary measures proposed by Kallisthenes. In his subsequent communications also with Athens, Philip found his

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 380.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 41. c. 32. p. 43. c. 36. Æschines accuses Demosthenes of traitorous partiality for Thebes.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 380; De Coronâ, p. 321. Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 49, 50) admits, and tries to justify, the proceeding.

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 237, 238, 239. It is evident that Demosthenes found little in the letter which could be turned against Philip. Its tone must have been plausible and winning.

A letter is inserted *verbatim* in this oration, professing to be the letter of Philip to the Athenians. I agree with those critics who doubt or disbelieve the genuineness of this letter, and therefore I do not cite it. If Demosthenes had had before him a letter so peremptory and insolent in its tone, he would have animadverted upon it much more severely.

advantage in continuing to profess the same friendship and to intersperse similar promises;<sup>1</sup> which, when enlarged upon by his partisans in the assembly, contributed to please the Athenians and to lull them into repose, thus enabling him to carry on without opposition real measures of an insidious or hostile character. Even shortly after Philip's passage of Thermopylæ, when he was in full coöperation with the Thebans and Thessalians, Æschines boldly justified him by the assertion, that these Thebans and Thessalians had been too strong for him, and had constrained him against his will to act on their policy, both to the ruin of the Phokians and to the offence of Athens.<sup>2</sup> And we cannot doubt that the restoration of the prisoners taken at Olynthus, which must soon have occurred, diffused a lively satisfaction at Athens, and tended for the time to countervail the mortifying public results of her recent policy.

Master as he now was of Phokis, at the head of an irresistible force of Macedonians and Thebans, Philip restored the Delphian temple to its inhabitants, and convoked anew the Amphiktyonic assembly, which had not met since the seizure of the temple by Philomelus. The Amphiktyons reassembled under feelings of vindictive antipathy against the Phokians, and of unqualified devotion to Philip. Their first vote was to dispossess the Phokians of their place in the assembly as one of the twelve ancient Amphiktyonic races, and to confer upon Philip the place and two votes (each of the twelve races had two votes) thus left vacant. All the rights to which the Phokians laid claim over the Delphian temple were formally cancelled. All the towns in Phokis, twenty-two in number, were dismantled and broken up into villages. Abæ alone was spared; being preserved by its ancient and oracular temple of

<sup>1</sup> Æschines went on boasting about the excellent dispositions of Philip towards Athens, and the great benefits which Philip promised to confer upon her, for at least several months after this capture of Thermopylæ. Æschines, cont. Timarch. p. 24. c. 33. Φίλιππον δὲ νῦν μὲν διὰ τὴν τῶν λόγων εὐφημίαν ἐπαινῶ· τὸν δ' αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐργοῖς γένηται, ὅλος νῦν ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς ὑποσχέσεσιν, ἀσφαλὴ καὶ βῆδιν τὸν καθ' αὐτοῦ ποιήσεται ἐπαινον.

This oration was delivered apparently about the middle of Olymp. 108, 3; some months after the conquest of Thermopylæ by Philip.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. De Pace, p. 62; Philippic ii. p. 69.



Apollo, and by the fact that its inhabitants had taken no part in the spoliation of Delphi.<sup>1</sup> No village was allowed to contain more than fifty houses, nor to be nearer to another than a minimum distance of one furlong. Under such restriction, the Phokians were still allowed to possess and cultivate their territory, with the exception of a certain portion of the frontier transferred to the Thebans;<sup>2</sup> but they were required to pay to the Delphian temple an annual tribute of fifty talents, until the wealth taken away should have been made good. The horses of the Phokians were directed to be sold; their arms were to be cast down the precipices of Parnassus, or burnt. Such Phokians as had participated individually in the spoliation, were proclaimed accursed, and rendered liable to arrest wherever they were found.<sup>3</sup>

By the same Amphiktyonic assembly, farther, the Lacedæmonians, as having been allies of the Phokians, were dispossessed of their franchise, that is, of their right to concur in the Amphiktyonic suffrage of the Dorian nation. This vote probably emanated from the political antipathies of the Argeians and Messenians.<sup>4</sup>

The sentence, rigorous as it is, pronounced by the Amphiktyons against the Phokians, was merciful as compared with some of the propositions made in the assembly. The Ceteans went so far as to propose, that all the Phokians of military age should be cast down the precipice; and Æschines takes credit to himself for having induced the assembly to hear their defence, and thereby preserved their lives.<sup>5</sup> But though the terms of the sentence may have been thus softened, we may be sure that the execution of it by Thebans, Thessalians, and other foreigners quartered on the country, — all bitter enemies of the Phokian name, and giving vent to their antipathies under the mask of pious indignation

<sup>1</sup> Pausanias, x. 3, 2.

<sup>2</sup> This transfer to the Thebans is not mentioned by Diodorus, but seems contained in the words of Demosthenes (Fals. Leg. p. 385) — *τῆς τῶν Φωκίων χώρας ὁπόσην βούλονται*: compare p. 380.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 60; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 385. *ὅλων τῶν τειχῶν καὶ τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἀναίρεσις*. Demosthenes causes this severe sentence of the Amphiktyonic council to be read to the Dikastery (Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 361). Unfortunately it has not been preserved.

<sup>4</sup> Pausanias, x. 8, 2.

<sup>5</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 47 c. 44.

against sacrilege, — went far beyond the literal terms in active cruelty. That the Phokians were stripped and slain,<sup>1</sup> — that children were torn from their parents, wives from their husbands, and the images of the gods from their temples, — that Philip took for himself the lion's share of the plunder and movable property, — all these are facts naturally to be expected, as incidental to the violent measure of breaking up the cities and scattering the inhabitants. Of those, however, who had taken known part in the spoliation of the temple, the greater number went into exile with Phalækus; and not they alone, but even all such of the moderate and meritorious citizens as could find means to emigrate.<sup>2</sup> Many of them obtained shelter at Athens. The poorer Phokians remained at home by necessity. But such was the destruction inflicted by the conquerors, that even two or three years afterwards, when Demosthenes and other Athenian envoys passed through the country in their way to the Amphiktyonic meeting at Delphi, they saw nothing but evidences of misery; old men, women and little children, without adults, — ruined houses, impoverished villages, half-cultivated fields.<sup>3</sup> Well might Demosthenes say that events more terrific and momentous had never occurred in the

<sup>1</sup> Justin, viii. 5. "Victi igitur necessitate, pactâ salute se dediderunt. Sed pactio ejus fidei fuit, cujus antea fuerat deprecâti belli promissio. Igitur cæduntur passim rapiunturque: non liberi parentibus, non conjuges maritis, non deorum simulacra templis suis relinquuntur. Unum tantum miseris solatium fuit, quod cum Philippus portione prædæ socios fraudasset, nihil rerum suarum apud inimicos viderunt."

Compare Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 366.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 47. c. 44; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 366; Demosthen. De Pace, p. 61. *ὅτι τοὺς Φωκίων φυγάδας σώζομεν*, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 361. *θεῶμα δεινὸν καὶ ἐλεεινὸν ὅτι γὰρ νῦν ἐπορευόμεθα εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡν ὁρᾶν ἡμῖν πάντα ταῦτα, οἰκίας κατεσκαμμένας, τείχη περιηρημένα, χώραν ἔρημον τῶν ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, γένητα δὲ καὶ παιδάρια ὀλίγα καὶ πρεσβύτερας ἀνθρώπους οἰκτρούς, οὐδ' ἂν εἰ δύναιτ' ἐπικέσθαι τῷ λόγῳ τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν νῦν ὄντων*.

As this oration was delivered in 343–342 B. C., the adverb of time *νῦν* may be reasonably referred to the early part of that year, and the journey to Delphi was perhaps undertaken for the spring meeting of the Amphiktyonic council of that year; between two and three years after the destruction of the Phokians by Philip.



Grecian world, either in his own time or in that of his predecessors.<sup>1</sup>

It was but two years since the conquest and ruin of Olynthus, and of thirty-two Chalkidic Grecian cities besides, had spread abroad everywhere the terror and majesty of Philip's name. But he was now exalted to a still higher pinnacle by the destruction of the Phokians, the capture of Thermopylæ, and the sight of a permanent Macedonian garrison, occupying from henceforward Nikæa and other places commanding the pass.<sup>2</sup> He was extolled as restorer of the Amphiktyonic assembly, and as avenging champion of the Delphian god, against the sacrilegious Phokians. That he should have acquired possession of an unassailable pass, dismissed the formidable force of Phalækus, and become master of twenty-two Phokian cities, all without striking a blow, — was accounted the most wonderful of all his exploits. It strengthened more than ever the prestige of his constant good fortune. Having been now, by the vote of the Amphiktyons, invested with the right of Amphiktyonic suffrage previously exercised by the Phokians, he acquired a new Hellenic rank, with increased facilities for encroachment and predominance in Hellenic affairs. Moreover, in the month of August 346 B. C., about two months after the surrender of Phokis to Philip, the season recurring for celebrating the great Pythian festival, after the usual interval of four years, the Amphiktyons conferred upon Philip the signal honor of nominating him president to celebrate this festival, in conjunction with the Thebans and Thessalians;<sup>3</sup> an honorary preëminence,

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 361.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. ad Philipp. Epistolam, p. 153. Νικαίαν μὲν φρουρὰ κατέχων, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 60. τιθέναι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τῶν Πυθίων Φίλιππον μετὰ Βοιωτῶν καὶ Θετταλῶν, διὰ τὸ Κορινθίους μετεσχηκέναι τοῖς Φωκεῦσι ὥς εἰς τὸ θεῖον παρανομίας.

The reason here assigned by Diodorus, why the Amphiktyons placed the celebration of the Pythian festival in the hands of Philip, cannot be understood. It may be true, as matter of fact, that the Corinthians had allied themselves with the Phokians during the Sacred War — though there is no other evidence of the fact except this passage. But the Corinthians were never invested with any authoritative character in reference to the Pythian festival. They were the recognized presidents of the Isthmian festival. I

which ranked among the loftiest aspirations of ambitious Grecian despots, and which Jason, of Pheræ, had prepared to appropriate for himself twenty-four years before, at the moment when he was assassinated.<sup>1</sup> It was in vain that the Athenians, mortified and indignant at the unexpected prostration of their hopes and the utter ruin of their allies, refused to send deputies to the Amphiktyons, — affected even to disregard the assembly as irregular, — and refrained from despatching their sacred legation as usual, to sacrifice at the Pythian festival.<sup>2</sup> The Amphiktyonic vote did not the less pass; without the concurrence, indeed, either of Athens or of Sparta, yet with the hearty support not only of Thebans and Thessalians, but also of Argeians, Messenians, Arcadians, and all those who counted upon Philip as a probable auxiliary against their dangerous Spartan neighbor.<sup>3</sup> And when envoys from Philip and from the Thessalians arrived at Athens, notifying that he had been invested with the Amphiktyonic suffrage, and inviting the concurrence of Athens in his reception, — prudential considerations obliged the Athenians, though against their feelings, to pass a vote of concurrence. Even Demosthenes was afraid to break the recent peace, however inglorious, — and to draw upon Athens a general Amphiktyonic war, headed by the King of Macedon.<sup>4</sup>

Here then was a momentous political change doubly fatal to

cannot but think that Diodorus has been misled by a confusion of these two festivals one with the other.

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vi.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 380-398. οὕτω δεινὰ καὶ σχέτλια ἡγουμένων τοῦς ταλαιπώρους πάσχειν Φωκέας, ὥστε μήτε τοῦς ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς θεωροῦς μήτε τοῦς θεσμοθέτας εἰς τὰ Πύθια πέμψαι, ἀλλ' ἀποστήναι τῆς πατρίδος θεωρίας, etc. Demosth. De Pace, p. 60. τοῦς συνελήλυθότας τοῦ τοῦς καὶ φάσκοντας Ἀμφικτύονας εἶναι, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 61; Philippic ii. p. 68, 69.

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. De Pace, p. 60-63; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 375. In the latter passage, p. 375, Demosthenes accuses Æschines of having been the only orator in the city who spoke in favor of the proposition, there being a strong feeling in the assembly and in the people against it. Demosthenes must have forgotten, or did not wish to remember, his own harangue De Pace, delivered three years before. In spite of the repugnance of the people, very easy to understand, I conclude that the decree must have passed; since, if it had been rejected, consequences must have arisen which would have come to our knowledge.



the Hellenic world; first, in the new position of Philip both as master of the keys of Greece and as recognized Amphiktyonic leader, with means of direct access and influence even on the inmost cities of Peloponnesus; next, in the lowered banner, and uncovered frontier, of Athens, disgraced by the betrayal both of her Phokian allies and of the general safety of Greece, — and recompensed only in so far as she regained her captives.

How came the Athenians to sanction a peace at once dishonorable and ruinous, yielding to Philip that important pass, the common rampart of Attica and of Southern Greece, which he could never have carried in war at the point of the sword? Doubtless, the explanation of this proceeding is to be found, partly in the general state of the Athenian mind; repugnance to military cost and effort, — sickness and shame at their past war with Philip, — alarm from the prodigious success of his arms, — and pressing anxiety to recover the captives taken at Olynthus. But the feelings here noticed, powerful as they were, would not have ended in such a peace, had they not been seconded by the deliberate dishonesty of Æschines and a majority of his colleagues; who deceived their countrymen with a tissue of false assurances as to the purposes of Philip, and delayed their proceedings on the second embassy in such a manner that he was actually at Thermopylæ before the real danger of the pass was known at Athens.

Making all just allowance for mistrust of Demosthenes as a witness, there appears in the admissions of Æschines himself sufficient evidence of corruption. His reply to Demosthenes, though successfully meeting some collateral aggravations, seldom touches, and never repels, the main articles of impeachment against himself. The dilatory measures of the second embassy, — the postponement of the oath-taking until Philip was within three days' march of Thermopylæ, — the keeping back of information about the danger of that pass, until the Athenians were left without leisure for deliberating on the conjuncture, — all these grave charges remain without denial or justification. The refusal to depart at once on the second embassy, and to go straight to Philip in Thrace for the protection of Kersobleptes, is indeed explained, but in a manner which makes the case rather worse than better. And the gravest matter of all, — the false assurances given to the Athenian

public respecting Philip's purposes, — are plainly admitted by Æschines.<sup>1</sup>

In regard to these public assurances given by Æschines about Philip's intentions, corrupt mendacity appears to me the only supposition admissible. There is nothing, even in his own account, to explain how he came to be beguiled into such flagrant misjudgment; while the hypothesis of honest error is yet farther refuted by his own subsequent conduct. "If (argues Demosthenes), Æschines had been sincerely misled by Philip, so as to pledge his own veracity and character to the truth of positive assurances given publicly before his countrymen, respecting Philip's designs, — then on finding that the result belied him, and that he had fatally misled those whom he undertook to guide, he would be smitten with compunction, and would in particular abominate the name of Philip as one who had disgraced him and made him an unconscious instrument of treachery. But the fact has been totally otherwise; immediately after the peace, Æschines visited Philip to share his triumph, and has been ever since his avowed partisan and advocate."<sup>2</sup> Such conduct is inconsistent with the supposition of honest mistake, and goes to prove, — what the proceedings of the second embassy all bear out, — that Æschines was the hired agent of Philip for deliberately deceiving his countrymen with gross falsehood. Even as reported by himself, the language of Æschines betokens his ready surrender of Grecian freedom, and his recognition of Philip as a master; for he gives not only his consent, but his approbation, to the entry of Philip within Thermopylæ,<sup>3</sup> only exhorting him, when he comes there, to

<sup>1</sup> Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 43. c. 37. Τοῦτο οὐκ ἀπαγγεῖλαι, ἀλλ' ὑποσχέσθαι μέ φησιν.

Compare p. 43. c. 36. p. 46. c. 41. p. 52. c. 54 — also p. 31–41 — also the speech against Ktesiphon, p. 65. c. 30. ὡς τάχιστα εἰσω Πυλῶν Φίλιππος παρήλθε καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐν Φωκεῦσι πόλεις παραδόξως ἀναστάτους ἐποίησε etc.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 373, 374. I translate the substance of the argument, not the words.

<sup>3</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 43. c. 36. In rebutting the charge against him of having betrayed the Phokians to Philip, Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 46, 47) dwells upon the circumstance, that none of the Phokian exiles appeared to assist in the accusation, and that some three or four Phokians and Boeo-



act against Thebes and in defence of the Boeotian cities. This, in an Athenian envoy, argues a blindness little short of treason. The irreparable misfortune, both for Athens and for free Greece generally, was to bring Philip within Thermopylae, with power sufficient to put down Thebes and reconstitute Boeotia, — even if it could have been made sure that such would be the first employment of his power. The same negotiator, who had begun his mission by the preposterous flourish of calling upon Philip to give up Amphipolis, ended by treacherously handing over to him a new conquest which he could not otherwise have acquired. Thermopylae, betrayed once before by Ephialtes the Malian to Xerxes, was now betrayed a second time by the Athenian envoys to an extra-Hellenic power yet more formidable.

The ruinous peace of 346 B. C. was thus brought upon Athens not simply by mistaken impulses of her own, but also by the corruption of Æschines and the major part of her envoys. Demosthenes had certainly no hand in the result. He stood in decided opposition to the majority of the envoys; a fact manifest as well from his own assurances, as from the complaints vented against him, as a colleague insupportably troublesome, by Æschines. Demosthenes affirms, too, that after fruitless opposition to the policy of the majority, he tried to make known their misconduct to his countrymen at home both by personal return, and by letter; and that in both cases his attempts were frustrated. Whether he did

tians (whom he calls by name) were ready to appear as witnesses in his favor

The reason, why none of them appeared against him, appears to me sufficiently explained by Demosthenes. The Phokians were in a state far too prostrate and terror-stricken to incur new enmities, or to come forward as accusers of one of the Athenian partisans of Philip, whose soldiers were in possession of their country.

The reason why some of them appeared in his favor is also explained by Æschines himself, when he states that he had pleaded for them before the Amphiktyonic assembly, and had obtained for them a mitigation of that extreme penalty which their most violent enemies urged against them. To captives at the mercy of their opponents, such an interference might well appear deserving of gratitude; quite apart from the question, how far Æschines as envoy, by his previous communications to the Athenian people, had contributed to betray Thermopylae and the Phokians to Philip.

all that he could towards this object, cannot be determined; but we find no proof of any short-coming. The only point upon which Demosthenes appears open to censure, is, on his omission to protest emphatically during the debates of the month Elaphebolion at Athens, when the Phokians were first practically excluded from the treaty. I discover no other fault established on probable grounds against him, amidst the multifarious accusations, chiefly personal and foreign to the main issue, preferred by his opponent.

Respecting Philokrates — the actual mover, in the Athenian assembly, of all the important resolutions tending to bring about this peace — we learn that being impeached by Hyperides<sup>1</sup> not long afterwards, he retired from Athens without standing trial, and was condemned in his absence. Both he and Æschines (so Demosthenes asserts) had received from Philip bribes and grants out of the spoils of Olynthus; and Philokrates, especially, displayed his newly-acquired wealth at Athens with impudent ostentation.<sup>2</sup> These are allegations in themselves probable, though coming from a political rival. The peace, having disappointed every one's hopes, came speedily to be regarded with shame and regret, of which Philokrates bore the brunt as its chief author. Both Æschines and Demosthenes sought to cast upon each other the imputation of confederacy with Philokrates.

The pious feeling of Diodorus leads him to describe, with peculiar seriousness, the divine judgments which fell on all those concerned in despoiling the Delphian temple. Phalækus, with his mercenaries out of Phokis, retired first into Peloponnesus; from thence seeking to cross to Tarentum, he was forced back when actually on shipboard by a mutiny of his soldiers, and passed into Krete. Here he took service with the inhabitants of Knosus against those of Lyktus. Over the latter he gained a victory, and their city was only rescued from him by the unexpected arrival of the Spartan king Archidamus. That prince, recently the auxiliary of Phalækus in Phokis, was now on his way across the sea towards Tarentum; near which city he was slain a few years afterwards. Phalækus, repulsed from Lyktus, next laid siege to Kydonia, and was bringing up engines to batter the walls,

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 376.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 375, 376, 377, 386



when a storm of thunder and lightning arose, so violent, that his engines "were burnt by the divine fire,"<sup>1</sup> and he himself with several soldiers perished in trying to extinguish the flames. His remaining army passed into Peloponnesus, where they embraced the cause of some Eleian exiles against the government of Elis; but were vanquished, compelled to surrender, and either sold into slavery or put to death.<sup>2</sup> Even the wives of the Phokian leaders, who had adorned themselves with some of the sacred donatives out of the Delphian Temple, were visited with the like extremity of suffering. And while the gods dealt thus rigorously with the authors of the sacrilege, they exhibited favor no less manifest towards their champion Philip, whom they exalted more and more towards the pinnacle of honor and dominion.<sup>3</sup>

## CHAPTER XC.

FROM THE PEACE OF 346 B. C., TO THE BATTLE OF CHÆRONEIA  
AND THE DEATH OF PHILIP.

I HAVE described in my last chapter the conclusion of the Sacred War, and the reestablishment of the Amphiktyonic assembly by Philip; together with the dishonorable peace of 346 B. C., whereby Athens, after a war, feeble in management and inglorious in result, was betrayed by the treachery of her own envoys into the abandonment of the pass of Thermopylæ;—a new sacrifice, not required by her actual position, and more fatal to her future security than any of the previous losses. This important pass, the key of Greece, had now come into possession

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 63. ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πυρὸς κατεφλέχθησαν, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 61, 62, 63.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 64; Justin, viii. 2. "Dignum itaque qui a Diis proximus habeatur, per quem Deorum majestas vindicata sit."

Some of these mercenaries, however, who had been employed in Phokis perished in Sicily in the service of Timoleon—as has been already related.

of Philip, who occupied it, together with the Phokian territory by a permanent garrison of his own troops.<sup>1</sup> The Amphiktyonic assembly had become an instrument for his exaltation. Both Thebans and Thessalians were devoted to his interest; rejoicing in the ruin of their common enemies the Phokians, without reflecting on the more formidable power now established on their frontiers. Though the power of Thebes had been positively increased by regaining Orchomenus and Koroneia, yet, comparatively speaking, the new position of Philip brought upon her, as well as upon Athens and the rest of Greece, a degradation and extraneous mastery such as had never before been endured.<sup>2</sup>

This new position of Philip, as champion of the Amphiktyonic assembly, and within the line of common Grecian defence, was profoundly felt by Demosthenes. A short time after the surrender of Thermopylæ, when the Thessalian and Macedonian envoys had arrived at Athens, announcing the recent determination of the Amphiktyons to confer upon Philip the place in that assembly from whence the Phokians had been just expelled, concurrence of Athens in this vote was invited; but the Athenians, mortified and exasperated at the recent turn of events, were hardly disposed to acquiesce. Here we find Demosthenes taking the cautious side, and strongly advising compliance. He insists upon the necessity of refraining from any measure calculated to break the existing peace, however deplorable may have been its conditions; and of giving no pretence to the Amphiktyons for voting conjoint war against Athens, to be executed by Philip.<sup>3</sup> These recommendations, prudent under the circumstances, prove that Demosthenes, though dissatisfied with the peace, was anxious to keep it now that it was made; and that if he afterwards came to renew his exhortations to war, this was owing to new encroachments and more menacing attitude on the part of Philip.

We have other evidences, besides the Demosthenic speech just cited, to attest the effect of Philip's new position on the Grecian mind. Shortly after the peace, and before the breaking up of the

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 119.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. De Pace, p. 62. νυνὶ δὲ Θεβαίους πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὴν χώραν κεκομισθαι, κάλλιστα πέπρακται, πρὸς δὲ τὴν καὶ δόξαν, αἰσχίστα, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. De Pace, p. 60, 61.



Phokian towns into villages had been fully carried into detail — Isokrates published his letter addressed to Philip — the *Oratio ad Philippum*. The purpose of this letter is, to invite Philip to reconcile the four great cities of Greece — Sparta, Athens, Thebes, and Argos; to put himself at the head of their united force, as well as of Greece generally; and to invade Asia, for the purpose of overthrowing the Persian empire, of liberating the Asiatic Greeks, and of providing new homes for the unsettled wanderers in Greece. The remarkable point here is, that Isokrates puts the Hellenic world under subordination and pupilage to Philip, renouncing all idea of it as a self-sustaining and self-regulating system. He extols Philip's exploits, good fortune, and power, above all historical parallels — treats him unequivocally as the chief of Greece — and only exhorts him to make as good use of his power, as his ancestor Herakles had made in early times.<sup>1</sup> He recommends him, by impartial and conciliatory behavior towards all, to acquire for himself the same devoted esteem among the Greeks as that which now prevailed among his own Macedonian officers — or as that which existed among the Lacedæmonians towards the Spartan kings.<sup>2</sup> Great and melancholy indeed is the change which had come over the old age of Isokrates, since he published the *Panegyric Oration* (380 B. C. — thirty-four years before) wherein he invokes a united Panhellenic expedition against Asia, under the joint guidance of the two Hellenic chiefs by land and sea — Sparta and Athens; and wherein he indignantly denounces Sparta for having, at the peace of Antalkidas, introduced for her own purposes a Persian rescript to impose laws on the Grecian world. The prostration of Grecian dignity, serious as it was, involved in the peace of Antalkidas, was far less disgraceful than that recommended by Isokrates towards Philip — himself indeed personally of Hellenic parentage, but a Macedonian or barbarian (as Demosthenes<sup>3</sup> terms him)

<sup>1</sup> Isokrates, *Or. v. ad Philipp.* s. 128 — 135.

<sup>2</sup> Isokrat. *Or. v. ad Philipp.* s. 91. *ὅταν οὕτω διαθῇ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὥσπερ ὁρᾷς Λακεδαιμονίους τε πρὸς τοὺς ἐαυτῶν βασιλέας ἔχοντας, τοὺς δ' ἐταίρους τοὺς σοὺς πρὸς σὲ διακειμένους. Ἔστι δ' οὐ χαλεπὸν τυχεῖν τούτων ἢν ἐθελήσῃς κοινὸς ἅπασι γενέσθαι, etc.*

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. *Philipp.* iii. p. 118.

by power and position. As Æschines, when employed in embassy from Athens to Philip, thought that his principal duty consisted in trying to persuade him by eloquence to restore Amphipolis to Athens, and put down Thebes — so Isokrates relies upon his skilful pen to dispose the new chief to a good use of imperial power — to make him protector of Greece, and conquerer of Asia. If copious and elegant flattery could work such a miracle, Isokrates might hope for success. But it is painful to note the increasing subservience, on the part of estimable Athenian freemen like Isokrates, to a foreign potentate; and the declining sentiment of Hellenic independence and dignity, conspicuous after the peace of 346 B. C. in reference to Philip.

From Isokrates as well as from Demosthenes, we thus obtain evidence of the imposing and intimidating effect of Philip's name in Greece after the peace of 346 B. C. Ochus, the Persian king, was at this time embarrassed by unsubdued revolt among his subjects; which Isokrates urges as one motive for Philip to attack him. Not only Egypt, but also Phenicia and Cyprus, were in revolt against the Persian king. One expedition (if not two) on a large scale, undertaken by him for the purpose of reconquering Egypt, had been disgracefully repulsed, in consequence of the ability of the generals (Diophantus an Athenian and Lamius a Spartan) who commanded the Grecian mercenaries in the service of the Egyptian prince Nektanebus.<sup>1</sup> About the time of the peace of 346 B. C. in Greece, however, Ochus appears to have renewed with better success his attack on Cyprus, Phenicia, and Egypt. To reconquer Cyprus, he put in requisition the force of the Karian prince Idrieus (brother and successor of Mausolus and Artemisia), at this time not only the most powerful prince in Asia Minor, but also master of the Grecian islands Chios, Kos, and Rhodes, probably by means of an internal oligarchy in each, who ruled in his interest and through his soldiers.<sup>2</sup> Idrieus sent

<sup>1</sup> Isokrates, *Or. v. Philipp.* s. 118; Diodor. xv. 40, 44, 48. Diodorus alludes three several times to this repulse of Ochus from Egypt. Compare Demosth. *De Rhod. Libert.* p. 193.

Trogus mentioned three different expeditions of Ochus against Egypt (*Argument. ad Justin. lib. x*).

<sup>2</sup> Isokrates, *Or. v. Philipp.* s. 102. *Ἰδρίεα γὰρ τῶν εὐπορώτατον τῶν νῦν περὶ τὴν ἡπείρου, etc.*



to Cyprus a force of forty triremes and eight thousand mercenary troops, under the command of the Athenian Phokion and of Evagoras, an exiled member of the dynasty reigning at Salamis in the island. After a long siege of Salamis itself, which was held against the Persian king by Protagoras, probably another member of the same dynasty — and after extensive operations throughout the rest of this rich island, affording copious plunder to the soldiers, so as to attract numerous volunteers from the mainland — all Cyprus was again brought under the Persian authority.<sup>1</sup>

The Phenicians had revolted from Ochus at the same time as the Cypriots, and in concert with Nektanebus prince of Egypt, from whom they received a reinforcement of four thousand Greek mercenaries under Mentor the Rhodian. Of the three great Phenician cities, Sidon, Tyre, and Aradus — each a separate political community, but administering their common affairs at a joint town called Tripolis, composed of three separate walled circuits, a furlong apart from each other — Sidon was at once the oldest, the richest, and the greatest sufferer from Persian oppression. Hence the Sidonian population, with their prince Tennes, stood foremost in the revolt against Ochus, employing their great wealth in hiring soldiers, preparing arms, and accumulating every means of defence. In the first outbreak they expelled the Persian garrison, seized and punished some of the principal officers, and destroyed the adjoining palace and park reserved for the satrap or king. Having farther defeated the neighboring satraps of Kilikia and Syria, they strengthened the defences of the city by triple ditches, heightened walls, and a fleet of one hundred triremes and quinqueremes. Incensed at these proceedings, Ochus

Demosth. De Pace, p. 63. *ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐῶμεν — καὶ τὸν Κάρα τὰς νήσους καταλαμβάνειν, Χίον καὶ Κῶν καὶ Ῥόδον*, etc. An oration delivered in the latter half of 346 B. C. after the peace.

Compare Demosth. De Rhod. Libertat. p. 121, an oration four years earlier.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 42-46. In the Inscription No. 87. of Boeckh's *Corpus Inscriptt.*, we find a decree passed by the Athenians recognizing friendship and hospitality with the Sidonian prince Strato — from whom they seem to have received a donation of ten talents. The note of date in this decree is not preserved; but M. Boeckh conceives it to date between Olympiads 101-104.

marched with an immense force from Babylon. But his means of corruption served him better than his arms. The Sidonian prince Tennes, in combination with Mentor, entered into private bargain with him, betrayed to him first one hundred of the principal citizens, and next placed the Persian army in possession of the city-walls. Ochus, having slain the hundred citizens surrendered to him, together with five hundred more who came to him with boughs of supplication, intimated his purpose of taking signal revenge on the Sidonians generally; who took the desperate resolution, first of burning their fleet that no one might escape — next, of shutting themselves up with their families, and setting fire each man to his own house. In this deplorable conflagration forty thousand persons are said to have perished; and such was the wealth destroyed, that the privilege of searching the ruins was purchased for a large sum of money. Instead of rewarding the traitor Tennes, Ochus concluded the tragedy by putting him to death.<sup>1</sup>

Flushed with this unexpected success, Ochus marched with an immense force against Egypt. He had in his army ten thousand Greeks; six thousand by requisition from the Greek cities in Asia Minor; three thousand by request from Argos; and one thousand from Thebes.<sup>2</sup> To Athens and Sparta, he had sent a like request, but had received from both a courteous refusal. His army, Greek and Asiatic, the largest which Persia had sent forth for many years, was distributed into three divisions, each commanded by one Greek and one Persian general; one of the three divisions was confided to Mentor and the eunuch Bagoas, the two ablest servants of the Persian king. The Egyptian prince Nektanebus, having been long aware of the impending attack, had also assembled a numerous force: no less than twenty thousand mercenary Greeks, with a far larger body of Egyptians and Libyans. He had also taken special care to put the eastern branch of the Nile, with the fortress of Pelusium at its mouth, in a full state of defence. But these ample means of defence were rendered unavailing, partly by his own unskillfulness and incompetence, partly by the ability and cunning of Mentor and Bagoas.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 42, 43, 45. "Occisis optimatibus Sidona cepit Ochus Trogus, Argum. ad Justin. lib. x).

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 47; Isokrates, Or. xii. Panathenaic. s. 171.



Nektanebus was obliged to retire into Ethiopia; all Egypt fell, with little resistance, into the hands of the Persians; the fortified places capitulated — the temples were pillaged, with an immense booty to the victors — and even the sacred archives of the temples were carried off, to be afterwards resold to the priests for an additional sum of money. The wealthy territory of Egypt again became a Persian province, under the satrap Pherendates; while Ochus returned to Babylon, with a large increase both of dominion and of reputation. The Greek mercenaries were dismissed to return home, with an ample harvest both of pay and plunder.<sup>1</sup> They constituted in fact the principal element of force on both sides; some Greeks enabled the Persian king to subdue revolters,<sup>2</sup> while others lent their strength to the revolters against him.

By this re-conquest of Phenicia and Egypt, Ochus relieved himself from that contempt into which he had fallen through the failure of his former expedition,<sup>3</sup> and even exalted the Persian empire

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 47–51. Ley, *Fata et Conditio, Ægypti sub Regno Persarum*, p. 25, 26.

<sup>2</sup> Isokrates, Or. iv. Philipp. s. 149. *καὶ τοὺς ἀφισταμένους τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς βασιλείας συγκαταστρέφόμεθα*, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Isokrates, Or. iv. Philipp. s. 117, 121, 160. Diodorus places the successful expeditions of Ochus against Phenicia and Egypt during the three years between 351–348 B. C. (Diodor. xvi. 40–52). In my judgment, they were not executed until after the conclusion of the peace between Philip and Athens in March 346 B. C.; they were probably brought to a close in the two summers of 346–345 B. C. The Discourse or Letter of Isokrates to Philip appears better evidence on this point of chronology, than the assertion of Diodorus. The Discourse of Isokrates was published shortly after the peace of March 346 B. C., and addressed to a prince perfectly well informed of all the public events of his time. One of the main arguments used by Isokrates to induce Philip to attack the Persian empire, is the weakness of Ochus in consequence of Egypt and Phenicia being still in revolt and unsubdued — and the contempt into which Ochus had fallen from having tried to reconquer Egypt and having been ignominiously repulsed — *ἀπῆλθεν ἐκεῖθεν (Ochus) οὐ μόνον ἡττηθεὶς ἀλλὰ καὶ καταγελασθεὶς, καὶ δόξας οὐτε βασιλεῦσιν οὐτε στρατηγοῖν ἄξιός εἶναι* (s. 118) . . . *οὐτὶ σφόδρα ὑμνησμένος καὶ καταπεφρονημένος ὑφ' ἀπάντων ὡς οὐδεὶς πώποτε τῶν βασιλευσάντων* (s. 160).

The reconquest of Egypt by Ochus, with an immense army and a large number of Greeks engaged on both sides, must have been one of the most impressive events of the age. Diodorus may perhaps have confounded the

in force and credit to a point nearly as high as it had ever occupied before. The Rhodian Mentor, and the Persian Bagoas, both of whom had distinguished themselves in the Egyptian campaign, became from this time among his most effective officers. Bagoas accompanied Ochus into the interior provinces, retaining his full confidence; while Mentor, rewarded with a sum of 100 talents, and loaded with Egyptian plunder, was invested with the satrapy of the Asiatic seaboard.<sup>1</sup> He here got together a considerable body of Greek mercenaries, with whom he rendered signal service to the Persian king. Though the whole coast was understood to belong to the Persian empire, yet there were many separate strong towns and positions, held by chiefs who had their own military force; neither paying tribute nor obeying orders. Among these chiefs, one of the most conspicuous was Hermeias, who resided in the stronghold of Atarneus (on the mainland opposite to Lesbos), but had in pay many troops and kept garrisons in many neighboring places. Though partially disabled by accidental injury in childhood,<sup>2</sup> Hermeias was a man of singular energy and ability, and had conquered for himself this dominion. But what has contributed most to his celebrity, is, that he was the attached friend and admirer of Aristotle; who passed three years with him at Atarneus, after the death of Plato in 348–347 B. C. — and who has commemorated his merits in a noble ode. By treachery and false promises, Mentor seduced Hermeias into an interview, seized his person, and employed his signet-ring to send counterfeit orders whereby he became master of Atarneus and all the remaining places held by Hermeias. Thus, by successful perfidy, Mentor reduced the most vigorous of the independent chiefs on the Asiatic coast; after which, by successive conquests of the same kind, he at length brought the whole coast effectively under Persian dominion.<sup>3</sup>

date of the first expedition, wherein Ochus failed, with that of the second, wherein he succeeded.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 50–52.

<sup>2</sup> Strabo, xvi. p. 610. Suidas v. Aristotelis — *θλιβίας ἐκ παιδός*.

<sup>3</sup> Diodorus places the appointment of Mentor to the satrapy of the Asiatic coast, and his seizure of Hermeias, in Olymp. 107, 4 (349–348 B. C.), immediately after the successful invasion of Egypt.

But this date cannot be correct, since Aristotle visited Hermeias at Atar



The peace between Philip and the Athenians lasted without any formal renunciation on either side for more than six years; from March 346 B. C. to beyond Midsummer 340 B. C. But though never formally renounced during that interval, it became gradually more and more violated in practice by both parties. To furnish a consecutive history of the events of these few years, is beyond our power. We have nothing to guide us but a few orations of Demosthenes;<sup>1</sup> which, while conveying a lively idea of the feeling of the time, touch, by way of allusion, and as materials for reasoning, upon some few facts; yet hardly enabling us to string together those facts into an historical series. A brief

neus after the death of Plato, and passed three years with him — from the archonship of Theophilus (348–347 B. C. Olymp. 108, 1), in which year Plato died — to the archonship of Eubulus (345–344 B. C. Olymp. 108, 4) (Vita Aristotelis ap. Dionys. Hal. Epist. ad Ammæum, c. 5; Scriptt. Biographici, p. 397, ed. Westermann), Diogen. Laert. v. 7.

Here is another reason confirming the remark made in my former note, that Diodorus has placed the conquest of Egypt by Ochus three or four years too early; since the appointment of Mentor to the satrapy of the Asiatic coast follows naturally and immediately after the distinguished part which he had taken in the conquest of Egypt.

The seizure of Hermias by Mentor must probably have taken place about 343 B. C. The stay of Aristotle with Hermias will probably have occupied the three years between 347 and 344 B. C.

Respecting the chronology of these events, Mr. Clinton follows Diodorus; Böhnecke dissents from him — rightly, in my judgment (Forschungen, p. 460–734, note). Böhnecke seems to think that the person mentioned in Demosth. Philipp. iv. (p. 139, 140) as having been seized and carried up prisoner to the king of Persia, accused of plotting with Philip measures of hostility against the latter — is Hermias. This is not in itself improbable, but the authority of the commentator Ulpian seems hardly sufficient to warrant us in positively asserting the identity.

It is remarkable that Diodorus makes no mention of the peace of 346 B. C. between Philip and the Athenians.

Demosthenes, Philippic ii. . . . .	Delivered in
De Halonneso, not genuine. . . . .	B. C. 344–343
De Falsâ Legatione. . . . .	B. C. 343–342
Æschines, De Falsâ Legatione. . . . .	ib.
Demosthenes, De Chersoneso. . . . .	ib.
Philipp iii. . . . .	B. C. 342–341
Philipp iv. . . . .	ib.
ad Philipp. Epist. . . . .	B. C. 341–440
	B. C. 340–339

sketch of the general tendencies of this period is all that we can venture upon.

Philip was the great aggressor of the age. The movement everywhere, in or near Greece, began with him, and with those parties in the various cities, who acted on his instigation and looked up to him for support. We hear of his direct intervention, or of the effects of his exciting suggestions, everywhere; in Peloponnesus, at Ambrakia and Leukas, in Eubœa, and in Thrace. The inhabitants of Megalopolis, Messênê, and Argos, were soliciting his presence in Peloponnesus, and his active coöperation against Sparta. Philip intimated a purpose of going there himself, and sent in the mean time soldiers and money, with a formal injunction to Sparta that she must renounce all pretension to Messênê.<sup>1</sup> He established a footing in Elis,<sup>2</sup> by furnishing troops to an oligarchical faction, and enabling them to become masters of the government, after a violent revolution. Connected probably with this intervention in Elis, was his capture of the three Eleian colonies, Pandosia, Bucheta, and Elateia, on the coast of the Epirotic Kassopia, near the Gulf of Ambrakia. He made over these three towns to his brother-in-law Alexander, whom he exalted to be prince of the Epirotic Molossians<sup>3</sup> — deposing the reigning prince Arrhybas. He farther attacked the two principal Grecian cities in that region, Ambrakia and Leukas; but here he appears to have failed.<sup>4</sup> Detachments of his troops showed themselves near Megara and Eretria, to the aid of philippizing parties in these cities and to the serious alarm of the Athenians. Philip established more firmly his dominion over Thessaly, distributing the country into four divisions, and planting a garrison in Pheræ, the city

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Pace, p. 61; Philippic ii. p. 69.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 424; Pausan. iv. 28, 3.

<sup>3</sup> Justin, viii. 6. Diodorus states that Alexander did not become prince until after the death of Arrhybas (xvi. 72).

<sup>4</sup> Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 84; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 424–435; Philippic iii. p. 117–120; Philippic iv. p. 133.

As these enterprises of Philip against Ambrakia and Leukas are not noticed in the second Philippic, but only in orations of later date, we may perhaps presume that they did not take place till after Olymp. 109, 1 = B. C. 344–343. But this is not a very certain inference.



most disaffected to him.<sup>1</sup> We also read, that he again overran and subdued the Illyrian, Dardanian, and Pæonian tribes on his northern and western boundary; capturing many of their towns, and bringing back much spoil; and that he defeated the Thracian prince Kersobleptes, to the great satisfaction of the Greek cities on and near the Hellespont.<sup>2</sup> He is said farther to have redistributed the population of Macedonia, transferring inhabitants from one town to another according as he desired to favor or discourage residence — to the great misery and suffering of the families so removed.<sup>3</sup>

Such was the exuberant activity of Philip, felt everywhere from the coasts of the Propontis to those of the Ionian sea and the Corinthian Gulf. Every year his power increased; while the cities of the Grecian world remained passive, uncombined, and without recognizing any one of their own number as leader. The philippizing factions were everywhere rising in arms or conspiring to seize the governments for their own account under Philip's auspices; while those who clung to free and popular Hellenism were discouraged and thrown on the defensive.<sup>4</sup>

It was Philip's policy to avoid or postpone any breach of peace with Athens; the only power under whom Grecian combination against him was practicable. But a politician like Demosthenes foresaw clearly enough the coming absorption of the Grecian world, Athens included, into the dominion of Macedonia, unless some means could be found of reviving among its members a spirit of vigorous and united defence. [In or before the year 344 B. C., we find this orator again coming forward in the Athenian assembly, persuading his countrymen to send a mission into Pelopon-

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 368, 424, 436; Philipp. iii. 117, 118. iv. p. 133 De Coronâ, p. 324; Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 84.

Compare Harpokration v. Δεκαδρχία.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 69, 71.

<sup>3</sup> Justin, viii. 5, 6. "Reversus in regnum, ut pecora pastores nunc in hybernos, nunc in æstivos saltus trajiciunt — sic ille populos et urbes, ut illi vel replenda vel derelinquenda quæque loca videbantur, ad libidinem suam transfert. Miseranda ubique facies et similis excidio erat," etc. Compare Livy, xl. 3, where similar proceedings of Philip son of Demetrius (B. C. 182) are described.

<sup>4</sup> See a striking passage in the fourth Philippic of Demosthenes, p. 133

nesus, and going himself among the envoys.<sup>1</sup> He addressed both to the Messenians and Argeians emphatic remonstrances on their devotion to Philip; reminding them that from excessive fear and antipathy towards Sparta, they were betraying to him their own freedom, as well as that of all their Hellenic brethren.<sup>2</sup> Though heard with approbation, he does not flatter himself with having worked any practical change in their views.<sup>3</sup> But it appears that envoys reached Athens (in 344–343 B. C.), to whom some answer was required, and it is in suggesting that answer that Demosthenes delivers his second Philippic. He denounces Philip anew, as an aggressor stretching his power on every side, violating the peace with Athens, and preparing ruin for the Grecian world.<sup>4</sup> Without advising immediate war, he calls on the Athenians to keep watch and ward, and to organize defensive alliance among the Greeks generally.

The activity of Athens, unfortunately, was shown in nothing but words; to set off against the vigorous deeds of Philip. But they were words of Demosthenes, the force of which was felt by Philip's partisans in Greece, and occasioned such annoyance to Philip himself that he sent to Athens more than once envoys and letters of remonstrance. His envoy, an eloquent Byzantine named Python,<sup>5</sup> addressed the Athenian assembly with much

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 252.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Philipp. ii. p. 71, 72. Demosthenes himself reports to the Athenian assembly (in 344–343 B. C.) what he had said to the Messenians and Argeians.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Philipp. ii. p. 72.

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. Philipp. ii. p. 66–72. Who these envoys were, or from whence they came, does not appear from the oration. Libanius in his Argument says that they had come jointly from Philip, from the Argeians, and from the Messenians. Dionysius Hal. (ad Ammæum, p. 737) states that they came out of Peloponnesus.

I cannot bring myself to believe, on the authority of Libanius, that there were any envoys present from Philip. The tenor of the discourse appears to contradict that supposition.

<sup>5</sup> Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 81, 82. Winiewski (Comment. Histor. in Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 140) thinks that the embassy of Python to Athens is the very embassy to which the second Philippic of Demosthenes provides or introduces a reply. I agree with Böckneke in regarding this supposition as improbable.



success, complaining of the calumnies of the orators against Philip — asserting emphatically that Philip was animated with the best sentiments towards Athens, and desired only to have an opportunity of rendering service to her — and offering to review and amend the terms of the late peace. Such general assurances of friendship, given with eloquence and emphasis, produced considerable effect in the Athenian assembly, as they had done from the mouth of Æschines during the discussions on the peace. The proposal of Python was taken up by the Athenians, and two amendments were proposed. 1. Instead of the existing words of the peace — “that each party should have what they actually had” — it was moved to substitute this phrase — “That each party should have their own.”<sup>1</sup> 2. That not merely the allies of Athens and of Philip, but also all the other Greeks, should be included in the peace; That all of them should remain free and autonomous; That if any of them were attacked, the parties to the treaty on both sides would lend them armed assistance forthwith. 3. That Philip should be required to make restitution of those places, Doriskus, Serreium, etc., which he had captured from Ker-sobleptes after the day when peace was sworn at Athens.

The first amendment appears to have been moved by a citizen named Hegesippus, a strenuous anti-philippizing politician, supporting the same views as Demosthenes. Python, with the other envoys of Philip, present in the assembly, either accepted these amendments, or at least did not protest against them. He partook of the public hospitality of the city as upon an understanding mutually settled.<sup>2</sup> Hegesippus with other Athenians was sent to Macedonia to procure the ratification of Philip; who admitted the justice of the second amendment, offered arbitration respecting the third, but refused to ratify the first — disavowing both the general proposition, and the subsequent acceptance of his envoys at

<sup>1</sup> Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 81. Περὶ δὲ τῆς εἰρήνης, ἣν ἔδοσαν ἡμῖν οἱ πρέσβεις οἱ παρ' ἐκείνου πεμφθέντες ἐπανορθώσασθαι, ὅτι ἐπὶ νωρθώσαμεθα, ὃ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὁμολογεῖται δίκαιον εἶναι, ἐκατέρους ἔχειν τὰ ἐαυτῶν, ἀμφισβητεῖ (Philip) ὡς δέδωκεναι, μηδὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις ταῦτ' εἰρηκέναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, etc.

Compare Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 398.

<sup>2</sup> Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 81. See Ulpian ad Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 364.

Athens.<sup>1</sup> Moreover he displayed great harshness in the reception of Hegesippus and his colleagues; banishing from Macedonia the Athenian poet Xenokleides, for having shown hospitality towards them.<sup>2</sup> The original treaty, therefore, remained unaltered.

Hegesippus and his colleagues had gone to Macedonia, not simply to present for Philip's acceptance the two amendments just indicated, but also to demand from him the restoration of the little island of Halonnesus (near Skiathos), which he had taken since the peace. Philip denied that the island belonged to the Athenians, or that they had any right to make such a demand; affirming that he had taken it, not from them, but from a pirate named Sostratus, who was endangering the navigation of the neighboring sea — and that it now belonged to him. If the Athenians disputed this, he offered to submit the question to arbitration; to restore the island to Athens, should the arbitrators decide against him — or to give it to her, even should they decide in his favor.<sup>3</sup>

Since we know that Philip treated Hegesippus and the other envoys with peculiar harshness, it is probable that the diplomatic argument between them, about Halonnesus as well as about other matters, was conducted with angry feeling on both sides. Hence an island, in itself small and insignificant, became the subject of

<sup>1</sup> Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 81, 84, 85. ἀμφισβητεῖ μὴ δέδωκεναι (Philip contends that he never tendered the terms of peace for amendment) μηδὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις ταῦτ' εἰρηκέναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς. . . . Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἐπανορθώμα (the second amendment) ὁμολογῶν ἐν τῇ ἐπιστολῇ, ὡς ἀκούετε, δικάζον τ' εἶναι καὶ δέχεσθαι, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Hegesippus was much denounced by the philippizing orators at Athens (Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 364). His embassy to Philip has been treated by some authors as enforcing a “grossly sophistical construction of an article in the peace,” which Philip justly resented. But in my judgment it was no construction of the original treaty, nor was there any sophistry on the part of Athens. It was an amended clause, presented by the Athenians in place of the original. They never affirmed that the amended clause meant the same thing as the clause prior to amendment. On the contrary, they imply that the meaning is *not* the same — and it is on that ground that they submit the amended form of words.

<sup>3</sup> Compare Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 77, and the Epistola Philippi, p. 162. The former says, ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοιοῦτους λόγους, ὅτι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπρεσβεύσαμεν, ὡς ληστὰς ἀφελόμενος ταῦτα τὴν νῆσιν κτήσασαυτο, καὶ προσήκειν αὐτὴν ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι.

Philip's letter agrees as to the main facts.



prolonged altercation for two or three years. When Hegesippus and Demosthenes maintained that Philip had wronged the Athenians about Halonnesus, and that it could only be received from him in restitution of rightful Athenian ownership, not as a gift *proprio motu* — Æschines and others treated the question with derision, as a controversy about syllables.<sup>1</sup> “Philip (they said) offers to give us Halonnesus. Let us take it, and set the question at rest. What need to care whether he *gives it* to us, or *gives it back* to us?” The comic writers made various jests on the same verbal distinction, as though it were a mere silly subtlety. But though party-orators and wits might here find a point to turn or a sarcasm to place, it is certain that well-conducted diplomacy, modern as well as ancient, has been always careful to note the distinction as important. The question here had no reference to capture during war, but during peace. No modern diplomatist will accept restitution of what has been unlawfully taken, if he is called upon to recognize it as gratuitous cession from the captor. The plea of Philip — that he had taken the island, not from Athens, but from the pirate Sostratus — was not a valid excuse, assuming that the island really belonged to Athens. If Sostratus had committed piratical damage, Philip ought to have applied to Athens for redress, which he evidently did not do. It was only in case of redress being refused, that he could be entitled to right himself by force; and even then, it may be doubted whether his taking of the island could give him any right to it against Athens. The Athenians refused his proposition of arbitration; partly because they were satisfied of their own right to the island — partly because they were jealous of admitting Philip to any recognized right of interference with their insular ascendancy.<sup>2</sup>

Halonnesus remained under garrison by Philip, forming one among many topics of angry communication by letters and by envoys, between him and Athens — until at length (seemingly about 341 B. C.) the inhabitants of the neighboring island of Peparethus retook it and carried off his garrison. Upon this proceeding, Philip addressed several remonstrances, both to the Peparethians and to the Athenians. Obtaining no redress, he attacked Peparethus

<sup>1</sup> Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 65. c. 30. *περὶ συλλαβῶν διαφερόμενος* etc.  
<sup>2</sup> Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 78–80.

and took severe revenge upon the inhabitants. The Athenians then ordered their admiral to make reprisals upon him, so that the war, though not yet actually declared, was approaching nearer and nearer towards renewal.<sup>1</sup>

But it was not only in Halonnesus that Athens found herself beset by Philip and the philippizing factions. Even her own frontier on the side towards Bœotia now required constant watching, since the Thebans had been relieved from their Phokian enemies; so that she was obliged to keep garrisons of hoplites at Drymus and Panaktum.<sup>2</sup> In Megara an insurgent party under Perilaus had laid plans for seizing the city through the aid of a body of Philip's troops, which could easily be sent from the Macedonian army now occupying Phokis, by sea to Pegæ, the Megarian post on the Krissæan Gulf. Apprized of this conspiracy, the Megarian government solicited aid from Athens. Phokion, conducting the Athenian hoplites to Megara with the utmost celerity, assured the safety of the city, and at the same time reestablished the Long Walls to Nisæa, so as to render it always accessible to Athenians by sea.<sup>3</sup> In Eubœa, the cities of Oreus and Eretria fell into the hands of the philippizing leaders, and became hostile to Athens. In Oreus, the greater part of the citizens were persuaded to second the views of Philip's chief adherent, Philistides; who prevailed on them to silence the remonstrances, and imprison the person, of the opposing leader Euphræus, as a disturber of the public peace. Philistides then, watching his opportunity, procured the introduction of a body of Macedonian troops, by means of whom he assured to himself the rule of the city as Philip's instrument; while Euphræus, agonized with grief and alarm, slew himself in prison.

<sup>1</sup> Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 162. The oration of Pseudo-Demosthenes De Halonneso is a discourse addressed to the people on one of these epistolary communications of Philip, brought by some envoys who had also addressed the people *viva voce*. The letter of Philip adverted to several other topics besides, but that of Halonnesus came first.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 446. I take these words to denote, not any one particular outmarch to these places, but a standing guard kept there, since the exposure of the northern frontier of Attica after the peace. For the great importance of Panaktum, as a frontier position between Athens and Thebes, see Thucydides, v. 35, 36, 39.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 368, 435, 446, 448; Philippic iv p. 133. De Coronâ, p. 324; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16.



At Eretria, Kleitarchus with others carried on the like conspiracy. Having expelled their principal opponents, and refused admission to Athenian envoys, they procured a thousand Macedonian troops under Hipponikus; they thus mastered Eretria itself, and destroyed the fortified seaport called Porthmus, in order to break the easy communication with Athens. Oreus and Eretria are represented by Demosthenes as suffering miserable oppression under these two despots, Philistides and Kleitarchus.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, Chalkis, the chief city in Eubœa, appears to have been still free, and leaning to Athens rather than to Philip, under the predominant influence of a leading citizen named Kallias.

At this time, it appears, Philip was personally occupied with operations in Thrace; where he passed at least eleven months and probably more,<sup>2</sup> leaving the management of affairs in Eubœa to his commanders in Phokis and Thessaly. He was now seemingly preparing his schemes for mastering the important outlets from the Euxine into the Ægean—the Bosphorus and Hellespont—and the Greek cities on those coasts. Upon these straits depended the main supply of imported corn for Athens and a large part of the Grecian world; and hence the great value of the Athenian possession of the Chersonese.

Respecting this peninsula, angry disputes now arose. To protect her settlers there established, Athens had sent Diopieithes with a body of mercenaries—unprovided with pay, however, and left to levy contributions where they could; while Philip had taken under his protection and garrisoned Kardias—a city situated within the peninsula near its isthmus, but ill-disposed to Athens, asserting independence, and admitted at the peace of 346 B. C., by Æschines and the Athenian envoys, as an ally of Philip to take part in the peace-oaths.<sup>3</sup> In conjunction with the Kardians,

<sup>1</sup> The general state of things, as here given, at Oreus and Eretria, existed at the time when Demosthenes delivered his two orations—the third Philippic and the oration on the Chersonese; in the late spring and summer of 341 B. C.—De Chersoneso, p. 98, 99, 104; Philipp. iii. p. 112, 115, 125, 126.

...δουλεύονσι γε μαστιγούμενοι καὶ στρεβλούμενοι (the people of Eretria under Kleitarchus, p. 128).

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. De Chersoneso, p. 99.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677 De Fals. Leg. p. 396; De Chersoneso, p. 104, 105.

Philip had appropriated and distributed lands which the Athenian settlers affirmed to be theirs; and when they complained, he insisted that they should deal with Kardias as an independent city, by reference to arbitration.<sup>1</sup> This they refused, though their envoy Æschines had recognized Kardias as an independent ally of Philip when the peace was sworn.

Here was a state of conflicting pretensions, out of which hostilities were sure to grow. The Macedonian troops overran the Chersonese, while Diopieithes on his side made excursions out of the peninsula, invading portions of Thrace subject to Philip; who sent letters of remonstrance to Athens.<sup>2</sup> While thus complaining at Athens, Philip was at the same time pushing his conquests in Thrace against the Thracian princes Kersobleptes, Teres, and Sitalkes,<sup>3</sup> upon whom the honorary grant of Athenian citizenship had been conferred.

The complaints of Philip, and the speeches of his partisans at Athens, raised a strong feeling against Diopieithes at Athens, so that the people seemed disposed to recall and punish him. It is against this step that Demosthenes protests in his speech on the Chersonese. Both that speech, and his third Philippic were delivered in 341–340 B. C.; seemingly in the last half of 341 B. C. In both, he resumes that energetic and uncompromising tone of hostility towards Philip, which had characterized the first Philippic and the Olynthiacs. He calls upon his countrymen not only to sustain Diopieithes, but also to renew the war vigorously against Philip in every other way. Philip (he says), while pretending in words to keep the peace, had long ago broken it by his acts, and by aggressions in numberless quarters. If Athens chose to imitate him by keeping the peace in name, let her do so; but at any rate, let her imitate him also by prosecuting a strenuous war in reality.<sup>4</sup> Chersonesus, the ancient possession of Athens, could be protected only by encouraging and reinforcing Diopieithes; Byzantium also was sure to become the next object of Philip's attack, and ought to be preserved, as essential to the interests of

<sup>1</sup> Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 87.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. De Chersoneso, p. 93; Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso p. 87; Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 161.

<sup>3</sup> Epistol. Philipp. l. c.

<sup>4</sup> Philippic iii. p. 112.



Athens, though hitherto the Byzantines had been disaffected towards her. But even these interests, important as they were, must be viewed only as parts of a still more important whole. The Hellenic world altogether was in imminent danger;<sup>1</sup> over-ridden by Philip's prodigious military force; torn in pieces by local factions leaning upon his support; and sinking every day into degradation more irrecoverable. There was no hope of rescue for the Hellenic name except from the energetic and well-directed military action of Athens. She must stand forth in all her might and resolution; her citizens must serve in person, pay direct taxes readily, and forego for the time their festival-fund; when they had thus shown themselves ready to bear the real pinch and hardship of the contest, then let them send round envoys to invoke the aid of other Greeks against the common enemy.<sup>2</sup>

Such, in its general tone, is the striking harangue known as the third Philippic. It appears that the Athenians were now coming round more into harmony with Demosthenes than they had ever been before. They perceived, — what the orator had long ago pointed out, — that Philip went on pushing from one acquisition to another, and became only the more dangerous in proportion as others were quiescent. They were really alarmed for the safety of the two important positions of the Hellespont and Bosphorus. From this time to the battle of Chæroneia, the positive influence of Demosthenes in determining the proceedings of his countrymen, becomes very considerable. He had already been employed several times as envoy, — to Peloponnesus (344–343 B. C.), to Ambrakia, Leukas, Korkyra, the Illyrians, and Thessaly. He now moved, first a mission of envoys to Eubœa, where a plan of operations was probably concerted with Kallias and the Chalkidians, — and subsequently, the despatch of a military force to the same island, against Oreus and Eretria.<sup>3</sup> This expedition, commanded by Phokion, was successful. Oreus and Eretria were liberated; Kleitarchus and Philistides, with the Macedonian troops, were expelled from the island, though both in vain tried to propitiate Athens.<sup>4</sup> Kallias, also, with the Chalkidians of Eubœa, and the Megarians, contributed as auxiliaries to this success.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Philippic iii. p. 118, 119.  
<sup>2</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 252.  
<sup>3</sup> Stephanus Byz. v. Ὀρεός.

<sup>4</sup> Philippic iii. p. 129, 130.  
<sup>5</sup> Diodor. xvi 74

In his proposition, supported by Demosthenes, the attendance and tribute from deputies of the Euboic cities to the synod at Athens, were renounced; and in place of it was constituted an Euboic synod, sitting at Chalkis; independent of, yet allied with, Athens.<sup>1</sup> In this Euboic synod Kallias was the leading man; forward both as a partisan of Athens and as an enemy of Philip. He pushed his attack beyond the limits of Eubœa to the Gulf of Pagasæ, from whence probably came the Macedonian troops who had formed the garrison of Oreus under Philistides. He here captured several of the towns allied with or garrisoned by Philip; together with various Macedonian vessels, the crews of which he sold as slaves. For these successes the Athenians awarded to him a public vote of thanks.<sup>2</sup> He also employed himself (during the autumn and winter of 341–340 B. C.) in travelling as missionary throughout Peloponnesus, to organize a confederacy against Philip. In that mission he strenuously urged the cities to send deputies to a congress at Athens, in the ensuing month Anthesterion (February), 340 B. C. But though he made flattering announcement at Athens of concurrence and support promised to him, the projected congress came to nothing.<sup>3</sup>

While the important success in Eubœa relieved Athens from anxiety on that side, Demosthenes was sent as envoy to the Chersonese and to Byzantium. He would doubtless encourage Diopeithes, and may perhaps have carried to him some reinforcements. But his services were principally useful at Byzantium.

<sup>1</sup> Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. p. 67, 68. Æschines greatly stigmatizes Demosthenes for having deprived the Athenian synod of these important members. But the Eubœan members certainly had not been productive of any good to Athens by their attendance, real or nominal, at her synod, for some years past. The formation of a free Euboic synod probably afforded the best chance of ensuring real harmony between the island and Athens.

Æschines gives here a long detail of allegations, about the corrupt intrigues between Demosthenes and Kallias at Athens. Many of these allegations are impossible to reconcile with what we know of the course of history at the time. We must recollect that Æschines makes the statement eleven years after the events.

<sup>2</sup> Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 159.

<sup>3</sup> Æschines adv. Ktesiph. l. c. Æschines here specifies the month, but not the year. It appears to me that Anthesterion, 340 B. C. (Olymp. 109, 4) is the most likely date; though Böhnecke and others place it a year earlier.



That city had long been badly disposed towards Athens, — from recollections of the Social War, and from jealousy about the dues on corn-ships passing the Bosphorus; moreover, it had been for some time in alliance with Philip; who was now exerting all his efforts to prevail on the Byzantines to join him in active warfare against Athens. So effectively did Demosthenes employ his eloquence at Byzantium, that he frustrated this purpose, overcame the unfriendly sentiment of the citizens, and brought them to see how much it concerned both their interest and their safety to combine with Athens in resisting the farther preponderance of Philip. The Byzantines, together with their allies and neighbors the Perinthians, contracted alliance with Athens. Demosthenes takes just pride in having achieved for his countrymen this success as a statesman and diplomatist, in spite of adverse probabilities. Had Philip been able to obtain the active coöperation of Byzantium and Perinthus, he would have become master of the corn-supply, and probably of the Hellespont also, so that war in those regions would have become almost impracticable for Athens.<sup>1</sup>

As this unexpected revolution in the policy of Byzantium was eminently advantageous to Athens, so it was proportionally mortifying to Philip; who resented it so much, that he shortly afterwards commenced the siege of Perinthus by land and sea,<sup>2</sup> a little before midsummer 340 B. C. He brought up his fleet through the Hellespont into the Propontis, and protected it in its passage, against the attack of the Athenians in the Chersonese,<sup>3</sup> by causing his land-force to traverse and lay waste that peninsula. This was a violation of Athenian territory, adding one more to the already

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 254, 304, 308. βουλόμενος τῆς σιτοπομπίας κύριος γενέσθαι (Philip), παρελθὼν ἐπὶ Θράκης Βυζαντίους συμμαχοῦς ὄντας αὐτῷ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἤξιον συμπολεμεῖν τὸν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πόλεμον, etc.

ἡ μὲν ἐμὴ πολιτεία . . . . ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἔχειν Φίλιππον λαβόντα Βυζάντιον, συμπολεμεῖν τοὺς Βυζαντίους μεθ' ἡμῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν (ἐπισείησεν) . . . . Τίς ὁ κωλύσας τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἀλλοτριωθῆναι κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους; (p. 255.)

Compare Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 90.

That Demosthenes foresaw, several months earlier, the plans of Philip upon Byzantium, is evident from the orations De Chersoneso, p. 93-106, and Philippic iii. p. 115.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 74.

<sup>3</sup> Epistola Philippi ap. Demosth. p. 163.

accumulated causes of war. At the same time, it appears that he now let loose his cruisers against the Athenian merchantmen, many of which he captured and appropriated. These captures, together with the incursions on the Chersonese, served as last additional provocations, working up the minds of the Athenians to a positive declaration of war.<sup>1</sup> Shortly after midsummer 340 B. C., at the beginning of the archonship of Theophrastus, they passed a formal decree<sup>2</sup> to remove the column on which the peace of 346 B. C. stood recorded, and to renew the war openly and explicitly against Philip. It seems probable that this was done while Demosthenes was still absent on his mission at the Hellespont and Bosphorus; for he expressly states that none of the decrees immediately bringing on hostilities were moved by him, but all of them by other citizens;<sup>3</sup> a statement which we may reasonably

<sup>1</sup> That these were the two last causes which immediately preceded and determined the declaration of war, we may see by Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 249 — Καὶ μὴν τὴν εἰρήνην γ' ἐκεῖνος ἔλυσεν τὰ πλοῖα λαβὼν, οὐχ ἡ πόλις, etc.

Ἄλλ' ἐπειδὴ φανερώς ἦδη τὰ πλοῖα ἐσεσβλήτο, Χερρόνησος ἐπορθεῖτο, ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐπορεύεθ' ἀνθρώπος, οὐκέτ' ἐν ἀμφισβητησίμῳ τὰ πράγματα ἦν. ἄλλ' ἐνειστῆκει πόλεμος, etc. (p. 274.)

<sup>2</sup> Philochorus, Frag. 135. ed. Didot; Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum, p. 738-741; Diodorus, xvi. 77. The citation given by Dionysius out of Philochorus is on one point not quite accurate. It states that Demosthenes moved the decisive resolution for declaring war; whereas Demosthenes himself tells us that none of the motions at this juncture were made by him (De Coronâ, p. 250).

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 250. It will be seen that I take no notice of the two decrees of the Athenians, and the letter of Philip, embodied in the oration De Coronâ, p. 249, 250, 251. I have already stated that all the documents which we read as attached to this oration are so tainted either with manifest error or with causes of doubt, that I cannot cite them as authorities in this history, wherever they stand alone. Accordingly, I take no account either of the supposed siege of Selymbria, mentioned in Philip's pretended letter, but mentioned nowhere else — nor of the twenty Athenian ships captured by the Macedonian admiral Amyntas, and afterwards restored by Philip on the remonstrance of the Athenians, mentioned in the pretended Athenian decree moved by Eubulus. Neither Demosthenes, nor Philochorus, nor Diodorus, nor Justin, says anything about the siege of Selymbria, though all of them allude to the attacks on Byzantium and Perinthus. I do not believe that the siege of Selymbria ever occurred. More over, Athenian vessels captured, but afterwards restored by Philip on re



believe, since he would be rather proud than ashamed of such an initiative.

About the same time, as it would appear, Philip on his side, addressed a manifesto and declaration of war to the Athenians. In this paper he enumerated many wrongs done by them to him, and still remaining unredressed in spite of formal remonstrance; for which wrongs he announced his intention of taking a just revenge by open hostilities.<sup>1</sup> He adverted to the seizure, on Macedonian soil, of Nikias his herald carrying despatches; the Athenians (he alleged) had detained this herald as prisoner for ten months and had read the despatches publicly in their assembly. He complained that Athens had encouraged the inhabitants of Thasos, in harboring triremes from Byzantium and privateers from other quarters, to the annoyance of Macedonian commerce. He dwelt on the aggressive proceedings of Diopithes in Thrace, and of Kallias in the Gulf of Pagasæ. He denounced the application made by Athens to the Persians for aid against him, as a departure from Hellenic patriotism, and from the Athenian maxims of aforetime. He alluded to the unbecoming intervention of Athens in defence of the Thracian princes Teres and Kersobleptes, neither of them among the sworn partners in the peace, against him; to the protection conferred by Athens on the inhabitants of Peparethus, whom he had punished for hostilities against his garrison in Halonnesus; to the danger incurred by his

remonstrance from the Athenians, can hardly have been the actual cause of war.

The pretended decrees and letter do not fit the passage of Demosthenes to which they are attached.

<sup>1</sup> Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 165. This Epistle of Philip to the Athenians appears here inserted among the orations of Demosthenes. Some critics reject it as spurious; but I see no sufficient ground for such an opinion. Whether it be the composition of Philip himself, or of some Greek employed in Philip's cabinet, is a point which we have no means of determining.

The oration of Demosthenes which is said to be delivered in reply to this letter of Philip (Orat. xi), is, in my judgment, wrongly described. Not only it has no peculiar bearing on the points contained in the letter — but it must also be two or three months later in date, since it mentions the aid sent by the Persian satraps to Perinthus, and the raising of the siege of that city by Philip (p. 153).

self in sailing up the Hellespont, from the hostilities of the Athenian settlers in the Chersonese, who had cooperated with his enemies the Byzantines, and had rendered it necessary for him to guard the ships by marching a land-force through the Chersonese. He vindicated his own proceedings in aiding his allies the inhabitants of Kardia, complaining that the Athenians had refused to submit their differences with that city to an equitable arbitration. He repelled the Athenian pretensions of right to Amphipolis, asserting his own better right to the place, on all grounds. He insisted especially on the offensive behavior of the Athenians, in refusing, when he had sent envoys conjointly with all his allies, to "conclude a just convention on behalf of the Greeks generally" — "Had you acceded to this proposition (he said), you might have placed out of danger all those who really suspected my purposes, or you might have exposed me publicly as the most worthless of men. It was to the interest of your people to accede, but not to the interest of your orators. To them — as those affirm who know your government best — peace is war, and war, peace; for they always make money at the expense of your generals, either as accusers or as defenders; moreover by reviling in the public assembly your leading citizens at home, and other men of eminence abroad, they acquire with the multitude credit for popular dispositions. It would be easy for me, by the most trifling presents, to silence their invectives and make them trumpet my praises. But I should be ashamed of appearing to purchase your good-will from them."<sup>1</sup>

It is of little moment to verify or appreciate the particular complaints here set forth, even if we had adequate information for the purpose. Under the feeling which had prevailed during the last two years between the Athenians and Philip, we cannot doubt that many detached acts of a hostile character had been committed on their side as well as on his. Philip's allegation — that he had repeatedly proposed to them amicable adjustment of differences — whether true or not, is little to the purpose. It was greatly to his interest to keep Athens at peace and tranquil, while he established his ascendancy everywhere else, and accumu-

<sup>1</sup> Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 159, 164, compare Isokrates, Or. v (Philip.) s. 82.



lated a power for ultimate employment such as she would be unable to resist. The Athenians had at length been made to feel, that farther acquiescence in these proceedings would only ensure to them the amount of favor tendered by Polyphemus to Odysseus — that they should be devoured last. But the lecture which he thinks fit to administer both to them and to their popular orators, is little better than insulting derision. It is strange to read encomiums on peace — as if it were indisputably advantageous to the Athenian public, and as if recommendations of war originated only with venal and calumnious orators for their own profit — pronounced by the greatest aggressor and conqueror of his age, whose whole life was passed in war and in the elaborate organization of great military force; and addressed to a people whose leading infirmity then was, an aversion almost unconquerable to the personal hardships and pecuniary sacrifices of effective war. This passage of the manifesto may probably be intended as a theme for Æschines and the other philippizing partisans in the Athenian assembly.

War was now an avowed fact on both sides. At the instigation of Demosthenes and others, the Athenians decreed to equip a naval force, which was sent under Chares to the Hellespont and Propontis.

Meanwhile Philip brought up to the siege of Perinthus an army of thirty thousand men, and a stock of engines and projectiles such as had never before been seen.<sup>1</sup> His attack on this place was remarkable not only for great bravery and perseverance on both sides, but also for the extended scale of the military operations.<sup>2</sup> Perinthus was strong and defensible; situated on a

<sup>1</sup> How much improvement Philip had made in engines for siege, as a part of his general military organization — is attested in a curious passage of a later author on mechanics. Athenæus, *De Machinis* ap. Auctor. *Mathem. Veter.* p. 3, ed. Paris. — ἐπίδοσιν δὲ ἔλαβεν ἡ τοιαύτη μηχανοποιία ἅπασα κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Διονυσίου τοῦ Σικελιώτου τυραννίδα, κατὰ τε τὴν Φιλίππου τοῦ Ἀννίου βασιλείαν, ὅτε ἐπολιόρκει Βυζαντίου Φίλιππος. Εὐημέρει δὲ τῇ τοιαύτῃ τεχνῇ Πολύεδος ὁ Θεσσαλός, οὗ οἱ μαθηταὶ συνεστρατεύοντο Ἀλεξάνδρῳ.

Respecting the engines employed by Dionysius of Syracuse, see Diodor xiv. 42, 48, 50.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 74–76; Plutarch, *Vit. Alexandri*, c. 70; also *Laconic. Aphegm.* p. 215, and *De Fortuna Alexan.* p. 339.

promontory terminating in abrupt cliffs southward towards the Propontis, unassailable from seaward, but sloping, though with a steep declivity towards the land, with which it was joined by an isthmus of not more than a furlong in breadth. Across this isthmus stretched the outer wall, behind which were seen the houses of the town, lofty, strongly built, and rising one above the other in terraces up the ascent of the promontory. Philip pressed the place with repeated assaults on the outer wall; battering it with rams, undermining it by sap, and rolling up movable towers said to be one hundred and twenty feet in height (higher even than the towers of the Perinthian wall), so as to chase away the defenders by missiles, and to attempt an assault by boarding-planks hand to hand. The Perinthians, defending themselves with energetic valor, repelled him for a long time from the outer wall. At length the besieging engines, with the reiterated attacks of Macedonian soldiers animated by Philip's promises, overpowered this wall, and drove them back into the town. It was found, however, that the town itself supplied a new defensible position to its citizens. The lower range of houses, united by strong barricades across the streets, enabled the Perinthians still to hold out. In spite of all their efforts, however, the town would have shared the fate of Olynthus, had they not been sustained by effective foreign aid. Not only did their Byzantine kinsmen exhaust themselves to furnish every sort of assistance by sea, but also the Athenian fleet, and Persian satraps on the Asiatic side of the Propontis, coöperated. A body of Grecian mercenaries under Apollodorus, sent across from Asia by the Phrygian satrap Arsites, together with ample supplies of stores by sea, placed Perinthus in condition to defy the besiegers.<sup>1</sup>

After a siege which can hardly have lasted less than three months, Philip found all his efforts against Perinthus baffled. He then changed his plan, withdrew a portion of his forces, and suddenly appeared before Byzantium. The walls were strong, but inadequately manned and prepared; much of the Byzantine force being in service at Perinthus. Among several vigorous attacks, Philip contrived to effect a surprise on a dark and stormy

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. ad Philip. *Epistol.* p. 153; Diodor. xvi. 75; Pausanias, i. 29 7.



night, which was very near succeeding. The Byzantines defended themselves bravely, and even defeated his fleet; but they too were rescued chiefly by foreign aid. The Athenians — now acting under the inspirations of Demosthenes, who exhorted them to bury in a generous oblivion all their past grounds of offence against Byzantium — sent a still more powerful fleet to the rescue, under the vigorous guidance of Phokion<sup>1</sup> instead of the loose and rapacious Chares. Moreover the danger of Byzantium called forth strenuous efforts from the chief islanders of the Ægean — Chians, Rhodians, Koans, etc., to whom it was highly important that Philip should not become master of the great passage for imported corn into the Grecian seas. The large combined fleet thus assembled was fully sufficient to protect Byzantium.<sup>2</sup> Compelled to abandon the siege of that city as well as of Perinthus, Philip was farther baffled in an attack on the Chersonese. Phokion not only maintained against him the full security of the Propontis and its adjoining straits, but also gained various advantages over him both by land and sea.<sup>3</sup>

These operations probably occupied the last six months of 340 B. C. They constituted the most important success gained by Athens, and the most serious reverse experienced by Philip, since the commencement of war between them. Coming as they did immediately after the liberation of Eubœa in the previous year, they materially improved the position of Athens against Philip. Phokion and his fleet not only saved the citizens of Byzantium from all the misery of a capture by Macedonian soldiers, but

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 14; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 848–851. To this fleet of Phokion, Demosthenes contributed the outfit of a trireme, while the orator Hyperides sailed with the fleet as trierarch. See Böeckh, Urkunden über das Attische See-Wesen, p. 441, 442, 498. From that source the obscure chronology of the period now before us derives some light; since it becomes certain that the expedition of Chares began during the archonship of Nichomachides; that is, in the year before Midsummer 340 B. C.; while the expedition of Phokion and Kephisophon began in the year following — after Midsummer 340 B. C.

See some anecdotes respecting this siege of Byzantium by Philip, collected from later authors (Dionysius Byzantinus, Hesychius Milesius, and others) by the diligence of Böhnecke — Forschungen, p. 470 seq.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 77; Plutarch, Demosthen. c. 17.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 14.

checked privateering, and protected the trade-ships so efficaciously that corn became unusually abundant and cheap both at Athens and throughout Greece;<sup>1</sup> and Demosthenes, as statesman and diplomatist, enjoyed the credit of having converted Eubœa into a friendly and covering neighbor for Athens, instead of being a shelter for Philip's marauding cruisers — as well as of bringing round Byzantium from the Macedonian alliance to that of Athens, and thus preventing both the Hellespont and the corn-trade from passing into Philip's hands.<sup>2</sup> The warmest votes of thanks, together with wreaths in token of gratitude, were decreed to Athens by the public assemblies of Byzantium, Perinthus, and the various towns of the Chersonese;<sup>3</sup> while the Athenian public assembly also decreed and publicly proclaimed a similar vote of thanks and admiration to Demosthenes. The decree, moved by Aristonikus, was so unanimously popular at the time, that neither Æschines nor any of the other enemies of Demosthenes thought it safe to impeach the mover.<sup>4</sup>

In the recent military operations, on so large a scale, against Byzantium and Perinthus, Philip had found himself in conflict not merely with Athens, but also with Chians, Rhodians and others; an unusually large muster of confederate Greeks. To break up this confederacy, he found it convenient to propose peace, and to abandon his designs against Byzantium and Perinthus — the point on which the alarm of the confederates chiefly turned. By withdrawing his forces from the Propontis, he was enabled to con-

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 255; Plutarch, De Glor. Athen. p. 350.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 305, 306, 307: comp. p. 253. *μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ τοὺς ἀποστόλους πάντας ἀπέστειλα, καθ' οὓς Χερρόνησος ἐσώθη, καὶ Βυζάντιον καὶ πάντες οἱ σύμμαχοι*, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 255, 257. That these votes of thanks were passed, is authenticated by the words of the oration itself. Documents are inserted in the oration, purporting to be the decree of the Byzantines and Perinthians, and that of the Chersonese cities. I do not venture to cite these as genuine, considering how many of the other documents annexed to this oration are decidedly spurious.

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. p. 253. Aristonikus is again mentioned, p. 302. A document appears, p. 253, purporting to be the vote of the Athenians to thank and crown Demosthenes, proposed by Aristonikus. The name of the Athenian archon is wrong, as in all the other documents embodied in this oration, where the name of an Athenian archon appears.



clude peace with the Byzantines and most of the maritime Greeks who had joined in relieving them. The combination against him was thus dissolved, though with Athens<sup>1</sup> and her more intimate allies his naval war still continued. While he multiplied cruisers and privateers to make up by prizes his heavy outlay during the late sieges, he undertook with his land-force an enterprize, during the spring of 339 B. C., against the Scythian king Atheas; whose country, between Mount Hæmus and the Danube, he invaded with success, bringing away as spoil a multitude of youthful slaves of both sexes, as well as cattle. On his return however across Mount Hæmus, he was attacked on a sudden by the Thracian tribe Triballi, and sustained a defeat; losing all his accompanying captives, and being badly wounded through the thigh.<sup>2</sup> This expedition and its consequences occupied Philip during the spring and summer of 339 B. C.

Meanwhile the naval war of Athens against Philip was more effectively carried on, and her marine better organized, than ever it had been before. This was chiefly owing to an important reform proposed and carried by Demosthenes, immediately on the declaration of war against Philip in the summer of 340 B. C. En-

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus (xvi. 77) mentions this peace; stating that Philip raised the sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus, and made peace *πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας τοὺς ἐναντιομένους*.

Wesseling (ad loc.) and Weiske (De Hyperbolé, ii. p. 41) both doubt the reality of this peace. Neither Böhnecke nor Winiewski recognize it. Mr. Clinton admits it in a note to his Appendix 16. p. 292; though he does not insert it in his column of events in the tables.

I perfectly concur with these authors in dissenting from Diodorus, so far as Athens is concerned. The supposition that peace was concluded between Philip and Athens at this time is distinctly negated by the language of Demosthenes (De Coronâ, p. 275, 276); indirectly also by Æschines. Both from Demosthenes and from Philochorus it appears sufficiently clear, in my judgment, that the war between Philip and the Athenians went on without interruption from the summer of 340 B. C., to the battle of Chæroneia in August 338.

But I see no reason for disbelieving Diodorus, in so far as he states that Philip made peace with the other Greeks — Byzantines, Perinthians, Chians, Rhodians, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Justin, ix. 2, 3. Æschines alludes to this expedition against the Scythians during the spring of the archon Theophrastus, or 339 B. C. (Æschines cont. Ktesiph. p. 71).

joying as he did, now after long public experience, the increased confidence of his fellow-citizens, and being named superintendent of the navy,<sup>1</sup> he employed his influence not only in procuring energetic interference both as to Eubœa and Byzantium, but also in correcting deep-seated abuses which nullified the efficiency of the Athenian marine department.

The law of Periander (adopted in 357 B. C.) had distributed the burthen of the trierarchy among the twelve hundred richest citizens on the taxable property-schedule, arranged in twenty fractions called Symmories, of sixty persons each. Among these men, the three hundred richest, standing distinguished, as leaders of the Symmories, were invested with the direction and enforcement of all that concerned their collective agency and duties. The purpose of this law had been to transfer the cost of trierarchy — a sum of about forty, fifty or sixty minæ for each trireme, defraying more or less of the outfit — which had originally been borne by a single rich man as his turn came round, and afterwards by two rich men in conjunction — to a partnership more or less numerous, consisting of five, six, or even fifteen or sixteen members of the same symmory. The number of such partners varied according to the number of triremes required by the state to be fitted out in any one year. If only few triremes were required, sixteen contributors might be allotted to defray collectively the trierarchic cost of each: if on the other hand many triremes were needed, a less number of partners, perhaps no more than five or six, could be allotted to each — since the total number of citizens whose turn it was to be assessed in that particular year was fixed. The assessment upon each partner was of course heavier, in proportion as the number of partners assigned to a trireme was smaller. Each member of the partnership, whether it consisted of five, of six, or of sixteen, contributed in equal proportion towards the cost.<sup>2</sup> The richer members of the partnership thus paid no

<sup>1</sup> Æschines cont. Ktesiph. p. 85. c. 80. *ἐπιστάτης τοῦ ναυτικοῦ*.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 260-262. *ἦν γὰρ αὐτοῖς (τοῖς ἡγεμόσι τῶν συμμοριῶν) ἐκ μὲν τῶν προτέρων νόμων συνεκκαίδεκα λειτουργεῖν — αὐτοῖς μὲν οὐκ ἐπὶ ἀνάγκῃ ἀναλίσκουσιν, τοὺς δ' ἀπόρους τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπιτρέβουσι...* *ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ νόμου τὸ γινόμενον κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἕκαστον τιθεῖται· καὶ οὐκ ἐφάνη τριήραρχος ὁ τῆς μιᾶς ἑκτοῦ καὶ δέκατος πρότερον συντελής· οὐδὲ γὰρ τριήραρχος ἐτι ὠνόμαζον ἑαυτοὺς, ἀλλὰ συντελεῖς.*



greater sum than the poorer; and sometimes even evaded any payment of their own, by contracting with some one to discharge the duties of the post, on condition of a total sum not greater than that which they had themselves collected from these poorer members.

According to Demosthenes, the poorer members of these trierarchic symmories were sometimes pressed down almost to ruin by the sums demanded; so that they complained bitterly, and even planted themselves in the characteristic attitude of suppliants at Munychia or elsewhere in the city. When their liabilities to the state were not furnished in time, they became subject to imprisonment by the officers superintending the outfit of the armament. In addition to such private hardship, there arose great public mischief from the money not being at once forthcoming; the armament being delayed in its departure, and forced to leave Peiræus either in bad condition or without its full numbers. Hence arose in great part, the ill-success of Athens in her maritime enterprises against Philip, before the peace of 346 B. C.<sup>1</sup>

The trierarchy, and the trierarchic symmories, at Athens, are subjects not perfectly known; the best expositions respecting them are to be found in Boeckh's *Public Economy of Athens* (b. iv. ch. 11-13), and in his other work, *Urkunden über das Attische Seewesen* (ch. xi. xii. xiii.); besides Parreidt, *De Symmoriis*, part ii. p. 22, seq.

The fragment of Hyperides (cited by Harpokration v. *Συμμορία*) alluding to the trierarchic reform of Demosthenes, though briefly and obscurely, is an interesting confirmation of the oration *De Corona*.

<sup>1</sup> There is a point in the earlier oration of Demosthenes *De Symmoriis*, illustrating the grievance which he now reformed. That grievance consisted, for one main portion, in the fact, that the richest citizen in a trierarchic partnership paid a sum no greater (sometimes even less) than the poorest. Now it is remarkable that this unfair apportionment of charge might have occurred, and is noway guarded against, in the symmories as proposed by Demosthenes himself. His symmories, each comprising sixty persons or one-twentieth of the total active twelve hundred, are directed to divide themselves into five fractions of twelve persons each, or a hundredth of the twelve hundred. Each group of twelve is to comprise the richest alongside of the poorest members of the sixty (*ἀνταναπληρούντας πρὸς τὸν εὐπορώτατον ἀεὶ τοὺς ἀπορωτάτους*, p. 182), so that each group would contain individuals very unequal in wealth, though the aggregate wealth of one group would be nearly equal to that of another. These twelve persons were to defray collectively the cost of trierarchy for one ship, two ships, or three ships, according to the number of ships which the state might require (p. 183).

The same influences, which had led originally to the introduction of such abuses, stood opposed to the orator in his attempted amendment. The body of Three Hundred, the richest men in the state — the leader or richest individual in each symmory — with those who stood second or third in order of wealth — employed every effort to throw out the proposition, and tendered large bribes to Demosthenes (if we may credit his assertion) as inducements for dropping it. He was impeached moreover under the *Graphê Paranomon*, as mover of an unconstitutional or illegal decree. It required no small share of firmness and public spirit, combined with approved eloquence and an established name, to enable Demosthenes to contend against these mighty enemies.

His new law caused the charge of trierarchy to be levied upon all the members of the symmories, or upon all above a certain minimum of property, in proportion to their rated property; but it seems, if we rightly make out, to have somewhat heightened the minimum, so that the aggregate number of persons chargeable was diminished.<sup>1</sup> Every citizen rated at ten talents was assessed singly for the charge of trierarchy belonging to one trireme; if rated at twenty talents, for the trierarchy of two; at thirty talents, for the trierarchy of three; if above thirty talents, for that of three triremes and a service boat — which was held to be the maximum payable by any single individual. Citizens rated at less than ten talents, were grouped together into ratings of ten talents in the aggregate, in order to bear collectively the trierarchy of one of a trireme; the contributions furnished by

But Demosthenes nowhere points out in what proportions they were to share the expense among them; whether the richest citizens among the twelve were to pay only an equal sum with the poorest, or a sum greater in proportion to their wealth. There is nothing in his project to prevent the richer members from insisting that all should pay equally. This is the very abuse that he denounced afterwards (in 340 B. C.), as actually realized — and corrected by a new law. The oration of Demosthenes *De Symmoriis*, omitting as it does all positive determination as to proportions of payment, helps us to understand how the abuse grew up.

<sup>1</sup> *Æschines* (adv. *Ktesiph.* p. 86) charges Demosthenes with "having stolen away from the city the trierarchs of sixty-five swift sailing vessels." This implies, I imagine, that the new law diminished the total number of persons chargeable with trierarchy.



each person in the group being proportional to the sum for which he stood rated. This new proposition, while materially relieving the poorer citizens, made large addition to the assessments of the rich. A man rated at twenty talents, who had before been chargeable for only the sixteenth part of the expense of one trierarchy, along with partners much poorer than himself but equally assessed — now became chargeable with the entire expense of two trierarchies. All persons liable were assessed in fair proportion to the sum for which they stood rated in the schedule. When the impeachment against Demosthenes came to be tried before the Dikastery, he was acquitted by more than four-fifths of the Dikasts; so that the accuser was compelled to pay the established fine. And so animated was the temper of the public at that moment, in favor of vigorous measures for prosecuting the war just declared, that they went heartily along with him, and adopted the main features of his trierarchic reform. The resistance from the rich, however, though insufficient to throw out the measure, constrained him to modify it more than once, during the progress of the discussion;<sup>1</sup> partly in consequence of the opposition of Æschines, whom he accuses of having been hired by the rich for the purpose.<sup>2</sup> It is deeply to be regretted that the speeches of both

<sup>1</sup> Deinarchus adv Demosthen. p. 95. s. 43. Εἰσὶ τινες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ τῶν ἐν τοῖς τριακοσίοις γεγενημένων, ὃθ' οὕτως (Demosthenes) ἐτίθει τὸν περὶ τῶν τριηράρχων νόμον. Οὐ φράσσετε τοῖς ἡλίσιον ὅτι τρία ταλάντα λαβὼν μετέγραφε καὶ μετεσκεύαζε τὸν νόμον καθ' ἐκάστην ἐκκλησίαν, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπώλει ὡς εἴληφαι τὴν τιμὴν, τὰ δ' ἀποδόμενος οὐκ ἔβεβαιον;

Without accepting this assertion of a hostile speaker, so far as it goes to accuse Demosthenes of having accepted bribes — we may safely accept it, so far as it affirms that he made several changes and modifications in the law before it finally passed, a fact not at all surprising, considering the intense opposition which it called forth.

Some of the Dikasts, before whom Deinarchus was pleading, had been included among the Three Hundred (that is, the richest citizens in the State) when Demosthenes proposed his trierarchic reform. This will show, among various other proofs which might be produced, that the Athenian Dikasts did not always belong to the poorest class of citizens, as the jests of Aristophanes would lead us to believe.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 329. Boeckh (Attisch. Seewesen, p. 183, and Publ. Econ. Ath. iv. 14) thinks that this passage — διτάλαντον δ' εἶχεσθ' ἐρανον δωρεὰν παρὰ τῶν ἡγεμόνων τῶν συμμοριῶν, ἐφ' οἷς ἐλυμήνω τὸν τριηραρχικὸν νόμον — must allude to injury done by Æschines to the law in

of them — especially those of Demosthenes, which must have been numerous — have not been preserved.

Thus were the trierarchic symmories distributed and assessed anew upon each man in the ratio of his wealth, and therefore most largely upon the Three Hundred richest.<sup>1</sup> How long the law remained unchanged, we do not know. But it was found to work admirably well; and Demosthenes boasts that during the entire war (that is, from the renewal of the war about August 340 B. C., to the battle of Chæroneia in August 338 B. C.) all the trierarchs named under the law were ready in time without complaint or suffering; while the ships, well-equipped and exempt from the previous causes of delay, were found prompt and effective for all exigencies. Not one was either left behind, or lost at sea, throughout these two years.<sup>2</sup>

Probably the first fruits of the Demosthenic reform in Athenian naval administration, was, the fleet equipped under Phokion, which acted so successfully at and near Byzantium. The operations of Athenians at sea, though not known in detail, appear to have been better conducted and more prosperous in their general effect than they had ever been since the Social War. But there arose now a grave and melancholy dispute in the interior of Greece, which threw her upon her defence by land. This new disturbing cause was nothing less than another Sacred War, declared by the Amphiktyonic assembly against the Lokrians of Amphissa. Kindled chiefly by the Athenian Æschines, it more than compensated Philip for his repulse at Byzantium and his

later years, after it became a law. But I am unable to see the reason for so restricting its meaning. The rich men would surely bribe most highly, and raise most opposition, against the first passing of the law, as they were then most likely to be successful; and Æschines, whether bribed or not bribed, would most naturally as well as most effectively stand out against the novelty introduced by his rival, without waiting to see it actually become a part of the laws of the State.

<sup>1</sup> See the citation from Hyperides in Harpokrat. v. Συμμορία. The Symmories are mentioned in Inscription xiv. of Boeckh's Urkunden über das Attische Seewesen (p. 465), which Inscription bears the date of 325 B. C. Many of these Inscriptions name individual citizens, in different numbers three, five, or six, as joint trierarchs of the same vessel.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 262.



defeat by the Triballi; bringing, like the former Sacred War, a grandizement to him alone, and ruin to Grecian liberty.

I have recounted, in the fourth volume of this work,<sup>1</sup> the first Sacred War recorded in Grecian history (590–580 B. C.), about two centuries before the birth of Æschines and Demosthenes. That war had been undertaken by the Amphiktyonic Greeks to punish, and ended by destroying, the flourishing sea-port of Kirrha, situated near the mouth of the river Pleistus, on the coast of the fertile plain stretching from the southern declivity of Delphi to the sea. Kirrha was originally the port of Delphi; and of the ancient Phokian town of Krissa, to which Delphi was once an annexed sanctuary.<sup>2</sup> But in process of time Kirrha increased at the expense of both; through profits accumulated from the innumerable visitors by sea who landed there as the nearest access to the temple. The prosperous Kirrhæans, inspiring jealousy at Delphi and Krissa, were accused of extortion in the tolls levied from visitors, as well as of other guilty or offensive proceedings. An Amphiktyonic war, wherein the Athenian Solon stood prominently forward, being declared against them, Kirrha was taken and destroyed. Its fertile plain was consecrated to the Delphian god, under an oath taken by all the Amphiktyonic members, with solemn pledges and formidable imprecations against all disturbers. The entire space between the temple and the sea now became, as the oracle had required, sacred property of the god; that is, incapable of being tilled, planted, or occupied in any permanent way, by man, and devoted only to spontaneous herbage with pasturing animals.

But though the Delphians thus procured the extirpation of their troublesome neighbors at Kirrha, it was indispensable that on or near the same spot there should exist a town and port, for the accommodation of the guests who came from all quarters to Delphi; the more so, as such persons, not merely visitors, but also traders with goods to sell, now came in greater multitudes than ever, from the increased attractions imparted out of the rich

<sup>1</sup> Chap. xxviii. p. 62 sq.

<sup>2</sup> For the topography of the country round Delphi, see the instructive work of Ulrichs, *Reisen und Forschungen in Griechenland* (Bremen, 1840), chapters i. and ii. about Kirrha and Krissa.

spoils of Kirrha itself, to the Pythian festival. How this want was at first supplied, while the remembrance of the oath was yet fresh, we are not informed. But in process of time Kirrha became reoccupied and refortified by the western neighbors of Delphi—the Lokrians of Amphissa—on whose borders it stood, and for whom probably it served as a port not less than for Delphi. These new occupants received the guests coming to the temple, enriched themselves by the accompanying profit and took into cultivation a certain portion of the plain around the town.<sup>1</sup>

At what period the occupation by the Lokrians had its origin, we are unable to say. So much however we make out—not merely from Demosthenes, but even from Æschines—that in their time it was an ancient and established occupation—not a recent intrusion or novelty. The town was fortified; the space immediately adjacent being tilled and claimed by the Lokrians as their own.<sup>2</sup> This indeed was a departure from the oath, sworn by Solon with his Amphiktyonic contemporaries, to consecrate Kirrha and its lands to the Delphian god. But if that oath had been literally carried out, the god himself, and the Delphians among whom he dwelt, would have been the principal losers; because the want of a convenient port would have been a serious discouragement, if not a positive barrier, against the arrival of visitors, most of whom came by sea. Accordingly the renovation of the town and port of Kirrha, doubtless on a modest scale, together with a space of adjacent land for tillage, was at least tolerated, if not encouraged. Much of the plain, indeed, still remained untilled and unplanted, as the property of Apollo; the boundaries being perhaps not accurately drawn.

While the Lokrians had thus been serviceable to the Delphian temple by occupying Kirrha, they had been still more valuable as its foremost auxiliaries and protectors against the Phokians, their enemies of long standing.<sup>3</sup> One of the first objects of Phi-

<sup>1</sup> Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 69; compare Livy, xlii. 5; Pausanias, x. 37, 4. The distance from Delphi to Kirrha is given by Pausanias at sixty stadia, or about seven English miles; by Strabo at eighty stadia.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, l. c.; Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 277. τὴν χώραν ἣν οἱ αὐτοὶ Ἀμφικτυόνες σφῶν αὐτῶν γεωργεῖν ἔφασαν, οὗτος δὲ (Æschines) τῆς ἱερᾶς χώρας ἐνταῦθα εἶναι, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 24; Thucyd. iii. 101.



lomelus the Phokian, after defeating the Lokrian armed force, was to fortify the sacred precinct of Delphi on its western side, against their attacks;<sup>1</sup> and we cannot doubt that their position in close neighborhood to Delphi must have been one of positive suffering as well as of danger, during the years when the Phokian leaders, with their numerous mercenary bands, remained in victorious occupation of the temple, and probably of the harbor of Kirrha also. The subsequent turn of fortune, — when Philip crushed the Phokians and when the Amphiktyonic assembly was reorganized, with him as its chief, — must have found the Amphissian Lokrians among the warmest allies and sympathizers. Resuming possession of Kirrha, they may perhaps have been emboldened, in such a moment of triumphant reaction, to enlarge their occupancy round the walls to a greater extent than they had done before. Moreover they were animated with feelings attached to Thebes; and were hostile to Athens, as the ally and upholder of their enemies the Phokians.

Matters were in this condition when the spring meeting of the Amphiktyonic assembly (February or March 339 B. C.) was held at Delphi. Diognetus was named by the Athenians to attend it as Hieronmemon, or chief legate; with three Pylagoræ or vice-legates, Æschines, Meidias, and Thrasykles.<sup>2</sup> We need hardly believe Demosthenes, when he states that the name of Æschines was put up without foreknowledge on the part of any one; and that though it passed, yet not more than two or three hands were held up in his favor.<sup>3</sup> Soon after they reached Delphi, Diognetus was seized with a fever, so that the task of speaking in the Amphiktyonic assembly was confided to Æschines.

There stood in the Delphian temple some golden or gilt shields dedicated as an offering out of the spoils taken at the battle of Plataea, a century and a half before, — with an inscription to this effect, — "Dedicated by the Athenians, out of the spoils of Persians and Thebans engaged in joint battle against the Greeks." It appears that these shields had recently been set up afresh (having been perhaps stript of their gilding by the Phokian plunderers), in a new cell or chapel, without the full customary

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 25.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 277.

<sup>3</sup> Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 63.

forms of prayer or solemnities;<sup>1</sup> which perhaps might be supposed unnecessary, as the offering was not now dedicated for the first time. The inscription, little noticed and perhaps obscured by the lapse of time on the original shields, would now stand forth brightly and conspicuously on the new gilding; reviving historical recollections highly offensive to the Thebans,<sup>2</sup> and to the Amphissian Lokrians as friends of Thebes. These latter not only remonstrated against it in the Amphiktyonic assembly, but were even preparing (if we are to believe Æschines), to accuse Athens of impiety; and to invoke against her a fine of fifty talents, for omission of the religious solemnities.<sup>3</sup> But this is denied by Demosthenes;<sup>4</sup> who states that the Lokrians could not bring any such accusation against Athens without sending a formal summons, — which they had never sent. Demosthenes would be doubtless right as to the regular form, probably also as to the actual fact; though Æschines accuses him of having received bribes<sup>5</sup> to defend the iniquities of the Lokrians. Whether the Lokrians went so far as to invoke a penalty, or not, — at any rate they spoke in terms of complaint against the proceeding. Such complaint was not without real foundation; since it was better for the common safety of Hellenic liberty against the Macedonian aggressor, that the treason of Thebes at the battle of Plataea should stand as a matter of past antiquity, rather than be republished in a new edition. But this was not the ground taken by the complainants, nor could they directly impeach the right of Athens to burnish up her old donatives. Accordingly they assailed the act on the

<sup>1</sup> This must have been an ἀποκατάστασις τῶν ἀναθημάτων (compare Plutarch, Demetrius, c. 13), requiring to be preceded by solemn ceremonies, sometimes specially directed by the oracle.

<sup>2</sup> How painfully the Thebans of the Demosthenic age felt the recollection of the alliance of their ancestors with the Persians at Plataea, we may read in Demosthenes, De Symmoriis, p. 187.

<sup>3</sup> It appears that the Thebans also had erected a new chapel at Delphi (after 346 B. C.) out of the spoils acquired from the conquered Phokians — ἀπὸ Φωκίων νάδες, ἐν ᾗ οὐσαντο Θεβαῖοι (Diodor. xvii. 10).

<sup>4</sup> Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 70. The words of his speech do not however give either a full or a clear account of the transaction; which I have endeavored, as well as I can, to supply in the text.

<sup>5</sup> Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 277.

<sup>6</sup> Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 69.



allegation of impiety, as not having been preceded by the proper religious solemnities; whereby they obtained the opportunity of inveighing against Athens, as ally of the Phokians in their recent sacrilege, and enemy of Thebes the steadfast champion of the god.

"The Amphiktyons being assembled (I here give the main recital, though not the exact words, of Æschines), a friendly person came to acquaint us that the Amphissians were bringing on their accusation against Athens. My sick colleagues requested me immediately to enter the assembly and undertake her defence. I made haste to comply, and was just beginning to speak, when an Amphissian, — of extreme rudeness and brutality, — perhaps even under the influence of some misguiding divine impulse, — interrupted me and exclaimed, — 'Do not hear him, men of Hellas! Do not permit the name of the Athenian people to be pronounced among you at this holy season! Turn them out of the sacred ground, like men under a curse.' With that he denounced us for our alliance with the Phokians, and poured out many other outrageous invectives against the city.

"To me (continues Æschines) all this was intolerable to hear; I cannot even now think on it with calmness — and at the moment, I was provoked to anger such as I had never felt in my life before. The thought crossed me that I would retort upon the Amphissians for their impious invasion of the Kirrhæan land. That plain, lying immediately below the sacred precinct in which we were assembled, was visible throughout. 'You see, Amphiktyons (said I), that plain cultivated by the Amphissians, with buildings erected in it for farming and pottery! You have before your eyes the harbor, consecrated by the oath of your forefathers, now occupied and fortified. You know of yourselves, without needing witnesses to tell you, that these Amphissians have levied tolls and are taking profit out of the sacred harbor! I then caused to be read publicly the ancient oracle, the oath, and the imprecations (pronounced after the first Sacred War, wherein Kirrha was destroyed). Then continuing, I said — 'Here am I, ready to defend the god and the sacred property, according to the oath of our forefathers, with hand, foot, voice, and all the powers that I possess. I stand prepared to clear my own city of her obligations to the gods as you take counsel forthwith for

yourselves. You are here about to offer sacrifice and pray to the gods for good things, publicly and individually. Look well then, — where will you find voice, or soul, or eyes, or courage, to pronounce such supplications, if you permit these accursed Amphissians to remain unpunished, when they have come under the imprecations of the recorded oath? Recollect that the oath distinctly proclaims the sufferings awaiting all impious transgressors, and even menaces those who tolerate their proceedings, by declaring, — They who do not stand forward to vindicate Apollo, Artemis, Latona, and Athênê Pronæa, may not sacrifice undefiled or with favorable acceptance.' "

Such is the graphic and impressive description,<sup>1</sup> given by Æschines himself some years afterwards to the Athenian assembly, of his own address to the Amphiktyonic meeting in spring 339 B. C.; on the lofty sight of the Delphian Pylæa, with Kirrha and its plain spread out before his eyes, and with the ancient oath and all its fearful imprecations recorded on the brass plate hard by, readable by every one. His speech, received with loud shouts, roused violent passion in the bosoms of the Amphiktyons, as well as of the hearers assembled round. The audience at Delphi was not like that of Athens. Athenian citizens were accustomed to excellent oratory, and to the task of balancing opposite arguments: though susceptible of high-wrought intellectual excitement — admiration or repugnance as the case might be — they discharged it all in the final vote, and then went home to their private affairs. But to the comparatively rude men at Delphi, the speech of a first-rate Athenian orator was a rarity. When Æschines, with great rhetorical force, unexpectedly revived in their imaginations the ancient and terrific history of the curse of Kirrha<sup>2</sup> — assisted by all the force of visible and local association — they were worked up to madness; while in such minds as theirs, the emotion raised would not pass off by simple voting, but required to be discharged by instant action.

<sup>1</sup> Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 70.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 277. ὡς δὲ τὸ τῆς πόλεως ἄξιωμα λαβὼν (Æschines) ἀφικέτο εἰς τοὺς Ἀμφικτύοντας, πᾶσι τὰ τάλλ' ἀφείξαι καὶ παρὶδὼν ἐπεραινεν ἐφ' οἷς ἐμισθώθη, καὶ λόγους εὐπροσώπους καὶ μύθους, ὅθεν ἡ Κιρραία χώρα καθιερώθη, συνθεῖς καὶ διεξεληθὼν, ἀνθρώπους ἀπειρούς λόγῳ καὶ τὸ μέλλον οὐ προορωμένους, τοὺς Ἀμφικτύοντας, πείθει ψηφισασθαι εἰς



How intense and ungovernable that emotion became, is shown by the monstrous proceedings which followed. The original charge of impiety brought against Athens, set forth by the Amphissian speaker coarsely and ineffectively, and indeed noway lending itself to exaggeration — was now altogether forgotten in the more heinous impiety of which Æschines had accused the Amphissians themselves. About the necessity of punishing them, there was but one language. The Amphissian speakers appear to have fled — since even their persons would hardly have been safe amidst such an excitement. And if the day had not been already far advanced, the multitude would have rushed at once down from the scene of debate to Kirrha.<sup>1</sup> On account of the lateness of the hour, a resolution was passed which the herald formally proclaimed, — That on the morrow at day-break, the whole Delphian population, of sixteen years and upwards, freemen as well as slaves, should muster at the sacrificing place, provided with spades and pickaxes: That the assembly of Amphiktyonic legates would there meet them, to act in defence of the god and the sacred property: That if there were any city whose deputies did not appear, it should be excluded from the temple, and proclaimed unholy and accursed.<sup>2</sup>

At day-break, accordingly, the muster took place. The Delphian multitude came with their implements for demolition: — the Amphiktyons with Æschines placed themselves at the head: — and all marched down to the port of Kirrha. Those there resident — probably astounded and terrified at so furious an inroad from an entire population with whom, a few hours before, they had been on friendly terms — abandoned the place without resistance, and ran to acquaint their fellow-citizens at Amphissa. The Amphiktyons with their followers then entered Kirrha, demolished all the harbor-conveniences, and even set fire to the houses in the town. This Æschines himself tells us; and we may be very sure (though he does not tell us) that the multitude

Æschin. adv. Ktesiph. p. 70. κραυγή πολλή καὶ θόρυβος ἦν τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων, καὶ λόγος ἦν οὐκέτι περὶ τῶν ἀσπίδων ἅς ἡμεῖς ἀνέθεμεν, ἀλλ' ἡδὴ περὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀμφισσέων τιμωρίας. Ἦδη δὲ πῶρῳ τῆς ἡμέρας οὐσης, προελθὼν ἐκέρυξ, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 71

thus set on were not contented with simply demolishing, but plundered and carried away whatever they could lay hands on. Presently, however, the Amphissians, whose town was on the high ground about seven or eight miles west of Delphi, apprised of the destruction of their property and seeing their houses in flames, arrived in haste to the rescue, with their full-armed force. The Amphiktyons and the Delphian multitude were obliged in their turn to evacuate Kirrha, and hurry back to Delphi at their best speed. They were in the greatest personal danger. According to Demosthenes, some were actually seized; but they must have been set at liberty almost immediately.<sup>1</sup> None were put to death; an escape which they probably owed to the respect borne by the Amphissians, even under such exasperating circumstances, to the Amphiktyonic function.

On the morning after this narrow escape, the president, a Thesalian of Pharsalus, named Kottyphus, convoked a full Amphiktyonic Ekklesia; that is, not merely the Amphiktyons proper, or the legates and co-legates deputed from the various cities, — but also, along with them, the promiscuous multitude present for pur-

Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 277. According to the second decree of the Amphiktyons cited in this oration (p. 278), some of the Amphiktyons were wounded. But I concur with Droysen, Franke, and others, in disputing the genuineness of these decrees; and the assertion, that some of the Amphiktyons were wounded, is one among the grounds for disputing it: for if such had been the fact, Æschines could hardly have failed to mention it; since it would have suited exactly the drift and purpose of his speech.

Æschines is by far the best witness for the proceedings at this spring meeting of the Amphiktyons. He was not only present, but the leading person concerned; if he makes a wrong statement, it must be by design. But if the facts as stated by Æschines are at all near the truth, it is hardly possible that the two decrees cited in Demosthenes can have been the real decrees passed by the Amphiktyons. The substance of what was resolved, as given by Æschines, pp. 70, 71, is materially different from the first decree quoted in the oration of Demosthenes, p. 278. There is no mention, in the latter, of those vivid and prominent circumstances — the summoning of all the Delphians, freemen and slaves above sixteen years of age, with spades and mattocks — the exclusion from the temple, and the cursing, of any city which did not appear to take part.

The compiler of those decrees appears to have had only Demosthenes before him, and to have known nothing of Æschines. Of the violent proceedings of the Amphiktyons, both provoked and described by Æschines Demosthenes says nothing.



pose of sacrifice and consultation of the oracle. Loud and indignant were the denunciations pronounced in this meeting against the Amphisians; while Athens was eulogized as having taken the lead in vindicating the rights of Apollo. It was finally resolved that the Amphisians should be punished as sinners against the god and the sacred domain, as well as against the Amphiktyons personally; that the legates should now go home, to consult each his respective city; and that as soon as some positive resolution for executory measures could be obtained, each should come to a special meeting, appointed at Thermopylæ for a future day,—seemingly not far distant, and certainly prior to the regular season of autumnal convocation.

Thus was the spark applied, and the flame kindled, of a second Amphiktyonic war, between six and seven years after the conclusion of the former in 346 B. C. What has been just recounted comes to us from Æschines, himself the witness as well as the incendiary. We here judge him, not from accusations preferred by his rival Demosthenes, but from his own depositions; and from facts which he details not simply without regret, but with a strong feeling of pride. It is impossible to read them without becoming sensible of the profound misfortune which had come over the Grecian world; since the unanimity or dissidence of its component portions were now determined, not by political congresses at Athens or Sparta, but by debates in the religious convocation at Delphi and Thermopylæ. Here we have the political sentiment of the Amphisian Lokrians,—their sympathy for Thebes, and dislike to Athens,—dictating complaint and invective against the Athenians on the allegation of impiety. Against every one, it was commonly easy to find matter for such an allegation, if parties were on the look-out for it; while defence was difficult, and the fuel for kindling religious antipathy all at the command of the accuser. Accordingly Æschines troubles himself little with the defence, but plants himself at once on the vantage-ground of the accuser, and retorts the like charge of impiety against the Amphisians, on totally different allegations. By superior oratory, as well as by the appeal to an ancient historical fact of a character peculiarly terror-striking, he exasperates the Amphiktyons to a pitch of religious ardor, in vindication of the god, such as to make them disdain alike the suggestions either of social justice or of

political prudence. Demosthenes—giving credit to the Amphiktyons for something like the equity of procedure, familiar to Athenian ideas and practice—affirmed that no charge against Athens could have been made before them by the Lokrians, because no charge would be entertained without previous notice given to Athens. But Æschines, when accusing the Lokrians,—on a matter of which he had given no notice, and which it first crossed his mind to mention at the moment when he made his speech<sup>1</sup>—found these Amphiktyons so inflammable in their religious antipathies, that they forthwith call out and head the Delphian mob armed with pickaxes for demolition. To evoke, from a far-gone and half-forgotten past, the memory of that fierce religious feud, for the purpose of extruding established proprietors, friends and defenders of the temple, from an occupancy wherein they rendered essential service to the numerous visitors of Delphi—to execute this purpose with brutal violence, creating the maximum of exasperation in the sufferers, endangering the lives of the Amphiktyonic legates, and raising another Sacred War pregnant with calamitous results—this was an amount of mischief such as the bitterest enemy of Greece could hardly have surpassed. The prior imputations of irreligion, thrown out by the Lokrian orator against Athens, may have been futile and malicious; but the retort of Æschines was far worse, extending as well as embittering the poison of pious discord, and plunging the Amphiktyonic assembly in a contest from which there was no exit except by the sword of Philip.

Some comments on this proceeding appeared requisite, partly because it is the only distinct matter known to us, from an actual witness, respecting the Amphiktyonic council—partly from its ruinous consequences, which will presently appear. At first, indeed, these consequences did not manifest themselves; and when Æschines returned to Athens, he told his story to the satisfaction of the people. We may presume that he reported the proceedings at the time in the same manner as he stated them afterwards, in the oration now preserved. The Athenians, indignant at the accusation brought by the Lokrians against Athens, were dispos-

<sup>1</sup> Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 70. ἐπὶ τῇ δ' οὖν μοι ἐπὶ τὴν γυναικὸν μνησθῆναι τῆς τῶν Ἀμφισσέων περὶ τὴν γῆν τὴν ἱερὰν ἀσεβείας, etc.



ed to take part in that movement of pious enthusiasm which Æschines had kindled on the subject of Kirrha, pursuant to the ancient oath sworn by their forefathers.<sup>1</sup> So forcibly was the religious point of view of this question thrust upon the public mind, that the opposition of Demosthenes was hardly listened to. He laid open at once the consequences of what had happened, saying — "Æschines, you are bringing war into Attica — an Amphiktyonic war." But his predictions were cried down as allusions or mere manifestations of party feeling against a rival.<sup>2</sup> Æschines denounced him openly as the hired agent of the impious Lokrians;<sup>3</sup> a charge sufficiently refuted by the conduct of these Lokrians themselves, who are described by Æschines as gratuitously insulting Athens.

But though the general feeling at Athens, immediately after the return of Æschines, was favorable to his proceedings at Delphi, it did not long continue so. Nor is the change difficult to understand. The first mention of the old oath, and the original devastation of Kirrha, sanctioned by the name and authority of Solon, would naturally turn the Athenian mind into a strong feeling of pious sentiment against the tenants of that accursed spot. But farther information would tend to prove that the Lokrians were more sinned against than sinning; that the occupation of Kirrha as a harbor was a convenience to all Greeks, and most of all to the temple itself; lastly, that the imputations said to have been cast by the Lokrians upon Athens had either never been made at all (so we find Demosthenes affirming), or were nothing worse than an unauthorized burst of ill-temper from some rude individual. — Though Æschines had obtained at first a vote of approbation for his proceedings, yet when his proposition came to be made — that Athens should take part in the special Amphiktyonic meeting convened for punishing the Amphisians — the opposition of Demosthenes was found more effective. Both the Senate and

<sup>1</sup> Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 71. καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἡμῶν ἀποδεξαμένον τοῦ δήμου, καὶ τῆς πόλεως πάσης προαιρουμένης εὐσεβεῖν, etc. Οὐκ ἐγὼ (Demosthenes) μεμνήσθαι τῶν ὀρκῶν, οὓς οἱ πρόγονοι ὤμοσαν, οὐδὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδὲ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ μαντείας.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 275.

<sup>3</sup> Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 69–71.

the public assembly passed a resolution peremptorily forbidding all interference on the part of Athens at that special meeting. "The Hieromnemon and the Pylagoræ of Athens (so the decree prescribed) shall take no part either in word or deed or resolution, with the persons assembled at that special meeting. They shall visit Delphi and Thermopylæ at the regular times fixed by our forefathers." This important decree marks the change of opinion at Athens. Æschines indeed tells us, that it was only procured by crafty manœuvre on the part of Demosthenes; being hurried through in a thin assembly, at the close of business, when most citizens (and Æschines among them) had gone away. But there is nothing to confirm such insinuations; moreover Æschines, if he had still retained the public sentiment in his favor, could easily have baffled the tricks of his rival.<sup>1</sup>

The special meeting of Amphiktyons at Thermopylæ accordingly took place, at some time between the two regular periods of spring and autumn. No legates attended from Athens — nor any from Thebes; a fact made known to us by Æschines, and remarkable as evincing an incipient tendency towards concurrence, such as had never existed before, between these two important cities. The remaining legates met, determined to levy a joint force for the purpose of punishing the Amphisians, and chose the president Kottyphus general. According to Æschines, this force was brought together, marched against the Lokrians, and reduced them to submission, but granted to them indulgent terms; requiring from them a fine to the Delphian god, payable at stated intervals — sentencing some of the Lokrian leaders to banishment as having instigated the encroachment on the sacred domain — and recalling others who had opposed it. But the Lokrians (he says), after the force had retired, broke faith, paid nothing, and brought back all the guilty leaders. Demosthenes, on the contrary, states, that Kottyphus summoned contingents from the various Amphiktyonic states; but some never came at all, while those that did come were lukewarm and inefficient; so that the purpose altogether miscarried.<sup>2</sup> The account of Demosthenes is the more probable of the two: for we know from Æschines himself that neither

<sup>1</sup> Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 71.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 277; Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 72.



Athens nor Thebes took part in the proceeding, while Sparta had been excluded from the Amphiktyonic council in 346 B. C. There remained therefore only the secondary and smaller states. Of these, the Peloponnesians, even if inclined, could not easily come, since they could neither march by land through Boeotia, nor come with ease by sea while the Amphissians were masters of the port of Kirrha; and the Thessalians and their neighbors were not likely to take so intense an interest in the enterprize as to carry it through without the rest. Moreover, the party who were only waiting for a pretext to invite the interference of Philip, would rather prefer to do nothing, in order to show how impossible it was to act without him. Hence we may fairly assume that what Æschines represents as indulgent terms granted to the Lokrians and afterwards violated by them, was at best nothing more than a temporary accommodation; concluded because Kottyphus could not do anything — probably did not wish to do anything — without the intervention of Philip.

The next Pylæa, or the autumnal meeting of the Amphiktyons at Thermopylæ, now arrived; yet the Lokrians were still unsubdued. Kottyphus and his party now made the formal proposition to invoke the aid of Philip. "If you do not consent (they told the Amphiktyons<sup>1</sup>), you must come forward personally in force, subscribe ample funds, and fine all defaulters. Choose which you prefer." The determination of the Amphiktyons was taken to invoke the interference of Philip; appointing him commander of the combined force, and champion of the god, in the new Sacred War, as he had been in the former.

At the autumnal meeting,<sup>2</sup> where this fatal measure of calling

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 277, 278.

<sup>2</sup> The chronology of the events here recounted has been differently conceived by different authors. According to my view, the first motion raised by Æschines against the Amphissian Lokrians, occurred in the spring meeting of the Amphiktyons at Delphi in 339 B. C. (the year of the archon Theophrastus at Athens); next, there was held a special or extraordinary meeting of Amphiktyons, and a warlike manifestation against the Lokrians; after which came the regular autumnal meeting at Thermopylæ (B. C. 339—September—the year of the archon Lysimachides at Athens), where the vote was passed to call in the military interference of Philip.

This chronology does not, indeed, agree with the two so-called decrees of

in Philip was adopted, legates from Athens were doubtless present (Æschines among them), according to usual custom; for the decree of Demosthenes had enacted that the usual custom should be followed, though it had forbidden the presence of legates at the special or extraordinary meeting. Æschines<sup>1</sup> was not backward in advocating the application to Philip; nor indeed could he take any other course, consistently with what he had done at the preceding spring meeting. He himself only laments that Athens suffered herself to be deterred, by the corrupt suggestions of Demosthenes, from heading the crusade against Amphissa, when the

the Amphiktyons, and with the documentary statement — Ἀρχῶν Μνησιθείδης, Ἀνθεστηριῶνος ἐκτῇ ἐπὶ δέλῳ — which we read as incorporated in the oration De Coronâ, p. 279. But I have already stated that I think these documents spurious.

The archon Mnesitheides (like all the other archons named in the documents recited in the oration De Coronâ) is a wrong name, and cannot have been quoted from any genuine document. Next, the first decree of the Amphiktyons is not in harmony with the statement of Æschines, himself the great mover, of what the Amphiktyons really did. Lastly, the second decree plainly intimates that the person who composed the two decrees conceived the nomination of Philip to have taken place in the very same Amphiktyonic assembly as the first movement against the Lokrians. The same words, ἐπὶ τέρῳ Κλειναγόρου, ἐαρινῆς πύλαιας —, prefixed to both decrees, must be understood to indicate the same assembly. Mr. Clinton's supposition that the first decree was passed at the spring meeting of 339 B. C. — and the second at the spring meeting of 338 B. C. — Kleinagoras being the eponymus in both years — appears to me nowise probable. The special purpose and value of an eponymus would disappear, if the same person served in that capacity for two successive years. Boeckh adopts the conjecture of Reiske, altering ἐαρινῆς πύλαιας in the second decree into ἰππωαινῆς πύλαιας. This would bring the second decree into better harmony with chronology; but there is nothing in the state of the text to justify such an innovation. Böhnecke (Forsch. p. 498–508) adopts a supposition yet more improbable. He supposes that Æschines was chosen Pylagoras at the beginning of the Attic year 340–339 B. C., and that he attended first at Delphi at the autumnal meeting of the Amphiktyons 340 B. C.; that he there raised the violent storm which he himself describes in his speech; and that he afterwards, at the subsequent spring meeting, came both the two decrees which we now read in the oration De Coronâ. But the first of these two decrees can never have come after the outrageous proceeding described by Æschines. I will add, that in the form of decree, the president Kottyphus is called an Arcadian; whereas Æschines designates him as a Pharsalian.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 278.



gods themselves had singled her out for that pious duty.<sup>1</sup> What part Thebes took in the nomination of Philip, or whether her legates attended at the autumnal Amphiktyonic meeting, we do not know. But it is to be remembered that one of the twelve Amphiktyonic double suffrages now belonged to the Macedonians themselves; while many of the remaining members had become dependent on Macedonia — the Thessalians, Phthiot Achæans, Perrhæbians, Dolopians, Magnetes, etc.<sup>2</sup> It was probably not very difficult for Kottyphus and Æschines to procure a vote investing Philip with the command. Even those who were not favorable might dread the charge of impiety if they opposed it.

During the spring and summer of this year 339 B. C. (the interval between the two Amphiktyonic meetings), Philip had been engaged in his expedition against the Scythians, and in his battle, while returning, against the Triballi, wherein he received the severe wound already mentioned. His recovery from this wound was completed, when the Amphiktyonic vote, conferring upon him the command, was passed. He readily accepted a mission which his partisans, and probably his bribes, had been mainly concerned in procuring. Immediately collecting his forces, he marched southward through Thessaly and Thermopylæ, proclaiming his purpose of avenging the Delphian god upon the unholy Lokrians of Amphissa. The Amphiktyonic deputies, and the Amphiktyonic contingents in greater or less numbers, accompanied his march. In passing through Thermopylæ, he took Nikæa (one of the towns most essential to the security of the pass) from the Thebans, in whose hands it had remained since his conquest of Phokis in 346 B. C., though with a Macedonian garrison sharing in the occupation.<sup>3</sup> Not being yet assured of the concurrence of the Thebans in his farther projects, he thought it safer to consign this impor-

<sup>1</sup> Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 72. . . τῶν μὲν θεῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς εὐσεβείας ἡμῖν παραδεδωκότων, τῆς δὲ Δημοσθένους δωροδοκίας ἐμποδῶν γεγενημένης.

<sup>2</sup> See Isokrates, Orat. V. (Philipp.) s. 22, 23.

<sup>3</sup> Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 73. ἐπεὶ δὲ Φίλιππος αὐτῶν ἀφελόμενος Νίκαιαν Θετταλοῖς παρέδωκε, etc.

Compare Demosthen. ad Philipp. Epistol. p. 153. ὑποπτεύεται δὲ ὑπὸ Θεβαίων Νικαίαν μὲν φρουρὰν κατέχων, etc.

tant town to the Thessalians, who were thoroughly in his dependence.

His march from Thermopylæ, whether to Delphi and Amphissa, or into Bœotia, lay through Phokis. That unfortunate territory still continued in the defenceless condition to which it had been condemned by the Amphiktyonic sentence of 346 B. C., without a single fortified town, occupied merely by small dispersed villages and by a population scanty as well as poor. On reaching Elateia, once the principal Phokian town, but now dismantled, Philip halted his army, and began forthwith to reestablish the walls, converting it into a strong place for permanent military occupation. He at the same time occupied Kytinium,<sup>1</sup> the principal town in the little territory of Doris, in the upper portion of the valley of the river Kephissus, situated in the short mountain road from Thermopylæ to Amphissa.

The seizure of Elateia by Philip, coupled with his operations for reconstituting it as a permanent military post, was an event of the gravest moment, exciting surprise and uneasiness throughout a large portion of the Grecian world. Hitherto he had proclaimed himself as general acting under the Amphiktyonic vote of nomination, and as on his march simply to vindicate the Delphian god against sacrilegious Lokrians. Had such been his real purpose, however, he would have had no occasion to halt at Elateia, much less to re-fortify and garrison it. Accordingly it now became evident that he meant something different — or at least something ulterior. He himself indeed no longer affected to conceal his real purposes. Sending envoys to Thebes, he announced that he had come to attack the Athenians, and earnestly invited her cooperation as his ally, against enemies odious to her as well as to himself. But if the Thebans, in spite of an excellent opportunity to crush an ancient foe, should still determine to stand aloof — he claimed of them at least a free passage through Bœotia, that he might invade Attica with his own forces.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Philochorus ap. Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum, p. 742

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 293-299. Justin, ix. 3, "diu dissimulatum bellum Atheniensibus infert." This expression is correct in the sense, that Philip, who had hitherto pretended to be on his march against Amphissa, disclosed his real purpose to be against Athens at the moment when he



The relations between Athens and Thebes at this moment were altogether unfriendly. There had indeed been no actual armed conflict between them since the conclusion of the Sacred War in 346 B. C. Yet the old sentiment of enmity and jealousy, dating from earlier days and aggravated during that war, still continued unabated. To soften this reciprocal dislike, and to bring about co-operation with Thebes, had always been the aim of some Athenian politicians — Eubulus — Aristophon — and Demosthenes himself, whom Æschines tries to discredit as having been complimented and corrupted by the Thebans.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, in spite of various visits and embassies to Thebes, where a philo-Athenian minority also subsisted, nothing had ever been accomplished.<sup>2</sup> The enmity still remained, and had been even artificially aggravated (if we are to believe Demosthenes<sup>3</sup>) during the six months which elapsed since the breaking out of the Amphissian quarrel, by Æschines and the partisans of Philip in both cities.

The ill-will subsisting between Athens and Thebes at the moment when Philip took possession of Elateia, was so acknowledged, that he had good reason for looking upon confederacy of the two against him as impossible.<sup>4</sup> To enforce the request, that Thebes, already his ally, would continue to act as such at this critical juncture, he despatched thither envoys not merely Macedonian, but also Thessalian, Dolopian, Phthiot Achæan, Ætolian, and Ænians — the Amphiktyonic allies who were now accompanying his march.<sup>5</sup>

If such were the hopes, and the reasonable hopes, of Philip, we may easily understand how intense was the alarm among the

seized Elateia. Otherwise, he had been at open war with Athens, ever since the sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus in the preceding year.

<sup>1</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46, 47.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 73; Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 281.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 276, 281, 284. 'Ἀλλ' ἐκείσε ἐπάνειμι, ὅτι τὸν ἐν Ἀμφίσσῃ πόλεμον τούτου (Æschines) μὲν ποιήσαντος, συμπεραναμένων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συνέργων αὐτοῦ τὴν πρὸς Θηβαίους ἐχθρὰν, συνέβη τὸν Φίλιππον ἐλθεῖν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς, οὐπὲρ ἕνεκα τῆς πόλεως οὗτοι συνέκρουον, etc. Οὕτω μέγα πῶρρω προήγαγον οὗτοι τὴν ἐχθρὰν.

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ — ἦκεν ἔχων (Philip) τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάτε-  
ραν κατέλαβεν, ὥς οὐδ' ἂν εἰ τι γένοιτο ἐτι συμπνευσάντων ἂν ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν  
Θηβαίων.

<sup>5</sup> Philochorus ap. Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum, Γ 742

Athenians, when they first heard of the occupation of Elateia. Should the Thebans comply, Philip would be in three days on the frontier of Attica; and from the sentiment understood as well as felt to be prevalent, the Athenians could not but anticipate, that free passage, and a Theban reinforcement besides, would be readily granted. Ten years before, Demosthenes himself (in his first Olynthiac) had asserted that the Thebans would gladly join Philip in an attack on Attica.<sup>1</sup> If such was then the alienation, it had been increasing rather than diminishing ever since. As the march of Philip had hitherto been not merely rapid, but also understood as directed towards Delphi and Amphissa, the Athenians had made no preparations for the defence of their frontier. Neither their families nor their movable property had yet been carried within walls. Nevertheless they had now to expect, within little more than forty-eight hours, an invading army as formidable and desolating as any of those during the Peloponnesian war, under a commander far abler than Archidamus or Agis.<sup>2</sup>

Though the general history of this important period can be made out only in outline, we are fortunate enough to obtain from Demosthenes a striking narrative, in some detail, of the proceedings at Athens immediately after the news of the capture of Elateia by Philip. It was evening when the messenger arrived, just at the time when the prytanes (or senators of the presiding tribe) were at supper in their official residence. Immediately breaking up their meal, some ran to call the generals whose duty it was to convoke the public assembly, with the trumpeter who gave public notice thereof; so that the Senate and assembly were convoked for the next morning at day-break. Others bestirred themselves in clearing out the market-place, which was full of booths and stands, for traders selling merchandize. They even set fire to these booths, in their hurry to get the space clear. Such was the excitement and terror throughout the city, that the public assembly was crowded at the earliest dawn, even before the

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 16. 'Ἄν δ' ἐκεῖνα Φίλιππος λάβῃ, τίς αὐτὸν κωλύσει δεῦρο βαδίζειν; Θηβαῖοι; οἱ, εἰ μὴ λίαν πικρὸν εἰπεῖν, καὶ συνεισβαλοῦσι ἐτοίμως.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 304. ἡ γὰρ ἐμὴ πολιτεία, ἥς οὗτος (Æschines) κατηγορεῖ, ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ Θηβαίους μετὰ Φίλιππου συνεμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν χώραν, δὲ πάντες φοντο, μεθ' ἡμῶν παραταξαμένους ἐκείνον κωλύειν ἐποίησεν, etc.



Senate could go through their forms and present themselves for the opening ceremonies. At length the Senate joined the assembly, and the prytanes came forward to announce the news, producing the messenger with his public deposition. The herald then proclaimed the usual words — "Who wishes to speak?" Not a man came forward. He proclaimed it again and again; yet still no one rose.

At length, after a considerable interval of silence, Demosthenes rose to speak. He addressed himself to that alarming conviction which beset the minds of all, though no one had yet given it utterance — that the Thebans were in hearty sympathy with Philip. "Suffer not yourselves (he said) to believe any such thing. If the fact had been so, Philip would have been already on your frontier, without halting at Elateia. He has a large body of partisans at Thebes, procured by fraud and corruption; but he has not the whole city. There is yet a considerable Theban party, adverse to him and favorable to you. It is for the purpose of emboldening his own partisans in Thebes, overawing his opponents, and thus extorting a positive declaration from the city in his favor — that he is making display of his force at Elateia. And in this he will succeed, unless you, Athenians, shall exert yourselves vigorously and prudently in counteraction. If you, acting on your old aversion towards Thebes, shall now hold aloof, Philip's partisans in the city will become all-powerful, so that the whole Theban force will march along with him against Attica. For your own security, you must shake off these old feelings, however well-grounded — and stand forward for the protection of Thebes, as being in greater danger than yourselves. March forth your entire military strength to the frontier, and thus embolden your partisans in Thebes, to speak out openly against their philippizing opponents who rely upon the army at Elateia. Next, send ten envoys to Thebes; giving them full powers, in conjunction with the generals, to call in your military force whenever they think fit. Let your envoys demand neither concessions nor conditions from the Thebans; let them simply tender the full force of Athens to assist the Thebans in their present straits. If the offer be accepted, you will have secured an ally inestimable for your own safety, while acting with a generosity worthy of Athens; if it be refused, the Thebans will have themselves to

blame, and you will at least stand unimpeached on the score of honor as well as of policy."<sup>1</sup>

The recommendation of Demosthenes, alike wise and generous, was embodied in a decree and adopted by the Athenians without opposition.<sup>2</sup> Neither Æschines, nor any one else, said a word

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 286, 287; Diodor. xvi. 84. I have given the substance, in brief, of what Demosthenes represents himself to have said.

<sup>2</sup> This decree, or a document claiming to be such, is given *verbatim* in Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 289, 290. It bears date on the 16th of the month Skirrophorion (June), under the archonship of Nausikles. This archon is a wrong or pseud-eponymous archon: and the document, to say nothing of its verbosity, implies that Athens was now about to pass out of pacific relations with Philip, and to begin war against him — which is contrary to the real fact.

There also appear inserted, a few pages before, in the same speech (p. 282), four other documents, purporting to relate to the time immediately preceding the capture of Elateia by Philip. 1. A decree of the Athenians, dated in the month Elaphebolion of the archon *Heropythus*. 2. Another decree, in the month Munychion of the same archon. 3. An answer addressed by Philip to the Athenians. 4. An answer addressed by Philip to the Thebans.

Here again, the archon called *Heropythus* is a wrong and unknown archon. Such manifest error of date would alone be enough to preclude me from trusting the document as genuine. Droysen is right, in my judgment, in rejecting all these five documents as spurious. The answer of Philip to the Athenians is adapted to the two decrees of the Athenians, and cannot be genuine if they are spurious.

These decrees, too, like that dated in Skirrophorion, are not consistent with the true relations between Athens and Philip. They imply that she was at peace with him, and that hostilities were first undertaken against him by her after his occupation of Elateia, whereas open war had been prevailing between them for more than a year, ever since the summer of 340 B. C., and the maritime operations against him in the Propontis. That the war was going on without interruption during all this period — that Philip could not get near to Athens to strike a blow at her and close the war, except by bringing the Thebans and Thessalians into coöperation with him — and that for the attainment of this last purpose, he caused the Amphissian war to be kindled, through the corrupt agency of Æschines — is the express statement of Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 275, 276. Hence I find it impossible to believe in the authenticity either of the four documents here quoted, or of this supposed very long decree of the Athenians on forming their alliance with Thebes, bearing date on the 16th of the month Skirrophorion, and cited De Coronâ, p. 289. I will add, that the two decrees which we read in p. 282, profess themselves as having been



against it. Demosthenes himself, being named chief of the ten envoys, proceeded forthwith to Thebes; while the military force of Attica was at the same time marched to the frontier.

passed in the months Elaphebolion and Munychion, and bear the name of the archon *Heropythus*; while the decree cited, p. 289, bears date the 16th of Skirrophorion, and the name of a different archon, *Nausikles*. Now if the decrees were genuine, the events which are described in both must have happened under the same archon, at an interval of about six weeks between the last day of Munychion and the 16th of Skirrophorion. It is impossible to suppose an interval of one year and six weeks between them.

It appears to me, on reading attentively the words of Demosthenes himself, that the *falsarius* or person who composed these four first documents, has not properly conceived what it was that Demosthenes caused to be read by the public secretary. The point which Demosthenes is here making, is to show how ably he had managed, and how well he had deserved of his country, by bringing the Thebans into alliance with Athens immediately after Philip's capture of Elateia. For this purpose he dwells upon the bad state of feeling between Athens and Thebes before that event, brought about by the secret instigations of Philip through corrupt partisans in both places. Now it is to illustrate this hostile feeling between Athens and Thebes, that he causes the secretary to read certain decrees and answers — ἐν οἷς δ' ἦτε ἤδη τὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ταυτωνὶ τῶν ψηφισμάτων ἀκούσαντες καὶ τῶν ἀποκρίσεων εἰσεσθε. Καὶ μοι λέγε ταῦτα λαβόν. . . . (p. 282) The documents here announced to be read do not bear upon the relations between Athens and Philip (which were those of active warfare, needing no illustration)—but to the relation between Athens and Thebes. There had plainly been interchanges of bickering and ungracious feeling between the two cities, manifested in public decrees or public answers to complaints or remonstrances. Instead of which, the two Athenian decrees, which we now read as following, are addressed, not to the Thebans, but to Philip; the first of them does not mention Thebes at all; the second mentions Thebes only to recite as a ground of complaint against Philip, that he was trying to put the two cities at variance; and this too, among other grounds of complaint, much more grave and imputing more hostile purposes. Then follow two answers—which are not answers between Athens and Thebes, as they ought to be—but answers from Philip, the first to the Athenians, the second to the Thebans. Neither the decrees, nor the answers, as they here stand, go to illustrate the point at which Demosthenes is aiming—the bad feeling and mutual provocations which had been exchanged a little before between Athens and Thebes. Neither the one nor the other justify the words of the orator immediately after the documents have been read—ὁὕτω διαθείς ὁ Φίλιππος τὰς πόλεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας διὰ τοῦτωι (through Æschines and his supporters), καὶ τοῦτοις ἐπαυθεῖς οἱ ψηφισμασ

At Thebes they found the envoys of Philip and his allies, and the philippizing Thebans full of triumph; while the friends of Athens were so dispirited, that the first letters of Demosthenes, sent home immediately on reaching Thebes, were of a gloomy cast.<sup>1</sup> According to Grecian custom, the two opposing legations were heard in turn before the Theban assembly. Amyntas and Klearchus were the Macedonian envoys, together with the eloquent Byzantine Python, as chief spokesman, and the Thessalians Daochus and Thrasylaus.<sup>2</sup> Having the first word, as established allies of Thebes, these orators found it an easy theme to denounce Athens, and to support their case by the general tenor of past history since the battle of Leuktra. The Macedonian orator contrasted the perpetual hostility of Athens with the valuable aid furnished to Thebes by Philip, when he rescued her from the Phokians, and confirmed her ascendancy over Bœotia. "If (said the orator) Philip had stipulated, before he assisted you against the Phokians, that you should grant him in return a free passage against Attica, you would have gladly acceded. Will you refuse it now, when he has rendered to you the service without stipulation? Either let us pass through to Attica—or join our march; whereby you will enrich yourself with the plunder

καὶ ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν, ἦκεν ἔχων τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν Ἐλάτειαν κατέλαβεν, ὥς οὐδ' ἂν εἰ τι γένοιτο ἐπὶ συμπνευσάντων ἂν ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν Θηβαίων.

Demosthenes describes Philip as acting upon Thebes and Athens through the agency of corrupt citizens in each; the author of these documents conceives Philip as acting by his own despatches.

The decree of the 16th Skirrophorion enacts, not only that there shall be alliance with Thebes, but also that the right of *intermarriage* between the two cities shall be established. Now at the moment when the decree was passed, the Thebans both had been, and still were, on bad terms with Athens, so that it was doubtful whether they would entertain or reject the proposition; nay, the chances even were, that they would reject it and join Philip. We can hardly believe it possible, that under such a state of probabilities, the Athenians would go so far as to pronounce for the establishment of *intermarriage* between the two cities.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 298.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Demosth. c. 18. Daochus and Thrasylaus are named by Demosthenes as Thessalian partisans of Philip (Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 324).



of that country, instead of being impoverished by having Boeotia as the seat of war."<sup>1</sup>

All these topics were so thoroughly in harmony with the previous sentiments of the Thebans, that they must have made a lively impression. How Demosthenes replied to them, we are not permitted to know. His powers of oratory must have been severely tasked; for the preestablished feeling was all adverse, and he had nothing to work upon, except fear, on the part of Thebes, of too near contact with the Macedonian arms — combined with her gratitude for the spontaneous and unconditional tender of Athens. And even as to fears, the Thebans had only to choose between admitting the Athenian army or that of Philip — a choice in which all presumption was in favor of the latter, as present ally and recent benefactor — against the former, as standing rival and enemy. Such was the result anticipated by the hopes of Philip as well as by the fears of Athens. Yet with all the chances thus against him, Demosthenes carried his point in the Theban assembly; determining them to accept the offered alliance of Athens and to brave the hostility of Philip. He boasts with good reason, of such a diplomatic and oratorical triumph;<sup>2</sup> by which he not only obtained a powerful ally against Philip, but also — a benefit yet more important — rescued Attica from being overrun by a united Macedonian and Theban army. Justly does the contemporary historian Theopompus extol the unrivalled eloquence whereby Demosthenes kindled in the bosoms of the Thebans a generous flame of Pan-hellenic patriotism. But it was not simply by superior eloquence<sup>3</sup> — though that doubtless was an essential condition — that his triumph at Thebes was achieved. It was still more owing to the wise and generous offer which he carried with him, and which he had himself prevailed on the Athenians to make — of unconditional alliance without any references to the jealousies and animosities of the past, and on

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. *De Coronâ*, p. 298, 299; Aristot. *Rhetoric*. ii. 23; Dionys. Hal. *ad Ammæum*, p. 744; Diodor. xvi. 85.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. *De Coronâ*, p. 304-307. *εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ μετέγνωσας ἐθελῶς, ὡς ταῦτ' εἶδον, οἱ Θεβαῖοι, καὶ μεθ' ἡμῶν ἐγένοντο*, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Theopompus, *Frag.* 239, ed. Didot; Plutarch, *Demosth.* c. 18.

terms even favorable to Thebes, as being more exposed than Athens in the war against Philip.<sup>1</sup>

The answer brought back by Demosthenes was cheering. The important alliance, combining Athens and Thebes in defensive war against Philip, had been successfully brought about. The Athenian army, already mustered in Attica, was invited into Boeotia, and marched to Thebes without delay. While a portion of them joined the Theban force at the northern frontier of Boeotia to resist the approach of Philip, the rest were left in quarters at Thebes. And Demosthenes extols not only the kindness with which they were received in private houses, but also their correct and orderly behavior amidst the families and properties of the Thebans; not a single complaint being preferred against them.<sup>2</sup> The antipathy and jealousy between the two cities seemed effaced in cordial cooperation against the common enemy. Of the cost of the joint operations, on land and sea, two-thirds were undertaken by Athens. The command was shared equally between the allies; and the centre of operations was constituted at Thebes.<sup>3</sup>

In this as well as in other ways, the dangerous vicinity of Philip, giving increased ascendancy to Demosthenes, impressed upon the counsels of Athens a vigor long unknown. The orator prevailed upon his countrymen to suspend the expenditure going on upon the improvement of their docks and the construction of a new arsenal, in order that more money might be devoted to military operations. He also carried a farther point which he had

<sup>1</sup> We may here trust the more fully the boasts made by Demosthenes of his own statesmanship and oratory, since we possess the comments of Æschines, and therefore know the worst that can be said by an unfriendly critic. Æschines (*adv. Ktesiph.* p. 73, 74) says that the Thebans were induced to join Athens, not by the oratory of Demosthenes, but by the fear of Philip's near approach, and by their displeasure in consequence of having Nikæa taken from them. Demosthenes says in fact the same. Doubtless the ablest orator must be furnished with some suitable points to work up in his pleadings. But the orators on the other side would find in the history of the past a far more copious collection of matters, capable of being appealed to as causes of antipathy against Athens, and of favor to Philip, and against this superior case Demosthenes had to contend.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. *De Coronâ*, p. 299, 300.

<sup>3</sup> Æschines *adv. Ktesiph.* p. 74.



long aimed at accomplishing by indirect means, but always in vain; the conversion of the Theoric Fund to military purposes.<sup>1</sup> So preponderant was the impression of danger at Athens, that Demosthenes was now able to propose this motion directly, and with success. Of course, he must first have moved to suspend the standing enactment, whereby it was made penal even to submit the motion.

To Philip, meanwhile, the new alliance was a severe disappointment and a serious obstacle. Having calculated on the continued adhesion of Thebes, to which he conceived himself entitled as a return for benefits conferred — and having been doubtless assured by his partisans in the city that they could promise him Theban coöperation against Athens, as soon as he should appear on the frontier with an overawing army — he was disconcerted at the sudden junction of these two powerful cities, unexpected alike by friends and enemies. Henceforward we shall find him hating Thebes, as guilty of desertion and ingratitude, worse than Athens, his manifest enemy.<sup>2</sup> But having failed in inducing the Thebans to follow his lead against Athens, he thought it expedient again to resume his profession of acting on behalf of the Delphian god against Amphissa, — and to write to his allies in Peloponnesus to come and join him, for this specific purpose. His letters were pressing, often repeated, and implying much embarrassment, according to Demosthenes.<sup>3</sup> As far as we can judge

<sup>1</sup> Philochorus Frag. 135, ed. Didot; Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum, p. 742.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 73. Æschines remarks the fact — but perverts the inferences deducible from it.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 279. Δὸς δὲ μοι τὴν ἐπιστολὴν, ἣν, ὡς οὐκ ὑπῆκουον αἱ Θηβαῖοι, πέμπει πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ συμμάχους ὁ Φίλιππος, ἵνα εἰδῇτε καὶ ἐκ ταύτης σαφῶς ὅτι τὴν μὲν ἀληθῆ πρόφασιν τῶν πραγμάτων, το ταῦτ' ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ τοὺς Θηβαίους καὶ ὑμᾶς πράττειν, ἀπεκρύπτετο κοινὰ δὲ καὶ τοῖς Ἀμφικτύοσι δόξαντα ποιεῖν προσποιεῖτο, etc.

Then follows a letter, purporting to be written by Philip to the Peloponnesians. I concur with Droysen in mistrusting its authenticity. I do not rest any statements on its evidence. The Macedonian month Lōus does not appear to coincide with the Attic Boedromion; nor is it probable that Philip in writing to Peloponnesians, would allude at all to Attic months. Various subsequent letters written by Philip to the Peloponnesians, and intimating much embarrassment, are alluded to by Demosthenes further on. Ἄλλ' ἀλλὰ μὴν οἷός τ' ἦν φωνᾶς ὁ Φίλιππος καὶ ἐν οἷαις ἦν ταραχαῖς ἐπὶ τοῖς τοῖς

they do not seem to have produced much effect; nor was it easy for the Peloponnesians to join Philip — either by land, while Bœotia was hostile — or by sea while the Amphiſſians held Kirrha, and the Athenians had a superior navy.

War was now carried on, in Phokis and on the frontiers of Bœotia, during the autumn and winter of 339–338 B. C. The Athenians and Thebans not only maintained their ground against Philip, but even gained some advantages over him; especially in two engagements — called the battle on the river, and the winter-battle — of which Demosthenes finds room to boast, and which called forth manifestations of rejoicing and sacrifice, when made known at Athens.<sup>1</sup> To Demosthenes himself, as the chief adviser of the Theban alliance, a wreath of gold was proposed by Demomeles and Hyperides, and decreed by the people; and though a citizen named Diondas impeached the mover for an illegal decree, yet he did not even obtain the fifth part of the suffrages of the Dikastery, and therefore became liable to the fine of one thousand drachms.<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes was crowned with public proclamation at the Dionysiac festival of March 338 B. C.<sup>3</sup>

But the most memorable step taken by the Athenians and Thebans, in this joint war against Philip, was that of reconstituting the Phokians as an independent and self-defending section of the Hellenic name. On the part of the Thebans, hitherto the bitterest enemies of the Phokians, this proceeding evinced adoption of an improved and generous policy, worthy of the Pan-hellenic cause in which they had now embarked. In 346 B. C., the Phokians had been conquered and ruined by the arms of Philip, under condemnation pronounced by the Amphiktyons. Their cities had all been dismantled, and their population distributed in

ἐκ τῶν ἐπὶ στολῶν ἐκείνου μαθήσεσθε ὧν εἰς Πελοπόννησον ἐπέμπευ (p. 301, 302) Demosthenes causes the letters to be read publicly, but no letters appear *verbatim*.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 300.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 302, Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator., p. 848.

<sup>3</sup> That Demosthenes was crowned at the Dionysiac festival (March 338 B. C.) is contended by Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 534, 535); upon grounds which seem sufficient, against the opinion of Boeckh and Winiewski (Comment. ad Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 250), who think that he was not crowned until the Panathenaic festival, in the ensuing July.



villages, impoverished, or driven into exile. These exiles, many of whom were at Athens, now returned, and the Phokian population were aided by the Athenians and Thebans in reoccupying and securing their towns.<sup>1</sup> Some indeed of these towns were so small, such as Parapotamii<sup>2</sup> and others, that it was thought inexpedient to reconstitute them. Their population was transferred to the others, as a means of increased strength. Ambrysus, in the south-western portion of Phokis, was refortified by the Athenians and Thebans with peculiar care and solidity. It was surrounded with a double circle of wall of the black stone of the country; each wall being fifteen feet high and nearly six feet in thickness, with an interval of six feet between the two.<sup>3</sup> These walls were seen, five centuries afterwards, by the traveller Pausanias, who numbers them among the most solid defensive structures in the ancient world.<sup>4</sup> Ambrysus was valuable to the Athenians and Thebans as a military position for the defence of Bœotia, inasmuch as it lay on that rough southerly road near the sea, which the Lacedæmonian king Kleombrotus<sup>5</sup> had forced when he marched from Phokis to the position of Leuktra; eluding Epaminondas and the main Theban force, who were posted to resist him on the more frequented road by Koroneia. Moreover, by occupying the south-western parts of Phokis on the Corinthian Gulf, they prevented the arrival of reinforcements to Philip by sea out of Peloponnesus.

The war in Phokis, prosecuted seemingly upon a large scale and with much activity, between Philip and his allies on one side, and the Athenians and Thebans with their allies on the other — ended with the fatal battle of Chæroneia, fought in August 338 B. C.; having continued about ten months from the time when Philip, after being named general at the Amphiktyonic assembly (about the autumnal equinox), marched southward and occupied Elateia.<sup>6</sup> But respecting the intermediate events, we are unfortu-

<sup>1</sup> Pausanias, x. 3, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Pausanias, x. 36, 2.

<sup>3</sup> Pausanias, iv. 31, 5. He places the fortifications of Ambrysus in a class with those of Byzantium and Rhodes.

<sup>4</sup> Pausan. ix. 13, 2; Diodor. xv. 53; Xenoph. Hell. vi. 4, 3.

<sup>5</sup> The chronology of this period has caused much perplexity, and has been differently arranged by different authors. But it will be found that all the

<sup>6</sup> Pausanias, x. 33, 4.

nately without distinct information. We pick up only a few hints and allusions which do not enable us to understand what passed. We cannot make out either the auxiliaries engaged, or the total numbers in the field, on either side. Demosthenes boasts of having procured for Athens as allies, the Eubœans, Achæans, Corinthians, Thebans, Megarians, Leukadians, and Korkyræans — arraying along with the Athenian soldiers not less than fifteen thousand infantry

difficulties and controversies regarding it have arisen from resting on the spurious decrees embodied in the speech of Demosthenes De Coronâ, as if they were so much genuine history. Mr. Clinton, in his *Fasti Hellenici*, cites these decrees as if they were parts of Demosthenes himself. When we once put aside these documents, the general statements both of Demosthenes and Æschines, though they are not precise or specific, will appear perfectly clear and consistent respecting the chronology of the period.

That the battle of Chæroneia took place on the 7th of the Attic month Metageitnion (August) B. C. 338 (the second month of the archon Chæronidas at Athens) — is affirmed by Plutarch (Camill. c. 19) and generally admitted.

The time when Philip first occupied Elateia has been stated by Mr. Clinton and most authors as the preceding month of Skirrophorion, fifty days or thereabouts earlier. But this rests exclusively on the evidence of the pretended decree, for alliance between Athens and Thebes, which appears in Demosthenes De Coronâ, p. 289. Even those who defend the authenticity of the decree, can hardly confide in the truth of the month-date, when the name of the archon Nausikles is confessedly wrong. To me neither this document, nor the other so-called Athenian decrees professing to bear date in Munychion and Elaphebolion (p. 282), carry any evidence whatever.

The general statements both of Demosthenes and Æschines, indicate the appointment of Philip as Amphiktyonic general to have been made in the autumnal convocation of Amphiktyons at Thermopylæ. Shortly after this appointment, Philip marched his army into Greece with the professed purpose of acting upon it. In this march he came upon Elateia and began to fortify it; probably about the month of October 339 B. C. The Athenians, Thebans, and other Greeks, carried on the war against him in Phokis for about ten months, until the battle of Chæroneia. That this war must have lasted as long as ten months, we may see by the facts mentioned in my last page — the reëstablishment of the Phokians and their towns, and especially the elaborate fortification of Ambrysus. Böhnecke (*Forschungen*, p. 533) points out justly (though I do not agree with his general arrangement of the events of the war) that this restoration of the Phokian towns implies a considerable interval between the occupation of Elateia and the battle of Chæroneia. We have also two battles gained against Philip, one of them *αἰχὴ καὶ ἀντιπύρην*, which perfectly suits with this arrangement.



and two thousand cavalry;<sup>1</sup> and pecuniary contributions besides, to no inconsiderable amount, for the payment of mercenary troops. Whether all these troops fought either in Phokis or at Chæroneia, we cannot determine; we verify the Achæans and the Corinthians.<sup>2</sup> As far as we can trust Demosthenes, the autumn and winter of 339-338 B. C. was a season of advantages gained by the Athenians and Thebans over Philip, and of rejoicing in their two cities; not without much embarrassment to Philip, testified by his urgent requisitions of aid from his Peloponnesian allies, with which they did not comply. Demosthenes was the war-minister of the day, exercising greater influence than the generals — deliberating at Thebes in concert with the Bœotarchs — advising and swaying the Theban public assembly as well as the Athenian — and probably in mission to other cities also, for the purpose of pressing military efforts.<sup>3</sup> The crown bestowed upon him at the Dionysiac festival (March 338 B. C.) marks the pinnacle of his glory and the meridian of his hopes, when there seemed a fair chance of successfully resisting the Macedonian invasion.

Philip had calculated on the positive aid of Thebes; at the very worst, upon her neutrality between him and Athens. That she would cordially join Athens, neither he nor any one else imagined; nor could so improbable a result have been brought about, had not the game of Athens been played with unusual decision and judgment by Demosthenes. Accordingly, when opposed by the unexpected junction of the Theban and Athenian force, it is not wonderful that Philip should have been at first repulsed. Such disadvantages would hardly indeed drive him to send instant

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 306; Plutarch, Demosth. c. 17. In the decree of the Athenian people (Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 850) passed after the death of Demosthenes, granting various honors and a statue to his memory — it is recorded that he brought in by his persuasions not only the allies enumerated in the text, but also the Lokrians and the Messenians; and that he procured from the allies a total contribution of above five hundred talents. The Messenians, however, certainly did not fight at Chæroneia; nor is it correct to say that Demosthenes induced the Amphissian Lokrians to become allies of Athens.

<sup>2</sup> Strabo, ix. p. 414; Pausanias, vii. 6, 3.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Demosth. c. 48. Æschines (adv. Ktesiph. p. 74) puts these same facts — the great personal ascendancy of Demosthenes at this period — in an invidious point of view.

propositions of peace;<sup>1</sup> but they would admonish him to bring up fresh forces, and to renew his invasion during the ensuing spring and summer with means adequate to the known resistance. It seems probable that the full strength of the Macedonian army, now brought to a high excellence of organization after the continued improvements of his twenty years' reign — would be marched into Phokis during the summer of 338 B. C., to put down the most formidable combination of enemies that Philip had ever encountered. His youthful son Alexander, now eighteen years of age, came along with them.

It is among the accusations urged by Æschines against Demosthenes, that in levying mercenary troops, he wrongfully took the public money to pay men who never appeared; and farther, that he placed at the disposal of the Amphissians a large body of ten thousand mercenary troops, thus withdrawing them from the main Athenian and Bœotian army; whereby Philip was enabled to cut to pieces the mercenaries separately, while the entire force, if kept together, could never have been defeated. Æschines affirms that he himself strenuously opposed this separation of forces, the consequences of which were disastrous and discouraging to the whole cause.<sup>2</sup> It would appear that Philip attacked and took Amphissa. We read of his having deceived the Athenians and Thebans by a false despatch intended to be intercepted; so as to induce them to abandon their guard of the road which led to that place.<sup>3</sup> The sacred domain was restored, and the Amphissians, or at least such of them as had taken a leading part against Delphi, were banished.<sup>4</sup>

It was on the seventh day of the month Metageitnion (the second month of the Attic year, corresponding nearly to August)

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Demosth. c. 18. ὥστε εὐθὺς ἐπικηρυκτέσθαι δομένον εἰρήνης etc.

It is possible that Philip may have tried to disunite the enemies assembled against him, by separate propositions addressed to some of them.

<sup>2</sup> Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 74. Deinarchus mentions a Theban named Proxenus, whom he calls a traitor, as having commanded these mercenary troops at Amphissa (Deinarchus adv. Demosth. p. 99).

<sup>3</sup> Polyænus, iv. 2, 8.

<sup>4</sup> We gather this from the edict issued by Polysperchon some years afterwards (D'odor. xviii. 56).



that the allied Grecian army met Philip near Chæroneia; the last Boeotian town on the frontiers of Phokis. He seems to have been now strong enough to attempt to force his way into Bœotia, and is said to have drawn down the allies from a strong position into the plain, by laying waste the neighboring fields.<sup>1</sup> His numbers are stated by Diodorus at thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse; he doubtless had with him Thessalians and other allies from Northern Greece; but not a single ally from Peloponnesus. Of the united Greeks opposed to him, the total is not known.<sup>2</sup> We can therefore make no comparison as to numbers, though the superiority of the Macedonian army in organization is incontestable. The largest Grecian contingents were those of Athens, under Lysikles and Chares — and of Thebes, commanded by Theagenes; there were, besides, Phokians, Achæans, and Corinthians — probably also Eubœans and Megarians. The Lacedæmonians, Messenians, Arcadians, Eleians, and Argeians, took no part in the war.<sup>3</sup> All of them had doubtless been solicited on both sides; by Demosthenes as well as by the partisans of Philip. But jealousy and fear of Sparta led the last four states rather to look towards Philip as a protector against her — though on this occasion they took no positive part.

The command of the army was shared between the Athenians and Thebans, and its movements determined by the joint decision of their statesmen and generals. As to statesmen, the presence of Demosthenes at least ensured to them sound and patriotic counsel powerfully set forth; as to generals, not one of the three was fit for an emergency so grave and terrible. It was the sad fortune of Greece, that at this crisis of her liberty, when everything was staked on the issue of the campaign, neither an Epaminondas nor an Iphikrates was at hand. Phokion was absent as commander of the Athenian fleet in the Hellespont or the Ægean.<sup>4</sup> Portents were said to have occurred — oracles, and prophecies, were in circulation — calculated to discourage the Greeks; but Demosthenes, animated by the sight of so numerous an army hearty and

<sup>1</sup> Polyanius, iv. 2, 14.

<sup>2</sup> Diodorus affirms that Philip's army was superior in number; Justin states the reverse (Diodor. xvi. 85; Justin, ix. 3).

<sup>3</sup> Pausanias, iv. 2, 82; v. 4, 5; viii. 6, 1.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16.

combined in defence of Grecian independence, treated all such stories with the same indifference<sup>1</sup> as Epaminondas had shown before the battle of Leuktra, and accused the Delphian priestess of philippizing. Nay, so confident was he in the result (according to the statement of Æschines), that when Philip, himself apprehensive, was prepared to offer terms of peace, and the Bœotarchs inclined to accept them — Demosthenes alone stood out, denouncing as a traitor any one who should broach the proposition of peace,<sup>2</sup> and boasting that if the Thebans were afraid, his countrymen the Athenians desired nothing better than a free passage through Bœotia to attack Philip single-handed. This is advanced as an accusation by Æschines; who however himself furnishes the justification of his rival, by intimating that the Bœotarchs were so eager for peace, that they proposed, even before the negotiations had begun, to send home the Athenian soldiers into Attica, in order that deliberations might be taken concerning the peace. We can hardly be surprised that Demosthenes "became out of his mind"<sup>3</sup> (such is the expression of Æschines) on hearing a proposition so fraught with imprudence. Philip would have gained his point even without a battle, if, by holding out the lure of negotiation for peace, he could have prevailed upon the allied army to disperse. To have united the full force of Athens and Thebes, with other subordinate states, in the same ranks and for the same purpose, was a rare good fortune, not likely to be reproduced, should it once slip away. And if Demosthenes, by warm or even passionate remonstrance, prevented such premature dispersion, he rendered the valuable service of ensuring to Grecian liberty a full trial of strength under circumstances not unpromising; and at the very worst, a catastrophe worthy and honorable.

In the field of battle near Chæroneia, Philip himself command

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Demosth. c. 19, 20; Æschin. adv. Ktesiph. p. 72.

<sup>2</sup> Æschin. adv. Ktesiph. p. 74, 75.

<sup>3</sup> Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 75. 'Ὡς δ' οὐ προσείχον αὐτῷ (Δημοσθένης) οἱ ἀρχόντες οἱ ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας τοὺς ἡμετέρους πύλαι ἀνέστρεψαν ἐξεληλυθότας, ἵνα βουλευσαιοσθε περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, ἐνταῦθα παντάπασιν ἐκφρων ἐγένετο, etc.

It is, seemingly, this disposition on the part of Philip to open negotiations which is alluded to by Plutarch as having been (Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16) favorably received by Phokion.



ed a chosen body of troops on the wing opposed to the Athenians, while his youthful son, Alexander, aided by experienced officers, commanded against the Thebans on the other wing. Respecting the course of the battle, we are scarcely permitted to know anything. It is said to have been so obstinately contested, that for some time the result was doubtful. The Sacred Band of Thebes, who charged in one portion of the Theban phalanx, exhausted all their strength and energy in an unavailing attempt to bear down the stronger phalanx and multiplied pikes opposed to them. The youthful Alexander<sup>1</sup> here first displayed his great military energy and ability. After a long and murderous struggle, the Theban Sacred Band were all overpowered and perished in their ranks,<sup>2</sup> while the Theban phalanx was broken and pushed back. Philip on his side was still engaged in undecided conflict with the Athenians, whose first onset is said to have been so impetuous, as to put to flight some of the troops in his army; insomuch that the Athenian general exclaimed in triumph, "Let us pursue them even to Macedonia."<sup>3</sup> It is farther said that Philip on his side simulated a retreat, for the purpose of inducing them to pursue and to break their order. We read another statement, more likely to be true — that the Athenian hoplites, though full of energy at the first shock, could not endure fatigue and prolonged struggle like the trained veterans in the opposite ranks.<sup>4</sup> Having steadily repelled them for a considerable time, Philip became emulous on witnessing the success of his son, and redoubled his efforts; so as to break and disperse them. The whole Grecian army was thus put to flight with severe loss.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 85. Alexander himself, after his vast conquests in Asia and shortly before his death, alludes briefly to his own presence at Chæroneia, in a speech delivered to his army (Arrian, vii. 9, 5).

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch Pelopidas, c. 18.

<sup>3</sup> Polyænus, iv. 2, 2. He mentions Stratokles as the Athenian general from whom this exclamation came. We know from Æschines (adv. Ktesiph. p. 74) that Stratokles was general of the Athenian troops at or near Thebes shortly after the alliance with the Thebans was formed. But it seems that Chares and Lysikles commanded at Chæroneia. It is possible, therefore, that the anecdote reported by Polyænus may refer to one of the earlier battles fought, before that of Chæroneia.

<sup>4</sup> Polyænus, iv. 2, 7; Frontinus.

<sup>5</sup> Diodor. xvi. 85, 86.

The Macedonian phalanx, as armed and organized by Philip, was sixteen deep; less deep than that of the Thebans either at Delium or at Leuktra. It had veteran soldiers of great strength and complete training, in its front ranks; yet probably soldiers hardly superior to the Sacred Band, who formed the Theban front rank. But its great superiority was in the length of the Macedonian pike or sarissa — in the number of these weapons which projected in front of the foremost soldiers — and the long practice of the men to manage this impenetrable array of pikes in an efficient manner. The value of Philip's improved phalanx was attested by his victory at Chæroneia.

But the victory was not gained by the phalanx alone. The military organization of Philip comprised an aggregate of many sorts of troops besides the phalanx; the body-guards, horse as well as foot — the hypaspistæ, or light hoplites — the light cavalry, bowmen, slingers, etc. When we read the military operations of Alexander, three years afterwards, in the very first year of his reign, before he could have made any addition of his own to the force inherited from Philip; and when we see with what efficiency all these various descriptions of troops are employed in the field;<sup>1</sup> we may feel assured that Philip both had them near him and employed them at the battle of Chæroneia.

One thousand Athenian citizens perished in this disastrous field two thousand more fell into the hands of Philip as prisoners.<sup>2</sup> The Theban loss is said also to have been terrible, as well as the Achæan.<sup>3</sup> But we do not know the numbers; nor have we any statement of the Macedonian loss. Demosthenes, himself present in the ranks of the hoplites, shared in the flight of his defeated countrymen. He is accused by his political enemies of having behaved with extreme and disgraceful cowardice; but we see plainly from the continued confidence and respect shown to him by the general body of his countrymen, that they cannot

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, Exp. Alex. i. 2, 3, 10.

<sup>2</sup> This is the statement of the contemporary orators (Demades, Frag. p. 179) Lykurgus (ap. Diodor. xvi. 85; adv. Leokratem, p. 236. c. 36) and Demosthenes (De Coronâ, p. 314). The latter does not specify the number of prisoners, though he states the slain at one thousand. Compare Pausanias, vii. 10, 2.

<sup>3</sup> Pausanias, vii. 6, 8.



have credited the imputation. The two Athenian generals Chares and Lysikles, both escaped from the field. The latter was afterwards publicly accused at Athens by the orator Lykurgus — a citizen highly respected for his integrity and diligence in the management of the finances, and severe in arraigning political delinquents. Lysikles was condemned to death by the Dikastery.<sup>1</sup> What there was to distinguish his conduct from that of his colleague Chares — who certainly was not condemned, and is not even stated to have been accused — we do not know. The memory of the Theban general Theagenes<sup>2</sup> also, though he fell in the battle, was assailed by charges of treason.

Unspeakable was the agony at Athens, on the report of this disaster, with a multitude of citizens as yet unknown left on the field or prisoners, and a victorious enemy within three or four days' march of the city. The whole population, even old men, women, and children, were spread about the streets in all the violence of grief and terror, interchanging effusions of distress and sympathy, and questioning every fugitive as he arrived about the safety of their relatives in the battle.<sup>3</sup> The flower of the citizens of military age had been engaged; and before the extent of loss had been ascertained, it was feared that none except the elders would be left to defend the city. At length the definite loss became known: severe indeed and terrible — yet not a total shipwreck, like that of the army of Nikias in Sicily.

As on that trying occasion, so now: amidst all the distress and alarm, it was not in the Athenian character to despair. The mass of citizens hastened unbidden to form a public assembly,<sup>4</sup> wherein the most energetic resolutions were taken for defence. Decrees were past enjoining every one to carry his family and property out of the open country of Attica into the various strongholds; directing the body of the senators, who by general rule were ex-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 88.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Alexand. c. 12; Deinarchus adv. Demosth. p. 99. Compare the Pseudo-Demosthenic Oratio Funebr. p. 1395, 1722.

<sup>3</sup> Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 164, 166. c. 11; Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 99.

<sup>4</sup> Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 146. Γεγεννημένης γὰρ τῆς ἐν Χαίρωνείᾳ μάχης καὶ συνδραμόντων πάντων ὑμῶν εἰς ἐκκλησίαν, ἐψηφίσατο ὁ δῆμος, παῖδες μὲν καὶ γυναῖκας ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν εἰς τὰ τείχη κατακοιῖναι, etc.

empt from military service, to march down in arms to Peiræus, and put that harbor in condition to stand a siege; placing every man without exception at the disposal of the generals, as a soldier for defence, and imposing the penalties of treason on every one who fled;<sup>1</sup> enfranchising all slaves fit for bearing arms, granting the citizenship to metics under the same circumstances, and restoring to the full privilege of citizens those who had been disfranchised by judicial sentence.<sup>2</sup> This last-mentioned decree was proposed by Hyperides; but several others were moved by Demosthenes, who, notwithstanding the late misfortune of the Athenian arms, was listened to with undiminished respect and confidence. The general measures requisite for strengthening the walls, opening ditches, distributing military posts and constructing earthwork, were decreed on his motion; and he seems to have been named member of a special Board for superintending the fortifications.<sup>3</sup> Not only he, but also most of the conspicuous citizens and habitual speakers in the assembly, came forward with large private contributions to meet the pressing wants of the moment.<sup>4</sup> Every man in the city lent a hand to make good the defective points in the fortification. Materials were obtained by felling the trees near the city, and even by taking stones from the adjacent sepulchres<sup>5</sup> — as had been done after the Persian war when the walls were built under the contrivance of Themistokles.<sup>6</sup> The temples were stripped of the arms suspended within them, for the purpose of equipping unarmed citizens.<sup>7</sup> By such earnest and unanimous efforts, the defences of the city and of Peiræus were soon materially improved. At sea Athens had nothing to

<sup>1</sup> Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 177. c. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 170. c. 11. ἦνιχ' ὁρᾶν ἦν τὸν δῆμον ψηφισάμενον τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐλευθέρους, τοὺς δὲ ξένους Ἀθηναίους, τοὺς δὲ ἀτίμους ἐντίμους. The orator causes this decree, proposed by Hyperides, to be read publicly by the secretary, in court.

Compare Pseudo-Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 849, and Demosth. cont. Aristog. p. 803.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 309; Deinarchus adv. Demosth. p. 100.

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 329; Deinarchus adv. Demosth. p. 100; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 851.

<sup>5</sup> Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 172. c. 11; Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 87.

<sup>6</sup> Thucyd. i. 93.

Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. l. c.



fear. Her powerful naval force was untouched, and her superiority to Philip on that element incontestable. Envoys were sent to Troezen, Epidaurus, Andros, Keos, and other places, to solicit aid, and collect money; in one or other of which embassies Demosthenes served, after he had provided for the immediate exigencies of defence.<sup>1</sup>

What was the immediate result of these applications to other cities, we do not know. But the effect produced upon some of these Ægean islands by the reported prostration of Athens, is remarkable. An Athenian citizen named Leokrates, instead of staying at Athens to join in the defence, listened only to a disgraceful timidity,<sup>2</sup> and fled forthwith from Peiræus with his family and property. He hastened to Rhodes, where he circulated the false news that Athens was already taken and the Peiræus under siege. Immediately on hearing this intelligence, and believing it to be true, the Rhodians with their triremes began a cruise to seize the merchant-vessels at sea.<sup>3</sup> Hence we learn, indirectly, that the Athenian naval power constituted the standing protection for these merchant vessels; insomuch that so soon as that protection was removed, armed cruisers began to prey upon them from various islands in the Ægean.

Such were the precautions taken at Athens after this fatal day. But Athens lay at a distance of three or four days' march from

<sup>1</sup> Lykurgus (adv. Leokrat. p. 171 c. 11) mentions these embassies; Deinarchus (adv. Demosth. p. 100) affirms that Demosthenes provided for himself an escape from the city as an envoy — *αὐτὸς ἐαυτὸν πρεσβευτὴν κατασκεύασας, ἐν' ἑκ τῆς πόλεως ἀποδραίνῃ*, etc. Compare Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 76.

The two hostile orators treat such temporary absence of Demosthenes on the embassy to obtain aid, as if it were a cowardly desertion of his post. This is a construction altogether unjust.

<sup>2</sup> Leokrates was not the only Athenian who fled, or tried to flee. Another was seized in the attempt (according to Æschines) and condemned to death by the Council of Areopagus (Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 89). A member of the Areopagus itself, named Autolykus (the same probably who is mentioned with peculiar respect by Æschines cont. Timarchum, p. 12), sent away his family for safety; Lykurgus afterwards impeached him for it, and he was condemned by the Dikastery (Harpokration v. *Αὐτολύκος*).

<sup>3</sup> Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 149. *Ὁὕτω δὲ σφοδρὰ ταυτ' ἐπίστευσαν οἱ Ῥόδιοι, ὥστε τριήρεις πᾶσιν ἡρώσαντες τὰ πλοῖα κατήγον, etc.*

the field of Chæroneia; while Thebes, being much nearer, bore the first attack of Philip. Of the behavior of that prince after his victory, we have contradictory statements. According to one account, he indulged in the most insulting and licentious exultation on the field of battle, jesting especially on the oratory and motions of Demosthenes; a temper, from which he was brought round by the courageous reproof of Demades, then his prisoner as one of the Athenian hoplites.<sup>1</sup> At first he even refused to grant permission to inter the slain, when the herald came from Lebadeia to make the customary demand.<sup>2</sup> According to another account, the demeanor of Philip towards the defeated Athenians was gentle and forbearing.<sup>3</sup> However the fact may have stood as to his first manifestations, it is certain that his positive measures were harsh towards Thebes and lenient towards Athens. He sold the Theban captives into slavery; he is said also to have exacted a price for the liberty granted to bury the Theban slain — which liberty, according to Grecian custom, was never refused and certainly never sold, by the victor. Whether Thebes made any farther resistance, or stood a siege, we do not know. But presently the city fell into Philip's power, who put to death several of the leading citizens, banished others, and confiscated the property of both. A council of Three Hundred — composed of philippizing Thebans, for the most part just recalled from exile — was invested with the government of the city, and with powers of life and death over every one.<sup>4</sup> The state of Thebes became much the same as it had been when the Spartan Phœbidas, in concert with the Theban party headed by Leontiades, surprised the Kadmeia. A Macedonian garrison was now placed in the Kadmeia, as a Spartan garrison had been placed then. Supported by this garrison, the philippizing Thebans were uncontrolled masters of the city; with full power, and no reluctance, to gratify their political antipathies. At the same time, Philip restored the minor

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 87. The story respecting Demades is told somewhat differently in Sextus Empiricus adv. Grammaticos, p. 281.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator. p. 849.

<sup>3</sup> Justin, ix. 4; Polybius, v. 10; Theopomp. Frag. 262. See the note of Wickers ad Theopompi Fragmenta, p. 259.

<sup>4</sup> Justin, ix. 4. Dienarch. cont. Demosth. s. 20. p. 92.



Bœotian towns — Orchomenus, and Plataea, probably also Thepiæ and Koroneia — to the condition of free communities instead of subjection to Thebes.<sup>1</sup>

At Athens also, the philippizing orators raised their voices loudly and confidently, denouncing Demosthenes and his policy. New speakers,<sup>2</sup> who would hardly have come forward before, were now put up against him. The accusations however altogether failed; the people continued to trust him, omitting no measure of defence which he suggested. Æschines, who had before disclaimed all connection with Philip, now altered his tone, and made boast of the ties of friendship and hospitality subsisting between that prince and himself.<sup>3</sup> He tendered his services to go as envoy to the Macedonian camp; whither he appears to have been sent, doubtless with others, perhaps with Xenokrates and Phokion;<sup>4</sup> Among them was Demades also, having been just released from his captivity. Either by the persuasions of Demades, or by a change in his own dispositions, Philip had now become inclined to treat with Athens on favorable terms. The bodies of the slain Athenians were burned by the victors, and their ashes collected to be carried to Athens; though the formal application of the herald to the same effect, had been previously refused.<sup>5</sup> Æschines (according to the assertion of Demosthenes) took part as a sympathizing guest in the banquet and festivities whereby Philip cele-

<sup>1</sup> Pausanias, iv. 25, 5; ix. 1, 3.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 310. οὐ δὲ ἐαυτῶν τό γε πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ δὲ ἄλλοις ὑπελάμβανον ἀγνοήσεσθαι, etc.

So the enemies of Alkibiades put up against him in the assembly speakers of affected candor and impartiality — ἄλλους ῥήτορας ἐνιέντες, etc. Thucyd. vi. 29.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 319, 320.

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 319. ὅς ἐνθὺς μετὰ τὴν μάχην πρεσβευτὴς ἐπορεύει πρὸς Φίλιππον, etc. Compare Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16. Diogen Laert. iv. 5. in his Life of the Philosopher Xenokrates.

<sup>5</sup> Demades, Fragment. Orat. p. 179. χιλίων ταφῇ Ἀθηναίων μαρτυρεῖ νοι, ἐπιδεινύουσα ταῖς τῶν ἐναντίων χερσίν, ἃς ἀντὶ πολεμίων φιλίας ἐποίησα τοῖς ἐποθανούσιν. Ἐνταῦθα ἐπιστὰς τοῖς πραγμασιν ἐγραψα τὴν εἰρήνην ὁμολογῶ. Ἐγραψα καὶ Φιλίππῳ τιμὰς· οὐκ ἄρνούμαι· δισχιλίους γὰρ αἰχμαλώτους ἀνεν λύτρων καὶ χίλια πολιτῶν σώματα χωρὶς κήρυκος, καὶ τὸν Ὀρόπδον ἐνεν πρεσβείας λαβὼν ὑμῖν, ταῦτ' ἐγραψα. See also Suidas v. Δημάδης.

brated his triumph over Grecian liberty.<sup>1</sup> At length Demades with the other envoys returned to Athens, reporting the consent of Philip to conclude peace, to give back the numerous prisoners in his hands, and also to transfer Oropus from the Thebans to Athens.

Demades proposed the conclusion of peace to the Athenian assembly, by whom it was readily decreed. To escape invasion and siege by the Macedonian army, was doubtless an unspeakable relief; while the recovery of the two thousand prisoners without ransom, was an acquisition of great importance, not merely to the city collectively, but to the sympathies of numerous relatives. Lastly, to regain Oropus — a possession which they had once enjoyed, and for which they had long wrangled with the Thebans — was a farther cause of satisfaction. Such conditions were doubtless acceptable at Athens. But there was a submission to be made on the other side, which to the contemporaries of Perikles would have seemed intolerable, even as the price of averted invasion or recovered captives. The Athenians were required to acknowledge the exaltation of Philip to the headship of the Grecian world, and to promote the like acknowledgment by all other Greeks, in a congress to be speedily convened. They were to renounce all pretensions of headship, not only for themselves, but for every other Grecian state; to recognize not Sparta or Thebes, but the king of Macedon, as Pan-hellenic chief; to acquiesce in the transition of Greece from the position of a free, self-determining, political aggregate, into a provincial dependency of the kings of Pella and Ægæ. It is not easy to conceive a more terrible shock to that traditional sentiment of pride and patriotism, inherited from forefathers, who, after repelling and worsting the Persians, had first organized the maritime Greeks into a confederacy running parallel with and supplementary to the non-maritime Greeks allied with Sparta; thus keeping out foreign dominion and casting the Grecian world into a system founded on native sympathies and free government. Such traditional sentiment, though it no longer governed the character of the Athenians or impressed upon them motives of action, had still a strong hold upon their imagination and memory, where it had been constant-

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 321.



ly kept alive by the eloquence of Demosthenes and others. The peace of Demades, recognizing Philip as chief of Greece, was a renunciation of all this proud historical past, and the acceptance of a new and degraded position, for Athens as well as for Greece generally.

Polybius praises the generosity of Philip in granting such favorable terms, and even affirms, not very accurately, that he secured thereby the steady gratitude and attachment of the Athenians. But Philip would have gained nothing by killing his prisoners; not to mention that he would have provoked an implacable spirit of revenge among the Athenians. By selling his prisoners for slaves he would have gained something, but by the use actually made of them he gained more. The recognition of his Hellenic supremacy by Athens was the capital step for the prosecution of his objects. It ensured him against dissentients among the remaining Grecian states, whose adhesion had not yet been made certain, and who might possibly have stood out against a proposition so novel and so anti-Hellenic, had Athens set them the example. Moreover, if Philip had not purchased the recognition of Athens in this way, he might have failed in trying to extort it by force. For though, being master of the field, he could lay waste Attica with impunity, and even establish a permanent fortress in it like Dekeleia — yet the fleet of Athens was as strong as ever, and her preponderance at sea irresistible. Under these circumstances, Athens and Peiræus might have been defended against him, as Byzantium and Perinthus had been, two years before; the Athenian fleet might have obstructed his operations in many ways; and the siege of Athens might have called forth a burst of Hellenic sympathy, such as to embarrass his farther progress. Thebes — an inland city, hated by the other Bœotian cities — was prostrated by the battle of Chæroneia, and left without any means of successful defence. But the same blow was not absolutely mortal to Athens, united in her population throughout all the area of Attica, and superior at sea. We may see therefore, that — with such difficulties before him if he pushed the Athenians to despair — Philip acted wisely in employing his victory and his prisoners to procure her recognition of his head-

<sup>1</sup> Polybius, v. 10; xvii. 14; Diodor. Fragm. lib. xxxii

ship. His political game was well-played, now as always; but to the praise of generosity bestowed by Polybius, he has little claim.

Besides the recognition of Philip as chief of Greece, the Athenians, on the motion of Demades, passed various honorary and complimentary votes in his favor; of what precise nature we do not know.<sup>1</sup> Immediate relief from danger, with the restoration of two thousand captive citizens, were sufficient to render the peace popular at the first moment; moreover, the Athenians, as if conscious of failing resolution and strength, were now entering upon that career of flattery to powerful kings, which we shall hereafter find them pushing to disgraceful extravagance. It was probably during the prevalence of this sentiment, which did not long continue, that the youthful Alexander of Macedon, accompanied by Antipater, paid a visit to Athens.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile the respect enjoyed by Demosthenes among his countrymen was noway lessened. Though his political opponents thought the season favorable for bringing many impeachments against him, none of them proved successful: and when the time came for electing a public orator to deliver the funeral discourse at the obsequies celebrated for the slain at Chæroneia — he was invested with that solemn duty, not only in preference to Æschines, who was put up in competition, but also to Demades the recent mover of the peace<sup>3</sup> — and honored with strong marks of esteem and sympathy from the surviving relatives of these gallant citizens. Moreover it farther appears that Demosthenes was continued in an important financial post as one of the joint managers of the Theoric Fund, and as member of a Board for purchasing corn; he was also continued, or shortly afterwards re-appointed, superintendent of the walls and defences of the city. The orator Hyperides, the political coadjutor of Demosthenes, was impeached by Aristogeiton under the Graphê Paranomon, for his illegal and unconstitutional decree (proposed under the im-

<sup>1</sup> Demades, Frag. p. 179. *ἔγραψα καὶ Φιλίππῳ τιμὰς, οὐκ ἀρνούμαι, etc.* Compare Arrian, Exp. Alex. i. 2, 3 — *καὶ πλείονα ἔτι τῶν Φιλίππῳ δοθέντων* 'Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐς τιμὴν ξυγχωρῆσαι, etc., and Clemens Alex. Admonit. ad Gent. p. 36 B. *τὸν Μακεδόνα Φίλιππον ἐν Κυνοσάργει νομοθετοῦντες προσκυνεῖν, etc.*

<sup>2</sup> Justin, ix. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 310–320.



mediate terror of the defeat at Chæroneia), to grant manumission to the slaves, citizenship to metics, and restoration of citizenship to those who had been disfranchised by judicial sentence. The occurrence of peace had removed all necessity for acting upon this decree; nevertheless an impeachment was entered and brought against its mover. Hyperides, unable to deny its illegality, placed his defence on the true and obvious ground — "The Macedonian arms (he said) darkened my vision. It was not I who moved the decree; it was the battle of Chæroneia."<sup>1</sup> The substantive defence was admitted by the Dikastery; while the bold oratorical turn attracted notice from rhetorical critics.

Having thus subjugated and garrisoned Thebes — having reconstituted the anti-Theban cities in Bœotia — having constrained Athens to submission and dependent alliance — and having established a garrison in Ambrakia, at the same time mastering Akarnania, and banishing the leading Arkananians who were opposed to him — Philip next proceeded to carry his arms into Peloponnesus. He found little positive resistance anywhere, except in the territory of Sparta. The Corinthians, Argeians, Messenians, Eleians, and many Arcadians, all submitted to his dominion; some even courted his alliance, from fear and antipathy against Sparta. Philip invaded Laconia with an army too powerful for the Spartans to resist in the field. He laid waste the country, and took some detached posts; but he did not take, nor do we know that he even attacked, Sparta itself. The Spartans could not resist; yet would they neither submit, nor ask for peace. It appears that Philip cut down their territory and narrowed their boundaries on all the three sides; towards Argos, Messênê, and Megalopolis.<sup>2</sup> We have no precise account of the details of his proceedings; but it is clear that he did just what seemed to him good, and that the governments of all the Peloponnesians cities came into the hands of his partisans. Sparta was the only city which stood out against him; maintaining her ancient free-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 849.

<sup>2</sup> Polybius, ix. 28, 33, xvii. 14; Tacitus, Annal. iv. 43; Strabo, viii. p. 361; Pausanias, ii. 20, 1. viii. 7, 4. viii. 27, 8. From Diodorus xvii. 3, we see how much this adhesion to Philip was obtained under the pressure of necessity.

dom and dignity, under circumstances of feebleness and humiliation, with more unshaken resolution than Athens.

Philip next proceeded to convene a congress of Grecian cities at Corinth. He here announced himself as resolved on an expedition against the Persian king, for the purpose both of liberating the Asiatic Greeks, and avenging the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. The general vote of the congress nominated him leader of the united Greeks for this purpose, and decreed a Grecian force to join him, to be formed of contingents furnished by the various cities. The total of the force promised is stated only by Justin, who gives it at two hundred thousand foot, and fifteen thousand horse; an army which Greece certainly could not have furnished, and which we can hardly believe to have been even promised.<sup>1</sup> The Spartans stood aloof from the congress, continuing to refuse all recognition of the headship of Philip. The Athenians attended and concurred in the vote; which was in fact the next step to carry out the peace made by Demades. They were required to furnish a well-equipped fleet to serve under Philip; and they were at the same time divested of their dignity of chiefs of a maritime confederacy, the islands being enrolled as maritime dependencies of Philip, instead of continuing to send deputies to a synod meeting at Athens.<sup>2</sup> It appears that Samos was still recognized as belonging to them<sup>3</sup> — or at least such portion of the island as was occupied by the numerous Athenian kleruchs or outsettlers, first established in the island after the conquest by Timotheus in 365 B. C., and afterwards reinforced. For several years afterwards, the naval force in the dockyards of Athens still continued large and powerful; but her maritime ascendancy henceforward disappears.

The Athenians, deeply mortified by such humiliation, were re-

<sup>1</sup> Justin, ix. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16; Pausanias, i. 25, 3. Τὸ γὰρ ἀτύχημα τὸ ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ ἅπασιν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἤρξε κακόν, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα δούλους ἐποίησε τοὺς ὑπεριδόντας, καὶ ὅσοι μετὰ Μακεδόνων ἐτάχθησαν. Τὰς μὲν δὲ πολλὰς Φίλιππος τῶν πόλεων ἔλεν. Ἀθηναίους δὲ λόγῳ συνθέμενος, ἔργῳ σφᾶς μάλιστα ἐκάκωσε, νήσους τε ἀφελόμενος καὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ ναυτικά παύσαι ἀρχῆς.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xviii. 56. Σάμον δὲ δίδωμεν Ἀθηναίους, ἐπειδὴ καὶ Φίλιππος ἔδωκεν ὁ πατήρ. Compare Plutarch, Alexand. c. 28.



mind by Phokion that it was a necessary result of the peace which they had accepted on the motion of Demades, and that it was now too late to murmur.<sup>1</sup> We cannot wonder at their feelings. Together with the other free cities of Greece, they were enrolled as contributory appendages of the king of Macedon; a revolution, to them more galling than to the rest, since they passed at once, not merely from simple autonomy, but from a condition of superior dignity, into the common dependence. Athens had only to sanction the scheme dictated by Philip and to furnish her quota towards the execution. Moreover, this scheme — the invasion of Persia — had ceased to be an object of genuine aspiration throughout the Grecian world. The Great King, no longer inspiring terror to Greece collectively, might now be regarded as likely to lend protection against Macedonian oppression. To emancipate the Asiatic Greeks from Persian dominion would be in itself an enterprise grateful to Grecian feeling, though all such wishes must have been gradually dying out since the peace of Antalkidas. But emancipation, accomplished by Philip, would be only a transfer of the Asiatic Greeks from Persian dominion to his. The synod of Corinth served no purpose except to harness the Greeks to his car, for a distant enterprise lucrative to his soldiers and suited to his insatiable ambition.

It was in 337 B. C. that this Persian expedition was concerted and resolved. During that year preparations were made of sufficient magnitude to exhaust the finances of Philip;<sup>2</sup> who was at the same time engaged in military operations, and fought a severe battle against the Illyrian king Pleurias.<sup>3</sup> In the spring of 336 A. C., a portion of the Macedonian army under Parmenio and Attalus, was sent across to Asia to commence military operations Philip himself intending speedily to follow.<sup>4</sup>

Such however was not the fate reserved for him. Not long before, he had taken the resolution of repudiating, on the allegation of infidelity, his wife Olympias; who is said to have become repugnant to him, from the furious and savage impulses of her character. He had successively married several wives, the last of

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, vii. 9, 5.

<sup>4</sup> Justin, ix. 5; Diodor. xvi. 91.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 93.

whom was Kleopatra, niece of the Macedonian Attalus. It was at her instance that he is said to have repudiated Olympias; who retired to her brother Alexander of Epirus.<sup>1</sup> This step provoked violent dissensions among the partisans of the two queens, and even between Philip and his son Alexander, who expressed a strong resentment at the repudiation of his mother. Amidst the intoxication of the marriage banquet, Attalus proposed a toast and prayer, that there might speedily appear a legitimate son, from Philip and Kleopatra, to succeed to the Macedonian throne. Upon which Alexander exclaimed in wrath — "Do you then proclaim me as a bastard?" — at the same time hurling a goblet at him. Incensed at this proceeding, Philip started up, drew his sword, and made furiously at his son; but fell to the ground from passion and intoxication. This accident alone preserved the life of Alexander; who retorted — "Here is a man, preparing to cross from Europe into Asia — who yet cannot step surely from one couch to another."<sup>2</sup> After this violent quarrel the father and son separated. Alexander conducted his mother into Epirus, and then went himself to the Illyrian king. Some months afterwards, at the instance of the Corinthian Demaratus, Philip sent for him back, and became reconciled to him; but another cause of displeasure soon arose, because Alexander had opened a negotiation for marriage with the daughter of the satrap of Karia. Rejecting such an alliance as unworthy, Philip sharply reproved his son, and banished from Macedonia several courtiers whom he suspected as intimate with Alexander;<sup>3</sup> while the friends of Attalus stood high in favor.

Such were the animosities distracting the court and family of Philip. A son had just been born to him from his new wife Kleopatra.<sup>4</sup> His expedition against Persia, resolved and prepared

<sup>1</sup> Athenæus, xiii. p. 557; Justin, ix. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Alexand. c. 9; Justin, ix. 7; Diodor. xvi. 91-93.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Alexand. c. 10; Arrian, iii. 6, 5.

<sup>4</sup> Pausanias (viii. 7, 5) mentions a son born to Philip by Kleopatra; Diodorus (xvii. 2) also notices a son. Justin in one place (ix. 7) mentions a daughter, and in another place (xi. 2) a son named Caranus. Satyrus (ap. Athenæum, xiii. p. 557) states that a daughter named Eurôpê was born to him by Kleopatra.

It appears that the son was born only a short time before the last festival



during the proceeding year, had been actually commenced; Parmenio and Attalus having been sent across to Asia with the first division, to be followed presently by himself with the remaining army. But Philip foresaw that during his absence danger might arise from the furious Olympias, bitterly exasperated by the recent events, and instigating her brother Alexander king of Epirus, with whom she was now residing. Philip indeed held a Macedonian garrison in Ambrakia,<sup>1</sup> the chief Grecian city on the Epirotic border; and he had also contributed much to establish Alexander as prince. But he now deemed it essential to conciliate him still farther, by a special tie of alliance; giving to him in marriage Kleopatra, his daughter by Olympias.<sup>2</sup> For this marriage, celebrated at Ægæ in Macedonia in August 336 B. C., Philip provided festivals of the utmost cost and splendor, commemorating at the same time the recent birth of his son by Kleopatra.<sup>3</sup> Banquets, munificent presents, gymnastic and musical matches, tragic exhibitions,<sup>4</sup> among which Neoptolemus the actor performed in the tragedy of Kinyras, etc. with every species of attraction known to the age — were accumulated, in order to reconcile the dissentient parties in Macedonia, and to render the effect imposing on the minds of the Greeks; who, from every city, sent deputies for congratulation. Statues of the twelve great gods, admirably executed, were carried in solemn procession into the theatre; immediately after them, the statue of Philip himself as a thirteenth god.<sup>5</sup>

and the assassination of Philip. But I incline to think that the marriage with Kleopatra may well have taken place two years or more before that event, and that there may have been a daughter born before the son. Certainly Justin distinguishes the two, stating that the daughter was killed by order of Olympias, and the son by that of Alexander (ix. 7; xi. 2).

Arrian (iii. 6, 5) seems to mean *Kleopatra* the wife of Philip, though he speaks of Eurydikê.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvii. 3.

<sup>2</sup> This Kleopatra — daughter of Philip, sister of Alexander the Great, and bearing the same name as Philip's last wife — was thus niece of the Epirotic Alexander, her husband. Alliances of that degree of kindred were then neither disreputable nor unfrequent.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvii. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Josephus, Antiq. xix. 1, 13; Suetonius, Caligula, c. 57. See Mr. Clinton's Appendix (4) on the Kings of Macedonia, Fast. Hellen. p. 230, note.

<sup>5</sup> Diodor. xvi. 92.

Amidst this festive multitude, however, there were not wanting discontented partisans of Olympias and Alexander, to both of whom the young queen with her new-born child threatened a formidable rivalry. There was also a malcontent yet more dangerous — Pausanias, one of the royal body-guards, a noble youth born in the district called Orestis in Upper Macedonia; who, from causes of offence peculiar to himself, nourished a deadly hatred against Philip. The provocation which he had received is one which we can neither conveniently transcribe, nor indeed accurately make out, amidst discrepancies of statement. It was Attalus, the uncle of the new queen Kleopatra, who had given the provocation, by inflicting upon Pausanias an outrage of the most brutal and revolting character. Even for so monstrous an act, no regular justice could be had in Macedonia, against a powerful man. Pausanias complained to Philip in person. According to one account, Philip put aside the complaint with evasions, and even treated it with ridicule; according to another account, he expressed his displeasure at the act, and tried to console Pausanias by pecuniary presents. But he granted neither redress nor satisfaction to the sentiment of an outraged man.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly Pausanias determined to take revenge for himself. Instead of revenging himself on Attalus — who indeed was out of his reach, being at the head of the Macedonian troops in Asia — his wrath fixed upon Philip himself, by whom the demand for redress had been refused. It appears that this turn of sentiment, diverting the appetite for revenge away from the real criminal, was not wholly spontaneous on the part of Pausanias, but was artfully instigated by various party conspirators who wished to destroy Philip. The enemies of Attalus and queen Kleopatra (who herself is said to have treated Pausanias with insult<sup>2</sup>) — being of course also partisans of Olympias and Alexander — were well disposed to make use of the maddened Pausanias as an instrument, and to direct his exasperation against the king. He had poured forth his complaints both to Olympias and to Alexander; the former is said to have worked him up vehemently against her

<sup>1</sup> Aristot. Polit. v. 8. 10. 'Ἡ Φιλίππου (ἐπιθεσίς) ὑπὸ Πανσανίου, διὰ τὸ εἶναι ὑβρισθῆναι αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ Ἀττάλου, etc. Justin, ix. 6; Diodor. xvi. 93.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch. Alex. c. 10.



late husband — and even the latter repeated to him a verse out of Euripides, wherein the fierce Medea, deserted by her husband Jason who had married the daughter of the Corinthian king Kreon, vows to include in her revenge the king himself, together with her husband and his new wife.<sup>1</sup> That the vindictive Olympias would positively spur on Pausanias to assassinate Philip, is highly probable. Respecting Alexander, though he also was accused, there is no sufficient evidence to warrant a similar assertion; but that some among his partisans — men eager to consult his feelings and to ensure his succession — lent their encouragements, appears tolerably well established. A Greek sophist named Hermokrates is also said to have contributed to the deed, though seemingly without intention, by his conversation; and the Persian king (an improbable report) by his gold.<sup>2</sup>

Unconscious of the plot, Philip was about to enter the theatre, already crowded with spectators. As he approached the door, clothed in a white robe, he felt so exalted with impressions of his own dignity, and so confident in the admiring sympathy of the surrounding multitude, that he advanced both unarmed and unprotected, directing his guards to hold back. At this moment Pausanias, standing near with a Gallic sword concealed under his garment, rushed upon him, thrust the weapon through his body, and killed him. Having accomplished his purpose, the assassin immediately ran off, and tried to reach the gates, where he had previously caused horses to be stationed. Being strong and active, he might have succeeded in effecting his escape — like most of the assassins of Jason of Pheræ<sup>3</sup> under circumstances very similar — had not his foot stumbled amidst some vine-stocks. The guards and friends of Philip were at first paralyzed with astonishment and consternation. At length however some hastened to assist the dying king; while others rushed in pursuit of Pausanias. Leonnatus and Perdikkas overtook him and slew him immediately.<sup>4</sup>

In what way, or to what extent, the accomplices of Pausanias

Plutarch, Alex. c. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, Exp. Alex. ii. 14, 10.

<sup>3</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4, 32.

<sup>4</sup> Diodor. xvi. 94; Justin, ix. 7; Plutarch. Alex. c. 10.

lent him aid, we are not permitted to know. It is possible that they may have posted themselves artfully so as to obstruct pursuit, and favor his chance of escape; which would appear extremely small, after a deed of such unmeasured audacity. Three only of the reputed accomplices are known to us by name — three brothers from the Lynkestian district of Upper Macedonia — Alexander, Heromenes, and Arrhibæus, sons of Æropus;<sup>1</sup> but it seems that there were others besides. The Lynkestian Alexander — whose father-in-law Antipater was one of the most conspicuous and confidential officers in the service of Philip — belonged to a good family in Macedonia, perhaps even descendants from the ancient family of the princes of Lynkestis.<sup>2</sup> It was he, who, immediately after Pausanias had assassinated Philip, hastened to salute the prince Alexander as king, helped him to put on his armor, and marched as one of his guards to take possession of the regal palace.<sup>3</sup>

This "prima vox"<sup>4</sup> was not simply an omen or presage to Alexander of empire to come, but essentially serviceable to him as a real determining cause or condition. The succession to the Macedonian throne was often disturbed by feud or bloodshed among the members of the regal family; and under the latter circumstances of Philip's reign, such disturbance was peculiarly probable. He had been on bad terms with Alexander, and on still worse terms with Olympias. While banishing persons attached to Alexander, he had lent his ear to Attalus with the partisans of the new queen Kleopatra. Had these latter got the first start after the assassination, they would have organized an opposition to Alexander in favor of the infant prince; which

Arrian, Exp. Alex. i. 25, 1.

<sup>2</sup> Justin, xii. 14; Quintus Curtius, vii. 1, 5, with the note of Müntzel.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, i. 25, 2; Justin, xi. 2. "Soli Alexandro Lyncistarum fratri pepercit, servans in eo auspiciū dignitatis suæ; nam regem eum primus salutaverat."

<sup>4</sup> Tacitus, Hist. ii. 80. "Dum quaeritur tempus locusque, quodque in tali difficillimum est, *prima vox*; dum animo spes, timor, ratio, casus observantur; egressum cubiculo Vespasianum, pauci milites solito adstantes ordine, Imperatorem salutavere. Tum cæteri accurrere, *Cæsarem*, et Augustum, et omnia principatus vocabula cumulare: mens a metu ad fortiam transierat."



opposition might have had some chances of success, since they had been in favor with the deceased king, and were therefore in possession of many important posts. But the deed of Pausanias took them unprepared, and for the moment paralyzed them; while, before they could recover or take concert, one of the accomplices of the assassin ran to put Alexander in motion without delay. A decisive initiatory movement from him and his friends, at this critical juncture, determined waverers and forestalled opposition. We need not wonder therefore that Alexander, when king, testified extraordinary gratitude and esteem for his Lynkestian namesake; not simply exempting him from the punishment of death inflicted on the other accomplices, but also promoting him to great honors and important military commands. Neither Alexander and Olympias on the one side, nor Attalus and Kleopatra on the other, were personally safe, except by acquiring the succession. It was one of the earliest proceedings of Alexander to send over a special officer to Asia, for the purpose of bringing home Attalus prisoner, or of putting him to death; the last of which was done, seemingly through the coöperation of Parmenio (who was in joint command with Attalus) and his son Philotas.<sup>1</sup> The unfortunate Kleopatra and her child were both put to death shortly afterwards.<sup>2</sup> Other persons also were slain, of whom I shall speak farther in describing the reign of Alexander.

We could have wished to learn from some person actually present, the immediate effect produced upon the great miscellaneous crowd in the theatre, when the sudden murder of Philip first became known. Among the Greeks present, there were doubt-

<sup>1</sup> Quintus Curtius, vii. 1, 3; Diodorus, xvii. 2, 5. Compare Justin, xi. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Justin, ix. 7; xi. 2. Pausanias, viii. 7, 5; Plutarch, Alex. c. 10.

According to Pausanias, Olympias caused Kleopatra and her infant boy to perish by a horrible death; being roasted or baked on a brazen vessel surrounded by fire. According to Justin, Olympias first slew the daughter of Kleopatra on her mother's bosom, and then caused Kleopatra herself to be hanged; while Alexander put to death Caranus, the infant son of Kleopatra. Plutarch says nothing about this; but states that the cruel treatment of Kleopatra was inflicted by order of Olympias during the absence of Alexander, and that he was much displeased at it. The main fact, that Kleopatra and her infant child were despatched by violence, seems not open to reasonable doubt; though we cannot verify the details.

less many who welcomed it with silent satisfaction, as seeming to reopen for them the door of freedom. One person alone dared to manifest satisfaction; and that one was Olympias.<sup>1</sup>

Thus perished the destroyer of freedom and independence in the Hellenic world, at the age of forty-six or forty-seven, after a reign of twenty-three years.<sup>2</sup> Our information about him is signally defective. Neither his means, nor his plans, nor the difficulties which he overcame, nor his interior government, are known to us with exactness or upon contemporary historical authority. But the great results of his reign, and the main lines of his character, stand out incontestably. At his accession, the Macedonian kingdom was a narrow territory round Pella, excluded partially, by independent and powerful Grecian cities, even from the neighboring sea-coast. At his death, Macedonian ascendancy was established from the coasts of the Propontis to those of the Ionian Sea, and the Ambrakian, Messenian, and Saronic Gulfs. Within these boundaries, all the cities recognized the supremacy of Philip; except only Sparta, and mountaineers like the Ætolians and others, defended by a rugged home. Good fortune had waited on Philip's steps, with a few rare interruptions;<sup>3</sup> but it was good fortune crowning the efforts of a rare talent, political and military. Indeed the restless ambition, the indefatigable personal activity and endurance, and the adventurous courage, of Philip, were such as, in a king, suffice almost of themselves to guarantee success, even with abilities much inferior to his. That among the causes of Philip's conquests, one was corruption, employed abundantly to foment discord and purchase partisans among neighbors and enemies — that with winning and agreeable manners, he combined recklessness in false promises, deceit and extortion even towards allies, and unscrupulous perjury when it suited his pur-

<sup>1</sup> After the solemn funeral of Philip, Olympias took down and burned the body of Pausanias (which had been crucified), providing for him a sepulchral monument and an annual ceremony of commemoration. Justin, ix. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Justin (ix. 3) calls Philip forty-seven years of age; Pausanias (viii. 7, 4) speaks of him as forty-six. See Mr. Clinton's Fast. Hellen. Appen. 4 p. 227.

<sup>3</sup> Theopompus, Frag. 265. ap. Athenæ. iii. p. 77. καὶ εὐτυχῆσαι πάντα τοὺς Ἕλληνας. Compare Demosth. Olynth. ii. p. 24.



pose — this we find affirmed, and there is no reason for disbelieving it.<sup>1</sup> Such dissolving forces smoothed the way for an efficient and admirable army, organized, and usually commanded, by himself. Its organization adopted and enlarged the best processes of scientific warfare employed by Epaminondas and Iphikrates.<sup>2</sup> Begun as well as completed by Philip, and bequeathed as an engine ready-made for the conquests of Alexander, it constitutes an epoch in military history. But the more we extol the genius of Philip as a conqueror, formed for successful encroachment and aggrandizement at the expense of all his neighbors — the less can we find room for that mildness and moderation which some authors discover in his character. If, on some occasions of his life, such attributes may fairly be recognized, we have to set against them the destruction of the thirty-two Greek cities in Chalkidike and the wholesale transportation of reluctant and miserable families from one inhabitancy to another.

Besides his skill as a general and a politician, Philip was no mean proficient in the Grecian accomplishments of rhetoric and letters. The testimony of Æschines as to his effective powers of speaking, though requiring some allowance, is not to be rejected. Isokrates addresses him as a friend of letters and philosophy; a reputation which his choice of Aristotle as instructor of his son Alexander, tends to bear out. Yet in Philip, as in the two Dionysii of Syracuse and other despots, these tastes were not found inconsistent either with the crimes of ambition, or the licenses of inordinate appetite. The contemporary historian Theopompus, a

<sup>1</sup> Theopomp. Frag. 249; Theopompus ap. Polybium, viii. 11. ἀδικωτάτων δὲ καὶ κακοπραγμονέστατον περὶ τὰς τῶν φίλων καὶ συμμάχων κατασκευὰς, πλείστας δὲ πόλεις ἐξηνδραποδισμένον καὶ πεπραξικοπηκότα μετὰ δόλου καὶ βίας, etc.

Justin, ix. 8. Pausanias, vii. 7, 3; vii. 10, 4; viii. 7, 4. Diodor. xvi. 54.

The language of Pausanias about Philip, after doing justice to his great conquests and exploits, is very strong — ὅς γε καὶ ὄρκους θεῶν κατεπάτησεν ἄελ, καὶ σπονδὰς ἐπὶ παντὶ ἐψέυσσας, πίστιν τε ἡτίμασε μάλιστα ἀνθρώπων, etc. By such conduct, according to Pausanias, Philip brought the divine wrath both upon himself and upon his race, which became extinct with the next generation.

<sup>2</sup> A striking passage occurs, too long to cite, in the third Philippic of Demosthenes (p. 123-124) attesting the marvellous stride made by Philip in the art and means of effective warfare.

warm admirer of Philip's genius, stigmatizes not only the perfidy, of his public dealings, but also the drunkenness, gambling, and excesses of all kinds in which he indulged — encouraging the like in those around him. His Macedonian and Grecian body-guard, eight hundred in number, was a troop in which no decent man could live; distinguished indeed for military bravery and aptitude, but sated with plunder, and stained with such shameless treachery, sanguinary rapacity, and unbridled lust, as befitted only Centaurs and Læstrygons.<sup>1</sup> The number of Philip's mistresses and wives was almost on an Oriental scale;<sup>2</sup> and the dissensions thus introduced into his court through his offspring by different mothers, were fraught with mischievous consequences.

In appreciating the genius of Philip, we have to appreciate also the parties to whom he stood opposed. His good fortune was nowhere more conspicuous than in the fact, that he fell upon those days of disunion and backwardness in Greece (indicated in the last sentence of Xenophon's Hellenica) when there was neither leading city prepared to keep watch, nor leading general to take command, nor citizen-soldiers willing and ready to endure the hardships of steady service. Philip combated no opponents like Epaminondas, or Agesilaus, or Iphikrates. How different might

<sup>1</sup> Theopomp. Frag. 249. Ἀπλῶς δ' εἰπεῖν . . . ἡγοῦμαι τοιαῦτα θήρια γεγονέναι, καὶ τοιοῦτον τρόπον τοὺς φίλους καὶ τοὺς ἐταίρους Φιλίππου προσαγορεύοντας, οἷους οὔτε τοὺς Κενταύρους τοὺς τὸ Πήλιον κατασχόντας, οὔτε τοὺς Λαιστρυγόνες τοὺς Λεοντίνον πέδιον οἰκήσαντας, οὔτ' ἄλλους οὐδ' ὁποίους.

Compare Athenæ. iv. p. 166, 167; vi. p. 260, 261. Demosthen. Olynth. ii. p. 23.

Polybius (viii. 11) censures Theopompus for self-contradiction, in ascribing to Philip both unprincipled means and intemperate habits, and yet extolling his ability and energy as a king. But I see no contradiction between the two. The love of enjoyment was not suffered to stand in the way of Philip's military and political schemes, either in himself or his officers. The master-passion overpowered all appetites; but when that passion did not require effort, intemperance was the habitual relaxation. Polybius neither produces any sufficient facts, nor cites any contemporary authority, to refute Theopompus.

It is to be observed that the statements of Theopompus, respecting both the public and private conduct of Philip, are as disparaging as anything in Demosthenes.

<sup>2</sup> Satyrus ap. Athenæ. xiii. p. 557. Ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος ἄει κατὰ πόλεμους ἐγάμει, etc.



have been his career, had Epaminondas survived the victory of Mantinea, gained only two years before Philip's accession! To suppose Philip, there needed a man like himself, competent not only to advise and project, but to command in person, to stimulate the zeal of citizen-soldiers, and to set the example of braving danger and fatigue. Unfortunately for Greece, no such leader stood forward. In counsel and speech Demosthenes sufficed for the emergency. Twice before the battle of Chæroneia — at Byzantium and at Thebes — did he signally frustrate Philip's combinations. But he was not formed to take the lead in action, nor was there any one near him to supply the defect. In the field, Philip encountered only that "public inefficiency," at Athens and elsewhere in Greece, of which even Æschines complains;<sup>1</sup> and to this decay of Grecian energy, not less than to his own distinguished attributes, the unparalleled success of his reign was owing. We shall find during the reign of his son Alexander (to be described in our next volume) the like genius and vigor exhibited on a still larger scale, and achieving still more wonderful results; while the once stirring politics of Greece, after one feeble effort, sink yet lower, into the nullity of a subject-province.

<sup>1</sup> Æschines cont. Timarchum, p. 26. *εἰτα τί θαυμάζομεν τὴν κοινὴν ἀπραξίαν, τοιούτων ῥητόρων ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ δήμου γνώμας ἐπιγραφόμενων;*

Æschines would ascribe this public inefficiency — which many admitted and deplored, though few except Demosthenes persevered in contending against it — to the fact that men of scandalous private lives (like Timarchus) were permitted, against the law, to move decrees in the public assembly. Compare Æschines, *Fals. Leg.* p. 37.



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